

Translator's Preface

The volume which is here presented to English readers is the first of three which will contain the Solomonic writings. They form the last section of the "Keil and Delitzsch" series of Commentaries on the Books of the Old Testament Scriptures. The remaining volume on the Proverbs, as well as that on Ecclesiastes and the Canticles, which has also been prepared by Delitzsch, and is now in course of publication in Germany, will be issued with as little delay as possible.

In this translation I have endeavoured accurately to reproduce the original, so as to bring the student as much as possible into direct contact with the learned commentators himself. Any explanatory notes or words I have thought it right to add are enclosed in square brackets [], so as to be easily distinguishable. The Arabic and Syriac words occurring in the original have been, with very few exceptions, printed in English characters. In their vocalization I have followed the system of Forbes in his *Arabic Grammar*, so that the student will be readily able to restore the original. When nothing depends on the inflection of these words, the consonants only are printed.

It might appear superfluous in me to speak in commendation of the great work which is now drawing to a close; but a translator, since he has necessarily been in close fellowship with the author, may be expected to be in a position to offer an opinion on the character of the work on which he has been engaged; and I am sure that all my *collaborateurs* will concur with me in speaking of the volumes which form this commentary as monuments of deep and careful research into the meaning of the sacred Scriptures. Whether or not we can in all cases accept the conclusions reached by the respected authors, no one can fail to see how elaborate and minute the investigation has been. These volumes are the priest fruits of life-long study of the Old Testament. Their authors are exegetes who have won for themselves an honoured place in the foremost rank for their profound acquaintance with the Hebrew and its cognate languages. With a scholarship of rare compass and accuracy, they combine a reverent sympathy with the sacred Scriptures, and a believing appreciation of its saving truths.

The satisfaction I have had in the study of this work, and in spending so many of my leisure hours in rendering it into English, is greatly heightened by the reflection, that I have been enabled in this way to contribute to the number of exegetical works within reach of the English student. the exegetical study of God's word, which appears to be increasingly drawing the attention of theologians, and which has been so greatly stimulated by the Translations issued by the publishers of this work, cannot fail to have the most beneficial

results. The minister of the gospel will find such study his best and truest preparation for his weighty duties as an expounder of Scripture, if prosecuted in the spirit of a devout recognition of the truth, that “bene orasse est bene studuisse.” Thus is he led step by step into a thorough and full understanding of the words and varying forms of expression used by those “holy men of old, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.”

Author's Preface

The preparation of this Commentary on the *Mishle*, which was begun in 1869 (not without previous preparation), and twice interrupted by providential events, extended into the winter of 1872. There is now wanting to the completion of the Commentary on the Old Testament, undertaken by Dr. Keil and myself, only the Commentary on the Canticles and Ecclesiastes, which will form the concluding volume.

In the preparation of this Commentary on the Proverbs, I am indebted in varied ways to my friends Fleischer and Wetzstein. In the year 1836, Fleischer entered on his duties as Professor at Leipzig by delivering a course of lectures on the Book of the Proverbs of Solomon. I was one of his hearers, and am now so fortunate as to be able from his own MS (begun 13th May, completed 9th September 1836) to introduce this beloved teacher into the number of interpreters of the Book of Proverbs. The assistance contributed by Wetzstein begins at chapter 30, and consists in remarks on Mühlau's work on the Proverbs of Agur and Lemuel (1869), which my Dorpat friend placed at my disposal.

The exegetical apparatus has in the course of this work extended far beyond the list given at pp. 35, 36. I obtained the Commentary of the Caraites Ahron b. Joseph (1294), which was printed at Koslow (Eupatoria) in 1835, and had lent to me from the library of Dr. Hermann Lotze the Commentary by the Roman poet Immanuel [born at Rome about 1265], who was intimately associated with Dante, printed at Naples in 1487, and equal in value to a MS. Among the interpreters comprehended in the *Biblia Rabbinica*, I made use also the Commentary of the Spanish Menachem b. Salomo Meiri (1447), which first appeared in the Amsterdam *Bibelwerk*, and came under my notice in a more handy edition (Fürth, 1844) from the library of my dear friend and companion in study, Baer. To him I owe, among many other things, the comparison of several MSS, particularly of one brought from Arabia by Jacob Sappir, which has come into his possession.

In making use of the *Graecus Venetus*, I was not confined to Villoison's edition (1784). The only existing MS (found in Venice) of this translation one of my young friends, von Gebhardt, has compared with the greatest care with

Villoison's printed edition, in which he has found many false readings and many omissions. We have to expect from him a critical, complete edition of this singular translation, which, both as regards the knowledge its author displays of the Hebrew language and his skill in the Greek language, remains as yet an unsolved mystery.

Bacon, in his work *De Augmentis Scientiarum* (viii. 2), rightly speaks ^{fla} of Solomon's proverbs as an unparalleled collection. May it be granted me, by the help of God, to promote in some degree the understanding of this incomparable Book, as to its history, its language, and its practical lessons!

Abbreviations

[The usual abbreviations of words and phrases are adopted throughout this work, and will readily be understood by the reader. The mark of abbreviation in Hebrew words is a stroke like an acute accent after a letter, as e.g., פִּרְ for פִּרְמוֹת, Pro. 29: 4; and in Hebrew sentences, וְגוֹ for וְגוֹמַר et complens = etc., as e.g., at Pro. 30: 4.]

THE BOOK OF PROVERBS

Introduction

The Book of Proverbs bears the external title **סֵפֶר מִשְׁלֵי**, which it derives from the words with which it commences. It is one of the three books which are distinguished from the other twenty-one by a peculiar system of accentuation, the best exposition of which that has yet been given is that by S. Baer, ^{f1} as set forth in my larger *Psalmen-commentar*. ^{f2}

The memorial word for these three books, viz., Job, Mishle (Proverbs), and Tehillim (Psalms), is **אמת**, formed from the first letter of the first word of each book, or, following the Talmudic and Masoretic arrangement of the books, **תאם**.

Having in view the superscription **משלי שלמה**, with which the book commences, the ancients regarded it as wholly the composition of Solomon. The circumstance that it contains only 800 verses, while according to 1Ki. 5:12 (1Ki. 4:32) Solomon spake 3000 proverbs, R. Samuel bar-Nachmani explains by remarking that each separate verse may be divided into two or three allegories or apothegms (e.g., Pro. 25:12), not to mention other more arbitrary modes of reconciling the discrepancy. ^{f3}

The opinion also of R. Jonathan, that Solomon first composed the Canticles, then the Proverbs, and last of all Ecclesiastes, inasmuch as the first corresponds ^{f4} with the spring-time of youth, the second with the wisdom of manhood, and the third with the disappointment of old age, is founded on the supposition of the unity of the book and of its Solomonic authorship.

At the present day also there are some, such as Stier, who regard the Book of Proverbs from first to last as the work of Solomon, just as Klauss (1832) and Randegger (1841) have ventured to affirm that all the Psalms without exception were composed by David. But since historical criticism has been applied to Biblical subjects, that blind submission to mistaken tradition appears as scarcely worthy of being mentioned. The Book of Proverbs presents itself as composed of various parts, different from each other in character and in the period to which they belong. Under the hands of the critical analysis it resolves itself into a mixed market of the most manifold intellectual productions of proverbial poetry, belonging to at least three different epochs.

1. The external plan of the Book of Proverbs, and its own testimony as to its origin. — The internal superscription of the book, which recommends

it, after the manner of later Oriental books, on account of its importance and the general utility of its contents, extends from v. 1 to v. 6. Among the moderns this has been acknowledged by Löwenstein and Maurer; for v. 7, which Ewald, Bertheau, and Keil have added to it, forms a new commencement to the beginning of the book itself. The book is described as “The Proverbs of Solomon,” and then there is annexed the statement of its object. That object, as summarily set forth in v. 2, is practical, and that in a twofold way: partly moral, and partly intellectual. The former is described in vv. 3-5. It present moral edification, moral sentiments for acceptance, not merely to help the unwise to attain to wisdom, but also to assist the wise. The latter object is set forth in v. 6. It seeks by its contents to strengthen and discipline the mind to the understanding of thoughtful discourses generally. In other words, it seeks to gain the moral ends which proverbial poetry aims at, and at the same time to make familiar with it, so that the reader, in these proverbs of Solomon, or by means of them as of a key, learns to understand such like apothegms in general. Thus interpreted, the title of the book does not say that the book contains proverbs of other wise men besides those of Solomon; if it did so, it would contradict itself. It is possible that the book contains proverbs other than those of Solomon, possible that the author of the title of the book added such to it himself, but the title presents to view only the Proverbs of Solomon. If Pro. 1: 7 begins the book, then after reading the title we cannot think otherwise than that here begin the Solomonic proverbs. If we read farther, the contents and the form of the discourses which follow do not contradict this opinion; for both are worthy of Solomon. So much the more astonished are we, therefore, when at 10: 1 we meet with a new superscription. **משלי שלמה**, from which point on to Pro. 22:16 there is a long succession of proverbs of quite a different tone and form — short maxims, Mashals proper — while in the preceding section of the book we find fewer proverbs than monitory discourses. What now must be our opinion when we look back from this second superscription to the part Pro. 1: 7-9, which immediately follows the title of the book? Are Pro. 1: 7-9, in the sense of the book, not the “Proverbs of Solomon”? From the title of the book, which declares them to be so, we must judge that they are. Or are they “Proverbs of Solomon”? In this case the new superscription (Pro. 10: 1), “The Proverbs of Solomon,” appears altogether incomprehensible. And yet only one of these two things is possible: on the one side, therefore, there must be a false appearance of contradiction, which on a closer investigation disappears. But on which side is it? If it is supposed that the tenor of the title, Pro. 1: 1-6, does not accord with that of the section Pro. 10: 1-22: 6, but that it accords well with that of Pro. 1: 7-9 (with the breadth of expression in Pro. 1: 7-9, it has also several favourite words not elsewhere occurring in the Book of Proverbs; among these, **עֲרָמָה**, subtilty, and **מִזְמָה**, discretion, Pro. 1: 4), then Ewald’s view is probable, that 1-9 is an

original whole written at once, and that the author had no other intention than to give it as an introduction to the larger Solomonic Book of Proverbs beginning at Pro. 10: 1. But it is also possible that the author of the title has adopted the style of the section Pro. 1: 7-9. Bertheau, who has propounded this view, and at the same time has rejected, in opposition to Ewald, the idea of the unity of the section, adopts this conclusion, that in Pro. 1: 8-9 there lies before us a collection of the admonitions of different authors of proverbial poetry, partly original introductions to larger collections of proverbs, which the author of the title gathers together in order that he may give a comprehensive introduction to the larger collection contained in Pro. 10: 1-22:16. But such an origin of the section as Bertheau thus imagines is by no means natural; it is more probable that the author, whose object is, according to the title of the book, to give the proverbs of Solomon, introduces these by a long introduction of his own, than that, instead of beginning with Solomon's proverbs, he first presents long extracts of a different kind from collections of proverbs. If the author, as Bertheau thinks, expresses indeed, in the words of the title, the intention of presenting, along with the "Proverbs of Solomon," also the "words of the wise," then he could not have set about his work more incorrectly and self-contradictorily than if he had begun the whole, which bears the superscription "Proverbs of Solomon" (which must be regarded as presenting the proverbs of Solomon as a key to the words of the wise generally), with the "words of the wise." But besides the opinion of Ewald, which in itself, apart from internal grounds, is more natural and probable than that of Bertheau, there is yet the possibility of another. Keil, following H. A. Hahn, is of opinion, that in the sense of the author of the title, the section 1-9 is Solomonic as well as 10-22, but that he has repeated the superscription "Proverbs of Solomon" before the latter section, because from that point onward proverbs follow which bear in a special measure the characters of the *Mashal* (Hävernick's *Einkl.* iii. 428). The same phenomenon appears in the book of Isaiah, where, after the general title, there follows an introductory address, and then in 2: 1 the general title is repeated in a shorter form. That this analogy, however, is here inapplicable, the further discussion of the subject will show.

The introductory section Pro. 1: 7-9, and the larger section Proverbs 10-22:16, which contains uniform brief Solomonic apothegms, are followed by a third section, Pro. 22:17-24:22. Hitzig, indeed, reckons Proverbs 10-24:22 as the second section, but with Pro. 22:17 there commences an altogether different style, and a much freer manner in the form of the proverb; and the introduction to this new collection of proverbs, which reminds us of the general title, places it beyond a doubt that the collector does not at all intend to set forth these proverbs as Solomonic. It may indeed be possible that, as Keil (iii. 410) maintains, the collector, inasmuch as he begins with the words, "Incline thine ear and hear words of the wise," names his own proverbs generally as "words

of the wise,” especially since he adds, “and apply thine heart to my knowledge;” but this supposition is contradicted by the superscription of a fourth section, Pro. 24:23 ff., which follows. This short section, an appendix to the third, bears the superscription, “These things also are **לְחֵכְמִים**.” If Keil thinks here also to set aside the idea that the following proverbs, in the sense of this superscription, have as their authors “the wise,” he does unnecessary violence to himself. The **ל** is here that of authorship and if the following proverbs are composed by the **חֵכְמִים**, “the wise,” then they are not the production of the one **חָכָם**, “wise man,” Solomon, but they are “the words of the wise” in contradistinction to “the Proverbs of Solomon.”

The Proverbs of Solomon begin again at Pro. 25: 1; and this second large section (corresponding to the first, Pro. 10: 1-22:16) extends to 29. This fifth portion of the book has a superscription, which, like that of the preceding appendix, commences thus: “Also (**וְגַם**) these are proverbs of Solomon which the men of Hezekiah king of Judah collected.” The meaning of the word **הֶעֱתִיקוּ** is not doubtful. It signifies, like the Arameo-Arabic **חָסַף**, to remove from their place, and denote that the men of Hezekiah removed from the place where they found them the following proverbs, and placed them together in a separate collection. The words have thus been understood by the Greek translator. From the supplementary words **αἱ ἀδιάκριτοι** (such as exclude all **διάκρισις**) it is seen that the translator had a feeling of the important literary historical significance of that superscription, which reminds us of the labours of the poetical grammarians appointed by Pisistratus to edit older works, such as those of Hesiod. The Jewish interpreters, simply following the Talmud, suppose that the “also” (**וְגַם**) belongs to the whole superscription, inclusive of the relative sentence, and that it thus bears witness to the editing of the foregoing proverbs also by Hezekiah and his companions; ^{f5} which is altogether improbable, for then, if such were the meaning of the words, “which the men of Hezekiah,” etc., they ought to have stood after Pro. 1: 1. The superscription Pro. 25: 1 thus much rather distinguishes the following collection from that going before, as having been made under Hezekiah. As two appendices followed the “Proverbs of Solomon,” Pro. 10: 1-22:16, so also two appendices the Hezekiah-gleanings of Solomonian proverbs. The former two appendices, however, originate in general from the “wise,” the latter more definitely name the authors: the first, 30, is by “Agur the son of Jakeh;” the second, Pro. 31: 1-9, by a “King Lemuel.” In so far the superscriptions are clear. The name of the authors, elsewhere unknown, point to a foreign country; and to this corresponds the peculiar complexion of these two series of proverbs. As a third appendix to the Hezekiah-collection, Pro. 31:10 ff.

follows, a complete alphabetical proverbial poem which describes the praiseworthy qualities of a virtuous woman.

We are thus led to the conclusion that the Book of Proverbs divides itself into the following parts: —

- (1) The title of the book, Pro. 1: 1-6, by which the question is raised, how far the book extends to which it originally belongs;
- (2) the hortatory discourses, Pro. 1: 7-9, in which it is a question whether the Solomonic proverbs must be regarded as beginning with these, or whether they are only the introduction thereto, composed by a different author, perhaps the author of the title of the book;
- (3) the first great collection of Solomonic proverbs, Proverbs 10-22:16;
- (4) the first appendix to this first collection, “The words of the wise,” Pro. 22:17-24:22;
- (5) the second appendix, supplement of the words of some wise men, Pro. 24:23 ff.;
- (6) the second great collection of Solomonic proverbs, which the “men of Hezekiah” collected, Proverbs 25-29;
- (7) the first appendix to this second collection, the words of Agur the son of Makeh, 30;
- (8) the second appendix, the words of King Lemuel, Pro. 31: 1-9;
- (9) third appendix, the acrostic ode, Pro. 31:10 ff.

These nine parts are comprehended under three groups: the introductory hortatory discourses with the general title at their head, and the two great collections of Solomonic proverbs with their two appendices. In prosecuting our further investigations, we shall consider the several parts of the book first from the point of view of the manifold forms of their proverbs, then of their style, and thirdly of their type of doctrine. From each of these three subjects of investigation we may expect elucidations regarding the origin of these proverbs and of their collections.

2. The several parts of the Book of Proverbs with respect to the manifold forms of the proverbs. — If the Book of Proverbs were a collection of popular sayings, we should find in it a multitude of proverbs of one line each, as e.g., “Wickedness proceedeth from the wicked” (1Sa. 24:13); but we seek for such in vain. At the first glance, Pro. 24:23 *b* appears to be a proverb of one line; but the line “To have respect of persons in judgment is not good,”

is only the introductory line of a proverb which consists of several lines, v. 24 f. Ewald is right in regarding as inadmissible a comparison of the collections of Arabic proverbs by Abu-Obeida, Meidani, and others, who gathered together and expounded the current popular proverbs, with the Book of Proverbs. Ali's Hundred Proverbs are, however, more worthy of being compared with it. Like these, Solomon's proverbs are, as a whole, the production of his own spirit, and only mediately of the popular spirit. To make the largeness of the number of these proverbs a matter of doubt were inconsiderate. Eichhorn maintained that even a godlike genius scarcely attains to so great a number of pointed proverbs and ingenious thoughts. But if we distribute Solomon's proverbs over his forty years' reign, then we have scarcely twenty for each year; and one must agree with the conclusion, that the composition of so many proverbs even of the highest ingenuity is no impossible problem for a "godlike genius." When, accordingly, it is related that Solomon wrote 3000 proverbs, Ewald, in his *History of Israel*, does not find the number too great, and Bertheau does not regard it as impossible that the collection of the "Proverbs of Solomon" has the one man Solomon as their author. The number of the proverbs thus cannot determine us to regard them as having for the most part originated among the people, and the form in which they appear leads to an opposite conclusion. It is, indeed, probable that popular proverbs are partly wrought into these proverbs,^{f6} and many of their forms of expression are moulded after the popular proverbs; but as they thus lie before us, they are, as a whole, the production of the technical *Mashal* poetry.

The simplest form is, according to the fundamental peculiarity of the Hebrew verse, the *distich*. The relation of the two lines to each other is very manifold. The second line may repeat the thought of the first, only in a somewhat altered form, in order to express this thought as clearly and exhaustively as possible. We call such proverbs *synonymous* distichs; as e.g., Pro. 11:25:

*A soul of blessing is made fat,
And he that watereth others is himself watered.*

Or the second line contains the other side of the contrast to the statement of the first; the truth spoken in the first is explained in the second by means of the presentation of its contrary. We call such proverbs *antithetic* distichs; as e.g., Pro. 10: 1:

*A wise son maketh his father glad,
And a foolish son is his mother's grief.*

Similar forms, Pro. 10:16; 12: 5. Elsewhere, as Pro. 18:14; 20:24, the antithesis clothes itself in the form of a question. sometimes it is two different truths that are expressed in the two lines; and the authorization of their union lies only in

a certain relationship, and the ground of this union in the circumstance that two lines are the minimum of the technical proverb — *synthetic* distichs; e.g., Pro. 10:18:

*A cloak of hatred are lying lips,
And he that spreadeth slander is a fool.*

Not at all infrequently one line does not suffice to bring out the thought intended, the begun expression of which is only completed in the second. These we call *integral* (*eingedankige*) distichs; as e.g., Pro. 11:31 (cf. 1Pe. 4:18):

*The righteous shall be recompensed on the earth —
How much more the ungodly and the sinner!*

To these distichs also belong all those in which the thought stated in the first receives in the second, by a sentence presenting a reason, or proof, or purpose, or consequence, a definition completing or perfecting it; e.g., Pro. 13:14; 16:10; 19:20; 22:28.¹⁷

But there is also a fifth form, which corresponds most to the original character of the Mashal: the proverb explaining its ethical object by a resemblance from the region of the natural and every-day life, the *παραβολή* proper. The form of this *parabolic* proverb is very manifold, according as the poet himself expressly compares the two subjects, or only places them near each other in order that the hearer or reader may complete the comparison. The proverb is least poetic when the likeness between the two subjects is expressed by a verb; as Pro. 27:15 (to which, however, v. 16 belongs):

*A continual dropping in a rainy day
And a contentious woman are alike.*

The usual form of expression, neither unpoetic nor properly poetic, is the introduction of the comparison by אֲשֶׁר [as], and of the similitude in the second clause by כֵּן [so]; as Pro. 10:26:

*As vinegar to the teeth, and as smoke to the eyes,
So is the sluggard to them who give him a commission.*

This complete verbal statement of the relation of likeness may also be abbreviated by the omission of the כֵּן; as Pro. 25:13; 26:11:

*As a dog returning to his vomit —
A fool returning to his folly.*

We call the parabolic proverbs of these three forms *comparisons*. The last, the abbreviated form of the comparative proverb, which we will call, in contradistinction to the comparative, the *emblematic*, in which the contrast and its emblem are loosely placed together without any nearer expression of the similitude; as e.g., Pro. 26:20; 27:17, 18, 20. This takes place either by means of the couplative *Vav*, ׀, as Pro. 25:25 —

*Cold water to a thirsty soul,
And good news from a far country.* ^{f8}

Or without the *Vav*; in which case the second line is as the subscription under the figure or double figure painted in the first; e.g., Pro. 25:11 f., 11:22:

*A gold ring in a swine's snout —
A fair woman without understanding.*

These ground-forms of two lines, can, however, expand into forms of several lines. Since the distich is the peculiar and most appropriate form of the technical proverb, so, when two lines are not sufficient for expressing the thought intended, the multiplication to four, six, or eight lines is most natural. In the *tetrastich* the relation of the last two to the first two is as manifold as is the relation of the second line to the first in the distich. There is, however, no suitable example of four-lined stanzas in antithetic relation. But we meet with *synonymous* tetrastichs, e.g., Pro. 23:15 f., 24: 3 f., 28 f.; *synthetic*, Pro. 30: 5 f.; *integral*, Pro. 30:17 f., especially of the form in which the last two lines constitute a proof passage beginning with ׀, Pro. 22:22 f., or ׀, Pro. 22:24 f., or without exponents, Pro. 22:26 f.; *comparative* without expressing the comparison, Pro. 25:16 f. (cf. on the other hand, Pro. 26:18 f., where the number of lines is questionable), and also the *emblematical*, Pro. 25: 4 f.:

*Take away the dross from the silver,
And there shall come forth a vessel for the goldsmith;
Take away the wicked from before the king,
And this throne shall be established in righteousness.*

Proportionally the most frequently occurring are tetrastichs, the second half of which forms a proof clause commencing with ׀ or ׀. Among the less frequent are the *six-lined*, presenting (Pro. 23: 1-3; 24:11 f.) one and the same thought in manifold aspects, with proofs interspersed. Among all the rest which are found in the collection, Pro. 23:12-14, 19-21, 26-28; 30:15 f., 30:29-31, the first two lines form a prologue introductory to the substance of the proverb; as e.g., Pro. 23:12-14:

*O let instruction enter into thine heart,
And apply thine ears to the words of knowledge.
Withhold not correction from the child;
For if thou beatest him with the rod — he dies not.
Thou shalt beat him with the rod,
And deliver his soul from hell.*

Similarly formed, yet more expanded, is the *eight-lined* stanza, Pro. 23:22-28:

*Hearken unto thy father that begat thee,
And despise not thy mother when she is old.
Buy the truth and sell it not:
Wisdom, and virtue, and understanding.
The father of a righteous man greatly rejoices,
And he that begetteth a wise child hath joy of him.
Thy father and thy mother shall be glad,
And she that bare thee shall rejoice.*

The Mashal proverb here inclines to the Mashal ode; for this octastich may be regarded as a short Mashal song, — like the alphabetical Mashal psalm 37, which consists of almost pure tetrastichs.

We have now seen how the distich form multiplies itself into forms consisting of four, six, and eight lines; but it also unfolds itself, as if in one-sided multiplication, into forms of three, five, and seven lines. *Tristichs* arise when the thought of the first line is repeated (Pro. 27:22) in the second according to the synonymous scheme, or when the thought of the second line is expressed by contrast in the third (Pro. 22:29; 28:10) according to the antithetic scheme, or when to the thought expressed in one or two lines (Pro. 25: 8; 27:10) there is added its proof. The parabolic scheme is here represented when the object described is unfolded in two lines, as in the comparison Pro. 25:13, or when its nature is portrayed by two figures in two lines, as in the emblematic proverb Pro. 25:20:

*To take off clothing in cold weather,
Vinegar upon nitre,
And he that singeth songs to a heavy heart.*

In the few instances of *pentastichs* which are found, the last three lines usually unfold the reason of the thought of the first two: Pro. 23: 4 f., 25: 6 f., 30:32 f.; to this Pro. 24:13 forms an exception, where the before the last three lines introduces the expansion of the figure in the first two. As an instance we quote Pro. 25: 6 f.:

*Seek not to display thyself in the presence of the king,
And stand not in the place of the great.
For better that it be said unto thee, "Come up hither,"
Than that they humble thee in the presence of the prince,
While thine eyes have raised themselves.*

Of *heptastichs* I know of only one example in the collection, viz., Pro. 23: 6-8:

*Eat not the bread of the jealous,
And lust not after his dainties;
For he is like one who calculates with himself: —
"Eat and drink," saith he to thee,
And his heart is not with thee.
Thy morsel which thou hast eaten must thou vomit up,
And thou hast wasted thy pleasant words.*

From this *heptastich*, which one will scarcely take for a brief *Mashal* ode according to the compound strophe-scheme, we see that the proverb of two lines can expand itself to the dimensions of seven and eight lines. Beyond these limits the whole proverb ceases to be *משל* in the proper sense; and after the manner of Psa. 25, 34, and especially 37, it becomes a *Mashal* ode. Of this class of *Mashal* odes are, besides the prologue, Pro. 22:17-21, that of the drunkard, Pro. 23:29-35; that of the slothful man, Pro. 24:30-34; the exhortation to industry, Pro. 27:23-27; the prayer for a moderate portion between poverty and riches, Pro. 30: 7-9; the mirror for princes, Pro. 31: 2-9; and the praise of the excellent wife, Pro. 31:10 ff. It is singular that this ode furnishes the only example of the alphabetical acrostic in the whole collection. Even a single trace of original alphabetical sequence afterwards broken up cannot be found. There cannot also be discovered, in the *Mashal* songs referred to, anything like a completed strophe-scheme; even in Pro. 31:10 ff. the distichs are broken by tristichs intermingled with them.

In the whole of the first part, Pro. 1: 7-9, the prevailing form is that of the extended flow of the *Mashal* song; but one in vain seeks for strophes. There is not here so firm a grouping of the lines; on the supposition of its belonging to the Solomonic era, this is indeed to be expected. The rhetorical form here outweighs the purely poetical. This first part of the Proverbs consists of the following fifteen *Mashal* strains:

- (1) Pro. 1: 7-19,
- (2) 20 ff.,
- (3) 2,
- (4) Pro. 3: 1-18,
- (5) 19-26,

- (6) 27 ff.,
- (7) Pro. 4: 1-5: 6,
- (8) 7 ff.,
- (9) 6: 1-5,
- (10) 6-11,
- (11) 12-19,
- (12) 20 ff.,
- (13) 7,
- (14) 8,
- (15) 9.

In 3 and 9 there are found a few Mashal odes of two lines and of four lines which may be regarded as independent Mashals, and may adapt themselves to the schemes employed; other brief complete parts are only waves in the flow of the larger discourses, or are altogether formless, or more than octastichs. The octastich Pro. 6:16-19 makes the proportionally greatest impression of an independent inwoven Mashal. It is the only proverb in which symbolical numbers are used which occurs in the collection from 1 to 29:

*There are six things which Jahve hateth,
And seven are an abhorrence to His soul:
Haughty eyes, a lying tongue,
And hands that shed innocent blood;
An heart that deviseth the thoughts of evil,
Feet that hastily run to wickedness,
One that uttereth lies as a false witness,
And he who soweth strife between brethren.*

Such *numerical* proverbs to which the name **מִשָּׁל** has been given by later Jewish writers (see my *Gesch. der Jüd. Poesie*, pp. 199, 202) are found in 30. With the exception of Pro. 30: 7-9, 24-28 (cf. Sir. 25: 1, 2), the numerical proverb has this peculiarity, found also in most of the numerical proverbs of Sirach (Sir. 23:16; 25: 7; 26: 5, 28), that the number named in the first parallel line is in the second (cf. Job. 5: 9) increased by one. On the other hand, the form of the *Priamel*¹⁹ is used neither in the Book of Proverbs nor in that of Sirach. Proverbs such as Pro. 20:10 (“Diverse weights, diverse measures — an abomination to Jahve are they both”) and Pro. 20:12 (“The hearing ear, the seeing eye — Jahve hath created them both”), to be distinguished from Pro. 17: 3; 27:21, and the like, where the necessary unity, and from Pro. 27: 3, where the necessary resemblance, of the predicate is wanting, are only a weak approach to the Priamel, — a stronger, Pro. 25: 3, where the three subjects form the preamble (“The heaven for height, and the earth for depth, and the heart of kings — are unsearchable”). Perhaps Pro. 30:11-14 is a greater

mutilated Priamel. Here four subjects form the preamble, but there is wanting the conclusion containing the common predicate. This, we believe, exhausts the forms of the Mashal in the collection. It now only remains to make mention of the *Mashal chain*, i.e., the ranging together in a series of proverbs of a similar character, such as the chain of proverbs regarding the fool, Pro. 26: 1-12, the sluggard, Pro. 26:13-16, the tale-bearer, Pro. 26:20-22, the malicious, Pro. 26:23-28 — but this form belongs more to the technics of the Mashal *collection* than to that of the Mashal *poetry*.

We now turn to the separate parts of the book, to examine more closely the forms of their proverbs, and gather materials for a critical judgment regarding the origin of the proverbs which they contain. Not to anticipate, we take up in order the separate parts of the arrangement of the collection. Since, then, it cannot be denied that in the introductory paedagogic part, Pro. 1: 7-9, notwithstanding its rich and deep contents, there is exceedingly little of the technical form of the Mashal, as well as generally of technical form at all. This part, as already shown, consist not of proper Mashals, but of fifteen Mashal odes, or rather, perhaps, Mashal discourses, didactic poems of the Mashal kind. In the flow of these discourses separate Mashals intermingle, which may either be regarded as independent, or, as Pro. 1:32; 4:18 f., can easily be so understood. In the Mashal chains of Proverbs 4 and 9 we meet with proverbs that are synonymous (Pro. 9: 7, 10), antithetic (Pro. 3:35; 9: 8), integral, or of one thought (Pro. 3:29, 30), and synthetic (Pro. 1: 7; 3: 5, 7), of two lines and of four lines variously disposed (Pro. 3: 9 f., 11 f., 31 f., 33 f.); but the parabolic scheme is not at all met with, separate proverbs such as Pro. 3:27 f. are altogether without form, and keeping out of view the octastich numerical proverb, Pro. 6:16-19, the thoughts which form the unity of separate groups are so widely expanded that the measure of the Mashal proper is far exceeded. The character of this whole part is not concentrating, but unfolding. Even the intermingling proverbs of two lines possess the same character. They are for the most part more like dissolved drops than gold coins with sharp outline and firm impress; as e.g., Pro. 9: 7:

*He that correcteth the mocker getteth to himself shame;
And he that rebuketh the sinner his dishonour.*

The few that consist of four lines are closer, more compact, more finished, because they allow greater space for the expression; e.g., Pro. 3: 9 f.:

*Honour Jahve with thy wealth,
And with the first-fruits of all thine income:
And thy barns shall be filled with plenty,
And thy vats shall overflow with must.*

But beyond the four lines the author knows no limits of artistic harmony; the discourse flows on till it has wholly or provisionally exhausted the subject; it pauses not till it reaches the end of its course, and then, taking breath, it starts anew. We cannot, moreover, deny that there is beauty in this new springing forth of the stream of the discourse with its fresh transparent waves; but it is a peculiar beauty of the rhetorically decomposed, dissolved Mashal, going forth, as it were, from its confinement, and breathing its fragrance far and wide.

The fifteen discourses, in which the Teacher appears twelve times and Wisdom three times, are neither of a symmetrically chiselled form nor of internally fashioned coherence, but yet are a garland of songs having internal unity, with a well-arranged manifoldness of contents. It is true that Bertheau recognises here neither unity of the contents nor unity of the formal character; but there is no Old Testament portion of like extent, and at the same time of more systematic internal unity, and which bears throughout a like formal impress, than this. Bertheau thinks that he has discovered in certain passages a greater art in the form; and certainly there are several sections which consist of just ten verses. But this is a mere accident; for the first Mashal ode consists of groups of 1, 2, and 10 verses, the second of 8 and 6 verses, the third of 10 and 12, the fourth of 10 and 8, the fifth of 2 and 6, etc. — each group forming a complete sense. The 10 verses are met with six times, and if Pro. 4: 1-9 from the Peshito, and Pro. 4:20-27 from the LXX, are included, eight times, without our regarding these decades as strophes, and without our being able to draw any conclusion regarding a particular author of these decade portions. In Pro. 1:20-33, Bertheau finds indeed, along with the regular structure of verses, an exact artistic formation of strophes (3 times 4 verses with an echo of 2). But he counts instead of the stichs the Masoretic verses, and these are not the true formal parts of the strophe.

We now come to the second part of the collection, whose superscription **שְׁלֹמֹה מִשְׁלֵי** can in no respect be strange to us, since the collection of proverbs here commencing, compared with Pro. 1: 7-9, may with special right bear the name *Mishle*. The 375 proverbs which are classed together in this part, 10-22:16, without any comprehensive plan, but only according to their more or fewer conspicuous common characteristics (Bertheau, p. xii), consist all and every one of distichs; for each Masoretic verse falls naturally into two stichs, and nowhere (not even Pro. 19:19) does such a distich proverb stand in necessary connection with one that precedes or that follows; each is in itself a small perfected and finished whole. The tristich Pro. 19: 7 is only an apparent exception. In reality it is a distich with the disfigured remains of a distich that has been lost. The LXX has here two distichs which are wanting in our text. The second is that which is found in our text, but only in a mutilated form:

*ὁ πολλὰ κακοποιῶν τελεσιουργεὶ κακίαν,
[He that does much harm perfects mischief,]
ὅς δὲ ἐρεθίζει λόγους οὐ σωθήσεται.
[And he that uses provoking words shall not escape.]*

Perhaps the false rendering of

מרע רבים ישלם־רע
מרדף אמרים לא ימלט

*The friend of every one is rewarded with evil,
He who pursues after rumours does not escape.*

But not only are all these proverbs distichs, they have also, not indeed without exception, but in by far the greatest number, a common character in that they are *antithetic*. Distichs of predominating antithetic character stand here together. Along with these all other schemes are, it is true, represented: the synonymous, Pro. 11: 7, 25, 30; 12:14, 28; 14:19, etc.; the integral, or of one thought, Pro. 14: 7; 15: 3, etc., particularly in proverbs with the comparative מן, Pro. 12: 9; 15:16, 17; 16: 8, 19; 17:10; 21:19; 22: 1, and with the ascending אֲרֵבִי [much more], Pro. 11:31; 15:11; 17: 7; 19: 7, 10; 21:27; the synthetic, Pro. 10:18; 11:29; 14:17; 19:13; the parabolic, the most feebly represented, for the only specimens of it are Pro. 10:26; 11:22; besides which I know not what other Bertheau could quote. We shall further see that in another portion of the book the parabolic proverbs are just as closely placed together as are the antithetic. Here almost universally the two members of the proverbs stand together in technical parallelism as thesis and antithesis; also in the synonymous proverbs the two members are the parallel rays of one thought; in the synthetic two monostichs occur in loose external connection to suffice for the parallelism as a fundamental law of the technical proverb. But also in these proverbs in which a proper parallelism is not found, both members being needed to form a complete sentence, verse and members are so built up, according to Bertheau's self-confirmatory opinion, that in regard to extent and the number of words they are like verses with parallel members.

To this long course of distichs which profess to be the *Mishle* of Solomon, there follows a course, Pro. 22:17-24:22, of "words of the wise," prefaced by the introduction Pro. 22:17-21, which undeniably is of the same nature as the greater introduction, Pro. 1: 7-9, and of which we are reminded by the form of address preserved throughout in these "words of the wise." These "words of the wise" comprehend all the forms of the Mashal, from those of two lines in Pro. 22:28; 23: 9; 24: 7, 8, 9, 10, to the Mashal song Pro. 23:29-35. Between these limits are the tetrastichs, which are the most popular form, Pro. 22:22 f., 24 f., 26 f., 23:10 f., 15 f., 17 f., 24: 1 f., 3 f., 5 f., 15,f., 17 f., 19 f., 21 f., —

pentastichs, Pro. 23: 4 f., 24:13 f., and hexastichs, Pro. 23: 1-3, 12-14, 19-21, 26-28; 24:11 f.; — of tristichs, heptastichs, and octastichs are at least found one specimen of each, Pro. 22:29; 23: 6-8; 23:22-25. Bertheau maintains that there is a difference between the structure of these proverbs and that of the preceding, for he counts the number of the words which constitute a verse in the case of the latter and of the former; but such a proceeding is unwarrantable, for the remarkably long Masoretic verse Pro. 24:12 contains eighteen words; and the poet is not to be made accountable for such an arrangement, for in his mind Pro. 24:11 f. forms a hexastich, and indeed a very elegant one. Not the *words* of the Masoretic verse, but the *stichs* are to be counted. Reckoning according to the *stichs*, I can discover no difference between these proverbs and the preceding. In the preceding ones also the number of the words in the stichs extends from two to five, the number two being here, however, proportionally more frequently found (e.g., Pro. 24: 4*b*, 24: 8*a*, 10*b*); a circumstance which has its reason in this, that the symmetry of the members is often very much disturbed, there being frequently no trace whatever of parallelism. To the first appendix to the “Proverbs of Solomon” there follows a second, Pro. 24:23 ff., with the superscription, “These things also to the wise,” which contains a hexastich, Pro. 24:23*b* -25, a distich, v. 26, a tristich, v. 27, a tetrastich, v. 28 f., and a Mashal ode, v. 30 ff., on the sluggard — the last in the form of an experience, of the poet like Psa. 37:35 f. The moral which he has drawn from this recorded observation is expressed in two verses such as we have already found at Pro. 6:10 f. These two appendices are, as is evident from their commencement as well as from their conclusion, in closest relation to the introduction, Pro. 1: 7-9.

There now follows in 25-29 the second great collection of “Proverbs of Solomon,” “copied out,” as the superscription mentions, by the direction of King Hezekiah. It falls, apparently, into two parts; for as Pro. 24:30 ff., a Mashal hymn stands at the end of the two appendices, so that the Mashal hymn Pro. 27:23 ff. must be regarded as forming the division between the two halves of this collection. It is very sharply distinguished from the collection beginning with Proverbs 10. The extent of the stichs and the greater or less observance of the parallelism furnish no distinguishing mark, but there are others worthy of notice. In the first collection the proverbs are exclusively in the form of distichs; here we have also some tristichs, Pro. 25: 8, 13, 20; 27:10, 22; 28:10, tetrastichs, Pro. 25: 4 f., 9 f., 21 f., 26:18 f., 24 f., 27:15 f., and pentastichs, Pro. 25: 6 f., besides the Mashal hymn already referred to. The kind of arrangement is not essentially different from that in the first collection; it is equally devoid of plan, yet there are here some chains or strings of related proverbs, Pro. 26: 1-12, 13-16, 20-22. A second essential distinction between the two collections is this, that while in the first the *antithetic* proverb forms the prevailing element, here is it the *parabolic*, and especially the *emblematic*;

in 25-27 are sentences almost wholly of this character. We say *almost*, for to place together proverbs of this kind exclusively is not the plan of the collector. There are also proverbs of the other schemes, fewer synonymous, etc., than antithetic, and the collection begins in very varied quodlibet: Pro. 25: 2, an antithetic proverb; Pro. 25: 3, a priamel with three subjects; Pro. 25: 4 f., an emblematic tetrastich; Pro. 25: 6 f., a pentastich; Pro. 25: 8, a tristich; Pro. 25: 9 f., a tetrastich, with the negative ׀; Pro. 25:11, an emblematic distich (“Golden apples in silver caskets — a word spoken in a fitting way”). The antithetic proverbs are found especially in 28 and 29: the first and the last proverb of the whole collection, Pro. 25: 2; 29:27, are antithetic; but between these two the comparative and the figurative proverbs are so prevalent, that this collection appears like a variegated picture-book with explanatory notes written underneath. In extent it is much smaller than the foregoing. I reckon 126 proverbs in 137 Masoretic verses.

The second collection of Solomon’s proverbs has also several appendices, the first of which, 30, according to the inscription, is by an otherwise unknown author, Agur the son of Jakeh. The first poem of this appendix present in a thoughtful way the unsearchableness of God. This is followed by certain peculiar pieces, such as a tetrastich regarding the purity of God’s word, Pro. 30: 5 f.; a prayer for a moderate position between riches and poverty, vv. 7-9; a distich against slander, v. 10; a priamel without the conclusion, vv. 11-14; the insatiable four (a *Midda*), v. 15 f.; a tetrastich regarding the disobedient son, v. 17, the incomprehensible four, vv. 18-20; the intolerable four, vv. 21-23; the diminutive but prudent four, vv. 24-28; the excellent four, vv. 29-31; a pentastich recommending prudent silence, v. 32 f. Two other supplements form the conclusion of the whole book: the counsel of Lemuel’s mother to her royal son, Pro. 31: 2-9, and the praise of the virtuous woman in the form of an alphabetical acrostic, Pro. 31:10 ff.

After we have acquainted ourselves with the manifold forms of the technical proverbs and their distribution in the several parts of the collection, the question arises, What conclusions regarding the origin of these several parts may be drawn from these forms found in them? We connect with this the conception of Ewald, who sees represented in the several parts of the collection the chief points of the history of proverbial poetry. The “Proverbs of Solomon,” Pro. 10: 1-22:16, appear to him to be the oldest collection, which represents the simplest and the most ancient kind of proverbial poetry. Their distinguishing characteristics are the symmetrical two-membered verse, complete in itself, containing in itself a fully intelligible meaning, and the quick contrast of thesis and antithesis. The oldest form of the technical proverb, according to Ewald, is, according to our terminology, the antithetic distich, such as predominates in Pro. 10: 1-22:16. Along with these antithetic

distichs we find here also others of a different kind. Ewald so considers the contrast of the two members to be the original fundamental law of the technical proverb, that to him these other kinds of distichs represent the diminution of the inner force of the two-membered verse, the already begun decay of the art in its oldest limits and laws, and the transition to a new method. In the "Proverbs of Solomon," 25-29, of the later collection, that rigorous formation of the verse appears already in full relaxation and dissolution: the contrast of the sense of the members appears here only exceptionally; the art turns from the crowded fulness and strength of the representation more to the adorning of the thought by means of strong and striking figures and forms of expression, to elegant painting of certain moral conditions and forms of life; and the more the technical proverb is deprived of the breath of a vigorous poetic spirit, so much the nearer does it approach to the vulgar proverb; the full and complete symmetry of the two members disappears, less by the abridgment of one of them, than by the too great extension and amplification of the two-membered proverb into longer admonitions to a moral life, and descriptions relating thereto. So the proverbial poetry passes essentially into a different form and manner. "While it loses in regard to internal vigorous brevity and strength, it seeks to gain again by means of connected instructive exposition, by copious description and detailed representation; breaking up its boldly delineated, strong, and yet simply beautiful form, it rises to oratorical display, to attractive eloquence, in which, indeed, though the properly poetical and the artistic gradually disappears, yet the warmth and easy comprehension are increased." In Proverbs ch. 1-9, the introduction of the older collection, and Pro. 22:17-24, of the first half of the supplement to the older collection (25-29 is the second half), supplied by a later writer, the great change is completed, the growth of which the later collection of the "Proverbs of Solomon," particularly in 25-29, reveals. The symmetry of the two members of the verse is here completely destroyed; the separate proverb appears almost only as an exception; the proverbial poetry has passed into admonition and discourse, and has become in many respects lighter, and more flexible, and flowing, and comprehensible. "It is true that on the side of this later form of proverbial poetry there is not mere loss. While it always loses the excellent pointed brevity, the inner fulness and strength of the old proverbs, it gains in warmth, impressiveness, intelligibility; the wisdom which at first strives only to make its existence and its contents in endless manifoldness known, reaches this point at last, that having become clear and certain, it now also turns itself earnestly and urgently to men." In the later additions, Pro. 30-31, appended altogether externally, the proverbial poetry has already disappeared, and given place to elegant descriptions of separate moral truths. While the creative passes into the background, the whole aim is now toward surprising expansion and new artistic representation.

This view of the progressive development of the course of proverbial poetry is one of the chief grounds for the determination of Ewald's judgment regarding the parts that are Solomonic and those that are not Solomonic in the collection. In Pro. 10: 1-22:16 he does not regard the whole as Solomon's, as immediately and in their present form composed by Solomon; but the breath of the Solomonic spirit enlivens and pervades all that has been added by other and later poets. But most of the proverbs of the later collection (25-29) are not much older than the time of Hezekiah; yet there are in it some that are Solomonic, and of the period next to Solomon. The collection stretches backward with its arms, in part indeed, as the superscription, the "Proverbs of Solomon," shows, to the time of Solomon. On the other hand, in the introduction, 1-9, and in the first half of the appendix (Pro. 22:17-24), there is not found a single proverb of the time of Solomon; both portions belong to two poets of the seventh century B.C., a new era, in which the didactic poets added to the older Solomonic collection longer pieces of their own composition. The four small pieces, Pro. 30: 1-14, 15-33; 31: 1-9, 10 ff., are of a still later date; they cannot belong to an earlier period than the end of the seventh or the beginning of the sixth century B.C.

We recognise the penetration, the sensibility, the depth of thought indicate by this opinion of Ewald's regarding the origin of the book; yet for the most part it is not supported by satisfactory proof. If we grant that he has on the whole rightly construed the history of proverbial poetry, nevertheless the conclusion that proverbs which bear in themselves the marks of the oldest proverbial poetry belong to the Solomonic era, and that the others belong to a period more nearly or more remotely subsequent to it, is very fallacious. In this case much that is found in Sirach's Book of Proverbs must be Solomonic; and the **אסף משלי** of Isaac Satanow,^{f10} the contemporary of Moses Mendelssohn, as well as many other proverbs in the collection **מלין דרבנן**, and in the poetical works of other Jewish poets belonging to the middle ages or to later times, might be dated back perhaps a thousand years. Along with the general course of development the individuality of the poet is also to be taken into account; an ancient poet can, along with the formally completed, produce the imperfect, which appears to belong to a period of art that has degenerated, and a modern poet can emulate antiquity with the greatest accuracy. but Ewald's construction of the progress of the development of proverbial poetry is also in part arbitrary. That the two-membered verse is the oldest form of the technical proverb we shall not dispute, but that it is the two-membered antithetic verse is a supposition that cannot be proved; and that Solomon wrote only antithetic distichs is an absurd assertion, to which Keil justly replies, that the adhering to only one form and structure is a sign of poverty, of mental narrowness and one-sidedness. There are also other kinds of parallelism, which are not less

beautiful and vigorous than the antithetic, and also other forms of proverbs besides the distich in which the thought, which can in no way be restrained within two lines, must necessarily divide itself into the branches of a greater number of lines. Thus I must agree with Keil in the opinion, that Ewald's assertion that in the Hezekiah-collection the strong form of the technical proverb is in full dissolution, contains an exaggeration. If the first collection, Pro. 10: 1-22:16, contains only two (Pro. 10:26; 11:22) figurative proverbs, while it would be altogether foolish to deny that these two, because they were figurative proverbs, were Solomonic, or to affirm that he was the author of only these two, so it is self-evident that the Hezekiah-collection, which is principally a collection of figurative proverbs, must contain many proverbs in which a different kind of parallelism prevails, which has the appearance of a looser connection. Is it not probable that Solomon, who had an open penetrating eye for the greatest and the smallest objects of nature, composed many such proverbs? And is e.g., the proverb Pro. 26:23,

*Dross of silver spread over a potsherd —
Burning lips and a wicked heart,*

less beautiful, and vigorous, and worthy of Solomon than any antithetic distich? If Ewald imagines that the 3000 proverbs which Solomon wrote were all constructed according to this one model, we are much rather convinced that Solomon's proverbial poetry, which found the distich and the tetrastich as forms of proverbs already in use, would not only unfold within the limits of the distich the most varied manifoldness of thought and form, but would also within the limits of the Mashal generally, run through the whole scale from the distich up to octastichs and more extensive forms. But while we cannot accept Ewald's criteria which he applies to the two collections, Pro. 10: 1-22:16 and 25-29, yet his delineation of the form and kind of proverbial poetry occurring in 1-9, Pro. 22:17 ff., is excellent, as is also his conclusion, that these portions belong to a new and more recent period of proverbial poetry. Since in Pro. 22:17-21 manifestly a new course of "Words of the Wise" by a poet later than Solomon is introduced, it is possible, yea, not improbable, that he, or, as Ewald thinks, another somewhat older poet, introduces in Pro. 1: 7-9 the "Proverbs of Solomon" following from Pro. 10: 1 onward.

But if Solomon composed not only distichs, but also tristichs, etc., it is strange that in the first collection, Pro. 10-22:16, there are exclusively distichs; and if he constructed not only contrasted proverbs, but equally figurative proverbs, it is as strange that in the first collection the figurative proverbs are almost entirely wanting, while in the second collection, 25-29, on the contrary, they prevail. This remarkable phenomenon may be partly explained if we could suppose that not merely the second collection but both of them, were arranged by the "men of Hezekiah," and that the whole collection of the Solomonic

proverbs was divided by them into two collections according to their form. But leaving out of view other objections, one would in that case have expected in the first collection the proportionally great number of the antithetic distichs which stand in the second. If we regard both collections as originally one whole, then there can be no rational ground for its being divided in this particular way either by the original collector or by a later enlarger of the collection. We have therefore to regard the two portions as the work of two different authors. The second is by the "men of Hezekiah;" the first cannot be by Solomon himself, since the number of proverbs composed, and probably also written out by Solomon, amounted to 3000; besides, if Solomon was the author of the collection, there would be visible on it the stamp of his wisdom in its plan and order: it is thus the work of another author, who is certainly different from the author of the introductory Mashal poems, Pro. 1: 7-9. For if the author of the title of the book were not at the same time the author of the introduction, he must have taken it from some other place; thus it is inconceivable how he could give the title "Proverbs of Solomon," etc., Pro. 1: 1-6, to poems which were not composed by Solomon. If 1: 7-9 is not by Solomon, then these Mashal poems are explicable only as the work of the author of the title of the book, and as an introduction to the "Proverbs of Solomon," beginning Pro. 10: 1. It must be one and the same author who edited the "Proverbs of Solomon" Pro. 10: 1- Pro. 22:16, prefixed Pro. 1: 7-9 as an introduction to them, and appended to them the "Words of the Wise," Pro. 22:17-24:22; the second collector then appended to this book a supplement of the "Words of the Wise," Pro. 24:23 ff., and then the Hezekiah-collection of Solomonic proverbs, 25-29; perhaps also, in order that the book might be brought to a close in the same form in which it was commenced, he added ^{f11} the non-Solomonic proverbial poem 30:f. We do not, however, maintain that the book has this origin, but only this, that on the supposition of the non-Solomonic origin of Pro. 1: 7-9 it cannot well have any other origin. But the question arises again, and more emphatically, How was it possible that the first collector left as gleanings to the second so great a number of distichs, almost all parabolical, and besides, all more than two-lined proverbs of Solomon? One can scarcely find the reason of this singular phenomenon in anything else than in the judgment of the author of the first collection as the determining motive of his selection. For when we think also on the sources and origin of the two collections, the second always presupposes the first, and that which is singular in the author's thus restricting himself can only have its ground in the freedom which he allowed to his subjectivity.

Before we more closely examine the style and the teaching of the book, and the conclusions thence arising, another phenomenon claims our attention, which perhaps throws light on the way in which the several collections

originated; but, at all events, it may not now any longer remain out of view, when we are in the act of forming a judgment on this point.

3. The repetitions in the Book of Proverbs. — We find not only in the different parts of the collection, but also within the limits of one and the same part, proverbs which wholly or in part are repeated in the same or in similar words. Before we can come to a judgment, we must take cognizance as closely as possible of this fact. We begin with “The Proverbs of Solomon,” Proverbs 10-22:16; for this collection is in relation to 25-29 certainly the earlier, and it is especially with respect to the Solomonic proverbs that this fact demands an explanation. In this earlier collection we find,

(1) whole proverbs repeated in exactly the same words: Pro. 14:12 = Pro. 16:25; —

(2) proverbs slightly changed in their form of expression: Pro. 10: 1 = Pro. 15:20; Pro. 14:20 = Pro. 19: 4; Pro. 16: 2 = Pro. 21: 2; Pro. 19: 5 = Pro. 19: 9; Pro. 20:10 = Pro. 20:23; Pro. 21: 9 = Pro. 21:19; —

(3) proverbs almost identical in form, but somewhat different in sense: Pro. 10: 2 = Pro. 11: 4; Pro. 13:14 = Pro. 14:27; —

(4) proverbs the first lines of which are the same: Pro. 10:15 = Pro. 18:11; —

(5) proverbs with their second lines the same: Pro. 10: 6 = Pro. 10:11; Pro. 10: 8 = Pro. 10:10; Pro. 15:33 = Pro. 18:12; —

(6) proverbs with one line almost the same: Pro. 11:13 = Pro. 20:19; Pro. 11:21 = Pro. 16: 5; Pro. 12:14 - 13: 2; Pro. 14:31 = Pro. 17: 5; Pro. 16:18 = Pro. 18:12; Pro. 19:12 = Pro. 20: 2; comp. also Pro. 16:28 with Pro. 17: 9; 19:25 with 21:11. In comparing these proverbs, one will perceive that for the most part the external or internal resemblance of the surrounding has prompted the collector of place the one proverb in this place and the other in that place (not always indeed; for what reason e.g., could determine the position of Pro. 16:25 and Pro. 19: 5, 9, I cannot say); then that the proverb standing earlier is generally, to all appearance, also the earlier formed, for the second of the pair is mostly a synonymous distich, which generally further extends antithetically one line of the first: cf. Pro. 18:11 with Pro. 10:15; Pro. 20:10, 23 with Pro. 11: 1; 20:19 with Pro. 11:13; Pro. 16: 5 with Pro. 11:21; 20: 2 with Pro. 19:12, also Pro. 17: 5 with Pro. 14:31, where from an antithetic proverb a synthetic one is formed; but here also there are exceptions, as Pro. 13: 2 compared with Pro. 12:14, and Pro. 15:33 with Pro. 18:12, where the same line is in the first case connected with a synonymous, and in the second with an antithetic proverb; but here also the contrast is so loose, that the earlier-occurring proverb has the appearance of priority.

We now direct our attention to the second collection, 25-29. When we compare the proverbs found here with one another, we see among them a disproportionately smaller number of repetitions than in the other collection; only a single entire proverb is repeated in almost similar terms, but in an altered sense, Pro. 29:20 = Pro. 26:12; but proverbs such as Pro. 28:12, 28; 29: 2, notwithstanding the partial resemblance, are equally original. On the other hand, in this second collection we find numerous repetitions of proverbs and portions of proverbs from the first: —

(1) Whole proverbs perfectly identical (leaving out of view insignificant variations): Pro. 25:24 = Pro. 21: 9; Pro. 26:22 = Pro. 18: 8; Pro. 27:12 = Pro. 22: 3; Pro. 27:13 = Pro. 20:16; —

(2) proverbs identical in meaning with somewhat changed expression: Pro. 26:13 = Pro. 22:13; Pro. 26:15 = Pro. 19:24; Pro. 28: 6 = Pro. 19: 1; Pro. 28:19 = Pro. 12:11; Pro. 29:13 = Pro. 22: 2; —

(3) proverbs with one line the same and one line different: Pro. 27:21 = Pro. 17: 3; Pro. 29:22 = Pro. 15:18; cf. also Pro. 27:15 with Pro. 19:13. when we compare these proverbs with one another, we are uncertain as to many of them which has the priority, as e.g., Pro. 27:21 = Pro. 17: 3; Pro. 29:22 = Pro. 15:18; but in the case of others there is no doubt that the Hezekiah-collection contains the original form of the proverb which is found in the other collection, as Pro. 26:13; Pro. 28: 6, 19; Pro. 29:13; Pro. 27:15, in relation to their parallels. In the other portions of this book also we find such repetitions as are met with in these two collections of Solomonic proverbs. In Pro. 1: 7-9:18 we have Pro. 2:16, a little changed, repeated in Pro. 7: 5, and Pro. 3:15 in Pro. 8:11; Pro. 9:10a = Pro. 1: 7a is a case not worthy of being mentioned, and it were inappropriate here to refer to Pro. 9: 4, 16. In the first appendix of “the Words of the Wise,” Pro. 22:17-24:22, single lines often repeat themselves in another connection; cf. Pro. 23: 3 and 6, Pro. 23:10 and Pro. 22:28; 23:17 f. and Pro. 24:13 f., 22:23 and Pro. 23:11; 23:17 and Pro. 24: 1. That in such cases the one proverb is often the pattern of the other, is placed beyond a doubt by the relation of Pro. 24:19 to Psa. 37: 1; cf. also Pro. 24:20 with Psa. 37:38. If here there are proverbs like those of Solomon in their expression, the presumption is that the priority belongs to the latter, as Pro. 23:27 cf. 22:14; 24: 5 f. cf. 11:14; 24:19 f. cf. 13: 9, in which latter case the justice of the presumption is palpable. Within the second appendix of “the Words of the Wise,” Pro. 24:23 ff., no repetitions are to be expected on account of its shortness; yet is Pro. 24:23 repeated from the Solomonic Mashal Pro. 28:21, and as Pro. 24:33 f. are literally the same as Pro. 6:10 f., the priority is presumably on the side of the author of Pro. 1: 7-9:18, at least of the Mashal in the form in which he communicates it. The supplements 30 and 31 afford

nothing that is worth mention as bearing on our present inquiry,^{f12} and we may therefore now turn to the question, What insight into the origin of these proverbs and their collection do the observations made afford?

From the numerous repetitions of proverbs and portions of proverbs of the first collection of the “Proverbs of Solomon” in the Hezekiah-collection, as well as from another reason stated at the end of the foregoing section of our inquiry, we conclude that the two collections were by different authors; in other words, that they had not both “the men of Hezekiah” for their authors. It is true that the repetitions in themselves do not prove anything against the oneness of their authorship for there are within the several collections, and even within 9-1 (cf. Pro. 6:20 with Pro. 1: 8; 8:10 f. with Pro. 3:14 f.), repetitions, notwithstanding the oneness of their authorship. But if two collections of proverbs are in so many various ways different in their character, as Pro. 10: 1-22:16 and 25-29, then the previous probability rises almost to a certainty by such repetitions. From the form, for the most part anomalous, in which the Hezekiah-collection presents the proverbs and portions of proverbs which are found also in the first collection, and from their being otherwise independent, we further conclude that “the men of Hezekiah” did not borrow from the first collection, but formed it from other sources. But since one does not understand why “the men of Hezekiah” should have omitted so great a number of genuine Solomonic proverbs which remain, after deducting the proportionally few that have been repeated (for this omission is not to be explained by saying that they selected those that were appropriate and wholesome for their time), we are further justified in the conclusion that the other collection was known to them as one current in their time. Their object was, indeed, not to supplement this older collection; they rather regarded their undertaking as a similar people’s book, which they wished to place side by side with that collection without making it superfluous. The difference of the selection in the two collections has its whole directing occasion in the difference of the intention. The first collection begins (Pro. 10: 1) with the proverb —

*A wise son maketh glad his father,
And a foolish son is the grief of his mother;*

the second (Pro. 25: 2) with the proverb —

*It is the glory of God to conceal a thing,
And the glory of kings to search out a matter.*

The one collection is a book for youth, to whom it is dedicated in the extended introduction, Pro. 1: 7-9:18; the second is a people’s book suited to the time of Hezekiah (“Solomon’s Wisdom in Hezekiah’s days,” as Stier has named it), and therefore it takes its start not, like the first, from the duties of the child, but

from those of the king. If in the two collections everything does not stand in conscious relation to these different objects, yet the collectors at least have, from the commencement to the close (cf. Pro. 22:15 with Pro. 29:26), these objects before their eyes.

As to the *time* at which the first collection was made, the above considerations also afford us some materials for forming a judgment. Several pairs of proverbs which it contains present to us essentially the same sayings in older and more recent forms. Keil regards the proverbs also that appear less original as old-Solomonic, and remarks that one and the same poet does not always give expression to the same thoughts with the same pregnant brevity and excellence, and affirms that changes and reproductions of separate proverbs may proceed even from Solomon himself. This is possible; but if we consider that even Davidic psalms have been imitated, and that in the “Words of the Wise” Solomonic proverbs are imitated, — moreover, that proverbs especially are subject to changes, and invite to imitation and transformation, — we shall find it to be improbable. Rather we would suppose, that between the publication of the 3000 proverbs of Solomon and the preparation of the collection Proverbs 10-22:16 a considerable time elapsed, during which the old-Solomonic *Mashal* had in the mouths of the people and of poets acquired a multitude of accretions, and that the collector had without hesitation gathered together such indirect Solomonic proverbs with those that were directly Solomonic. But did not then the 3000 Solomonic proverbs afford to him scope enough? We must answer this question in the negative; for if that vast number of Solomonic proverbs was equal in moral-religious worth to those that have been preserved to us, then neither the many repetitions within the first collection nor the proportional poverty of the second can be explained. The “men of Hezekiah” made their collection of Solomonic proverbs nearly 300 years after Solomon’s time; but there is no reason to suppose that the old book of the Proverbs of Solomon had disappeared at that time. Much rather we may with probability conclude, from the subjects to which several proverbs of these collections extend (husbandry, war, court life, etc.), and from Solomon’s love for the manifold forms of natural and of social life, that his 3000 proverbs would not have afforded much greater treasures than these before us. But if the first collection was made at a time in which the old-Solomonic proverbs had been already considerably multiplied by new combinations, accretions, and imitations, then probably a more suitable time for their origination could not be than that of Jehoshaphat, which was more related to the time of Solomon than to that of David. The personality of Jehoshaphat, inclined toward the promotion of the public worship of God, the edification of the people, the administration of justice; the dominion of the house of David recognised and venerated far and wide among neighbouring peoples; the tendencies of that time towards intercourse with distant regions; the deep peace which followed

the subjugation of the confederated nations, — all these are features which stamped the time of Jehoshaphat as a copy of that of Solomon. Hence we are to expect in it the fostering care of the *Chokma*. If the author of the introduction and editor of the older book of Proverbs lived after Solomon and before Hezekiah, then the circumstances of the case most suitably determine his time as at the beginning of the reign of Jehoshaphat, some seventy years after Solomon's death. If in 1-9 it is frequently said that wisdom was seen openly in the streets and ways, this agrees with 2Ch. 17: 7-9, where it is said that princes, priests, and Levites, sent out by Jehoshaphat (compare the Carolingian *missi*), went forth into the towns of Judah with the book of the law in their hands as teachers of the people, and with 2Ch. 19: 4, where it is stated that Jehoshaphat himself "went out through the people from Beer-sheba to Mount Ephraim, and brought them back unto the Lord God of their fathers." We have an evidence of the fondness for allegorical forms of address at that time in 2Ki. 14: 8-11 (2Ch. 25:17-21), which is so far favourable to the idea that the allegorizing author of 1-9 belonged to that epoch of history.

This also agrees with the time of Jehoshaphat, that in the first collection the kingdom appears in its bright side, adorned with righteousness (Pro. 14:35; 16:10, 12, 13; 20: 8), wisdom (Pro. 20:26), grace and truth (Pro. 20:28), love to the good (Pro. 22:11), divine guidance (Pro. 21: 1), and in the height of power (Pro. 16:14, 15; 19:12); while in the second collection, which immediately begins with a series of the king's sayings, the kingdom is seen almost only (with exception of Pro. 29:14) on its dark side, and is represented under the destructive dominion of tyranny (Pro. 28:15, 16; 29: 2), of oppressive taxation (Pro. 29: 4), of the Camarilla (Pro. 25: 5; 29:12), and of multiplied authorities (Pro. 28: 2). Elster is right when he remarks, that in 10-22:16 the kingdom in its actual state corresponds to its ideal, and the warning against the abuse of royal power lies remote. If these proverbs more distinguishably than those in 25-29 bear the physiognomy of the time of David and Solomon, so, on the other hand, the time of Jehoshaphat, the son and successor of Asa, is favourable to their collection; while in the time of Hezekiah, the son and successor of Ahaz, and father and predecessor of Manasseh, in which, through the sin of Ahaz, negotiations with the world-kingdom began, that cloudy aspect of the kingdom which is borne by the second supplement, Pro. 24:23-25, was brought near.

Thus between Solomon and Hezekiah, and probably under Jehoshaphat, the older Book of Proverbs contained in Proverbs ch. 1-24:22 first appeared. The "Proverbs of Solomon," Pro. 10: 1-22:16, which formed the principal part, the very kernel of it, were enclosed on the one side, at their commencement, by the lengthened introduction Pro. 1: 7-9:18, in which the collector announces himself as a highly gifted teacher and as the instrument of the Spirit of

revelation, and on the other side are shut in at their close by “the Words of the Wise,” Pro. 22:17-24:34. The author, indeed, does not announce Pro. 1: 6 such a supplement of “the Words of the Wise;” but after these words in the title of the book, he leads us to expect it. The introduction to the supplement Pro. 22:17-21 sounds like an echo of the larger introduction, and corresponds to the smaller compass of the supplement. The work bears on the whole the stamp of a unity; for even in the last proverb with which it closes (Pro. 24:21 f., “My son, fear thou Jahve and the king,” etc.), there still sounds the same key-note which the author had struck at the commencement. A later collector, belonging to the time subsequent to Hezekiah, enlarged the work by the addition of the Hezekiah-portion, and by a short supplement of “the Words of the Wise,” which he introduces, according to the law of analogy, after Pro. 22:17-24:22. The harmony of the superscriptions Pro. 24:23; 25: 1, favours at least the supposition that these supplements are the work of one hand. The circumstance that “the Words of the Wise,” Pro. 22:17-24:22, in two of their maxims refer to the older collection of Solomonian proverbs, but, on the contrary, that “the Words of the Wise,” Pro. 24:23 ff., refer in Pro. 24:23 to the Hezekiah- collection, and in Pro. 24:33 f. to the introduction Pro. 1: 7-9:18, strengthens the supposition that with Pro. 24:23 a second half of the book, added by another hand, begins. There is no reason for not attributing the appendix 30-31 to this second collector; perhaps he seeks, as already remarked above, to render by means of it the conclusion of the extended Book of Proverbs uniform with that of the older book. Like the older collection of “Proverbs of Solomon,” so also now the Hezekiah-collection has “Proverbs of Solomon,” so also now the Hezekiah-collection has “Proverbs of the Wise” on the right and on the left, and the king of proverbial poetry stands in the midst of a worthy retinue. The second collector distinguishes himself from the first by this, that he never professes himself to be a proverbial poet. It is possible that the proverbial poem of the “virtuous woman,” Pro. 31:10 ff., may be his work, but there is nothing to substantiate this opinion.

After this digression, not which we have been led by the repetitions found in the book, we now return, conformably to our plan, to examine it from the point of view of the forms of its language and of its doctrinal contents, and to inquire whether the results hitherto attained are confirmed, and perhaps more fully determined, by this further investigation.

4. The Book of the Proverbs on the side of its manifoldness of style and form of instruction. —

We commence our inquiry with the relation in which Proverbs 10-22:16 and 25-29 stand to each other with reference to their forms of language. If the primary stock of both of these sections belongs indeed to the old time of Solomon, then they must bear essentially the same verbal stamp upon them. Here we of course keep out of

view the proverbs that are wholly or partially identical. If the expression **חֲדָרֵי־בֶטֶן** (the chambers of the body) is in the first collection a favourite figure (Pro. 18: 8; 20:27, 30), coined perhaps by Solomon himself, the fact that this figure is also found in Pro. 26:22 is not to be taken into account, since in Pro. 26:22 the proverb Pro. 18: 8 is repeated. Now it cannot at all be denied, that in the first collection certain expressions are met with which one might expect to meet again in the Hezekiah-collection, and which, notwithstanding, are not to be found in it. Ewald gives a list of such expressions, in order to show that the old-Solomonic dialect occurs, with few exceptions, only in the first collection. But his catalogue, when closely inspected, is unsatisfactory. That many of these expressions occur also in the introduction Pro. 1: 1-9:18 proves, it is true, nothing against him. But **מְרִפָּא** (health), Pro. 12:18; 13:17; 14:30; 15: 4; 16:24, occurs also in Pro. 29: 1; **רִדְרִי** (he pursueth), Pro. 11:19; 12:11; 15: 9; 19: 7, also in Pro. 28:19; **נִרְנָן** (a tattler), Pro. 16:28; 18: 8, also in Pro. 26:20, 22; **לֹא יִנְקָה** (not go unpunished), Pro. 11:21; 16: 5; 17: 5, also in Pro. 28:20. These expressions thus supply an argument for, not against, the linguistic oneness of the two collections. The list of expressions common to the two collections might be considerably increased, *e.g.*: **נִפְרָע** (are unruly), Pro. 29:18, *Kal* Pro. 13:18; 15:32; **אִץ** (he that hastens), Pro. 19: 2; 21: 5; 28:20; 29:19; **מְדוֹנִים** (of contentions), Pro. 21: 9 (Pro. 25:24), Pro. 21:19; 23:29; 26:21; 27:25. If it may be regarded as a striking fact that the figures of speech **מְקוֹר חַיִּים** (a fountain of life), Pro. 10:11; 13:14; 14:27; 17:22, and **עֵץ חַיִּים** (a tree of life), Pro. 11:30; 13:12; 15: 4, as also the expressions **מַחֲתָה** (destruction), Pro. 10:14, 15; 13: 3; 14:28; 18: 7; 10:29; 21:15, **יִפְיֵחַ** (he uttereth), Pro. 12:17; 14: 5, 25; 19: 5, 9; **סִלַּף** (perverteth), Pro. 13: 6; 19: 3; 21:12; 22:12, and **סִלְפָּא** (perverseness), Pro. 11: 3; 15: 4, are only to be found in the first collection, and not in that by the “men of Hezekiah,” it is not a decisive evidence against the oneness of the origin of the proverbs in both collections. The fact also, properly brought forward by Ewald, that proverbs which begin with **יֵשׁ** (there is), — *e.g.*, Pro. 11:24, “There is that scattereth, and yet increaseth still,” — are exclusively found in the first collection, need not perplex us; it is one peculiar kind of proverbs which the author of this collection has by preference gathered together, as he has also omitted all parabolic proverbs except these two, Pro. 10:26; 11:22. If proverbs beginning with **שׁ** are found only in the first, so on the other hand the parabolic *Vav* and the proverbial perfect, reporting as it were an experience (cf. in the second collection, besides Pro. 26:13; 27:12; 29:13, also Pro. 28: 1; 29: 9), for which Döderlein^{f13} has invented the expression *aoristus gnomicus*,^{f14} are common to both sentences. Another remark of Ewald’s (*Jahrb.* xi. 28), that extended

proverbs with אִישׁ are exclusively found in the Hezekiah-collection (Pro. 29: 9, 3; 25:18, 28), is not fully established; in Pro. 16:27-29 three proverbs with אִישׁ are found together, and in Pro. 20: 6 as well as in Pro. 29: 9 אִישׁ occurs twice in one proverb. Rather it strikes us that the article, not merely the punctatorially syncopated, but that expressed by ה, occurs only twice in the first collection, in Pro. 20: 1; 21:31; oftener in the second, Pro. 26:14, 18; 27:19, 20, 22. Since, however, the first does not wholly omit the article, this also cannot determine us to reject the linguistic unity of the second collection with the first, at least according to their primary stock.

But also what of the linguistic unity of Pro. 1: 1-9:18 with both of these, maintained by Keil? It is true, and merits all consideration, that a unity of language and of conception between Pro. 1: 1-9:18 and Proverbs 10-22:16 which far exceeds the degree of unity between Proverbs 10-22:16 and 25-29 may be proved. The introduction is bound with the first collection in the closest manner by the same use of such expressions as אָגַר (gathereth), Pro. 6: 8; 10: 5; אִישׁוֹן (the middle, i.e., of the night, deep darkness), Pro. 7: 9; 20:20; אַחֲרִית (the end), Pro. 5: 4; 23:18; 24:14; אַכְזָרִי (fierce), Pro. 5: 9; 17:11; בִּינָה (understanding), Pro. 1: 2; 16:16; תְּבוּנָה (understanding), Pro. 2: 6; 3:19; 21:30; זָרָה (an adulteress), Pro. 5: 3; 22:14; 23:33; חָסֵר לֵב (lacking understanding), Pro. 6:32; 7: 7; 12:11; יוֹסֵף לָקַח (will increase learning), Pro. 1: 5; 9: 9; 16:21, 23; יָפִיחַ (uttereth), Pro. 6:19; 14: 5; 19: 5, 9; נָלוֹז (perverted), Pro. 3:32; 14: 2; מְדַנִּים (contention), Pro. 6:14, 19; 10:12; מְרַפֵּא (health), Pro. 4:22; 12:18; 13:17; 16:24 (deliverance, Pro. 29: 1); נִסָּח (are plucked up), Pro. 2:22; 15:25; לֹא יִנְקָה (shall not be unpunished), Pro. 6:29; 11:21; 16: 5; הֶעֱזָ (strengthened, i.e., the face), Pro. 7:13; 21:29; עֵץ חַיִּים (tree of life), Pro. 3:18; 11:30; 13:12; 15: 4; עָרַב (becometh surety) and תִּקַּע (strikereth hands) occurring together, Pro. 6: 1; 17:18; 22:26; פְּתָיִם and פְּתָאִים (simplicity, folly), Pro. 1:22, 32; 8: 5; 9: 6; 23: 3; קָרַץ (to wink with the eyes), Pro. 6:13; 10:10; קְרָת (a city), Pro. 8: 3; 9: 3, 14; 11:11; רֵאשִׁית (the beginning), Pro. 1: 7; 17:14; שְׂכַל טוֹב (good understanding), Pro. 3: 4; 13:15; יִשְׁבְּנוּ אֶרֶץ (shall dwell in the land), Pro. 2:21; 10:30; מְדוֹן שֶׁלַח (sendeth forth strife), Pro. 6:14; 16:28; תְּהַפְכוֹת (evil words), Pro. 2:12; 6:14; 10:31; 16:28; תְּנִיחָה (instruction), Pro. 1: 8; 3: 1; 4: 2; 7: 2; 13:14; תּוֹשָׁבָה (counsel), Pro. 3:21; 8:14; 18: 1; תְּחַבּוּלוֹת (prudent measures), Pro. 1: 5; 20:18; 24: 6; — and these are not the only points of contact between the two portions which an attentive reader will meet with. This relation of Pro. 1: 1-9:18 to 10-22:16 is a strong proof of the internal unity of that portion, which

Bertheau has called in question. But are we therefore to conclude, with Keil, that the introduction is not less of the old time of Solomon than Pro. 10-22:16? Such a conclusion lies near, but we do not yet reach it. For with these points of contact there are not a few expressions exclusively peculiar to the introduction; — the expressions **מוֹצֵה** sing. (counsel), Pro. 1: 4; 3:21; **עֲרֻמָּה** (prudence), Pro. 1: 4; 8: 5, 12; **מְלִיצָה** (an enigma, obscure maxim), Pro. 1: 6; **מַעְגַּל** (a path of life), Pro. 2: 9; 4:11, 26; **מַעְגָּלָה**, Pro. 2:15, 18; 5: 6, 21; **אִישׁוֹן** (the apple of the eye), Pro. 7: 2, 9; **נְרַגְרוֹת** (the throat), Pro. 1: 9; 3: 3, 22; the verbs **אַתָּה** (cometh), Pro. 1:27; **פָּלַס** (make level or plain), Pro. 4:26; 5: 6, 21, and **שָׁמָה** (deviate), Pro. 4:15; 7:25. Peculiar to this section is the heaping together of synonyms in close connection, as “congregation” and “assembly,” Pro. 5:14, “lovely hind” and “pleasant roe,” Pro. 5:19; cf. 5:11; 6: 7; 7: 9; 8:13, 31. This usage is, however, only a feature in the characteristic style of this section altogether different from that of Pro. 10: 1-22:16, as well as from that of 25-29, of its disjointed diffuse form, delighting in repetitions, abounding in synonymous parallelism, even to a repetition of the same words (cf. e.g., Pro. 6: 2), which, since the linguistic and the poetic forms are here inseparable, we have already spoken of in the second part of our introductory dissertation. This fundamental diversity in the whole condition of the section, notwithstanding those numerous points of resemblance, demands for Pro. 1: 1-9:18 an altogether different author from Solomon, and one who is more recent. If we hold by this view, then these points of resemblance between the sections find the most satisfactory explanation. The gifted author of the introduction (Pro. 1: 1-9:18) has formed his style, without being an altogether slavish imitator, on the Solomonic proverbs. And why, then, are his parallels confined almost exclusively to the section Pro. 10: 1-22:16, and do not extend to 25-29? Because he edited the former and not the latter, and took pleasure particularly in the proverbs which he placed together, Pro. 10: 1-22:16. Not only are expressions of this section, formed by himself, echoed in his poetry, but the latter are for the most part formed out of germs supplied by the former. One may regard Pro. 19:27, cf. Pro. 27:11, as the germ of the admonitory addresses to the son, and Pro. 14: 1 as the occasion of the allegory of the wise and the foolish woman, 9. Generally, the poetry of this writer has its hidden roots in the older writings. Who does not hear, to mention only one thing, in Pro. 1: 7-9:18 an echo of the old **שָׁמַע** (hear), Deu. 6: 4-9, cf. 11:18-21? The whole poetry of this writer savours of the Book of Deuteronomy. The admonitory addresses Pro. 1: 7-9:18 are to the Book of Proverbs what Deuteronomy is to the Pentateuch. As Deuteronomy seeks to bring home and seal upon the heart of the people the **תּוֹרָה** of the Mosaic law, so do they the **תּוֹרָה** of the Solomonic proverbs.

We now further inquire whether, in the style of the two supplements, Pro. 22:27-24:22 and Pro. 24:23 ff., it is proved that the former concludes the Book of Proverbs edited by the author of the general introduction, and that the latter was added by a different author at the same time with the Hezekiah-collection. Bertheau placed both supplements together, and attributes the introduction to them, Pro. 22:17-21, to the author of the general introduction, Pro. 1: 7-9. From the fact that in v. 19 of this lesser introduction (“I have taught thee, אָרַף־אֶתְּךָ, even thee”) the pronoun is as emphatically repeated as in Pro. 23:15 (לְבִי גַם־אֲנִי, cf. Pro. 23:14, 19), and that נְעִים (sweet), Pro. 22:18, also occurs in the following proverbs, Pro. 23: 8; 24: 4, I see no ground for denying it to the author of the larger general introduction, since, according to Bertheau’s own just observation, the linguistic form of the whole collection of proverbs has an influence on the introduction of the collector; with more justice from שְׁלִישִׁים, Pro. 22:20 [only in *Keri*], as the title of honour given to the collection of proverbs, compared with נְגִידִים, Pro. 8: 6, may we argue for the identity of the authorship of both introductions. As little can the contemporaneousness of the two supplements be shown from the use of the pronoun, Pro. 24:32, the שִׁית לֵב (animus advertere, Pro. 24:32), and יִנְעֵם (shall be delight) Pro. 24:25, for these verbal points of contact, if they proved anything, would prove too much: not only the contemporaneousness of the two supplements, but also the identity of their authorship; but in this case one does not see what the superscription גַּם־אֵלֶּה לְחַכְמִים (these also of the wise men), separating them, means. Moreover, Pro. 24:33 f. are from Pro. 6:10 f., and nearer than the comparison of the first supplement lies the comparison of יִנְעֵם with Pro. 2:10; 9:17, אָדָם חָסֵר לֵב (a man lacking understanding) with Pro. 17:18, יִנְעֻמוּהוּ with Pro. 22:14, — points of contact which, if an explanatory reason is needed, may be accounted for from the circumstance that to the author or authors of the proverbs Pro. 24:23 ff. the Book of Proverbs Pro. 1: 1-24:22 may have been perfectly familiar. From imitation also the points of contact of Pro. 22:17-24:22 may easily be explained; for not merely the lesser introduction, the proverbs themselves also in part strikingly agree with the prevailing language of Pro. 1: 1-9:18: cf. אֲשֶׁר בְּדֶרֶךְ (go straight forward in the way), Pro. 23:19, with Pro. 4:14; חֵכְמוֹת (wisdom), Pro. 24: 7, with Pro. 1:20; 9: 1; and several others. But if, according to Pro. 1: 7, we conceive of the older Book of Proverbs as accompanied with, rather than as without דְּבַר־י חֲכָמִים (words of wise men), then from the similarity of the two superscriptions Pro. 24:23; 25: 1, it is probable that the more recent half of the canonical book begins with Pro. 24:23, and we cannot therefore determine to regard Pro. 24:23 ff. also as a component part of the older Book of Proverbs; particularly since Pro. 24:23 b

is like Pro. 28:21 *a*, and the author of the introduction can scarcely have twice taken into his book the two verses Pro. 24:33 f., which moreover seem to stand in their original connection at Pro. 6:10 f.

The supplements to the Hezekiah-collection, 30 f., are of so peculiar a form, that it will occur to no one (leaving out of view such expressions as קְדָשִׁים דָּאֵה, knowledge of the Holy, 30: 3, cf. 9:10) to ascribe them to one of the authors of the preceding proverbs. We content ourselves here with a reference to Mühlau's work, *De Proverbiorum quae dicuntur Aguri et Lemuelis origine atque indole*, 1869, where the Aramaic-Arabic colouring of this in all probability foreign section is closely investigated.

Having thus abundantly proved that the two groups of proverbs bearing the inscription מְשָׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה are, as to their primary stock, truly old-Solomonic, though not without an admixture of imitations; that, on the contrary, the introduction, Pro. 1: 7-9:18, as well as the דְּבַרֵי חֲכָמִים, Pro. 22:17-24 and 30 f., are not at all old-Solomonic, but belong to the editor of the older Book of Proverbs, which reaches down to Pro. 24:22, so that thus the present book of the poetry of Solomon contains united with it the poems of the older editor, and besides of other poets, partly unknown Israelites, and partly two foreigners particularly named, Agur and Lemuel; we now turn our attention to the DOCTRINAL CONTENTS of the work, and ask whether a manifoldness in the type of instruction is noticeable in it, and whether there is perceptible in this manifoldness a progressive development. It may be possible that the Proverbs of Solomon, the Words of the Wise, and the Proverbial poetry of the editor, as they represent three eras, so also represent three different stages in the development of proverbial poetry. However, the Words of the Wise Pro. 22:17-24 are so internally related to the Proverbs of Solomon, that even the sharpest eye will discover in them not more than the evening twilight of the vanishing Solomonic Mashal. There thus remain on the one side only the Proverbs of Solomon with their echo in the Words of the Wise, on the other the Proverbial Poems of the editor; and these present themselves as monuments of two sharply defined epochs in the progressive development of the Mashal.

The common fundamental character of the book in all its parts is rightly defined when we call it a Book of Wisdom. Indeed, with the Church Fathers not only the Book of Sirach and the Solomonic Apocrypha, but also this Book of Proverbs bears this title, which seems also to have been in use among the Jews, since Melito of Sardes adds to the title "Proverbs of Solomon," ἡ καὶ Σοφία; since, moreover, Eusebius (*H. E.* iv. 22) affirms, that not only Hegesippus and Irenaeus, but the whole of the ancients, called the Proverbs of Solomon Πανάρετος Σοφία.^{f15}

It is also worthy of observation that it is called by Dionysius of Alexandria ἡ σοφὴ βίβλος, and by Gregory of Nazianzum ἡ παιδαγωγικὴ σοφία. These names not only express praise of the book, but they also denote at the same time the circle of human intellectual activity from which it emanated. As the books of prophecy are a product of the פְּסוּקֵי, so the Book of the Proverbs is a product of the מְדַבֵּר, σοφία, the human effort to apprehend the objective σοφία, and thus of φιλοσοφία, or the *studium sapientiae*. It has emanated from the love of wisdom, to incite to the love of wisdom, and to put into the possession of that which is the object of love — for this end it was written. We need not hesitate, in view of Col. 2: 8, to call the Book of Proverbs a “philosophical” treatise, since the origin of the name φιλοσοφία is altogether noble: it expresses the relativity of human knowledge as over against the absoluteness of the divine knowledge, and the possibility of an endlessly progressive advancement of the human toward the divine. The characteristic ideas of a dialectic development of thought and of the formation of a scientific system did not primarily appertain to it — the occasion for this was not present to the Israelitish people: it required fructification through the Japhetic spirit to produce philosophers such as Philo, Maimonides, and Spinoza. But philosophy is everywhere present when the natural, moral, positive, is made the object of a meditation which seeks to apprehend its last ground, its legitimate coherence, its true essence and aim. In the view C. B. Michaelis, in his *Adnotationes uberiores in Hagiographa*, passes from the exposition of the Psalms to that of the Proverbs with the words, “From David’s closet, consecrated to prayer, we now pass into Solomon’s school of wisdom, to admire the greatest of philosophers in the son of the greatest of theologians.” ^{f16}

When we give the name φιλοσοφία to the tendency of mind to which the Book of Proverbs belongs, we do not merely use a current scientific word, but there is an actual internal relation of the Book of Proverbs to that which is the essence of philosophy, which Scripture recognises (Act. 17:27, cf.

Rom. 1:19 f.) as existing within the domain of heathendom, and which stamps it as a natural produce of the human spirit, which never can be wanting where a human being or a people rises to higher self-consciousness and its operations in their changing relation to the phenomena of the external world. The mysteries of the world without him and of the world within him give man no rest, he must seek to solve them; and whenever he does that, he philosophizes, i.e., he strives after a knowledge of the nature of things, and of the laws which govern them in the world of phenomena and of events; on which account also Josephus, referring to Solomon’s knowledge of nature, says (*Ant.* viii. 2. 5), οὐδεμίαν τούτων φύσιν ἠγνόησεν οὐδὲ παρήλθεν ἀνεξέταστον ἀλλ’ ἐν πάσαις ἐφιλοσόφησεν. Cf. Irenaeus, *Cont. Her.* iv. 27. 1: *eam quae est in conditione (κτίσει) sapientiam Dei exponebat physiologicè.*

The historical books show us how much the age of Solomon favoured philosophical inquiries by its prosperity and peace, its active and manifold commercial intercourse with foreign nations, its circle of vision extending to Tarshish and Ophir, and also how Solomon himself attained to an unequalled elevation in the extent of his human and secular knowledge. We also read of some of the wise men in 1Ki. 5:11, cf. Psalm 88-89, who adorned the court of the wisest of kings; and the **מְשָׁל**, which became, through his influence, a special branch of Jewish literature, is the peculiar poetic form of the **חֻקְמָה**. Therefore in the Book of Proverbs we find the name **דְּבָרֵי חֻקְמִים** (words of the wise) used for **מְשָׁלִים** (proverbs); and by a careful consideration of all the proverbs in which mention is made of the **חֻקְמִים**, one will convince himself that this name has not merely a common ethical sense, but begins to be the name of those who made wisdom, i.e., the knowledge of things in the depths of their essence, their special lifework, and who connected themselves together in oneness of sentiment and fellowship into a particular circle within the community. To this conclusion we are conducted by such proverbs as Pro. 13:20 —

*He that walketh with wise men becomes wise,
And whoever has intercourse with fools is destroyed;*

Pro. 15:12 —

*The scorner loveth not that one reprove him:
To wise men he goeth not; —*

and by the contrast, which prevails in the Book of Proverbs, between **לֵץ** (mockers) and **חֻקְמִים** (wise), in which we see that, at the same time with the striving after wisdom, scepticism also, which we call free thought, obtained a great ascendancy in Israel. Mockery of religion, rejection of God in principle and practice, a casting away of all fear of Jahve, and in general of all **δαισιδαίμονία**, were in Israel phenomena which had already marked the times of David. One may see from the Psalms that the community of the Davidic era is to be by no means regarded as furnishing a pattern of religious life: that there were in it **גוֹיִם** (Gentile nations) which were in no way externally inferior to them, and that it did not want for rejecters of God. But it is natural to expect that in the Solomonic era, which was more than any other exposed to the dangers of sensuality and worldliness, and of religious indifference and free-thinking latitudinarianism, the number of the **לֵצִים** increased, and that scepticism and mockery became more intensified. The Solomonic era appears to have first coined the name of **לֵץ** for those men who despised that which was holy, and in doing so laid claim to wisdom (Pro. 14: 6), who caused

contention and bitterness when they spake, and carefully avoided the society of the חכמים, because they thought themselves above their admonitions (Pro. 15:12). For in the psalms of the Davidic time the word נבל is commonly used for them (it occurs in the Proverbs only in Pro. 17:21, with the general meaning of low fellow, Germ. *Bube*), and the name לץ is never met with except once, in Psa. 1: 1, which belongs to the post-Davidic era. One of the Solomonic proverbs (Pro. 21:24) furnishes a definite idea of this newly formed word:

*An inflated arrogant man they call a scorner (לץ),
One who acts in the superfluity of haughtiness.*

By the self-sufficiency of his ungodly thoughts and actions he is distinguished from the פתח (simple), who is only misled, and may therefore be reclaimed, Pro. 19:25; 21:11; by his non-recognition of the Holy in opposition to a better knowledge and better means and opportunities, he is distinguished from the בסיל (foolish, stupid), Pro. 17:16, the אָוִיל (foolish, wicked), Pro. 1: 7; 7:22, and the חסר לב (the void of understanding), Pro. 6:32, who despise truth and instruction from want of understanding, narrowness, and forgetfulness of God, but not from perverse principle. This name specially coined, the definition of it given (cf. also the similarly defining proverb Pro. 24: 8), and in general the rich and fine technical proverbs in relation to the manifold kinds of wisdom (בינה, Pro. 16:16; מוסר, Pro. 1: 8; תבונות, Pro. 21:30; מזמות, Pro. 5: 2; תחבולות, Pro. 1: 5; 12: 5; the תושבה first coined by the Chokma, etc.), of instruction in wisdom (לקח, Pro. 1: 5; תורה, Pro. 4: 2; 6:23; רעה, to tend to a flock, to instruct, Pro. 10:21; חנך, Pro. 22: 6; הובח, Pro. 15:12; לקח נפשות, to win souls, Pro. 6:25; 11:30), of the wise men themselves (חכם, Pro. 12:15; נבון, Pro. 10:13; מוכיח, a reprover, preacher of repentance, Pro. 25:12, etc.), and of the different classes of men (among whom also אדם אחר, one who steps backwards [retrograder], Pro. 28:23) — all this shows that חכמה was at that time not merely the designation of an ethical quality, but also the designation of a science rooted in the fear of God to which many noble men in Israel then addicted themselves. Jeremiah places (Jer. 18:18) the חכם along with the כהן (priest) and נביא (prophet); and if Ezekiel (Eze. 7:26) uses זקן (old man) instead of חכם, yet by reference to Job. 12:12 this may be understood. In his “Dissertation on the popular and intellectual freedom of Israel from the time of the great prophets to the first destruction of Jerusalem” (*Jahrbücher*, i. 96 f.), Ewald says, “One can scarcely sufficiently conceive how high the attainment was which was reached in the pursuit after wisdom (philosophy) in the first centuries after David, and one too much overlooks the

mighty influence it exerted on the entire development of the national life of Israel. The more closely those centuries are inquired into, the more are we astonished at the vast power which wisdom so early exerted on all sides as the common object of pursuit of many men among the people. It first openly manifested itself in special circles of the people, while in the age after Solomon, which was peculiarly favourable to it, eagerly inquisitive scholars gathered around individual masters, until ever increasing schools were formed. But its influence gradually penetrated all the other pursuits of the people, and operated on the most diverse departments of authorship." We are in entire sympathy with this historical view first advanced by Ewald, although we must frequently oppose the carrying of it out in details. The literature and the national history of Israel are certainly not understood if one does not take into consideration, along with the **נְבוּאָה** (prophecy), the influential development of the **חֻכְמָה** as a special aim and subject of intellectual activity in Israel.

And how was this *Chokma* conditioned — to what was it directed? To denote its condition and aim in one word, it was universalistic, or humanistic. Emanating from the fear or the religion of Jahve (**דֶּרֶךְ ה'**, the way of the Lord, Pro. 10:29), but seeking to comprehend the spirit in the letter, the essence in the forms of the national life, its effort was directed towards the general truth affecting mankind as such. While prophecy, which is recognised by the *Chokma* as a spiritual power indispensable to a healthful development of a people (**בְּאֵין חֻזֵן יִפְרַע עִם**, Pro. 29:18), is of service to the historical process into which divine truth enters to work out its results in Israel, and from thence outward among mankind, the *Chokma* seeks to look into the very essence of this truth through the robe of its historical and national manifestation, and then to comprehend those general ideas in which could already be discovered the fitness of the religion of Jahve for becoming the world-religion. From this aim towards the ideal in the historical, towards the everlasting same amid changes, the human (I intentionally use this word) in the Israelitish, the universal religion in the Jahve-religion (Jahvetum), and the universal morality in the Law, all the peculiarities of the Book of Proverbs are explained, as well as of the long, broad stream of the literature of the *Chokma*, beginning with Solomon, which, when the Palestinian Judaism assumed the rugged, exclusive, proud national character of Pharisaism, developed itself in Alexandrinism. Bertheau is amazed that in the Proverbs there are no warnings given against the worship of idols, which from the time of the kings gained more and more prevalence among the Israelitish people. "How is it to be explained," he asks (*Spr.* p. xlii.), "if the proverbs, in part at least, originated during the centuries of conflict between idolatry and the religion of Jahve, and if they were collected at a time in which this conflict reached its climax and stirred all ranks of the people — this conflict against the immorality of the

Phoenician-Babylonian religion of nature, which must often have led into the same region of the moral contemplation of the world over which this book moves?!" The explanation lies in this, that the *Chokma* took its stand-point in a height and depth in which it had the mingling waves of international life and culture under it and above it, without being internally moved thereby. It naturally did not approve of heathenism, it rather looked upon the fear of Jahve as the beginning of wisdom, and the seeking after Jahve as implying the possession of all knowledge (Pro. 28: 5, cf. 1Jo. 2:20); but it passed over the struggle of prophecy against heathendom, it confined itself to its own function, viz., to raise the treasures of general religious-moral truth in the Jahve-religion, and to use them for the ennobling of the Israelites as men. In vain do we look for the name **יְשׁוּעָה** in the Proverbs, even the name **תְּנָרָה** has a much more flexible idea attached to it than that of the law written at Sinai (cf. Pro. 28: 4; 29:18 with Pro. 28: 7; 13:14, and similar passages); prayer and good works are placed above sacrifice, Pro. 15: 8; 21: 3, 27, — practical obedience to the teaching if wisdom above all, Pro. 28: 9. The Proverbs refer with special interest to Gen. 1 and 2, the beginnings of the world and of the human race before nations took their origin. On this primitive record in the book of Genesis, to speak only of the **מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה**, the figure of the tree of life (perhaps also of the fountain of life), found nowhere else in the Old Testament, leans; on it leans also the contrast, deeply pervading the Proverbs, between life (immortality, Pro. 12:28) and death, or between that which is above and that which is beneath (Pro. 15:24); on it also many other expressions, such, e.g., as what is said in Pro. 20:27 of the "spirit of man." This also, as Stier (*Der Weise ein König*, 1849, p. 240) has observed, accounts for the fact that **חָכְמָה** occurs by far most frequently in the Book of Job and in the Solomonic writings. All these phenomena are explained from the general human universal aim of the *Chokma*.

When James (Jam. 3:17) says that the "wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality and without hypocrisy," his words most excellently designate the nature and the contents of the discourse of wisdom in the Solomonic proverbs, and one is almost inclined to think that the apostolic brother of the Lord, when he delineates wisdom, has before his eyes the Book of the Proverbs, which raises to purity by the most impressive admonitions. Next to its admonitions to purity are those especially to peacefulness, to gentle resignation (Pro. 14:30), quietness of mind (Pro. 14:33) and humility (Pro. 11: 2; 15:33; 16: 5, 18), to mercy (even toward beasts, Pro. 12:10), to firmness and sincerity of conviction, to the furtherance of one's neighbour by means of wise discourse and kind help. What is done in the Book of Deuteronomy with reference to the law is continued here. As in Deuteronomy,

so here, love is at the bottom of its admonitions, the love of God to men, and the love of men to one another in their diverse relations (Pro. 12: 2; 15: 9); the conception of **רַחֲמִים** gives way to that of charity, of almsgiving (**δικαιοσύνη** = **ἐλεημοσύνη**). Forgiving, suffering love (Pro. 10:12), love which does good even to enemies (Pro. 25:21 f.), rejoices not over the misfortune that befalls an enemy (Pro. 24:17 f.), retaliates not (Pro. 24:28 f.), but commits all to God (Pro. 20:22), — love in its manifold forms, as that of husband and wife, of children, of friends, — is here recommended with New Testament distinctness and with deepest feeling. Living in the fear of God (Pro. 28:14), the Omniscient (Pro. 15: 3, 11; 16: 2; 21: 2; 24:11 f.), to whom as the final Cause all is referred (Pro. 20:12, 24; 14:31; 22: 2), and whose universal plan all must subserve (Pro. 16: 4; 19:21; 21:30), and on the other side active pure love to man — these are the hinges on which all the teachings of wisdom in the Proverbs turn. Frederick Schlegel, in the fourteenth of his *Lectures on the History of Literature*, distinguishes, not without deep truth, between the historico-prophetic books of the Old Testament, or books of the history of redemption, and the Book of Job, the Psalms, and the Solomonic writings, as books of aspiration, corresponding to the triple chord of faith, hope, charity as the three stages of the inner spiritual life. The Book of Job is designed to support faith amid trials; the Psalms breathe forth and exhibit hope amid the conflicts of earth's longings; the Solomonic writings reveal to us the mystery of the divine love, and the Proverbs that wisdom which grows out of and is itself eternal love. When Schlegel in the same lecture says that the books of the Old Covenant, for the most part, stand under the signature of the lion as the element of the power of will and spirited conflict glowing in divine fire, but that in the inmost hidden kernel and heart of the sacred book the Christian figure of the lamb rises up out of the veil of this lion strength, this may specially be said of the Book of Proverbs, for here that same heavenly wisdom preaches, which, when manifested in person, spake in the Sermon on the Mount, New Testament love in the midst of the Old Testament.

It is said that in the times before Christ there was a tendency to apocryphize not only the Song of Solomon and Ecclesiastes, but also the Book of Proverbs, and that for the first time the men of the Great Synagogue established their canonicity on the ground of their spiritual import; they became perplexed about the Proverbs, according to *b. Sabbath, 30b*, on account of such self-contradictory proverbs as Pro. 26: 4, 5, and according to *Aboth de-Rabbi Nathan, c. 1*, on account of such secular portions as that of the wanton woman, 7. But there is no need to allegorize this woman, and that self-contradiction is easily explained. The theopneustic character of the book and its claim to canonicity show themselves from its integral relation to the Old Testament preparation for redemption; but keeping out of view the book as a

whole, it is self-evident that the conception of a practical proverb such as Pro. 14: 4 and of a prophecy such as Isa. 7:14 are very different phenomena of the spiritual life, and that in general the operation of the Divine Spirit in a proverb is different from that in a prophecy.

We have hitherto noted the character of the instruction set forth in the Proverbs according to the marks common to them in all their parts, but in such a way that we have taken our proofs only from the “Proverbs of Solomon” and the “Words of the Wise,” with the exclusion of the introductory proverbial poems of the older editor. If we compare the two together, it cannot be denied that in the type of the instruction contained in the latter, the *Chokma*, of which the book is an emanation and which it has as its aim (לְדַת חִכְמָה, Pro. 1: 2), stands before us in proportionally much more distinctly defined comprehension and form; we have the same relation before us whose adumbration is the relation of the instruction of wisdom in the Avesta and in the later Minochired (Spiegel, *Parsi-Grammatik*, p. 182 ff.). The *Chokma* appears also in the “Proverbs of Solomon” as a being existing in and for itself, which is opposed to ambiguous subjective thought (Pro. 28:26); but here there is attributed to it an objectivity even to an apparent personality: it goes forth preaching, and places before all men life and death for an eternally decisive choice, it distributes the spirit of those who do not resist (Pro. 1:23), it receives and answers prayer (Pro. 1:28). The speculation regarding the *Chokma* is here with reference to Job 28 (cf. Pro. 2: 4; 3:14 f., 8:11, 19), and particularly to Pro. 28:27, where a demiurgic function is assigned to wisdom, carried back to its source in eternity: it is the medium by which the world was created, Pro. 3:19; it was before the creation of the world with God as from everlasting, His son of royal dignity, Pro. 8:22-26; it was with Him in His work of creation, Pro. 8:27-30; after the creation it remained as His delight, rejoicing always before Him, and particularly on the earth among the sons of men, Pro. 8:30 f. Staudenmaier (*Lehre von der Idee*, p. 37) is certainly not on the wrong course, when under this rejoicing of wisdom before God he understands the development of the ideas or life-thoughts intimately bound up in it — the world-idea. This development is the delight of God, because it represents to the divine contemplation of the contents of wisdom, or of the world-idea founded in the divine understanding, in all its activities and inner harmonies; it is a calm delight, because the divine idea unites with the fresh and every young impulse of life, the purity, goodness, innocence, and holiness of life, because its spirit is light, clear, simple, childlike, in itself peaceful, harmonious, and happy; and this delight is experienced especially on the earth among the sons of men, among whom wisdom has its delight; for, as the divine idea, it is in all in so far as it is the inmost life-thought, the soul of each being, but it is on the earth of men in whom it comes to its self-conception, and self-conscious

comes forth into the light of the clear day. Staudenmaier has done the great service of having worthily estimated the rich and deep fulness of this biblical theologumenon of wisdom, and of having pointed out in it the foundation-stone of a sacred metaphysics and a means of protection against pantheism in all its forms. We see that in the time of the editor of the older Book of Proverbs the wisdom of the schools in its devotion to the chosen object of its pursuit, the divine wisdom living and moving in all nature, and forming the background of all things, rises to a height of speculation on which it has planted a banner showing the right way to latest times. Ewald rightly points to the statements in the introduction to the Proverbs regarding wisdom as a distinct mark of the once great power of wisdom in Israel; for they show us how this power learned to apprehend itself in its own purest height, after it had become as perfect, and at the same time also as self-conscious, as it could at all become in ancient Israel.

Many other appearances also mark the advanced type of instruction contained in the introduction. Hitzig's view (*Sprüche*, p. xvii.f.), that Pro. 1: 6-9:18 are the part of the whole collection which was earliest written, confutes itself on all sides; on the contrary, the views of Bleek in his *Introduction to the Old Testament*, thrown out in a sketchy manner and as if by a diviner, surprisingly agree with our own results, which have been laboriously reached and are here amply established. The advanced type of instruction in the introduction, 1-9, appears among other things in this, that we there find the allegory, which up to this place occurs in Old Testament literature only in scattered little pictures built up into independent poetic forms, particularly in 9, where without any contradiction אִשָּׁת בְּסִילוֹת [a simple woman, Pro. 5:13] is an allegorical person. The technical language of the *Chokma* has extended itself on many sides and been refined (we mention these synonyms: בִּינָה, דָּאָת, חֲכָמָה, עֲרָמָה, מְזֻמָּה, מוֹסֵר, מוֹשֵׁה, תּוֹשֵׁה); and the seven pillars in the house of wisdom, even though it be inadmissible to think of them as the seven liberal arts, yet point to a division into seven parts of which the poet was conscious to himself. The common address, בְּנִי [my son], which is not the address of the father to the son, but of the teacher to the scholar, countenances the supposition that there were at that time בְּנֵי חֲכָמִים, i.e., scholars of the wise men, just as there were "sons of the prophets" (נְבִיאִים), and probably also schools of wisdom. "And when it is described how wisdom spake aloud to the people in all the streets of Jerusalem, in the high places of the city and in every favourable place, does not one feel that such sublime descriptions could not be possible unless at that time wisdom were regarded by the people as one of the first powers, and the wise men truly displayed a great public activity?" We must answer this question of Ewald's in the affirmative.

Bruch, in his *Weisheitslehre der Hebraer*, 1851, was the first to call special attention to the *Chokma* or humanism as a peculiar intellectual tendency in Israel; but he is mistaken in placing it in an indifferent and even hostile relation to the national law and the national cultus, which he compares to the relation of Christian philosophy to orthodox theology. Oehler, in his *Grundzüge der alttestamentl. Weisheit*, which treats more especially of the doctrinal teachings of the Book of Job, judges more correctly; cf. also his comprehensive article, *Pädagogik des A. T.* in Schmid's *Pädagogischer Encyclopädie*, pp. 653-695 (partic. 677-683).

5. The Alexandrian Translation of the Book of Proverbs. — Of highest interest for the history of the Book of Proverbs is the relation of the LXX to the Hebrew text. One half of the proverbs of Agur (30 of the Hebrew text) are placed in it after Pro. 24:22, and the other half after Pro. 24:34; and the proverbs of King Lemuel (Pro. 31: 1-9 of the Hebrew text) are placed after the proverbs of Agur, while the acrostic proverbial poem of the virtuous woman is in its place at the end of the book. That transposition reminds us of the transpositions in Jeremiah, and rests in the one place as well as in the other on a misunderstanding of the true contents. The translator has set aside the new superscription. Pro. 10: 1, as unsuitable, and has not marked the new beginning, Pro. 22:17; he has expunged the new superscription, Pro. 24:23, and has done the same to the superscription, "The words of Agur" (Pro. 30: 1), in two awkward explanations (λόγον φυλασσόμενος and τοὺς ἑμοὺς λόγους φοβήθητι), and the superscription, "The words of Lemuel" (Pro. 31: 1), in one similar (οἱ ἔμοι λόγοι εἴρηνται ὑπὸ Θεοῦ), so that the proverbs of Agur and of Lemuel are without hesitation joined with those of Solomon, whereby it yet remains a mystery why the proverbs beginning with "The words of Agur" have been divided into two parts. Hitzig explains it from a confounding of the columns in which, two being on each page, the Hebrew MS which lay before the translator was written, and in which the proverbs of Agur and of Lemuel (names which tradition understood symbolically of Solomon) were already ranked in order before Proverbs 25. But besides these, there are also many other singular things connected with this Greek translation interesting in themselves and of great critical worth. That it omits Pro. 1:16 may arise from this, that this verse was not found in the original MS, and was introduced from Isa. 59: 7; but there are wanting also proverbs such as Pro. 21: 5, for which no reason can be assigned. But the additions are disproportionately more numerous. Frequently we find a line added to the distich, such as in Pro. 1:18, or an entire distich added, as Pro. 3:15; or of two lines of the Hebrew verse, each is formed into a separate distich, as Pro. 1: 7; 11:16; or we meet with longer interpolations, extending far beyond this measure, as that added to

Pro. 4:27. Many of these proverbs are easily re-translated into the Hebrew, as that added to Pro. 4:27, consisting of four lines:

דִּי דַרְדְּי מִימִינִים יִדַע יְהוָה
וְעַקְשִׁים דַּרְדְּי מִשְׁמַאֲיִלִים
הוּא יִפְלֵס מֵעַגְלוֹתֶיךָ
אֶרְחוּתֶיךָ בְּשִׁלּוֹם יִצְלִיחַ

But many of them also sound as if they had been originally Greek; e.g., the lines appended to Pro. 9:10; 13:15; the distich, Pro. 6:11; the imperfect tristich, Pro. 22:14; and the formless train, Pro. 25:10. The value of these enlargements is very diverse; not a few of these proverbs are truly thoughtful, such as the addition to Pro. 12:13 —

*He who is of mild countenance findeth mercy;
He who is litigious crushes souls —*

and singularly bold in imagery, as the addition to Pro. 9:12 —

*He who supports himself by lies hunts after (רעה) the wind,
He catches at fluttering birds;
For he forsakes the ways of his own vineyard,
And wanders away from the paths of his own field,
And roams through arid steppes and a thirsty land,
And gathers with his hand withered heath.*

The Hebrew text lying before the Alexandrian translators had certainly not all these additions, yet in many passages, such as Pro. 11:16, it is indeed a question whether it is not to be improved from the LXX; and in other passages, where, if one reads the Greek, the Hebrew words naturally take their place, whether these are not at least old Hebrew marginal notes and interpolations which the translation preserves. But this version itself has had its gradual historical development. The text, the κοινή (*communis*), proceeds from the Hexaplar text edited by Origen, which received from him many and diverse revisions; and in the times before Christ, perhaps (as Hitz. supposes), down to the second century after Christ, the translation itself, not being regarded as complete, as in the progress of growth, for not unfrequently two different translations of one and the same proverb stand together, as Pro. 14:22; 29:25 (where also the Peshito follows the LXX after which it translates), or also interpenetrate one another, as Pro. 22: 8, 9. These doubled translations are of historical importance both in relation to the text and to the interpretation of it. Along with the Books of Samuel and Jeremiah, there is no book in regard to which the LXX can be of higher significance than the Book of Proverbs; we shall seek in the course of our exposition duly to estimate the text ^{f17} as

adopted by Bertheau (1847) and Hitzig (1858) in their commentaries, and by Ewald in his *Jahrb.* xi. (1861) and his commentary (2nd ed. 1867). The historical importance of the Egyptian text-recension is heightened by this circumstance, that the old Syrian translator of the Solomonian writings had before him not only the original text, but also the LXX; for the current opinion, that the Peshito, as distinguished from the Syro-Hexaplar version, sprang solely from the original text with the assistance of the Targum, is more and more shown to be erroneous. In the Book of Proverbs the relation of the Peshito and Targum is even the reverse; the Targum of the Proverbs, making use of the Peshito, restores the Masoretic text, — the points of contact with the LXX showing themselves here and there, are brought about ^{f18} by the Peshito. But that Jerome, in his translation of the Vulgate according to the *Hebraea veritas*, sometimes follows the LXX in opposition to the original text, is to be explained with Hitzig from the fact that he based his work on an existing Latin translation made from the LXX. Hence it comes that the two distichs added in the LXX to Pro. 4:27 remain in his work, and that instead of the one distich, Pro. 15: 6, we have two: — *In abundantia* (after the phrase בָּרֵךְ instead of בִּיטָה of the Masoretic text) *justitia virtus maxima est, cogitationes autem impiorum eradicabuntur. Domus* (בֵּיתָה) *justi plurima fortitudo, et in fructibus impiorum conturbatio*; for Jerome has adopted the two translations of the LXX, correcting the second according to the original text. ^{f19}

The fragments of the translations of Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, etc., contained in Greek and Syrian sources, have been recently collected, more perfectly than could have been done by Montfaucon, by Fried. Field, in his work *Origenis Hexaplorum quae supersunt*, etc. (Oxonii, 1867, 4). Of special interest is the more recent translation of the original text, existing only in a MS laid up in the Library of St. Mark [at Venice], executed in bold language, rich in rare and newly invented words, by an unknown author, and belonging to an age which has not yet been determined (*Graecus Venetus*): cf. d'Anse de Villoison's *nova versio Graeca Proverbiorum, Ecclesiastis, Cantici Canticorum*, etc., Argentorati, 1784; and also the *Animadversiones* thereto of Jo. Ge. Dahler, 1786.

The literature of the interpretation of the Book

The literature of the interpretation of the Book of Proverbs is found in Keil's *Einleitung in das A. T.* (1859), p. 346 f. [*Manual of Historico-Critical Introduction to the Old Testament*, translated by Professor Douglas, D. D., Free Church College, Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, Vol. i. p. 468 f.]. The most important of the older linguistic works on this book is the commentary of Albert Schultens (*Lugduni Batavorum*, 1748, 4), whose service to the cause of Semitic philology and O. T. exegesis Mühlau has brought to

remembrance in the Lutheran *Zeitschrift*, 1870, 1; Vogel's abstract (*Halae*, 1769), prefaced by Semler, does not altogether compensate for the original work. From the school of Schultens, and also from that of Schröder, originate the *Anmerkungen* by Alb. Jac. Arnoldi, maternal grandson of Schultens, a Latin edition of which was published (*Lugduni Bat.* 1783) by Henr. Alb. Schultens, the grandson of Schultens by his son. Among the commentaries of English interpreters, that in Latin by Thomas Cartwright (*Amstelredami*, 1663, 4), along with the *Exposition of the Book of Proverbs* by Charles Bridges (4th ed., London, 1859), hold an honourable place. The *Critical Remarks on the Books of Job, Proverbs, etc.*, by D. Durell (Oxford, 1772, 4), also merit attention. Of more recent commentaries, since Keil gave his list of the literature of the subject, have been published those of Elster (1858) and of Zöckerl (1867), forming a part of the theologico-homiletical *Bibelwerk* edited by J. P. Lange. Chs. 25-29 Rud. Stier has specially interpreted in two works entitled *Der Weise ein König* ["The Wise Man a king"], and *Salomonis Weisheit in Hiskiastagen* ["Solomon's Wisdom in the Days of Hezekiah"], 1849; and chapters 30-31 in a work entitled *Die Politik der Weisheit* ["The Politics of Wisdom"], 1850. Part III (1865) of the new exegetico-critical *Aehrenlese* ["Gleanings"] of Fried. Böttcher, edited by Mühlau, furnishes 39 pages of remarks on the Proverbs. Leop. Dukes, author of the Rabbinical *Blumenlese* ["Anthology"], 1844, and the *Schrift zur rabbinischen Spruchkunde*, 1851, has published (1841) a commentary to the Proverbs in Cahen's French *Bibelwerk*. There also is furnished a list of Jewish interpreters down to the appearance of L. H. Loewenstein's Commentary (1838), which contains valuable contributions to the critical confirmation of the Masoretic text, in which Heidenheim's MS remains, and also the Codex of 1294 mentioned in my preface to Baer's edition of the Psalter, and in the *Specimen Lectionum* of Baer's edition of Genesis, are made use of. Among Malbim's best works are, after his Commentary on Isaiah, that on the Mishle (Warsaw, 1867). [*Vide* Preface.]

EXPOSITION

The Older Book of Proverbs

1-24

Superscription And Motto, Pro. 1: 1-7

Pro. 1: 1-7. The external title, i.e., the Synagogue name, of the whole collection of Proverbs is מְשָׁלֵי (*Mishle*), the word with which it commences. Origen (Euseb. *h. e.* vi. 25) uses the name Μισλωθ, i.e., מְשָׁלוֹת, which occurs

in the Talmud and Midrash as the designation of the book, from its contents. In a similar way, the names given to the Psalter, **תהלות** and **תהלים**, are interchanged.

This external title is followed by one which the Book of Proverbs, viewed as to its gradual formation, and first the older portion, gives to itself. It reaches from Pro. 1: 1 to v. 6, and names not only the contents and the author of the book, but also commends it in regard to the service which it is capable of rendering. It contains “Proverbs of Solomon, the son of David, king of Israel.” The books of the **נבואה** and **חכמה**, including the Canticles, thus give their own titles; among the historical books, that of the memoirs of Nehemiah is the only one that does so. **משלי** has the accent *Dechî*, to separate ^{f20} it from the following complex genitive which it governs, and **מלך ישראל** is made the second hemistich, because it belongs to **שלמה**, ^{f21} not to **דוד**.

As to the fundamental idea of the word **משל**, we refer to the derivation given in the *Gesch. der jud. Poesie*, p. 196, from **משל**, Aram. **מתל**, root **תל**, Sanskr. *tul* (whence *tulâ*, balance, similarity), Lat. *tollere*; the comparison of the Arab. *mathal* leads to the same conclusion. “**משל** signifies, not, as Schultens and others after him affirm, *effigies ad similitudinem alius rei expressa*, from **משל** in the primary signification *premere, premente manu tractare*; for the corresponding Arab. verb *mathal* does not at all bear that meaning, but signifies to stand, to present oneself, hence to be like, properly to put oneself forth as something, to represent it; and in the Hebr. also to rule, properly with **אל** to stand on or over something, with **ב** to hold it erect, like Arab. *ḵam* with *b*, *rem administravit* [vid. *Jesaia*, p. 691]. Thus e.g., Gen. 24: 2, it is said of Eliezer: **המשל בכל אשר-לו**, who ruled over all that he (Abraham) had (Luther: was a prince over all his goods). Thus **משל**, figurative discourse which represents that which is real, similitude; hence then parable or shorter apothegm, proverb, in so far as they express primarily something special, but which as a general symbol is then applied to everything else of a like kind, and in so far stands figuratively. An example is found in 1Sa. 10:11 f. It is incorrect to conclude from this meaning of the word that such memorial sayings or proverbs usually contained comparisons, or were clothed in figurative language; for that is the case in by far the fewest number of instances: the oldest have by far the simplest and most special interpretations” (Fleischer). Hence *Mashal*, according to its fundamental idea, is that which stands with something = makes something stand forth = representing. This something that represents may be a thing or a person; as e.g., one may say Job is a *Mashal*, i.e., a representant, similitude, type of Israel (*vide* the work entitled **עץ החיים**, by Ahron b. Elia, c. 90, p. 143); and, like Arab. *mathal*

(more commonly *mithl* = מִשַׁל, cf. מִשַׁל, Job. 41:25), is used quite as generally as is its etymological cogn. *instar* (*instare*). But in Hebr. Mashal always denotes representing discourse with the additional marks of the figurative and concise, e.g., the section which presents (Hab. 2: 6) him to whom it refers as a warning example, but particularly, as there defined, the gnome, the apothegm or maxim, in so far as this represents general truths in sharply outlined little pictures.

Pro. 1: 2. Now follows the statement of the object which these proverbs subserve; and first, in general,

***To become acquainted with wisdom and instruction,
To understand intelligent discourses.***

They seek on the one side to initiate the reader in wisdom and instruction, and on the other to guide him to the understanding of intelligent discourses, for they themselves contain such discourses in which there is a deep penetrating judgment, and they sharpen the understanding of him who engages his attention with them. ^{f22}

As Schultens has already rightly determined the fundamental meaning of יָדַע, frequently compared with the Sanskr. *vid*, to know (whence by gunating, ^{f23} *vêda*, knowledge), after the Arab. *wad'a*, as *deponere*, *penes se condere*, so he also rightly explains הִבְחִינָה by *soliditas*; it means properly (from חָכַם, Arab. *ḥakm*, R. *ḥk*, *vide* under Psa. 10: 8, to be firm, closed) compactness, and then, like *πικνότης*, ability, worldly wisdom, prudence, and in the higher general sense, the knowledge of things in the essence of their being and in the reality of their existence. Along with wisdom stands the moral מוֹסֵר, properly discipline, i.e., moral instruction, and in conformity with this, self-government, self-guidance, from יָסַר = וָסַר, cogn. אָסַר, properly *adstrictio* or *constrictio*; for the מ of the noun signifies both *id quod* or *aliquid quod* (δ, τ) and *quod* in the conjunctive sense (δτ), and thus forms both a concrete (like מוֹסֵר = מַאֲסַר, fetter, chain) and an abstract idea. The first general object of the Proverbs is יָדָע, the reception into oneself of wisdom and moral edification by means of education and training; and second is to comprehend utterances of intelligence, i.e., such as proceed from intelligence and give expression to it (cf. אָמַרְי אֲמַת, 232:21). בִּינָה, *Kal*, to be distinguished (whence בֵּין, between, *constr.* of בֵּין, space between, interval), signifies in *Hiph.* to distinguish, to understand; בִּינָה is, according to the sense, the *n. actionis* of this *Hiph.*, and signifies the understanding as the capability effective in the possession of the right criteria of distinguishing between the true and the false, the good and the bad (1Ki. 3: 9), the wholesome and the pernicious.

Pro. 1: 3-5. In the following, *2a* is expanded in vv. 3-5, then *2b* in v. 6. First the immediate object:

*3 to attain intelligent instruction,
Righteousness, and justice, and integrity;*

*4 To impart to the inexperienced prudence,
To the young man knowledge and discretion*

*5 Let the wise man hear and gain learning,
And the man of understanding take to himself rules of conduct.*

With **לָאָתַת**, denoting the reception into oneself, acquiring, is interchanged (cf. Pro. 2: 1) **קָחָה**, its synonym, used of intellectual reception and appropriation, which, contemplated from the point of view of the relation between the teacher and the learner, is the correlative of **תָּתַת**, **παρὰδιδόναι**, *tradere* (Pro. 9: 9). But **מוֹסֵר הַשִּׁבְל** is that which proceeds from *chokma* and *musar* when they are blended together: discipline of wisdom, discipline training to wisdom; i.e., such morality and good conduct as rest not on external inheritance, training, imitation, and custom, but is bound up with the intelligent knowledge of the Why and the Wherefore. **הַשִּׁבְל**, as Pro. 21:16, is *inf. absol.* used substantively (cf. **הַשְּׁקֵט**, keeping quiet, Isa. 32:17) of **שִׁבְל** (whence **שִׁבְל**, *intellectus*), to entwine, involve; for the thinking through a subject is represented as an interweaving, complicating, configuring of the thoughts (the syllogism is in like manner represented as **אֲשִׁבְל**, Aram. **סְגוּל**, a bunch of grapes), (with which also **סָבַל**, a fool, and **הַסְּבִיל**, to act foolishly, are connected, from the confusion of the thoughts, the entangling of the conceptions; cf. Arab. *'akl*, to understand, and **מַעְקָל**). The series of synonyms (cf. Pro. 23:23) following in *3b*, which are not well fitted to be the immediate object to **לָקַחַת**, present themselves as the unfolding of the contents of the **מוֹסֵר הַשִּׁבְל**, as meaning that namely which is dutiful and right and honest. With the frequently occurring two conceptions **צְדָק וּמִשְׁפָּט** (Pro. 2: 9), (or with the order reversed as in Psa. 119:121) is interchanged **מִשְׁפָּט וְצְדָקָה** (or with the order also reversed, Pro. 21: 3). The remark of Heidenheim, that in **צְדָקָה** the conception of the *justum*, and in **צְדָקָה** that of the *aequum* prevails, is suggested by the circumstance that not **צְדָקָה** but **צְדָקָה** signifies **δικαιοσύνη** (cf. Pro. 10: 2) in the sense of liberality, and then of almsgiving (**ἐλεημοσύνη**); but **צְדָקָה** also frequently signifies a way of thought and action which is regulated not by the letter of the law and by *talio*, but by love (cf. Isa. 41: 2; 42: 6). *Tsedek* and *ts'dakah* have almost the relation to one another of integrity

and justice which practically brings the former into exercise. מִשְׁפָּט (from שָׁפַט, to make straight, to adjust, cf. שָׁבַט, Arab. *sabīṭa*, to be smooth) is the right and the righteousness in which it realizes itself, here subjectively considered, the right mind. ^{f24} מִשְׁרִים (defect. for מִישְׁרִים, from יָשַׁר, to be straight, even) is plur. *tantum*; for its sing. מִיָּשָׁר (after the form מִיָּטָב) the form מִישׁוֹר (in the same ethical sense, e.g., Mal. 2: 6) is used: it means thus a way of thought and of conduct that is straight, i.e., according to what is right, true, i.e., without concealment, honest, i.e., true to duty and faithful to one's word.

Pro. 1: 4. This verse presents another aspect of the object to be served by this book: it seeks to impart prudence to the simple. The form פְּתָאִים ^{f25} (in which, as in גְּוִים, the ׀ plur. remains unwritten) is, in this mongrel form in which it is written (cf. Pro. 7: 7; 8: 5; 9: 6; 14:18; 27:12), made up of פְּתָיִם (Pro. 1:22, 32, once written *plene*, פְּתָיִים, Pro. 22: 3) and פְּתָאִים (Pro. 7: 7). These two forms with ׀ and the transition of ׀ into ׀ are interchanged in the plur. of such nouns as פְּתָיִם, segolate form, “from פָּתַח (cogn. פָּתַח), to be open, properly the open-hearted, i.e., one whose heart stands open to every influence from another, the harmless, good-natured, — a *vox media* among the Hebrews commonly (though not always, cf. e.g., Psa. 116: 6) *in malam partem*: the foolish, silly, one who allows himself to be easily persuaded or led astray, like similar words in other languages — Lat. *simplex*, Gr. εὔθετος, Fr. *naïv*; Arab. *fatyn*, always, however, in a good sense: a high and noble-minded man, not made as yet mistrustful and depressed by sad experiences, therefore *juvenis ingenuus, vir animi generosi*” (Fl.). The פְּתָאִים, not of firm and constant mind, have need of עֲרָמָה; therefore the saying Pro. 14:15, cf. 8: 5; 19:25. The noun עֲרָמָה (a fem. segolate form like חֲכָמָה) means here *calliditas* in a good sense, while the corresponding Arab. ‘*aram* (to be distinguished from the verb ‘*aram*, עָרַם, to peel, to make bare, *nudare*) is used only in a bad sense, of malevolent, deceptive conduct. In the parallel member the word נְאֹר is used, generally (collectively) understood, of the immaturity which must first obtain intellectual and moral clearness and firmness; such an one is in need of *peritia et sollertia*, as Fleischer well renders it; for דָּאָתָה is experimental knowledge, and מְזַמָּה (from זָמַם, according to its primary signification, to press together, *comprimere*; then, referred to mental concentration: to think) signifies in the sing., *sensu, bono*, the capability of comprehending the right purposes, of seizing the right measures, of projecting the right plans.

Pro. 1: 5. In this verse the infinitives of the object pass into independent sentences for the sake of variety. That **יִשְׁמַע** cannot mean *audiet*, but *audiat*, is shown by Pro. 9: 9; but **וַיִּסְרֵךְ** is jussive (with the tone thrown back before **לָקַח**; cf. Pro. 10: 8, and Pro. 16:21, 23, where the tone is not thrown back, as also 2Sa. 24: 3) with the consecutive *Vav* (ו) (= Arab. *f*): let him hear, thus will he... or, in order that he. Whoever is wise is invited to hear these proverbs in order to add learning (*doctrinam*) to that which he already possesses, according to the principle derived from experience, Pro. 9: 9, Mat. 13:12. The segolate **לָקַח**, which *in pausa* retains its **—** as also **בָּמַח, יִשַׁע, צִמַח, מִלֵּךְ, צִדֵּק, קָדַם, צִדֵּק**, and others), means reception, and concretely what one takes into himself with his ear and mind; therefore learning (**διδάχῃ**) with the object of the **ἄποδοχῃ**), as Deu. 32: 2 (parallel **אִמְרָה**, as Pro. 4: 2 **תִּנְרָה**), and then learning that has passed into the possession of the receiver, knowledge, science (Isa. 29:24, parall. **בִּינָה**). Schultens compares the Arab. *laḡaḡ*, used of the fructification of the female palm by the flower-dust of the male. The part. **נִבּוֹן** (the *inf.* of which is found only once, Isa. 10:13) is the passive or the reflexive of the *Hiph.* **הִבִּין**, to explain, to make to understand: one who is caused to understand or who lets himself be informed, and thus an intelligent person — that is one who may gain **תְּחִבּוּלוֹת** by means of these proverbs. This word, found only in the plur. (probably connected with **הַיָּבֵל**, shipmaster, properly one who has to do with the **הַיָּבֵלִים**, ship's ropes, particularly handles the sails, LXX **κυβέρνησιν**), signifies guidance, management, skill to direct anything (Job. 32: 7, of God's skill which directs the clouds), and in the plur. conception, the taking measures, designs in a good sense, or also (as in Pro. 12: 5) in a bad sense; here it means guiding thoughts, regulating principles, judicious rules and maxims, as Pro. 11:14, prudent rules of government, Pro. 20:18; 24: 6 of stratagems. Fl. compares the Arab. *tedbîr* (guidance, from **דָּבַר**, to lead cattle), with its plur. *tedâbîr*, and the Syr. *dubôro*, direction, management, etc.

Pro. 1: 6. The mediate object of these proverbs, as stated in v. 2b, is now expanded, for again it is introduced in the infinitive construction: — The reader shall learn in these proverbs, or by means of them as of a key, to understand such like apothegms generally (as Pro. 22:17 ff.):

***To understand proverb and symbol,
The words of wise men and their enigmas.***

In the *Gesch. der jüüd. Poesie*, p. 200 f., the derivation of the noun **מְלִיצָה** is traced from **לּוֹץ**, primarily to shine, Sanskr. *las*, frequently with the meanings

ludere and *lucere*; but the Arab. brings near another primary meaning. “מליצה, from Arab. root *las*, *flexit*, *torsit*, thus properly *oratio detorta*, *obliqua*, *non aperta*; hence לץ, mocker, properly *qui verbis obliquis utitur*: as *Hiph.* הלליץ, to scoff, but also *verba detorta retorquere*, i.e., to interpret, to explain” (Fl.). Of the root ideas found in הידה, to be sharp, pointed (חד, perhaps related to the Sanskr. *katu*, sharp of taste, but not to *acutus*), and to be twisted (cf. אחר, אגד, עקד, harmonizing with the at present mysterious *catena*), that the preference is given to the latter already, Psa. 78: 2. “The Arab. *ḥād*, to revolve, to turn (whence *hid*, bend, turn aside!), thence הידה, στροφή, cunning, intrigue, as also enigma, dark saying, *perlexe dictum*” (Fl.). The comparison made by Schultens with the Arab. *hidt* as the name of the knot on the horn of the wild-goat shows the sensible fundamental conception. In post-biblical literature חידה is the enigma proper, and מליצה poetry (with הלצה of poetical prose). The *Graec. Venet.* translates it ῥητορείαν.

Pro. 1: 7. The title of the book is followed by its motto, symbol, device:

*The fear of Jahve is the beginning of knowledge;
Wisdom and discipline is despised by fools.*

The first hemistich expresses the highest principle of the Israelitish *Chokma*, as it is found also in Pro. 9:10 (cf. Pro. 15:33), Job. 28:28, and in Psa. 111:10 (whence the LXX has interpolated here two lines). ראשית combines in itself, as ἀρχή, the ideas of *initium* (accordingly J. H. Michaelis: *initium cognitionis*, *a quo quisquis recte philosophari cupit auspiciam facere debet*) and *principium*, i.e., the basis, thus the root (cf. Mic. 1:13 with Job. 19:28).^{f26}

Wisdom comes from God, and whoever fears Him receives it (cf. Jam. 1: 5 f.). יהוה יראת is reverential subordination to the All-directing, and since designedly יהוה is used, and not אלהים (ה), to the One God, the Creator and Governor of the world, who gave His law unto Israel, and also beyond Israel left not His holy will unattested; the reverse side of the fear of Jahve as the Most Holy One is שנאת רע, Pro. 8:13 (post-biblical יראת חטא). The inverted placing of the words 7b imports that the wisdom and discipline which one obtains in the way of the fear of God is only despised by the אנולים, i.e., the hard, thick, stupid; see regarding the root-word אול, *coalescere*, *cohaerere*, *incrassari*, *der Prophet Jesaia*, p. 424, and at Psa. 73: 4. Schultens rightly compares παχέις, *crassi pro stupidis*.^{f27}

בָּנוּ has the tone on the *penult.*, and thus comes from בָּנוּ; the 3rd pr. of בָּנָה would be בָּנוּ or בָּנִי. The perf. (cf. v. 29) is to be interpreted after the Lat. *oderunt* (Ges. § 126).

First Introductory Mashal Discourse, 1: 8-19

WARNING AGAINST FELLOWSHIP WITH THOSE WHO SIN AGAINST THEIR NEIGHBOUR'S LIFE AND PROPERTY

Pro. 1: 8, 9. After the author has indicated the object which his Book of Proverbs is designed to subserve, and the fundamental principle on which it is based, he shows for whom he has intended it; he has particularly the rising generation in his eye:

*8 Hear, my son, thy father's instruction,
And refuse not the teaching of thy mother;*

*9 For these are a fair crown to thy head,
And Jewels to thy neck.*

“My son,” says the teacher of wisdom to the scholar whom he has, or imagines that he has, before him, addressing him as a fatherly friend. The N.T. representation of birth into a new spiritual life, 1Co. 4:15, Phm. 1:10, Gal. 4:19, lies outside the circle of the O.T. representation; the teacher feels himself as a father by virtue of his benevolent, guardian, tender love. Father and mother are the beloved parents of those who are addressed. When the Talmud understands אָבִיךָ of God, אָמְךָ of the people (אָמָה), that is not the grammatico-historic meaning, but the practical interpretation and exposition, after the manner of the Midrash. The same admonition (with נָצַר, keep, instead of שָׁמַע, hear, and מְצִוָּה, command, instead of מוֹסֵר, instruction) is repeated in Pro. 6:20, and what is said of the parents in one passage is in Pro. 10: 1 divided into two synonymous parallel passages. The stricter *musar*, which expresses the idea of sensible means of instruction (discipline), (Pro. 13:24; 22:15; 23:13 f.), is suitably attributed to the father, and the *torah* to the mother, only administered by the word; Wisdom also always says תּוֹרַתִּי (my *torah*), and only once, 8:10, מוֹסְרִי (my *musar*).

Pro. 1: 9. הֵם, which is also used in the neut. *illa*, e.g., Job. 22:24, refers here to the paternal discipline and the maternal teaching. These, obediently received and followed, are the fairest ornament of the child. לְנוֹה, from לָנָה, to wind, to roll, Arab. *lawy* (from לוּ, whence also לִוּלוּ = לוּלוּ, as דוּד, to boil up, = דוּדוּ), means winding, twisted ornament, and especially wreath; a crown of gracefulness is equivalent to a graceful crown, a *corolla gratiosa*, as Schultens

translates it; cf. Pro. 4: 9, according to which, Wisdom bestows such a crown.
f28

עֲנָקִים (or עֲנָקוֹת, Jud. 8:26) are necklaces, jewels for the neck; denom. of the Arab. *ʿunek*, and Aram. עֲנִיֵּק, the neck (perhaps from עֲנִיק = עֵיֶק, to oppress, of heavy burdens; cf. ἀγχίν, the neck). גַּרְגְּרוֹת, is, like *fauces*, the throat by which one swallows (Arab. *garggāra*, *taḡarggēara*), a plur. extensive (Böttcher, § 695), and is better fitted than גַּרְרוֹן to indicate the external throat; Ezekiel, however, uses (Eze. 16:11) *garon*, as our poet (Pro. 3: 3, 22; 6:21) uses *gargéroth*, to represent the front neck. f29

Pro. 1:10. The general counsel of v. 9 is here followed by a more special warning:

*My son, if sinners entice thee
Consent thou not.*

The בְּנִי^{f30} (my son) is emphatically repeated. The intensive from הִטְאִים (signifies men to whom sin has become a habit, thus vicious, wicked. פִּתְהָ (Pi. of פִּתְהָ, to open) is not denom., to make or wish to make a פִּתְהָ; the meaning, to entice (harmonizing with πείθειν), פִּתְהָ obtains from the root-meaning of the *Kal*, for it is related to it as *pandere (januam) to patere*: to open, to make accessible, susceptible, namely to persuasion. The warning 10b is as brief as possible a call of alarm back from the abyss. In the form תִּבֵּא (from אָבָה, to agree to, to be willing, see Wetstein in Job, p. 349) the preformative נ is wanting, as in תִּמְרוּ, 2Sa. 19:14, cf. Ps. 139:20, Ges. § 68, 2, and instead of תִּבֵּא (= תִּאָבָה, 1Ki. 20: 8) is vocalized not תִּבֵּא (cf. 11:25), but after the Aram. תִּבֵּא (cf. יִגְלִי); see Gen. 26:29, and *Comment. on Isaiah*, p. 648; Gesen. § 75, 17.

Pro. 1:11-14. Of the number of wicked men who gain associates to their palliation and strengthening, they are adduced as an example whom covetousness leads to murder.

*11 If they say, “Go with us, we will lurk for blood,
Lie in wait for the innocent without cause;*

*12 Luke the pit we will swallow them alive
And in perfect soundness like them that go down to the grave.*

*13 We find all manner of precious treasure,
Fill our houses with spoil.*

**14 Thou shalt cast thy lot amongst us,
We all have only one purse.”**

Pro. 1:11. The verb **אַרְבַּח** signifies *nectere*, to bind fast (from **אַרְבַּח**, close, compact), (see under Isa. 25:11), and particularly (but so that it bears in itself its object without ellipse) *insidias nectere = insidiari*. Regarding **לָדָם** Fleischer remarks: “Either elliptically for **לְשִׁפְךָ דָּם** (Jewish interp.), or, as the parallelism and the usage of the language of this book rather recommend, *per synecd.* for: for a man, with particular reference to his blood to be poured out (cf. our saying ‘*ein junges Blut*,’ a young blood = a youth, with the underlying conception of the blood giving colour to the body as shining through it, or giving to it life and strength), as Psa. 94:21.” As in post-biblical Heb. **בְּשָׂר וְדָם** (or inverted, **αίμα και σάρξ**, Heb. 2:14), used of men as such, is not so used in the O.T., yet **דָּם**, like **נַפֶּשׁ**, is sometimes used synecdochically for the person, but never with reference to the blood as an essentially constituent part of corporeality, but always with reference to violent putting to death, which separates the blood from the body (cf. my *System der bibl. Psychologie*, p. 242). Here **לָדָם** is explained by **לְדָמִים**, with which it is interchanged, Mic. 7: 2: let us lurk for blood (to be poured out). The verb **צָפַן** is never, like **טָמַן** (to conceal), connected with **חֲבָלִים**, **מוֹקְשִׁים**, **פַּח**, **רֶשֶׁת** — thus none of these words is here to be supplied; the idea of gaining over one expressed in the organic root **צָרַח** (whence **צָפָה**, *diducendo obducere*) has passed over into that of restraining oneself, watching, lurking, hence **צָפַן** (cog. Aram. **בְּמַן**) in the sense of *speculari, insidiari*, interchanges with **צָפָה** (to spy), (cf. Psa. 10: 8; Psa. 56: 7 with Psa. 37:32). The adv. **חִנָּם** (an old accus. from **חָן**) properly means in a gracious manner, as a free gift (**δωρεάν**, *gratis = gratiis*), and accordingly, without reward, also without cause, which frequently = without guilt; but it never signifies *sine effectu qui noceat*, i.e., with impunity (Löwenst.). We have thus either to connect together **נִקְי חִנָּם** “innocent in vain” (as **אֵיבֵי חִנָּם**, my enemies without a cause, Lam. 3:52): his innocence helps him nothing whom God protects not against us notwithstanding his innocence (Schultens, Bertheau, Elster, and others); or connect **חִנָּם** with the verb (lie in wait for), for which Hitzig, after the LXX, Syr., Rashi, ^{f31} Ralbag, Immanuel, rightly decides in view of 1Sa. 19: 5; 25:31; cf. also Job. 9:17, where the succession of the accents is the same (*Tarcha* transmuted from *Mugrash*). Frequently there are combined together in his **חִנָּם** (cf. Isa. 28:14 f.), that which the author thinks, and that which those whom he introduces as speaking think.

Pro. 1:12. The first clause of this verse Hitzig translates: “as the pit (swallows) that which lives.” This is untenable, because **כִּי** with the force of a substantive (as *instar*, likeness) is regarded as a preposition, but not a conjunction (see at Psa. 38:14 f.). **חַיִּים** (the living) is connected with **נִבְלָעֵם**, and is the accus. of the state (*hāl*, according to the terminology of the Arab. grammarians) in which they will, with impunity, swallow them up like the pit (the insatiable, Pro. 27:20; 30:16), namely, while these their sacrifices are in the state of life’s freshness, ^{f32} “the living,” — without doubt, like Psa. 55:16; 63:10; 124: 3, in fact and in expression an allusion to the fate of the company of Korah, Num. 16:30 33. If this is the meaning of **חַיִּים**, then **תְּמִימִים** as the parallel word means *integros* not in an ethical sense, in which it would be a synonym of **נָקִי** of v. 11b (cf. Pro. 29:10 with Psa. 19:14), but in a physical sense (*Graec. Venet. καὶ τελείους*; Parchon as Rashi, **בריאִים ושלמים**, vid., Böttcher, *De Inferis*, § 293). This physical sense is claimed for **תָּם**, Job. 21:23, for **תָּם** probably, Psa. 73: 4, and why should not **תְּמִים**, used in the law regarding sacrifices (e.g., Exo. 12: 5, “without blemish”) of the faultlessness of the victim, also signify such an one **אֲשֶׁר אֵין־בּוֹ מָתָם** (Isa. 1: 6)? In the midst of complete external health they will devour them like those that go down to the grave (cf. Psa. 28: 1; 88: 5, with Isa. 14:19), i.e., like those under whose feet the earth is suddenly opened, so that, without leaving any trace behind, they sink into the grave and into Hades. The connection of the finite with the accus. of place, Psa. 55:16, lies at the foundation of the genitive connection **יִרְדְּי בּוֹר** (with the tone thrown back): those that go down to the grave.

Pro. 1:13, 14. ^{f33} To their invitation, bearing in itself its own condemnation, they add as a lure the splendid self-enriching treasures which in equal and just fellowship with them they may have the prospect of sharing. **הוֹן** (from **הוֹן**, *levem*, then *facilem esse, être aisé, à son aise*) means *aisance*, convenience, opulence, and concretely that by which life is made agreeable, thus money and possessions (Fleischer in Levy’s *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 423 f.). With this **הוֹן** with remarkable frequency in the *Mishle* **יָקָר** (from **יָקָר**, Arab. *waqar, grave esse*) is connected in direct contrast, according to its primary signification; cf. Pro. 12:27; 24: 4: heavy treasures which make life light. Yet it must not be maintained that, as Schultens has remarked, this oxymoron is intended, nor also that it is only consciously present in the language. **מָצָא** has here its primitive appropriate signification of attaining, as Isa. 10:14 of reaching. **שָׁלַל** (from **שָׁלַל**, to draw from, draw out, from **חָל**, cf. **שָׁלַח, שָׁלַף**, Arab. *salab*, *Comm. on Isa.* p. 447) is that which is drawn away from the enemy, *exuviae*, and then the booty and spoil taken in war generally. **נִמְלֵא**, to fill with

anything, make full, governs a double accusative, as the *Kal* (to become full of anything) governs only one. In v. 14, the invitation shows how the prospect is to be realized. Interpreters have difficulty in conceiving what is here meant. Do not a share by lot and a common purse exclude one another? Will they truly, in the distribution of the booty by lot, have equal portions at length, equally much in their money-bags? Or is it meant that, apart from the portion of the booty which falls to every one by lot, they have a common purse which, when their business is ebbing, must supply the wants of the company, and on which the new companion can maintain himself beforehand? Or does it mean only that they will be as mutually helpful to one another, according to the principle τὰ τῶν φίλων κοινά (*amicorum omnia communia*), as if they had only one purse? The meaning is perfectly simple. The oneness of the purse consists in this, that the booty which each of them gets, belongs not wholly or chiefly to him, but to the whole together, and is disposed of by lot; so that, as far as possible, he who participated not at all in the affair in obtaining it, may yet draw the greatest prize. This view harmonizes the relation between 14*b* and 14*a*. The common Semitic כִּסְּף is even used at the present day in Syria and elsewhere as the name of the Exchange (“*Börse*”) (plur *akjās*); here it is the purse (“*Kasse*”) (χρημάτων δοχείον, Procop.), which is made up of the profits of the business. This profit consists not merely in gold, but is here thought of in regard to its worth in gold. The apparent contradiction between distributing by lot and having a common purse disappears when the distribution by lot of the common property is so made, that the retaining of a stock-capital, or reserve fund, is not excluded.

Pro. 1:15. After the men are described against whose enticements a warning is given forth, the warning is emphatically repeated, and is confirmed by a threefold reason:

***My son! go not in the way with them.
Keep back thy foot from their path.***

If בְּדַרְךָ (in the way), taken alone, cannot be equivalent to בְּדַרְךָ אַחֲדָה (in one way), so is אִתָּם (with them) to be regarded as its determination.^{f34}

Foot (not feet), as eye, hand, etc., is used where the members come less under consideration than what they unitedly bring about (Pro. 4:26 f.). נִתְיַבֵּה, from יָבַה, signifies properly that which is raised, especially the (raised) footstep.

Pro. 1:16. The *first* argument to enforce the warning:

***For their feet run to the evil,
And hasten to shed blood.***

That this is their object they make no secret (v. 11 ff.); but why is it that such an object as this should furnish no ground of warning against them, especially as on this beginning the stamp of that which is morally blamable is here impressed with לָרַע? Besides, this circular movement of the thoughts is quite after the manner of this poet; and that v. 16 is his style, 6:18 shows. The want of this distich (16b = Rom. 3:15) in LXX B. **Σ**. weighs heavier certainly than the presence of it in LXX A. (Procop., Syro-Hezap.), since the translation is not independent, but is transferred from Isa. 59: 7; but if for the first time, at a later period, it is supplied in the LXX, yet it has the appearance of an addition made to the Hebr. text from Isa. 59: 7 (Hitzig, Lagarde); cf. *Comm. on Isaiah*, 40-66. לְשַׁפֵּךְ is always pointed thus; for, as a regular rule, after ל as well as מ the aspiration disappears; but in Eze. 17:17 בְּשַׁפֵּךְ is also found, and in this case (cf. at Psa. 40:15) the punctuation is thus inconsequent.

Pro. 1:17. The *second* argument in support of the warning.

***For in vain is the net spread out
In the eyes of all (the winged) birds.***

The interpretation *conspersum est rete*, namely, with corn as a bait, which was put into circulation by Rashi, is inadmissible; for as little as הִנָּה (Hiph. of נָנָה) can mean to strew, can זָרָה mean to spread. The object is always that which is scattered (*gestreut*), not that which is spread (*bestreut*). Thus, *expansum est rete*, but not from מָנַר, *extendere*, from which מְזוֹרָה^{f35} in this form cannot be derived (it would in that case be מְזוֹרָה), but from זָרָה, pass. of זָרָה, to scatter, spread out. The alluring net, when it is shaken out and spread, is, as it were, scattered, *ventilatur*. But if this is done incautiously before the eyes of the birds to be caught, they forthwith fly away. The principle stress lies on the בְּעֵינֵי (before the eyes) as the reason of the הִנָּם (in vain), according to the saying of Ovid, *Quae nimis apparent retia, vitat avis*. The *applicatio similitudinis* lying near, according to J. H. Michaelis, is missed even by himself and by most others. If the poet wished to say that they carried on their work of blood with such open boldness, that he must be more than a simpleton who would allow himself to be caught by them, that would be an unsuitable ground of warning; for would there not be equally great need for warning against fellowship with them, if they had begun their enticement with more cunning, and reckoned on greater success? Hitzig, Ewald, Zöckler, and others, therefore interpret הִנָּם, not in the sense of in vain, inasmuch as they do not let themselves be caught; but: in vain, for they see not the net, but only the scattered corn. But according to the preceding, הָרְשֵׁת (the net) leads us to think only either of the net of the malicious designs, or the net of the alluring

deceptions. Thus, as Ziegler has noticed, the warned ought to make application of the similitude to himself: God not with them, for their intention is bad; go not with them, for if the bird flees away from the net which is spread out before it, thou wilt not surely be so blind as suffer thyself to be ensnared by their gross enticements. **בְּאֵל בְּנֵרִי** : the furnished with the wing (wings in Ecc. 10:20); **בְּאֵל** forms the idea of property (lord).

Pro. 1:18. The causal conj. **כִּי** (for) in vv. 16 and 17 are coordinated; and there now follows, introduced by the conj. **וְ** (“and”), a *third* reason for the warning:

*And they lie in wait for their own blood,
They lay snares for their own lives.*

The warning of v. 16 is founded on the immorality of the conduct of the enticer; that of 17 on the audaciousness of the seduction as such, and now on the self-destruction which the robber and murderer bring upon themselves: they wish to murder others, but, as the result shows, they only murder themselves. The expression is shaped after v. 11, as if it were: They lay snares, as they themselves say, for the blood of others; but it is in reality for their *own* blood: they certainly lie in wait, as they say; but not, as they add, for the innocent, but for their own lives (Fl.). Instead of **לְדַמֵּם**, there might be used **לְדַמֵּיהֶם**, after Mic. 7: 2; but **לְנַפְשָׁם** would signify *ipsis* (post-biblical, **לְאַצְמָם**), while **לְנַפְשָׁתָם** leaves unobliterated the idea of the life: *animis ipsorum*; for if the O.T. language seeks to express *ipse* in any other way than by the personal pronoun spoken emphatically, this is done by the addition of **נַפְשׁ** (Isa. 53:11). **וְהָם** was on this account necessary, because v. 17 has another subject (cf. Ps. 63:10).

Pro. 1:19. An epiphonema:

*Such is the lot of all who indulge in covetousness;
It takes away the life of its owner.*

This language is formed after Job. 8:13. Here, as there, in the word **אֲרָחוֹת**, the ideas of action and issue, manner of life and its result, are all combined. **בַּצַּע** signifies properly that which is cut off, a piece, fragment broken off, then that which one breaks off and takes to himself — booty, gain, particularly unjust gain (Pro. 28:16). **בַּצַּעַן בַּצַּעַן** is he who is greedy or covetous. The subject to **יִקַּח** is **בַּצַּעַן**, covetousness, **πλεονεξία** (see Isa. 57:17). As Hos. 4:11, says of three other things that they taken away **לֵב**, the understanding (**νοῦς**), so here we are taught regarding unjust gain or covetousness, that it takes away

נֶפֶשׁ, the life (נֶפֶשׁ) (נֶפֶשׁ לְקַח נֶפֶשׁ), to take away the life, 1Ki. 19:10, Psa. 31:14). בְּעֵלְיוֹ denotes not the possessor of unjust gain, but as an inward conception, like בְּעַל אֶף, Pro. 22:24, cf. 23: 2; 24: 8, Ecc. 10:11, him of whom covetousness is the property. The sing. נֶפֶשׁ does not show that בְּעֵלְיוֹ is thought of as sing.; cf. Pro. 22:23, Psa. 34:23; but according to Pro. 3:27; 16:22, Ecc. 8: 8, this is nevertheless probable, although the usage without the suffix is always בְּאֵל בְּצַע, and not בְּעֵלְיוֹ (of plur. intens. בְּעֵלִים).

Second Introductory Mashal Discourse, Pro. 1:20-33

DISCOURSE OF WISDOM TO HER DESPISERS

Pro. 1:20-33. After the teacher of wisdom has warned his disciples against the allurements of self-destroying sin, whose beastly demoniacal nature culminates in murder and robbery, he introduces Wisdom herself saying how by enticing promises and deterring threatenings she calls the simple and the perverse to repentance. Wisdom is here personified, i.e., represented as a person. But this personification presupposes, that to the poet wisdom is more than a property and quality of human subjectivity: she is to him as a divine power, existing independently, to submit to which is the happiness of men, and to reject which is their destruction. And also to the public appearance of wisdom, as it is here represented, there must be present objective reality, without which the power of conviction departs from the figure. The author must think on historical and biographical facts, on human organs (as 2Ch. 17: 7-9, cf. Wisd. 7:27), through which, without words and in words, Wisdom delivers such addresses. But the figure cannot be so historical that it sustains only the relation to a definite time, and not to all time; it is a call to repentance, going forth to all time and to all places, which, divested of all the accidents of its externality, he here refers to its invisible divine background, when he begins in these words:

*20 Wisdom cries, sounding loudly in the streets,
She causes her voice to be heard in the chief streets.*

*21 Over the places of greatest tumult she calleth;
In the porches of the gates, in the city, she speaketh forth her words.*

Pro. 1:20. Looking to its form and vocalization, חֲכָמוֹת may be an Aramaizing abstract formation (Ges. 165, c; Olsh. 219, b); for although the forms אֲחֹת and גְּלוֹת are of a different origin, yet in רְבוֹת and הוֹלְלוֹת such abstract formations lie before us. The termination *ûth* is here, by the passing over of the *u* into the less obscure but more intensive *o* (cf. יְהוֹ in the

beginning and middle of the word, and **יְהוּ יְהוּ** at the end of the word), raised to *ôth*, and thereby is brought near to the fem. plur. (cf. **חֲכָמוֹת**, Pro. 14: 1, *sapientia*, as our plur. of the neut. *sapiens*, **חֲכָמָה**), approaching to the abstract. On the other hand, that **חֲכָמוֹת** is sing. of abstract signification, is not decisively denoted by its being joined to the plur. of the predicate (for **תְּרַנָּה** here, as at Pro. 8: 3, is scarcely plur.; and if **רְאִימוֹת**, Pro. 24: 7, is plur., **חֲכָמוֹת** as the numerical plur. may refer to the different sciences or departments of knowledge); but perhaps by this, that it interchanges with **תְּבוּנוֹת**, Psa. 49: 4, cf. Pro. 11:12; 28:16, and that an abstract formation from **חֲכָמָה** (fem. of **חָכָם**, **חָכְמָה**), which besides is not concrete, was unnecessary. Still less is **חֲכָמוֹת** = **חֲכָמָת** a singular, which has it in view to change **חֲכָמָה** into a proper name, for proof of which Hitzig refers to **תְּהוֹמוֹת**, Psa. 78:15; the singular ending *ôth* without an abstract signification does not exist. After that Dietrich, in his *Abhandl.* 1846, has shown that the origin of the plur. proceeds not from separate calculation, but from comprehension,^{f36} and that particularly also names denoting intellectual strength are frequently plur., which multiply the conception not externally but internally, there is no longer any justifiable doubt that **חֲכָמוֹת** signifies the all-comprehending, absolute, or, as Böttcher, § 689, expresses it, the full personal wisdom. Since such intensive plurals are sometimes united with the plur. of the predicate, as e.g., the monotheistically interpreted *Elohim*, Gen. 35: 7 (see *l.c.*), so **תְּרַנָּה** may be plur. On the other hand, the idea that it is a *forma mixta* of **רִנָּן** (from **רִנָּן**) and **תְּרַנָּה** (Job. 39:23) or **תְּרַנָּה**, the final sound in *ah* opposes. It may, however, be the emphatic form of the 3rd fem. sing. of **רִנָּן**; for, that the Hebr. has such an emphatic form, corresponding to the Arab. *taktubanna*, is shown by these three examples (keeping out of view the suspicion of a corruption of the text, Olsh. p. 452), Jud. 5:26, Job. 17:16, Isa. 28: 3; cf. **תִּשְׁלַחְנָה**, Oba. 1:13 (see Caspari, *l.c.*), an example of the 2nd masc. sing. of this formation. **רִנָּן** (with **רִנָּה**) is a word imitative of sound (*Schallwort*), used to denote

“a clear-sounding, shrill voice (thence the Arab. *rannan*, of a speaker who has a clear, piercing voice); then the clear shrill sound of a string or chord of a bow, or the clear tinkle of the arrow in the quiver, and of the metal that has been struck” (Fl.).

The meaning of **רְחִיבוֹת** is covered by *plateae* (Luke 14:21), wide places; and **חוּץ**, which elsewhere may mean that which is without, before the gates of the city and courts, here means the “open air,” in contradistinction to the inside of the houses.

Pro. 1:21. הַמְּיֹזֵת (plur. of הוֹמִי, the ground-form of הִנְמָה, from הָמַי = הִמָּה), “they who are making noise;” for the epithet is poetically sued (Isa. 22: 2) as a substantive, crowded noisy streets or places. רֹאשׁ is the place from which on several sides streets go forth: cf. *ras el-ain*, the place where the well breaks forth; *ras en-nahr*, the place from which the stream divides itself; the sing. is meant distributively as little as at Pro. 8: 2. פְּתָח, if distinguished from שַׁעַר (which also signifies cleft, breach), is the opening of the gate, the entrance by the gate. Four times the poet says that Wisdom goes froth preaching, and four times that she preaches publicly; the בְּעִיר used in five places implies that Wisdom preaches not in the field, before the few who there are met with, but in the city, which is full of people.

Pro. 1:22. The poet has now reached that part of his introduction where he makes use of the very words uttered by Wisdom:

*How long, ye simple, will ye love simplicity,
And scorners delight in scorning,
And fools hate knowledge?*

Three classes of men are here addressed: the פְּתִיִּים, the simple, who, being accessible to seduction, are only too susceptible of evil; the לְצִיִּים, mockers, i.e., free-thinkers (from לִוּץ, Arab. *lus, flectere, torquere*, properly *qui verbis obliquis utitur*); and the בְּסִילִים, fools, i.e., the mentally imbecile and stupid (from בָּסַל, Arab. *kasal*, to be thick, coarse, indolent). The address to these passes immediately over into a declaration regarding them; cf. the same enallage, Pro. 1:27 f. אֲדַמְתִּי has the accent *Mahpach*, on account of the *Pasek* following; vid., *Torath Emeth*, p. 26. Intentionally, Wisdom addresses only the פְּתִיִּים, to whom she expects to find soonest access. Between the futt., which express the continuing love and hatred, stands the perf. הִמְדוּ, which expresses that in which the mockers found pleasure, that which was the object of their love. לָהֶם is the so-called *dat. ethicus*, which reflexively refers to that which is said to be the will and pleasure of the subject; as we say, “I am fond of this and that.” The form תִּאְהָבוּ, *Abulwalid*, Parchon, and Kimchi regard as *Piel*; but תִּאְהָבוּ instead of תִּאְהָבוּ would be a recompensatio of the virtual doubling, defacing the character of the *Piel*. Schultens regards it as a defectively written *Paiël* (in Syr.), but it is not proved that this conjugation exists in Hebr.; much rather תִּאְהָבוּ is the only possible *Kal* form with תִּאְהָבוּ without the pause, regularly formed from תִּאְהָבוּ (vid., Ewald, § 193, a). The division by the accent *Mercha-Mahpach* of the two words תִּאְהָבוּ פְּתִיִּים is equal in value to the connecting of them by *Makkeph*; vid., Baer’s

Psalterium, p. x. In codd., and also in correct texts, תִּשְׁבֹּבוּ is written with the accent *Galgal* on the first syllable, as the servant of the *Mercha-Mahpach*. The *Gaja* is incorrectly here and there placed under the תִּ.

Pro. 1:23. To the call to thoughtfulness which lies in the complaint “How long?” there follows the entreaty:

***Turn ye at my reproof!
Behold! I would pour out my Spirit upon you,
I would make you to know my words.***

23a is not a clause expressive of a wish, which with the particle expressive of a wish, which is wanting, would be תִּשְׁבֹּבוּנָא, or according to *Pro. 23: 1* and *Pro. 27:23* would be שׁוּב תִּשְׁבֹּבוּ. The הִנֵּה, introducing the principal clause, stamps 23a as the conditional clause; the relation of the expressions is as *Isa. 26:10*, *Job. 20:24*. תִּשְׁבֹּבוּ^{f37} is not equivalent to *si convertamini*, which would require תִּפְּנוּ, but to *si revertamini*; but לתּוֹכַחְתִּי^{f38} does not therefore mean at my reproof, i.e., in consequence of it (*Hitzig*, after *Num. 16:34*), but it is a *constructio praegnans*: turning and placing yourselves under my reproof. With תּוֹכַחַת there is supposed an ἔλεγχος (*LXX*, *Symm.*): bringing proof, conviction, punishment. If they, leaving their hitherto accustomed way, permit themselves to be warned against their wickedness, then would Wisdom cause her words to flow forth to them, i.e., would without reserve disclose and communicate to them her spirit, cause them to know (namely by experience) her words. הִבִּיאַ (from נָבַע, *R.* נב; vid., *Genesis*, p. 635) is a common figurative word, expressive of the free pouring forth of thoughts and words, for the mouth is conceived of as a fountain (cf. *Pro. 18: 4* with *Mat. 12:34*), and the ῥῆσις (vid., *LXX*) as ῥεῦσις; only here it has the Spirit as object, but parallel with דְּבַר־יְיָ, thus the Spirit as the active power of the words, which, if the Spirit expresses Himself in them, are πνεῦμα καὶ ζωή, *Joh. 6:63*. The addresses of Wisdom in the Book of Proverbs touch closely upon the discourses of the Lord in the Logos-Gospel. Wisdom appears here as the fountain of the words of salvation for men; and these words of salvation are related to her, just as the λόγοι to the divine λόγος expressing Himself therein.

Pro. 1:24-27. The address of Wisdom now takes another course. Between vv. 23 and 24 there is a pause, as between *Isa. 1:20* and 21. In vain Wisdom expects that her complaints and enticements will be heard. Therefore she turns her call to repentance into a discourse announcing judgment.

***24 Because I have called, and ye refused;
Stretched out my hand, and no man regarded;***

**25 And ye have rejected all my counsel,
And to my reproof have not yielded:**

**26 Therefore will I also laugh at your calamity,
Will mock when your terror cometh;**

**27 When like a storm your terror cometh,
And your destruction swept on like a whirlwind;
When distress and anguish cometh upon you.**

Commencing with יָאֵן (which, like מֵאֵן, from עָנָה, to oppose, denotes the intention, but more the fundamental reason or the cause than, as לְמַאֵן, the motive or object), the clause, connected with גַּם־אֲנִי, *ego vicissim*, turns to the conclusion. As here יָאֵן קָרָאתִי (as the word of Jahve) are connected by גַּם־אֲנִי to the expression of the *talio* in Isa. 66: 4, so also מֵאֵן, with its contrast אָבָה, Isa. 1:19 f. The construction *quoniam vocavi et renuistis* for *quoniam quum vocarem renuistis* (cf. Isa. 12: 1) is the common diffuse (*zerstreute*) Semitic, the paratactic instead of the periodizing style. The stretching out of the hand is, like the “spreading out” in Isa. 65: 2, significant of striving to beckon to the wandering, and to bring them near. Regarding הַקָּשִׁיב, viz., אָזְנוֹ, to make the ear still (R. קָח), *arrigere*, incorrectly explained by Schultens, after the Arab *kashab, polire*, by *aurem purgare*, vid., *Isaiah*, p. 257, note.

Pro. 1:25. פָּרַע is synonymous with נָטַשׁ, Pro. 1: 8; cf. 4:15 פָּרַע־הוּ, turn from it. Gesenius has inaccurately interpreted the phrase פָּרַע רֵאשׁ of the shaving off of the hair, instead of the letting it fly loose. פָּרַע means to loosen (= to lift up, syn. הִחָל), to release, to set free; it combines the meanings of loosening and making empty, or at liberty, which is conveyed in Arab. by *fr'* and *frg*. The latter means, intrans., to be set free, therefore to be or to become free from occupation or business; with (Arabic *mn*) of an object, to be free from it, i.e., to have accomplished it, to have done with it (Fl.). Thus: since ye have dismissed (*missum fecistis*) all my counsel (עָצָה as לָדָה, from יָאֵן, Arabic *w(d)*, i.e., what I always would advise to set you right. אָבָה combines in itself the meanings of consent, Pro. 1:10, and compliance, Pro. 1:30 (with לָ), and, as here, of acceptance. The principal clause begins like an echo of Psa. 2: 4 (cf. Jer. 20: 7).

Pro. 1:26, 27. שָׂחַק, as Pro. 31:25 shows, is not to be understood with בָּ; בָּ is that of the state or time, not of the object. Regarding אֲיִד, *calamitas opprimens, obruens* (from אָוִד = Arabic *âda*, to burden, to oppress), see at

Psa. 31:12. **בֹּא** is related to **יִאָתֶה** as arriving to approaching; **פַּחַדְדָכֶם** is not that for which they are in terror, — for those who are addressed are in the condition of carnal security, — but that which, in the midst of this, will frighten and alarm them. The *Chethîb* **שִׂאוּה** is pointed thus, **שִׂאוּה** (from **שָׂאוּ** = **שָׂאָה**, as **רָאוּה**, **זַעוּה** after the form **אָהַבָה**, **דָּאָבָה**); the *Kerî* substitutes for this infinitive name the usual particip. **שֹׂאָה** (where then the *Vav* is **יְתִיר**, “superfluous”), crashing (fem. of **שָׂאָה**), then a crash and an overthrow with a crash; regarding its root-meaning (to be waste, and then to sound hollow), see under Psa. 35: 8. **סוּפָה** (from **סוּף** = **סָפָה**), sweeping forth as a (see Pro. 10:25) whirlwind. The infinitive construction of 27*a* is continued in 27*b* in the finite.

“This syntactical and logical attraction, by virtue of which a *modus* or *tempus* passes by **ו** or by the mere parallel arrangement (as Pro. 2: 2) from one to another, attracted into the signification and nature of the latter, is peculiar to the Hebr. If there follows a new clause or section of a clause where the discourse takes, as it were, a new departure, that attraction ceases, and the original form of expression is resumed; cf. Pro. 1:22, where after the accent *Athnach* the future is returned to, as here in 27*c* the infinitive construction is restored” (Fl.).

The alliterating words **צָרָה וְצוּקָה**, cf. Isa. 30: 6, Zep. 1:15, are related to each other as narrowness and distress (Hitzig); the Mashal is fond of the stave-rhyme. ^{f39}

Pro. 1:28-31. Then — this sublime preacher in the streets continues — distress shall teach them to pray:

**28 Then shall they call on me, and I will not answer;
They shall early seek after me, and not find me;**

**29 Because that they hated knowledge,
And did not choose the fear of Jahve.**

**30 They have not yielded to my counsel,
Despised all my reproof:**

**31 Therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their way,
And satiate themselves with their own counsels.**

In the full emphatic forms, **יִקְרְאוּנִי**, they shall call on me, **יִשְׁחַרְנֵנִי**, they shall seek me, and **יִמְצְאוּנִי**, they shall find me, the suffix **נִי** may be joined to the old plur. ending *ûn* (Gesenius, Olshausen, Böttcher); but open forms like

יְבַרְכֵנְהוּ, He will bless him, יְכַבְּדֵנִי, He will honour me (from יְכַבְּדֵנִי), and the like, rather favour the conclusion that ך is epenthetic (Ew. § 250, b).^{f40}

The address here takes the form of a declaration: *Stultos nunc indignos censet ulteriori alloquio* (Mich.). It is that laughter and scorn, v. 26, which here sounds forth from the address of the Judge regarding the incorrigible. שָׁחַר is denom. of שָׁחַר, to go out and to seek with the morning twilight, as also בִּקֵּר, Psa. 27: 5, perhaps to appear early, and usually (Arab.) *bakar* (I, II, IV), to rise early, to be zealous (Lane: “He hastened to do or accomplish, or attain the thing needed”). Zöckler, with Hitzig, erroneously regards vv. 29, 30 as the antecedent to v. 31. With וַיֹּאכְלוּ, “and they shall eat,” the fut. announcing judgment are continued from v. 28; cf. Deu. 28:46-48. The conclusion after כִּי תִתֵּן, “therefore because,” or as usually expressed (except here and Deu. 4:37, cf. Gen. 4:25), תִּתֵּן אֲשֶׁר (ὄνθ’ ὄν), is otherwise characterized, Deu. 22:29, 2Ch. 21:12; and besides, תִּתֵּן אֲשֶׁר stands after (e.g., 1Sa. 26:21; 2Ki. 22:17; Jer. 29:19) oftener than before the principal clause. בָּחַר combines in itself the meanings of *eligere* and *diligere* (Fl.). The construction of אָבָה לְ (to be inclining towards) follows that of the analogous שָׁמַע לְ (to hear). Each one eats of the fruit of his way — good fruit of good ways (Isa. 3:10), and evil fruit of evil ways.

“The מִן, 31b, introduces the object from which, as a whole, that which one eats, and with which he is satisfied, is taken as a part, or the object from which, as from a fountain, satisfaction flows forth” (Fl.).

In correct texts, וַיֹּאכְלוּ has the accent *Dechî*, and at the same time *Munach* as its servant. Regarding the laws of punctuation, according to which וּמִמַּעֲצוֹתֵיהֶם (with *Munach* on the tone-syllable, *Tarcha* on the antepenult, and *Metheg* before the *Chateph-Pathach*) is to be written, see Baer’s *Torath Emeth*, p. 11, *Accentssystem*, iv. § 4. Norzi accents the word incorrectly with *Rebia Mugrash*. With the exception of Pro. 22:22, the plural ^{f41} מוֹעֲצוֹת has always the meaning of ungodly counsels.

Pro. 1:32, 33. The discourse is now summarily brought to a close:

***32 For the perverseness of the simple slays them,
And the security of fools destroys them.***

***33 But whoever harkeneth to me dwells secure,
And is at rest from fear of evil.***

Of the two interpretations of **שוב**, a turning towards (with **אל** and the like, conversion) or a turning away (with **מֵאַחֲרַי** or **מֵאַל**, desertion), in **מְשׁוּבָה** the latter (as in the *post-Bib.* **תְּשׁוּבָה**, repentance, the former) is expressed; apostasy from wisdom and from God are conjoined. **שְׁלוּה** is here *carnalis securitas*; but the word may also denote the external and the internal peace of the righteous, as **שְׁאֲנָן**, whence **שְׁלֹאֲנָן**, Job. 21:23, as a superlative is formed by the insertion of the **ל** of **שְׁלוּ**, is taken *in bonam et malam partem*. **שְׁאֲנָן** is, according to the Masora (also in Jer. 30:10; 46:27; 48:11), 3rd perf. *Pilel* (Ewald, § 120, *a*), from the unused **שָׁאֵן**, to be quiet: he has attained to full quietness, and enjoys such. The construction with **מִן** follows the analogy of **מִן** **הַיָּיִח** (to give rest from), **מִן** **שָׁקַט** (to rest from), and the like. The negative interpretation of **מִן**, *sine ullo pavore mali* (Schultens, Ewald), is unnecessary; also Job. 21: 9 may be explained by “peace from terror,” especially since **שְׁלוּם** is derived from the root **שָׁל**, *extrahere*. **פָּחַד רָעָה**, “fear of evil,” one may perhaps distinguish from **פָּחַד רָע** as the genitive of combination.

Third Introductory Mashal Discourse, Proverbs ch. 2

EARNEST STRIVING AFTER WISDOM AS THE WAY TO THE FEAR OF GOD AND TO VIRTUE

Pro. 2. The admonition so far has almost wholly consisted of warning and threatening. The teacher, directing back to the discipline of the paternal home, warns against fellowship in the bloody deeds of the covetous, which issue in self-murder; and Wisdom holds up before her despisers the mirror of the punishment which awaits them. Now the admonition becomes positive. The teacher describes separately the blessings of the endeavour after wisdom; the endeavour after wisdom, which God rewards with the gift of wisdom, leads to religious and moral knowledge, and this guards men on the way of life from all evil. The teacher accordingly interweaves conditions and promises:

*1 My son, if thou receivest my words,
And keepest my commandments by thee;*

*2 So that thou inclinest thine ear unto wisdom,
Turnest thine heart to understanding; —*

*3 Yea, if thou callest after knowledge,
To understanding directest thy voice;*

*4 If thou seekest her as silver,
And searchest for her as for treasures:*

*5 Then shalt thou understand the fear of Jahve,
And find the knowledge of God.*

*6 For Jahve giveth wisdom:
From His mouth cometh knowledge and understanding.*

*7 He preserves for the upright promotion;
A shield for such as walk in innocence.*

*8 For He protects the paths of justice,
And guards the way of His saints.*

The first **וְאִם**, with that which it introduces, vv. 1, 2, is to be interpreted as an exclamation, “O that!” (*O si*), and then as an optative, as Psa. 81: 9; 139:19. **וְאִם** ... **כִּי**, vv. 3-5, with the inserted connecting clauses, would then be confirmatory, “for then.” But since this poet loves to unfold one and the same thought in ever new forms, one has perhaps to begin the conditional premisses with v. 1, and to regard **וְאִם כִּי** as a new commencement. Hitzig takes this **וְאִם כִּי** in the sense of *imo*: “much more if thou goest to meet her, e.g., by curious inquiry, not merely permittest her quietly to come to thee.” **וְאִם** would then preserve its conditional meaning; and **כִּי** as in Job. 31:18, Psa. 130: 4, since it implies an intentional negative, would receive the meaning of *imo*. But the sentences ranged together with **וְאִם** are too closely related in meaning to admit such a negative between them. **כִּי** will thus be confirmatory, not mediately, but immediately; it is the “for = yes” of confirmation of the preceding conditions, and takes them up again (Ewald, § 356, *b*, cf. 330 *b*) after the form of the conditional clause was given up. The **וְצִפְפֹּן**, which in Pro. 1:11, 18, is the synonym of **וְצִפְפֹּה**, *speculari*, presents itself here, 1*b*, 7*a*, as the synonym of **וְצִפְפֹּן**, whence **וְצִפְפֹּנִים**, synon. of **וְצִפְפֹּנִים**, *recondita*; the group of sounds, **צִפְ**, **צִפְ**, **צִפְ** (cf. also **דָּרַף**, in Arab. *dafan*, whence *dafynat*, treasure), express shades of the root representation of pressing together. The inf. of the conclusion **וְלִהְקַשִּׁיב**, to incline (Fr. Venet. **ὤς ἀκροῶτο**), is followed by the accus. of the object **וְאֹזְנֶךָ**, thine ear, for **וְהַקְשִׁיב** properly means to stiffen (not to purge, as Schultens, nor to sharpen, as Gesenius thinks); cf. under Psa. 10:17. With **וְהַקְשִׁיב** are interchanged **וְבִינָה**, which properly means that which is distinguished or separated, and **וְתִבְינָה**, which means the distinguishing, separating, appellations of the capacity of distinguishing in definite cases and in general; but it does not represent this as a faculty of the soul, but as a divine power which communicates itself as the gift of God (*charisma*).

Pro. 2: 3-8. Instead of **כִּי אִם** there is an old **אֵל תִּקְרֵי** ^{f42} (read not so, but thus), **כִּי אִם** (if thou callest understanding mother), which supposes the phrase **כִּי אִם** (LXX) as traditional. If **אִם** were intended (according to which the Targ. in the *Bibl. rabbinica*, but not in Norzi's text, translates), then 3b would correspond; vid., 7: 4, cf. Job. 17:14. Thus: Yea, if thou callest for understanding, i.e., callest her to thee (*Pro. 18: 6*), invitest her to thee (*Pro. 9:15*). The **ק** of **בִּקְשׁוּ** is, with the exception of the imper. (e.g., **בִּקְשׁוּ**), always without the *Dagesh*. V. 4b belongs to the ideas in the Book of Job found in these introductory discourses, cf. Job. 3:21, as at v. 14, Job. 3:22 (Ewald, *Sprüche*, p. 49). **חָפַשׁ** (**חָפַשׁ**), *scrutari*, proceeds, as **חָפַשׁ** shows, from the primary meaning of a ditch, and is thus in its root-idea related to **חָפַר** (to dig, search out). In the principal clause of v. 5 the **יִרְאַת ה'**, as Psa. 19:10, is the fear of Jahve as it ought to be, thus the reverence which is due to Him, the worshipping of Him as revealed. **ה'** and **אֱלֹהִים** are interchanged as **קִדְשִׁים** and **ה'** at 9:10. **יָדָת** is knowledge proceeding from practice and experience, and thus not merely cognition (*Kenntnis*), but knowledge (*Erkenntnis*). The thoughts revolve in a circle only apparently. He who strives after wisdom earnestly and really, reaches in this way fellowship with God; for just as He gives wisdom, it is nowhere else than with Him, and it never comes from any other source than from Him. It comes (v. 6) **מִפִּי ה'** (LXX erroneously **מִפְּנֵי ה'**), i.e., it is communicated through the medium of His word, Job. 22:22, or also (for *λόγος* and *πνεῦμα* lie here undistinguished from one another) it is His breath (Book of Wisdom 7:25: *ἀτμὶς τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης ἐιλικρινῆς*); the inspiration (**נִשְׁמַת**) of the Almighty (according to Job. 32: 8) gives men understanding. In v. 7a, whether **יָצַפְן** (*Chethîb*) or **יָצַפְן** (*Kerî*) is read, the meaning is the same. The former is the expression of the completed fact, as *ἡτοιμάσεν*, 1Co. 2: 9, and is rightly preferred by LXX and Syr., for one reluctantly misses the copula (since the thought is new in comparison with v. 6).

לִישְׂרִים should be written with the accent *Dechî*. The Chokma-word (besides in Proverbs and Job, found only in Mic. 6: 9 and Isa. 28:29) **תּוֹשִׁיָּה** is a *Hiphil* formation (with the passing over of *ô* into *û*, as in **תּוֹנָה**) from **הוֹשִׁיָּה** (whence the pr. names **יֹשְׁיָה** and **יֹשְׁוִיָּה**) = (Arab.) *wasy* and *âsy*, to re-establish, to advance, *Hiph.* of **יָשָׁה** = **וָשָׁה**, to stand, and thus means furtherance, i.e., the power or the gift to further, and concretely that which furthers and profits, particularly true wisdom and true fortune. ^{f43}

The derivation from **נָשׂ** (Pro. 8:21) is to be rejected, because “the formation would be wholly without analogy, so much the more because the **נ** of this word does not represent the place of the **נ**, as is seen from the Arab. *l-ys* and the Syr. *lyt* “ (Fl.); ^{f44} and the derivation of **נָשָׂה** = **נָשָׂה**, to be smooth (Hitzig), passes over without any difficulty into another system of roots. ^{f45}

In the passage under consideration (v. 7), **תְּרוּשָׁה** signifies advancement in the sense of true prosperity. The parallel passage *7a* clothes itself in the form of an apposition: (He) a shield (**מָגֵן**, *n. instr.* of **גָּנַן**, to cover) for **הַלְכֵי תָם**, pilgrims of innocence (Fl.), i.e., such as walk in the way (the object-accus., as Pro. 6:12, for which in Pro. 10: 9 **ב**) of innocence. **תָם** is whole, full submission, moral faultlessness, which chooses God with the whole heart, seeks good without exception: a similar thought is found in Psa. 84:12. **לִנְצֹר**, *8a*, is such an inf. of consequence as **לְהַקְשִׁיב** (v. 2), and here, as there, is continued in the finite. The “paths of justice” are understood with reference to those who enter them and keep in them; parallel, “the way of His saints” (**חֲסִיד**, he who cherishes **חֶסֶד**, earnest inward love to God), for that is just **אֲרַחֲ-צְדָקָה** (Pro. 12:28): they are **הַלְכֵי צְדָקוֹת** (Isa. 33:15). Instead of the *Mugrash*, the conjunctive *Tarcha* is to be given to **וְדָרְךְ**.

Pro. 2: 9-11. With the **אֵז** repeated, the promises encouraging to the endeavour after wisdom take a new departure:

**9 Then shalt thou understand righteousness, and justice,
And uprightness; every way of good.**

**10 For wisdom will enter into thine heart,
And knowledge will do good to thy soul;**

**11 Discretion will keep watch over thee,
Understanding will keep thee.**

Regarding the ethical triad **מִישְׁרִים** [righteousness, rightness], **מִשְׁפָּט** [judgment], and **צְדָקָה** [rectitude], vid., Pro. 1: 3. Seb. Schmid is wrong in his rendering, *et omnis via qua bonum aditur erit tibi plana*, which in comparison with Isa. 26: 7 would be feebly expressed. J. H. Michaelis rightly interprets all these four conceptions as object- accusatives; the fourth is the summarizing asyndeton (cf. Psa. 8: 7) breaking off the enumeration: *omnem denique orbitam boni*; Jerome, *bonam*: in this case, however, **טוֹב** would be genitive (vid., 17: 2). **מַעְגָּל** is the way in which the chariot rolls along; in **עָגַל** there are united the root-conceptions of that which is found (**גַּל**) and rolling (**גָּל**).

Whether כִּי, v. 10, is the argumentative “because” (according to the versions and most interpreters) or “for” (“denn,” J. H. Michaelis, Ewald, and others), is a question. That with כִּי = “for” the subject would precede the verb, as at vv. 6, 21, and Pro. 1:32 (Hitzig), determines nothing, as v. 18 shows. On the one hand, the opinion that כִּי = “because” is opposed by the analogy of the כִּי, v. 6, following אֵל, v. 5; the inequality between vv. 5-8 and v. 9 ff. if the new commencement, v. 9, at once gives place to another, v. 10; the relationship of the subject ideas in vv. 10, 11, which makes v. 11 unsuitable to be a conclusion from v. 10. On the contrary, the promise not only of intellectual, but at the same time also of practical, insight into the right and the good, according to their whole compass and in their manifoldness, can be established or explained quite well as we thus read vv. 10, 11: For wisdom will enter (namely, to make it a dwelling-place, Pro. 14:33; cf. Joh. 14:23) into thine heart, and knowledge will do good to thy soul (namely, by the enjoyment which arises from the possession of knowledge, and the rest which its certainty yields). דָּאֵת, γνῶσις, is elsewhere fem. (Psa. 139: 6), but here, as at Pro. 8:10; 14: 6, in the sense of τὸ γνῶναι, is masc. In v. 11 the contents of the אֵל תְּבִין (v. 9) are further explained. שָׁמַר אֵל, of watching (for Job. 16:16 is to be interpreted differently), is used only by our poet (here and at Pro. 6:22). Discretion, i.e., the capacity of well-considered action, will hold watch over thee, take thee under protection; understanding, i.e., the capacity in the case of opposing rules to make the right choice, and in the matter of extremes to choose the right medium, will be bestowed upon thee. In תִּנְצֵרְכָהּ, as in Psa. 61: 8; 140: 2, 5, Deu. 33: 9, etc., the first stem letter is not assimilated, in order that the word may have a fuller sound; the writing כָּה־ for דָּ־ is meant to affect the eye.

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Pro. 2:12-15. As in vv. 10, 11, the אֵל תְּבִין (“then shalt thou understand,” v. 5) is expanded, so now the watching, preserving, is separately placed in view:

*12 To deliver thee from an evil way,
From the man who speaks falsehood;*

*13 (From those) who forsake the ways of honesty
To walk in ways of darkness,*

*14 Who rejoice to accomplish evil,
Delight in malignant falsehood —*

*15 They are crooked in their paths,
And perverse in their ways.*

That דָּרְךְ רָע is not genitival, *via mali*, but adjectival, *via mala*, is evident from דָּרְךְ לֹא־טוֹב, Pro. 16:29. From the evil way, i.e., conduct, stands opposed to the false words represented in the person of the deceiver; from both kinds of *contagium* wisdom delivers. תְּהַפְכוֹת (like the similarly formed תְּהַבְלוֹת, occurring only as plur.) means misrepresentations, viz., of the good and the true, and that for the purpose of deceiving (Pro. 17:20), *fallaciae*, i.e., intrigues in conduct, and lies and deceit in words. Fl. compares Arab. *ifk*, a lie, and *affak*, a liar. לְהַצִּילֶךָ has *Munach*, the constant servant of *Dechî*, instead of *Metheg*, according to rule (*Accentssystem*, vii. § 2). הַעֲזוּבִים (v. 13) is connected with the collective אִישׁ (cf. Jud. 9:55); we have in the translation separated it into a relative clause with the abstract present. The vocalization of the article fluctuates, yet the expression הַעֲזוּבִים, like v. 17 הַעֲזוּבַת, is the better established (*michlol* 53b); הַעֲזוּבִים is one of the three words which retain their *Metheg*, and yet add to it a *Munach* in the tone-syllable (vid., the two others, Job. 22: 4; 39:26). To the “ways of honesty” (*Geradheit*) (cf. the adj. expression, Jer. 31: 9), which does not shun to come to the light, stand opposed the “ways of darkness,” the ἔργα τοῦ σκότους, Rom. 13:12, which designedly conceal themselves from God (Isa. 29:15) and men (Job. 24:15; 38:13, 15).

Pro. 2:14. In this verse the regimen of the מֵן, 12b, is to be regarded as lost; the description now goes on independently. Whoever does not shrink back from evil, but gives himself up to deceit, who finally is at home in it as in his own proper life-element, and rejoices, yea, delights in that which he ought to shun as something destructive and to be rejected. The neut. רָע is frequently an attributive genit., Pro. 6:24; 15:26; 28: 5; cf. טוֹב, 24:25, which here, since תְּהַפְכוֹת are those who in themselves are bad, does not separate, but heightens: *perversitates non simplices aut vulgares, sed pessimae et ex omni parte vitiosae* (J. H. Michaelis). With אֲשֶׁר (ὅτινες), v. 15, this part is brought to a conclusion. Fleischer, Bertheau, and others interpret אֲרַחֲתֶיהֶם, as the accus. of the nearer definition, as σκολιὸς τὸν νοῦν, τὰς πράξεις; but should it be an accus., then would we expect, in this position of the words, עֲקָשׁוֹ (Isa. 59: 8; Pro. 10: 8, cf. 9:15). עֲקָשִׁים is the pred.; for אֲרַח, like דָּרְךְ, admits of both genders. וּנְלוּזִים carries in it its subject הֵם; לוּזוֹ, like the Arab. *l'd, l'dh*, is a weaker form of לוּזַן, *flectere, inclinare*, intrans. *recedere*: they are turned aside, inclined out of the way to the right and left in their walk (ב as Pro. 17:20).

Pro. 2:16-19. With the resumption of **לְהַצִּילֶךָ**, the watchful protection which wisdom affords to its possessors is further specified in these verses:

*16 To save thee from the strange woman,
From the stranger who useth smooth words;*

*17 Who forsakes the companion of her youth,
And forgets the covenant of her God;*

*18 For she sinks down to death together with her house,
And to the shadow of Hades her paths —*

*19 All they who go to her return not again,
And reach not the paths of life*

The subject here continued is the fourfold wisdom named in vv. 10, 11. **זָר** signifies *alienus*, which may also be equivalent to *alius populi*, but of a much wider compass — -him who does not belong to a certain class (e.g., the non-priestly or the laity), the person or thing not belonging to me, or also some other than I designate; on the other hand, **נָכַר**, *peregrinus*, scarcely anywhere divests itself of the essential mark of a strange foreign origin. While thus **זָרָה אִשָּׁה** is the non-married wife, **נְכַרְיָה** designates her as non-Israelitish.

Prostitution was partly sanctioned in the cultus of the Midianites, Syrians, and other nations neighbouring to Israel, and thus was regarded as nothing less than customary. In Israel, on the contrary, the law (Deu. 23:18 f.) forbade it under a penalty, and therefore it was chiefly practised by foreign women (Pro. 23:27, and cf. the exception, Rut. 2:10),^{f47} — an inveterate vice, which spread itself particularly from the latter days of Solomon, along with general ungodliness, and excusing itself under the polygamy sanctioned by the law, brought ruin on the state. The *Chokma* contends against this, and throughout presents monogamy as alone corresponding to the institution and the idea of the relation. Designating marriage as the “covenant of God,” it condemns not only adulterous but generally promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, because unhallowed and thus unjustifiable, and likewise arbitrary divorce. Regarding the ancient ceremonies connected with the celebration of marriage we are not specially informed; but from v. 17, Mal. 2:14 (Ewald, Bertheau, Hitzig, but not Köhler), it appears that the celebration of marriage was a religious act, and that they who were joined together in marriage called God to witness and ratify the vows they took upon themselves. The perf. in the attributive clause **הַחֲלִיקָה אֶמְרֶיהָ** proceeds on the routine acquired in cajoling and dissembling: who has smoothed her words, i.e., learned to entice by flattering words (Fl.).

Pro. 2:17-19. אֶלְנִי, as here used, has nothing to do with the phylarch-name, similar in sound, which is a denom. of אֶלְנִי; but it comes immediately from אֶלְנִי, to accustom oneself to a person or cause, to be familiar therewith (while the Aram. אֶלְנִי, יִלְנִי, to learn, Pa. to teach), and thus means, as the synon. of אֶלְנִי, the companion or familiar associate (vid., Schultens). Parallels such as Jer. 3: 4 suggested to the old interpreters the allegorical explanation of the adulteress as the personification of the apostasy or of heresy. V. 18a the LXX translate: ἔθετο γὰρ παρὰ τῷ θανάτῳ τὸν οἶκον αὐτῆς: she (the dissolute wife) has placed her house beside death (the abyss of death). This שָׁחָה [ἔθετο] is perhaps the original, for the text as it lies before us is doubtful, though, rightly understood, admissible. The accentuation marks בִּיתָהּ as the subject, but בֵּיתָהּ is elsewhere always masc., and does not, like the rarer אֶרְחָה, v. 15, admit in usage a double gender; also, if the fem. usage were here introduced (Bertheau, Hitzig), then the predicate, even though בִּיתָהּ were regarded as fem., might be, in conformity with rule, שָׁחָה, as e.g., Isa. 2:17. שָׁחָה is, as in Psa. 44:26, 3rd pr. of שׁוּחָה, Arab. *sākh*, to go down, to sink; the emendation שָׁחָה (Joseph Kimchi) does not recommend itself on this account, that שָׁחָה and שָׁחָה mean, according to usage, to stoop or to bend down; and to interpret (Rabag, השפילה) שָׁחָה transitively is inadmissible. For that reason Aben Ezra interprets בִּיתָהּ as in apposition: to death, to its house; but then the poet in that case should say אֶל-שְׂאוֹל, for death is not a house. On the other hand, we cannot perceive in בִּיתָהּ an accus. of the nearer definition (J. H. Michaelis, Fl.); the expression would here, as 15a, be refined without purpose. Böttcher has recognised בִּיתָהּ as permutative, the personal subject: for she sinks down to death, her house, i.e., she herself, together with all that belongs to her; cf. the permutative of the subject, Job. 29: 3, Isa. 29:23 (vid., comm. *l.c.*), and the more particularly statement of the object, Exo. 2: 6, etc. Regarding רַפָּאִים, shadows of the under-world (from רָפָה, synon. חָלָה, weakened, or to become powerless), a word common to the Solomonic writings, vid., *Comment. on Isaiah*, p. 206. What v. 18b says of the person of the adulteress, v. 19 says of those who live with her בִּיתָהּ, her house-companions. בָּאִיָּהּ, “those entering in to her,” is equivalent to בָּאִים אֵלֶיהָ; the participle of verbs *eundi et veniendi* takes the accusative object of the finite as gen. in *st. constr.*, as e.g., Pro. 1:12; 2: 7, Gen. 23:18; 9:10 (cf. Jer. 10:20). The יִשׁוּבוּן, with the tone on the ult., is a protestation: there is no return for those who practise fornication, ^{f48} and they do not reach the paths of life from which they have so widely strayed. ^{f49}

Pro. 2:20-22. With לִמְאֵן there commences a new section, coordinating itself with the לְהַצִּילְךָ (“to deliver thee”) of vv. 12, 16, unfolding that which wisdom accomplishes as a preserver and guide:

*20 So that thou walkest in the good way,
And keepest the right paths.*

*21 For the upright shall inhabit the land,
And the innocent shall remain in it.*

*22 But the godless are cut off out the land,
And the faithless are rooted out of it.*

Wisdom — thus the connection — will keep thee, so that thou shalt not fall under the seductions of man or of woman; keep, in order that thou... לִמְאֵן (from מֵאֵן = מַעֲנֶה, tendency, purpose) refers to the intention and object of the protecting wisdom. To the two negative designations of design there follows, as the third and last, a positive one. טוֹבִים (contrast to רָעִים, Pro. 14:19) is here used in a general ethical sense: the good (*Guten*, not *Gütigen*, the kind). שָׁמַר, with the object of the way, may in another connection also mean to keep oneself from, *cavere ab* (Psa. 17: 4); here it means: carefully to keep in it. The promise of v. 21 is the same as in the Mashal Psa. 37: 9, 11, 22; cf. Pro. 10:30. אֶרֶץ is Canaan, or the land which God promised to the patriarchs, and in which He planted Israel, whom He had brought out of Egypt; not the earth, as Mat. 5: 5, according to the extended, unlimited N.T. circle of vision. מִלֵּל (Milel) is erroneously explained by Schultens: *funiculis bene firmis irroborabunt in terra*. The verb מִלֵּל, Arab. *watar*, signifies to yoke (whence מִלֵּל, a cord, rope), then intrans. to be stretched out in length, to be hanging over (vid., Fleischer on Job. 30:11); whence מִלֵּל, residue, Zep. 2: 9, and after which the LXX here renders ὑπολειφθήσονται, and Jerome *permanebunt*. In 22b the old translators render מִסְחָו as the fut. of the pass. נָסַח, Deu. 28:63; but in this case it would be מִסְחָוּ. The form מִסְחָו, pointed מִסְחָו, might be the *Niph.* of סָחַח, but סָחַח can neither be taken as one with נָסַח, of the same meaning, nor with Hitzig is it to be vocalized מִסְחָו (*Hoph.* of נָסַח); nor, with Böttcher (§ 1100, p. 453), is מִסְחָו to be regarded as a veritable fut. *Niph.* מִסְחָו is, as at Pro. 15:25, Psa. 52: 7, active: *evellant*; and this, with the subj. remaining indefinite (for which J. H. Michaelis refers to Hos. 12: 9), is equivalent to *evellentur*. This indefinite “they” or “one” (“*man*”), Fleischer remarks, can even be used of God, as here and Job. 7: 3, — a thing which is common in Persian, where e.g., the expression rendered *hominem ex pulvere fecerunt* is used instead of the fuller form, which would be rendered *homo a*

Deo ex pulvere factus est. בּוֹגְדִים bears (as בְּנֵד proves) the primary meaning of concealed, i.e., malicious (treacherous and rapacious, Isa. 33: 1), and then faithless men. ^{f50}

Fourth Introductory Mashal Discourse, Pro. 3: 1-18

EXHORTATION TO LOVE AND FAITHFULNESS, AND SELF-SACRIFICING DEVOTION TO GOD, AS THE TRUE WISDOM

Pro. 3: 1-4. The foregoing Mashal discourse seeks to guard youth against ruinous companionship; this points out to them more particularly the relation toward God and man, which alone can make them truly happy, vv. 1-4.

*1 My son, forget not my doctrine,
And let thine heart keep my commandments;*

*2 For length of days, and years of life,
And peace, will they add to thee.*

*3 Let not kindness and truth forsake thee:
Bind them about thy neck,
Write them on the tablet of thy heart,*

*4 And obtain favour and true prudence
In the eyes of God and of men.*

The admonition takes a new departure. תּוֹרָתִי and מִצְוֹתַי refer to the following new discourse and laws of conduct. Here, in the midst of the discourse, we have יָצַר and not יִנְצֵר; the non-assimilated form is found only in the conclusion, e.g., Pro. 2:11; 5: 2. The plur. יוֹסִיפוּ (v. 2) for תוֹסִיפְנָה (they will bring, add) refers to the doctrine and the precepts; the synallage has its ground in this, that the fem. construction in Hebrew is not applicable in such a case; the vulgar Arab. also has set aside the forms *jaktubna, taktubna*. “Extension of days” is continuance of duration, stretching itself out according to the promise, Exo. 20:12, and “years of life” (Pro. 9:11) are years — namely, many of them — of a life which is life in the full sense of the word. חַיִּים has here the pregnant signification *vita vitalis*, βίος βιωτός (Fl.). שְׁלוֹם (R. שָׁל) is pure well-being, free from all that disturbs peace or satisfaction, internal and external contentment.

Pro. 3: 3. With this verse the doctrine begins; אֵל (not לֵא) shows the 3a does not continue the promise of v. 2. חָסַד (R. חָס, *stringere, afficere*) is, according to the prevailing usage of the language, well-affectedness, it may be of God toward men, or of men toward God, or of men toward one another — a loving

disposition, of the same meaning as the N.T. ἀγάπη (vid., e.g., Hos 6: 6). אֶמֶת (from אִמְנַת), continuance, a standing to one's promises, and not falsifying just expectations; thus fidelity, πίστις, in the interrelated sense of *fides* and *fidelitas*. These two states of mind and of conduct are here contemplated as moral powers (Psa. 61: 8; 43: 3), which are of excellent service, and bring precious gain; and 4b shows that their ramification on the side of God and of men, the religious and the moral, remains radically inseparable. The suffix ׀— does not refer to the doctrine and the precepts, but to these two cardinal virtues. If the disciple is admonished to bind them about his neck (vid., Pro. 1: 9, cf. 3:22), so here reference is made, not to ornament, nor yet to protection against evil influences by means of them, as by an amulet^{f51} (for which proofs are wanting), but to the signet which was wont to be constantly carried (Gen. 38:18, cf. Son. 8: 6) on a string around the neck. The parallel member 3c confirms this; 3b and 3c together put us in mind of the *Tephillim* (phylacteries), Exo. 13:16, Deu. 6: 8; 11:18, in which what is here a figure is presented in external form, but as the real figure of that which is required in the inward parts. לִוּיָהּ (from לוֹיָהּ, Arab. *l'ah*, to begin to shine, e.g., of a shooting star, gleaming sword; vid., Wetzstein, *Deutsch. morgenl. Zeitschr.* xxii. 151 f.) signifies the tablet prepared for writing by means of polish; to write love and fidelity on the tablet of the heart, is to impress deeply on the heart the duty of both virtues, so that one will be impelled to them from within outward (Jer. 31:33).

Pro. 3: 4. To the admonitory imper. there follows here a second, as Pro. 4: 4; 20:13, Amo. 5: 4, 2Ch. 20:20, instead of which also the *perf. consec.* might stand; the counsellor wishes, with the good to which he advises, at the same time to present its good results. שֶׁבֶל is (1Sa. 25: 3) the appearance, for the Arab. *shakl* means *forma*, as uniting or binding the lineaments or contours into one figure, σχῆμα, according to which שֶׁבֶל טוֹב may be interpreted of the pleasing and advantageous impression which the well-built external appearance of a man makes, as an image of that which his internal excellence produces; thus, favourable view, friendly judgment, good reputation (Ewald, Hitzig, Zöckler). But everywhere else (Pro. 13:15; Psa. 111:10; 2Ch. 30:22) this phrase means good, i.e., fine, well-becoming insight, or prudence; and שֶׁבֶל has in the language of the *Mishle* no other meaning than *intellectus*, which proceeds from the inwardly forming activity of the mind. He obtains favour in the eyes of God and man, to whom favour on both sides is shown; he obtains refined prudence, to whom it is on both sides adjudicated. It is unnecessary, with Ewald and Hitzig, to assign the two objects to God and men. In the eyes of both at the same time, he who carries love and faithfulness in his heart appears as one to whom חֵן and שֶׁבֶל טוֹב must be adjudicated.

Pro. 3: 5-8. Were “kindness and truth” (v. 3) understood only in relation to men, then the following admonition would not be interposed, since it proceeds from that going before, if there the quality of kindness and truth, not only towards man, but also towards God, is commended:

***5 Trust in Jahve with thy whole heart,
And lean not on thine own understanding.***

***6 In all thy ways acknowledge Him,
And He will make plain thy paths.***

***7 Be not wise in thine own eyes;
Fear Jahve, and depart from evil.***

***8 Health will then come to thy navel,
And refreshing to thy bones.***

From God alone comes true prosperity, true help. He knows the right way to the right ends. He knows what benefits us. He is able to free us from that which does us harm: therefore it is our duty and our safety to place our confidence wholly in Him, and to trust not to our own judgment. The verb **בָּטַח**, Arab. *baṭḥ*, has the root-meaning *expandere*, whence perhaps, by a more direct way than that noted under Psa. 4: 6, it acquires the meaning *confidere*, to lean with the whole body on something, in order to rest upon it, strengthened by **אָל**, if one lean wholly — Fr. *se reposer sur quelqu'un*; Ital. *riposarsi sopra alcuno*, — like **הִשְׁעֵן** with **אָל**, to lean on anything, so as to be supported by it; with **אָל**, to support oneself on anything (Fl.). **דָּעָהוּ** (the same in form as **שָׂאָהוּ**, Num. 11:12) is not fully represented by “acknowledge Him;” as in 1Ch. 28: 9 it is not a mere theoretic acknowledgment that is meant, but earnest penetrating cognizance, engaging the whole man. The practico-mystical **דָּעָהוּ**, in and of itself full of significance, according to O. and N.T. usage, is yet strengthened by *toto corde*. The heart is the central seat of all spiritual soul-strength; to love God with the whole heart is to concentrate the whole inner life on the active contemplation of God, and the ready observance of His will. God requites such as show regard to Him, by making plain their path before them, i.e., by leading them directly to the right end, removing all hindrances out of their way. **אֶרְחֹמֶיךָ** has *Cholem* in the first syllable (vid., Kimchi’s *Lex.*).^{f52}

“Be not wise in thine own eyes” is equivalent to *ne tibi sapiens videare*; for, as J. H. Michaelis remarks, *confidere Deo est sapere, sibi vero ac suae sapientiae, desipere*. “Fear God and depart from evil” is the twofold representation of the **εὐσεβεία**, or practical piety, in the *Chokma* writings:

Pro. 16: 6, the Mashal psalm 34:10, 15, and Job. 28:28 cf. 1: 2. For **סר מרע**, the post-biblical expression is **נרא חטא**.

Pro. 3: 8. The subject to **תהי** (it shall be) is just this religious-moral conduct. The conjectural reading **לבשרך** (Clericus), **לשארך = לשרך** (Ewald, Hitzig), to thy flesh or body, is unnecessary; the LXX and Syr. so translating, generalize the expression, which is not according to their taste. **שר**, from **שרר**, Arab. *sarr*, to be fast, to bind fast, properly, the umbilical cord (which the Arabs call *surr*, whence the denom. *sarra*, to cut off the umbilical cord of the newborn); thus the navel, the origin of which coincides with the independent individual existence of the new-born, and is as the firm centre (cf. Arab. *saryr*, foundation, basis, *Job*, p. 487) of the existence of the body. The system of punctuation does not, as a rule, permit the doubling of **ר**, probably on account of the prevailing half guttural, i.e., the uvular utterance of this sound by the men of Tiberias.¹⁵³

לשרך here, and **שרך** at Eze. 16: 4, belong to the exceptions; cf. the expanded duplication in **שררך**, Son. 7: 3, to which a chief form **שרר** is as little to be assumed as is a **הרר** to **הררי**. The **ἄπ. γερ. רפאות**, healing, has here, as **מרפא**, Pro. 4:22; 16:24, and **תרופה**, Eze. 47:12, not the meaning of restoration from sickness, but the raising up of enfeebled strength, or the confirming of that which exists; the navel comes into view as the middle point of the *vis vitalis*. **שקוי** is a *Piel* formation, corresponding to the abstract *Kal* formation **רפאות**; the Arab. *saqâ*, used transit. (to give to drink), also *saqqâ* (cf. *Pu. Job*. 21:24) and *asqâ*, like the Hebr. **השקה** (*Hiph.* of **שקה**, to drink); the infin. (Arab.) *saqy* means, to the obliterating of the proper signification, distribution, benefaction, showing friendship, but in the passage before us is to be explained after Job. 21:24 (the marrow of his bones is well watered; Arnheim — full of sap) and Pro. 15:30. Bertheau and Hitzig erroneously regard v. 8 as the conclusion to v. 7, for they interpret **רפאות** as the subject; but had the poet wished to be so understood, he should have written **ותהי**. Much rather the subject is devotion withdrawn from the evil one and turned to God, which externally proves itself by the dedication to Him of earthly possessions.

**9 Honour Jahve with thy wealth,
And with the first-fruits of all thine increase:**

**10 Then shall thy barns be filled with plenty,
And thy vats overflow with must.**

Pro. 3: 9, 10. It may surprise us that the Chokma, being separated from the ceremonial law, here commends the giving of tithes. But in the first place, the consciousness of the duty of giving tithes is older than the Mosaic law, Gen. 28:22; in this case, the giving of tithes is here a general ethical expression. עֵשֶׂר and מַעֲשֵׂר do not occur in the Book of Proverbs; in the post-biblical phraseology the tithes are called חֶלֶק הַגְּבוּהָ, the portion of the Most High. כִּבֵּד, as the Arab. *wakkra*, to make heavy, then to regard and deal with as weighty and solemn (*opp.* קָלַל, to regard and treat as light, from קָלַל = Arab. *hân*, to be light). הוֹן, properly lightness in the sense of *aisance*, opulency, forms with כִּבֵּד an *oxymoron* (*fac Jovam gravem de levitate tua*), but one aimed at by the author neither at Pro. 1:13 nor here. מִן (in מֵהַנֶּנְדָה and מֵרֵךְ, v. 9) is in both cases partitive, as in the law of the Levitical tenths, Lev. 27:30, and of the *Challa* (heave-offering of dough), Num. 15:21, where also רֵאשִׁית (in Heb. 7: 4, ἀκροθίνια) occurs in a similar sense, cf. Num. 18:12 (in the law of the *Theruma* or wave-offering of the priests), as also תְּבוּאָה in the law of the second tenths, Deu. 14:22, cf. Num. 18:30 (in the law of the tenths of the priests). V. 10. With אַפּוֹדוֹסִיס *imperativi* the conclusion begins. שָׂבַע, satisfaction, is equivalent to fulness, making satisfied, and that, too, richly satisfied; תִּירוֹשׁ also is such an accusative, as verbs of filling govern it, for פָּרַץ, to break through especially to overflow, signifies to be or become overflowingly full (Job. 1:10). מִסָּן (from מִסָּן, Chald. אִסָּן, Syr. *âsan*, to lay up in granaries) is the granary, of the same meaning as the Arab. *âkhzan* (from *khazan* = מִסָּן, Isa. 23:18, *recondere*), whence the Spanish *magazen*, the French and German *magazin*. יָקַב (from יָקַב, Arab. *wakab*, to be hollow) is the vat or tub into which the must flows from the wine-press (נֵת or פּוֹרְהָ), λάκκος or ὑπολήνιον. Cf. the same admonition and promise in the prophetic statement of Mal. 3:10-12.

Pro. 3:11, 12. The contrast here follows. As God should not be forgotten in days of prosperity, so one should not suffer himself to be estranged from Him by days of adversity.

***11 The school of Jahve, my son, despise thou not,
Nor loathe thou His correction;***

***12 For Jahve correcteth him whom He loveth,
And that as a father his son whom he loveth***

Vid., the original passage Job. 5:17 f. There is not for the Book of Job a more suitable motto than this tetrastich, which expresses its fundamental thought,

that there is a being chastened and tried by suffering which has as its motive the love of God, and which does not exclude sonship.^{f54}

One may say that v. 11 expresses the problem of the Book of Job, and v. 12 its solution. מוֹסֵר, παιδεία, we have translated “school,” for מוֹסֵר, παιδεύειν, means in reality to take one into school. *Ahdung* [punishment] or *Rüge* [reproof] is the German word which most corresponds to the Hebr. תּוֹכַחָה or תּוֹכַחַת. קוּיַן בְּ (whence here the prohibitive תִּקַּן with אַל) means to experience loathing (disgust) at anything, or aversion (vexation) toward anything. The LXX (cited Heb. 12: 5 f.), μηδέ ἐκλύου, nor be faint-hearted, which joins in to the general thought, that we should not be frightened away from God, or let ourselves be estranged from Him by the attitude of anger in which He appears in His determination to inflict suffering. In 12a the accentuation leaves it undefined whether הַנְּהָה as subject belongs to the relative or to the principal clause; the traditional succession of accents, certified also by Ben Bileam, is כִּי אֶת אֲשֶׁר יְאֵהֵב יְהוָה, for this passage belongs to the few in which more than three servants (viz., *Mahpach*, *Mercha*, and three *Munachs*) go before the *Athnach*.^{f55}

The further peculiarity is here to be observed, that אַתָּה, although without the *Makkeph*, retains its *Segol*, besides here only in Psa. 47: 5; 60: 2. 12b is to be interpreted thus (cf. Pro. 9: 5b): “and (that) as a father the son, whom he loves.” The ו is explanatory, as 1Sa. 28: 3 (Gesenius, § 155, 1a), and רַצְיָה (which one may supplement by אֶתָּו or בּוֹ) is a defining clause having the force of a clause with אֲשֶׁר. The translation *et ut pater qui filio bene cupit*, is syntactically (cf. Isa. 40:11) and accentually (vid., 13b) not less admissible, but translating “and as a father he holds his son dear,” or with Hitzig (after Jer. 31:10, a passage not quite syntactically the same), “and holds him dear, as a father his son” (which Zöckler without syntactical authority prefers on account of the 2nd modus, cf. e.g., Psa. 51:18), does not seem a right parallel clause, since the giving of correction is the chief point, and the love only the accompanying consideration (Pro. 13:24). According to our interpretation, יוֹכִיחַ is to be carried forward in the mind from 12a. The LXX find the parallel word in יְכַאֵב, for they translate μαστιγοῖ δὲ πάντα υἱὸν, ὃν παραδέχεται, and thus have read יְכַאֵב or יְכַאֵב.

Pro. 3:13-15. Such submission to God, the All-wise, the All-directing, who loves us with fatherly affection, is wisdom, and such wisdom is above all treasures.

*13 Blessed is the man who has found wisdom,
And the man who has gained understanding;*

*14 For better is her acquisition than the acquisition of silver,
And her gain than fine gold.*

*15 More precious is she than corals;
And all thy jewels do not equal her value.*

The imperfect **נִפְּיֵק**, which as the *Hiph.* of **פּוֹקֵץ**, *exire*, has the general meaning *educere*, interchanges with the perfect **נָפַק**. This bringing forth is either a delivering up, i.e., giving out or presenting, Isa. 58:10, Psa. 140: 9; 144:13 (cf. **נָפַק**, Arab. *naftak*, to give out, to pay out), or a fetching out, getting out, receiving, Pro. 8:35; 12: 2; 18:22. Thus 13*a* reminds one of the parable of the treasure in the field, and 13*b* of that of the goodly pearl for which the *ἔμπορος* who sought the pearl parted with all that he had. Here also is declared the promise of him who trades with a merchant for the possession of wisdom; for **סָחַרָה** and **סָחַר** (both, as Isa. 23: 3, 18; 45:15, from **סָחַר**, the latter after the forms **זָרַע**, **נָטַע**, without our needing to assume a second primary form, **סָחַר**) go back to the root-word **סָחַר**, to trade, go about as a trader, with the fundamental meaning *ἔμπορεύεσθαι* (LXX); and also the mention of the pearls is not wanting here, for at all events the meaning “pearls” has blended itself with **פְּנִינִים**, which is a favourite word in the Mashal poetry, though it be not the original meaning of the word. In 14*b* **פְּסָרִי** is surpassed by **קָרְוִיץ** (besides in the Proverbs, found only in this meaning in Psa. 68:14), which properly means ore found in a mine, from **קָרַץ**, to cut in, to dig up, and hence the poetic name of gold, perhaps of gold dug out as distinguished from molten gold. Hitzig regards *χρυσός* as identical with it; but this word (Sanskrit. without the ending *hir*, Zench. *zar*) is derived from *ghar*, to glitter (vid., Curtius). **תְּבוּאָתָהּ** we have translated “gain,” for it does not mean the profit which wisdom brings, the tribute which it yields, but the gain, the possession of wisdom herself.

Pro. 3:15. As regards **פְּנִינִים**, for which the *Kethib* has **פְּנִינִים**, the following things are in favour of the fundamental meaning “corals,” viz.: (1.) The name itself, which corresponds with the Arab. *fann*; this word, proceeding from the root-idea of shooting forth, particularly after the manner of plants, means the branch and all that raises or multiplies itself branch-like or twig-like (Fleischer). (2.) The redness attributed to the **פְּנִינִים**, Lam. 4: 7, in contradistinction to the pure whiteness attributed to snow and milk (vid., at Job. 28:18). The meaning of the word may, however, have become generalized in practice (LXX *in loc.* *λίθων πολυτελών*, *Braec. Venet. λιθοδίων*); the meaning “pearls,” given to it in the Job-Targum by Rashi, and particularly by Bochart, lay so much the nearer as one may have wrought also corals and

precious stones, such as the carbuncle, sardius, and sapphire, into the form of pearls. יְקָרָה, in consequence of the retrogression of the tone, has *Munach* on the *penult.*, and that as an exception, as has been remarked by the Masora, since in substantives and proper names terminating in הָ the נסוג אחר, i.e., the receding of the tone, does not elsewhere appear, e.g., יָפֶה הִיא, Gen. 12:14, בָּרָה הִיא, Son. 6: 9, צָרָה הִיא, Jer. 30: 7. חָפֵץ is first *abstr.*, a being inclined to something, lust, will, pleasure in anything, then also *concr.*, anything in which one has pleasure, what is beautiful, precious; cf. Arab. *nfis, shyy*, hence *hjárt nfist*, precious stones” (Fleischer). שָׁוָה with בּ means to be an equivalent (purchase-price, exchange) for anything; the most natural construction in Arab. as well as in Hebr. is that with ל, to be the equivalent of a thing (vid., at Job. 33:27); the בּ is the *Beth pretii*, as if one said in Arab.: *biabi anta* thou art in the estimate of my father, I give it for thee. One distinctly perceives in vv. 14, 15, the echo of Job. 28. This tetrastich occurs again with a slight variation at Pro. 8:10, 11. The Talmud and the Midrash accent it so, that in the former the expression is וּכְלֵי-חַפְצִים, and in the latter וּכְלֵי-חַפְצֵיךְ, and they explain the latter of precious stones and pearls (אבנים טובות ומרגליות).

Pro. 3:16-18. That wisdom is of such incomparable value is here confirmed:

***16 Length of days is in her right hand;
In her left, riches and honour.***

***17 Her ways are pleasant ways,
And all her paths are peace.***

***18 A tree of life is she to those that lay hold upon her,
And he who always holdeth her fast is blessed.***

As in the right hand of Jahve, according to Psa. 16:11, are pleasures for evermore, so Wisdom holds in her right hand “length of days,” viz., of the days of life, thus life, the blessing of blessings; in her left, riches and honour (Pro. 8:18), the two good things which, it is true, do not condition life, but, received from Wisdom, and thus wisely, elevate the happiness of life — in the right hand is the chief good, in the left the *προσθήκη*, Mat. 6:33. Didymus: *Per sapientiae dextram divinarum rerum cognitio, ex qua immortalitatis vita oritur, significatur; per sinistram autem rerum humanarum notitia, ex qua gloria opumque abundantia nascitur.* The LXX, as between 15a and 15b, so also here after v. 16, interpolate two lines: “From her mouth proceedeth righteousness; justice and mercy she bears upon her tongue,” — perhaps translated from the Hebr., but certainly added by a reader.

Pro. 3:17. דְּרָכַי נְאֻם are ways on which one obtains what is agreeable to the inner and the outer man, and which it does good to enjoy. The parallel שְׁלוֹם is not a genitive to נְתִיבוֹת to be supplied; that paths of Wisdom are themselves שְׁלוֹם, for she brings well-being on all sides and deep inwards satisfaction (peace). In regard to נְתִיבָה, *via eminens, elata*, Schultens is right (vid., under *Pro. 1:15*); ^{f56} נְתִיבוֹתֶיהָ has *Munach*, and instead of the *Metheg, Tarcha*, vid., under *Pro. 1:31b*. The figure of the tree of life the fruit of which brings immortality, is, as *Pro. 11:30; 15: 4* (cf. *Pro. 13:12*), *Rev. 2: 7*, taken from the history of paradise in the Book of Genesis. The old ecclesiastical saying, *Lignum vitae crux Christi*, accommodates itself in a certain measure, through *Mat. 11:19, Luk. 11:49*, with this passage of the Book of Proverbs. הִחְזִיק בִּי means to fasten upon anything, more fully expressed in *Gen. 21:18*, to bind the hand firm with anything, to seize it firmly. They who give themselves to Wisdom, come to experience that she is a tree of life whose fruit contains and communicates strength of life, and whoever always keeps fast hold of Wisdom is blessed, i.e., to be pronounced happy (*Psa. 41: 3*, vid., under *Psa. 137: 8*). The predicate מְאֻשֵׁר, blessed, refers to each one of the תְּמַכְיָהּ, those who hold her, cf. *Pro. 27:16, Num. 24: 9*. It is the so-called distributive singular of the predicate, which is freely used particularly in those cases where the plur. of the subject is a participle (vid., under v. 35).

Fifth Introductory Mashal Discourse, Pro. 3:19-26

THE WORLD-CREATIVE WISDOM AS MEDIATRIX OF DIVINE PROTECTION

Pro. 3:19-26. O son, guard against seducers (*Pro. 1: 8 ff.*); listen to the warning voice of Wisdom (*Pro. 1:20 ff.*); seek after Wisdom: she is the way to God, comes from God, and teaches thee to shun the wicked way and to walk in the way that is good (2); thou shalt obtain her if, renouncing self-confidence, thou givest thyself unreservedly to God (*Pro. 3: 1-18*) — these are the four steps, so far, of this introductory παραίνεσις. Each discourse contributes its own to present vividly and impressively what Wisdom is and what she procures, her nature and her blessings. From her hand come all good gifts of God to men. She is the tree of life. Her place between God and men is thus that of a mediatrix.

Pro. 3:19, 20. This place of a mediatrix — the speaker here now continues — she had from the beginning. God's world-creating work was mediated by her:

*19 Jahve hath by wisdom founded the earth,
Established the heavens by understanding.*

*20 By His knowledge the water-floods broke forth,
And the sky dropped down dew.*

That wisdom is meant by which God planned the world-idea, and now also wrought it out; the wisdom in which God conceived the world ere it was framed, and by which also He gave external realization to His thoughts; the wisdom which is indeed an attribute of God and a characteristic of His actions, since she is a property of His nature, and His nature attests itself in her, but not less, as appears, not from this group of tetrastichs, but from all that has hitherto been said, and from the personal testimony, Pro. 8:22 ff., of which it is the *praeludium*, she goes forth as a divine power to which God has given to have life in herself. Considered apart from the connection of these discourses, this group of verses, as little as Jer. 10: 2, Psa. 104:24, determines regarding the attributive interpretation; the Jerusalem Targum, I, when it translates, Gen. 1: 1, בראשית by בחוכמא (בבְּחֻכְמָא), combines Pro. 8:22 with such passages as this before us. נָסַד (here with the tone thrown back) properly signifies, like the Arab. *wasad*, to lay fast, to found, for one gives to a fact the firm basis of its existence. The parallel *Pil.* of כוּן (Arab. *kān*, cogn. כָּהַן, see on *Isaiah*, p. 691) signifies to set up, to restore; here equivalent to, to give existence.

Pro. 3:20. It is incorrect to understand 20*a*, with the Targ., of division, i.e., separating the water under the firmament from the water above the firmament; נִבְקַע is spoken of water, especially of its breaking forth, Gen. 7:11, Exo. 14:21, cf. Psa. 74:15, properly dividing itself out, i.e., welling forth from the bowels of the earth; it means, without distinguishing the primordial waters and the later water-floods confined within their banks (cf. Job. 38: 8 f., Psa. 104: 6-8), the overflowing of the earth for the purpose of its processes of cultivation and the irrigation of the land. תְּהוֹמוֹת (from תָּהַם = הָמָה, to groan, to roar) are chiefly the internal water stores of the earth, Gen. 49:25, Psa. 33: 7. But while 20*a* is to be understood of the waters under the firmament, 20*b* is to be interpreted of those above. שְׁחָקִים (from שָׁחַק, Arab. *shāḡ*, *comminuere*, *attenuare*) properly designates the uppermost stratum of air thinly and finely stretching itself far and wide, and then poetically the clouds of heaven (vid., under Psa. 77:18). Another name, עֲרִיפִים, comes from עָרַף, which is transposed from רָאָף (here used in 20*b*), Arab. *r'af*, to drop, to run. The מַל added on the object accusative represents synecdochically all the waters coming down from heaven and fructifying the earth. This watering proceeds

from above (וּרְעַפּוֹ); on the contrary, the endowing of the surface of the earth with great and small rivers is a fundamental fact in creation (נִבְקָעוּ).

Pro. 3:21-22. From this eminence, in which the work of creation presents wisdom, exhortations are now deduced, since the writer always expresses himself only with an ethical intention regarding the nature of wisdom:

***21 My son, may they not depart from thine eyes —
Preserve thoughtfulness and consideration,***

***22 And they will be life to thy soul
And grace to thy neck.***

If we make the synonyms of wisdom which are in 21b the subject *per prolepsin* to אֶל-יָלֹזוּ (Hitzig and Zöckler), then 19-20 and 21-22 clash. The subjects are wisdom, understanding, knowledge, which belong to God, and shall from His become the possession of those who make them their aim. Regarding לִוּוּ, *obliquari, deflectere*, see under Pro. 2:15, cf. 4:21; regarding תִּשְׁפִּיחַ (here *defective* after the Masora, as rightly in Vened. 1515, 1521, and Nissel, 1662), see at Pro. 2: 7; יָלֹזוּ for תִּלְוֶנָה, see at 3: 2b. The LXX (cf. Heb. 2: 1) translate without distinctness of reference: ὑὲν μὴ παραῤῥῆς, παραρῥῆς), let it now flow past, i.e., let it not be unobserved, hold it always before thee; the Targ. with the Syr. render לֹא נִלָּ, *ne vilescat*, as if the words were אֶל-יִזְוִלוּ. In 22a the *synallage generis* is continued: וְתִהְיֶינָה for וְיִהְיֶינָה. Regarding נִרְגָּרַת, see at Pro. 1: 9. By wisdom the soul gains life, divinely true and blessed, and the external appearance of the man grace, which makes him pleasing and gains for him affection.

Pro. 3:23-26. But more than this, wisdom makes its possessor in all situations of life confident in God:

***23 Then shalt thou go thy way with confidence,
And thy foot shall not stumble.***

***24 When thou liest down, thou are not afraid,
But thou layest thyself down and hast sweet sleep.***

***25 Thou needest not be afraid of sudden alarm,
Nor for the storm of the wicked when it breaketh forth.***

***26 For Jahve will be thy confidence
And keep thy foot from the snare.***

The **לְבַטָּח** (cf. our “*bei guter Laune*” = in good cheer), with **ל** of the condition, is of the same meaning as the conditional adverbial accusative **בְּמַח**, Pro. 10: 9; 1:33. V. 23b the LXX translate **ὁ δὲ πούς σου οὐ μὴ προσκόψη**, while, on the contrary, at Psa. 91:12 they make the person the subject (**μὴποτε προσκόψης τὸν κ.τ.λ.**); here also we retain more surely the subject from 23a, especially since for the intrans. of **נָגַר** (to smite, to push) a *Hithpa.* **הִתְנַגֵּר** is used Jer. 13:16. In v. 24 there is the echo of Job. 11:18, and in v. 25 of Job. 5:21. 24b is altogether the same as Job. 5:24b: *et decumbes et suavis erit somnus tuus = is deculueris, suavis erit.* The hypothetic perf., according to the sense, is both there and at Job. 11:18 (cf. Jer. 20: 9) oxytoned as *perf. consec.* Similar examples are Pro. 6:22, Gen. 33:13, 1Sa. 25:31, cf. Ewald, § 357a. **עָרְבָה** (of sleep as Jer. 31:26) is from **עָרַב**, which in Hebr. is used of pleasing impressions, as the Arab. ‘*ariba* of a lively, free disposition. **שָׁנָה**, *somnus* (*nom. actionis* from **שָׁן**, with the ground-form *sina* preserved in the Arab. *lidat*, vid., *Job*, p. 284, note), agrees in inflexion with **שָׁנָה**, *annus*. **אֵל**, v. 25a, denies, like Psa. 121: 3, with emphasis: be afraid only not = thou hast altogether nothing to fear. Schultens rightly says: *Subest species prohibitionis et tanquam abominationis, ne tale quicquam vel in suspicionem veniat in mentemve cogitando admittatur.* **פָּחַד** here means terror, as Pro. 1:26 f., the terrific object; **פְּתָאם** (with the accus. *om*) is the virtual genitive, as Pro. 26: 2 **חָנָם** (with accus. *am*). Regarding **שָׂשָׂה**, see under Pro. 1:27. The genitive **רְשָׁעִים** may be, after Psa. 37:18, the *genit. subjecti*, but still it lies nearer to say that he who chooses the wisdom of God as his guiding star has no ground to fear punishment as transgressors have reason to fear it; the **שָׂשָׂה** is meant which wisdom threatens against transgressors, Pro. 1:27. He needs have no fear of it, for wisdom is a gift of God, and binds him who receives it to the giver: Jahve becomes and is henceforth his confidence. Regarding **ב** *essentiae*, which expresses the closest connection of the subject with the predicate which it introduces, see under Psa. 35: 2. As here, so also at Exo. 18: 4, Psa. 118: 7; 146: 6, the predicate is a noun with a pronominal suffix. **כֶּסֶל** is, as at Psa. 78: 7, Job. 31:24, cognate to **מִבְטָח** and **מִקְוָה**,^{f57} the object and ground of confidence. That the word in other connections may mean also foolhardiness, Psa. 49:14, and folly, Ecc. 7:25 (cf. regarding **כֶּסֶל**, which in Arab. as *befid* denotes the dull, in Hebr. fools, see under Pro. 1:22), it follows that it proceeds from the fundamental conception of fulness of flesh and of fat, whence arise the conceptions of dulness and slothfulness, as well as of confidence, whether confidence in self or in God (see Schultens *l.c.*, and Wünsche’s *Hosea*, p. 207 f.). **לָכַד** is taking, catching, as in a net or trap or pit, from **לָכַד**, to catch (cf. Arab. *lakida*, to fasten, III, IV to hold fast); another

root-meaning, in which Arab. *lak* connects itself with *nak*, נָךְ, to strike, to assail (whence *al-lakdat*, the assault against the enemy, *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xxii. 140), is foreign to the Hebr. Regarding the מן of מִלְכָד, Fleischer remarks: “The מן after the verbs of guarding, preserving, like שָׁמַר and נָצַר, properly expresses that one by those means holds or seeks to hold a person or thing back from something, like the Lat. *defendere, tueri aliquem ab hostibus, a perculo.*” ^{f58}

Sixth Introductory Mashal Discourse, Pro. 3:27-35

EXHORTATION TO BENEVOLENCE AND RECTITUDE

Pro. 3:27-35. The promise in which it terminates, designates the close of the fifth discourse. The sixth differs from it in this, that, like none of the preceding, it adds proverb to proverb. The first series recommends love to one’s neighbour, and the second warns against fellowship with the uncharitable.

Pro. 3:27, 28. The first illustration of neighbourly love which is recommended, is readiness to serve:

*27 Refuse no manner of good to him to whom it is due
When it is in thy power to do it.*

*28 Say not to thy neighbour, “Go, and come again,
To-morrow I will give it,” whilst yet thou hast it.*

Regarding the intensive plur. בְּעָלָיו with a sing. meaning, see under Pro. 1:19. The form of expression without the suffix is not בְּעָלִי but בְּאֵל טוֹב; and this denotes here, not him who does good (בעל as Arab. *dhw* or *ṣahb*), but him to whom the good deed is done (cf. Pro. 17: 8), i.e., as here, him who is worthy of it (בעל as Arab. *âhl*), him who is the man for it (Jewish interp.: רֵאשִׁי לוֹ (מִי שְׁהוּא)). We must refuse nothing good (nothing either legally or morally good) to him who has a right to it (מִנֵּעַ מִן as Job. 22: 7; 31:16), ^{f59} if we are in a condition to do him this good. The phrase יִשְׁ-לֹאֵל יָדִי, Gen. 31:29, and frequently, signifies: it is belonging to (practicable) the power of my hand, i.e., I have the power and the means of doing it. As יָד signifies the haughty, insolent, but may be also used in the neuter of insolent conduct (vid., Psa. 19:14), so אֵל signifies the strong, but also (although only in this phrase) strength. The *Keri* rejects the plur. יָדַי, because elsewhere the hand always follows לֹאֵל in the singular. But it rejects the plur. לְרַעְיָהּ (v. 28) because the address following is directed to one person. Neither of these emendations was

necessary. The usage of the language permits exceptions, notwithstanding the *usus tyrannus*, and the plur. לרעיד may be interpreted distributively: to thy fellows, it may be this one or that one. Hitzig also regards לרעיד as a singular; but the masc. of רעהיה, the ground-form of which is certainly *ra'j*, is רעהה, or shorter, ראש. לך ושוב. does not mean: forth! go home again! but: go, and come again. שוב, to come again, to return to something, to seek it once more. ^{f60}

The ו of ויש אהך is, as 29b, the conditional: *quum sit penes te, sc. quod ei des*. “To-morrow shall I give” is less a promise than a delay and putting off, because it is difficult for him to alienate himself from him who makes the request. This holding fast by one’s own is unamiable selfishness; this putting off in the fulfilment of one’s duty is a sin of omission — οὐ γὰρ οἶδας, as the LXX adds, τί τέξεται ἡ ἐπιούσα.

Pro. 3:29. A second illustration of neighbourly love is harmlessness:

***Devise not evil against thy neighbour,
While he dwelleth securely by thee.***

The verb חרש, χαράσσειν, signifies to cut into, and is used of the *faber ferrarius* as well as of the *tignarius* (*Isaiah*, p. 463), who with a cutting instrument (חרש, Gen. 4:22) works with metal or wood, and from his profession is called חרש. But the word means as commonly to plough, i.e., to cut with the plough, and חרש is used also of a ploughman, and, without any addition to it, it always has this meaning. It is then a question whether the metaphorical phrase חרש רעה signifies to fabricate evil, cf. *dolorum faber, mendacia procudere*, ψευδῶν καὶ ἀπατῶν τέκτων, and the Homeric κακὰ φρεσὶ βυσσοδομεύειν (Fleischer and most others), or to plough evil (Rashi, Ewald, etc.). The Targ., Syriac, and Jerome translate חשב, without deciding the point, by *moliri*; but the LXX and *Graecus Venet.* by τεκταίνειν. The correctness of these renderings is not supported by Eze. 21:36, where מִשְׁחִית חרשי are not such as fabricate destruction, but smiths who cause destruction; also מַחְרִישׁ, 1Sa. 23: 9, proves nothing, and probably does not at all appertain to חרש *inciddere* (Keil), but to חרש *silere*, in the sense of *dolose moliri*. On the one hand, it is to be observed from Job. 4: 8, Hos. 10:13, cf. *Psa.* 129: 3, that the meaning *arare malum* might connect itself with חרש רעה; and the proverb of *Sirach* 7:12, μὴ ἀροτρία ψεύδος ἐπ’ ἀδελφῷ σου, places this beyond a doubt. Therefore in this phrase, if one keeps before him a clear perception of the figure, at one time the idea of fabricating, at another that of ploughing, is

presented before us. The usage of the language in the case before us is more in favour of the latter than of the former. Whether **יָשַׁב אִתָּהּ** means to dwell together with, or as Böttcher, to sit together with, after Psa. 1: 1; 26: 4 f., need not be a matter of dispute. It means in general a continued being together, whether as sitting, Job. 2:13, or as dwelling, Jud. 17:11. ^{f61}

To take advantage of the regardlessness of him who imparts to us his confidence is unamiable. Love is doubly owing to him who resigns himself to it because he believes in it.

Pro. 3:30. A third illustration of the same principle is peaceableness:

*Contend not with a man without a cause,
When he has inflicted no evil upon thee.*

Instead of **תָּרוּב**, or as the *Kerî* has amended it **תָּרִיב**, the abbreviated form **תָּרַב** or **תָּרַב** would be more correct after **אֵל**; **רִיב** or **רִיב** (from **רַב**, to be compact) means to fall upon one another, to come to hand-blows, to contend. Contending and quarrelling with a man, whoever he may be, without sufficient reason, ought to be abandoned; but there exists no such reason if he has done me no harm which I have to reproach him with. **גָּמַל רָעָה** with the accus. or dat. of the person signifies to bring evil upon any one, *malum inferre*, or also *referre* (Schultens), for **גָּמַל** (cogn. **גָּמַר**) signifies to execute, to complete, accomplish, — both of the initiative and of the requital, both of the anticipative and of the recompensing action; here in the former of these senses.

Pro. 3:31, 32. These exhortations to neighbourly love in the form of warning against whatever is opposed to it, are followed by the warning against fellowship with the loveless:

*31 Be not envious toward the man of violence,
And have no pleasure in all his ways.*

*32 For an abhorrence to Jahve is the perverse,
But with the upright is His secret.*

The conceptions of jealousy and envy lie in **קִנְיָא** (derived by Schultens from **קָנָא**, Arab. *kanâ*, *intensius rubere*) inseparable from each other. The LXX, which for **תִּקְנָה** reads **תִּקְנָה** (**κτιση**), brings the envy into 31*b*, as if the words here were **וְאֵל-תִּתְחַר**, as in Psa. 37: 1, 7 (there the LXX has **μη παραζηλου**, here **μηδὲ ζηλωσης**). There is no reason for correcting our text in accordance with this (substituting **תִּתְחַר** for **תִּתְחַר** as Hitzig does), because **בְּכָל-דְּרָבָיו** would be too vague an expression for the object of the envy, while **אֵל-תִּתְחַר**

altogether agrees with it; and the contrary remark, that **בַּחַר בְּכֹל** is fundamentally no **בַּחַר**, fails since (1) **בַּחַר** frequently expresses pleasure in anything without the idea of choice, and (2) “have not pleasure in all his ways” is in the Hebrew style equivalent to “in any one of his ways;” Ewald, § 323*b*. He who does “violence to the law” (Zep. 3: 4) becomes thereby, according to the common course of the world, a person who is feared, whose authority, power, and resources are increased, but one must not therefore envy him, nor on any side take pleasure in his conduct, which in all respects is to be reprobated; for the **נָלוּז**, *inflexus, tortuosus* (vid., 2:15), who swerves from the right way and goes in a crooked false way, is an object of Jahve’s abhorrence, while, on the contrary, the just, who with a right mind walks in the right way, is Jahve’s **סוֹד** — an echo of Psa. 25:14. **סוֹד** (R. **סד**, to be firm, compressed) means properly the being pressed together, or sitting together (cf. the Arab. *wisâd, wisâdt*, a cushion, divan, corresponding in form to the Hebr. **יְסוֹד**) for the purpose of private communication and conversation (**הַיְסוֹד**), and then partly the confidential intercourse, as here (cf. Job. 29: 4), partly the private communication, the secret (Amo. 3: 7). LXX, ἐν δὲ δικάλοις [οἱ] συνεδριάζει. Those who are out of the way, who prefer to the simplicity of right-doing all manner of crooked ways, are contrary to God, and He may have nothing to do with them; but the right-minded He makes partakers of His most intimate intercourse, He deals with them as His friends.

Pro. 3:33. The prosperity of the godless, far from being worthy of envy, has as its reverse side the curse:

*The curse of Jahve is in the house of the godless,
And the dwelling of the just He blesseth.*

מְאַרְרָה (a curse), like **מְסַלְלָה** (a highway, from **סָלַל**), is formed from **אַרַר** (cf. Arab. *harr, detestari, abhorrere*, a word-imitation of an interjection used in disagreeable experiences). The curse is not merely a deprivation of external goods which render life happy, and the blessing is not merely the fulness of external possessions; the central-point of the curse lies in continuous disquiet of conscience, and that of the blessing in the happy consciousness that God is with us, in soul-rest and peace which is certain of the grace and goodness of God. The poetic **נְוָה** (from **נווה** = Arab. *nwy, tetendit aliquo*) signifies the place of settlement, and may be a word borrowed from a nomad life, since it denotes specially the pasture-ground; cf. Pro. 24:15 (Fleischer). While the curse of God rests in the house of the wicked (vid., Köhler on Zec. 5: 4), He blesses, on the contrary, the dwelling-place of the righteous. The LXX and Jerome read **יְבַרְךָ**, but **יְבָרַךְ** is more agreeable, since God continues to be the subject.

Pro. 3:34. His relation to men is determined by their relation to Him.

*As for the scorers, He scorneth them,
But to the lowly He giveth grace.*

Most interpreters render the verse thus: “If the scorner He (even He, in return) scorneth, so He (on the other hand) giveth grace to the lowly.” For the sequence of the words in the consequence, in which the precedence of the verb is usual, e.g., Lev. 12: 5, we are referred to Pro. 23:18, cf. 24:14; but why had the poet placed the two facts in the relation of condition and consequence? The one fact is not the consequence but the reverse of the other, and accordingly they are opposed to each other in coordinated passages, Psa. 18:26 f. The *Vav* in such antitheses has generally the meaning of “and on the other hand,” e.g., Job. 8:20, while the LXX, Targ., Syriac, and Jerome altogether pass over the **וְ** as if it did not exist. Ziegler translates: “Truly! the scorner He scorneth;” but an affirmative **וְ** does not exist, the asseveration after the manner of an oath is negative. Bertheau’s expedient would be more acceptable, by which he makes the whole of v. 34 the protasis to v. 35; but if this were intended, another subject would not enter into v. 35. Thus 34*a* and 34*b* are two independent parallel passages; **אִם־לְלֹצִים** is the protasis: if as regards the scorers, i.e., if His conduct is directed to the scorers, so He scorneth. The **לְ** denotes relation, and in this elliptical usage is like the **לְ** of superscription, e.g., Jer. 23: 9. **הוּא** is the emphatic *αὐτός*: *He* on the contrary, and in a decisive way (Ewald, § 314*ab*). Instead of **לְיָי** there might have been used **יְלִיצִם** (for **יְלִיָּהּ**, where it occurs as a governing word, has the accusative, 19:28, Psa. 119:51), but we do not miss the object: if it relates to scorers (thus also Löwenstein translates), so it is He in return who scorneth. The LXX renders it: *κύριος ὑπερήφανοῖς ἀντιτάσσεται, ταπεινοῖς δὲ δίδωσι χάριν*; cf. Jam. 4: 6, 1Pe. 5: 5. **הוּא** is used as a name of God (*Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitschr.* xvi. 400), on which account it is rendered like **יְהוָה** by *κύριος*. A *ὑπερήφανος* (appearing above others, i.e., overbearing) is the **לְיָ**, according to the definition Pro. 21:24. the expression of the *talio* is generalized in *ἀντιτάσσεται* (resists them). For **עֲנִיִּים** the *Kerî* has **עֲנִיָּה**: **עֲנִי** (from **עָנָה**, the ground-form **עָנָה**, Arab. ‘*anaw*) is the lowly (*ταπεινός*), or he who bends himself, i.e., the gentle and humble, the patient, and the passive **עֲנִי**, he who is bowed down, the suffering; but the limits of the conception are moveable, since in **עֲנִי** is presupposed the possession of fruit-virtues gained in the school of affliction.

Pro. 3:35. This group of the proverbs of wisdom now suitably closes with the fundamental contrast between the wise and fools:

*The wise shall inherit honour,
But fools carry away shame.*

If we take **וּבְסִילִים** as the object, then we can scarcely interpret the clause: shame sweeps fools away (Umbreit, Zöckler, Bertheau), for **הָרִים** [*Hiph.* of **רָם**] signifies (Isa. 57:14, Eze. 21:31) “to raise up anything high and far,” not “to sweep away.” Preferable is the rendering: **τὸν δ’ ἄφρονας ὑψοῖ ἀτιμία** (*Graec. Venet.*, and similarly Jerome), i.e., only to it do they owe their celebrity as warning examples (Ewald), to which Oetinger compares “whose glory is in their shame,” Phi. 3:19; ^{f62} but **קָלוֹן** is the contrary of **כְּבוֹד** (glory, Hab. 2:16), and therefore is as much an object conception as is the latter, 35a. If it is the object, then if we take **מְרִים** from **מָר** after the form of **לָן**, Neh. 13:21 = **מְמִירִים** (Hos. 4: 7), it might be rendered: Yet fools exchange shame (Löwenstein). But **מֹר**, like the Arab. *mrr*, *transire*, means properly to pass over or to wander over; it is intransitive, and only in *Hiph.* signifies actively to exchange. **מְרִים** thus will be the participle of **הָרִים**; the plur. taken distributively (fools = whoever is only always a fool) is connected with the singular of the predicate. This change in the number is here, however, more difficult than at Pro. 3:18, and in other places, where the plur. of the part. permits the resolution into a relative clause with *quicumque*, and more difficult than at Pro. 28: 1, where the sing. of the predicate is introduced by attraction; wherefore **מְרִים** may be an error in transcribing for **מְרִימִים** or **מְרִימֵי** (Böttcher). J. H. Michaelis (after the Targ. and Syr.) has properly rendered the clause: “*stulti tollunt ignominiam tanquam portionem suam,*” adding “*quae derivato nomine תְּרוּמָה dicitur.*” **הָרִים** signifies, in the language of the sacrificial worship and of worship generally, to lift off from anything the best portion, the legitimate portion due to God and the priesthood (vid., at Pro. 3: 9); for which reason Rashi glosses **מְרִים** by **מִפְּרִישׁ לוֹ**, and Ralbag by **מִגְּבִיָּה לָהּ**. See Pro. 14:29. Honour is that which the wise inherit, it falls to them unsought as a possession, but fools receive shame as the offal (viz., of their foolish conduct). The fut. and part. are significantly interchanged. The life of the wise ends in glory, but fools inherit shame; the fruit of their conduct is shame and evermore shame.

Seventh Introductory Mashal Discourse, Pro. 4: 1-5: 6

RECOLLECTIONS OF HIS FATHER’S HOUSE

Pro. 4: 1-5: 6. The means are not yet exhausted by which the teacher of wisdom seeks to procure acceptance for his admonitions and warnings, and to give them emphasis. He has introduced the importance of his person in order

that he might gain the heart of the disciple, and has presented as speaker, instead of himself, the revered person of Wisdom herself, who seeks to win, by means of warnings and promises, the souls of men.

Pro. 4: 1-4. He now confirms and explains the command to duty which he has placed at the beginning of the whole (Pro. 1: 8). This he does by his own example, for he relates from the history of his own youth, to the circle of disciples by whom he sees himself surrounded, what good doctrine his parents had taught him regarding the way of life:

*1 Hear, ye sons, the instruction of a father,
And attend that ye may gain understanding;*

*2 For I give to you good doctrine,
Forsake not my direction!*

*3 For I was a son to my father,
A tender and only (son) in the sight of my mother.*

*4 And he instructed me, and said to me:
“Let thine heart hold fast my words:
Observe my commandments and live!”*

That בְּנִים in the address comes here into the place of בְּנִי, hitherto used, externally denotes that בְּנִי in the progress of these discourses finds another application: the poet himself is so addressed by his father. Intentionally he does not say אֲבִיכֶם (cf. Pro. 1: 8): he does not mean the father of each individual among those addressed, but himself, who is a father in his relation to them as his disciples; and as he manifests towards them fatherly love, so also he can lay claim to paternal authority over them. לְדָאָה is rightly vocalized, not לְדָאָה. The words do not give the object of attention, but the design, the aim. The combination of ideas in דָּאָה בִּינָה (cf. Pro. 1: 2), which appears to us singular, loses its strangeness when we remember that דָּעָה means, according to its etymon, deposition or reception into the conscience and life. Regarding לָקַח, apprehension, reception, lesson = doctrine, vid., Pro. 1: 5. נִתְּמָה is the perf., which denotes as fixed and finished what is just now being done, Gesenius, § 126, 4. עֲזָב is here synonym of נִמְשָׁח, Pro. 1: 8, and the contrary of שָׁמַר, Pro. 28: 4. The relative *factum* in the perfect, designating the circumstances under which the event happened, regularly precedes the chief *factum* וַיִּרְנֵי; see under Gen. 1: 2 f. Superficially understood, the expression 3a would be a platitude; the author means that the natural legal relation was also confirming itself as a moral one. It was a

relation of many-sided love, according to 3a: he was esteemed of his mother — לפני, used of the reflex in the judgment, Gen. 10: 9, and of loving care, Gen. 17:18, means this — as a tender child, and therefore tenderly to be protected (ךָ as Gen. 33:13), and as an only child, whether he were so in reality, or was only loved as if he were so. יָחִיד (Aq., Sym., Theod., μονογενής) may with reference to number also mean *unice dilectus* (LXX ἀγαπώμενος); cf. Gen. 22: 2, יָחִידָךְ (where the LXX translate τὸν ἀγαπητόν, without therefore having יָדִידָךְ before them). לפני is maintained by all the versions; לבני is not a variant. ^{f63}

The instruction of the father begins with the jussive, which is pointed ^{f64} יְתַמְּדֶךָ to distinguish it from יְתַמְּדֶךָ on account of the *ō*. The LXX has incorrectly ἐπειδέτω, as if the word were יִסְמַךְ; Symmachus has correctly κατεχέτω. The imper. וְיַחֲיֶה is, as Pro. 7: 2, Gen. 20: 7, more than וְיַחֲיֶה; the teacher seeks, along with the means, at the same time their object: Observe my commandments, and so become a partaker of life! The Syriac, however, adds וְיַחֲזִיק בְּאִישׁוֹן עֵינֶיךָ [and my instruction as the apple of thine eye], a clause borrowed from Pro. 7: 2.

Pro. 4: 5, 6. The exhortation of the father now specializes itself:

**5 Get wisdom, get understanding;
Forget not and turn not from the words of my mouth.**

**6 Forsake her not, so shall she preserve thee;
Love her, so shall she keep thee.**

Wisdom and understanding are (5a) thought of as objects of merchandise (cf. Pro. 23:23, 3:14), like the one pearl of great price, Mat. 13:46, and the words of fatherly instruction (5b), accordingly, as offering this precious possession, or helping to the acquisition of it. One cannot indeed say correctly מאמרֵי־פי אלתשכח, but אלתשכח משמר אמרי־פי (Psa. 102: 5); and in this sense אלתשכח goes before, or also the accus. object, which in אלתשכח the author has in his mind, may, since he continues with אלתת, now not any longer find expression as such. That the אמרי־פי are the means of acquiring wisdom is shown in v. 6, where this continues to be the primary idea. The verse, consisting of only four words, ought to be divided by *Mugrash*; ^{f65} the *Vav* (ו) in both halves of the verse introduces the *apodosis imperativi* (cf. e.g., Pro. 3: 9 f., and the *apodosis prohibitivi*, Pro. 3:21 f.). The actual representation of wisdom, v. 5, becomes in v. 6 personal.

Pro. 4: 7-9. Referring to v. 5, the father further explains that wisdom begins with the striving after it, and that this striving is itself its fundamental beginning:

*7 The beginning of wisdom is “Get wisdom,”
And with [um, at the price of] all thou hast gotten get understanding,*

*8 Esteem her, so shall she lift thee up;
She will bring thee honour if thou dost embrace her.*

*9 She will put on thine head a graceful garland,
She will bestow upon thee a glorious diadem.*

In the motto of the book, Pro. 1: 7, the author would say that the fear of Jahve is that from which all wisdom takes its origin. **יְרֵאתָ יְהוָה** (Pro. 1: 7) is the subject, and as such it stands foremost. Here he means to say what the beginning of wisdom consists in. **רֵאשִׁית חֲכָמָה** is the subject, and stands forth as such. The predicate may also be read **קְנֵה-חֲכָמָה** (= **קְנִיָּה**), after Pro. 16:16. The beginning of wisdom is (consists in) the getting of wisdom; but the imperative **קְנֵה**, which also Aq., Sym., Theod. (**κτῆσαι**), Jerome, Syr., Targ. express (the LXX leaves v. 7 untranslated), is supported by *7b*. Hitzig, after Mercier, De Dieu, and Döderlein, translates the verse thus: “the highest thing is wisdom; get wisdom,” which Zöckler approves of; but the reasons which determine him to this rendering are subtleties: if the author had wished himself to be so understood, he ought at least to have written the words **רֵאשִׁית חֲכָמָה**. But **רֵאשִׁית חֲכָמָה** is a genitive of relation, as is to be expected from the relativity of the idea **רֵאשִׁית**, and his intention is to say that the beginning of wisdom consists in the proposition **קְנֵה חֲכָמָה** (cf. the similar formula, Ecc. 12:13); this proposition is truly the *lapis philosophorum*, it contains all that is necessary in order to becoming wise. Therefore the Greek **σοφία** called itself modestly **φιλοσοφία**; for **ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς** the Book of Wisdom has, Pro. 6:18, **ἡ ἀληθεστάτη παιδείας ἐπιθυμία**. In *7b* the proposition is expressed which contains the *specificum* helping to wisdom. The **כֹּ** denotes price: give all for wisdom (Mat. 13:46, 44); no price is too high, no sacrifice too great for it.

Pro. 4: 8. The meaning of the **ἀπ. γεργ. סִלְסַל** is determined by **רֹמַם** in the parallel clause; **סִלְסַל** signifies to raise, exalt, as a way or dam by heaping up; the *Pilpel*, here tropical: to value or estimate highly. Böttcher interprets well: hold it high in price, raise it (as a purchaser) always higher, make offer for it upon offer. The LXX (approved by Bertheau), **περιχαράκωσον αὐτήν**, circumvallate it, i.e., surround it with a wall (**סִלְסַלָהּ**) — a strange and here

unsuitable figure. Hold it high, says the author, and so it will reward ^{f66} thee with a high place, and (with chiasmic transposition of the performance and the consequence) she will honour ^{f67} thee if (εάν) thou lovingly embracest her.

חֶבֶק is used of embracing in the pressure of tender love, as in the Son. 2: 6, 8: 3; the *Piel* is related to the *Kal* as *amplexari* to *amplecti*. Wisdom exalts her admirers, honours her lovers, and makes a man's appearance pleasant, causing him to be revered when he approaches. Regarding לִי־תִתְחַן, vid., Pro. 1: 9. מִגֵּן, to deliver up (Gen. 14:20), to give up (Hos. 11: 8), is connected in the free poetic manner with two accusatives, instead of with an accus. and dat. LXX has ὑπερασπίση, but one does not defend himself (as with a shield) by a wreath or crown.

Pro. 4:10-12. There is no reason for the supposition that the warning which his father gave to the poet now passes over into warnings given by the poet himself (Hitzig); the admonition of the father thus far refers only in general to the endeavour after wisdom, and we are led to expect that the good doctrines which the father communicates to the son as a *viaticum* will be further expanded, and become more and more specific when they take a new departure.

***10 Hearken, my son, and receive my sayings,
So shall the years of life be increased to thee.***

***11 In the way of wisdom have I taught thee,
Guided thee in the paths of rectitude.***

***12 When thou goest, thy step shall not be straitened;
And if thou runnest, thou shalt not stumble.***

Regarding קַח (of לָקַח) of appropriating reception and taking up *in succum et sanguinem*, vid., Pro. 1: 3; regarding שְׁנוֹת חַיִּים, years not merely of the duration of life, but of the enjoyment of life, Pro. 3: 2; regarding מַעְגָּל (מַעְגָּלָה), path (track), Pro. 2: 9; regarding the בַּ of הַדְרָה, of the department and subject of instruction, Psa. 25: 8. The perfects, v. 11, are different from נִתְּתִי, 2a: they refer to rules of life given at an earlier period, which are summarily repeated in this address. The way of wisdom is that which leads to wisdom (Job. 28:23); the paths of rectitude, such as trace out the way which is in accordance with the rule of the good and the right. If the youth holds to this direction, he will not go on in darkness or uncertainty with anxious footsteps; and if in youthful fervour he flies along his course, he will not stumble on any unforeseen obstacle and fall. יָצַר is a metaplastic fut. to צָרַר or צוּר, to be narrow, to straiten, formed as if from יָצַר. The Targ. after Aruch, ^{f68} אַרְחַךְ

לא תשנק, thou shalt not need to bind together (*constringere*) or to hedge up thy way.

Pro. 4:13-17. The exhortations attracting by means of promises, now become warnings fitted to alarm:

*13 Hold fast to instruction, let her not go;
Keep her, for she is thy life.*

*14 Into the path of the wicked enter not,
And walk not in the way of the evil*

*15 Avoid it, enter not into it;
Turn from it and pass away.*

*16 For they cannot sleep unless they do evil,
And they are deprived of sleep unless they bring others to ruin.*

*17 For they eat the bread of wickedness,
And they drink the wine of violence.*

Elsewhere מוֹסֵר means also self-discipline, or moral religious education, 1: 3; here discipline, i.e., parental educative counsel. תִּירָף is the segolated fut. apoc. *Hiph.* (indic. תִּירְפֶה) from *tarp*, cf. the imper. *Hiph.* הִירֵף from *harp*. נִצְרָה is the imper. *Kal* (not *Piel*, as Aben Ezra thinks) with *Dagesh dirimens*; cf. the verbal substantive נִצְרָה *Psa.* 141: 3, with similar *Dagesh*, after the form יִקְהֶה, *Gen.* 49:10. מוֹסֵר (elsewhere always masc.) is here used in the fem. as the synonym of the name of wisdom: keep her (instruction), for she is thy life, ^{f69} i.e., the life of thy life. In v. 14 the godless (*vid.*, on the root-idea of רָשַׁע under *Psa.* 1: 1) and the habitually wicked, i.e., the vicious, stand in parallelism; בוא and אָשֶׁר are related as entering and going on, *ingressus* and *progressus*. The verb אָשֶׁר signifies, like יָשַׁר, to be straight, even, fortunate, whence אָשֶׁר = Arab. *yusâr*, happiness, and to step straight out, *Pro.* 9: 6, of which meanings אָשֶׁר is partly the intensive, as here, partly the causative, *Pro.* 23:19 (elsewhere causative of the meaning, to be happy, *Gen.* 30:13). The meaning *progredi* is not mediated by a supplementary צִעְדֵיךָ; the derivative אָשֶׁר (אָשֶׁר), a step, shows that it is derived immediately from the root-idea of a movement in a straight line. Still less justifiable is the rendering by Schultens, *ne vestigia imprimas in via malorum*; for the Arab. *âththr* is denom. of *ithr*, אָתַר, the primitive verb roots of which, *athr*, אָתַר = אָשֶׁר, are lost.

Pro. 4:15. On פָּרַעְהוּ, avoid it (the way), (*opp.* אָחֹז, Job. 17: 9; תָּמַךְ, Psa. 17: 5), see under Pro. 1:25. שָׁמָּה, elsewhere (as the Arab. *shatt*, to be without measure, insolent) used *in malam partem*, has here its fundamental meaning, to go aside. מֵעָלָיו (expressed in French by *de dessus*, in Ital. by *di sopra*) denotes: so that thou comest not to stand on it. עָבַר means in both cases *transire*, but the second instance, “to go beyond (farther)” (cf. 2Sa. 15:22, and under Hab. 1:11), coincides with “to escape, *evadere*.”

Pro. 4:16. In the reason here given the perf. may stand in the conditional clauses as well as in Virgil’s *Et si non aliqua nocuisses, mortuus esses*; but the fut., as in Ecc. 5:11, denotes that they (the רָעִים and the רָשָׁעִים) cannot sleep, and are deprived of their sleep, unless they are continually doing evil and bringing others into misery; the interruption of this course of conduct, which has become to them like a second nature, would be as the interruption of their diet, which makes them ill. For the *Kal* יִכְשׁוּלוּ, which here must have the meaning of the person sinning (cf. v. 19), and would be feeble if used of the confirmed transgressors, the *Keri* rightly substitutes the *Hiphil* יִכְשִׁילוּ, which occurs also 2Ch. 25: 8, there without an object, in the meaning to cause to fall, as the contrast of עֲזַר (to help).

Pro. 4:17. The second בִּי introduces the reason of their bodily welfare being conditioned by evil-doing. If the poet meant: they live on bread which consists in wickedness, i.e., on wickedness as their bread, then in the parallel sentence he should have used the word הָמָס; the genitives are meant of the means of acquisition: they live on unrighteous gain, on bread and wine which they procure by wickedness and by all manner of violence or injustice. On the etymon of הָמָס (Arab. *hamas, durum, asperum, vehementem esse*), vid., Schultens; the plur. הָמָסִים belongs to a more recent epoch (vid., under 2Sa. 22:49 and Psa. 18:49). The change in the tense represents the idea that they having eaten such bread, set forth such wine, and therewith wash it down.

Pro. 4:18, 19. The two ways that lie for his choice before the youth, are distinguished from one another as light is from darkness:

***18 And the path of the just is like the brightness of the morning light,
Which shines more and more till the perfect day.***

***19 The way of the wicked is deep darkness,
They know not at what they stumble.***

The Hebr. style is wont to conceal in its Vav (ו) diverse kinds of logical relations, but the Vav of 18a may suitably stand before 19a, where the

discontinuance of this contrast of the two ways is unsuitable. The displacing of a *Vav* from its right position is not indeed without example (see under Psa. 16: 3); but since v. 19 joins itself more easily than v. 18 to v. 17 without missing a particle, thus it is more probable that the two verses are to be transposed, than that the ו of וְאֵרַח (v. 17) is to be prefixed to דִּרְךָ (v. 18).

Sinning, says v. 16, has become to the godless as a second nature, so that they cannot sleep without it; they must continually be sinning, adds v. 17, for thus and not otherwise do they gain for themselves their daily bread. With reference to this fearful self-perversion to which wickedness has become a necessity and a condition of life, the poet further says that the way of the godless is כְּאִפְלָה, ^{f70} as deep darkness, as the entire absence of light: it cannot be otherwise than that they fall, but they do not at all know whereat they fall, for they do not at all know wickedness as such, and have no apprehension of the punishment which from an inward necessity it brings along with it; on the contrary, the path of the just is in constantly increasing light — the light of knowledge, and the light of true happiness which is given ^{f71} in and with knowledge.

On בָּמָה vid., under Isa. 2:22; it is מְכַשׁוּל, σκάνδαλον, that is meant, stumbling against which (cf. Lev. 26:37) they stumble to their fall. נִגְהָ, ^{f72} used elsewhere than in the Bible, means the morning star (Venus), (Sirach 50: 4, Syr.); when used in the Bible it means the early dawn, the light of the rising sun, the morning light, 2Sa. 23: 4, Isa. 62: 1, which announces itself in the morning twilight, Dan. 6:20. The light of this morning sunshine is הוֹלֵךְ וְאוֹר, going and shining, i.e., becoming ever brighter. In the connection of וְאוֹר הוֹלֵךְ it might be a question whether אוֹר is regarded as gerundive (Gen. 8: 3, 5), or as participle (2Sa. 16: 5, Jer. 41: 6), or as a participial adjective (Gen. 26:13, Jud. 4:24); in the connection of הוֹלֵךְ וְאוֹר, on the contrary, it is unquestionably the gerundive: the partic. denoting the progress joins itself either with the partic., Jon. 1:11, or with the participial adjective, 2Sa. 3: 1, 2Ch. 17:12, or with another adjective formation, 2Sa. 15:12, Est. 9: 4 (where וְגִדּוּל after וְגִדּוּל of other places appears to be intended as an adjective, not after 2Sa. 5:10 as gerundive). Thus וְאוֹר, as also וְטוֹב, 1Sa. 2:26, will be participial after the form בּוֹשׁ, being ashamed (Ges. § 72, 1); cf. בּוֹם, Zec. 10: 5, קוֹם, 2Ki. 16: 7. “נִכּוֹן הַיּוֹם” quite corresponds to the Greek τὸ σταθῆρὸν τῆς ἡμέρας, ἢ σταθῆρὰ μεσημβρία (as one also says τὸ σταθῆρὸν τῆς νυκτός), and to the Arabic qā‘mt ‘l-nhâr and qā‘mt ‘l-dhyrt. The figure is probably derived from the balance (cf. Lucan’s *Pharsalia*, lib. 9: *quam cardine summo Stat librata dies*): before and after midday the tongue on the balance of the day bends to the left and to the right, but at the point of midday it stands directly in the midst” (Fleischer). It is the midday time that is meant, when the

clearness of the day has reached its fullest intensity, — the point between increasing and decreasing, when, as we are wont to say, the sun stands in the zenith (= Arab. *samt*, the point of support, i.e., the vertex). Besides Mar. 4:28, there is no biblical passage which presents like these two a figure of gradual development. The progress of blissful knowledge is compared to that of the clearness of the day till it reaches its midday height, having reached to which it becomes a knowing of all in God, Pro. 28: 5, 1Jo. 2:20.

Pro. 4:20-22. The paternal admonition now takes a new departure:

***20 My son, attend unto my words,
Incline thine ear to my sayings.***

***21 Let them not depart from thine eyes;
Keep them in the midst of thine heart.***

***22 For they are life to all who get possession of them,
And health to their whole body.***

Regarding the *Hiph.* הָלִיז (for הִלִּיז), v. 21, formed after the Chaldee manner like הָלִיץ, הִנִּיחַ, הִסִּיג, הִסִּיחַ, vid., Gesenius, § 72, 9; — Ewald, § 114, c, gives to it the meaning of “to mock,” for he interchanges it with הִלִּיץ, instead of the meaning to take away, *efficere ut recedat* (cf. under Pro. 2:15). This supposed causative meaning it has also here: may they = may one (vid., under Pro. 2:22) not remove them from thine eyes; the object is (v. 20) the words of the paternal admonition. Hitzig, indeed, observes that “the accusative is not supplied;” but with greater right it is to be remarked that הִלִּיזוּ (fut. *Hiph.* of לָוּז) and הִלִּיזוּ (fut. *Kal* of *id.*) are not one and the same, and the less so as הָלִיז occurs, but the masoretical and grammatical authorities (e.g., Kimchi) demand הִלִּיזוּ. The plur. לְמַצְאֵיהֶם is continued, 22b, in the sing., for that which is said refers to each one of the many (Pro. 3:18, 28, 35). מָצָא is fundamentally an active conception, like our “*finden*,” to find; it means to attain, to produce, to procure, etc. מְרַפֵּא means, according as the מ is understood of the “that = *ut*” of the action or of the “what” of its performance, either health or the means of health; here, like רְפָאוֹת, Pro. 3: 8, not with the underlying conception of sickness, but of the fluctuations connected with the bodily life of man, which make needful not only a continual strengthening of it, but also its being again and again restored. Nothing preserves soul and body in a healthier state than when we always keep before our eyes and carry in our hearts the good doctrines; they give to us true guidance on the way of life: “Godliness has the promise of this life, and of that which is to come.” 1Ti. 4: 8.

Pro. 4:23-27. After this general preface the exhortation now becomes special:

*23 Above all other things that are to be guarded, keep thy heart,
For out from it life has its issues.*

*24 Put away from thee perverseness of mouth,
And waywardness of lips put far from thee.*

*25 Thine eyes should look straight forward,
And thine eyelids look straight to the end before thee.*

*26 Make even the path of thy feet,
And let all thy ways be correct.*

*27 Turn not aside to the right and to the left;
Remove thy foot from evil.*

Although **מִשְׁמֶרֶת** in itself and in this connection may mean the object to be watchfully avoided (*cavendi*) (vid., under Pro. 2:20 *b*): thus the usage of the language lying before us applies it, yet only as denoting the place of watching or the object *observandi*; so that it is not to be thus explained, with Raschi and others: before all from which one has to protect himself (*ab omni re cavenda*), guard thine heart; but: before all that one has to guard (*prae omni re custodienda*), guard it as the most precious of possessions committed to thy trust. The heart, which according to its etymon denotes that which is substantial (*Kernhafte*) in man (cf. Arab. *lubb*, the kernel of the nut or almond), comes here into view not as the physical, but as the intellectual, and specially the ethical *centrum*.

Pro. 4:24. The **תְּצַאֲוֹת** are the point of a thing, e.g., of a boundary, from which it goes forth, and the linear course proceeding from thence. If thus the author says that the **תְּצַאֲוֹת הַיָּיִם** go out from the heart,¹⁷³ he therewith implies that the life has not only its fountain in the heart, but also that the direction which it takes is determined by the heart. Physically considered, the heart is the receptacle for the blood, in which the soul lives and rules; the pitcher at the blood-fountain which draws it and pours it forth; the chief vessel of the physically self-subsisting blood-life from which it goes forth, and into which it disembogues (*Syst. der bib. Psychol.* p. 232). What is said of the heart in the lower sense of corporeal vitality, is true in the higher sense of the intellectual soul-life. The Scripture names the heart also as the intellectual soul-centre of man, in its concrete, central unity, its dynamic activity, and its ethical determination on all sides. All the radiations of corporeal and of soul life concentrate there, and again unfold themselves from thence; all that is

implied in the Hellenic and Hellenistic words *νοῦς*, *λόγος*, *συνείδησις*, *θυμός*, lies in the word *καρδία*; and all whereby *בָּשָׂר* (the body) and *נְפֶשׁ* (the spirit, *anima*) are affected comes in *לֵב* into the light of consciousness (*Id.* p. 251). The heart is the instrument of the thinking, willing, perceiving life of the spirit; it is the seat of the knowledge of self, of the knowledge of God, of the knowledge of our relation to God, and also of the law of God impressed on our moral nature; it is the workshop of our individual spiritual and ethical form of life brought about by self- activity, — the life in its higher and in its lower sense goes out from it, and receives from it the impulse of the direction which it takes; and how earnestly, therefore, must we feel ourselves admonished, how sacredly bound to preserve the heart in purity (Psa. 73: 1), so that from this spring of life may go forth not mere seeming life and a caricature of life, but a true life well-pleasing to God! How we have to carry into execution this careful guarding of the heart, is shown in v. 24 and the golden rules which follow. Mouth and lips are meant (v. 24) as instruments of speech, and not of its utterance, but of the speech going forth from them. *עֲקָשׂוֹת*, *distorsio*, refers to the mouth (Pro. 6:12), when what it speaks is disfiguring and deforming, thus falsehood as the contrast of truth and love (Pro. 2:12); and to the lips *לְזוֹת*, when that which they speak turns aside from the true and the right to side-ways and by-ways. Since the *Kametz* of such *abstracta*, as well of verbs *ע״ו* like *רָמוֹת*, Eze. 32: 5, as of verbs *ל״ה* like *נָלוֹת*, Isa. 45:13, *חָזוֹת*, Isa. 28:18, is elsewhere treated as unalterable, there lies in this *לְזוֹת* either an inconsistency of punctuation, or it is presupposed that the form *לְזוֹת* was vocalized like *שְׁבוֹת = שְׁבִית*, Num. 21:29.

Pro. 4:25. Another rule commends gathering together (concentration) in opposition to dissipation. It is also even externally regarded worthy of consideration, as Ben-Sira, 9: 5, expresses it: *μη περιβλέπου ἐν ῥύμαις πόλεως* — purposeless, curious staring about operates upon the soul, always decentralizing and easily defiling it. But the rule does not exhaust itself in this meaning with reference to external self-discipline; it counsels also straightforward, unswerving directness toward a fixed goal (and what else can this be in such a connection than that which wisdom places before man?), without the turning aside of the eye toward that which is profitless and forbidden, and in this inward sense it falls in with the demand for a single, not squinting eye, Mat. 6:22, where Bengel explains *ἀπλοῦς* by *simplex et bonus, intentus in caelum, in Deum, unice*. *נָבַח* (R. *נָךְ*) means properly fixing, or holding fast with the look, and *נָךְ* (as the Arab. *najad*, to be clear, to be in sight, shows) the rising up which makes the object stand conspicuous before the eyes; both denote here that which lies straight before us, and presents itself to the eye

looking straight out. The naming of the אַפְּאִיִּים (from עִפְּעָר, to flutter, to move tremblingly), which belongs not to the seeing apparatus of the eye but to its protection, is introduced by the poetical parallelism; for the eyelids, including in this word the twinkling, in their movement follow the direction of the seeing eye. On the form יִישְׂרוּ (fut. *Hiph.* of יָשַׁר, to be straight), defective according to the Masora, with the *Jod* audible, cf. Hos. 7:12, 1Ch. 12: 2, and under Gen. 8:17; the softened form הַיִּשִׁיר does not occur, we find only הַיִּשִׁיר or הוֹשִׁיר.

Pro. 4:26. The understanding of this rule is dependent on the right interpretation of פָּלַס, which means neither “weigh off” (Ewald) nor “measure off” (Hitzig, Zöckler). פָּלַס has once, Ps. 58: 3, the meaning to weigh out, as the denom. of פָּלַס, a level, a steelyard; ^{f74} everywhere else it means to make even, to make level, to open a road: vid., under Isa. 26: 7, 40:12. The admonition thus refers not to the careful consideration which measures the way leading to the goal which one wishes to reach, but to the preparation of the way by the removal of that which prevents unhindered progress and makes the way insecure. The same meaning appears if פָּלַס, of cognate meaning with תָּבַן, denoted first to level, and then to make straight with the level (Fleischer). We must remove all that can become a moral hindrance or a dangerous obstacle, in our life-course, in order that we may make right steps with our feet, as the LXX (Heb. 12:13) translate. *26b* is only another expression for this thought. הָכִין דְּרָכָו (2Ch. 27: 6) means to give a direction to his way; a right way, which keeps in and facilitates the keeping in the straight direction, is accordingly called דְּרָךְ נָכוֹן; and “let all thy ways be right” (cf. Ps. 119: 5, LXX κατευθυνθεισας) will thus mean: see to it that all the ways which thou goest lead straight to the end.

Pro. 4:27. In closest connection with the preceding, *27a* cautions against by-ways and indirect courses, and *27b* continues it in the briefest moral expression, which is here מָרַע הַגְּלָדָּהֶסֶר instead of סוֹר מָרַע, Pro. 3: 7, for the figure is derived from the way. The LXX has other four lines after this verse (27), which we have endeavoured to retranslate into the Hebrew (Intro. p. 34). They are by no means genuine; for while in *27a* right and left are equivalent to by-ways, here the right and left side are distinguished as that of truth and its contrary; and while there [in LXX] the ὁρθὰς τροχὰς ποιεῖν is required of man, here it is promised as the operation of God, which is no contradiction, but in this similarity of expression betrays poverty of style. Hitzig disputes also the genuineness of the Hebrew v. 27. But it continues explanatorily v. 26, and is related to it, yet not as a gloss, and in the general

relation of 26 and 27a there comes a word, certainly not unwelcome, such as 27b, which impresses the moral stamp on these thoughts.

That with v. 27 the admonition of his father, which the poet, placing himself back into the period of his youth, reproduces, is not yet concluded, the resumption of the address בְּנִי, Pro. 5: 1, makes evident; while on the other hand the address בְּנִיִּם in Pro. 5: 7 shows that at that point there is advance made from the recollections of his father's house to conclusions therefrom, for the circle of young men by whom the poet conceives himself to be surrounded. That in Pro. 5: 7 ff. a subject of the warning with which the seventh address closes is retained and further prosecuted, does not in the connection of all these addresses contradict the opinion that with Pro. 5: 7 a new address begins. But the opinion that the warning against adultery does not agree (Zöckler) with the designation אִשָּׁה, Pro. 4: 3, given to him to whom it is addressed, is refuted by 1Ch. 22: 5, 2Ch. 13: 7.

Pro. 5: 1-6. Here a fourth rule of life follows the three already given, Pro. 4:24, 25, 26-27:

*1 My son, attend unto my wisdom,
And incline thine ear to my prudence,*

*2 To observe discretion,
And that thy lips preserve knowledge.*

*3 For the lips of the adulteress distil honey,
And smoother than oil is her mouth;*

*4 But her end is bitter like wormwood,
Sharper than a two-edged sword.*

*5 Her feet go down to death,
Her steps cleave to Hades.*

*6 She is far removed from entering the way of life,
Her steps wander without her observing it.*

Wisdom and understanding increase with the age of those who earnestly seek after them. It is the father of the youth who here requests a willing ear to his wisdom of life, gained in the way of many years' experience and observation. In v. 2 the inf. of the object is continued in the *finitum*, as in Pro. 2: 2, 8.

מְזִמָּה (vid., on its etymon under Pro. 1: 4) are plans, projects, designs, for the most part in a bad sense, intrigues and artifices (vid., Pro. 24: 8), but also used of well-considered resolutions toward what is good, and hence of the purposes of God, Jer. 23:20. This noble sense of the word מְזִמָּה, with its plur., is

peculiar to the introductory portion (1-9) of the Book of Proverbs. The plur. means here and at Pro. 8:12 (placing itself with **תְּבוּנוֹת** and **חֲכָמוֹת**, vid., p. 48) the reflection and deliberation which is the presupposition of well-considered action, and **שֹׁמֵר** is thus not otherwise than at Pro. 19: 8, and everywhere so meant, where it has that which is obligatory as its object: the youth is summoned to careful observation and persevering exemplification of the *quidquid agas, prudenter agas et respice finem*. In 2b the *Rebia Mugrash* forbids the genitive connection of the two words **וְדָאֵת שְׂפָתַיִךְ**; we translate: *et ut scientiam labia tua tueantur*. Lips which preserve knowledge are such as permit nothing to escape from them (Psa. 17: 3b) which proceeds not from the knowledge of God, and in Him of that which is good and right, and aims at the working out of this knowledge; vid., Köhler on Mal. 2: 7. **שְׂפָתַיִךְ** (from **שָׂפָה**, Arab. *shafat*, edge, lip, properly that against which one rubs, and that which rubs itself) is fem., but the usage of the language presents the word in two genders (cf. 3a with Pro. 26:23). Regarding the pausal **וַיִּצְרוּ** for **יִצְרוּ**, vid., under Pro. 3: 1, 2:11. The lips which distil the honey of enticement stand opposite to the lips which distil knowledge; the object of the admonition is to furnish a protection against the honey-lips.

Pro. 5: 3. **זָרָה** denotes the wife who belongs to another, or who does not belong to him to whom she gives herself or who goes after her (vid., Pro. 2:16). She appears here as the betrayer of youth. The poet paints the love and amiableness which she feigns with colours from the Canticles, Son. 4:11, cf. 5:16. **נִפְתָּה** denotes the honey flowing of itself from the combs (**צוּפִים**), thus the purest and sweetest; its root-word is not **נִיף**, which means to shake, vibrate, and only mediately (when the object is a fluid) to scatter, sprinkle, but, as Schultens has observed, as verb **נִפְתָּה** = Arab. *nafat*, to bubble, to spring up, *nafath*, to blow, to spit out, to pour out. Parchon places the word rightly under **נִפְתָּה** (while Kimchi places it under **נִכַף** after the form **בִּשְׂתָה**), and explained it by **דְּבַשׁ הַיּוֹצֵא חֲלוֹת דְּבַשׁ הַיּוֹצֵא מִי הַכּוֹרֵת קוֹדֵם רִיסוֹק** (the words **דְּבַשׁ הַיּוֹצֵא** should have been used): the honey which flows from the cells before they are broken (the so-called virgin honey). The mouth, **חֵךְ** = Arab. *ħink* (from **חֵנֵךְ**, Arab. *hanak*, *imbuere*, e.g., after the manner of Beduins, the mouth of the newly-born infant with date-honey), comes into view here, as at Pro. 8: 7, etc., as the instrument of speech: smoother than oil (cf. Psa. 55:22), it shows itself when it gives forth amiable, gentle, impressive words (Pro. 2:16, 6:24); also our “schmeicheln” (= to flatter, caress) is equivalent to to make smooth and fair; in the language of weavers it means to smooth the warp.

Pro. 5: 4, 5. In verse 4 the reverse of the sweet and smooth external is placed opposite to the attraction of the seducer, by whose influence the inconsiderate

permits himself to be carried away: her end, i.e., the last that is experienced of her, the final consequence of intercourse with her (cf. Pro. 23:32), is bitter as wormwood, sharp as a two-edged sword. The O.T. language regards bitterness and poison as related both in meaning and in reality; the word **לַעֲנָה** (Aq. **ἀψίνθιον** = wormwood) means in Arab. the curse. **חָרַב פִּיּוֹת** is translated by Jerome after the LXX, *gladius biceps*; but **פִּיּוֹת** means double-edged, and **חָרַב שְׁנֵי פִיּוֹת** (Jud. 3:16) means a doubled-edged sword. Here the plur. will thus poetically strengthen the meaning, like **ξίφος πολύστομον**, that which devours, as if it had three or four edges (Fl.). The end in which the disguised seduction terminates is bitter as the bitterest, and cutting as that which cuts the most: self-condemnation and a feeling of divine anger, anguish of heart, and destructive judgment. The feet of the adulteress go downward to death. In Hebr. this *descendentes ad mortem* is expressed by the genitive of connection; **מֹת** is the genitive, as in **יֹרְדֵי בֹר**, Pro. 1:12; elsewhere the author uses **אֵל יֹרְדוֹת**, Pro. 7:27, 2:18. Death, **מֹת** (so named from the stretching of the corpse after the stiffness of death), denotes the condition of departure from this side as a punishment, with which is associated the idea of divine wrath. In **שְׂאוּל** (sinking, abyss, from **שָׂאֵל**, R. **שָׁל**, **χαλᾶν**, vid., under Isa. 5:14), lie the ideas of the grave as a place of corruption, and of the under-world as the place of incorporeal shadow-life. Her steps hold fast to Hades is equivalent to, they strive after Hades and go straight to it; similar to this is the Arab. expression, *hdha âldrb yâkhdh âly âlbl*: this way leads straight forward to the town (Fl.).

Pro. 5: 6. If we try to connect the clause beginning with **פֶּן** with 5b as its principal sentence: she goes straight to the abyss, so that by no means does she ever tread the way of life (thus e.g., Schultens), or better, with 6b: never more to walk in the way of life, her paths fluctuate hither and thither (as *Gr. Venet.* and Kamphausen in Bunsen's *Bibelwerk*, after Bertheau and Ewald, translate); then in the former case more than in the latter the difference of the subject opposes itself, and in the latter, in addition, the **לֹא תִדַע**, only disturbing in this negative clause. Also by the arrangement of the words, 6a appears as an independent thought. But with Jewish expositors (Rashi, Aben-Ezra, Ralbag, Malbim, etc.) to interpret **תַּפְּלִים**, after the Talmud (*b. Moëd katan* 9a) and Midrash, as an address is impracticable; the warning: do not weigh the path of life, affords no meaning suitable to this connection — for we must, with Cartwright and J. H. Michaelis, regard 6a as the antecedent to 6b: *ne forte semitam vitae ad sequendum eligas, te per varios deceptionum meandros abripit ut non noveris, ubi locorum sis*; but then the continuation of the address is to be expected in 6b. No, the subject to **תַּפְּלִים** is the adulteress, and **פֶּן** is an intensified **לֹא**. Thus the LXX, Jerome, Syr., Targ., Luther, Geier, Nolde, and

among Jewish interpreters Heidenheim, who first broke with the tradition sanctioned by the Talmud and the Midrash, for he interpreted 6a as a negative clause spoken in the tone of a question. But פֶּן is not suitable for a question, but for a call. Accordingly, Böttcher explains: *viam vitae ne illa complanare studeat!* (פֶּלֶס in the meaning *complanando operam dare*). But the adulteress as such, and the striving to come to the way of life, stand in contradiction: an effort to return must be meant, which, because the power of sin over her is too great, fails; but the words do not denote that, they affirm the direct contrary, viz., that it does not happen to the adulteress ever to walk in the way of life. As in the warning the independent פֶּן may be equivalent to *cave ne* (Job. 32:13), so also in the declaration it may be equivalent to *absit ut*, for פֶּן (from פִּנָּה, after the forms בֶּן = Arab. *banj*. עֵץ = Arab. *‘asj*) means turning away, removal. Thus: Far from taking the course of the way of life (which has life as its goal and reward) — for פֶּלֶס, to open, to open a road (Psa. 78:50), has here the meaning of the open road itself — much rather do her steps wilfully stagger (Jer. 14:10) hither and thither, they go without order and without aim, at one time hither, at another time thither, without her observing it; i.e., without her being concerned at this, that she thereby runs into the danger of falling headlong into the yawning abyss. The unconsciousness which the clause לֹא תִדַע expresses, has as its object not the falling (Psa. 35: 8), of which there is here nothing directly said, but just this staggering, vacillation, the danger of which she does not watch against. נָעוּ has *Mercha* under the ע with *Zinnorith* preceding; it is *Milra* [an oxytone] (*Michlol* 111b); the punctuation varies in the accentuations of the form without evident reason: Olsh. § 233, p. 285. The old Jewish interpreters (and recently also Malbim) here, as also at Pro. 2:16, by the זָרָה [strange woman] understand heresy (מִיִּנּוֹת), or the philosophy that is hostile to revelation; the ancient Christian interpreters understood by it folly (Origen), or sensuality (Procopius), or heresy (Olympiodorus), or false doctrine (Polychronios). The LXX, which translates, v. 5, רִגְלֶיהָ by τῆς ἀφοροσύνης οἱ πόδες, looks toward this allegorical interpretation. But this is unnecessary, and it is proved to be false from Pro. 5:15-20, where the זָרָה is contrasted with the married wife.

Eighth Introductory Mashal Discourse, Pro. 5: 7-23

WARNING AGAINST ADULTERY AND COMMENDATION OF MARRIAGE

Pro. 5: 7-23. With Pro. 5: 1-6, which like Pro. 4:20 commences it once more, the seventh discourse is brought to a conclusion. The address בְּנִי is

three times repeated in similar connections, Pro. 4:10, 20, 5: 1. There is no reason for breaking off the fatherly admonition (introduced with the words, “And he said to me,” Pro. 4: 4), which was addressed to the author in the period of his youth, earlier than here, where the author again resumes the **בְּנִים שָׁמְעוּ** with which he had begun (Pro. 4: 1) this seventh narrative address. That after the father has ceased speaking he does not express himself in a rounded manner, may be taken as a sign that toward the end he had become more and more unmindful of the *rôle* of the reporter, if this **וְאִתָּה בְּנִים** following, with which he realizes for his circle of hearers the admonition which had been in part addressed to himself, does not prove the contrary.

Pro. 5: 7-11. The eighth discourse springs out of the conclusion of the seventh, and connects itself by its reflective **מִמְעַלְיָה** so closely with it that it appears as its continuation; but the new beginning and its contents included in it, referring only to social life, secures its relative independence. The poet derives the warning against intercourse with the adulteress from the preceding discourse, and grounds it on the destructive consequences.

*7 And now, ye sons, hearken unto me,
And depart not from the words of my mouth.*

*8 Hold thy path far from her neighbourhood,
And come not to the door of her house!*

*9 That thou mayest not give the freshness of thy youth to another,
Nor thy years to the cruel one;*

*10 That strangers may not sate themselves with thy possessions,
And the fruit of thy toils come into the house of a stranger,*

*11 And thou groanest at the end,
When thy flesh and thy body are consumed.*

Neither here nor in the further stages of this discourse is there any reference to the criminal punishment inflicted on the adulterer, which, according to Lev. 20:10, consisted in death, according to Eze. 16:40, cf. Joh. 8: 5, in stoning, and according to a later traditional law, in strangulation (**חֲנִיקָה**). Ewald finds in v. 14 a play on this punishment of adultery prescribed by law, and reads from v. 9 f. that the adulterer who is caught by the injured husband was reduced to the state of a slave, and was usually deprived of his manhood. But that any one should find pleasure in making the destroyer of his wife his slave is a far-fetched idea, and neither the law nor the history of Israel contains any evidence for this punishment by slavery or the mutilation of the adulterer, for which Ewald refers to Grimm's *Deutsche Rechtsaltertümer*. The figure which

is here sketched by the poet is very different. He who goes into the net of the wanton woman loses his health and his goods. She stands not alone, but has her party with her, who wholly plunder the simpleton who goes into her trap. Nowhere is there any reference to the husband of the adulteress. The poet does not at all think on a married woman. And the word chosen directs our attention rather to a foreigner than to an Israelitish woman, although the author may look upon harlotry as such as heathenish rather than Israelitish, and designate it accordingly. The party of those who make prostitutes of themselves consists of their relations and their older favourites, the companions of their gain, who being in league with her exhaust the life-strength and the resources of the befooled youth (Fl.). This discourse begins with וְאִתָּהּ, for it is connected by this concluding application (cf. Pro. 7:24) with the preceding.

Pro. 5: 8, 9. In verse 8, one must think on such as make a gain of their impurity. מַאֲל, Schultens remarks, with reference to Eze. 23:18, *crebrum in rescisso omni commercio*: מֵן denotes the departure, and אֶל the nearness, from which one must remove himself to a distance. Regarding הוֹדֵד (v. 9), which primarily, like our *Pracht* (*bracht* from *brechen* = to break) [pomp, magnificence], appears to mean fulness of sound, and then fulness of splendour, see under Job. 39:20; here there is a reference to the freshness or the bloom of youth, as well as the years, against the sacrifice of which the warning is addressed — in a pregnant sense they are the fairest years, the years of youthful fulness of strength. Along with אֶחָרִים the *singulare-tantum* אֶבְרִי (vid., Jer. 50:42) has a collective sense; regarding the root-meaning, vid., under Isa. 13: 9. It is the *adj. relat.* of אֶבְרִי after the form אֶבְרִי, which is formed not from אֶבְרִי, but from an unknown verb אֶבְרִי. The ancients referred it to death and the devil; but the אֶבְרִי belongs to the covetous society, which impels ever anew to sin, which is their profit, him who has once fallen into it, and thus brings bodily ruin upon him; they are the people who stand far aloof from this their sacrifice, and among them are barbarous, rude, inexorably cruel monsters (*Unmenschen*) (*Graecus Venetus*, τῶ ἀπανθρώπων), who rest not till their victim is laid prostrate on the ground and ruined both bodily and financially.

Pro. 5:10. This other side of the ruin v. 10 presents as an image of terror. For הוֹדֵד refers to the person in his stately appearance, but כֹּחַ to his possessions in money and goods; for this word, as well as in the strikingly similar passage Hos. 7: 9, is used as the synonym of הוֹדֵד (Gen. 34:29, etc.), in the sense of ability, estate. This meaning is probably mediated by means of a metonymy, as Gen. 4:12, Job. 31:39, where the idea of the capability of producing is passed over into that of the produce conformable to it; so here the idea of work-power

passes over into that of the gain resulting therefrom. וְעֲצָבֶיךָ (and thy toils) is not, like כְּחֶךְךָ, the accusative governed by יִשְׁבְּעוּ; the carrying over of this verb disturbs the parallelism, and the statement in the passage besides does not accord therewith, which, interpreted as a virtual predicate, presents 10b as an independent prohibitive clause: *neve sint labores tui in domo peregrini*, not *peregrina*; at least נִכְרִי according to the usage of the language is always personal, so that בֵּית נִכְרִי (cf. Lam. 5: 2), like מַלְבוּשׁ נִכְרִי, Zep. 1: 8, is to be explained after עִיר נִכְרִי, Jud. 19:12. עֲצָב (from עָצַב, Arab. *‘aşab*, to bind fast, to tie together, then to make effort, ποιεῖν, *laborare*) is difficult work (Pro. 10:22), and that which is obtained by it; Fleischer compares the Ital. *i miei sudori*, and the French *mes sueurs*.

Pro. 5:11. The fut. יִשְׁבְּעוּ and the יְהִי needed to complete 10b are continued in v. 11 in the *consec. perf.* נָהַם, elsewhere of the hollow roaring of the sea, Isa. 5:30, the growling of the lion, Pro. 28:15, here, as also Eze. 24:23, of the hollow groaning of men; a word which echoes the natural sound, like הוֹם, הֶמָּה, הוֹם. The LXX, with the versions derived from it, has καὶ μεταμεληθήσῃ, i.e., וְנִחַמְתָּ (the *Niph.* נָחַם, to experience the sorrow of repentance, also an echo-word which imitates the sound of deep breathing) — a happy *quid pro quo*, as if one interchanged the Arab. *naham*, *fremere*, *anhelare*, and *nadam*, *paenitere*. That wherein the end consists to which the deluded youth is brought, and the sorrowful sound of despair extorted from him, is stated in 11b: his flesh is consumed away, for sensuality and vexation have worked together to undermine his health. The author here connects together two synonyms to strengthen the conception, as if one said: All thy tears and thy weeping help thee nothing (Fl.); he loves this heaping together of synonyms, as we have shown at p. 24. When the blood-relation of any one is called שָׂרָר בְּשָׂרוֹ, Lev. 18: 6, 25:49, these two synonyms show themselves in subordination, as here in close relation. שָׂרָר appears to be closely connected with שָׂרָרִים, muscles and sinews, and with שֶׁרֶט, the umbilical cord, and thus to denote the flesh with respect to its muscular nature adhering to the bones (Mic. 3: 2), as בְּשָׂרָר denotes it with respect to its tangible outside clothed with skin (vid., under *Isaiah*, p. 418).

Pro. 5:12-14. The poet now tells those whom he warns to hear how the voluptuary, looking back on his life-course, passes sentence against himself.

***12 And thou sayest, “Why have I then hated correction,
And my heart despised instruction!”***

**13 And I have not listened to the voice of my teachers,
Nor lent mine ear to my instructors?**

**14 I had almost fallen into every vice
In the midst of the assembly and the congregation!”**

The question 12a (here more an exclamation than a question) is the combination of two: How has it become possible for me? How could it ever come to it that.... Thus also one way in Arab.: *Kyf f'alat hadhâ* (Fl.). The regimen of **שָׁמַע** in 12b is becoming faint, and in 13b has disappeared. The *Kal* **נָסָא** (as Pro. 1:30, 15: 5) signifies to despise; the *Piel* intensively, to contemn and reject (R. **נָץ**, *pungere*).

Pro. 5:13. **בְּשָׁמַע** signifies to cleave to anything in hearing, as **בְּרָאָה** is to do so in seeing; **לְשָׁמַע** yet more closely corresponds with the classic **ἐπακούειν**, *obedire*, e.g., Psa. 81: 9; **שָׁמַע בְּקוֹל** is the usual phrase for “hearken!”

Pro. 5:14. **בְּמֵאֵט** with the perf. following is equivalent to: it wanted but a little that this or that should happen, e.g., Gen. 26:10. It is now for the most part thus explained: it wanted but a little, and led astray by that wicked companionship I would have been drawn away into crime, for which I would then have been subjected to open punishment (Fl.). Ewald understands **רָע** directly of punishment in its extreme form, stoning; and Hitzig explains **כָּל-רָע** by “the totality of evil,” in so far as the disgraceful death of the criminal comprehends in it all other evils that are less. But **בְּכָל-רָע** means, either, into every evil, misfortune, or into every wickedness; and since **רָע**, in contradistinction to **לֵב** (Hitzig compares Eze. 36: 5), is a conception of a species, then the meaning is equivalent to *in omni genere mali*. The reference to the death-punishment of the adulteress is excluded thereby, though it cannot be denied that it might be thought of at the same time, if he who too late comes to consider his ways were distinctly designated in the preceding statements as an adulterer. But it is on the whole a question whether **בְּכָל-רָע** is meant of the evil which follows sin as its consequence. The usage of the language permits this, cf. 2Sa. 16: 8, Exo. 5:19, 1Ch. 7:23, Psa. 10: 6, but no less the reference to that which is morally bad, cf. Exo. 32:22 (where Keil rightly compares with 1Jo. 5:19); and **הִיִּיתִי** (for which in the first case one expected **נִפְלֵיתִי**, I fell into, vid., Pro. 13:17, 17:20, 28:14) is even more favourable to the latter reference. Also **בְּתוֹךְ קָהָל וְעַדָּה** (cf. on the heaping together of synonyms under 11b), this paraphrase of the *palam ac publice*, with its **בְּתוֹךְ** (cf. Psa. 111: 1, 2Ch. 20:14), looks rather to a heightening of the moral self-

accusation. He found himself in all wickedness, living and moving therein in the midst of the congregation, and thereby giving offence to it, for he took part in the external worship and in the practices of the congregation, branding himself thereby as a hypocrite. That by the one name the congregation is meant in its civil aspect, and by the other in its ecclesiastical aspect, is not to be supposed: in the congregation of the people of the revealed law, the political and the religious sides are not so distinguished. It is called without distinction קהל and עדה (from יָאָד). Rather we would say that קהל is the whole *ecclesia*, and עדה the whole of its representatives; but also the great general council bears sometimes the one name (Exo. 12: 3, cf. 21) and sometimes the other (Deu. 31:30, cf. 28) — the placing of them together serves thus only to strengthen the conception.

Pro. 5:15-17. The commendation of true conjugal love in the form of an invitation to a participation in it, is now presented along with the warning against non-conjugal intercourse, heightened by a reference to its evil consequences.

*15 Drink water from thine own cistern,
And flowing streams from thine own fountain.*

*16 Shall thy streams flow abroad,
The water-brooks in the streets!*

*17 Let them belong to thyself alone,
And not to strangers with thee.*

One drinks water to quench his thirst; here drinking is a figure of the satisfaction of conjugal love, of which Paul says, 1Co. 7: 9, κρείσσον ἑστί γαμήσαι ἢ πυροῦσθαι, and this comes into view here, in conformity with the prevailing character of the O.T., only as a created inborn natural impulse, without reference to the poisoning of it by sin, which also within the sphere of married life makes government, moderation, and restraint a duty. Warning against this degeneracy of the natural impulse to the πάθος ἐπιθυμίας authorized within divinely prescribed limits, the apostle calls the wife of any one τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σκεῦος (cf. 1Pe. 3: 7). So here the wife, who is his by covenant (Pro. 2:17), is called “cistern” (בֹּרַ) ¹⁷⁵ and “fountain” (בְּאֵר) of the husband to whom she is married. The figure corresponds to the sexual nature of the wife, the expression for which is נְקִיבָה; but Isa. 51: 1 holds to the natural side of the figure, for according to it the wife is a pit, and the children are brought out of it into the light of day. Aben-Ezra on Lev. 11:36 rightly distinguishes between בור and באר: the former catches the rain, the latter wells out from within. In the former, as Rashi in *Erubin* ii. 4 remarks, there are מים מכוּנסים,

in the latter מים חיים. The post-biblical Hebrew observes this distinction less closely (vid., Kimchi's *Book of Roots*), but the biblical throughout; so far the *Kerî*, Jer. 6: 7, rightly changes בור into the form בַּיִר, corresponding to the Arab. *byar*. Therefore בור is the cistern, for the making of which הָצַב, Jer. 2:13, and באר the well, for the formation of which חָפַר, Gen. 21:30, and כָּרַה, 26:25, are the respective words usually employed (vid., Malbim, *Sifra* 117b). The poet shows that he also is aware of this distinction, for he calls the water which one drinks from the בור by the name מים, but on the other hand that out of the באר by the name נוֹזְלִים, running waters, *fluenta*; by this we are at once reminded of Son. 4:15, cf. 12. The בור offers only stagnant water (according to the *Sohar*, the בור has no water of its own, but only that which is received into it), although coming down into it from above; but the באר has living water, which wells up out of its interior (מִתּוֹךְ, 15b, intentionally for the mere מן), and is fresh as the streams from Lebanon (נוֹל, properly *labi*, to run down, cf. אָזַל, *placide ire*, and generally *ire*; Arab. *zâl, loco cedere, desinere*; Arab. *zll, IV, to cause to glide back, deglutire*, of the gourmand). What a valuable possession a well of water is for nomads the history of the patriarchs makes evident, and a cistern is one of the most valuable possessions belonging to every well-furnished house. The figure of the cistern is here surpassed by that of the fountain, but both refer to the seeking and finding satisfaction (cf. the opposite passage, Pro. 23:27) with the wife, and that, as the expressive possessive suffixes denote, with his legitimate wife.

Pro. 5:16. Here we meet with two other synonyms standing in a similar relation of progression. As אֵין denotes the fountain as to its point of outflow, so מַעְיָן (*n. loci*) means water flowing above on the surface, which in its course increases and divides itself into several courses; such a brook is called, with reference to the water dividing itself from the point of outflow, or to the way in which it divides, פְּלַג (from פָּלַג, Job. 38:25), Arab. *falaj* (as also the Ethiop.) or *falj*, which is explained by *nahar saghayr* (Fl.).¹⁷⁶

We cannot in this double figure think of any reference to the generative power in the *sperma*; similar figures are the waters of Judah, Isa. 48: 1, and the waters of Israel flowing forth as if from a bucket, Num. 24: 7, where זָרְעוּ is the parallel word to מים, cf. also the proper name מִזְאָב (from מוֹ = מוֹי from מָוָה, *diffluere*), *aqua h.e. semen patris*, and שִׁגְלָל, Deu. 28:30, = Arab. *sajal* (whence *sajl* = דְּלִי, *situla*), which is set aside by the *Kerî*. Many interpreters have by חוֹצָה and בְּרַחֲבוֹת been here led into the error of pressing into the text the exhortation not to waste the creative power in sinful lust. The LXX translates

יִפְצוּ by ὑπερεκχείσθω; but Origen, and also Clemens Alexandrinus, used the phrase μὴ ὑπερεκχείσθω, which is found in the Complut., Ald., and several codd., and is regarded by Lagarde, as also Cappellus, as original: the three Göttingen theologians (Ewald, Bertheau, and Elster) accordingly make the emendation אֶל-יִפְצוּ. But that μὴ of the LXX was not added till a later period; the original expression, which the Syro-Hexapl. authorizes, was ὑπερεκχείσθω without μὴ, as also in the version of Aquila, διασκορπιζέσθωσαν without μὴ (vid., Field). The Hebrew text also does not need אֶל. Clericus, and recently Hitzig, Zöckler, Kamphausen, avoid this remedy, for they understand this verse interrogatively — an expedient which is for the most part and also here unavailing; for why should not the author have written אִם יִפְצוּ? Schultens rightly remarks: *nec negationi nec interrogationi ullus hic locus*, for (with Fleischer and von Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 2, 402) he regards v. 16 as a conclusion: *tunc exundabunt*; so that he strengthens the summons of v. 15 by the promise of numerous descendants from unviolated marriage. But to be so understood, the author ought to have written יִפְצוּ. So, according to the text, יִפְצוּ as jussive continues the *imper.* שִׁתָּה (15a), and the full meaning according to the connection is this: that within the marriage relation the generative power shall act freely and unrestrained. רְחֹבוֹת חוּץ and חוּץ (Pro. 1:20) the space free from houses, and the ways and places which lead towards and stretch between them; חוּץ (from חָוַץ, Arab. *khass*, to split, *seorsim ponere*) is a very relative conception, according as one thinks of that which is without as the contrast of the house, the city, or the country. Here חוּץ is the contrast of the person, and thus that which is anywhere without it, whereto the exercise of its manly power shall extend. The two figurative expressions are the description of the *libero flumine*, and the contrast, that restriction of self which the marriage relation, according to 1Co. 7: 3-5, condemns.

Pro. 5:17. That such matters as there are thought of, is manifest from this verse. As זרע comprehends with the cause (*sperma*) the effect (posterity), so, in v. 16, with the *effusio roboris virilis* is connected the idea of the beginnings of life. For the subjects of v. 17 are the *effusiones seminis* named in v. 16. These in their effects (v. 17) may belong to thee alone, viz., to thee alone (לְבַדְּךָ, properly in thy separateness) within thy married relation, not, as thou hast fellowship with other women, to different family circles, Aben-Ezra rightly regards as the subject, for he glosses thus: שֶׁהֵם הַבְּנִים הַכַּשְׂרִים יִתְחַסּוּ לְךָ, and Immanuel well explains יִתְחַסּוּ לְךָ by הַפְּלִגִים. The child born out of wedlock belongs not to the father alone, he knows not to whom it belongs; its father must for the sake of his honour deny it before the world.

Thus, as Grotius remarks: *ibi sere ubi prolem metas*. In יְהִיוּ and וְאִין is continued. It is not thus used adverbially for לָא, as in the old classic Arabic *lyas* for *l'* (Fl.), but it carries in it the force of a verb, so that יְהִיוּ, according to rule, in the sense of וְלָא יְהִיוּ = וְלָא יְהִיוּ, continues it.

Pro. 5:18-20. With v. 18 is introduced anew the praise of conjugal love. These three verses, 18-21, have the same course of thought as 15-17.

*18 Let thy fountain be blessed,
And rejoice in the wife of thy youth.*

*19 The lovely hind and the graceful gazelle —
May her bosom always charm thee;
In her love mayest thou delight thyself evermore.*

*20 But why wilt thou be fascinated with a stranger,
And embrace the bosom of a foreign woman?*

Like בּוֹר and בָּאָר, מְקוֹר, is also a figure of the wife; the root-word is קוֹר, from קָר, כּוֹר, the meanings of which, to dig and make round, come together in the primary conception of the round digging out or boring out, not קוֹר = קָרָר, the *Hiph.* of which means (Jer. 6: 7) to well out cold (water). It is the fountain of the birth that is meant (cf. מְקוֹר of the female עֵרְוָה, e.g., Lev. 20:18), not the procreation (LXX, ἡ σὴ φλέψ, viz., φλέψ γονίμη); the blessing wished for by him is the blessing of children, which בְּרוּךְ so much the more distinctly denotes if בְּרַךְ, Arab. *barak*, means to spread out, and בְּרַךְ thus to cause a spreading out. The מֵן, 18b, explains itself from the idea of drawing (water), given with the figure of a fountain; the word בְּאֵשֶׁת found in certain codices is, on the contrary, prosaic (Fl.). Whilst מֵן שְׂמַח is found elsewhere (Ecc. 2:20, 2Ch. 20:27) as meaning almost the same as בְּ שְׂמַח; the former means rejoicing from some place, the latter in something. In the genitive connection, “wife of thy youth” (cf. Pro. 2:17), both of these significations lie: thy youthful wife, and she who was chosen by thee in thy youth, according as we refer the suffix to the whole idea or only to the second member of the chain of words.

Pro. 5:19. The subject, 19a, set forth as a theme courts love for her who is to be loved, for she presents herself as lovely. אֵילָה is the female of the stag, which may derive its name אֵיל from the weapon-power of its horns, and יַעֲלָה (from יָאָל, Arab. *wa'al*, to climb), that of the wild-goat (יַעַל); and thus properly, not the gazelle, which is called צִבִי on account of its elegance, but

the chamois. These animals are commonly used in Semitic poetry as figures of female beauty on account of the delicate beauty of their limbs and their sprightly black eyes. אֶהְבִּים signifies always sensual love, and is interchanged in this erotic meaning (Pro. 7:18) with דְּוִדִים. In 19b the predicate follows the subject. The *Graec. Venet.* translates as if the word were דְּוִדִיה, and the *Syr.* as if it were דְּרַכִּיה, but Aquila rightly translates τίθοι ἀτῆς. As τίθος is derived (vid., Curtius, *Griech. Etymologie*, Nr. 307) from *dhâ*, to suck (causative, with *anu*, to put to sucking), so דָד, שָד, תָד, Arab. *thady* (commonly in dual *thadjein*), from שָדָה, Arab. *thdy, rigare*, after which also the verb יִרְוֶה is chosen: she may plentifully give thee to drink; figuratively equivalent to, refresh or (what the *Aram.* רָוַי precisely means) fascinate^{f77} thee, satisfy thee with love. דְּדִים also is an erotic word, which besides in this place is found only in Ezekiel (Eze. 23: 3, 8, 21). The LXX obliterates the strong sensual colouring of this line. In 19c it changes תִּשְׁגָה into תִּשְׁגָה, πολλοστός ἔση, perhaps also because the former appeared to be too sensual. Moses ha-Darshan (in Rashi) proposes to explain it after the Arab. *sjy*, to cover, to cast over, to come over anything (III = עָסַק, to employ oneself with something): engage thyself with her love, i.e., be always devoted to her in love. And Immanuel himself, the author of a Hebrew *Divan* expatiating with unparalleled freedom in erotic representations, remarks, while he rightly understands תִּשְׁגָה of the fascination of love: חֲשָׁקוֹ אֶפִּילוֹ בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ שִׁגְגָה: קוֹרָא הַתְּמִדָה, he calls the husband's continual caressing of the wife an error. But this moral side-glance lies here at a distance from the poet. He speaks here of a morally permissible love-ecstasy, or rather, since תְּמִיד excludes that which is extraordinary, of an intensity of love connected with the feeling of superabundant happiness. שָׁגָה properly signifies to err from the way, therefore figuratively, with ב of a matter, like *delirare ea*, to be wholly captivated by her, so that one is no longer in his own power, can no longer restrain himself — the usual word for the intoxication of love and of wine, Pro. 20: 1 (Fl.).

Pro. 5:20. The answer to the Why? in this verse is: no reasonable cause, — only beastly sensuality only flagitious blindness can mislead thee. The ב of בְּזָרָה is, as 19b and Isa. 28: 7, that of the object through which one is betrayed into intoxication. חָק (thus, according to the Masora, four times in the O.T. for חֵיק) properly means an incision or deepening, as Arab. *hujr* (from *hjr, cohibere*), the front of the body, the part between the arms or the female breasts, thus the bosom, Isa. 40:11 (with the swelling part of the clothing, *sinus vestis*, which the Arabs call *jayb*), and the lap; חָבַק (as Pro. 4: 8), to embrace, corresponds here more closely with the former of these meanings; also

elsewhere the wife of any one is called **השכבת בחיקו** or **אשת חיקו**, as she who rests on his breast. The ancients, also J. H. Michaelis, interpret vv. 15-20 allegorically, but without thereby removing sensual traces from the elevated N.T. consciousness of pollution, striving against all that is fleshly; for the *castum cum Sapientia conjugium* would still be always represented under the figure of husband and wife dwelling together. Besides, though **זרה** might be, as the contrast of **חכמה**, the personified lust of the world and of the flesh, yet 19a is certainly not the **חכמה**, but a woman composed of flesh and blood. Thus the poet means the married life, not in a figurative sense, but in its reality — he designedly describes it thus attractively and purely, because it bears in itself the preservative against promiscuous fleshly lust.

Pro. 5:21-23. That the intercourse of the sexes out of the married relationship is the commencement of the ruin of a fool is now proved.

**21 For the ways of every one are before the eyes of Jahve,
And all his paths He marketh out.**

**22 His own sins lay hold of him, the evil-doer,
And in the bands of his sins is he held fast.**

**23 He dies for the want of correction,
And in the fulness of his folly he staggers to ruin.**

It is unnecessary to interpret **נכח** as an adverbial accusative: straight before Jahve's eyes; it may be the nominative of the predicate; the ways of man (for **איש** is here an individual, whether man or woman) are an object (properly, fixing) of the eyes of Jahve. With this the thought would suitably connect itself: *et omnes orbitas ejus ad amussim examinat*; but **פלים**, as the denom. of **פלים**, Psa. 58: 3, is not connected with all the places where the verb is united with the obj. of the way, and Psa. 78:50 shows that it has there the meaning to break though, to open a way (from **פל**, to split, cf. Talmudic **מפלט**, opened, accessible, from **פלט**, Syriac *p^elaš, perfodere, fodiendo viam, aditum sibi aperire*). The opening of the way is here not, as at Isa. 26: 7, conceived of as the setting aside of the hindrances in the way of him who walks, but generally as making walking in the way possible: man can take no step in any direction without God; and that not only does not exempt him from moral responsibility, but the consciousness of this is rather for the first time rightly quickened by the consciousness of being encompassed on every side by the knowledge and the power of God. The dissuasion of v. 20 is thus in v. 21 grounded in the fact, that man at every stage and step of his journey is observed and encompassed by God: it is impossible for him to escape from the knowledge of God or from

dependence on Him. Thus opening all the paths of man, He has also appointed to the way of sin the punishment with which it corrects itself: “his sins lay hold of him, the evil-doer.” The suffix **וִי** does not refer to **אִישׁ** of v. 21, where every one without exception and without distinction is meant, but it relates to the obj. following, the evil-doer, namely, as the explanatory permutative annexed to the “him” according to the scheme, Exo. 2: 6; the permutative is distinguished from the apposition by this, that the latter is a forethought explanation which heightens the understanding of the subject, while the former is an explanation afterwards brought in which guards against a misunderstanding. The same construction, Pro. 14:13b, belonging to the *syntaxis ornata* in the old Hebrew, has become common in the Aramaic and in the modern Hebrew. Instead of **יִלְכְּדוּהוּ** (v. 22), the poet uses poetically **יִלְכְּדֵנוּ**; the interposed **נ** may belong to the emphatic ground-form **יִלְכְּדוּן**, but is epenthetic if one compares forms such as **קָבְנוּ** (R. **קב**), Num. 23:13 (cf. p. 52). The **חֲטָאתוֹ** governed by **חֲבָלֵי**, *laquei* (**חֲבָלֵי**, *tormina*), is either *gen. exeg.*: bands which consist in his sin, or *gen. subj.*: bands which his sin unites, or better, *gen. possess.*: bands which his sin brings with it. By these bands he will be held fast, and so will die: he (**הוּא** referring to the person described) will die in insubordination (Symm. **δι’ ἀπειθεύσαν**), or better, since **אִין** and **רַב** are placed in contrast: in want of correction. With the **יִשְׁנָה** (v. 23b), repeated purposely from v. 20, there is connected the idea of the overthrow which is certain to overtake the infatuated man. In v. 20 the sense of moral error began already to connect itself with this verb. **אֹולַת** is the right name of unrestrained lust of the flesh. **אֹולַת** is connected with **אֹול**, the belly; **אֹול**, Arab. *âl*, to draw together, to condense, to thicken (*Isaiah*, p. 424). *Dummheit* (stupidity) and the Old-Norse *dumba*, darkness, are in their roots related to each other. Also in the Semitic the words for blackness and darkness are derived from roots meaning condensation. **אֹוִיל** is the mind made thick, darkened, and become like crude matter.

Ninth Introductory Mashal Discourse, Pro. 6: 1-5

WARNING AGAINST INCONSIDERATE SURETYSHIP

Pro. 6: 1-5. The author does not return to the subject of chastity till the twelfth discourse, Pro. 6:20 ff. Between the eight and the twelfth three other groups of moral proverbs are introduced, which are neither connected with one another nor with the eight discourses which precede them. Must we therefore, with Hitzig and Kamphausen, hold Pro. 6: 1-5, 6-11, 12-19, to be an interpolation here introduced from some other place? We find here the fondness for synonyms and words similar in sound peculiar to the author of the

introduction, Pro. 6: 2, 3, 5, and meet with the same interchange of words, Pro. 6: 4, cf. 4:25, and figurative expressions, Pro. 6:18, cf. 3:29 (חרש), word-formations, Pro. 6:10 (חֶבֶק), cf. Pro. 3: 8 (שְׁקוֹי), ideas, Pro. 6:12, cf. 4:28 (עֲקֻשׁוֹת פֶּה), Pro. 6:14, cf. 2:12, 13 (תְּהַפְכוֹת), and constructions, Pro. 6:12 (הוֹלֵךְ עֲקֻשׁוֹת פֶּה), cf. Pro. 2: 7 (הִלְכִי תָם); like delineations of character, Pro. 6:18b, cf. 1:16, and threatenings, Pro. 6:15, cf. 1:26 f., 3:25 — as many marks of identity of the authorship as could be expected. And what had moved the interpolators to introduce the three groups of proverbs, Pro. 6: 1-5, 6-11, 12-19, just here? In vain does Hitzig seek to extract from Proverbs 5 certain words and ideas common to it with Proverbs 6 which shall make it clear that the groups of proverbs in question are here an interpolation; the points of contrast are not prominent. If now the poet has already in Pro. 3: 1-18, but still more in Pro. 3:27 ff., connected together all manner of rules of life without any close or visible connection, it is not strange if at Pro. 6: 1, where besides the בְּנִי denotes the new section, he breaks off to a new subject out of the fulness of his matter; and the connection wanting between Pro. 6: 1 and Pro. 5:23, as well as between Pro. 3:27 and Pro. 3:26, does not therefore warrant critical suspicion.

Pro. 6: 1-5. The author warns against suretyship; or rather, he advises that if one has made himself surety, he should as quickly as possible withdraw from the snare.

*1 My son, if thou hast become surety for thy neighbour,
Hast given thy hand for another:*

*2 Thou art entangled in the words of thy mouth,
Ensnared in the words of thy mouth.*

*3 Do this then, my son, and free thyself —
For thou hast come under the power of thy neighbour —
Go, instantly entreat and importune thy neighbour.*

*4 Give no sleep to thine eyes,
And no slumber to thine eyelids;*

*5 Tear thyself free like a gazelle from his hand,
And as a bird from the hand of the fowler.*

The chief question here is, whether עָרַב after לְ after עָרַב introduces him for whom or with whom one becomes surety. Elsewhere עָרַב (R. רַב, whence also אָרַב, nectere, to twist close and compact) with the accusative of the person means to become surety for any one, to represent him as a surety, Pro. 11:15, 20:16 (Pro. 27:13), Gen. 43: 9, 44:33 (as with the accusative of the matter, to pledge

anything, to deposit it as a pledge, Jer. 30:21, Neh. 5: 3, = שִׁים, Arab. *wad'a*, Job. 17: 3); and to become surety with any one is expressed, Pro. 17:18, by עָרַב לְפָנַי. The phrase עָרַב לְ is not elsewhere met with, and is thus questionable. If we look to v. 3, the רָא (רָעָה) mentioned there cannot possibly be the creditor with whom one has become surety, for so impetuous and urgent an application to him would be both purposeless and unbecoming. But if he is meant for whom one has become surety, then certainly לְרָעָד is also to be understood of the same person, and לְ is thus *dat. commodi*; similar to this is the Targumic אַרְבֹּתָא אַל, suretyship for any one, Pro. 17:18, 22:26. But is the זָר, 1b, distinguished from רָעָד, the stranger with whom one has become surety? The parallels Pro. 11:15, 20:16, where זָר denotes the person whom one represents, show that in both lines one and the same person is meant; זָר is in the Proverbs equivalent to אַחֵר, each different from the person in the discourse, Pro. 5:17, 27: 2, — thus, like רָעָד, denotes not the friend, but generally him to whom one stands in any kind of relation, even a very external one, in a word, the fellow-creatures or neighbours, Pro. 24:28 (cf. the Arab. *sahbk* and *karynk*, which are used as vaguely and superficially). It is further a question, whether we have to explain 1b: if thou hast given thine hand to another, or for another. Here also we are without evidence from the usage of the language; for the phrase תָּתַקַּע בְּיָד, or merely תָּתַקַּע, appears to be used of striking the hand in suretyship where it elsewhere occurs without any further addition, Pro. 17:18, 22:26, 11:15; however, Job. 17: 3, נִתְתַּקַּע לְיָד, appears the same: to strike into the hand of any one, i.e., to give to him the hand-stroke. From this passage Hitzig concludes that the surety gave the hand-stroke, without doubt in the presence of witnesses, first of all of the creditor, to the debtor, as a sign that he stood for him. But this idea is unnatural, and the “without doubt” melts into air. He on whose hand the stroke falls is always the person to whom one gives suretyship, and confirms it by the hand-stroke. Job also, *l.c.*, means to say: who else but Thou, O Lord, could give to me a pledge, viz., of my innocence? If now the זָר, v. 1b, is, as we have shown, not the creditor,^{f78} but the debtor, then is the לְ the *dat. commodi*, as 1a, and the two lines perfectly correspond. תָּתַקַּע properly means to drive, to strike with a resounding noise, cogn. with the Arab. *wak'a*, which may be regarded as its *intrans.* (Fl.); then particularly to strike the hand or with the hand. He to whom this hand-pledge is given for another remains here undesignated. A new question arises, whether in v. 6, where נִלְכַּד (illaqueari) and נִלְכַּד (comprehendi) follow each other as Isa. 8:15, cf. Jer. 50:24, the hypothetical antecedent is continued or not. We agree with Schultens, Ziegler, and Fleischer against the continuance of the אַם. The repetition of the בְּאִמְרֵי פִיךָ (cf.

Pro. 2:14) serves rightly to strengthen the representation of the thought: thou, thou thyself and no other, hast then ensnared thyself in the net; but this strengthening of the expression would greatly lose in force by placing v. 2 in the antecedent, while if v. 2 is regarded as the conclusion, and thus as the principal proposition, it appears in its full strength.

Pro. 6: 3. The new commencement needs no particle denoting a conclusion; the אפוא, making the summons emphatic (cf. 2Ki. 10:10, frequently in interrogative clauses), connects it closely enough. זאת, neut., refers to what follows. The ו before הנצל is explanatory, as we say in familiar language: Be so good as tell me, or do me the favour to come with me; while no Frenchman would say, *Faites-moi le (ce) plaisir et venez avec moi* (Fl.).¹⁷⁹

The clause כִּי בָאתָ^{f80} is not to be translated: in case thou art fallen into the hand of thy neighbour; for this is represented (vv. 1, 2) as having already in fact happened. On two sides the surety is no longer *sui juris*: the creditor has him in his hand; for if the debtor does not pay, he holds the surety, and in this way many an honourable man has lost house and goods, Sirach 29:18, cf. 8:13; — and the debtor has him, the surety, in his hand; for the performance which is due, for which the suretyship avails, depends on his conscientiousness. The latter is here meant: thou hast made thy freedom and thy possessions dependent on the will of thy neighbour for whom thou art the surety. The clause introduced with כִּי gives the reason for the call to set himself free (הנצל from נצל, R. של, צל, to draw out or off); it is a parenthetical sentence.

The meaning of התרפס is certain. The verb רָפַס (רָפַשׁ, רָפַס) signifies to stamp on, *calcare, concludere*; the *Kamûs*^{f81} explains *rafas* by *rakaḍ balarjal*. The *Hithpa.* might, it is true, mean to conduct oneself in a trampling manner, to tread roughly, as התנבא, and the medial *Niph.* נָבֵא, to conduct oneself speaking (in an impassioned manner); but Psa. 68:31 and the analogy of התבוסס favour the meaning to throw oneself in a stamping manner, i.e., violently, to the ground, to trample upon oneself, — i.e., let oneself be trampled upon, to place oneself in the attitude of most earnest humble prayer. Thus the *Graec. Venet.* πατήθητι, Rashi (“humble thyself like to the threshold which is trampled and trode upon”), Aben-Ezra, Immanuel (“humble thyself under the soles of his feet”); so Cocceius, J. H. Michaelis, and others: *conculcandum te praebe.* וְרָהַב is more controverted. The Talmudic-Midrash explanation (*b. Joma*, 87a; *Bathra*, 173b, and elsewhere): take with thee in great numbers thy friends (רָהַב = הִרְבֵּה), is discredited by this, that it has along with it the explanation of התרפס by (יד) חָתַר פִּס (יד), *solve palmam* (*manus*), i.e., pay what thou canst. Also with the meaning to rule (Parchon,

Immanuel), which רהב besides has not, nothing is to be done. The right meaning of ברהב is to rush upon one boisterously, Isa. 3: 5. רהב means in general to be violently excited (Arab. *rahiba*, to be afraid), and thus to meet one, here with the accusative: assail impetuously thy neighbour (viz., that he fulfil his engagement). Accordingly, with a choice of words more or less suitable, the LXX translates by *παρόξυνε*, Symm., Theodotion by *παρόρησον*, the *Graec. Venet.* by *ἐνίσχυσον*, the Syr. (which the Targumist copies) by *גרג* (*solicita*), and Kimchi glosses by: lay an arrest upon him with pacifying words. The Talmud explains רעיה as plur.;^{f82} but the plur., which was permissible in Pro. 3:28, is here wholly inadmissible: it is thus the *plena scriptio* for רעה with the retaining of the third radical of the ground-form of the root-word (רע' = רעה), or with ' as *mater lectionis*, to distinguish the pausal-form from that which is without the pause; cf. Pro. 24:34. LXX, Syr., Jerome, etc., rightly translate it in the sing. The immediateness lying in רעה (cf. *ὑπαγε*, Mat. 5:24) is now expressed as a duty, v. 4 f. One must not sleep and slumber (an expression quite like Psa. 132: 4), not give himself quietness and rest, till the other has released him from his bail by the performance of that for which he is surety. One must set himself free as a gazelle or as a bird, being caught, seeks to disentangle itself by calling forth all its strength and art.

Pro. 6: 5. The naked מיד is not to be translated “immediately;” for in this sense the word is rabbinical, not biblical. The versions (with exception of Jerome and the *Graec. Venet.*) translate as if the word were מפה [out of the snare]. Bertheau prefers this reading, and Böttcher holds ציד [a hunger] to have fallen out after מיד. It is not a parallelism with reservation; for a bird-catcher is not at the same time a gazelle-hunter. The author, if he has so written, has conceived of מיד, as at 1Ki. 20:42, as absolute, and connected it with הנצל: tear thyself free like the gazelle from the hand into which thou hast fallen (Hitzig); according to which, the section should be accentuated thus: מיד. הנצל כצבי. צבי. ארם. ארם, Arab. *zaby*, is the gazelle (Arab. *ghazâl*), so called from its elegance; צפור, the bird, from its whistling (צפר, Arab. *şafâr*, R. צף, cf. Arab. *saffârat*, the whistling of a bird), Arab. *safar*, whistler (with prosthesis, *aşafwar*, warbler, *Psalm.* p. 794). The bird-catcher is called יקוש (from יקש, after the form יכל, cog. קוש, Isa. 29:21, נקש, R. קש), after the form בגוד (fem. בגודה), or יקוש; one would think that the *Kametz*, after the form *kâtwl* (vid., under Isa. 1:17), must here be fixed, but in Jer. 5:26 the word is vocalized יקושים.

Tenth Introductory Mashal Discourse, Pro. 6: 6-11

CALL TO THE SLUGGARD TO AWAKE

Pro. 6: 6-11. *Altera paraenesis* (remarks J. H. Michaelis) *ad debitorem potius directa, sicut prima ad fidejussorem.* But this connection is a subtle invention. These brief proverbial discourses, each of which forms a completed whole, have scarcely been *a priori* destined for this introduction to the Salomonic Book of Proverbs edited by the author; but he places them in it; and that he so arranges them that this section regarding sluggards follows that regarding sureties, may have been occasioned by accidental points of contact of the one with the other (cf. לָךְ, 6a, with 3b; שְׁנוֹת ... תְּנוּמוֹת, v. 10, with v. 4), which may also further determine the course in which the proverbs follow each other.

Pro. 6: 6-8. As Elihu (Job. 35:11) says that God has set the beasts as our teachers, so he sends the sluggard to the school of the ant (*Ameise*), so named (in Germ.) from its industry (*Emsigkeit*):

*6 Go to the ant, sluggard;
Consider her ways, and be wise!*

*7 She that hath no judge,
Director, and ruler:*

*8 She prepareth in summer her food,
Has gathered in harvest her store.*

The *Dechî* written mostly under the לָךְ separates the inseparable. The thought, Go to the ant, sluggard! permits no other distinction than in the vocative; but the *Dechî* of לָךְ אֶל-נַמְלָה is changed into *Munach*^{f83} on account of the nature of the *Athnach* -word, which consists of only two syllables without the counter-tone. The ant has for its Hebrew-Arabic name נַמְלָה, from the R. נַם (*Isaiah*, p. 687), which is first used of the sound, which expresses the idea of the low, dull, secret, — thus of its active and yet unperceived motion; its Aramaic name in the *Peshîto*, *sûšm^{na}*, and in the Targ. שׁוּמְשׁוּמָא (also Arab. *sumsum*, *simsim*, of little red ants), designates it after its quick activity, its busy running hither and thither (vid., *Fleischer in Levy's Chald. Wörterb.* ii. 578). She is a model of unwearied and well-planned labour. From the plur. דְּרָרְכֵיהָ it is to be concluded that the author observed their art in gathering in and laying up in store, carrying burdens, building their houses, and the like (vid., the passages in the Talmud and Midrash in the *Hamburg Real-Encyclopädie für Bibel und Talmud*, 1868, p. 83 f.). To the ant the sluggard (עֲצֵל, Aram. and

Arab. **עמל**, with the fundamental idea of weight and dulness) is sent, to learn from her to be ashamed, and to be taught wisdom.

Pro. 6: 7. This relative clause describes the subject of v. 8 more fully: it is like a clause with **גַּם כִּי**, *quamquam*.^{f84}

The community of ants exhibits a peculiar class of workers; but it is not, like that of bees, composed of grades germinating in the queen-bee as the head. The three offices here named represent the highest judiciary, police, and executive powers; for **קִצִּין** (from **קָצָה**, to distinguish, with the ending *in, vid.*, *Jesurun*, p. 215 s.) is the judge; **שֹׁטֵר** (from **שָׁטַר**, Arab. *saṭr*, to draw lines, to write) is the overseer (in war the director, controller), or, as Saalschütz indicates the province of the *schotrim* both in cities and in the camp, the office of police; **מְשָׁל** (*vid.*, *Isaiah*, p. 691), the governors of the whole state organism subordinated to the *schoftim* and the *schotrim*. The Syr., and the Targ. slavishly following it, translate **קִצִּין** by **חֲצִידָא** (harvest), for they interchange this word with **קִצִּיר**.

Pro. 6: 8. In this verse the change of the time cannot be occasioned by this, that **קִיץ** and **קִצִּיר** are distinguished as the earlier and the later period of the year; for **קִיץ** (= Arab. *kayt*, from *kât*, to be glowing hot, cf. Arab. *kghyyt* of the glow of the mid-day heat) is the late summer, when the heat rises to the highest degree; but the son of the Shunammite succumbed to the sun-stroke in the time of harvest (2Ki. 4:18 f.). Löwenstein judiciously remarks that **רָבִין** refers to immediate want, **אֲנָרָה** to that which is future; or, better, the former shows them engaged in persevering industry during the summer glow, the latter as at the end of the harvest, and engaged in the bringing home of the winter stores. The words of the procuring of food in summer are again used by Agur, Pro. 30:25; and the Aramaic fable of the *ant and the grasshopper*,^{f85} which is also found among those of Aesop and of Syntipas, serves as an illustration of this whole verse. The LXX has, after the “Go to the ant,” a proverb of five lines, **ἡ πορεύθητι πρὸς τὴν μέλισσαν**. Hitzig regards it as of Greek origin; and certainly, as Lagarde has shown, it contains idiomatic Greek expressions which would not occur to a translator from the Hebrew. In any case, however, it is an interpolation which disfigures the Hebrew text by overlading it.

Pro. 6: 9-11. After the poet has admonished the sluggard to take the ant as an example, he seeks also to rouse him out of his sleepiness and indolence:

**9 How long, O sluggard, wilt thou lie?
When wilt thou rise up from thy sleep?**

*10 “A little sleep, a little slumber,
A little folding of the hands to rest!”*

*11 So comes like a strong robber thy poverty,
And thy want as an armed man.*

Pro. 6: 9, 10. The awakening cry, v. 9, is not of the kind that Paul could have it in his mind, Eph. 5:14. **עֵצֵל** has, as the vocative, *Pasek* after it, and is, on account of the *Pasek*, in correct editions accentuated not with *Munach*, but *Mercha*. The words, v. 10, are not an ironical call (sleep only yet a little while, but in truth a long while), but *per mimesin* the reply of the sluggard with which he turns away the unwelcome disturber. The plurals with **מֵאֵט** sound like self-delusion: yet a little, but a sufficient! To fold the hands, i.e., to cross them over the breast, or put them into the bosom, denotes also, Ecc. 4: 5, the idler. **חֲבוּק**, *complicatio* (cf. in Livy, *compressis quod aiunt manibus sidere*; and Lucan, 2:292, *compressas tenuisse manus*), for formed like **שָׁקִי**, 3: 8, and the *inf.* **שָׁבַב** like **חָסַר**, Pro. 10:21, and **שָׁפַל**, Pro. 16:19. The *perf. consec.* connects itself with the words heard from the mouth of the sluggard, which are as a hypothetical antecedent thereto: if thou so sayest, and always again sayest, then this is the consequence, that suddenly and inevitably poverty and want come upon thee. That **מְהֵלֵךְ** denotes the *grassator*, i.e., vagabond (Arab. *dawwar*, one who wanders much about), or the robber or foe (like the Arab. *‘aduww*, properly *transgressor finium*), is not justified by the usage of the language; **הֵלֵךְ** signifies, 2Sa. 12: 4, the traveller, and **מְהֵלֵךְ** is one who rides quickly forward, not directly a **κακὸς ὀδοιπόρος** (LXX).

Pro. 6:11. The point of comparison, 11*a*, is the unforeseen, as in quick march or assault (Böttcher), and 11*b* the hostile and irretrievable surprise; for a man in armour, as Hitzig remarks, brings no good in his armour: he assails the opponent, and he who is without defence yields to him without the possibility of withstanding him. The LXX translate **כְּאִישׁ מִגֵּן** by **ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς δρομεύς** (cf. **δρομεύς** = **מְנִי־אָרֶג**, Job. 7: 6, LXX, Aq.), for what reason we know not. After v. 11 they interpose two other lines: “but if thou art assiduous, thy harvest will come to thee as a fountain, but want will go away **ὥσπερ κακὸς δρομεύς**.” Also this “bad runner” we must let go; for Lagarde’s retranslation, **וּמַחְסֵרְךָ כְּחֵשׁ בְּאִישׁ נִמְגָה**, no one can understand. The four lines, vv. 10, 11 are repeated in the appendix of Words of the Wise, Pro. 24:33 f.; and if this appendix originated in the time of Hezekiah, they may have been taken therefrom by the poet, the editor of the older Book of Proverbs. Instead of **בְּמַהֲלֵךְ**, **מִתְהֵלֵךְ** is there used (so comes forward thy poverty, i.e., again and again, but certainly moving forward); and instead of **מַחְסֵרְךָ**, **מַחְסְרֵיךָ** is

written, as also here, v. 6, for משנתך is found the variant משנתך with Jod as *mater lectionis* of the pausal *Segol*.

Eleventh Introductory Mashal Discourse, Pro. 6:12-19

WARNING AGAINST DECEIT AND MALICE

Pro. 6:12-19. There follows now a *third* brief series of instructions, which run to a conclusion with a deterring prospect similar to the foregoing.

*12 A worthless man, a wicked man,
Is he who practiseth falsehood with his mouth;*

*13 Who winketh with his eyes, scrapeth with his foot,
Pointeth with his fingers.*

*14 Malice is in his heart,
He deviseth evil at all times,
He spreadeth strife.*

*15 Therefore suddenly his destruction shall come,
Suddenly shall he be destroyed, and there is no remedy.*

It is a question, what is the subject and what the predicate in v. 12. Thus much is clear, that upon him who is here described according to his deceitful conduct the sentence of condemnation shall fall. He who is so described is thus subject, and אדם בלי־אֵל is without doubt predicate. But does the complex subject begin with אִישׁ אָוֶן ? Thus e.g., Hitzig: “A worthless man is the wicked man who...” But the interchange of אדם and אִישׁ is a sign of parallel relation; and if 12*b* belonged attributively to אִישׁ אָוֶן, then since אִישׁ הָאָוֶן is not used, it ought at least to have been continued by הַהוֹלֵךְ. The general moral categories, 12*a*, are thus predicates, as was indeed besides probable; the copious division of the subject demands also in point of style a more developed predicate. 16:27 is simpler in plan, and also logically different. There the expression is, as is usual, אִישׁ בלי־עַל. Since אדם אָוֶן is not possible, the author uses instead בלי־עַל. This word, composed of בלי־ and אֵל (from אֵל, אֵל, to be useful, to be good for), so fully serves as one word, that it even takes the article, 1Sa. 25:25. It denotes worthlessness, generally in a chain of words in the genitive, but also the worthless, Job. 34:18; and it is to be so taken here, for אדם does not form a *constructivus*, and never governs a genitive. בלי־עַל is thus a virtual adjective (as *nequam* in *homo nequam*); the connection is like that of אדם רָשָׁע, Pro. 11: 7, and elsewhere, although more appositional than this pure attributive. Synonymous with בלי־עַל is אָוֶן (from *an*, to breathe),

wickedness, i.e., want of all moral character. Thus worthless and wicked is he who practises deceit with his mouth (cf. Pro. 4:24), i.e., who makes language the means of untruthfulness and uncharitableness. עֲקָשׁוֹת פֶּה is meant in a moral sense, but without excluding that distortion of the mouth which belongs to the mimicry of the malicious. It is the accus. of the object; for הִלָּךְ is also bound in a moral sense with the accusative of that which one practises, i.e., dealing with, exercises himself in, Pro. 2: 7, 28:18, Isa. 33:15.

Pro. 6:13. קוֹרֵץ בְּעֵינָיו is translated according to the sense: who winks (*nictat*) with his eyes; but that is not the proper meaning of the word, for קרץ is used not only of the eyes. Pro. 10:10 (cf. Pro. 16:30, *qui oculos morsicat* or *connivet*), Psa. 35:19, but also of the lips, Pro. 16:30. Thus Löwenstein's explanation: who opens up the eyes, is incorrect. The verb קרץ unites in it the meanings of Arab. *qrs*, to pinch off with a sharp implement, and Arab. *qrđ*, with a blunt instrument (Arab. *mikrad*, *pincers*). It means to pince, to nip, as Arab. *ḵars*, *pincer*, — e.g., *ḵars balskyn alarsasat*, he cuts off with the knife the leaden seal, — hence frequently, to nip together the eyes, provincially: to wink (“*zwickern*,” frequent. of “*zwicken*,” to nip) with the eyes — the action of the deceiver, who thereby gives the sign to others that they help or at least do not hinder him from bantering and mocking, belying and deceiving a third person (Fl.); cf. Ali's proverb, “O God, pardon to us the culpable winking with the eye (*ramzat*),” and Fleischer's notes thereon, the *Proverbs of Ali*, p. 100 f.

That the words which follow, מוֹלֵל בְּרַגְלָיו, are meant of discourse, i.e., the giving of signs, with the feet, and, so to say, significant *oratio pedestris* (LXX, Aben-Ezra, Bertheau, Hitzig, and others), is very improbable, since the usage of language has set apart the *Piel* מָלַל for the meaning *loqui*, and מוֹלֵל admits another suitable signification, for מוֹלֵל means in Talmudic *fricare, confricare*, — e.g., המוֹלֵל מְלִילוֹת, he who grinds the parched ears of corn (*b. Beza* 12b; *Ma'seroth*, iv. 5), — after which Syr., Targ., תָּבַס (stamping), Aq. τριβων, Symm. προστρίβων, Jerome, (*qui*) *terit pede*, and Rashi משפֵּשֵׁף (grinding, scratching); it means one who scrapes with his feet, draws them backwards and forwards on the ground in order thereby to give a sign to others; also the Arab. *ml*, *levem et agilem esse*, which as the synonym of Arab. ‘*sr*’ is connected with Arab. *fī* of the way, signifies properly to move the feet quickly hither and thither (Fl.).^{f86}

מָרָה appears here, in accordance with its primary signification (*projicere*, sc. *brachium* or *digitum* = *monstrare*), connected with בְּאַצְבַּעְתָּיו; another expression for this scornful, malicious δακτυλοδεικνεῖν is שְׁלַח אֶצְבַּע, Isa. 58: 9.

Pro. 6:14. In this verse is continued the description of the subject, only once returning to the *particip.* The clauses are arranged independently, but logically according to the complex conception of the subject. **תְּהַפְכוֹת** are just the knaveries, i.e., the malicious wickedness which comes to light in word and deportment as **עַקְשׁוֹת פֶּה**. Regarding the double figure of the smithy and of agriculture underlying **חֲרָשׁ**, *machinari*, vid., at Pro. 3:29, and regarding the omission of the **הוּא** to **חֲרָשׁ**, at Psa. 7:10. The phrase **שִׁלַּח מְדָנִים** (as v. 19, Pro. 16:28), to let loose disputes, so that they break forth, reminds us rather of the unfettering of the winds by Aeolus than of the casting in of the apple of discord. Instead of **מְדָנִים** the *Kerī* has **מְדָנִים**; on the other hand, **מְדָנִים** remains uncorrected Pro. 6:19, 10:12. The form **מְדָנִים** occurs once, Pro. 18:18, and its *constr.* **מְדָנִי** once, Pro. 19:13. Everywhere else the text has **מְדוּנִים**, for which the *Kerī* has **מְדָנִים**, Pro. 18:19; 21: 9, 19; 23:29; 25:24; 26:21; 27:15. The forms **מְדָן** and **מְדָן** are also recognised: the former stands alone without any analogous example; the latter is compared at least with **מִצָּד**, Arab. *masād* (*Psalmen*, p. 163, 3). Probably these two forms are warranted by Gen. 25: 2, cf. 37:28, 36, where **מְדָן** and **מְדָן** occur as the names of two sons of Abraham by Keturah. But the national name **מְדָנִים** is no reason for the seven times laying aside of the regular form **מְדוּנִים**, i.e., **מְדוּנִים**, which is the plur. of **מְדוּן** after the forms **מְאוּרִים**, **מְעוּרִים**, although **מְדוּנִים**, after the forms **מְבוּשִׁים**, **מְצוּקִים**, is also found.

Pro. 6:15. With the 14th verse the description terminates. A worthless and a wicked person is he who does such things. The point lies in the characteristic out of which the conclusion is drawn: therefore his ruin will suddenly come upon him, etc. Regarding **אֵיד**, the root-meaning of which is illustrated by Amo. 2:13, vid., at 1:26. **פְּתָא** is an old accus. of an absol. **פְּתָא**, of the same meaning as **פְּתַע**, used as an adverbial accus., both originating in the root-idea of splitting, opening, breaking out and breaking forth. “Shall be broken to pieces” (as a brittle potter’s vessel, Psa. 2: 9, Isa. 30:14, Jer. 29:11) is a frequent figure for the destruction (**שִׁבְר**) of an army (cf. Arab. *ânksar âljysh*), of a city or a state, a man. **וְאֵין** continues the **שִׁבְר** as Pro. 29: 1: there shall be as it were no means of recovery for his shattered members (Fl.). Without the *Vav* this **אֵין מְרַפָּא** would be a clause conceived of accusatively, and thus adverbially: without any healing.

Pro. 6:16-19. What now follows is not a separate section (Hitzig), but the corroborative continuation of that which precedes. The last word (**מְדָנִים**,

strife) before the threatening of punishment, 14*b*, is also here the last. The thought that no vice is a greater abomination to God than the (in fact satanical) striving to set men at variance who love one another, clothes itself in the form of the numerical proverb which we have already considered, pp. 10, 11. From that place we transfer the translation of this example of a *Midda*: —

***16 There are six things which Jahve hateth,
And seven are an abhorrence to His soul:***

***17 Haughty eyes, a lying tongue,
And hands that shed innocent blood;***

***18 An heart that deviseth the thoughts of evil,
Feet that hastily run to wickedness,***

***19 One that uttereth lies as a false witness,
And he who soweth strife between brethren.***

The sense is not, that the six things are hateful to God, and the seventh an abomination to Him besides (Löwenstein); the *Midda* -form in Amo. 1: 3-2: 6, and in the proverb in Job. 5:19, shows that the seven are to be numbered separately, and the seventh is the *non plus ultra* of all that is hated by God. We are not to translate: *sex haecce odit*, for הַמָּה, הַנָּה, (הֵם, הֵן) points backwards and hitherwards, but not, as אֱלֹהָ, forwards to that immediately following; in that case the words would be אֱלֹהָ, or more correctly הַאֱלֹהָ. But also Hitzig's explanation, "These six things (viz., vv. 12-15) Jahve hateth," is impossible; for (which is also against that *haecce*) the substantive pronoun הַמָּה, הַנָּה (הַמָּה, הַנָּה) is never, like the Chald. הַמּוֹן (הַמּוֹן), employed as an accus. in the sense of אֲתָהֶן, אֲתָהֶן, it is always (except where it is the virtual gen. connected with a preposition) only the nom., whether of the subject or of the predicate; and where it is the nom. of the predicate, as Deu. 20:15, Isa. 51:19, substantival clauses precede in which הַנָּה (הַמָּה) represents the substantive verb, or, more correctly, in which the logical copula resulting from the connection of the clause itself remains unexpressed. Accordingly, שֵׁנֵי אֱלֹהֵי is a relative clause, and is therefore so accentuated here, as at Pro. 30:15 and elsewhere: *sex (sunt) ea quae Deus odit, et septem (sunt) abominatio animae ejus*. Regarding the statement that the soul of God hates anything, vid., at Isa. 1:14. תּוֹעֵבוֹת, an error in the writing occasioned by the numeral (vid., Pro. 26:25), is properly corrected by the *Kerî*; the poet had certainly the singular in view, as Pro. 3:32, 11: 1, when he wrote תּוֹעֵבַת. The first three characteristics are related to each other as mental, verbal, actual, denoted by the members of the body by means of which these characteristics come to light. The virtues are taken all together as a body (organism), and meekness is

its head. Therefore there stands above all, as the sin of sins, the *mentis elatae tumor*, which expresses itself in *elatum (grande) supercilium*: עֵינַיִם רְמוּת, the feature of the רָם, haughty (cf. Psa. 18:28 with 2Sa. 22:28), is the opposite of the feature of the נִשָּׂא עֵינַיִם, Job. 22:29; אָיִן is in the O.T. almost always (vid., Son. 4: 9) fem., and adjectives of course form no dual. The second of these characteristics is the lying tongue, and the third the murderous hands. דָּם-נָקִי is innocent blood as distinguished from דָּם הַנָּקִי, the blood of the innocent, Deu. 19:13. ^{f87}

Pro. 6:18. The fourth characteristic is a deceitful heart. On חָרַשׁ, vid., v. 14, Pro. 3:29, and on אָיִן, v. 12. The fifth: feet running with haste to evil; לָרָעָה as לָרָע in Isa. 59: 7, echoing the distich 1:16, as here, 17b and 18b. The connection מָהֵר לָרוּץ, *propere cucurrit* (contrast אַחֲרָיִךְ), is equivalent to רָץ מָהֵר

Pro. 6:19. the sixth: “A speaker of lies, a tongue of falsehood,” is hateful to God. It is one subject which is thus doubly characterized. בְּזוּבִים are fictions, and שֶׁקֶר is the disfiguring (*deformatio*) of the actual facts. They are purposely placed together in this connection. The derivations of these synonyms are obscure; Fürst gives to the former the root-idea of spinning (properly knotting together), and to the latter that of painting. כּוּזְבִים is introduced to support שֶׁקֶר. ^{f88}

It would also be verbally permissible to interpret אִד שֶׁקֶר in the sense of שֶׁקֶר עֲדוּת, like Pro. 25:18, as in apposition to כּוּזְבִים; but in the nearest parallel, Pro. 14:15, the idea is personal, for it is said of the עַד שֶׁקֶר that he breathes out lies. In that place there can be no doubt that the clause is a verbal one, and יָפִיחַ *finitum*, viz., *Hiph.* of פּוּחַ. This *Hiph.* signifies elsewhere also *sufflare*, Pro. 20: 8, *afflare*, Psa. 10: 5, Eze. 21:26, *perflare*, Son. 4:16, *anhelare* (*desiderare*), Psa. 12: 6, Hab. 2: 3, but with כּוּזְבִים, *efflare*, a synonym to דָּבַר, as הַבִּיאַ and הַטִּיף, which has (cf. Pro. 12:17) no secondary meaning in use, but is mostly connected with כּוּזְבִים, not without reference to the fact that that which is false is without reality and is nothing more than הַבֵּל וְרוּחַ. But what kind of a form is יָפִיחַ, where it is not, as Pro. 14: 5, the predicate of a verbal clause, but in connection with כּוּזְבִים, as here and at Pro. 14:25, 19: 5, 9 (once with אֱמוּנָה, Pro. 12:17), is the subject of a substantival clause? That which lies nearest is to regard it as a noun formed from the *fut. Hiph.* Such formations we indeed meet only among proper names, such as יָאִיר, יָבִין, יָקִים; however,

at least the one *n. appell.* יָרִיב (an adversary) is found, which may be formed from the *Hiph.* as well as from the *Kal.* But should not the *constr.* of יָפִיחַ after the form יָרִיב be יָפִיחַ? One does not escape from this consideration by deriving יָפִיחַ, after the forms יָגִיאַ, יָחִיל, יָדִיר, יָשִׁישׁ, and the like, from a secondary verb יָפַח, the existence of which is confirmed by Jer. 4:31, and from which also יָפַח, Psa. 27:12, appears to be derived, although it may be reduced also, after the form יָרַב (with יָרִיב), to יָהִפִּיחַ. But in this case also one expects as a connecting form יָפִיחַ like יָדִיר, as in reality יָפַח from יָפַח (cf. שָׂמַח, אָבַל, from שָׂמַח, אָבַל). Shall it now be assumed that the *Kametz* is treated as fixed? This were contrary to rule, since it is not naturally long. Thus the connection is not that of the genitive. But if יָפִיחַ were a substantive formed with the preformative of the second *modus* like יִלְקוּט [1Sa. 17:40], or were it a participial intensive form of active signification such as נָבִיא, then the verbal force remaining in it is opposed to the usage of the language. There remains nothing further, therefore, than to regard יָפִיחַ as an attributive put in the place of a noun: one who breathes out; and there is a homogeneous example of this, for in any other way we cannot explain יוֹסִיף, Ecc. 1:18. In 19*b* the numeral proverb reaches its point. The chief of all that God hates is he who takes a fiendish delight in setting at variance men who stand nearly related. Thus this brief proverbial discourse rounds itself off, coming again to 14*b* as a refrain.

Twelfth Introductory Mashal Discourse, Pro. 6:20-35

WARNING AGAINST ADULTERY, BY REFERENCE TO ITS FEARFUL CONSEQUENCES

Pro. 6:20-35. After these three smaller sections, the teacher of wisdom returns here to the theme of the eighth: Warning against sins of the flesh, whose power and prevalence among men is so immeasurably great, that their terrible consequences cannot sufficiently be held up before them, particularly before youth.

*20 Keep, my son, the commandment of thy father,
And reject not the instruction of thy mother.*

*21 Bind them to thy heart evermore,
Fasten them about thy neck.*

The suff. *-ēm* refers to the good doctrine (cf. Pro. 7: 3) pointed out by מְצֹנָה and תְּנֹרָה; the masc. stands, as is usual (e.g., Pro. 1:16, 5: 2), instead of the

fem. Regarding the figure, reminding us of the Tefillin and of Amuletes for perpetual representation, vid., under Pro. 3: 3. Similarly of persons, Son. 8: 6. The verb עָנָד (only here and Job. 31:36) signifies to bend, particularly to bend aside (Arab. 'ind, bending off, going aside; accus. as adv., aside, *apud*), and to bend up, to wind about, *circumplicare*.

Pro. 6:22. The representation of the good doctrine is now personified, and becomes identified with it.

***When thou walkest, it will guide thee;
When thou liest down, it will keep watch over thee;
And when thou wakest, it will talk with thee.***

The subject is the doctrine of wisdom, with which the representation of wisdom herself is identified. the futures are not expressive of a wish or of an admonition, but of a promise; the form of the third clause shows this. Thus, and in the same succession as in the *schema* Deu. 6: 7, cf. 11:19, are the three circumstances of the outward life distinguished: going, lying down, and rising up. The punctuation בְּהִתְהַלֵּךְ, found here and there, is Ben-Naphtali's variant; Ben-Asher and also the *Textus rec.* reject the *Metheg* in this case, vid., Baer's *Metheg-Setzung*, § 28. The verb נָחָה, with its *Hiph.* in a strengthened *Kal*-signification, is more frequently found in the Psalms than in the Proverbs; the Arab. *nh*^c shows that it properly signifies to direct (*dirigere*), to give direction, to move in a definite direction. שָׁמַר with אֵל, to take into protection, we had already Pro. 2:11; this author has favourite forms of expression, in the repetition of which he takes delight. With lying down, sleeping is associated. וְהִקְיִצְנֹת is, as Ps. 139:18, the *hypoth. perf.*, according to Ewald, § 357a: *et ut expergefactus es, illa te compellabit*. Bertheau incorrectly: she will make thee thoughtful. But apart from the fact that there is no evidence of the existence of this *Hiph.* in the language of the Bible, the personification demands a clearer figure. שִׁיחַ (שׁוּחַ) signifies mental speech and audible speech (Gen. 24:63, poet., in the Talmudic^{f89} a common word); with ב, speaking concerning something (*fabulari de*), Ps. 69:13; with the accus., that which is said of a thing, Ps. 145: 5, or the address, briefly for לְ שִׁיחַ, Job. 12: 8 (as מִגֵּן with accus. Pro. 4: 9 = מִגֵּן לְ): when thou art awake, wisdom will forthwith enter into conversation with thee, and fill thy thoughts with right matter, and give to thy hands the right direction and consecration.

Pro. 6:23. Since in הִיא the idea of wisdom and of wholesome doctrine lie in one another, the author can proceed with proof:

*For a lamp is the commandment, and instruction a light (Jerome et lex lux);
And a way of life, disciplinary reproofs.*

That **תורה** has here not the positive, specifically Israelitish sense, but the generalized sense of instruction in conformity with truth regarding the will of God and the duty of man, vid., p. 42. This instruction mediated by man, but of divine origin, is **אור**, light, which enlightens the man who submits to it; and the commandment, **מצוה**, which directs men in every case to do what is right, and forbids that which is wrong (including the prohibition Lev. 4: 2), is **נר**, a lamp which, kindled at that light, enlightens all the darkness of ignorance with reference to human conduct and its consequences. **אור** and **נר** are related to each other as general and particular, primary and derivative. Löwenstein accentuates incorrectly **ותורה אור** instead of **ותורה אור** (as the Cod. 1294 and the 3 Erfurt Codd.); vid., on the retrogression of the tone, not existing here, under 3:15. The gen. **מוסר** denotes the object or character of the admonition: not disciplinary in the external sense of the word, but rather moral, having in view discipline in the sense of education, i.e., moral edification and elevation. Such corrections are **דרך חיים**, the way to true life, direction how to obtain it.

Pro. 6:24. The section thus closes:

*To keep thee from the vile woman,
From the flattery of the strange tongue.*

Regarding the genitive connection **אשת רע**, a woman of a wicked character, vid., under 2:14; and regarding the adjectival connection **לשון נכריה**, under v. 17; the strange tongue is the tongue (**לשון**) of the strange (foreign) woman (vid., p. 58), alluring with smooth words (Pro. 2:16). Ewald, Bertheau: from her of a smooth tongue, the stranger, as Symm., Theod., **ἀπὸ λειογλώσσου ξένης**; but **חלקת** is a substantive (Gen. 27:16), and as a fem. adj. form is without an example. Rather **חלקת לשון** is to be regarded as the first member and **נכריה** as the second of the *st. constr.*, for the former constitutes one idea, and **לשון** on this account remains unabbreviated; cf. Ps. 68:22, Isa. 28: 1; but (1) this syntactical phenomenon is yet problematical, vid., Friedr. Philippi, *Wesen und Ursprung des St. Constr.* p. 17; and (2) the supposition of such an anomaly is here unnecessary.

Pro. 6:25, 26. The *proaemium* of these twelve proverbial discourses is now at an end. Wisdom herself begins striking the note of the Decalogue:

*25 Long not for her beauty in thy heart,
And let her not catch thee with her eyelids;*

***26 Because for a harlot one cometh down to a piece of bread,
And a man's wife lieth in wait for a precious soul.***

The warning 25a is in the spirit of the “thou shalt not covet,” Exo. 20:17, and the ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ, Mat. 5:28, of the Preacher on the Mount. The Talmudic proverb הרהורי עבירה קשו מעבירה (Joma 29a) means only that the imagination of the sinful act exhausts the body even more than the act itself. The warning, “let her not catch thee with her eyelids,” refers to her (the adulteress’s) coquettish ogling and amorous winking. In the reason added, beginning with כִּי בְאֵד־ (thus it is to be punctuated), there is the appositional connection אִשָּׁה זֹנָה Gesen. § 113; the idea of זֹנָה goes over into 26b. “לֶחֶם כֶּבֶד [= כֶּבֶדָּבָר, R. כֶּבֶד, to round, vid., at Gen. 49: 5], properly a circle of bread, is a small round piece of bread, such as is still baked in Italy (*pagnotta*) and in the East (Arab. *ḵurs*), here an expression for the smallest piece” (Fl.). בְּאֵד (constr. of בְּאֵד־), as Job. 2: 4, Isa. 32:14, is used in the sense of ὑπερ, *pro*, and with אֵד there is connected the idea of the coming down to this low point. Ewald, Bertheau explain after the LXX, τιμὴ γὰρ πόρνῆς ὄση καὶ ἐνὸς ἄρτου, γυνὴ δὲ ἀνδρῶν τιμίας ψυχὰς ἀγρεύει. But nothing is said here of price (reward); the parallelism is synonymous, not antithetic: he is doubly threatened with loss who enters upon such a course. The adulterer squanders his means (Pro. 29: 3) to impoverishment (vid., the mention of a loaf of bread in the description of poverty 1Sa. 2:36), and a man’s wife (but at the same time seeking converse with another) makes a prey of a precious soul; for whoever consents to adulterous converse with her, loses not perhaps his means, but certainly freedom, purity, dignity of soul, yea, his own person. צוֹד comprehends — as צִידוֹן, fisher’s town [Zidon], Arab. *ḡyād*, hunter and fisher, show — all kinds of hunting, but in Hebr. is used only of the hunting of wild beasts. The root-meaning (cf. צָדָה) is to spy, to seize.

Pro. 6:27-29. The moral necessity of ruinous consequences which the sin of adultery draws after it, is illustrated by examples of natural cause and effect necessarily connected:

***27 Can one take fire in his bosom
And his clothes not be burned?***

***28 Or can any one walk over burning coals
And his feet not be burned?***

***29 So he that goeth to his neighbour's wife,
No one remains unpunished that toucheth her.***

We would say: Can any one, without being, etc.; the former is the Semitic “extended (paratactic) ¹⁹⁰ construction.” The first אִישׁ has the conjunctive *Shalsheleth*. שָׁחַתָּה signifies to seize and draw forth a brand or coal with the fire-tongs or shovel (מִחַתָּה, the instrument for this); cf. Arab. *khât*, according to Lane, “he seized or snatched away a thing;” the form יִחַתָּה is *Kal*, as יִחַנָּה (vid., Köhler, *De Tetragrammate*, 1867, p. 10). חֵיק (properly indentation) is here not the lap, but, as Isa. 40:11, the bosom.

Pro. 6:28. A second example of destructive consequences naturally following a certain course is introduced with אִם of the double question. גָּחַלִים (from גָּחַל, after the form פָּחַם, but for which גָּחַלָה is used) is the regular modification of *gahhalim* (Gesen. § 27, 2). The fem. וְרִגְלָיו is followed here (cf. on the other hand Pro. 1:16) by the rhythmically full-sounding form תִּפְרִינָה (retaining the distinction of gender), from פָּרָה, Arab. *kwy*, to burn so that a brand-mark (פֶּ, Isa. 3:24, *cauterium*) remains.

Pro. 6:29. The instruction contained in these examples here follows: τὸ εἶς πῦρ καὶ εἷς γυναικᾶ ἐμπεσεῖν ἴσον ὑπάρχει (Pythagoras in Maximi *Eclog.* c. 39). בּוֹא אֵל is here, as the second in Psa. 51: 1, a euphemism, and נָגַע בְּ, to come in contact with, means, as נָגַע אֵל, to touch, Gen. 20: 6. He who goes in to his neighbour’s wife shall not do so with impunity (נָקָה). Since both expressions denote fleshly nearness and contact, so it is evident he is not guiltless.

Pro. 6:30, 31. The thief and the adulterer are not placed in comparison with one another, in such a way that adultery is supposed to be a yet greater crime.

***30 One does not treat the thief scornfully if he steals
To satisfy his craving when he is hungry;***

***31 Being seized, he may restore sevenfold,
Give up the whole wealth of his house.***

For the most part 30a is explained: even when this is the case, one does not pass it over in the thief as a bagatelle. Ewald remarks: בּוֹא לְ stands here in its nearest signification of overlooking, whence first follows that of contemning. But this “nearest” signification is devised wholly in favour of this passage; — the interpretation, “they do not thus let the thief pass,” is set aside by Son. 8: 1, 7; for by 31b, cf. Son. 8: 7b, and 34a, cf. Son. 8: 6a, it is proved that from v. 30 on, reminiscences from the Canticles, which belong to the literature of the Chokma, find their way into the Mashal language of the author. Hitzig’s correct supposition, that בּוֹא לְ always signifies positive contemning, does not

necessitate the interrogative interpretation: “Does not one despise the thief if...?” Thus to be understood, the author ought to have written **כִּי אֵף** or **כִּי גַם**. Michaelis rightly: *furtum licet merito pro infami in republica habetur, tamen si cum adulterio comparatur, minus probrosum est*. Regarding **נִפְשׁוֹ** in the sense of appetite, and even throat and stomach, vid., *Psychologie*, p. 204. A second is, that the thief, if he is seized (but we regard **וְנִמְצָא** not as the *hypoth. perf.*, but as the *part. deprehensus*), may make compensation for this crime. The fut. **יִשְׁלַם** thus to be understood as the potential lies near from this, that a sevenfold compensation of the thing stolen is unheard of in the Israelitish law; it knows only of a twofold, fourfold, fivefold restoration, Exo. 21:37, 22: 1-3, 8 (cf. Saalschütz, *Mos. Recht*, p. 554 ff.). This excess over that which the law rendered necessary leads into the region of free-will: he (the thief, by which we are now only to think of him whom bitter necessity has made such) may make compensation sevenfold, i.e., superabundantly; he may give up the whole possessions (vid., on **הוֹן** at Pro. 1:13) of his house, so as not merely to satisfy the law, but to appease him against whom he has done wrong, and again to gain for himself an honoured name. What is said in vv. 30 and 31 is perfectly just. One does not condemn a man who is a thief through poverty, he is pitied; while the adulterer goes to ruin under all circumstances of contempt and scorn. And: theft may be made good, and that abundantly; but adultery and its consequences are irreparable.

Pro. 6:32, 33. Here there is a contrast stated to v. 30:

**32 He who commits adultery (adulterans mulierem) is beside himself,
A self-destroyer — who does this.**

**33 He gains stripes and disgrace,
And his reproach is never quenched.**

נִפְשׁוֹ, which primarily seems to mean *excedere*, to indulge in excess, is, as also in the Decalogue, cf. Lev. 20:10, transitive: **ὁ μοιχεύων γυναῖκα**. Regarding being mad (*herzlos* = *heartless*) = *amens* (*excors, vecors*), vid., *Psychologie*, p. 254. **מִשְׁחִית נִפְשׁוֹ** is he who goes to ruin with wilful perversity. A self-murderer — i.e., he intends to ruin his position and his prosperity in life — who does it, viz., this, that he touches the wife of another. It is the worst and most inextinguishable dishonouring of oneself. Singularly Behaji: who annihilates it (his soul), with reference to Deu. 21:12. Ecc. 4:17, where **עֲשָׂה** would be equivalent to **בִּטַּל**, **καταργεῖν**, which is untrue and impossible.^{f91}

נִגַּע refers to the corporal punishment inflicted on the adulterer by the husband (Deu. 17: 8, 21: 5); Hitzig, who rejects v. 32, refers it to the stripes which were

given to the thief according to the law, but these would be called **מְבוּחָה** (מְבוּחָה). The punctuation **נִגְעַתְוּקְלוֹן** is to be exchanged for **נִגְעַתְוּקְלוֹן** (Löwenstein and other good editors). **מָצָא** has a more active signification than our “finden” (to find): *consequitur*, **τυγχάνει**.

Pro. 6:34, 35. One who has been stolen from is to be appeased, but not the injured husband.

*34 For jealousy is the fury of a husband,
And he spareth not in the day of vengeance.*

*35 He regardeth not any ransom,
And is not contented though thou offerest to him gifts ever so great.*

The connection marks **קִנְיָאָה** as the subject; for it respects carnal intercourse with another’s wife. Jealousy is not usually **חֲמָה**, the glow of anger (from **חָמַם**, as **שָׂנֵה** from **שָׂן**), but **חֲמַת־גִּבּוֹר** (*constr.* as **שִׁנַּת**), the glow of a man’s anger, who with the putting forth of all his manly strength will seek satisfaction to his wounded honour. **גִּבּוֹר**, here significant for **אִישׁ**, with the fundamental idea of strength, firmness; cf. Arab. *jabr*, to make fast, to put right again something broken in pieces, particularly a broken vessel, hence *Algebra*, properly the operation by which an incomplete magnitude is completed (Fl.). The following **וְלֹא־יִחַמְלֵם** (with the orthophonic *Dagesh*, as v. 25 **יִחַמְדֵּם**, and with *Makkeph*) is connected with **גִּבּוֹר**, with definite reference to the man whom the faithless guest has made a cuckold. When the day comes in which the adultery brought to light demands and admits of vengeance, then, wounded in his right and in his honour, he knows no mercy; he pays no regard to any atonement or recompense by which the adulterer seeks to appease him and induce him not to inflict the punishment that is due: he does not consent, even though thou makest ever so great the gift whereby thou thinkest to gain him. The phrase **וְנָשָׂא פָנָיו**, **πρόσωπον λαμβάνειν**, signifies elsewhere to receive the countenance, i.e., the appearance and the impression of a man, i.e., to let it impress one favourably; here it is used of the **כִּפְרָה**, i.e., the means by which covering, i.e., non-punishment, pardon of the crime, impunity of the guilty, is obtained. Regarding **אָשָׁבָה**, to consent to, vid., at Pro. 1:10. **שִׁחָד**, Aram. **שִׁחָד**, is a gift, particularly bribery. That the language may again finally assume the form of an address, it beautifully rounds itself off.

Thirteenth Introductory Mashal Discourse, Proverbs 7

**WARNING AGAINST ADULTERY BY THE REPRESENTATION OF
ITS ABHORRENT AND DETESTABLE NATURE
AS SEEN IN AN EXAMPLE**

Pro. 7. The fearful desolation which adultery, and in general the sin of uncleanness, occasions in the life of the individual who is guilty of it, as well as in society, does not suffer the author of this discourse, directed to youth, to abandon his theme, which he has already treated of under different aspects. He takes up his warning once more, strengthens it by an example he himself had witnessed of one who fell a sacrifice to this sin, and gives it a very impressive conclusion, v. 24 ff.

Pro. 7: 1-3. The introduction first counsels in general to a true appreciation of these well-considered life-rules of wisdom.

*1 My son, keep my words,
And treasure up my commandments with thee.*

*2 Keep my commandments, and thou shalt live;
And my instruction as the apple of thine eye.*

*3 Wind them about thy fingers,
Write them on the tablet of thy heart.*

The LXX has after v. 1 another distich; but it here disturbs the connection. Regarding **צָפֵן**, vid., at Pro. 2: 1; **אָתָּךְ** refers, as there, to the sphere of one's own character, and that subjectively. Regarding the *imper.* **וְיָחִיהָ**, which must here be translated according to its sense as a conclusion, because it comes in between the objects governed by **שָׁמַר**, vid., at Pro. 4: 4. There **וְיָחִיהָ** is punctuated with *Silluk*; here, according to Kimchi (*Michlol* 125a), with *Segol-Athnach*, **וְיָחִיהָ**, as in the *Cod. Erfurt.* 2 and 3, and in the editions of Athias and Clodius, so that the word belongs to the class **פִּתְחִין בְּאֵתְנַח** (with short instead of long vowel by the pausal accent): no reason for this is to be perceived, especially as (Pro. 4: 4) the *Tsere* (*ê* from *aj*) which is characteristic of the *imper.* remains unchanged. Regarding **אִישׁוֹן הָאֵינ**, Arab. *insân el-^cain*, the little man of the eye, i.e., the apple of the eye, named from the miniature portrait of him who looks into it being reflected from it, vid., at Psa. 17: 8; the ending *ôn* is here diminutive, like Syr. *Achuno*, little brother, *b^eruno*, little son, and the like. On v. 3, vid., at Pro. 6:21; 3: 3. The **תְּפִילִין שֶׁל יָד** ^{f92} were wound seven times round the left arm and seven times round the middle finger. The writing on the table of the heart may be regarded as referring to Deu. 6: 9 (the *Mezuzoth*). ^{f93}

Pro. 7: 4, 5. The subject-matter of this earnest warning are the admonitions of the teacher of wisdom, and through him of Wisdom herself, who in contrast to the world and its lust is the worthiest object of love, and deserves to be loved with the purest, sincerest love:

***4 Say to wisdom: “Thou art my sister!”
And call understanding “Friend;”***

***5 That they may keep thee from the strange woman,
From the stranger who useth smooth words.***

The childlike, sisterly, and friendly relationship serves also to picture forth and designate the intimate confidential relationship to natures and things which are not flesh and blood. If in Arabic the poor is called the brother of poverty, the trustworthy the brother of trustworthiness, and *abu, um* (אב), *achu, ucht*, are used in manifold ways as the expression for the interchangeable relation between two ideas; so (as also, notwithstanding Ewald, § 273*b*, in many Hebr. proper names) that has there become national, which here, as at Job. 17:14; Pro. 30:29, mediated by the connection of the thoughts, only first appears as a poetic venture. The figurative words of v. 4 not merely lead us to think of wisdom as a personal existence of a higher order, but by this representation it is itself brought so near, that אב easily substitutes itself, Pro. 2: 3, in the place of אב. אהתי of Solomon's address to the bride brought home is in its connection compared with Book of Wisdom 8: 2. While the *ôth* of אהות by no means arises from abstr. *ûth*, but *achôth* is derived from *achajath*, מודע (as Rut. 2: 1, cf. מודעת, 3: 2), here by *Mugrash* מודע, properly means acquaintance, and then the person known, but not in the superficial sense in which this word and the Arab. *ma'arfat* are used (e.g., in the Arabic phrase quoted by Fleischer, *kanna aşşaab şarna m'arraf*—*nous étions amis, nous en sommes plus que de simples connaissances*), but in the sense of familiar, confidential alliance. The *infin.* לשמרך does not need for its explanation some intermediate thought to be introduced: *quod eo conducet tibi ut* (Mich.), but connects itself immediately as the purpose: bind wisdom to thyself and thyself to wisdom thus closely that thou mayest therewith guard thyself. As for the rest, vid., Pro. 2:16; this verse repeats itself here with the variation of one word.

Pro. 7: 6, 7. How necessary it is for the youth to guard himself by the help of wisdom against the enticements of the wanton woman, the author now shows by a reference to his own observation.

***6 For through the window of my house,
From behind the lattice I looked out;***

**7 Then saw I among the simple ones,
Discerned among the young people, a youth devoid of understanding.**

כִּי refers indeed to the immediately following clause, yet it actually opens up the whole following exemplification. The connection with v. 5 would be closer if instead of the extended Semitic construction it were said: *nam quum...prospicerem vidi, etc.* חֲלוֹן (from חָלַל, to bore through) is properly a place where the wall is bored through. אֶשְׁנֵב (from שָׁנַב = Arab. *shaniba*, to be agreeable, cool, fresh) is the window-lattice or lattice-window, i.e., lattice for drawing down and raising up, which keeps off the rays of the sun. נִשְׁקָר signifies primarily to make oneself long in order to see, to stretch up or out the neck and the head, *καπαδοκεῖν*, *atall*, *atal'a*, and *tatall'a* of things, *imminere*, to overtop, to project, to jut in; cf. Arab. *askaf* of the ostrich, long and bent, with respect to the neck stretching it up, *sakaf*, *abstr.* crooked length. And בְּאַד is thus used, as in Arab. *duna*, but not *b'ad*, is used: so placed, that one in relation to the other obstructs the avenue to another person or thing: "I looked forth from behind the lattice-window, i.e., with respect to the persons or things in the room, standing before the lattice-window, and thus looking out into the open air" (Fleischer). That it was far in the night, as we learn at v. 9, does not contradict this looking out; for apart from the moon, and especially the lighting of the streets, there were star-lit nights, and to see what the narrator saw there was no night of Egyptian darkness. But because it was night 6a is not to be translated: I looked about among those devoid of experience (thus e.g., Löwenstein); but he saw among these, observed among the youths, who thus late amused themselves without, a young man whose want of understanding was manifest from what further happened. Bertheau: that I might see, is syntactically impossible. The meaning of אֶרְאֶה is not determined by the אֶבְיֵה following, but conversely אֶבְיֵה stands under the operation of רָ (= אֶרְאֶה, Neh. 13: 7), characterizing the historic *aorist*. Regarding פִּתִּי, vid., at 1: 4. בְּנִים is the masc. of בְּנוֹת, Arab. *benât* in the meaning maiden. בְּבָנִים has in correct texts, according to the rules of the accents, the *raphatum*.^{f94}

Pro. 7: 8, 9. Now follows, whither he saw the young fop [*Laffen*] then go in the darkness.

**8 Going up and down the street near her corner,
And he walked along the way to her house,**

**9 In the twilight, when the day declined,
In the midst of the night and deep darkness.**

We may interpret עֵבֶר as appos.: *juvenem amentem, ambulantem*, or as the predicate accus.: *vidi juvenem...ambulantem*; for that one may so express himself in Hebrew (cf. e.g., Isa. 6: 1, Dan. 8: 7), Hitzig unwarrantably denies. The passing over of the *part.* into the *finite*, 8b, is like Pro. 2:14, 17, and that of the *inf.* Pro. 1:27; 2: 8. שׁוּק, Arab. *suk* (dimin. *suweiḳa*, to separate, from *sikkat*, street, alley), still means, as in former times, a broad street, a principal street, as well as an open place, a market-place where business is transacted, or according to its etymon: where cattle are driven for sale. On the street he went backwards and forwards, yet so that he kept near to her corner (i.e., of the woman whom he waited for), i.e., he never withdrew himself far from the corner of her house, and always again returned to it. The corner is named, because from that place he could always cast a look over the front of the house to see whether she whom he waited for showed herself. Regarding פְּנֵה for פְּנֵתָה, vid., at Psa. 27: 5: a primary form פָּן has never been in use; פְּנִים, Zec. 14:10, is plur. of פָּנָה. אֶצֶל (from אָצַל, Arab. *wasl*, to bind) is, as a substantive, the side (as the place where one thing connects itself with another), and thus as a preposition it means (like *juxta* from *jungere*) beside, Ital. *allato*. וְדָרָךְ is the object. accus., for thus are construed verbs *eundi* (e.g., Hab. 3:12, Num. 30:17, cf. Pro. 21:22).

Pro. 7: 9. The designations of time give the impression of progress to a climax; for Hitzig unwarrantably denies that נֶשֶׁף means the twilight; the Talmud, *Berachoth 3b*, correctly distinguishes תְּרֵי נִשְׁפֵי two twilights, the evening and the morning twilight. But the idea is not limited to this narrow sense, and does not need this, since the root-word נֶשֶׁף (vid., at Isa. 40:24) permits the extension of the idea to the whole of the cool half (evening and night) of the entire day; cf. the parallel of the adulterer who veils himself by the darkness of the night and by a mask on his countenance, Job. 24:15 with Jer. 13:16. However, the first group of synonyms, יוֹם בְּעֶרֶב בְּנֶשֶׁף (with the *Cod. Frankf.* 1294, to be thus punctuated), as against the second, appears to denote an earlier period of the second half of the day; for if one reads, with Hitzig, יוֹם בְּעֶרֶב (after Jud. 19: 9), the meaning remains the same as with יוֹם בְּעֶרֶב, viz., *advesperascente die* (Jerome), for עֶרֶב = Arab. *gharab*, means to go away, and particularly to go under, of the sun, and thus to become evening. He saw the youth in the twilight, as the day had declined (κέκλικεν, Luke 24:29), going backwards and forwards; and when the darkness of night had reached its middle, or its highest point, he was still in his lurking-place. לַיְלָה אִישׁוֹן, apple of the eye of the night, is, like the Pers. *dili scheb*, heart of the night, the poetic designation of the middle of the night. Gusset incorrectly: *crepusculum in quo sicut in oculi pupilla est nigredo sublustris et quasi*

mistura lucis ac tenebrarum. אִישׁוֹן is, as elsewhere לֵב, particularly the middle; the application to the night was specially suitable, since the apple of the eye is the black part in the white of the eye (Hitzig). It is to be translated according to the accus., in *pupilla noctis et caligine* (not *caliginis*); and this was probably the meaning of the poet, for a ב is obviously to be supplied to וַאֲפֵלָה.

Pro. 7:10-12. Finally, the young man devoid of understanding sees his waiting rewarded: like meets like.

***10 And, lo, a woman coming to meet him,
In the attire of an harlot and of subtle heart.***

***11 Boisterous is she, and ungovernable;
Her feet have no rest in her own house.***

***12 At one time before her door, at another in the street,
And again at every corner she places herself on the watch.***

“V. 12 (Hitzig) expresses what is wont to be, instead of a single event, v. 11, viz., the custom of a street harlot. But she who is spoken of is not such an one; lurking is not applicable to her (cf. Job. 31: 9), and, v. 11, it is not meant that she is thus inclined.” But Hitzig’s rendering of v. 11, “she was boisterous...in her house her feet had no rest,” is inaccurate, since neither וְהָיָא nor שְׁכָנָה is used. Thus in vv. 11 and 12 the poet gives a characteristic of the woman, introduced by וְהָיָה into the frame of his picture, which goes beyond that which then presented itself to his eyes. We must with v. 12 reject also v. 11; and even that would not be a radical improvement, since that characteristic lying behind the evident, that which was then evident begins with וַנְצַרְתָּ לֵב (and subtle in heart). We must thus suppose that the woman was not unknown to the observer here describing her. He describes her first as she then appeared. שֵׁית Hitzig regards as equivalent to שְׁוִיָּה, similitude (from שָׁוָה), and why? Because שֵׁית does not mean “to lay against,” but “to place.” But Exo. 33: 4 shows the contrary, and justifies the meaning attire, which the word also has in Psa. 73: 6. *Meiri* less suitably compares 2Ki. 9:30, but rightly explains תְּקוּן (dressing, ornament), and remarks that שֵׁית elliptical is equivalent to בְּשִׁית. It is not the nominative (Bertheau), but the accusative, as תְּבַנִּית, Psa. 144:12, Ewald, § 279d. How Hitzig reaches the translation of וַנְצַרְתָּ לֵב by “and an arrow in her heart” (*et saucia corde*^{f95}), one can only understand by reading his commentary. The usage of the language, Pro. 4:23, he remarks, among other things, would stamp her as a virtuous person. As if a phrase like נֶצֶר לֵב could be used both *sensu bono* and *sensu malo*! One can guard his heart when

he protects it carefully against moral danger, or also when he purposely conceals that which is in it. The *part.* נָצַר signifies, Isa. 1: 8, besieged (blockaded), Eze. 16:12, protected, guarded, and Isa. 48: 6; 65: 4, concealed, hidden. Ewald, § 187*b*, refers these three significations in the two passages in Isaiah and in the passage before us to צָרַר, *Niph.* נָצַר (as נָגַל); but (1) one would then more surely take צוּר (cf. נִבְכִּים, נְמוּל) as the verbal stem; (2) one reaches the idea of the concealed (the hidden) easier from that of the preserved than from that of the confined. As one says in Lat. *homo occultus, tectus, abstrusus*, in the sense of κρυψίνους, so it is said of that woman נִצְרָת לֵב, not so much in the sense of *retenta cor, h.e. quae quod in corde haberet non pandebat*, Fr. *retenue* (Cocc.), as in the sense of *custodita cor, quae intentionem cordis mentemque suam callide novit premere* (Mich.): she is of a hidden mind, of a concealed nature; for she feigns fidelity to her husband and flatters her paramours as her only beloved, while in truth she loves none, and each of them is to her only a means to an end, viz., to the indulgence of her worldly sensual desire. For, as the author further describes here, she is הַמְיָה (frem. of הִמָּה = הַמִּי, as 1:21, Isa. 22: 2), *tumultuosa*, externally as internally impetuous, because full of intermingling lust and deceit (*opp.* ἡσυχίος, 1Pe. 3: 4, 1Ti. 2:11), and סָרְרָת, self-willed, not minding the law of duty, of discretion, or of modesty (from סָרַר, Arab. *sharr, pervicacem, malum esse*). She is the very opposite of the noiseless activity and the gentle modesty of a true house-wife, rude, stubborn, and also vagrant like a beast in its season (Hos. 4:14): *in domo ipsius residere nequeunt pedes ejus*; thus not οἰκουρός or οἰκουργός (Tit. 2: 5), far removed from the genuine woman-like εἶσω ἡσυχον μένειν δόμων^{f96} — a *radt*, as they call such a one in Arab. (Wünsche on Hos. 12: 1), or as she is called in Aram. נִפְקֵת בְּרָא

Pro. 7:12. This verse shows how she conducts herself when she wanders abroad. It is no common street-walker who is designated (no “*Husterin*,” Arab. *ḫahbt*, after which also the female demon-name (Arab.) *se‘alâ* is explained), but that licentious married wife, who, no better than such a strumpet when she wanders abroad, hunts after lovers. The alternating פֶּאַם (properly a stroke) Fleischer compares with the Arab. synonyms, *marrt*, a going over, *karrt*, a going back, *una volta, una fiata, une fois* (Orelli, *Synon. der Zeit und Ewigkeit*, p. 51). Regarding חוּץ, vid., at Pro. 5:16: it is the free space without, before the house-door, or also before the gate of the city; the parallelism speaks here and at Pro. 1:20 more in favour of the former signification.

Pro. 7:13. After this digression the poet returns to the subject, and further describes the event as observed by himself.

*And she laid hold on him and kissed him;
Put on a bold brow and said to him.*

The verb נִשְׁקָה is here, after its primary signification, connected with the dat.: *osculum fixit ei*. Thus also Gen. 27:26 is construed, and the *Dagesh* in לוֹ is, as there, *Dag. forte conj.*, after the law for which the national grammarians have coined the technical name אֲתֵי מֵרַחֵיק (veniens e longinquo, “coming out of the distance,” i.e., the attraction of a word following by one accented on the penult.). The penult.-accenting of נִשְׁקָה is the consequence of the retrogression of the accent (נִסּוּג אַחֲרֵי), which, here where the word from the first had the penult, only with Metheg, and thus with a half a tone, brings with it the dageshing of the לוֹ following, as the original penultima-accenting of וְהִחְזִיקָה does of the בוּ which follows it, for the reading בוּ by Löwenstein is contrary to the laws of punctuation of the *Textus receptus* under consideration here.^{f97}

As בוּ and לוֹ have received the doubling *Dagesh*, so on the other hand, according to Ewald, § 193*b*, it has disappeared from הֶעֱנָה (written with *Raphe* according to Kimchi, *Michlol* 145*a*). And as נִשְׁקָה has the tone thrown back, so the proper pausal וַיֵּאמֶר is accented on the ult., but without attracting the לוֹ following by dageshing, which is the case only when the first of the two words terminates in the sound of *ā* (*āh*). הֶעֱנָה פָּנָיו is said of one who shows firmness of hardness of countenance (Arab. *slabt alwajh*), i.e., one who shows shamelessness, or, as we say, an iron forehead (Fl.).

Pro. 7:14, 15. She laid hold on him and kissed him, both of which actions were shameless, and then, assuming the passivity and modesty befitting the woman, and disregarding morality and the law, she said to the youth:

*14 “To bring peace-offerings was binding upon me,
To-day have I redeemed my vows.*

*15 Therefore am I come out to meet thee,
To seek thy face, and have found thee.”*

We have translated זָבַחֵי שְׁלָמִים “peace-offerings,” proceeding on the principle that שָׁלַם (sing. only Amo. 5:22, and on the Phoenician altar at Marseilles) denotes contracting friendship with one (from שָׁלַם, to hold friendly relationship), and then the gifts having this in view; for the idea of this kind of offering is the attestation and confirmation of communion with God. But in view of the derivatives שְׁלָמָיִם and שְׁלוֹם, it is perhaps more

appropriate to combine שָׁלַם with שָׁלֵם, to discharge perfectly, and to translate it thank-payment-offering, or with v. Hofmann, a due-offering, where not directly thank-offering; for the proper eucharistic offering, which is the expression of thanks on a particular occasion, is removed from the species of the *Shelamim* by the addition of the words אֶל־תְּנִדָּה (Lev. 7:12-25). The characteristic of the *Shelamim* is the division of the flesh of the sacrifice between Jahve and His priests on the one side, and the person (or persons) bringing it on the other side: only one part of the flesh of the sacrifice was Jahve's, consumed by fire (Lev. 3:16); the priests received one part; those who brought the offering received back another part as it were from the altar of God, that they might eat it with holy joy along with their household. So here the adulteress says that there was binding upon her, in consequence of a vow she had taken, the duty of presenting peace-offerings, or offerings that were due; to-day (she reckons the day in the sense of the *dies civilis* from night to night) she has performed her duties, and the שְׁלָמֵי נֶדֶר have yielded much to her that she might therewith regale him, her true lover; for with אֶל־כֶּן she means to say that even the prospect of the gay festival which she can prepare for him moved her thus to meet him. This address of the woman affords us a glimpse into the history of the customs of those times. The *Shelamim* meals degenerated in the same manner as our *Kirmsen*.^{f98}

Secularization lies doubly near to merrymaking when the law sanctions this, and it can conceal itself behind the mask of piety. Regarding שָׁחַר, a more exact word for בִּקֵּשׁ, vid., at Pro. 1:28. To seek the countenance of one is equivalent to to seek his person, himself, but yet not without reference to the wished-for look [*aspectus*] of the person.

Pro. 7:16-18. Thus she found him, and described to him the enjoyment which awaited him in eating and drinking, then in the pleasures of love.

**16 “My bed have I spread with cushions,
Variegated coverlets, Egyptian linen;**

**17 I have sprinkled my couch
With myrrh, aloes, and cinnamon.**

**18 Come then, we will intoxicate ourselves with love till the morning,
And will satisfy ourselves in love.”**

The noun עֶרֶשׁ, from עָרַשׁ, = Arab. ‘*arash, aedificare, fabricari*, signifies generally the wooden frame; thus not so much the bed within as the erected bed-place (cf. Arab. ‘*arsh, throne, and ‘arysh, arbour*). This bedstead she had richly and beautifully cushioned, that it might be soft and agreeable. רִבֵּר,

from **רָבַר**, signifies to lay on or apply closely, thus either *vincire* (whence the name of the necklace, Gen. 41:42) or *sternere* (different from **רָפַד**, Job. 17:13, which acquires the meaning *sternere* from the root-meaning to raise up from under, *sublevare*), whence **מַרְבְּדִים**, cushions, pillows, *stragulae*. Böttcher punctuates **מַרְבְּדִים** incorrectly; the **ב** remains aspirated, and the connection of the syllables is looser than in **מַרְבֵּה**, Ewald, § 88*d*. The **חֲטָבוֹת** beginning the second half-verse is in no case an adjective to **מַרְבְּדִים**, in every case only *appos.*, probably an independent conception; not derived from **חָטַב** (cogn. **חָצַב**), to hew wood (whence Arab. *ḥṭab*, fire-wood), according to which Kimchi, and with him the *Graec. Venet.* (**περιξυστοίς**), understands it of the carefully polished bed-poles or bed-boards, but from **חָטַב** = Arab. *khateba*, to be streaked, of diverse colours (vid., under Psa. 144:12), whence the Syriac *machtābto*, a figured (striped, checkered) garment. Hitzig finds the idea of coloured or variegated here unsuitable, but without justice; for the pleasantness of a bed is augmented not only by its softness, but also by the impression which its costliness makes on the eye. The following **אֲטוּן מִצְרַיִם** stands in an appositional relation to **חֲטָבוֹת**, as when one says in Arabic *taub-un dībâg^c-un*, a garment brocade = of brocade. **אֲטוּן** (after the Syr. for **אֲטוּן**, as **אֲטוּן**) signifies in the Targum the cord (e.g., Jer. 38: 6), like the Arab. *tunub*, Syr. (e.g., Isa. 54: 2) *tûnob*; the root is **טָן**, not in the sense of to bind, to wind (Deitr.), but in the sense of to stretch; the thread or cord is named from the extension in regard to length, and **אֲטוּן** is thus thread-work, whether in weaving or spinning.^{f99}

The fame of Egyptian manufactures is still expressed in the Spanish *aclabtea*, fine linen cloth, which is equivalent to the modern Arabic *el-koftije* (*kibṭije*); they had there particularly also an intimate acquaintance with the dye stuffs found in the plants and fossils of the country (Klemm's *Culturgeschichte*, v. 308-310).

Pro. 7:17, 18. These verses remind us of expressions in the Canticles. There, at Son. 4:14, are found the three names for spicery as here, and one sees that **מֵר אֱהָלִים** are not to be connected genitively: there are three things, accented as in the title-verse Son. 1: 3. The myrrh, **מֵר** (*Balsamodendron myrrha*), belongs, like the frankincense, to the species of the *Amyris*, which is an exotic in Palestine not less than with us; the aromatic quality in them does not arise from the flowers or leaves, so that Son. 1:13 leads us to think of a bunch of myrrh, but from the resin oozing through the bark (*Gummi myrrhae* or merely *myrrha*), consisting of bright glossy red or golden-yellow grains more or less transparent. **אֱהָלִים** (used by Balaam, Num. 24: 6) is the Semitic Old-Indian

name of the aloë, *agaru* or *aguru*; the aromatic quality is in the wood of the *Aquilaria agallocha*, especially its root (*agallochum* or *lignum aloes*) dried in the earth, — in more modern use and commerce the inspissated juice of its leaves. קַנְמֹן is κιννάμωμον (like מֶר, a Semitic word ^{f100} that had come to the Greeks through the Phoenicians), the cinnamon, i.e., the inner rind of the *Laurus cinnamomum*. The myrrh is native to Arabia; the aloë, as its name denotes, is Indian; the cinnamon in like manner came through Indian travellers from the east coast of Africa and Ceylon (Taprobane). All these three spices are drugs, i.e., are dry apothecaries' wares; but we are not on that account to conclude that she perfumed (Hitzig) her bed with spices, viz., burnt in a censer, an operation which, according to Son. 3: 6, would rather be designated קַטְרֵתִי. The verb נוֹרָה (only here as *Kal*) signifies to lift oneself up (vid., under Psa. 48:13), and transitively to raise and swing hither and thither (= הִנְיָרָה); here with a double accusative, to besprinkle anything out of a vessel moved hither and thither. According to this sense, we must think of the three aromas as essences in the state of solution; cf. Exo. 30:22-33, Est. 2:12. Hitzig's question, "Who would sprinkle bed-sheets with perfumed and thus impure water?" betrays little knowledge of the means by which even at the present day clean linen is made fragrant. The expression רָוַח דְּרוּדִים sounds like דְּרוּדִים שָׁבַר, Son. 5: 1, although there דְּרוּדִים is probably the voc., and not, as here, the accus.; רָוַח is the *Kal* of רָוַח, 5:19, and signifies to drink something copiously in full draughts. The verbal form עָלַם for עָלַץ is found besides only in Job. 20:18; 39:13; the *Hithpa.* signifies to enjoy oneself greatly, perhaps (since the *Hithpa.* is sometimes used reciprocally, vid., under Gen. 2:25) with the idea of reciprocity (Targ. לָחַד לְחַד). We read *bo'habim* with *Chateph-Kametz* after Ben-Asher (vid., Kimchi's *Lex.*); the punctuation בְּאַהֲבִים is that of Ben-Naphtali.

Pro. 7:19, 20. The adulteress now deprives the youth of all fear; the circumstances under which her invitation is given are as favourable as possible.

**19 "For the man is not at home,
He has gone on a long journey.**

**20 He has taken the purse with him:
He will not return home till the day of the full moon."**

It is true that the article stands in הָאִישׁ, Arab. *alm'ar-fat*, i.e., serves to define the word: the man, to whom here κατ' ἐξοχῆν and alone reference can be made, viz., the husband of the adulteress (Fl.); but on the other side it is characteristic that she does not say אִישׁ (as e.g., Gen. 29:32), but ignores the

relation of love and duty in which she is placed to him, and speaks of him as one standing at a distance from her (Aben-Ezra). Erroneously Vogel reads **בְּבֵית** after the Targ. instead of **בְּבֵיתוֹ**. We say in Hebr. **אֵינוּ בְּבֵיתוֹ**, *il n'est pas chez soi*, as we say **לָקַח בְּיָדוֹ**, *il a pris avec soi* (cf. Jer. 38:10). **מְרַחוֹק** Hitzig seeks to connect with the verb, which, after Isa. 17:13; 22: 3, is possible; for the Hebr. **מְרַחוֹק** (**מִמְרַחֵק**), far off, has frequently the meaning from afar, for the measure of length is determined not from the point of departure outward, but from the end, as e.g., Homer, *Il. ii. 456*; **ἔκαθεν δέ τε φαίνεται ἀγλή**, from afar the gleam is seen, i.e., shines hither from the distance. Similarly we say in French, *il vient du côté du nord*, he comes from the north, as well as *il va du côté du nord*, he goes northwards. But as we do not say: he has gone on a journey far off, but: on a distant journey, so here **מְרַחוֹק** is virtually an adj. (vid., under Isa. 5:26) equivalent to **רְחוֹקָה** (Num. 9:10): a journey which is distant = such as from it he has a long way back. Michaelis has well remarked here: *ut timorem ei penitus adimat, veluti per gradus incedit*. He has undertaken a journey to a remote point, but yet more: he has taken money with him, has thus business to detain him; and still further: he has even determined the distant time of his return. **צִרְוֹר־הַכֶּסֶף** (thus to be written after Ben-Asher, vid., Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 41) is the purse (from **צָרַר**, to bind together), not one of many, but that which is his own. The terminus precedes 20b to emphasize the lateness; vid., on **כֶּסֶף** under Psa. 81: 4. *Graec. Venet. τῆ ἡμέρα τοῦ καιροῦ*, after Kimchi and others, who derive **כֶּסֶף** (**כֶּסֶה**) from the root **כִּס**, to reckon, and regard it as denoting only a definite time. But the two passages require a special idea; and the Syr. *ḵêso*, which in 1Ki. 12:32, 2Ch. 7:10, designates the time from the 15th day of the month, shows that the word denotes not, according to the Talmud, the new moon (or the new year's day), when the moon's disk begins to cover itself, i.e., to fill (**יִתְכַסֶּה**), but the full moon, when it is covered, i.e., filled; so that thus the time of the night-scene here described is not that of the last quarter of the moon (Ewald), in which it rises at midnight, but that of the new moon (Hitzig), when the night is without moonlight. Since the derivation of the word from **כֶּסֶף** (**כֶּסֶה**), to cover, gives the satisfactory idea of the covering or filling of the moon's disk, we do not seek after any other; Dietrich fixes on the root-idea of roundness, and Hitzig of vision (**כֶּסֶף** = **סָכַה**, **שָׁכַה**, vid., on the contrary, under Psa. 143: 9). The **ל** is that of time at which, in which, about which, anything is done; it is more indefinite than **ב** would be. He will not return for some fourteen days.

Pro. 7:21. The result: —

**21 She beguiled him by the fulness of her talking,
By the smoothness of her lips she drew him away.**

Here is a climax. First she brought him to yield, overcoming the resistance of his mind to the last point (cf. 1Ki. 11: 3); then drove him, or, as we say, hurried him wholly away, viz., from the right path or conduct (cf. Deu. 13: 6, 11). With **הַמַּתְּהוּ** (= **הַמַּתְּהוּ**) as the chief *factum*, the past imperf. is interchanged, 21b. Regarding **לָקַח**, see above, p. 40. Here is the rhetoric of sin (Zöckler); and perhaps the **לָקַח** of 20a has suggested this antiphrastic **לָקַח** to the author (Hitzig), as **חָלַק** (the inverted **לָקַח**, formed like **שָׁפַל**, which is the *abstr.* of **שָׁפַל** as that is of **חָלַק**) and **תְּדִיחֲנוּ** are reciprocally conditioned, for the idea of the slipperiness (Psa. 73:18) connects itself with **חָלַק**.

Pro. 7:22, 23. What followed: —

**22 So he goes after her at once
As an ox which goeth to the slaughter-house,
And as one bereft of reason to the restraint of fetters,**

**23 As a bird hastens to the net,
Without knowing that his life is at stake —
Till the arrow pierces his liver.**

The *part.* **הוֹלֵךְ** (thus to be accentuated according to the rule in Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 25, with *Mercha* to the tone-syllable and *Mahpach* to the preceding open syllable) preserves the idea of the fool's going after her. **פְּתָאם** (suddenly) fixes the point, when he all at once resolves to betake himself to the rendezvous in the house of the adulteress, now a **κερωθεις**, as the LXX translates, i.e., as we say, a simpleton who has gone on the lime-twig. He follows her as an ox goes to the slaughter-house, unconscious that he is going thither to be slaughtered; the LXX ungrammatically destroying the attributive clause: **ὡσπερ δὲ βοῦς ἐπὶ σφαγῆν ἄγεται**. The difficulties in **וּבְעַבְסָם** (thus punctuated, after Kimchi, with a double *Segol*, and not **וּבְעַבְסָם**, as is frequently the case) multiply, and it is not to be reconciled with the traditional text. The ox appears to require another beast as a side-piece; and accordingly the LXX, Syr., and Targ. find in **עַבְסָם** a dog (to which from **אוּיֵל** they also pick out **אֵיֵל**, a stag), Jerome a lamb (*et quasi agnus* **בְּבַשׁ**), Rashi a venomous serpent (perhaps after **ἔχιδνα**?), Löwenstein and Malbim a rattlesnake (**נַחֲשׁ מְצַלְצֵל** after **עַבְסָם**); but all this is mere conjecture. Symmachus' **ἄφρων** (**ἄφρων**) is without support, and, like the favourite rendering of Schelling, *et sicut saliens in vinculum cervus* (**אֵיֵל**), is unsuitable on account of the

unsemitic position of the words. The noun **עֶבֶס**, plur. **עֶבְסִים**, signifies, Isa. 3:18, an anklet as a female ornament (whence v. 16 the denom. **עֵבֶס**, to make a tinkling of the anklets). In itself the word only means the fetter, *compes*, from **עֶבֶס**, Arab. ‘*akas*, ‘*akash*, *contrahere*, *constringere* (vid., Fleischer under Isa. 59: 5); and that it can also be used of any kind of means of checking free movement, the Arab. ‘*ikâs*, as the name of a cord with which the camel is made fast by the head and forefeet, shows. With this signification the interpretation is: *et velut pedicâ (= וּכְבַעֲסוּ) implicatus ad castigationem stulti*, he follows her as if (bound) with a fetter to the punishment of the fool, i.e., of himself (Michaelis, Fleischer, and others). Otherwise Luther, who first translated “in a fetter,” but afterwards (supplying **לְ**, not **בְּ**): “and as if to fetters, where one corrects fools.” But the ellipsis is harsh, and the parallelism leads us to expect a living being in the place of **עֶבֶס**. Now since, according to Gesenius, **עֶבֶס**, fetter, can be equivalent to a fettered one neither at Isa. 17: 5; 21:17, nor Pro. 23:28 (according to which **עֶבֶס** must at least have an active personal signification), we transpose the nouns of the clause and write **עֶבֶס וְכֹאֵוִל אֶל-מוֹסֵר**, he follows her as a fool (*Psychol.* p. 292) to correction (restraint) with fetters; or if **אוִיל** is to be understood not so much physically as morally, and refers to self-destroying conduct (Psa. 107: 7): as a madman, i.e., a criminal, to chains. The one figure denotes the fate into which he rushes, like a beast devoid of reason, as the loss of life; and the other denotes the fate to which he permits himself to be led by that woman, like a criminal by the officer, as the loss of freedom and of honour.

Pro. 7:23. The confusion into which the text has fallen is continued in this verse. For the figure of the deadly arrow connects itself neither with that of the ox which goes to the slaughter-house, nor with that of the madman who is put in chains: the former is not killed by being shot; and with the latter, the object is to render him harmless, not to put him to death. The LXX therefore converts **אוִיל** into **אֵיל**, a stag, and connects the shooting with an arrow with this: ἡ ὥς ἔλαφος τοξεύματι πεπληγὼς εἰς τὸ ἦπαρ. But we need no encroachment on the text itself, only a correct placing of its members. The three thoughts, v. 23, reach a right conclusion and issue, if with **בְּמַהֵר צִפּוֹר אֶל-פֶּחַ** (here *Merchamahpach*) a new departure is begun with a comparison: he follows her with eager desires, like as a bird hastens to the snare (vid., regarding **פֶּחַ**, a snare, and **מוֹקֵשׁ**, a noose, under Isa. 8:15). What then follows is a continuation of 22a. The subject is again the youth, whose way is compared to that of an ox going to the slaughter, of a culprit in chains, and of a fool; and he knows not (*non novit*, as Pro. 4:19; 9:18, and according to the sense, *non curat*, Pro. 3: 6;

5: 6) that it is done at the risk of his life (בְּנַפְשׁוֹ as 1Ki. 2:23, Num. 17: 3), that his life is the price with which this kind of love is bought (הוֹנָא, *neut.*, as not merely Ecc. 2: 1 and the like, but also e.g., Lev. 10: 3, Est. 9: 1) — that does not concern him till (אֵד = עַד אֲשֶׁר or כִּי עַד) the arrow breaks or pierces through (פִּלְחָה as Job. 16:13) his liver, i.e., till he receives the death-wound, from which, if not immediately, yet at length he certainly dies. Elsewhere the part of the body struck with a deadly wound is called the reins or loins (Job, etc.), or the gall-bladder (Job. 20:25); here the liver, which is called כֶּבֶד, Arab. *kebid*, perhaps as the organ in which sorrowful and painful affections make themselves felt (cf. Aeschylus, *Agam.* 801: δῆγμα λύπης ἐφ’ ἥπαρ προσικνεῖται), especially the latter, because the passion of sensual love, according to the idea of the ancients, reflected itself in the liver. He who is love-sick has *jecur ulcerosum* (Horace, *Od.* i. 25. 15); he is diseased in his liver (*Psychol.* p. 268). But the arrow is not here the arrow of love which makes love-sick, but the arrow of death, which slays him who is ensnared in sinful love. The befooled youth continues the disreputable relation into which he has entered till it terminates in adultery and in lingering disease upon his body, remorse in his soul, and dishonour to his name, speedily ending in inevitable ruin both spiritually and temporally.

Pro. 7:24, 25. With וְאִתָּהּ, as at Pro. 5: 7, the author now brings his narrative to a close, adding the exhortation deduced from it:

*24 And now, ye children, give ear unto me,
And observe the words of my mouth!*

*25 Let not thine heart incline to her ways,
And stray not in her paths.*

The verb שָׁמַח (whence *jēst*, like *jēt*, Pro. 4:15, with long *ē* from *ī*) the author uses also of departure from a wicked way (Pro. 4:15); but here, where the portraiture of a faithless wife (אִסְתָּה) is presented, the word used in the law of jealousy, Numbers 5, for the trespass of an אִשָּׁת אִישׁ is specially appropriate. שָׁמַח is interchanged with תָּעָה (cf. Gen. 21:14): wander not on her paths, which would be the consequence of straying on them. Theodotion: καὶ μὴ πλανηθῆς ἐν ἀτραποῖς αὐτῆς, with καί, as also Syr., Targ., and Jerome. The Masora reckons this verse to the 25 which have אַל at the beginning and אַל at the middle of each clause (vid., Baer in the *Luth. Zeitschrift*, 1865, p. 587); the text of Norzi has therefore אַל אַל, which is found also in good MSS (e.g., the Erfurt, 2 and 3).

Pro. 7:26, 27. The admonition, having its motive in that which goes before, is now founded on the emphatic *finale*:

**26 For many are the slain whom she hath caused to fall,
And many are her slain.**

**27 A multiplicity of ways to help is her house,
Going down to the chambers of death.**

The translation “for many slain has she laid low” (Syr., Targ., Jerome, Luther) is also syntactically possible; for רַבִּים can be placed before its substantive after the manner of the demonstratives and numerals (e.g., Neh. 9:28, cf. אַחַד, Son. 4: 9), and the accentuation which requires two servants (the usual two *Munachs*) to the *Athnach* appears indeed thus to construe it. It is otherwise if רַבִּים here meant *magni* (thus e.g., Ralbag, and recently Bertheau), and not *multi*; but רַבִּים and עַצְמִים stand elsewhere in connection with each other in the signification many and numerous, Psa. 35:18, Joe. 2: 2, Mic. 4: 3. “Her slain” are those slain by her; the part. pass. is connected with the genitive of the actor, e.g., Pro. 9:18; cf. (Arab.) *ḡatyl ālmḡabbt*, of one whom love kills (Fl.). With v. 27 cf. Pro. 2:18; 9:18. In 27a, בִּיתָהּ is not equivalent to כְּבֵיתָהּ after 8: 2, also not elliptical and equivalent to דְּרָכֵי בֵיתָהּ; the former is unnecessary, the latter is in no case established by Psa. 45: 7, Ezr. 10:13, nor by Deu. 8:15, 2Ki. 23:17 (see, on the other hand, Philippi’s *Status Constructus*, pp. 87-93). Rightly Hitzig has: her house forms a multiplicity of ways to hell, in so far as adultery leads by a diversity of ways to hell. Similarly the subject and the predicate vary in number, Pro. 16:25, Psa. 110: 3, Job. 26:13, Dan. 9:23, and frequently. If one is once in her house, he may go in this or in that way, but surely his path is to destruction: it consists of many steps to hell, such as lead down (כַּרְד, fem. Isa. 37:34, masc. Isa. 30:21) to the extreme depths of death (cf. Job. 9: 9, “chambers of the south” = its remotest regions veiling themselves in the invisible); for חֶדֶר (Arab. *khiddr*) is the part of the tent or the house removed farthest back, and the most private (Fl.). These חֶדְרֵי־מוֹת, cf. עֲמֻקֵּי שְׂאוּל, Pro. 9:18, approach to the conception of גִּיהֶנֶם, which is afterwards distinguished from שְׂאוּל.

Fourteenth Introductory Mashal Discourse, Proverbs 8

A DISCOURSE OF WISDOM CONCERNING HER EXCELLENCE AND HER GIFTS

Pro. 8. The author has now almost exhausted the ethical material; for in this introduction to the Solomonic Book of Proverbs he works it into a memorial

for youth, so that it is time to think of concluding the circle by bending back the end to the beginning. For as in the beginning, Pro. 1:20 ff., so also here in the end, he introduces Wisdom herself as speaking. There, her won testimony is delivered in contrast to the alluring voice of the deceiver; here, the daughter of Heaven in the highways inviting to come to her, is the contrast to the adulteress lurking in the streets, who is indeed not a personification, but a woman of flesh and blood, but yet at the same time as the incarnate *ἀπάτη* of worldly lust. He places opposite to her Wisdom, whose person is indeed not so sensibly perceptible, but who is nevertheless as real, coming near to men in a human way, and seeking to win them by her gifts.

*1 Doth not Wisdom discourse,
And Understanding cause her voice to be heard?*

*2 On the top of the high places in the way,
In the midst of the way, she has placed herself.*

*3 By the side of the gates, at the exit of the city,
At the entrance to the doors, she calleth aloud.*

As *הַנְּה* points to that which is matter of fact, so *הַלֵּא* calls to a consideration of it (cf. Pro. 14:22); the question before the reader is doubly justified with reference to Pro. 1:20 ff. With *תְּבוּנָה, חִכְמָה* is interchanged, as e.g., Pro. 2: 1-6; such names of wisdom are related to its principal name almost as *עֲלִיּוֹן, אֱלֹהִים*, and the like, to *יְהוָה*. In describing the scene, the author, as usual, heaps up synonyms which touch one another without coming together.

Pro. 8: 2. By *מְרָמִים* Hitzig understands the summit of a mountain, and therefore regards this verse as an interpolation; but the “high places” are to be understood of the high-lying parts of the city. There, on the way which leads up and down, she takes her stand. *עֲלִי* = Arab. *‘ly*, old and poetic for *אֵל*, signifies here “hard by, close to,” properly, so that something stands forward over the edge of a thing, or, as it were, passes over its borders (Fl.). The *בֵּית*, Hitzig, as Bertheau, with LXX, Targ., Jerome, interpret prepositionally as a strengthening of *בֵּין* (in the midst); but where it once, Eze. 1:27, occurs in this sense, it is fully written *בֵּית ל*. Here it is the *accus. loci* of the substantive; “house of the ascent” (Syr. *bêth urchotho*) is the place where several ways meet, the uniting point, as *אֵם הַדָּרֶךְ* (Eze. 21:26), the point of departure, exit; the former the crossway, as the latter the separating way. Thus Immanuel: the place of the frequented streets; *Meîri*: the place of the ramification (more correctly, the concentration) of the ways. *נִצְבָּה* signifies more than *קָמָה* (she

raises herself) and עֲמֻדָה (she goes thither); it means that she plants herself there.

Pro. 8: 3. In this verse Bertheau finds, not inappropriately, the designations of place: on this side, on that side, and within the gate. לְיָד, at the hand, is equivalent to at the side, as Psa. 140: 6. לְפִי, of the town, is the same as לְפֶתַח, Pro. 9:14, of the house: at the mouth, i.e., at the entrance of the city, thus where they go out and in. There are several of these ways for leaving and entering a city, and on this account מְבוֹא פְתָחִים are connected: generally where one goes out and in through one of the gates (doors). מְבוֹא, fully represented by the French *avenue*, the space or way which leads to anything (Fl.). There she raises her voice, which sounds out far and wide; vid., concerning תְּרַנֶּנָּה (*Graec. Venet.* incorrectly, after Rashi, ἀλαλάξουσι), at Pro. 1:20.

Pro. 8: 4-9. Now begins the discourse. The exordium summons general attention to it with the emphasis of its absolute truth:

*4 “To you, ye men, is my discourse addressed,
And my call is to the children of men!*

*5 Apprehend, O ye simple ones, what wisdom is;
And, ye fools what understanding is.*

*6 Hear, for I will speak princely things,
And the opening of my lips is upright.*

*7 For my mouth uttereth truth,
And a wicked thing is an abomination to my lips.*

*8 The utterances of my mouth are in rectitude,
There is nothing crooked or perverse in them.*

*9 To the men of understanding they are all to the point,
And plain to those who have attained knowledge.”*

Hitzig rejects this section, 4-12, as he does several others in 8 and 9, as spurious. But if this preamble, which reminds us of Elihu, is not according to every one's taste, yet in respect of the circle of conception and thought, as well as of the varying development of certain fundamental thoughts, it is altogether after the manner of the poet. The terminology is one that is strange to us; the translation of it is therefore difficult; that which is given above strives at least not to be so bad as to bring discredit on the poet. The tautology and flatness of v. 4 disappears when one understands אִשִּׁים and בְּנֵי אָדָם like the Attic

ἄνδρες and ἄνθρωποι; vid., under Isa. 2: 9; 53: 3 (where אִישִׁים, as here and Psa. 141: 4, is equivalent to בְּנֵי אִישׁ, Psa. 49: 3; 4: 3). Wisdom turns herself with her discourses to high and low, to persons of standing and to the *proletariat*. The verbal clause 4a interchanges with a noun clause 4b, as frequently a preposition with its noun (e.g., v. 8a) completes the whole predicate of a semistich (Fl.).

Pro. 8: 5. Regarding עֲרָמָה, *calliditas*, in a good sense, vid., at 1: 4; regarding פְּתָאִים, those who are easily susceptible of good or bad, according to the influence that is brought to bear upon them, vid., also 1: 4; and regarding בְּסִילִים, the intellectually heavy, dull persons in whom the flesh burdens the mind, vid., at Pro. 1:22. לֵב is parallel with עֲרָמָה, for the heart (according to its Semitic etymon, that which remains fast, like a kernel, the central-point) is used for the understanding of which it is the seat (*Psychol.* p. 249), or heartedness = intelligence (cf. חֶסֶד-לֵב, Pro. 6:32 = ἄνους or ἄλογος). We take עֲרָמָה and לֵב as objective, as we have translated: that which is in both, and in which they consist. Thus הִבִּינְךָ, which is a favourite word with this author, has both times the simple transitive meaning of the gain of understanding into the nature and worth of both; and we neither need to interpret the second הִבִּינוּ in the double transitive meaning, “to bring to understanding,” nor, with Hitzig, to change in into הִבִּינוּ^{f101} [direct, i.e., *applicate*].

Pro. 8: 6. That to which Wisdom invites, her discourse makes practicable, for she speaks of נְגִידִים. Hitzig interprets this word by *conspicua*, manifest truths, which the *Graev. Venet.* understands to be ἐναντία, after Kimchi’s interpretation: truths which one makes an aim and object (נִגְדָה) on account of their worth. Fürst, however, says that נגיד, from נגד, Arab. *najad*, means to be elevated, exalted, and thereby visible (whence also הִגִּיד, to bring to light, to bring forward); and that by נגידים, as the plur. of this נגיד, is to be understood *princeps* in the sense of *principalia*, or *praestantia* (LXX σεμνά; Theodot. ἡγεμονικά; Jerome, *de rebus magnis*) (cf. νόμος βασιλικός of the law of love, which surpasses the other laws, as kings do their subjects), which is supported by the similar expression, Pro. 22:20. But that we do not need to interpret נגידים as *abstr.*, like מִישָׁרִים, and as the *acc. adverb.*: in noble ways, because in that case it ought to be נגידות (Berth.), is shown by Pro. 22:20, and also Pro. 16:13; cf. on this neuter use of the masc., Ewald, § 172a. “The opening of my lips (i.e., this, that they open themselves, not: that which they disclose, lay open) is upright” is to be regarded as *metonymia antecedentis pro conseq.*: that

which I announce is...; or also as a poetic attribution, which attributes to a subject that which is produced by it (cf. 3:17 *b*): my discourse bearing itself right, brings to light (Fl.). Pro. 23:16, cf. 31, is parallel both in the words and the subject; מִישְׂרִים, that which is in accordance with fact and with rectitude, uprightness (vid., at Pro. 1: 3), is a word common to the introduction (1-9), and to the first appendix to the first series of Solomonic Proverbs (Pro. 22:17-24:22), with the Canticles. In Son. 5:16, also, as where (cf. Pro. 5: 3, Job. 6:30), the word palate [*Gaumen*] is used as the organ of speech.

Pro. 8: 7. כִּי continues the reason (begun in v. 6) for the Hearken! (cf. Pro. 1:15-17; 4:16 f.); so that this second reason is co-ordinated with the first (Fl.). Regarding אָמַת, vid., at Pro. 3: 3; חֲנָה, here of the palate (cf. Psa. 37:30), as in Pro. 15:28 of the heart, has not hitherto occurred. It signifies quiet inward meditation, as well as also (but only poetically) discourses going forth from it (vid., at Psa. 1: 2). The contrary of truth, i.e., moral truth, is רָשַׁע, wickedness in words and principles, — a segolate, which retains its *Segol* also *in pausa*, with the single exception of Ecc. 3:16.

Pro. 8: 8, 9. The כִּי of בְּצַדִּיק is that of the close connection of a quality with an action or matter, which forms with a substantive *adverbia* as well as virtual *adjectiva*, as here: *cum rectitudine (conjuncta i. e. vera) sunt omnia dicta oris mei* (Fl.); it is the כִּי of the distinctive attribute (Hitzig), certainly related to the כִּי *essentiae* (Pro. 3:26, according to which Schultens and Bertheau explain), which is connected with the abstract conception (e.g., Psa. 33: 4), but also admits the article designating the gender (vid., at Psa. 29: 4). The opposite of צַדִּיק (here in the sense of *veracitas*, which it means in Arab.) is נִפְתָּל וְעָקָשׁ, *dolosum ac perversum*. עָקָשׁ (cf. Gesen. § 84, 9) is that which is violently bent and twisted, i.e., estranged from the truth, which is, so to speak, parodied or caricatured. Related to it in meaning, but proceeding from a somewhat different idea, is נִפְתָּל. נִפְתָּל, used primarily of threads, cords, ropes, and the like, means to twist them, to twine them over and into one another, whence פְּתִיל, a line or string made of several intertwisted threads (cf. Arab. *fīl*, a wick of a candle or lamp); *Niph.*, to be twisted, specifically *luctari*, of the twisting of the limbs, and figuratively to bend and twist oneself, like the crafty (*versutus*) liars and deceivers, of words and thoughts which do not directly go forth, but by the crafty twistings of truth and rectitude, *opp.* נִכּוֹן יֶשֶׁר (Fl.). There is nothing of deception or error in the utterances of wisdom; much rather they are all נִכְחִים, straight out from her (cf. Isa. 57: 2), going directly out, and without circumlocution directed to the right end for the intelligent, the knowing (cf. Neh. 10:29); and יֶשֶׁרִים, straight or even, giving no occasion to

stumble, removing the danger of erring for those who have obtained knowledge, i.e., of good and evil, and thus the ability of distinguishing between them (Gesen. § 134, 1), — briefly, for those who know how to estimate them.

Pro. 8:10-12. Her self-commendation is continued in the resumed address:

**10 “Receive my instruction, and not silver,
And knowledge rather than choice gold!”**

**11 For wisdom is better than corals,
And all precious jewels do not equal her.**

**12 I, Wisdom, inhabit prudence,
And the knowledge of right counsels is attainable by me.”**

Instead of **וְלֹא-כֶסֶף** influenced by **קָחוּ**, is **וְאֵל-כֶסֶף** with **תִּקְחוּ** to be supplied; besides, with most Codd. and older editions, we are to accentuate **קָחוּ מוֹסָרִי** with the erasure of the *Makkeph*. “Such negations and prohibitions,” Fleischer remarks, “are to be understood comparatively: instead of acquiring silver, rather acquire wisdom. Similar is the old Arabic *‘l-nâr w-l-‘l-‘âr*, the fire, and not the disgrace! Also among the modern Arabic proverbs collected by Burckhardt, many have this form, e.g., No. 34, *alḥajamat balafas wala alḥajat alanas*, Better to let oneself be cut with the axe than to beg for the favour of another” 10b is to be translated, with Jerome, Kimchi, and others: and knowledge is more precious than fine gold (**נְבֻכָהָר**, neut.: *auro pretiosius*); and in view of Pro. 16:16, this construction appears to be intended. But Fleischer has quite correctly affirmed that this assertatory clause is unsuitably placed as a parallel clause over against the preceding imperative clause, and, what is yet more important, that then v. 11 would repeat *idem per idem* in a tautological manner. We therefore, after the Aramaic and Greek translators, take **כֶסֶף נְבֻכָהָר** together here as well as at v. 19, inasmuch as we carry forward the **קָחוּ**: *et scientiam prae auro lectissimo*, which is also according to the accentuation. Equally pregnant is the **מִן** in **מִקְרוֹיִן** of the passage 3:14, 15, which is here varied.

Pro. 8:12. Ver. 12 follows v. 11 = Pro. 3:15 as a justification of this estimating of wisdom above all else in worth. Regarding **אֲנִי** with *Gaja*, vid., the rule which the accentuation of this word in the three so-called metrical books follows in Merx’ *Archiv*, 1868, p. 203 (cf. Baer’s *Torath Emeth*, p. 40). We translate: *ego sapientia involo sollertiam*, for the verb **שָׁכַן** is construed with the accusative of the object, Pro. 2:21; 10:30, Psa. 37: 3 (cf. **גִּוֹר**, Psa. 5: 5), as well as with **ב**, Gen. 26: 2, Psa. 69:37. Wisdom inhabits

prudence, has settled down, as it were, and taken up her residence in it, is at home in its whole sphere, and rules it. Bertheau not unsuitably compares οἰκῶν with μόνος ἔχων, 1Ti. 6:16. Regarding מְזִמּוֹת, vid., Pro. 1: 4; 5: 2. It denotes well-considered, carefully thought out designs, plans, conclusions, and תְּרָאִי is here the knowledge that is so potent. This intellectual power is nothing beyond wisdom, it is in her possession on every occasion; she strives after it not in vain, her knowledge is defined according to her wish. Wisdom describes herself here personally with regard to that which she bestows on men who receive her.

Pro. 8:13. Far remote is the idea that 13a is dependent on אֲמָצֵא (I acquire) (Löwenstein, Bertheau). With this verse begins a new series of thoughts raising themselves on the basis of the fundamental clause 13a. Wisdom says what she hates, and why she hates it:

***13 “The fear of Jahve is to hate evil;
Pride and arrogancy, and an evil way
And a deceitful mouth, do I hate.”***

If the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom (Pro. 9:10; 1: 7), then wisdom, personally considered, stands before all else that is to be said of her in a relation of homage or reverence toward God corresponding to the fear of God on the part of man; and if, as the premiss 13a shows, the fear of God has as its reverse side the hatred of evil, then there arises what Wisdom says in שִׂנְאֵתִי (I hate) of herself. Instead of the *n. actionis* שִׂנְאָת (hatred), formed in the same way with יְרֵאָת, which, admitting the article, becomes a substantive, the author uses, in order that he might designate the predicate as such (Hitzig), rather the *n. actionis* שִׂנְאָת as מְלֵאָת, Jer. 29:10. קְרֵאָת, Jud. 8: 1, is equivalent to שִׂנְאָת like יְבֵשֶׁת, the becoming dry, יְכַלֵּת, the being able; cf. (Arab.) *shanat*, hating, *malât*, well-being, *ḡarât*, reading (Fl.). The evil which Wisdom hates is now particularized as, Pro. 6:16-19, the evil which Jahve hates. The virtue of all virtues is humility; therefore Wisdom hates, above all, self-exaltation in all its forms. The *paronomasia* גִּאָה וְגִאָוִן (pride and haughtiness) expresses the idea in the whole of its contents and compass (cf. Isa. 15: 6; 3: 1, and above at Pro. 1:27). גִּאָה (from גִּאָה, the nominal form), that which is lofty = pride, stands with גִּאָוִן, as Job. 4:10, גִּבְהָה, that which is high = arrogance. There follows the *viam mali*, representing the sins of walk, i.e., of conduct, and *os fullax* (vid., at 2:12), the sins of the mouth. Hitzig rightly rejects the interpunctuation רַע, and prefers רָע. In consequence of this *Dechî* (*Tiphcha init.*), וּפִי תִהְיֶה כַּת, have in Codd. and good editions the servants *Asla* and *Illuj* (vid., Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 11); Aben-Ezra and Moses Kimchi consider the

Asla erroneously as disjunctive, and explain וַיִּבֶן by *et os = axioma meum*, but Asla is conjunctive, and has after it the רַפְּחָטֻם *raphatum*.

Pro. 8:14-16. After Wisdom has said what she hates, and thus what she is not, she now says what she is, has, and promises:

**14 “Mine is counsel and promotion;
I am understanding, mine is strength.**

**15 By me kings reign,
And rulers govern justly.**

**16 By me princes rule, and nobles —
All judges of the earth.”**

Whoever gives anything must himself possess it; in this sense Wisdom claims for herself counsel, promotion (in the sense of offering and containing that which is essentially and truly good; vid., concerning תּוֹשִׁיָה, 2: 7), and energy (vid., Ecc. 7:19). But she does not merely possess בְּיָנָה; this is much rather her peculiar nature, and is one with her. That v. 14 is formed after Job. 12:13, 16 (Hitzig) is possible, without there following thence any argument against its genuineness. And if v. 15 f., and Isa. 32: 1; 10: 1, stand in intentional reciprocal relation, then the priority is on the side of the author of the Proverbs. The connection gives to the laconic expression its intended comprehensiveness. It is not meant that Wisdom has the highest places in the state of give, but that she makes men capable of holding and discharging the duties of these.

Pro. 8:15b. Here we are led to think of legislation, but the usage of the language determines for the *Po.* חָקַק only the significations of commanding, decreeing, or judging; צֶדֶק is the object accus., the opposite of חֲקֵי־אָוֶן (decrees of unrighteousness), Isa. 10: 1. רִזָּן is a poetic word, from רִזָּן = Arab. *razuna*, to be heavy, weighty, then to be firm, incapable of being shaken, figuratively of majestic repose, dignity (cf. Arab. *wqâr* and פְּבֹד) in the whole external *habitus*, in speech and action such as befits one invested with power (Fl.).

Pro. 8:16a. We may not explain the second clause of this verse: *et ad ingenua impelluntur quicumque terrae imperant*, for נְדִיב is adj. without such a verbal sense. But besides, נְדִיבִים is not pred., for which it is not adapted, because, with the obscuring of its ethical signification (from נָדַב, to impel inwardly, viz., to noble conduct, particularly to liberality), it also denotes those who are noble only with reference to birth, and not to disposition (Isa. 32: 8).

Thus כִּלְשַׁפְטֵי אֶרֶץ is a fourth synonym for the highly exalted, and כִּלְשַׁפְטֵי אֶרֶץ is the summary placing together of all kinds of dignity; for שֹׁפֵט unites in itself references to government, administration of justice, and rule. כֹּל is used, and not וְכֹל — a so-called *asyndeton summativum*. Instead of אֶרֶץ (LXX) there is found also the word צֶדֶק (Syr., Targ., Jerome, *Graec. Venet.*, adopted by Norzi after Codd. and Neapol. 1487). But this word, if not derived from the conclusion of the preceding verse, is not needed by the text, and gives a summary which does not accord with that which is summed up (מַלְכִים, רוֹנִים, שְׂרִים, נְדִיבִים); besides, the Scripture elsewhere calls God Himself שׁוֹפֵט צֶדֶק (Psa. 9: 5; Jer. 11:20). The Masoretic reading ^{f102} of most of the editions, which is also found in the Cod. Hillel (סֵפֶר הַלְלוֹת ^{f103}), merits the preference.

Pro. 8:17-21. The discourse of Wisdom makes a fresh departure, as at v. 13: she tells how, to those who love her, she repays this love:

*17 “I love them that love me,
And they that seek me early find me.*

*18 Riches and honour are with me,
Durable riches and righteousness.*

*19 Better is my fruit than pure and fine gold,
And my revenue (better) than choice silver.*

*20 In the way of righteousness do I walk,
In the midst of the paths of justice.*

*21 To give an inheritance to them that love me
And I fill their treasures.”*

The *Chethîb* אֶהְבֵּיהָ (ego hos qui eam amant redamo), Gesenius, *Lehrgeb.* § 196, 5, regards as a possible synallage (*eam* = *me*), but one would rather think that it ought to be read אֶהְבֵּיהָ (= יְהוּדָה). The ancients all have the reading אֶהְבֵּי אֶהְבֵּי (= אֶהְבֵּי אֶהְבֵּי, with the change of the *éë* into *ê*, and the compression of the radical א; cf. אֶהְבֵּי אֶהְבֵּי, Pro. 1:10) is the form of the *fut. Kal*, which is inflected תִּאֶהְבֵּי, Pro. 1:22. Regarding שָׁחַר (the *Graec. Venet.* well: οὐ ὀρθρίζοντές μου), vid., Pro. 1:28, where the same *epenthet. fut.* form is found.

Pro. 8:18. In this verse part of Pro. 3:16 is repeated, after which אֶתִּי is meant of possession (*mecum* and *penes me*). Regarding הוֹן, vid., Pro. 1:13; instead of the adjective יָקָר there, we have here עֲתָק. The verb עֲתָק signifies

promoveri, to move forwards, whence are derived the meanings old (cf. *aetas provecta*, advanced age), venerable for age, and noble, free (cf. אֲתִיק, Isa. 28: 9, and Arab. *‘atyk, manumissus*), unbound, the bold. Used of clothing, עֲתִיק (Isa. 23:18) expresses the idea of venerable for age. עֲתִק used of possessions and goods, like the Arab. *‘atak*, denotes such goods as increase during long possession as an inheritance from father to son, and remain firm, and are not for the first time gained, but only need to be inherited, *opes perennes et firmae* (Schultens, Gesenius’ *Thesaur.*, Fleischer), although it may be also explained (which is, however, less probable with the form עֲתִק) of the idea of the venerable from *opes superbae* (Jerome), splendid opulence. צְדָקָה is here also a good which is distributed, but properly the distributing goodness itself, as the Arab. *ṣadaqat*, influenced by the later use of the Hebrew צְדָקָה (δικαιοσύνη = ἐλεημοσύνη), denotes all that which God of His goodness causes to flow to men, or which men bestow upon men (Fl.). Righteousness is partly a recompensative goodness, which rewards, according to the law of requital, like with like; partly communicative, which, according to the law of love without merit, and even in opposition to it, bestows all that is good, and above all, itself; but giving itself to man, it assimilates him to itself (vid., Psa. 24: 7), so that he becomes צְדִיק, and is regarded as such before God and men, v. 19.

The fruit and product of wisdom (the former a figure taken from the trees, Pro. 3:18; the latter from the sowing of seed, Pro. 3: 9) is the gain and profit which it yields. With חֲרוֹץ, Pro. 8:10; 3:14, פֶּזֶז is here named as the place of fine gold, briefly for זָהָב מִפֶּזֶז, solid gold, gold separated from the place of ore which contains it, or generally separated gold, from פֶּזֶז, violently to separate metals from base mixtures; Targ. דְּהַבָּא אֲוִבְרִיזִין, gold which has stood the fire-test, *obrussa*, of the crucible, Greek ὄβρυζον, Pers. *ebrîz*, Arab. *ibrîz*. In the last clause of this verse, as also in 10*b*, נִבְחָר is to be interpreted as pred. to תְּבוּאָתִי, but the balance of the meaning demands as a side-piece to the מַחְרוֹץ וּמִפֶּזֶז (19*a*) something more than the mere בְּסֵף. In 20 f. the reciprocal love is placed as the answer of love under the point of view of the requiting righteousness. But recompensative and communicative righteousness are here combined, where therefore the subject is the requital of worthy pure love and loving conduct, like with like. Such love requires reciprocal love, not merely cordial love, but that which expresses itself outwardly.

Pro. 8:20, 21. In this sense, Wisdom says that she acts strictly according to justice and rectitude, and adds (21) wherein this her conduct manifests itself. The *Piel* הִלֵּךְ expresses firm, constant action; and בָּתוֹךְ means that she turns

from this line of conduct on no side. **לְהַנְחִיל** is distinguished from **בְּהַנְחִיל**, as *ut possidendam tribuam* from *possidendam tribuendo*; the former denotes the direction of the activity, the latter its nature and manner; both combine if we translate *ita ut...* ^{f104}

Regarding the origin of **שׁ**, vid., at Pro. 2: 7; it denotes the being founded, thus *substantia*, and appears here, like the word in mediaeval Latin and Romanic (Ital. *sustanza*, Span. *substancia*), and like **οὐσία** and **ὑπαρξις** (**τὰ ὑπάρχοντα**) in classic Greek, to denote possessions and goods. But since this use of the word does not elsewhere occur (therefore Hitzig explains **ישׁ** = **לִי**, I have it [= *presto est*]), and here, where Wisdom speaks, **שׁ** connects itself in thought with **תְּוָשִׁיָּהּ**, it will at least denote real possession (as we also are wont to call not every kind of property, but only landed property, *real* possession), such possession as has real worth, and that not according to commercial exchange and price, but according to sound judgment, which applies a higher than the common worldly standard of worth. The *Pasek* between **אֶהְבֵּי** and **ישׁ** is designed to separate the two *Jods* from each other, and has, as a consequence, for **לְהַנְחִיל אֶהְבֵּי** the accentuation with *Tarcha* and *Mercha* (vid., *Accentssystem*, vi. § 4; cf. *Torath Emeth*, p. 17, § 3). The carrying forward of the inf. with the finite, 21*b*, is as 1:27; 2: 2, and quite usual.

Pro. 8:22. Wisdom takes now a new departure, in establishing her right to be heard, and to be obeyed and loved by men. As the Divine King in Psa. 2 opposes to His adversaries the self-testimony: “I will speak concerning a decree! Jahve said unto me: Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten Thee;” so Wisdom here unfolds her divine patent of nobility: she originates with God before all creatures, and is the object of God’s love and joy, as she also has the object of her love and joy on God’s earth, and especially among the sons of men:

**“Jahve brought me forth as the beginning of His way,
As the foremost of His works from of old.”**

The old translators render **קִנְיִי** (with *Kametz* by *Dechî*; vid., under Psa. 118: 5) partly by verbs of creating (LXX **ἔκτισε**, Syr., Targ. **בְּרָאֲנִי**), partly by verbs of acquiring (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Venet. **ἐκτήσατο**; Jerome, *possedit*); Wisdom appears also as created, certainly not without reference to this passage, Sir. 1: 4, **προτέρα πάντων ἐκτίσται σοφία**; 1: 9, **αὐτὸς ἐκτίσεν αὐτήν**; Pro. 24: 8, **ὁ κτίσας με**. In the christological controversy this word gained a dogmatic signification, for they proceeded generally on the identity of **σοφία ὑποστατική** (*sapientia substantialis*) with the *hypostasis* of the Son of God. The Arians used the **ἐκτίσέ με** as a proof of their doctrine of the *filius non*

genitus, sed factus, i.e., of His existence before the world began indeed, but yet not from eternity, but originating in time; while, on the contrary, the orthodox preferred the translation ἐκτίσατο, and understood it of the co-eternal existence of the Son with the Father, and agreed with the ἔκτισε of the LXX by referring it not to the actual existence, but to the position, place of the Son (Athanasius: *Deus me creavit regem or caput operum suorum*; Cyrill.: *non condidit secundum substantiam, sed constituit me totius universi principium et fundamentum*). But

(1) Wisdom is not God, but is God's' she has personal existence in the Logos of the N.T., but is not herself the Logos; she is the world-idea, which, once projected, is objective to God, not as a dead form, but as a living spiritual image; she is the archetype of the world, which, originating from God, stands before God, the world of the idea which forms the medium between the Godhead and the world of actual existence, the communicated spiritual power in the origination and the completion of the world as God designed it to be. This wisdom the poet here personifies; he does not speak of the person as Logos, but the further progress of the revelation points to her actual personification in the Logos. And

(2) since to her the poet attributes an existence preceding the creation of the world, he thereby declares her to be eternal, for to be before the world is to be before time. For if he places her at the head of the creatures, as the first of them, so therewith he does not seek to make her a creature of this world having its commencement in time; he connects her origination with the origination of the creature only on this account, because that *à priori* refers and tends to the latter; the power which was before heaven and earth were, and which operated at the creation of the earth and of the heavens, cannot certainly fall under the category of the creatures around and above us. Therefore

(3) the translation with ἔκτισεν has nothing against it, but it is different from the κτίσις of the heavens and the earth, and the poet has intentionally written not בְּרֵאשִׁית, but קִנְיִי. Certainly קָנָה, Arab. *knâ*, like all the words used of creating, refers to one root-idea: that of forging (vid., under Gen. 4:22), as בָּרָא does to that of cutting (vid., under Gen. 1: 1); but the mark of a commencement in time does not affix itself to קָנָה in the same way as it does to בָּרָא, which always expresses the divine production of that which has not hitherto existed. קָנָה comprehends in it the meanings to create, and to create something for oneself, to prepare, *parare* (e.g., Psa. 139:13), and to prepare something for oneself, *comparare*, as κτίζειν and κτᾶσθαι, both from *shki*, to build, the former expressed by *struere*, and the latter by *sibi struere*. In the קִנְיִי, then, there are the ideas, both that God produced wisdom, and that He

made Himself to possess it; not certainly, however, as a man makes himself to possess wisdom from without, 4: 7. But the idea of the bringing forth is here the nearest demanded by the connection. For **רֵאשִׁית דְּרַכּוֹ** is not equivalent to **בְּרֵאשִׁית דְּרַכּוֹ** (Syr., Targ., Luther), as Jerome also reads: *Ita enim scriptum est: ADONAI CANANI BRESITH DERCHO* (*Ep. cxl. ad Cyprian.*); but it is, as Job. 40:19 shows, the second accusative of the object (LXX, Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion). But if God made wisdom as the beginning of His way, i.e., of His creative efficiency (cf. Rev. 3:14 and Col. 1:15), the making is not to be thought of as acquiring, but as a bringing forth, revealing this creative efficiency of God, having it in view; and this is also confirmed by the **חוללתי** (*genita sum*; cf. Gen. 4: 1, **קִנִּיתִי**, *genui*) following. Accordingly, **קֶדֶם מִפְּעֻלֹי** (foremost of His works) has to be regarded as a parallel second object. accusative. All the old translators interpret **קֶדֶם** as a preposition [before], but the usage of the language before us does not recognise it as such; this would be an Aramaism, for **קֶדְמָה**, Dan. 7: 7, frequently **מִן־קֶדְמָה** (Syr., Targ.), is so used. But as **קֶדֶם** signifies previous existence in space, and then in time (vid., Orelli, *Zeit und Ewigkeit*, p. 76), so it may be used of the object in which the previous existence appears, thus (after Sir. 1: 4): **πρωτέραν τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ** (Hitzig).

Pro. 8:23. A designation of the When? expressed first by **מֵאָז** (Isa. 48: 8, cf. 40:21), is further unfolded:

***“From everlasting was I set up,
From the beginning, from the foundations of the earth.”***

That **נִסְכַּחְתִּי** cannot be translated: I was anointed = consecrated, vid., at Psa. 2: 6. But the translation also: I was woven = wrought (Hitzig, Ewald, and previously one of the Greeks, **ἑδιάσθη**), does not commend itself, for **רִקָּה** (Psa. 139:15), used of the embryo, lies far from the metaphorical sense in which **נִסְכַּח** = Arab. *nasaj, texere*, would here be translated of the origin of a person, and even of such a spiritual being as Wisdom; **נִסְדַּחְתִּי**, as the LXX reads (**ἔθεμελιώσέ με**), is not once used of such. Rightly Aquila, **κατεστάθη**; Symmachus, **προκεχειρισμαι**; Jerome, *ordinata sum*. Literally, but unintelligibly, the *Gr. Venet. κέχυμαι*, according to which (cf. Sir. 1:10) Böttcher: I was poured forth = formed, but himself acknowledging that this figure is not suitable to personification; nor is it at all likely that the author applied the word, used in this sense of idols, to the origin of Wisdom. The fact is, that **נִסְכַּח**, used as seldom of the anointing or consecration of kings, as **סִיָּד**, passes over, like **צִיָּק** (**הַצִּיָּק**), **צִיָּק** (**מִצִּיָּק**, a pillar), and **צִיָּג** (**הַצִּיָּג**), from the meaning of pouring out to that of placing and appointing; the mediating idea

appears to be that of the pouring forth of the metal, since נִסִּיךְ, Dan. 11: 8, like נִסִּיךְ, signifies a molten image. The Jewish interpreters quite correctly remark, in comparing it with the princely name נִסִּיךְ [cf. Psa. 83:12] (although without etymological insight), that a placing in princely dignity is meant. Of the three synonyms of *aeternitas a parte ante*, מַעְלָם points backwards into the infinite distance, מֵרֵאשִׁית into the beginning of the world, מִקְדָּמֵי-אָרֶץ not into the times which precede the origin of the earth, but into the oldest times of its gradual arising; this קִדְמִי it is impossible to render, in conformity with the Hebr. use of language: it is an extensive plur. of time, Böttcher, § 697. The מִן repeated does not mean that the origin and greatness of Wisdom are contemporaneous with the foundation of the world; but that when the world was founded, she was already an actual existence.

Pro. 8:24-26. This her existence before the world began is now set forth in yet more explicit statements:

**24 “When there were as yet no floods was I brought forth,
When as yet there were not fountains which abounded with water;**

**25 For before the mountains were settled,
Before the hills was I brought forth,**

**26 While as yet He had not made land and plains,
And the sum of the dust of the earth.”**

The description is poetical, and affords some room for imagination. By תְּהוֹמוֹת are not intended the unrestrained primeval waters, but, as also Pro. 3:20, the inner waters, treasures of the earth; and consequently by מַעְיָנוֹת, not the fountains of the sea on this earth (Ewald, after Job. 38:16), but he springs or places of springs (for מַעְיָן is *n. loci* to אֵין, a well as an eye of the earth; vid., Gen. 16: 7), by means of which the internal waters of the earth communicate themselves to the earth above (cf. Gen. 7:11 with 49:25). נִכְבְּדֵי-מַיִם (abounding with water) is a descriptive *epitheton* to מַעְיָנוֹת, which, notwithstanding its fem. plur., is construed as masc. (cf. Pro. 5:16). The Masora does not distinguish the thrice-occurring נִכְבְּדֵי according to its form as written (Isa. 23: 8, 9). The form נִכְבְּדֵי (which, like בְּתִים, would demand *Metheg*) is to be rejected; it is everywhere to be written נִכְבְּדֵי (Ewald, § 214b) with *Pathach*, with *Dagesh* following; vid., Kimchi, *Michlol* 61b. Kimchi adds the gloss מַעְיָנֵי מַיִם רַבִּים, which the *Gr. Venet.*, in accordance with the meaning of נִכְבְּדֵי elsewhere, renders by *πηγαῖς δεδοξασμένων ὑδάτων* (as also Böttcher: the most honoured = the most lordly); but *Meiri*,

Immanuel, and others rightly judge that the adjective is here to be understood after Gen. 13: 2, Job. 14:21 (but in this latter passage כָּבֵד does not mean “to be numerous”): loaded = endowed in rich measure.

Pro. 8:25. Instead of בְּאֵין, in (yet) non-existence (24), we have here מָרַם, a subst. which signifies cutting off from that which already exists (vid., at Gen. 2: 5), and then as a particle *nondum* or *antequam*, with בְּ always *antequam*, and in v. 26 אֲדַלֵּא, so long not yet (this also originally a substantive from עָדָה, in the sense of progress). With הִתְמַבְּעוּ (were settled) (as Job. 38: 6, from מִבְּעַע, to impress into or upon anything, *imprimere*, *infigere*) the question is asked: wherein? Not indeed: in the depths of the earth, but as the Caraites Ahron b. Joseph answers, אֵל קִרְקַע הַיָּם, in the bottom of the sea; for out of the waters they rise up, Psa. 104: 8 (cf. at Gen. 1: 9).

Pro. 8:26. אֶרֶץ וְחוּצוֹת is either, connecting the whole with its part: *terra cum campis*, or אֶרֶץ gains by this connection the meaning of land covered with buildings, while חוּצוֹת the expanse of unoccupied land, or the free field outside the towns and villages (cf. בָּר, Arab. *barrytt*) (Fl.), vid., Job. 5:10; 18:17 (where we have translated “in the steppe far and wide”); and regarding the fundamental idea, vid., above at Pro. 5:16. Synonymous with אֶרֶץ, as contrast to חוּצוֹת, is תְּבֵל, which like יְבוּל (produce, wealth) comes from יָבַל, and thus denotes the earth as fruit-bearing (as אֲדָמָה properly denotes the *humus* as the covering of earth). Accordingly, with Ewald, we may understand by רֵאשֵׁי אֶפְרוֹת, “the heaps of the many clods of the fertile arable land lying as if scattered on the plains.” Hitzig also translates: “the first clods of the earth.” We do not deny that אֶפְרוֹת may mean clods of earth, i.e., pieces of earth gathered together, as Job. 28: 6, אֶפְרַת זָהָב, gold ore, i.e., pieces of earth or ore containing gold. But for clods of earth the Heb. language has the nouns רֶגֶב and מִגְרָפָה; and if we read together אֶפְרוֹת, plur. of the collective עָפָר (dust as a mass), which comes as from a *n. unitatis* עֶפְרָה, and רֵאשֵׁי, which, among its meanings in poetry as well as in prose, has also that of the sum, i.e., the chief amount or the total amount (cf. the Arab. *râs âlmâl*, the capital, τὸ κεφάλαιον), then the two words in their mutual relation yield the sense of the sum of the several parts of the dust, as of the atoms of dust (Cocceius; Schultens, *summam pluverum orbis habitabilis*); and Fleischer rightly remarks that other interpretations, as *ab initio pulveris orbis*, *praecipus quaeque orbis terrarum*, *caput orbis terrarum* (i.e., according to Rashi, the first man; according to Umbreit, man generally), leave the choice of the plur. אֶפְרוֹת unintelligible. Before these creatures originated, Wisdom was, as she herself

says, and emphatically repeats, already born; **וְהִלְלָתָּ** is the passive of the *Pilel* **וְהִלְלָה**, which means to whirl, to twist oneself, to bring forth with sorrow (Aquila, Theodotion, **ὠδινήθην**; *Graec. Venet.* 24a, **πέπλασμαι**, 25b, **ὠδίνημαι**), then but poet. generally to beget, to bring forth (Pro. 25:23; 26:10).

Pro. 8:27. But not only did her existence precede the laying of the foundation of the world; she was also actively taking part in the creative work:

***“When He prepared the heavens, I was there,
When He measured out a circle for the mirror of the multitude of waters.”***

Again a sentence clothed with two designations of time. The adv. of place **שָׁם** is used, chiefly poetically, for **יָסָא**, *eo tempore* (Arab. *thumm*, in contradistinction to *thamm, eo loco*); but here it has the signification of place, which includes that of time: Wisdom was there when God created the world, and had then already long before that come into existence, like as the servant of Jahve, Isa. 48:16, with just such a **יָסָא שָׁם**, says that He is there from the time that the history of nations received a new direction, beginning with Cyrus. **וְהִבִּינֵנִי** signifies to give a firm position or a definite direction. Thus Job. 28:27 of Wisdom, whom the Creator places before Himself as a pattern (ideal); here, as Jer. 10:12, Psa. 65: 7, of the setting up, restoring throughout the whole world. In the parallel member, **וְהִגְדֵּנִי**, corresponding to **וְהִמְדֵּנִי**, appears necessarily to designate the circle or the vault of the heavens (Job. 22:14), which, according to the idea of the Hebrews, as in Homer, rests as a half-globe on the outermost ends of the disc of the earth surrounded with water, and thus lies on the waters. Vid., Hupfeld under Psa. 24: 2. This idea of the ocean girdling the earth is introduced into the O.T. without its being sanctioned by it. The LXX (**καὶ ὅτε ἀφώριξε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ θρόνον ἐπ’ ἀνέμων**) appears to understand **וְהִמְדֵּנִי** of the waters above; but **וְהִמְדֵּנִי** never has this meaning, **וְהִמְדֵּנִי** (Job. 9: 8; 36:30) might rather be interpreted of the ocean of the heavens. The passage in accordance with which this before us is to be expounded is Job. 26:10: He has set a limit for the surface of the waters, i.e., describing over them a circle setting bounds to their region. So here, with the exchange of the functions of the two words; when He marked out a circle over the surface of the multitude of waters, viz., to appoint a fixed region (**וְהִמְדֵּנִי**, Gen. 1:10) for them, i.e., the seas, fountains, rivers, in which the waters under the heavens spread over the earth. **וְהִקְדֵּנִי** signifies *incidere, figere*, to prescribe, to measure off, to consign, and directly to mark out, which is done by means of firm impressions of the graver’s tools. But here this verb is without the *Dagesh*, to distinguish between the infinitive and the substantive **וְהִקְדֵּנִי** (his statute or limit); for correct texts have **וְהִקְדֵּנִי** (*Michlol* 147a); and although a monosyllable follows, yet there is no throwing

back of the tone, after the rule that words terminating in *o* in this case maintain their ultima accentuation (e.g., **מִשְׁמֹו אֵל**, Num. 24:23). Fleischer also finally decides for the explanation: *quum delinearet circulum super abyssso*, when He marked out the region of the sea as with the circle.

Pro. 8:28, 29. In 28, 29, these two features of the figure of the creation of the world return (the beginning of the firmament, and the embankment of the under waters); hence we see that the discourse here makes a fresh start with a new theme:

*28 “When He made firm the ether above,
When He restrained the fountains of the waters;*

*29 When He set to the sea its bounds,
That the waters should not pass their limits;
When He settled the pillars of the earth;*

*30 Then was I with Him as director of the work,
And was delighted day by day,
Rejoicing always before Him,*

*31 Rejoicing in His earth,
And having my delight in the children of men.”*

We have, with Symmachus, translated **שְׁחָקִים** (from **שָׁחַק**, Arab. *shaḡ*, to grind, to make thin) by **αἰθέρα**, for so the fine transparent strata of air above the hanging clouds are called — a poetic name of the firmament **רָקִיעַ**. The making firm **אִמַּץ** is not to be understood locally, but internally of the spreading out of the firmament over the earth settled for continuance (an expression such as Psa. 78:23). In 28*b* the Masora notices the plur. **עִינוֹת** instead of **עִנוֹת** with **לִית** as *unicum* (cf. *Michlol* 191*a*); the transition of the sound is as in **גַּלִּיתָ** from *galajta*. The inf. **עָזַז** appears on the first look to require a transitive signification, as the LXX and the Targ., the *Graec. Venet.* and Luther (*da er festiget die Brünnen der tieffen* = when He makes firm the fountains of the deep) have rendered it. Elster accordingly believes that this signification must be maintained, because **כִּי** here introduces creative activity, and in itself is probably the transitive use of **עָזַז**, as the Arab. ‘azz shows: when He set His **עָז** against the **מִים אֲזִים** (Isa. 43:16). But the absence of the subject is in favour of the opinion that here, as everywhere else, it is intransitive; only we may not, with Hitzig, translate: when the fountains of the flood raged wildly; but, since 28*b*, if not a creative efficiency, must yet express a creative work, either as Ewald, with reference to **מַעוֹז**, fortress: when they became

firm, or better as Fleischer, with reference to מים עזים : when they broke forth with power, with strong fulness. Whether the suff. of חֲקוּן, 29a, refers back to the sea or to Jahve, is decided after the parallel פִּי. If this word is equivalent to its coast (cf. Psa. 104: 9), then both suffixes refer to the sea; but the coast of the sea, or of a river, is called שְׂפָה, not פֶּה, which only means ostium (mouth), not ora. Also Isa. 19: 7 will require to be translated: by the mouth of the Nile, and that פִּי, Psa. 133: 2, may denote the under edge, arises from this, that a coat has a mouth above as well as below, i.e., is open. Thus both suff. are to be referred to God, and פִּי is to be determined after Job. 23:12. The clause beginning with ומים corresponds in periodizing discourse to a clause with ut, Ewald, § 338. בחוקו is the same form, only written plene, as v. 27, בחקו = בחקו = בחקקו. ^{f105}

Pro. 8:30. In this sentence, subordinating to itself these designations of time, the principal question is as to the meaning of אֱמוּן, Hofmann's interpretation (*Schriftbew.* i. 97) "continually" (*inf. absol.* in an adverbial sense) is a judicious idea, and אֱמוּן, to endure, remains indeed in אֱמֻתָּה (stability); but in this sense, which אֱמוּנָה represents, it is not otherwise used. Also מְדַמְנֵתָא (believing, trusting) of the Targ. (*Graec. Venet.* πιστις, as if the word used were אֱמוּן) is linguistically inadmissible; the Hebr. אֱמוּנָה corresponds to the Aram. *haimēn*. One of these two only is possible: אֱמוּן means either *opifex* or *alumnus*. The meaning *alumnus* (Aquila, τιθηνομένη; *Meiri* and *Malbim*, אֱמוּן בְּחִיק הָאֵל, ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ) would derive the word from אֱמוּן, to support, make firm, take care of; the form ought to have a passive sense (*Symm. Theod.* ἑστηριγμένη), as נָדוּל, twined, pressed, strong, great, and be pointed נָקַד (with a moveable *ā*, different from the form אֱמוּן, בְּגוּד, חֲמוּץ, Isa. 1:17); and אֱמוּן, in the meaning nursling, foster-child, favourite (*Schultens*, *Euchel*, *Elster*, and others, also *Rashi* and *Kimchi*, who all find in אֱמוּן the meaning of education, גִּידוּל), would place itself with אֱמוּן, fostered, Lam. 4: 5, אֱמוּן, fosterer, אֱמוּנָה, foster-mother. This is the meaning of the word according to the connection, for Wisdom appears further on as the child of God; as such she had her joy before Him; and particularly God's earth, where she rejoiced with the sons of men, was the scene of her mirth. But on this very account, because this is further said, we also lose nothing if אֱמוּן should be interpreted otherwise. And it is otherwise to be interpreted, for Wisdom is, in consequence of קַנְיִי (Pro. 8:22), and חוֹלְלָתִי, which is twice used (Pro. 8:24, 25), God's own child; but the designation אֱמוּן would make Him to be the אֱמוּן of Wisdom; and the child which an אֱמוּן bears, Num. 11:12, and fosters,

Est. 2: 7, is not his own. Hence it follows that **חָמוּן** in this signification would be an *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον*; on the other hand, it really occurs elsewhere, Jer. 52:15 (vid., Hitzig *l.c.*), in the sense of *opifex*. This sense, which recommends itself to Ewald, Hitzig, Bertheau, and Zöckler, lies also at the foundation of the *ἀρμόζουσα* of the LXX, **מתקנא** of the Syr., the *cuncta componens* of Jerome, and the designation of Wisdom as *ἡ τῶν πάντων τεχνίτις* of the Book of Wisdom 7:21. The workmaster is called **חָמוּן**, for which, Son. 7: 2, **חָמוּן**, or rather **חָמוּן** (*ommân*), Aram. and Mishn. **חָמוּן**; not, perhaps, as he whom one entrusts with something in whom one confides or may confide in a work (vid., Fleischer, *loc*), but from **חָמוּן**, to be firm, as one who is strong in his art, as perhaps also the right hand, which has the name **יָמִין** as being the *artifex* among the members. The word occurs also as an adjective in the sense of “experienced, skilful,” and does not form a fem. according to the use of the word in this case before us, only because handicraft (**אומנות**) belongs to men, and not to women; also in the Greek, *δημιουργός*, in the sense of *τὰ δημόσια* (*εἰς τὸ δημόσιον*) *ἐργαζόμενος*, has no fem.; and in Lat., *artifex* is used as a substantive (e.g., in Pliny: *artifex omnium natura*), like an adj. of double gender. It is thus altogether according to rule that we read **חָמוּן** and not **חָמוּנה** (after the form **בגננה**); also we would make a mistake if we translated the word by the German “*Werkmeisterin*” [work-mistress, directress] (Hitzig), for it is intended to be said that she took up the place of a workmaster with Him, whereby chiefly the artistic performances of a **חָרוּשׁ** [artificer] are thought of. This self-designation of Wisdom is here very suitable; for after she has said that she was brought forth by God before the world was, and that she was present when it was created, this **חָמוּן** now answers the question as to what God had in view when He gave to Wisdom her separate existence, and in what capacity she assisted in the creation of the world: it was she who transferred the creative thoughts originally existing in the creative will of God, and set in motion by His creative order, from their ideal into their real effectiveness, and, as it were, artistically carried out the delineations of the several creatures; she was the mediating cause, the demiurgic power which the divine creative activity made use of, as is said, Pro. 3:19, “Jahve has by Wisdom founded the earth,” and as the Jerusalem Targ. Gen. 1: 1, in connection with Pro. 8:22, translates: **בְּחֹכְמָא בְּרָא יְיָ יְהוָה שְׂמִיָּא וַיְהִי אֶרֶץ**.

But — this is now the question — does the further unfolding of the thoughts here agree with this interpretation of **חָמוּן**? That we may not misunderstand what follows, we must first of all represent to ourselves, that if **חָמוּן** meant the foster-child, Wisdom could not yet, in what follows, be thought of as a little child (Num. 11:12), for that would be an idea without any meaning; to rejoice

[*spielen* = play] is certainly quite in accordance with youth, as 2Sa. 2:14 shows (where שִׁחַק לְפָנָי is said of the sportive combat of youthful warriors before the captain), not exclusively little children. So, then, we must guard against interpreting שִׁעֲשׂוּעִים, with the LXX and Syr., in the sense of שִׁעֲשׂוּעֵי, — an interpretation which the Targ., Jerome, the *Graev. Venet.*, and Luther have happily avoided; for mention is not made here of what Wisdom is for Jahve, but of what she is in herself. The expression is to be judged after Psa. 109: 4 (cf. Gen. 12: 2), where Hitzig rightly translates, “I am wholly prayer;” but Böttcher, in a way characteristic of his mode of interpretation, prefers, “I am ointment” (vid., *Neue Aehrenlese*, No. 1222). The delight is meant which this mediating participation in God’s creating work imparted to her — joy in the work in which she was engaged. The plural *שִׁעֲשׂוּעִים* is to be understood here, not after Jer. 13:20, but after Isa. 11: 8, Psa. 119:70, where its root-word, the *Pilpel* שִׁעֲשַׁע (proceeding from the primary meaning of caressing, *demulcere*), signifies intransitively: to have his delight somewhere or in anything, to delight oneself, — a synonym to the idea of play (cf. Aram. שִׁעֲשַׁע, *Ethpe.* to play, *Ethpa.* to chatter); for play is in contrast to work, an occupation which has enjoyment in view. But the work, i.e., the occupation, which aims to do something useful, can also become a play if it costs no strenuous effort, or if the effort which it costs passes wholly into the background in presence of the pleasure which it yields. Thus Wisdom daily, i.e., during the whole course of creation, went forth in pure delight; and the activity with which she translated into fact the creative thoughts was a joyful noise in the sight of God, whose commands she obeyed with childlike devotion; cf. 2Sa. 6:21, where David calls his dancing and leaping before the ark of the covenant a שִׁחַק לְפָנָי ה'. But by preference, her delight was in the world, which is illustrated from the Persian *Minokhired*, which personifies Wisdom, and, among other things, says of her: “The creation of the earth, and its mingling with water, the springing up and the growth of the trees, all the different colours, the odour, the taste, and that which is pleasing in everything — all that is chiefly the endowment and the performance of Wisdom.”^{f106}

She also there says that she was before all celestial and earthly beings, the first with Ormuzd, and that all that is celestial and earthly arose and also remains in existence by her. But the earth was the dearest object of her delight in the whole world; to help in establishing it (Pro. 3:19) was her joyful occupation; to fashion it, and to provide it with the multiplicity of existences designed for it, was the most pleasant part of her creative activity. For the earth is the abode of man, and the heart-pleasure of Wisdom was with (אֶת־, prep.) the children of men; with them she found her high enjoyment, these were her peculiar and dearest sphere of activity.

Pro. 8:31. Since the statements of Wisdom, as to her participation in the creation of the world, are at this point brought to a close, in this verse there is set forth the intimate relation into which she thus entered to the earth and to mankind, and which she has continued to sustain to the present day. She turned her love to the earth for the sake of man, and to man not merely as a corporeal, but especially as a spiritual being, to whom she can disclose her heart, and whom, if he receives her, she can bring back to God (Book of Wisdom 7:27). There are not here express references to Genesis ch. 1 or 2. In **יום יום** (day for day, as Gen. 39:10, cf. Est. 2: 4, **יום ויום**) we have not to think of the six days of creation. But inasmuch as the whole description goes down to **בני אדם** as its central-point, it denotes that creation came to its close and its goal in man. The connection of **תבל ארץ** is as Job. 37:12, where **ארצה** for **ארץ** is wholly, as **חרסה, לילה**, and the like, an original accusative.

Pro. 8:32. After that Wisdom has shown in vv. 22-31 how worthy her fellowship is of being an object of desire from her mediating place between God and the world, she begins with this verse (as Pro. 7:24; 5: 7) the hortatory (*paränetische*) concluding part of her discourse:

***“And now, ye sons, hearken unto me,
And salvation to those who keep my ways!”***

The LXX omits v. 33, and obviates the disturbing element of **ואשרי**, 32b, arising from its **י**, by a transposition of the stichs. But this **ואשרי** is the same as the **καὶ μακάριος**, Mat. 11: 6; the organic connection lies hid, as Schleiermacher (*Hermeneutik*, p. 73) well expresses it, in the mere sequence; the clause containing the proof is connected by **י** with that for which proof is to be assigned, instead of subordinating itself to it with **כי**. Such an exclamatory clause has already been met with in Pro. 3:13, there **אדם** follows as the governed genitive, here a complete sentence (instead of the usual participial construction, **שמרי דרכי**) forms this genitive, Gesen. § 123, 3, Anm. 1.

Pro. 8:33-36. The summons 32a, and its reason 32b, are repeated in these verses which follow:

***33 “Hear instruction, and be wise,
And withdraw not.***

***34 Blessed is the man who hears me,
Watching daily at my gates,
Waiting at the posts of my doors!***

**35 For whosoever findeth me has found life,
And has obtained favour from Jahve;**

**36 And whosoever misseth me doeth wrong to himself;
All they who hate me love death.”**

The *imper.* וְחָכְמוּ, 33a (*et sapite*), is to be judged after Pro. 4: 4, וְחָיָה, cf. the *Chethîb*, Pro. 13:20; one sees this from the words וְאַל-תִּפְרְעוּ which follow, to which, after Pro. 15:32, as at Pro. 4:13, to מוֹסֵר, אֶל-תִּרְרָף is to be placed as object: and throw not to the winds (*ne missam faciatis*; vid., regarding פִּרְעַת at Pro. 1:25), viz., instruction (*disciplinam*).

Pro. 8:34. The אֲשֶׁרִי here following שָׁמְעוּ is related to it as assigning a motive, like the וְאֲשֶׁרִי (v. 32b) following שָׁמְעוּ; according to the Masora, we have to write אֲשֶׁרִי with *Mercha*, and on the first syllable *Gaja* (vid., Baer's *Torath Emeth*, pp. 26, 29; cf. under Psa. 1: 1). לְשָׁקֵד signifies to watch, not in the sense of *ad vigilandum*, but *vigilando*, as Isa. 5:22; 30: 1; Ewald, § 380d. In contradistinction to הָעֵיר and הַקִּיץ, which denote watching as the consequence of wakefulness or an interruption of sleep, שָׁקֵד signifies watching as a condition, and that as one which a person willingly maintains (*Psychol.* p. 275), the intentional watching (cf. Arab. *shakidha*, to fix penetrating eyes upon anything), with אֵל of the place and object and aim (Jer. 5: 6; cf. הָעֵיר עַל, Job. 8: 6). The plurals דְּלִתּוֹת (*fores*, as חַמּוֹת, Jer. 1:18, *maenia*) and פְּתָחִים are amplifying plurs. of extension, suggesting the idea of a palace or temple; מְזוּזוֹת (*postes portae, in quibus cardines ejus moventur*, from זָוַן, to move hither and thither) is intended to indicate that he to whom the discourse refers holds himself in closest nearness to the entrance, that he might not miss the moment when it is opened, or when she who dwells there presents herself to view. “The figure is derived from the service of a court: Wisdom is honoured by her disciples, as a queen or high patroness; cf. Samachschari's *Golden Necklaces*, Pr. 35: Blessed is the man who knocks only at God's door, and who departs not a nail's breadth from God's threshold” (Fl.).

Pro. 8:35. This verse gives the reason for pronouncing those happy who honour Wisdom. The *Chethîb* is כִּי מִצְאֵי מִצְאֵי חַיִּים, but the passing over into the sing. 35b is harsh and objectionable; the *Kerî* rightly regards the second מִצְאֵי as a mistaken repetition of the first, and substitutes מִצְאֵי חַיִּים כִּי מִצְאֵי, with which the וְחִטָּאֵי (v. 36a) of the antithesis agrees. Regarding מִצְאֵי, for which, less accurately, מִצְאֵי (only with the *Dechî* without *Metheg*)

is generally written, vid., *Accentuationssystem*, vii. § 2. הִפִּיק, to get out = reach, exchanged with מָצָא, Pro. 3:13 (vid., there); according to its etymon, it is connected with מָן, of him from or by whom one has reached anything; here, as Pro. 12: 2; 18:22, God’s favour, *favorem a Jova impetravit*.

Pro. 8:36. חָטָא, it is true, mean “my sinning one = he who sins against me (חָטָא לִי),” as קָמִי is frequently equivalent to קָמִים עָלַי; but the contrast of מָצָא places it beyond a doubt that חָטָא stands here in its oldest signification: to miss something after which one runs (Pro. 19: 2), seeks (Job. 5:24), at which one shoots (*Hiph.* Jud. 20:16), etc., *id non attingere quod petitur*, Arab. *ākhta*, to miss, opposite to *āṣab*, to hit (Fl.). Just because it is the idea of missing, which, ethically applied, passes over into that of sin and guilt (of fault, mistake, false step, “*Fehls, Fehlers, Fehltritts*”), חָטָא can stand not only with the accusative of the subject in regard to which one errs, Lev. 5:16, but also with the accusative of the subject which one forfeits, i.e., misses and loses, 20: 2, cf. Hab. 2:10; so that not only מָאֵס נַפְשׁוֹ, 15:32 (*animam suam nihili facit*), but also חוֹטְאָ נַפְשׁוֹ, Pro. 20: 2 (*animam suam pessumdat*), is synonymous with חָמַס נַפְשׁוֹ (*animae suae h. e. sibi ipsi injuriam facit*). Whoever misses Wisdom by taking some other way than that which leads to her, acts suicidally: all they who wilfully hate (*Piel*) wisdom love death, for wisdom is the tree of life, Pro. 3:18; wisdom and life are one, 35a, as the Incarnate Wisdom saith, Joh. 8:51, “If a man keep my sayings, he shall never see death.” In the Logos, Wisdom has her self-existence; in Him she has her personification, her justification, and her truth.

Fifteenth Introductory Mashal Discourse, Proverbs 9

A DOUBLE INVITATION: THAT OF WISDOM, AND THAT OF HER RIVAL, FOLLY

Pro. 9. The preceding discourse pronounces those happy who, having taken their stand at the portal of Wisdom, wait for her appearance and her invitation. There is thus a house of Wisdom as there is a house of God, Psa. 84:11; and if now the discourse is of a house of Wisdom, and of an invitation to a banquet therein (like that in the parable, Matthew 22, of the invitation to the marriage feast of the king’s son), it is not given without preparation:

*1 Wisdom hath builded for herself an house,
Hewn out her seven pillars;*

*2 Hath slaughtered her beasts, mingled her wine;
Hath also spread her table;*

3 Hath sent out her maidens; she waiteth On the highest points of the city.

Regarding חִכְמוֹת, vid., at Pro. 1:20. It is a *plur. excellentiae*, which is a variety of the *plur. extensivus*. Because it is the expression of a plural unity, it stands connected (as for the most part also אֱלֹהִים, *Deus*) with the sing. of the predicate. The perfects enumerate all that Wisdom has done to prepare for her invitation. If we had a parable before us, the perf. would have run into the historical וַתִּשְׁלַח; but it is, as the תִּקְרָא shows, an allegorical picture of the arrangement and carrying out of a present reality. Instead of בְּנִתָּהּ לָהּ בֵּיתָהּ there is בְּנִתָּהּ בֵּיתָהּ, for the house is already in its origin represented as hers, and 1b is to be translated: she has hewn out her seven pillars (Hitzig); more correctly: her pillars, viz., seven (after the scheme רָבִתָּם רָעָה, Gen. 37: 2); but the construction is closer. שִׁבְעָה is, altogether like Exo. 25:37, the accusative of the second object, or of the predicate after the species of *verba*, with the idea: to make something, turn into something, which take to themselves a double accusative, Gesen. § 139, 2: *excidit columnas suas ita ut septem essent*. Since the figure is allegorical, we may not dispense with the interpretation of the number seven by the remark, “No emphasis lies in the number” (Bertheau). First, we must contemplate architecturally the house with seven pillars: “They are,” as Hitzig rightly remarks, “the pillars of the מִסְדְּרוֹן (porch) [vid. Bachmann under Jud. 3:23, and Wetstein under Psa. 144:12, where חָטַב is used of the cutting out and hewing of wood, as חָצַב of the cutting out and hewing of stone] in the inner court, which bore up the gallery of the first (and second) floors: four of these in the corners and three in the middle of three sides; through the midst of these the way led into the court of the house-floor [the area].” But we cannot agree with Hitzig in maintaining that, with the seven pillars of 8 and 9, the author looks back to the first seven chapters (Arab. *âbwab*, gates) of this book; we think otherwise of the component members of this Introduction to the Book of Proverbs; and to call the sections of a book “gates, שַׁעֲרִים,” is a late Arabico-Jewish custom, of which there is found no trace whatever in the O.T. To regard them also, with Heidenheim (cf. Dante’s Prose Writings, translated by Streckfuss, p. 77), as representing the seven liberal arts (שִׁבְעַת חִכְמוֹת) is impracticable; for this division of the *artes liberales* into seven, consisting of the *Trivium* (Grammar, Rhetoric, and Dialectics) and *Quadrivium* (Music, Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy), is not to be looked for within the old Israelitish territory, and besides, these were the sciences of this world which were so divided; but wisdom, to which the discourse here refers, is wholly a religious-moral subject. The Midrash thinks of the seven heavens (שִׁבְעַת רַקִּיעִים), or the

seven climates or parts of the earth (שבעה ארצות), as represented by them; but both references require artificial combinations, and have, as also the reference to the seven church-eras (Vitringa and Chr. Ben. Michaelis), this against them, that they are rendered probable neither from these introductory proverbial discourses, nor generally from the O.T. writings. The patristic and middle-age reference to the seven sacraments of the church passes sentence against itself; but the old interpretation is on the right path, when it suggests that the seven pillars are the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. The seven-foldness of the manifestation of the Spirit, already brought near by the seven lamps of the sacred candelabra (the מנורה), is established by Isa. 11: 2 (vid., *l.c.*); and that Wisdom is the possessor and dispenser of the Spirit she herself testifies, Pro. 1:23. Her Spirit is the “Spirit of wisdom;” but at the same time, since, born of God, she is mediatrix between God and the world, also the “Spirit of Jahve,” He is the “spirit of understanding,” the “spirit of counsel,” and the “spirit of might” (Isa. 11: 2); for she says, Pro. 8:14, “Counsel is men, and reflection; I am understanding, I have strength.” He is also the “spirit of knowledge,” and the “spirit of the fear of the Lord” (Isa. 11: 2); for fear and the knowledge of Jahve are, according to Pro. 9:14, the beginning of wisdom, and essentially wisdom itself.

Pro. 9: 2. If thus the house of Wisdom is the place of her fellowship with those who honour her, the system of arrangements made by her, so as to disclose and communicate to her disciples the fulness of her strength and her gifts, then it is appropriate to understand by the seven pillars the seven virtues of her nature communicating themselves (apocalyptically expressed, the ἐπιτὰ πνεύματα), which bear up and adorns the dwelling which she establishes among men. Flesh and wine are figures of the nourishment for the mind and the heart which is found with wisdom, and, without asking what the flesh and the wine specially mean, are figures of the manifold enjoyment which makes at once strong and happy. The segolate *n. verbale* טבח, which Pro. 7:22 denoted the slaughtering or the being slaughtered, signifies here, in the concrete sense, the slaughtered ox; Michaelis rightly remarks that טבח, in contradistinction to זבח, is the usual word for *mactatio extrasacrificialis*. Regarding מִסַּךְ יַיִן, vid., under Isa. 5:22; it is not meant of the mingling of wine with sweet scents and spices, but with water (warm or cold), and signifies simply to make the wine palatable (as κεραννύναι, *temperare*); the LXX ἐκέρασεν εἰς κρατήρα, κρατήρ is the name of the vessel in which the mixing takes place; they drank not ἄκρατον, but κεκρασμένον ἄκρατον, Rev. 14:10. The frequently occurring phrase עָרַךְ שֻׁלְחָן signifies to prepare the table (from שֻׁלַּח, properly the unrolled and outspread leather cover), viz., by the placing out of the dishes (vid., regarding עָרַךְ, under Gen. 22: 9).

Pro. 9: 3. The verb **קָרָא**, when a feast is spoken of, means to invite; **קָרָאִים**, v. 18 (cf. 1Sa. 9:13, etc.), are the guests. **נְעֻרֹתֶיהָ** the LXX translates **τῶν ἑαυτῆς δούλους**, but certainly here the disciples are meant who already are in the service of Wisdom; but that those who are invited to Wisdom are thought of as feminine, arises from the tasteful execution of the picture. The invitation goes forth to be known to all far and wide, so that in her servants Wisdom takes her stand in the high places of the city. Instead of **בְּרֹאשׁ**, Pro. 8: 2; 1:21, there is used here the expression **אֶל-גַּבִּי**. We must distinguish the Semitic **גַּף** (= *ganf*), wings, from **גָּנַף** = **כָּנַף**, to cover, and **גַּף** (= *gaff* or *ganf*), the bark, which is derived either from **גָּפַף** or **גָּנַף**, Arab. *jnf*, *convexus*, *incurvus et extrinsecus gibber fuit*, hence originally any surface bent outwards or become crooked (cf. the roots *cap*, *caf*, **קָב כָּף גַּף גָּב**, etc.), here the summit of a height (Fl.); thus not *super alis* (after the analogy of **περὺγιον**, after Suidas = **ἄκρωτήριον**), but *super dorsis* (as in Lat. we say *dorsum montis*, and also *viae*).

Pro. 9: 4-6. Now follows the street-sermon of Wisdom inviting to her banquet:

4 Who is simple? let him come hither!"

Whoso wanteth understanding, to him she saith:

5 "Come, eat of my bread,

And drink of the wine which I have mingled!"

6 Cease, ye simple, and live,

And walk straight on in the way of understanding."

The question **מִי פְתִי** (thus with *Munach*, not with *Makkeph*, it is to be written her and at v. 16; vid., Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 40), *quis est imperitus*, is, as Psa. 25:12, only a more animated expression for *quisquis est*. The retiring into the background of the **נְעֻרֹת** (servants), and the immediate appearance of Wisdom herself, together with the interruption, as was to be expected, of her connected discourses by the **אִמְרָה לוֹ**, are signs that the pure execution of the allegorical representation is her at an end. Hitzig seeks, by the rejection of vv. 4, 5, 7-10, to bring in a logical sequence; but these interpolations which he cuts out are yet far more inconceivable than the proverbial discourses in the mouth of Wisdom, abandoning the figure of a banquet, which besides are wholly in the spirit of the author of this book. That Folly invites to her, v. 16, in the same words as are used by Wisdom, v. 4, is not strange; both address themselves to the simple (vid., on **פְתִי** at 1: 4) and those devoid of understanding (as the youth, 7: 7), and seek to bring to their side those who are accessible to evil as

to good, and do not dully distinguish between them, which the emulating *devertat huc* of both imports. The fourth verse points partly backwards, and partly forwards; 4a has its introduction in the **תקרא** of v. 3; on the contrary, 4b is itself the introduction of what follows. The setting forth of the *nom. absolutus* **חֲסֵר-לֵב** is conditioned by the form of 4a; the **מִי** (cf. 4a) is continued (in 4b) without its needing to be supplied: *excors* (= *si quis est excors*) *dicit ei* (not *dixit*, because syntactically subordinating itself to the **תקרא**). It is a nominal clause, whose virtual predicate (the devoid of understanding is thus and thus addressed by her) as in v. 16.

Pro. 9: 5. The plur. of the address shows that the simple (inexperienced) and the devoid of understanding are regarded as essentially one and the same class of men. The **ב** after **לָחֵם** and **שָׁתָה** proceeds neither from the idea of eating into (hewing into) anything, nor from the eating with anything, i.e., inasmuch as one makes use of it, nor of pampering oneself with anything (as **בְּרִשָּׁה**); Michaelis at last makes a right decision (cf. Lev. 22:11, Jud. 13:16, Job. 21:25, and particularly **בְּלֶחֶם**, Psa. 141: 4): *communicationem et participationem in re fruenda denotat*; the LXX **φάγετε τῶν ἐμῶν ἄρτων**. The attributive **מִסְכֵּתִי** stands with backward reference briefly for **מִסְכֵּתִי**. That Wisdom, v. 2, offers flesh and wine, but here presents bread and wine, is no contradiction, which would lead us, with Hitzig, critically to reject vv. 4 and 5 as spurious; **לָחֵם** is the most common, all-comprehensive name for nourishment. Bertheau suitably compares Jahve's invitation, Isa. 55: 1, and that of Jesus, Joh. 6:35.

Pro. 9: 6. That **פְּתָאִין** is a plur. with abstract signification (according to which the four Greek and the two Aramaean translations render it; the *Graec. Venet.*, however, renders **τοὺς νηπιούς**) is improbable; the author forms the abstr. v. 13 otherwise, and the expression here would be doubtful. For **פְּתָאִים** is here to be rendered as the object-accus.: leave the simple, i.e., forsake this class of men (Ahron b. Joseph; Umbreit, Zöckler); or also, which we prefer (since it is always a singular thought that the “simple” should leave the “simple”), as the vocative, and so that **עֲזָבוּ** means not absolutely “leave off” (Hitzig), but so that the object to be thought of is to be taken from **פְּתָאִים**: give up, leave off, viz., the simple (Immanuel and others; on the contrary, Rashi, *Meiri*, and others, as Ewald, Bertheau, decide in favour of **פְּתָאִים** as *n. abstr.*). Regarding **וַחֲיוּ**, for *et vivetis*, vid., Pro. 4: 4. The LXX, paraphrasing: **ἵνα εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα βασιλεύσητε**. **אָשַׁר** is related to **אָשַׁר** (**אָשַׁר**) is **אָשַׁר** to **אָשַׁר**; the *Piel*, not in its intrans. (vid., Pro. 4:14) but in its trans. sense (Isa. 1:17; 3:12, etc.), shows that the idea of going straight out and forwards

connects itself therewith. The peculiarity of the פתִי is just the absence of character.

Pro. 9: 7-9. In what now follows the discourse of Wisdom is continued; wherefore she directs her invitation to the simple, i.e., those who have not yet decided, and are perhaps susceptible of that which is better:

*7 “He who correcteth a scorner draweth upon himself insult;
And he who communicateth instruction to a scorner,
it is a dishonour to him.*

*8 Instruct not a scorner, lest he hate thee;
Give instruction to the wise, so he will love thee.*

*9 Give to the wise, and he becomes yet wiser;
Give knowledge to the upright, and he gains in knowledge.”*

Zöckler thinks that herewith the reason for the summons to the “simple” to forsake the fellowship of men of their own sort, is assigned (he explains 6a as Ahron b. Joseph: הפתאים מן הפרדו); but his remark, that, under the term “simple,” mockers and wicked persons are comprehended as belonging to the same category, confounds two sharply distinguished classes of men. לִץ is the freethinker who mocks at religion and virtue (vid., Pro. 1:22), and רָשָׁע the godless who shuns restraint by God and gives himself up to the unbridled impulse to evil. The course of thought in v. 7 and onwards shows why Wisdom, turning from the wise, who already are hers, directs herself only to the simple, and those who are devoid of understanding: she must pass over the לִץ and רָשָׁע, because she can there hope for no receptivity for her invitation; she would, contrary to Mat. 7: 6, “give that which is holy to the dogs, and cast her pearls before swine.” יָסַר, παιδεύειν (with the prevailing idea of the bitter lesson of reproof and punishment), and הוֹכִיחַ, ἐλέγχειν, are interchangeable conceptions, Psa. 94:10; the לִ is here exponent of the object (to bring an accusation against any one), as v. 8, Pro. 15:12 (otherwise as Isa. 2: 4; 11: 4, where it is the *dat. commodi*: to bring unrighteousness to light, in favour of the injured). יָסַר לִץ is pointed with *Mahpach* of the penultima, and thus with the tone thrown back. The *Pasek*, placed in some editions between the two words, is masoretically inaccurate. He who reads the moral the mocker brings disgrace to himself; the incorrigible replies to the goodwill with insult. Similar to the לִקַּח לוֹ here, is מְרִים tollit = reportat, Pro. 3:25; 4:27. In 7b מוֹמוֹ is by no means the object governed by וּמוֹכִיחַ: and he who shows to the godless his fault (*Meiri*, Arama, Löwenstein: מוֹמוֹ = על-מוֹמוֹ, and thus also the *Graec. Venet.* μῶμον ἑαυτῶ, scil. λαμβάνει); plainly מוֹמוֹ is parallel with קִלוֹן. But

קלון: **מֹמְרוּ** does not also subordinate itself to **לְקַח** as to the object. parallel **מֹמְרוּ**: *maculam sibimet scil. acquirit*; for, to be so understood, the author ought at least to have written **מֹמְרוּ לֹ**. Much rather **מֹמְרוּ** is here, as at Deu. 32: 5, appos., thus pred. (Hitzig), without needing anything to be supplied: his blot it is, viz., this proceeding, which is equivalent to **מוֹמֵא הוּא לִיה** (Targ.), *opprobrio ipsi est*. Zöckler not incorrectly compares Psa. 115: 7 and Ecc. 5:16, but the expression (*macula ejus = ipsi*) lies here less remote from our form of expression. In other words: Whoever correcteth the mockers has only to expect hatred (**אֶל-תּוֹכַח**) with the tone thrown back, according to rule; cf. on the contrary, Jud. 18:25), but on the other hand, love from the wise.

Pro. 9: 8. The **ו** in **וַיֵּאָהֱבֶךָ** is that of consequence (*apodosis imperativi*): so he will love thee (as also Ewald now translates), not: that he may love thee (Syr., Targ.), for the author speaks here only of the consequence, not of something else, as an object kept in view. The exhortation influences the mocker less than nothing, so much the more it bears fruit with the wise. Thus the proverb is confirmed *habenti dabitur*, Mat. 13:12; 25:29.

Pro. 9: 9. If anything is to be supplied to **תָּן**, it is **לְקַח** (Pro. 4: 2); but **תָּן**, *tradere*, **παραδιδόναι**, is of itself correlat. of **לְקַח**, *accipere* (post-bibl. **קָבַל**), **παραλαμβάνειν**, e.g., Gal. 1: 9. **הוֹדִיעַ לְ** = to communicate knowledge, **דַּעַת**, follows the analogy of **הוֹכִיחַ לְ**, to impart instruction, **תּוֹכַחַת**. Regarding the jussive form **וַיְוֹסֶרְךָ** in the *apod. imper.*, vid., Gesen. § 128, 2. Observe in this verse the interchange of **חָכְמָה** and **צְדִיקָה**! Wisdom is not merely an intellectual power, it is a moral quality; in this is founded her receptivity of instruction, her embracing of every opportunity for self-improvement. She is humble; for, without self-will and self-sufficiency, she makes God's will her highest and absolutely binding rule (Pro. 3: 7).

Pro. 9:10. These words naturally follow:

**10 “The beginning of wisdom is the fear of Jahve,
And the knowledge of the Holy One is understanding.”**

This is the highest principle of the Chokma, which stands (Pro. 1: 7) as a motto at the beginning of the Book of Proverbs. The LXX translate **רֵאשִׁית** there (Pro. 1: 7), and **תְּחִלַּת** here, by **ἀρχή**. Gusset distinguishes the two synonyms as *pars optima* and *primus actus*; but the former denotes the fear of God as that which stands in the uppermost place, to which all that Wisdom accomplishes subordinates itself; the latter as that which begins wisdom, that which it proposes to itself in its course. With **יְהוָה** is interchanged, Pro. 2: 5, **אֱלֹהִים**, as

here קדושים, as the internally multiplicative plur. (Dietrich, *Abhandlungen*, pp. 12, 45), as Pro. 30: 3, Jos. 24: 9, Hos. 12: 1, of God, the “Holy, holy, holy” (Isa. 6: 3), i.e., Him who is absolutely Holy. Michaelis inaccurately, following the ancients, who understood not this non-numerical plur.: *cognitio quae sanctos facit et sanctis propria est*. The דעת, parallel with דעת, is meant of lively practical operative knowledge, which subordinates itself to this All-holy God as the normative but unapproachable pattern.

Pro. 9:11. The singular reason for this proverb of Wisdom is now given:

*“For by me will thy days become many,
And the years of thy life will be increased.”*

Incorrectly Hitzig: “and years of life will increase to thee;” הוסיף is always and everywhere (e.g., also Job. 38:11) transitive. In the similar passage, Pro. 3: 2, וסיפו had as its subject the doctrine of Wisdom; here חכמה and בינה it is not practicable to interpret as subj., since 11a Wisdom is the subject discoursing — the expression follows the scheme, *dicunt eos = dicuntur*, as e.g., Job. 7: 3; Gesen. § 137 — a concealing of the operative cause, which lies near, where, as Pro. 2:22, the discourse is of severe judgment, thus: they (viz., the heavenly Powers) will grant to thee years of life (חיים in a pregnant sense, as 3: 2) in rich measure, so that constantly one span comes after another. But in what connection of consequence does this stand with the contents of the proverb, v. 10? The ancients say that the clause with כי refers back to v. 5 f. The vv. 7-10 (according also to Fl.) are, as it were, parenthetic. Hitzig rejects these verses as an interpolation, but the connection of v. 11 with 5 f. retains also something that is unsuitable: “steps forward on the way of knowledge, for by me shall thy days become many;” and if, as Hitzig supposes, v. 12 is undoubtedly genuine, whose connection with v. 11 is in no way obvious, then also will the difficulty of the connection of vv. 7-10 with the preceding and the succeeding be no decisive mark of the want of genuineness of this course of thought. We have seen how the progress of v. 6 to 7 is mediated: the invitation of Wisdom goes forth to the receptive, with the exclusion of the irrecoverable. And v. 11 is related to v. 10, as the proof of the cause from the effect. It is the fear of God with which Wisdom begins, the knowledge of God in which above all it consists, for by it is fulfilled the promise of life which is given to the fear of God, Pro. 10:27; 14:27; 19:23, cf. Deu. 4:40, and to humility, which is bound up with it. Pro. 10:17.

Pro. 9:12. This wisdom, resting on the fear of God, is itself a blessing to the wise:

***“If thou art wise, thou art wise for thyself;
And if thou mockest, thou alone shalt bear it.”***

The LXX, with the Syr., mangle the thought of 12*a*, for they translate: if thou art wise for thyself, so also thou wilt be wise for thy neighbour. The *dat. commodi* לך means that it is for the personal advantage of the wise to be wise. The contrast expressed by Job. 22: 2 f.: not profitable to God, but to thyself (Hitzig), is scarcely intended, although, so far as the accentuation is antithetic, it is the nearest. The perf. וְלִצְיָתָהּ is the hypothetical; Gesen. § 126, 1. To bear anything, viz., anything sinful (חַטָּא or עוֹן), is equivalent to, to atone for it, Job. 34: 2, cf. Num. 9:13, Eze. 23:35. Also 12*b* is a contrast scarcely aimed at. Wisdom is its own profit to man; libertinism is its own disgrace. Man decides, whenever he prefers to be wise, or to be a mocker of religion and of virtue, regarding his own weal and woe. With this *nota bene* the discourse of Wisdom closes.

Pro. 9:13-15. The poet now brings before us another figure, for he personifies Folly working in opposition to Wisdom, and gives her a feminine name, as the contrast to Wisdom required, and thereby to indicate that the seduction, as the 13th proverbial discourse (Pro. 7) has shown, appears especially in the form of degraded womanhood:

***13 The woman Folly [Frau Thorheit] conducts herself boisterously,
Wantonness, and not knowing anything at all;***

***14 And hath seated herself at the door of her house,
On a seat high up in the city,***

***15 To call to those who walk in the way,
Who go straight on their path.***

The connection of אִשְׁתַּ בְּסִילוֹתָהּ is genitival, and the genitive is not, as in רַע אִשְׁתַּ בְּתַצְיוֹן (vid., under Isa. 1: 8). הוֹמְיָהּ [boisterous] is pred., as Pro. 7:11: her object is sensual, and therefore her appearance excites passionately, overcoming the resistance of the mind by boisterousness. In 13*b* it is further said who and how she is. פְּתִיּוֹת she is called as wantonness personified. This abstract פְּתִיּוֹת, derived from פָּתַי, must be vocalized as אֲכַנְרִיּוֹת; Hitzig thinks it is written with *a* on account of the following *u* sound, but this formation always ends in *ijjûth*, not *ajjûth*. But as from חָנָה as well חֲנִיּוֹן = חֲנִיּוֹן as חוֹן is formed, so from פָּתָה as well פְּתוֹת like חֲצוֹת or פְּתוֹת like לְזוֹת, רַעוֹת, as פְּתִיּוֹת (instead of which פְּתִיּוֹת is preferred) can be formed; Kimchi rightly (*Michlol* 181*a*)

presents the word under the form **פְּעֻלוֹת**. With **וּבַל** (Pro. 14: 7) poetic, and stronger than **וְלֹא**, the designation of the subject is continued; the words **מָה וּבַל-יִדְעָה** (thus with *Mercha* and without *Makkeph* following, **יִדְעָה** is to be written, after Codd. and old editions) have the value of an adjective: and not knowing anything at all (**מָה** = **אִי**, as Num. 23: 3, Job. 13:13, and here in the negative clause, as in prose **מֵאִוְמָה**), i.e., devoid of all knowledge. The Targ. translates explanatorily: not recognising **טַבְּתָא**, the good; and the LXX substitutes: she knows not shame, which, according to Hitzig, supposes the word **בְּלִמָּה**, approved of by him; but **כַּלְמָה** means always *pudefactio*, not *pudor*. To know no **כַּלְמָה** would be equivalent to, to let no shaming from without influence one; for shamelessness the poet would have made use of the expression **וּבַל-יִדְעָה בְּשֵׁת**. In **וַיִּשְׁבָּה** the declaration regarding the subject beginning with **הוֹמִיָּה** is continued: Folly also has a house in which works of folly are carried one, and has set herself down by the door (**לְפִי** as **לְפֶתַח**, Pro. 8: 3) of this house; she sits there **אֶל-כִּסֵּא**. Most interpreters here think on a throne (LXX **ἐπὶ θρόνου**, used especially of the *sella curulis*); and Zöckler, as Umbreit, Hitzig, and others, connecting genitiv. therewith **מֵרְמֵי קִרְתָּ**, changes in 14b the scene, for he removes the “high throne of the city” from the door of the house to some place elsewhere. But the sitting is in contrast to the standing and going on the part of Wisdom on the streets preaching (Evagrius well renders: *in molli ignavaque sella*); and if **כִּסֵּא** and house-door are named along with each other, the former is a seat before the latter, and the accentuation rightly separates by *Mugrash* **כִּסֵּא** from **קִרְתָּ**. “According to the accents and the meaning, **מֵרְמֵי קִרְתָּ** is the *acc. loci*: on the high places of the city, as Pro. 8: 2 f.” (Fl.). They are the high points of the city, to which, as Wisdom, v. 3, Pro. 8: 2, so also Folly, her rival (wherefore Ecc. 10: 6 does not appertain to this place), invites followers to herself. She sits before her door to call **לְעֹבְרֵי דְרָךְ** (with *Munach*, as in Cod. 1294 and old editions, without the *Makkeph*), those who go along the way (genitive connection with the supposition of the accusative construction, *transire viam*, as 2: 7), to call (invite) **הַמְיֹשְׁרִים** (to be pointed with **מֵ** *raphatum* and *Gaja* going before, according to Ben-Asher’s rule; vid., *Methegsetz.* § 20), those who make straight their path, i.e., who go straight on, directly before them (cf. Isa. 57: 2). The participial construction (the schemes *amans Dei* and *amans Deum*), as well as that of the verb **קָרָא** (first with the dat. and then with the accus.), interchange.

Pro. 9:16, 17. The woman, who in her own person serves as a sign to her house, addresses those who pass by in their innocence (**לְתָמִים**, 2Sa. 15:11):

16 “Whoso is simple, let him turn in hither!”
And if any one is devoid of understanding, she saith to him:
17 “Stolen waters taste sweet,
And the bread of secrecy is pleasant.”

פְּתִי (folly, simplicity) has a side accessible to good and its contrary: Wisdom is connected with the one side, and Folly with the other. And as the חֶסֶד-לֵב offers a *vacuum* to Wisdom which may perhaps be filled with the right contents, so is this *vacuum* welcome to Folly, because it meets there no resistance. In this sense, v. 16 is like v. 4 (excepting the addition of a connecting and of a concluding ׀: *et si quis excors, tum dicit ei*); the word is the same in both, but the meaning, according to the two speakers, is different. That to which they both invite is the pleasure of her fellowship, under the symbol of eating and drinking; in the one case it is intellectual and spiritual enjoyment, in the other sensual. That Wisdom offers (Pro. 9: 5) bread and wine, and Folly water and bread, has its reason in this, that the particular pleasure to which the latter invites is of a sensual kind; for to drink water out of his own or out of another fountain is (Pro. 3:15-20) the symbol of intercourse in married life, or of intercourse between the unmarried, particularly of adulterous intercourse. מַיִם גְּנוּבִים (correct texts have it thus, without the *Makkeph*) is sexual intercourse which is stolen from him who has a right thereto, thus carnal intercourse with אִשֶׁת אִישׁ ; and לֶחֶם סֵתֵרִים fleshly lust, which, because it is contrary to the law, must seek (cf. *furtum*, secret love intrigue) concealment (סֵתֵרִים, extensive plur., as מַעֲמָקִים; Böttcher, § 694). Just such pleasure, after which one wipes his mouth as if he had done nothing (Pro. 30:20), is for men who are without wisdom sweet (מֵתֵק, Job. 20:12) and pleasant; the prohibition of it gives to such pleasure attraction, and the secrecy adds seasoning; and just such enjoyments the כַּסִּילוֹת, personified carnality, offers. But woe to him who, befooled, enters her house!

Pro. 9:18. He goes within:

18 And he knows not that the dead are there;
In the depths of Hades, her guests.

How near to one another the house of the adulteress and Hades are, so that a man passes through the one into the other, is already stated in Pro. 2:18; 7:28. Here, in the concluding words of the introduction to the Book of Proverbs, addressed to youth, and for the most part containing warning against sinful pleasure, these two further declarations are advanced: the company assembled in the house of lewdness consists of רַפְּאִים, i.e., (cf. p. 59) the old, worn-out, who are only in appearance living, who have gone down to the seeming life of

the shadowy existence of the kingdom of the dead; her (כסילות) invited ones (cf. 7:26, her slaughtered ones) are in the depths of Hades (not in the valleys, as Umbreit, Löwenstein, and Ewald translate, but in the depths, Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, ἐπι τοῖς βάθεσι; for עֲמֻקֵּי is not only plur. to עֲמֻק, but also *per metaplasmum* to עֲמֻק, Pro. 25: 3, as אָמַר to אָמַר), thus in שְׂאוֹל תַּחֲתַיִת (Deu. 32:22); they have forsaken the fellowship of the life and of the love of God, and have sunk into the deepest destruction. The house of infamy into which Folly allures does not only lead to hell, it is hell itself; and they who permit themselves to be thus befooled are like wandering corpses, and already on this side of death are in the realm of wrath and of the curse. ^{f107}

First Collection Of Solomonic Proverbs, Pro. 10: 1-22:16

CHAPTER 10

Pro. 10: 1-22:16. The superscription, מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה, here shows that now we have reached that which the title of the book, Pro. 1: 1-6, presented to view. Here we have the commencement of that collection of Solomonic Proverbs which under this title forms, together with the introduction, Pro. 1: 7-9:18, the Older Book of Proverbs. The introduction is disproportionately long. It is the manner of the editor to extend himself in length and breadth; and besides, an educational zeal in behalf of youth, and his aim, which was without doubt to put them on their guard against certain prevailing moral evils of his time, make him thus persuasive; and if he detains his readers so long from the proper Solomonic Proverbs, yet this might be excused from the circumstance, that though his introduction does not strictly consists of Proverbs of Solomon, yet it consists of proverbs after the manner of Solomon, i.e., of proverbs which, as to their contents and form, take their structure from the pattern of those of Solomonic authorship.

In this introduction, 1-9, there are larger sections of interconnected thoughts having one common aim. Even in Pro. 6: 1-19 there are manifestly three proverbial discourses distinguished from one another, shorter indeed, yet containing one fundamental thought. Such proverbs as are primarily designed to form one completed little whole of themselves, are not here to be met with. On the contrary, the Solomonic collection which now follows consists of pure distichs, for the most part antithetical, but at the same time going over all the forms of the technical proverb, as we have already shown; vid., p. 16.

Accordingly the exposition must from this point onward renounce reproduced combinations of thought. The succession of proverbs here is nevertheless not one that is purely accidental or without thought; it is more than a happy accident when three of the same character stand together; the collector has

connected together proverb with proverb according to certain common characteristics (Bertheau). And yet more than that: the mass separates itself into groups, not merely succeeding one another, but because a certain connection of ideas connects together a number of proverbs, in such a way that the succession is broken, and a new point of departure is arrived at (Hitzig). There is no comprehensive plan, such as Oetinger in his summary view of its contents supposes; the progressive unfolding follows no systematic scheme, but continuously wells forth. But that the editor, whom we take also to be the arranger of the contents of the book, did not throw them together by good chance, but in placing them together was guided by certain reasons, the very first proverb here shows, for it is chosen in conformity with the design of this book, which is specially dedicated to youth:

***10: 1 A wise son maketh glad his father;
A foolish son is his mother's grief.***

One sees here quite distinctly (cf. Hos. 13:13) that **כֹּבֵד** (from **כָּבֵד**, properly to be thick, stout, solid, as **πακνός** = **σοφός**) is primarily a practical and ethical conception. Similar proverbs are found further on, but consisting of synonymous parallel members, in which either the father both times represents the parents, as Pro. 17:21; 23:24, or father and mother are separated, each being named in different members, as Pro. 17:25; 23:25, and particularly Pro. 15:20, where *20a* = *1a* of the above proverb. It is incorrect to say, with Hitzig, that this contrast draws the division after it: the division lies nearer in the synonymous distichs, and is there less liable to be misunderstood than in the antithetic. Thus, from this proverb before us, it might be concluded that grief on account of a befooled son going astray in bypaths, and not coming to the right way, falls principally on the mother, as (Sir. 3: 9) is often the case in unfortunate marriages. The idea of the parents is in this way only separated, and the two members stand in suppletive interchangeable relationship. **שִׂמְחָה** is the middle of the clause, and is the usual form in connection; **שִׂמְחָה** is the pausal form. **תִּוְגָה**, from **תוּגָה** ("גה"), has *pass. û*, as **תִּוְרָה**, *act. ô*. "The expression of the *pred. 1b* is like Pro. 3:17; 8: 6; 10:14 f.; cf. e.g., Arab. *âlastakṣa furkat*, oversharpener is dividing, i.e., effects it [inquiries become or lead to separation] (cf. our proverb, *Allzuscharf macht scharig* = too much sharpening makes full of notches); Burckhardt, *Sprüche*. Nr. 337" (Fl.).

Pro. 10: 2. There follows now a series of proverbs which place possessions and goods under a moral-religious point of view:

***Treasures of wickedness bring no profit;
But righteousness delivers from death.***

The LXX and Aquila translate ἀνόμους (ἀσεβείς). הוֹעִיל (to profit) with the accus. is possible, Isa. 57:12, but אֲזַרְוֹת one does not use by itself; it requires a genitive designating it more closely. But also אֲשַׁעֲרֶה of the Targ., παρανόμων of Symmachus, fails; for the question still remains, to whom? Rightly Syr., Jerome, Theodotion, and the Quinta: ἀσεβείας, cf. Pro. 4:17, Mic. 4:10; Luke 16: 9, μαμωνᾶς τῆς ἀδικίας. Treasures to which wickedness cleaves profit not, viz., him who has collected them through wickedness. On the contrary, righteousness saves from death (2b = 11: 4b, where the parallelism makes it clear that death as a judgment is meant). In Deu. 24:13 it had been already said that compassionate love is “righteousness before the Lord,” the cardinal virtue of the righteousness of life. Faith (Hab. 2: 4) is its soul, and love its life. Therefore δικαιοσύνη and ἐλεημοσύνη are interchangeable ideas; and it ought not to be an objection against the Apocrypha that it repeats the above proverb, ἐλεημοσύνη ἐκ θανάτου ῥύεται, Tob. 4:10; 12: 9, Sir. 3:30; 29:12, for Dan. 4:24 also says the very same thing, and the thought is biblical, in so far as the giving of alms is understood to be not a dead work, but (Psa. 112: 9) the life-activity of one who fears God, and of a mind believing in Him and resting in His word.

Pro. 10: 3. Another proverb, the members of which stand in chiasmic relation to those of the preceding:

***Jahve does not suffer the soul of the righteous to hunger;
But the craving of the godless He disappointeth.***

The thought is the same as Pro. 13:25. There, as also at Pro. 6:30, the soul is spoken of as the faculty of desire, and that after nourishment, for the lowest form of the life of the soul is the impulse to self-preservation. The parallel הָרָבָה, in which LXX and Ar. erroneously find the meaning of הָרָבָה, life, the Syr. Targ. the meaning of הָרָבָה, possession, means the desire, without however being related to הָרָבָה (Berth.); it is the Arab. *hawan*, from הָרָבָה, Arab. *haway*, which, from the fundamental meaning *χαίνειν*, *hiare*, to gape, yawn, signifies not only unrestrained driving along, and crashing overthrow (cf. Pro. 11: 6; 19:13), but also the breaking forth, *ferri in aliquid*, whence הָרָבָה, Arab. *hawan*, violent desire, in Hebr. generally (here and Psa. 52: 9, Mic. 7: 3) of desire without limits and without restraint (cf. the plur. *âhawâ*, arbitrary actions, caprices); the meanings deduced from this important verbal stem (of which also הָרָבָה הָרָבָה, *accidere*, and then *esse*, at least after the Arabic conception of speech, is an offshoot) are given by Fleischer under Job. 37: 6, and after Fleischer by Ethé, *Schlafgemach der Phantasie*, ii. p. 6 f. The verb הָרָבָה signifies to push in the most manifold shades, here to push forth, *repellere*, as 2Ki. 4:27 (cf. Arab.

hadhaf, to push off = to discharge); the fut. is invariably **יִהְיֶה**, like **יִהְיֶה**. God gives satisfaction to the soul of the righteous, viz., in granting blessings. The desire of the wicked He does not suffer to be accomplished; it may appear for a long time as if that which was aimed at was realized, but in the end God pushes it back, so that it remains at a distance, because contrary to Him. Instead of **וְהוֹת רְשָׁעִים**, some editions (Plantin 1566, Bragadin 1615) have **וְהוֹת בְּגָדִים**, but, in opposition to all decided testimony, only through a mistaken reference to Pro. 11: 6.

Pro. 10: 4. There follow two proverbs which say how one man fails and another succeeds:

***He becomes poor who bears a sluggish hand;
But the hand of the diligent maketh rich.***

These three proverbs, Pro. 19:15; 12:24, 27, are similar. From the last two it is seen that **רְמִיָּה** is a subst., as also from Psa. 120: 2 f. (**לְשׁוֹן רְמִיָּה**, from a crafty tongue) that it is an adjunct., and from Lev. 14:15 f. (where **כַּף** is fem.) that it may be at the same time an adjunct. here also. The masc. is **רְמִי**, like **טְרִי** to **טְרִיָּה**, but neither of these occur; “the fundamental idea is that of throwing oneself down lazily, when one with unbent muscles holds himself no longer erect and stretched, Arab. *taramy*” (Fl.). The translation: deceitful balances (Löwenstein after Rashi), is contrary to biblical usage, which knows nothing of **כַּף** in this Mishnic meaning. But if **כַּף** is here regarded as fem., then it cannot be the subject (Jerome, *egestatem operata est manus remissa*), since we read **עָשָׂה**, not **עָשָׂה**. But **רָאשׁ** also is not suitable as the subject (LXX, Syr., Targ.), for poverty is called **רִישׁ**, **רִישׁ**, **רָאשׁ**; on the contrary, **רֶשׁ**, plur. **רְשָׁיִם** or **רָאשָׁיִם**, is used adjectively. Since now the adjunct. **רֶשׁ**, 1Sa. 12:14, is also written **רָאשׁ**, it may be translated: Poor is he who...(Bertheau); but we much rather expect the statement of that which happens to such an one, thus: Poor will he be... **רָאשׁ**, 3 praet. = **רֶשׁ**, Psa. 34:11, with the same (grammatically incorrect) full writing as **קָאֵם**, Hos. 10:14. In the conception of the subject, **כַּף־רְמִיָּה**, after Jer. 48:10, is interpreted as the accus. of the manner (Berth.: whoever works with sluggish hand); but since **עָשָׂה רְמִיָּה** (in another sense indeed: to practise cunning) is a common phrase, Psa. 52: 4; 101: 7, so also will **כַּף־רְמִיָּה** be regarded as the object: *qui agit manum remissam*, whoever carries or moves such a hand (Hitzig). In 4b working is placed opposite to bearing: the diligent hand makes rich, *ditat* or *divitias parit*; but not for itself (Ges. and others: becomes rich), but for him who bears it. The diligent man is called **חַרְוִץ**, from **חָרַץ**, to sharpen, for, as in **ὀξύς**, *acer*, sharpness is

transferred to energy; the form is the same as חלוק, smooth (for the *ā* is unchangeable, because recompensative), a kindred form to קטול like חמוץ, and Arab. *fā'ûl* as *fashawsh*, a boaster, wind-bag, either of active (as חנון) or (as חלוק, חרוץ, אמוד, שבול) of passive signification.

Pro. 10: 5. There is now added a proverb which, thus standing at the beginning of the collection, and connecting itself with v. 1, stamps on it the character of a book for youth:

***He that gathereth in summer is a wise son;
But he that is sunk in sleep in the time of harvest
is a son that causeth shame.***

Von Hofmann (*Schriftb.* ii. 2. 403) rightly interprets בן מביש and בן משכיל, with Cocceius and others, as the subject, and not with Hitzig as predicate, for in nominal clauses the rule is to place the predicate before the subject; and since an accurate expression of the inverted relation would both times require הוא referring to the subject, so we here abide by the usual syntax: he that gathers in summer time is... Also the relation of the members of the sentence, Pro. 19:26, is a parallel from which it is evident that the misguided son is called מביש as causing shame, although in הביש the idea to put to shame (= to act so that others are ashamed) and to act shamefully (disgracefully), as in השכיל the ideas to have insight and to act intelligently, lie into one another (cf. Pro. 14:35); the root-meaning of השכיל is determined after שכל, which from שכל, *complicare*, designates the intellect as the faculty of intellectual configuration. בוש, properly *disturbari*, proceeds from a similar conception as the Lat. *confundi* (*pudore*). קיץ and קציר fall together, for קיץ (from קיץ = *qât*, to be glowing hot) is just the time of the קציר; vid., under Gen. 8:22. To the activity of a thoughtful ingathering, אגר, for a future store (vid., Pro. 6: 7), stands opposed deep sleep, i.e., the state of one sunk in idleness. נרדם means, as Schultens has already shown, *somno penitus obrui, omni sensu obstructo et oppilato quasi*, from נרם, to fill, to shut up, to conclude; the derivation (which has been adopted since Gesenius) from the Arab. word having the same sound, *rdm, stridere*, to shrill, to rattle (but not *stertere*, to snore), lies remote in the *Niph.*, and also contradicts the usage of the word, according to which it designates a state in which all free activity is bound, and all reference to the external world is interrupted; cf. תרדמה, Pro. 19:15, of dulness, apathy, somnolency in the train of slothfulness. The LXX has here one distich more than the Hebr. text.

Pro. 10: 6. There now follow two proverbs regarding the blessings and the curses which come to men, and which flow forth from them. Here, however, as throughout, we take each proverb by itself, that it might not appear as if we had a tetrastich before us. The first of these two antithetic distichs is:

***Blessings (come) on the head of the just;
But violence covereth the mouth of the godless.***

Blessings are, without being distinguished, bestowed as well as prayed for from above. Regarding the undistinguished uses of לְרֹאשׁ (of a recompense of reward), בְּרֹאשׁ (of penal recompense), and אֶל-רֹאשׁ (especially of punishment), vid., under Gen. 49:26. If we understand, with Ewald, Bertheau, Elster, Zöckler, and others, the two lines after v. 11, Pro. 19:28, cf. 10:18: the mouth of the wicked covers (hides under a mask) violence, inasmuch as he speaks words of blessing while thoughts of malediction lurk behind them (Psa. 62: 5), then we renounce the sharpness of the contrast. On the contrary, it is preserved if we interpret וּפִי as object: the violence that has gone out from it covereth the mouth of the wicked, i.e., it falls back upon his foul mouth; or as Fleischer (and Oetinger almost the same) paraphrases it: the deeds of violence that have gone forth from them are given back to them in curses and maledictions, so that going back they stop, as it were, their mouth, they bring them to silence; for it is unnecessary to take פִּי synecdochically for פְּנֵי (cf. e.g., Psa. 69: 8), since in בְּרִכּוֹת 6a are perhaps chiefly meant blessings of thankful acknowledgment on the part of men, and the giving prominence to the mouth of the wicked from which nothing good proceeds is well accounted for. The parallels do not hinder us thus to explain, since parts of proverbs repeating themselves in the Book of Proverbs often show a change of the meaning (vid., p. 18 f.). Hitzig's conjecture, 'בְּסֵה (better 'בְּסֵה), is unnecessary; for elsewhere we read, as here, that חַמַּס (violence), *jure talionis*, covers, 'בְּסֵה, the wicked, Hab. 2:17, or that he, using "violence," therewith covers the whole of his external appearance, i.e., gives to it the branded impress of the unrighteousness he has done (vid., Köhler under Mal. 2:16).

Pro. 10: 7. Thus, as v. 6 says how it goes with the righteous and the wicked in this life, so this verse tells how it fares with them after death:

***The memory of the righteous remains in blessings,
And the name of the godless rots.***

The tradition regarding the writing of זָכַר with five (זֶכֶר) or six points (זִכָּר) is doubtful (vid., Heidenheim in his ed. of the Pentateuch, *Me'ôr Enajim*, under Exo. 17:14); the Cod. 1294 and old printed copies have here זִכָּר. Instead of

לְבָרְכָהּ, יִבְרַךְ might be used; the phrase *היה לברכה* (*opp.* *היה לקללה*), often used by Jeremiah), subordinate to the substantival clause, paraphrases the passive, for it expresses a growing to something, and thus the entrance into a state of endurance. The remembrance of the righteous endures after his death, for he is thought of with thankfulness (*זכר צדיק לברכה = ז"צל*, the usual appendix to the name of an honoured, beloved man who has died), because his works, rich in blessing, continue; the name of the godless, on the contrary, far from continuing fresh and green (Psa. 62:17) after his departure, becomes corrupt (*רקב*, from *רק*, to be or to become thin, to dissolve in fine parts, *tabescere*), like a worm-eaten decayed tree (Isa. 40:20). The Talmud explains it thus, *Joma 38b*: foulness comes over their name, so that we call no one after their name. Also the idea suggests itself, that his name becomes corrupt, as it were, with his bones; the Mishnah, at least *Ohaloth* ii. 1, uses *רָקַב* of the dust of corruption.

Pro. 10: 8. There follows now a series of proverbs in which reference to sins of the mouth and their contrary prevails:

*He that is wise in heart receives precepts;
But he that is of a foolish mouth comes to ruin.*

A *חכם־לב*, wise-hearted, as one whose heart is *חכם*, Pro. 23:15; in a word, a *נבון*, a person of understanding or judgment, Pro. 16:21. Such an one does not make his own knowledge the *ne plus ultra*, nor does he make his own will the *noli me tangere*; but he takes commands, i.e., instructions directing or prohibiting, to which he willingly subordinates himself as the outflow of a higher knowledge and will, and by which he sets bounds and limits to himself. But a fool of the lips, i.e., a braggart blunderer, one pleasing himself with vain talk (Pro. 14:23), falls prostrate, for he thinks that he knows all things better, and will take no pattern; but while he boasts himself from on high, suddenly all at once — for he offends against the fundamental principle of common life and of morality — he comes to lie low down on the ground. The Syr. and Targ. translate *יִלְבַּט* by, he is caught (Bertheau, ensnared); Aquila, Vulgate, Luther, *δαρήσεται*, he is slain; Symmachus, *βασανισθήσεται*; but all without any support in the usage of the language known to us. Theodotion, *φυρήσεται*, he is confounded, is not tenable; Joseph Kimchi, who after David Kimchi, under Hos. 4:14, appeals in support of this meaning (*ישתבש*, similarly Parchon: *יתבלבל*) to the Arabic, seems to think on *iltibās*, confusion. The demonstrable meanings of the verb *לבט* are the following: 1. To occasion trouble. Thus *Mechilta*, under Exo. 17:14, *לבטוהו*, one has imposed upon him trouble; *Sifri*, under Num. 11: 1, *נתלבטנו*, we are tired, according to which Rashi: he

fatigues himself, but which fits neither to the subj. nor to the contrast, which is to be supposed. The same may be said of the meaning of the Syr. *lbt*, to drive on, to press, which without doubt accords with the former meaning of the word in the language of the Midrash. 2. In Arab. *labat* (R. *lab*, vid., Wünsche's *Hos.* p. 172), to throw any one down to the earth, so that he falls with his whole body his whole length; the passive **נלבט**, to be thus thrown down by another, or to throw oneself thus down, figuratively of one who falls hopelessly into evil and destruction (Fl.). The Arabic verb is also used of the springing run of the animal ridden on (to gallop), and of the being lame (to hop), according to which in the Lex. the explanations, he hurries, or he wavers hither and thither, are offered by Kimchi (*Graec. Venet.* **πλανηθήσεται**). But the former of these explanations, *corruit* (= *in calamitatem ruit*), placed much nearer by the Arabic, is confirmed by the LXX **ὑποσκελισθήσεται**, and by the *Berêshith rabba*, c. 52, where **לבט** is used in the sense to be ruined (= **נכשל**). Hitzig changes the passive into the active: "he throws the offered **לקח** scornfully to the ground," but the contrast does not require this. The wanton, arrogant boasting lies already in the designation of the subj. **אויל שפתים**; and the sequel involves, as a consequence, the contrasted consequence of ready reception of the limitations and guidance of his own will by a higher.

Pro. 10: 9. The form of this verse is like the eighth, word for word:

***He that walketh in innocence walketh securely;
But he that goeth in secret ways is known.***

The full form of **בתום** does not, as Hitzig supposes, stand in causal connection with the *Dechi*, for the consonant text lying before us is at least 500 years older than the accentuation. For **הלך בתום** at *Pro. 2: 7*, there is here **הלך בתום** = **הלך בדרך תום**; so **מאקש דרבו** denotes, after *Pro. 2:15*, such an one **אשר דרבו עקשים**. Expressed in the language of the N.T., **תום** is the property of the **ἀπλοῦς** or **ἀκέραιος**, for the fundamental idea of fulness is here referred to full submission, full integrity. Such an one goes **בטה** (Aquila, **ἀμερίμνως**), for there is nothing designedly concealed by him, of which he has reason to fear that it will come to the light; whoever, on the contrary, makes his ways crooked, i.e., turns into crooked ways, is perceived, or, as we might also explain it (vid., under *Gen. 4:15*): if one (*qui = si quis*) makes his ways crooked, then it is known — nothing, however, stands opposed to the reference of **נודע** to the person: he is finally known, i.e., unmasked (LXX Jerome, **γνωσθήσεται**, *manifestus fiet*). Usually it is explained: he is knowing, clever, with the remark that **נודע** is here the passive of **הודיע** (Gesén., Ewald, Hitzig); *Hiph.* to give to feel; *Niph.* to become to feel, properly to be made to

know (Luth.: made wise); but the passive of the *Hiph.* is the *Hoph.* Such a *Niph.* in which the causative (not simply transitive) signification of the *Hiph.* would be applied passively is without example (vid., Ewald, § 133a); the meaning of Jer. 31:19 also is: after I have become known, i.e., been made manifest, uncovered, drawn into the light.

Pro. 10:10. This verse contains another proverb, similarly formed, parallel with the half of v. 8:

***He that winketh with the eye causeth trouble;
And a foolish mouth comes to ruin.***

Regarding the winking or nipping, i.e., the repeated nipping of the eyes (cf. *nictare*, frequent. of *nicēre*), as the conduct of the malicious or malignant, which aims at the derision or injury of him to whom it refers, vid., under Pro. 6:13; there קָרַץ was connected with ב of the means of the action; here, as Psa. 35:19, cf. Pro. 16:30, it is connected with the object accus. He who so does produces trouble (heart-sorrow, Pro. 15:13), whether it be that he who is the butt of this mockery marks it, or that he is the victim of secretly concerted injury; לְתַלְתֵּל is not here used impersonally, as Pro. 13:10, but as Pro. 29:15, cf. Lev. 19:28; 24:20, in the sense of the cause. 10*b* forms a striking contrast to 10*a*, according to the text of the LXX: ὁ δὲ ἐλέγχων μετὰ παρρησίας εἰρηνοποιεῖ. The Targ., however, abides, contrary to the Syr., by the Hebrew text, which certainly is older than this its correction, which Ewald and Lagarde unsuccessfully attempt to translate into the Hebrew. The foolish mouth, here understood in conformity with 10*a*, is one who talks at random, without examination and deliberation, and thus suddenly stumbles and falls over, so that he comes to lie on the ground, to his own disgrace and injury.

Pro. 10:11. Another proverb, similar to the half of v. 6:

***A fountain of life is the mouth of the righteous;
But the mouth of the godless hideth violence.***

If we understand 11*b* wholly as 6*b*: *os improborum obteget violentia*, then the meaning of 11*a* would be, that that which the righteous speaks tends to his own welfare (Fl.). But since the words spoken are the means of communication and of intercourse, one has to think of the water as welling up in one, and flowing forth to another; and the meaning of 11*b* has to accommodate itself to the preceding half proverb, whereby it cannot be mistaken that מַקּוֹר חַיִּים (violence), which was 6*b* subj., bears here, by the contrast, the stamp of the obj.; for the possibility of manifold windings and turnings is a characteristic of the *Mashal*. In the Psalms and Prophets it is God who is called מַקּוֹר חַיִּים, Psa. 36:10, Jer. 2:13; 17:13; the proverbial poetry plants the figure on ethical

ground, and understands by it a living power, from which wholesome effects accrue to its possessor, Pro. 14:27, and go forth from him to others, Pro. 13:14. Thus the mouth of the righteous is here called a fountain of life, because that which he speaks, and as he speaks it, is morally strengthening, intellectually elevating, and inwardly quickening in its effect on the hearers; while, on the contrary, the mouth of the godless covereth wrong (*violentiam*), i.e., conceals with deceitful words the intention, directed not to that which is best, but to the disadvantage and ruin of his neighbours; so that words which in the one case bring to light a ground of life and of love, and make it effectual, in the other case serve for a covering to an immoral, malevolent background.

Pro. 10:12. Another proverb of the different effects of hatred and of love:

***Hate stirreth up strife,
And love covereth all transgressions.***

Regarding מְדַנֵּי, for which the *Keri* elsewhere substitutes מְדַנִּים, vid., under Pro. 6:14. Hatred of one's neighbour, which is of itself an evil, has further this bad effect, that it calls forth hatred, and thus stirreth up strife, feuds, factions, for it incites man against man (cf. עָרַר, Job. 3: 8); on the contrary, love covers not merely little errors, but also greater sins of every kind (כָּל־פְּשָׁעִים), viz., by pardoning them, concealing them, excusing them, if possible, with mitigating circumstances, or restraining them before they are executed. All this lies in the covering. James, however, gives it, Pro. 5:20, another rendering: love covers them, viz., from the eyes of a holy God; for it forgives them to the erring brother, and turns him from the error of his way. The LXX improperly translate πάντας δὲ τοὺς μὴ φιλονεικοῦντας κελόπτει φιλία; but Peter (1Pe. 4: 8) as well as James, but none of the Greek versions; ἡ ἀγάπη καλύψει πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν. The Romish Church makes use of this passage as a proof for the introduction of the *fides formata*, viz., *caritate*, in justification, which is condemned in the *Apology of the Augsburg Confession*; and, indeed, the *multitudo peccatorum* is not meant of the sins of him who cherishes love, but of the sins of the neighbour. Sin stirs up hatred in men in their relation to one another; but love covers the already existing sins, and smooths the disturbances occasioned by them.

Pro. 10:13. There follow now two other proverbs on the use and abuse of speech:

***On the lips of the man of understanding wisdom is found;
And the rod for the back of the fool.***

With Löwenstein, Hitzig, and others, it is inadmissible to regard וְשֵׁבֶט as a second subject to תְּמָצָה. The mouth itself, or the word of the mouth, may be

called a rod, viz., a rod of correction (Isa. 11: 4); but that wisdom and such a rod are found on the lips of the wise would be a combination and a figure in bad taste. Thus 13*b* is a clause by itself, as Luther renders it: “but a rod belongs to the fool’s back;” and this will express a contrast to 13*a*, that while wisdom is to be sought for on the lips of the man of understanding (cf. Mal. 2: 7), a man devoid of understanding, on the contrary, gives himself to such hollow and corrupt talk, that in order to educate him to something better, if possible, the rod must be applied to his back; for, according to the Talmudic proverb: that which a wise man gains by a hint, a fool only obtains by a club. The rod is called **שֶׁבֶט**, from **שָׁבַט**, to be smooth, to go straight down (as the hair of the head); and the back **גֵּו**, from **גָּוַה**, to be rounded, i.e., concave or convex.

***14 Wise men store up knowledge;
But the mouth of the fool is threatening destruction.***

Pro. 10:14. Ewald, Bertheau, Hitzig, Oetinger: “The mouth of the fool blunders out, and is as the sudden falling in of a house which one cannot escape from.” But since **מַחֲתָה** is a favourite *Mishle* -word to denote the effect and issue of that which is dangerous and destructive, so the sense is perhaps further to be extended: the mouth of the fool is for himself (Pro. 13: 3) and others a near, i.e., an always threatening and unexpectedly occurring calamity; unexpectedly, because suddenly he blunders out with his inconsiderate shame-bringing talk, so that such a fool’s mouth is to every one a *praesens periculum*. As to **יִצְפְּנוּ**, it is worthy of remark that in the Beduin, Arab. *dfn, fut. i*, signifies to be still, to be thoughtful, to be absorbed in oneself (vid., Wetstein on Job, p. 281). According to Codd. and editions, in this correct, **וּפִי** is to be written instead of **אוֹיֵל** ; vid., Baer’s *Torath Emeth*, p. 40.

A pair of proverbs regarding possession and gain.

Pro. 10:15. Regarding possession:

***The rich man’s wealth is his strong city;
The destruction of the poor is their poverty.***

Pro. 10:15. The first line = Pro. 18:11. One may render the idea according to that which is internal, and according to that which is external; and the proverb remains in both cases true. As **אֵז** may mean, of itself alone, power, as means of protection, or a bulwark (Psa. 8: 3), or the consciousness of power, high feeling, pride (Jud. 5:21); so **קִרְיַת עֵזוֹ** may be rendered as an object of self-confidence, and **מַחֲתָה**, on the contrary, as an object of terror (Jer. 48:39): the

rich man, to whom his estate (vid., on **הוֹן**, p. 44) affords a sure reserve and an abundant source of help, can appear confident and go forth energetically; on the contrary, the poor man is timid and bashful, and is easily dejected and discouraged. Thus e.g., Oetinger and Hitzig. But the objective interpretation is allowable, and lies also much nearer: the rich man stands thus independent, changes and adversities cannot so easily overthrow him, he is also raised above many hazards and temptations; on the contrary, the poor man is overthrown by little misfortunes, and his despairing endeavours to save himself, when they fail, ruin him completely, and perhaps make him at the same time a moral outlaw. It is quite an experienced fact which this proverb expresses, but one from which the double doctrine is easily derived:

- (1) That it is not only advised, but also commanded, that man make the firm establishing of his external life-position the aim of his endeavour;
- (2) That one ought to treat with forbearance the humble man; and if he always sinks deeper and deeper, one ought not to judge him with unmerciful harshness and in proud self-exaltation.

Pro. 10:16. Regarding gain:

*The gain of the righteous tendeth to life;
The income of the godless to sin.*

Pro. 10:16. Intentionally, that which the righteous received is called **פְּעֹלָה** (as Lev. 19:13), as a reward of his labour; that which the godless receives is called **תְּבוּאָה**, as income which does not need to be the reward of labour, and especially of his own immediate labour. And with **לְחַטָּאת, לְחַיִּים** runs parallel, from the supposition that sin carries the germ of death in itself. The reward of his labour serves to the righteous to establish his life, i.e., to make sure his life-position, and to elevate his life-happiness. On the contrary, the income of the godless serves only to ruin his life; for, made thereby full and confident, he adds sin to sin, whose wages is death. Hitzig translates: for expiation, i.e., to lose it again as atonement for past sins; but if **חַיִּים** and **חַטָּאת** are contrasted with each other, then **חַטָּאת** is death-bringing sin (Pro. 8:35 f.).

The group of proverbs now following bring again to view the good and bad effects of human speech. The seventeenth verse introduces the transition:

*17 There is a way to life when one gives heed to correction;
And whoever disregards instruction runs into error.*

Pro. 10:17. Instead of אָרַח חַיִּים (Pro. 5: 6), there is here אָרַח לְחַיִּים ; and then this proverb falls into rank with v. 16, which contains the same word לְחַיִּים. The accentuation denotes אָרַח as subst.; for אָרַח [way, road] = אָרַח [a wayfarer, part. of אָרַח] would, as שָׁסַע, Lev. 11: 7, נָמַע, Psa. 94: 9, have the tone on the ultima. It is necessary neither to change the tone, nor, with Ewald, to interpret אָרַח as *abstr. pro concreto*, like הֶלֶךְ, for the expression “wanderer to life” has no support in the *Mishle*. Michaelis has given the right interpretation: *via ad vitam est si quis custodiat disciplinam*. The syntactical contents, however, are different, as e.g., 1Sa. 2:13, where the participle has the force of a hypothetical clause; for the expression: “a way to life is he who observes correction,” is equivalent to: he is on the way to life who...; a variety of the manner of expression: “the porch was twenty cubits,” 2Ch. 3: 4, particularly adapted to the figurative language of proverbial poetry, as if the poet said: See there one observant of correction — that (viz., the שֹׁמֵר [שָׁמַר, to watch] representing itself in this שֹׁמֵר) is the way to life. מוֹסֵר and תּוֹכַחַת are related to each other as παιδεία and ἔλεγχος; עֹזֵב [עָזַב, to leave, forsake] is equivalent to בְּלַתִּי שֹׁמֵר. מִתְּעָה would be unsuitable as a contrast in the causative sense: who guides wrong, according to which Bertheau understands 17a, that only he who observes correction can guide others to life. We expect to hear what injuries he who thinks to raise himself above all reproach brings on himself. Hitzig, in his Commentary (1858), for this reason places the *Hithpa.* מִתְּעָה (rather write מִתְּעָה) in the place of the *Hiph.*; but in the *Comm. on Jeremiah* (1866), Jer. 42:20, he rightly remarks: “To err, not as an involuntary condition, but as an arbitrary proceeding, is suitably expressed by the *Hiph.*” In like manner הִגִּיא הוֹסִיף (to touch), הִרְחִיק (to go to a distance), denote the active conduct of a being endowed with reason; Ewald, § 122, c. Jewish interpreters gloss מִתְּעָה by supplying נִפְשׁוּ; but it signifies only as inwardly transitive, to accomplish the action of the תְּעוֹת.

***18 He that hideth hatred is a mouth of falsehood;
And he that spreadeth slander is a fool.***

Pro. 10:18. The LXX, καλύπτουσιν ἔχθραν χεῖλα δίκαια, which Ewald prefers, and which has given occasion to Hitzig to make a remarkable conjecture (“He who conceals hatred, close lips,” which no one understands without Hitzig’s comment. to this his conjecture). But

(1) to hide hatred (cf. v. 11, Pro. 26:24) is something altogether different from to cover sin (v. 12, Pro. 17: 9), or generally to keep anything secret with discretion (Pro. 10:13); and

(2) that *δικαία* is a corrupt reading for *ἄδικα* (as Grabe supposes, and Symmachus translates) or *δόλια* (as Lagarde supposes, and indeed is found in Codd.). Michaelis well remarks: *odium tectum est dolosi, manifesta sycophantia stultorum*. Whoever conceals hateful feelings behind his words is שְׂפִתֵי־שָׁקֶר, a mouth of falsehood (cf. the mouth of the fool, v. 14); one does not need to supply אִישׁ, but much rather has hence to conclude that a false man is simply so named, as is proved by Psa. 120: 3. There is a second moral judgment, 18b: he who spreadeth slander (וּמוֹצֵא, according to the Masoretic writing: he who divulges it, the correlate to הַבִּיא, to bring to, Gen. 37: 2) is a *Thor* [fool, stupid, dull], בְּסִיל (not a *Narr* [fool, godless person], אָוִיל); for such slandering can generally bring no advantage; it injures the reputation of him to whom the דְּבָרָה, i.e., the secret report, the slander, refers; it sows discord, has incalculable consequences, and finally brings guilt on the tale-bearer himself.

***19 In a multitude of words transgression is not wanting;
But he who restrains his lips shows wisdom.***

Pro. 10:19. We do not, with Bertheau, understand 19a: by many words a transgression does not cease to be what it is; the contrast 19b requires a more general condemnation of the multitude of words, and חָרַל not only means to cease from doing (to leave off), and to cease from being (to take away), but also not at all to do (to intermit, Eze. 3:11; Zec. 11:12), and not at all to be (to fail, to be absent), thus: *ubi verborum est abundantia non deest peccatum* (Fl.). Michaelis suitably compares *πολυλογία πολλὰ σφάλματα ἔχει* by Stobäus, and חֵטְא כֹל הַמְרַבֵּה דְבָרִים מְבִיא חֵטְא in the tractate *Aboth* i. 17, wherewith Rashi explains the proverb. פִּשְׁעַ is not here, as elsewhere, e.g., Psa. 19:14, with special reference to the sin of falling away from favour, apostasy, but, like the post-biblical עֲבָרָה, generally with reference to every kind of violation (פִּשְׁעַ = Arab. *fsq dirumpere*) of moral restraint; here, as Jansen remarks, *peccatum sive mendacii, sive detractionis, sive alterius indiscretæ laesionis, sive vanitatis, sive denique verbi otiosi*. In 19b it is more appropriate to regard מְשַׁבֵּיל as the present of the internal transitive (*intelligenter agit*) than to interpret it in the attributive sense (*intelligens*).

***20 Choice silver is the tongue of the righteous;
But the heart of the godless is little worth.***

Pro. 10:20. Choice silver is, as Pro. 8:19, cf. 10, pure, freed from all base mixtures. Like it, pure and noble, is whatever the righteous speaks; the heart, i.e., the manner of thought and feeling, of the godless is, on the contrary, like little *instar nihili*, i.e., of little or no worth, Arab. *yasway kâlyla* (Fl.). LXX: the

heart of the godless *ἔκλειψει*, i.e., *יָמַט*, at first arrogant and full of lofty plans, it becomes always the more dejected, discouraged, empty. But 20a leads us to expect some designation of its worth. The Targ. (according to which the Peshito is to be corrected; vid., Levy's *Wörterbuch*, ii. 26): the heart of the godless is *מִתְקָה* (from *נָתַת*), refuse, dross. The other Greek versions accord with the text before us.

**21 The lips of the righteous edify many;
But fools die through want of understanding.**

Pro. 10:21. The LXX translate 21a: the lips of the righteous *ἐπίσταται ὑψηλά*, which would at least require *יְדַעו רַבּוֹת רָעָה*. *רָעָה* is, like the post-bibl. *פְּרִיָּם* (vid., the *Hebr. Römerbrief*, p. 97), another figure for the N.T. *οἰκοδομῆιν*: to afford spiritual nourishment and strengthening, to which Fleischer compares the ecclesiastical expressions: *pastor, ovile ecclesiae, les ouailles*; *רָעָה* means leader, Jer. 10:21, as well as teacher, Ecc. 12:11, for it contains partly the prevailing idea of leading, partly of feeding. *יָרְעוּ* stands for *תִּרְעֵינָה*, as v. 32, Pro. 5: 2. In 21b, Bertheau incorrectly explains, as Euchel and Michaelis: *stulti complures per dementem unum moriuntur*; the food has truly enough in his own folly, and needs not to be first drawn by others into destruction. *חָסַר* is not here the connective form of *חָסַר* (Jewish interpreters: for that reason, that he is such an one), nor of *חָסַר* (Hitzig, Zöckler), which denotes, as a concluded idea, *penuria*, but like *רָחַב*, Pro. 21: 4, *שָׁכַב*, Pro. 6:10, and *שָׁפַל*, Pro. 16:19, *infin.*: they die by want of understanding (cf. Pro. 5:23); this *amentia* is the cause of their death, for it leads fools to meet destruction without their observing it (Hos. 4: 6).

Three proverbs which say that good comes from above, and is as a second nature to the man of understanding:

**22 Jahve's blessing — it maketh rich;
And labour addeth nothing thereto**

Pro. 10:22. Like 24a, *יְיָ* limits the predicate to this and no other subject: "all depends on God's blessing." Here is the first half of the *ora et labora*. The proverb is a compendium of Psalms 127: 1, 2. 22b is to be understood, according to v. 2 of this Solomonic psalm, not that God adds to His blessing no sorrow, much rather with the possession grants at the same time a joyful, peaceful mind (LXX, Targ., Syriac, Jerome, Aben-Ezra, Michaelis, and others), which would require the word *עָלְיָהּ*; but that trouble, labour, i.e., strenuous self-endeavours, add not (anything) to it, i.e., that it does not associate itself with the blessing (which, as the Jewish interpreters rightly remark, is, according to

its nature, תוספת, as the curse is (חסרון) as the *causa efficiens*, or if we supply *quidquam*, as the complement to עִמָּה [along with it]: nothing is added thereto, which goes along with that which the blessing of God grants, and completes it. Thus correctly Rashi, Luther, Ziegler, Ewald, Hitzig, Zöckler. the now current accentuation, וְלֹא יוֹסֵף עֲצָב עִמָּה, is incorrect. Older editions, as Venice 1525, 1615, Basel 1618, have וְלֹא־יוֹסֵף עֲצָב עִמָּה, the transformation of וְלֹא־יוֹסֵף עֲצָב. Besides, עֲצָב has double Segol (vid., Kimchi's *Lex.*), and יוֹסֵף is written, according to the Masora, in the first syllable *plene*, in the last *defective*.

**23 Like sport to a fool is the commission of a crime;
And wisdom to a man of understanding.**

Pro. 10:23. Otherwise Löwenstein: to a fool the carrying out of a plan is as sport; to the man of understanding, on the contrary, as wisdom. זָמָה, from זָמַם, to press together, mentally to think, as Job. 17:11, and according to Gesenius, also Pro. 21:27; 24: 9. But זָמָה has the prevailing signification of an outrage against morality, a sin of unchastity; and especially the phrase זָמָה עָשָׂה is in Jud. 20: 6 and in Ezekiel not otherwise used, so that all the old interpreters render it here by *patrare scelus*; only the Targum has the equivocal עֲבַד עֲבִידָהּא; the Syriac, however, *bd bîstā*. Sinful conduct appears to the fool, who places himself above the solemnity of the moral law, as sport; and wisdom, on the contrary, (appears as sport) to a man of understanding. We would not venture on this acceptance of שָׂחַק if כְּשָׂחֹק were not attributed, 8:30 f., to wisdom itself. This alternate relationship recommends itself by the indetermination of וְהִכְבֵּדָהּ, which is not favourable to the interpretation: *sed sapientiam colit vir intelligens*, or as Jerome has it: *sapientia autem est viro prudentia*. The subjects of the antithesis chiasmically combine within the verse: חֲכָמָה, in contrast to wicked conduct, is acting in accordance with moral principles. This to the man of understanding is as easy as sporting, just as to the fool is shameless sinning; for he follows in this an inner impulse, it brings to him joy, it is the element in which he feels himself satisfied.

**24 That of which the godless is afraid cometh upon him,
And what the righteous desires is granted to him.**

Pro. 10:24. The formation of the clause 24a is like the similar proverb, Pro. 11:27b; the subject-idea has there its expression in the genitival *annexum*, of which Gen. 9: 6b furnishes the first example; in this passage before us it stands at the beginning, and is, as in v. 22, emphatically repeated with הִיא.

מִגְנָרָה, properly the turning oneself away, hence shrinking back in terror; here, as Isa. 66: 4, of the object of fear, parallel to תִּשְׁאָנָה, wishing, of the object of the wish. In 24b Ewald renders יִתֵּן as adj. from יָתַן (whence יִתְּן), after the form פִּקְנָה, and translates: yet to the righteous desire is always green. But whether יִתֵּן is probably formed from יָתַן, and not from נָתַן, is a question in Pro. 12:12, but not here, where wishing and giving (fulfilling) are naturally *correlata*. Hitzig corrects יִתְּן, and certainly the supplying of הִ is as little appropriate here as at Pro. 13:21. Also a “one gives” is scarcely intended (according to which the Targ., Syr., and Jerome translate passively), in which case the Jewish interpreters are wont to explain יִתֵּן, *scil.* הַנּוֹתֵן; for if the poet thought of יִתֵּן with a personal subject, why did he not rescue it from the dimness of such vague generality? Thus, then, יִתֵּן is, with Böttcher, to be interpreted as impersonal, like Pro. 13:10, Job. 37:10, and perhaps also Gen. 38:28 (Ewald, § 295a): what the righteous wish, that there is, i.e., it becomes actual, is fulfilled. In this we have not directly and exclusively to think of the destiny at which the godless are afraid (Heb. 10:27), and toward which the desire of the righteous goes forth; but the clause has also truth which is realized in this world: just that which they greatly fear, e.g., sickness, bankruptcy, the loss of reputation, comes upon the godless; on the contrary that which the righteous wish realizes itself, because their wish, in its intention, and kind, and content, stands in harmony with the order of the moral world.

There now follows a series of proverbs, broken by only one dissimilar proverb, on the immoveable continuance of the righteous:

***25 When the storm sweeps past, it is no more with the wicked;
But the righteous is a building firm for ever.***

Pro. 10:25. How v. 25 is connected with v. 24 is shown in the Book of Wisdom 5:15 (the hope of the wicked like chaff which the wind pursues). The Aram., Jerome, and *Graec. Venet.* interpret כִּי of comparison, so that the destruction of the godless is compared in suddenness and rapidity to the rushing past of a storm; but then רָיָח ought to have been used instead of סוּפָה; and instead of וְאֵין רָשָׁע with the ἠ apodosis, a disturbing element in such a comparison, would have been used יִחַלֵּף רָשָׁע, or at least רָשָׁע אֵין. The thought is no other than that of Job. 21:18: the storm, which is called סוּפָה, from סוּף, to rush forth, is meant, as sweeping forth, and כִּי the temporal, as Exo. 11: 4 (LXX παραπορευομένης καταιγίδος), with ἠ apod. following, like e.g., after a similar member of a temporal sentence, Isa. 10:25.

סופה is a figure of God-decreed calamities, as war and pestilence, under which the godless sink, while the righteous endure them; cf. with 25a, 1:27, Isa. 28:18; and with 25b, 3:25, Hab. 2: 4, Psa. 91. “An everlasting foundation,” since **עולם** is understood as looking forwards, not as at Isa. 58:12, backwards, is a foundation capable of being shaken by nothing, and synecdoch. generally a building. The proverb reminds us of the close of the Sermon on the Mount, and finds the final confirmation of its truth in this, that the death of the godless is a penal thrusting of them away, but the death of the righteous a lifting them up to their home. The righteous also often enough perish in times of war and of pestilence; but the proverb, as it is interpreted, verifies itself, even although not so as the poet, viewing it from his narrow O.T. standpoint, understood it; for the righteous, let him die when and how he may, is preserved, while the godless perishes.

Pro. 10:26. This proverb stands out of connection with the series:

*As vinegar to the teeth, and as smoke to the eyes,
So is the sluggard to them who gives him a commission.*

A parabolic proverb (vid., p. 8), *priamel*-like in its formation (p. 11). Here and there **לשנים** is found with *Mugrash*, but in correct texts it has *Rebîa-magnum*; the verse is divided into two by *Athnach*, whose subordinate distributive is (*Accentssystem*, xi. § 1) *Rebîa-magnum*. Smoke makes itself disagreeably perceptible to the sense of smell, and particularly to the eyes, which it causes to smart so that they overflow with tears; wherefore Virgil speaks of it as *amarus*, and Horace *lacrimosus*. **חמץ** (from **חמץ**, to be sour, harsh) signifies properly that which is sour, as *acetum*, **ὄξος**; here, after the LXX **ὄμφαξ**, the unripe grapes, but which are called **בסר** (**בסר**) (vid., under Job. 15:33), by which the Syr., here following the LXX, translates, and which also in the Talmud, *Demai* i. 1, is named **חמץ**, after a doubtful meaning (vid., Aruch, and on the other side Rashi), thus: vinegar, which the word commonly means, and which also accords with the object of the comparison, especially if one thinks of the sharp vinegar-wine of the south, which has an effect on the teeth denoted by the Hebr. verb **קהה**, as the effect of smoke is by **כהה** (Fl.). The plur. **לשלהיו** is that of the category, like Pro. 22:21; 25:13; the parallel **אדניו** of the latter passage does not at least make it necessary to regard it, like this, as a *plur. excellentiae* (Bertheau, Hitzig, Ewald). They who send a sluggard, i.e., who make him their agent, do it to their own sorrow; his slothfulness is for them, and for that which they have in view, of dull, i.e., slow and restrained, of biting, i.e., sensibly injurious operation.

From this point the proverbs fall into the series connecting themselves with v. 25:

***27 The fear of Jahve multiplies the days of life;
But the years of the godless are shortened.***

Pro. 10:27. This parable, like v. 25, also corresponds with the O.T. standpoint, having in view the present life. The present-life history confirms it, for vice destroys body and soul; and the fear of God, which makes men contented and satisfied in God, is truly the right principle of longevity. But otherwise also the pious often enough die early, for God carries them away **מפני הרעה** [from the face of the evil], Isa. 57: 1 f.; or if they are martyrs for the truth (Psa. 44:23, cf. 60: 6), the verification of the above proverb in such cases moves forward (Wisd. 4: 7 ff.) into eternity, in which the life of the pious continues for ever, while that of the godless loses itself with his death in the state of everlasting death. Pro. 9:11, cf. 3: 2, resembles 27a. Instead of **תקצרנה, תקצרנה** was to be expected; but the flexion does not distinguish the transitive **קצר** (Arab. *kašara*) and intransitive **קצרה** (Arab. *kašura*) as it ought.

***28 The expectation of the righteous is gladness
And the hope of the godless comes to nothing.***

Pro. 10:28. **תנחלת** as well as **תקנה** proceed on the fundamental idea of a strained earnest looking back upon something, the same fundamental idea which in another view gives the meaning of strength (**חיל**, Arab. *ḥayl*; *kuwwat, kawiy*, cf. **גדל**, Arab. *jdl, plectere*, and **גדול**, *strong and strength*). The substantival clause 28a denotes nothing more than: it is gladness (cf. Pro. 3:17, all their steps are gladness), but which is equivalent to, it is that in its issue, *in gaudium desinit*. Hitzig's remark that **תוחלת** is the chief idea for hope and fear, is not confirmed by the usage of the language; it always signifies joyful, not anxious, expectation; cf. the interchange of the same two synonyms Pro. 13: 7, and **תאונת**, Psa. 112:10, instead of **תקנות** (here and Job. 8:13). While the expectation of the one terminates in the joy of the fulfilment, the hope of the other (**אבד**, R. **בד**, to separate) perishes, i.e., comes to nothing.

***29 Jahve's way is a bulwark to the righteous;
But ruin to those that do evil.***

Pro. 10:29. Of the two meanings which **מעוז** (**מעוז**) has: a stronghold from **עוז**, and asylum (= Arab. *m'adz*) from **עוז**, the contrast here demands the former. **דרך ה'** and **יראת ה'**, understood objectively, are the two O.T. names

of true religion. It means, then, the way which the God of revelation directs men to walk in (Psa. 143: 8), the way of His precepts, Psa. 119:27, His way of salvation, Psa. 67: 3 (4); in the N.T. ἡ ὁδὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, Mat. 22:16, Act. 18:25 f.; cf. ἡ ὁδὸς simply, Act. 9: 2; 24:14. This way of Jahve is a fortress, bulwark, defence for innocence, or more precisely, a disposition wholly, i.e., unreservedly and without concealment, directed toward God and that which is good. All the old interpreters, also Luther, but not the *Graec. Venet.*, translate as if the expression were לַיְהוָה; but the punctuation has preferred the *abstr. pro concreto*, perhaps because the personal יְהוָה nowhere else occurs with any such prefix; on the contrary, אֱלֹהִים is frequently connected with ב, כ, ל. לַיְהוָה דֶּרֶךְ *integro viae (vitae)*, are by no means to be connected in one conception (Ziegler, Umbr., Elster), for then the poet ought to have written מַעַן יְהוָה לַיְהוָה דֶּרֶךְ. 29b cannot be interpreted as a thought by itself: and ruin (vid., regarding מַחֲרָה, *ruina*, and subjectively *consternatio*, v. 16) comes to those who do evil; but the thought, much more comprehensive, that religion, which is for the righteous a strong protection and safe retreat, will be an overthrow to those who delight only in wickedness (vid., on אֲוִן, p. 104), is confirmed by the similarly formed distich, Pro. 21:15. Also almost all the Jewish interpreters, from Rashi to Malbim, find here expressed the operation of the divine revelation set over against the conduct of men, — essentially the same as when the Tora or the Chokma present to men for their choice life and death; or the gospel of salvation, according to 2Co. 2:15, is to one the savour of life unto life, to another the savour of death unto death.

***30 The righteous is never moved;
But the godless abide not in the land.***

Pro. 10:30. Love of home is an impulse and emotion natural to man; but to no people was fatherland so greatly delighted in, to none was exile and banishment from fatherland so dreadful a thought, as it was to the people of Israel. Expatriation is the worst of all evils with which the prophets threatened individuals and the people, Amo. 7:17, cf. Isa. 22:17 f.; and the history of Israel in their exile, which was a punishment of their national apostasy, confirms this proverb and explains its form; cf. Pro. 2:21 f., Psa. 37:29. בֵּל is, like Pro. 9:13, the emphatic No of the more elevated style; נְמוּט, the opposite of נִבְוֶן, Pro. 12: 3; and שָׁבַן signifies to dwell, both inchoative: to come to dwell, and consecutive: to continue to dwell (e.g., Isa. 57:15, of God who inhabiteth eternity). In general, the proverb means that the righteous fearlessly maintains the position he takes; while, on the contrary, all they who have no hold on God lose also their outward position. But often enough this saying is fulfilled in this, that they, in order that they may escape disgrace, became

wanderers and fugitives, and are compelled to conceal themselves among strangers.

Pro. 10:31. For the third time the favourite theme already handled in three appendixes is taken up:

***The mouth of the righteous bringeth forth wisdom,
And the tongue of falsehood shall be rooted up.***

Regarding the biblical comparison of thoughts with branches, and of words with flowers and fruits, vid., my *Psychol.* p. 181; and regarding the root נב (with its weaker אב), to swell up and to spring up (to well, grow, etc.), vid., what is said in the *Comm. on Genesis* on נביא, and in *Isaiah* on אוב. We use the word נוב of that which sprouts or grows, and נבב of that which causes that something sprout; but also נוב may, after the manner of verbs of being full (Pro. 3:10), of flowing (Ges. § 138, 1, Anm. 2), take the object accus. of that from which anything sprouts (Pro. 24:31), or which sprouting, it raises up and brings forth (cf. Isa. 57:19). The mouth of the righteous sprouts, brings forth (in Psa. 37:30, without a figure, יְהַגֵּה, i.e., utters) wisdom, which in all relations knows how to find out that which is truly good, and suitable for the end intended, and happily to unriddle difficult complications.

The conception of wisdom, in itself practical (from חכם, to be thick = solid, firm), here gains such contents by the contrast: the tongue — whose character and fruit is falsehood, which has its delight in intentional perversions of fact, and thus increaseth complications (vid., regarding תְּהַפְכֹת, Pro. 2:12) — is rooted up, whence it follows as regards the mouth of the righteous, that it continues for ever with that its wholesome fruit.

***32 The lips of the righteous know what is acceptable;
But the mouth of the godless is mere falsehood.***

Pro. 10:32. Hitzig, instead of יִדְעוּן, reads יִבְעוּן; the ἀποστάζει [they distil or send forth] of the LXX does not favour this, for it is probably only a corruption of ἐπίσταται, which is found in several MSS the *Graec. Venet.*, which translates ποιμανοῦσι, makes use of a MS which it sometimes misreads. The text does not stand in need of any emendations, but rather of a corrected relation between the clauses, for the relation of 31a with 32b, and of 32a with 31b, strongly commends itself (Hitzig); in that case the explanation lies near: the lips of the righteous find what is acceptable, viz., to God. But this thought in the Mashal language is otherwise expressed (Pro. 12: 2 and paral.); and also 32a and 32b fit each other as contrasts, if by רָצוֹן, as Pro. 11:27; 14: 9, is to be understood that which is acceptable in its widest generality, equally then in

relation to God and man. It is a question whether ידעון means that they have knowledge of it (as one e.g., says ידע ספר, to understand writing, i.e., the reading of it), or that they think thereupon (cf. Pro. 27:23). Fundamentally the two ideas, according to the Hebrew conception of the words, lie in each other; for the central conception, perceiving, is biblically equivalent to a delighted searching into or going towards the object. Thus: the lips of the righteous think of that which is acceptable (רצון, cogn. to חן, gracefulness; χάρις, Col. 4: 6); while the mouth of the godless is mere falsehood, which God (the wisdom of God) hates, and from which discord on all sides arises. We might transfer ידעון to 32b; but this line, interpreted as a clause by itself, is stronger and more pointed (Fl.).

CHAPTER 11

The next three proverbs treat of honesty, discretion, and innocence or dove-like simplicity:

*1 Deceitful balances are an abomination to Jahve;
But a full weight is His delight.*

Pro. 11: 1. The very same proverb, with slightly varied expression, is found in Pro. 20:23; and other such like proverbs, in condemnation of false and in approbation of true balances, are found, Pro. 20:10; 16:11; similar predicates, but connected with other subjects, are found at Pro. 12:22; 15: 8. “An abomination to Jahve” is an expression we have already twice met with in the introduction, Pro. 3:32; 6:16, cf. 8: 7; תועבה is, like תועה, a participial noun, in which the active conception of abhorring is transferred to the action accomplished. רצון is in post-biblical Hebr. the designation of the *arbitrium* and the *voluntas*; but here רצונו signifies not that which God wishes, but that which He delights in having. “מַרְמָה (here for the first time in Proverbs), from רָמָה, the *Piel* of which means (Pro. 26:19) *aliquem dolo et fraude petere*. אֶבֶן, like the Pers. *sanak, sanakh*, Arab. *šajat*, a stone for weight; and finally, without any reference to its root signification, like Zec. 5: 8, אֶבֶן העופרת, a leaden weight, as when we say: a horseshoe of gold, a chess-man of ivory.”

Pro. 11: 2. Now follows the Solomonic “Pride goeth before a fall.”

*There cometh arrogance, so also cometh shame;
But with the humble is wisdom.*

Interpreted according to the Hebr.: if the former has come, so immediately also comes the latter. The general truth as to the causal connection of the two is

conceived of historically; the fact, confirmed by many events, is represented in the form of a single occurrence as a warning example; the preterites are like the Greek *aoristi gnomici* (vid., p. 32); and the perf., with the *fut. consec.* following, is the expression of the immediate and almost simultaneous consequence (vid., at Hab. 3:10): has haughtiness (נָדוֹן after the form לְצוֹן, from נָדַד, to boil, to run over) appeared, then immediately also disgrace appeared, in which the arrogant behaviour is overwhelmed. The harmony of the sound of the Hebr. נָדוֹן and קָלוֹן cannot be reproduced in German [nor in English]; Hitzig and Ewald try to do so, but such a *quid pro quo* as “*Kommt Unglimpf kommt an ihn Schimpf*” [there comes arrogance, there comes to him disgrace] is not a translation, but a distortion of the text. If, now, the antithesis says that with the humble is wisdom, wisdom is meant which avoids such disgrace as arrogance draws along with it; for the זָנוּאִי thinks not more highly of himself than he ought to think (R. זָנַן, *subsidere, demitti, Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xxv. 185).

***3 The integrity of the upright guideth them;
But the perverseness of the ungodly destroyeth them.***

Pro. 11: 3. To the upright, יִשְׂרָיִם, who keep the line of rectitude without turning aside therefrom into devious paths (Psa. 125: 4 f.), stand opposed (as at Pro. 2:21 f.) the ungodly (faithless), בְּגַדִּים, who conceal (from בָּגַד, to cover, whence בָּגַד = בְּסוֹת) malicious thoughts and plans. And the contrast of תְּמָה, integrity = unreserved loving submission, is סָלַף, a word peculiar to the Solomonic Mashal, with its verb סָלַף (vid., p. 23). Hitzig explains it by the Arab. *saraf*, to step out, to tread over; and Ewald by *lafat*, to turn, to turn about (“treacherous, false step”), both of which are improbable. Schultens compares *salaf* in the meaning to smear (R. לָפַף, לָפַף, ἀλείφειν; cf. regarding such secondary formations with שׁ preceding, Hupfeld on Psa. 5: 7), and translates here, *lubricitas*. But this rendering is scarcely admissible. It has against it lexical tradition (Menahem: מוֹטָה, wavering; Perchon: זיוף, falsifying; Kimchi: עוֹוֹת, misrepresentation, according to which the *Graec. Venet.* σκολιότης), as well as the methodical comparison of the words. The Syriac has not this verbal stem, but the Targum has סָלַף in the meaning to distort, to turn the wrong way (σκολιούσιν, στρεβλοῦσιν), Pro. 10:10, and Est. 6:10, where, in the second Targum, פּוּמָה אֶסְתַּלַּף means “his mouth was crooked.” With justice, therefore, Gesenius in his *Thesaurus* has decided in favour of the fundamental idea *pervertere*, from which also the Peshito and Saadia proceed; for in Exo. 23: 8 they translate (Syr.) *mahpêk* (it, the gift of bribery, perverts) and (Arab.) *tazyf* (= תַּזְיִף, it falsifies). Fl. also, who at Pro. 15: 4 remarks, “סָלַף,

from סִלַף, to stir up, to turn over, so that the lowermost becomes the uppermost,” gives the preference to this primary idea, in view of the Arab. *salaf*, *invertere terram conserendi causa*. It is moreover confirmed by *salaf*, *praecedere*, which is *pervertere* modified to *praevertere*. But how does סִלַף mean *perversio* (Theod. ὑποσκελισμός), in the sense of the overthrow prepared for thy neighbour? The parallels demand the sense of a condition peculiar to the word and conduct of the godless (treacherous), Pro. 22:12 (cf. Exo. 23: 8), Pro. 19: 3, thus *perversitas*, perversity; but this as contrary to truth and rectitude (*opp.* תִּמְהָה), “perverseness,” as we have translated it, for we understand by it want of rectitude (dishonesty) and untruthfulness. While the sincerity of the upright conducts them, and, so to say, forms their *salvus conductus*, which guards them against the danger of erring and of hostile assault, the perverseness of the treacherous destroys them; for the disfiguring of truth avenges itself against them, and they experience the reverse of the proverb, “*das Ehrlich währt am längsten*” (honesty endures the longest). The *Chethib* וְשָׂדֵם (וְשָׂדֵם) is an error of transcription; the *Kerî* has the proper correction, וְשָׂדֵם = וְשָׂדֵם, Jer. 5: 6. Regarding שָׂדֵד (whence יְשָׂדִי), which, from its root-signification of making close and fast, denotes violence and destruction, vid., under Genesis 17.

Three proverbs in praise of צְדָקָה:

***4 Possessions are of no profit in the day of wrath;
But righteousness delivereth from death.***

Pro. 11: 4. That which is new here, is only that possessions and goods (vid., regarding הוֹן, p. 44) are destitute of all value in the day of the μέλλουσα ὀργή; for יוֹם עֲבָרָה, the day of wrath breaking through the limits (of long-suffering), has the same meaning as in the prophets; and such prophetic words as Isa. 10: 3, Zep. 1:18, and, almost in the same words, Eze. 7:19, are altogether similar to this proverb. The LXX, which translates ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπαγωγῆς, harmonizes in expression with Sir. 5: 8, cf. 2: 2. Theodotion translates אִוִּד, Pro. 27:10, by ἐπαγωγή (providence, fate).

***5 The righteousness of the blameless smootheth his way,
And by his own wickedness doth the wicked fall.***

Pro. 11: 5. With the תְּמִיָּם (cf. Pro. 1:12), formed after the passive, more than with תָּם, is connected the idea of the perfected, but more in the negative sense of moral spotlessness than of moral perfection. The rectitude of a man who seeks to keep his conscience and his character pure, maketh smooth (יִשָּׂר), as Pro. 3: 6, not of the straightness of the line, but of the surface, evenness) his

life's path, so that he can pursue his aim without stumbling and hindrance, and swerving from the direct way; while, on the contrary, the godless comes to ruin by his godlessness — that by which he seeks to forward his interests, and to make a way for himself, becomes his destruction.

***6 The rectitude of the upright saveth them,
And in their own covetousness are the faithless taken.***

Pro. 11: 6. The integrity of those who go straight forward and straight through, without permitting themselves to turn aside on crooked ways, delivers them from the snares which are laid for them, the dangers they encounter; while, on the contrary, the faithless, though they mask their intentions ever so cunningly, are ensnared in their passionate covetousness: the mask is removed, they are convicted, and are caught and lost. Regarding **וְהִתְהַוָּה**, abyss, overthrow, also stumbling against anything = covetousness, vid., at Pro. 10: 3, and under Psa. 5:10. The form of the expression *6b* follows the scheme, “in the image of God created He man,” Gen. 9: 6. The subject is to be taken from the genitive, as is marked by the accentuation, for it gives *Mugrash* to the **וְהִתְהַוָּה**, as if it were the principal form, for **וְהִתְהַוָּה**.

Three proverbs regarding destruction and salvation:

***7 When a godless man dies, his hope cometh to nought,
And the expectation of those who stand in fulness of strength is destroyed.***

Pro. 11: 7. We have already remarked in the Introduction that **אדם** is a favourite word of the Chokma, and the terminological distinction of different classes and properties of men (vid., pp. 29, 30); we read, Pro. 6:12, **בְּלִיאַל אָדָם**, and here, as also Job. 20:29; 27:13, **רָשָׁע אָדָם רָשָׁע**, cf. Pro. 21:29, **רָשָׁע שִׂאֵשׁ**, but generally only **רָשָׁע** is used. A godless man, to whom earthly possessions and pleasure and honour are the highest good, and to whom no means are too base, in order that he may appease this his threefold passion, rocks himself in unbounded and measureless hopes; but with his death, his hope, i.e., all that he hoped for, comes to nought. The LXX translate **τελευτήσαντος ἀνδρὸς δικαίου οὐκ ἔλλυται ἐλπίς**, which is the converse of that which is here said, *7a*: the hope of the righteous expects its fulfilment beyond the grave. The LXX further translate, **τὸ δὲ καύχημα (וְהִתְהַוָּה) τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἔλλυται**; but the distich in the Hebr. text is not an antithetic one, and whether **אֲנִיִּים** may signify the wicked (thus also the Syr., Targ., Venet., and Luther), if we regard it as a brachyology for **אֲנִישׁי אֲנִיִּים**, or as the plur. of an adj. **אֲנִי**, after the form **טוב** (Elazar b. Jacob in Kimchi), or wickedness (Zöckler, with Hitzig, “the wicked expectation”), is very questionable. Yet

more improbable is Malbim's (with Rashi's) rendering of this אֹנִים, after Gen. 49: 3, Psa. 78:51, and the Targ. on Job. 18:12, of the children of the deceased; children *gignuntur ex robore virili*, but are not themselves the *robur virile*. But while אֹנִים is nowhere the plur. of אָוֶן in its ethical signification, it certainly means in Psa. 78:51, as the plur. of אָוֶן, manly strength, and in Isa. 40:26, 29 the fulness of strength generally, and once, in Hos. 9: 4, as plur. of אָוֶן in its physical signification, derived from its root-meaning *anhelitus* (Gen. 35:18, cf. Hab. 3: 7), deep sorrow (a heightening of the אָוֶן, Deu. 26:14). This latter signification has also been adopted: Jerome, *expectatio sollicitorum*; Bertheau, "the expectation of the sorrowing;" Ewald, "continuance of sorrow;" but the meaning of this in this connection is so obscure, that one must question the translators what its import is. Therefore we adhere to the other rendering, "fulness of strength," and interpret אֹנִים as the opposite of אֵין אֹנִים, Isa. 40:29, for it signifies, *per metonymiam abstracti pro concr.*, those who are full of strength; and we gain the meaning that there is a sudden end to the expectation of those who are in full strength, and build their prospects thereon. The two synonymous lines complete themselves, in so far as אֹנִים gains by אָדָם רָשָׁע the associated idea of self-confidence, and the second strengthens the thought of the first by the transition of the expression from the fut. to the preterite (Fl.). ותוחלת has, for the most part in recent impressions, the *Mugrash*; the correct accentuation, according to codices and old impressions, is ותוחלת אֹנִים (vid., Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 10, § 4).

***8 The righteous is delivered from trouble,
And the godless comes in his stead.***

Pro. 11: 8. The succession of the tenses gives the same meaning as when, periodizing, we say: while the one is delivered, the other, on the contrary, falls before the same danger. נִחַלֵץ (vid., under Isa. 58:11) followed by the historical tense, the expression of the principal fact, is the perfect. The statement here made clothes itself after the manner of a parable in the form of history. It is true there are not wanting experiences of an opposite kind (from that here stated), because divine justice manifests itself in this world only as a prelude, but not perfectly and finally; but the poet considers this, that as a rule destruction falls upon the godless, which the righteous with the help of God escapes; and this he realizes as a moral motive. In itself תִּחַתְּרוּ may also have only the meaning of the exchange of places, but the LXX translate ἀντ' αὐτοῦ, and thus in the sense of representation the proverb appears to be understood in connection with Pro. 21:18 (cf. the prophetic-historical application, Isa. 43: 4). The idea of atonement has, however, no application here, for the essence of atonement consists in the offering up of an innocent one in the room

of the guilty, and its force lies in the offering up of self; the meaning is only, that if the divinely-ordained linking together of cause and effect in the realms of nature and of history brings with it evil, this brings to the godless destruction, while it opens the way of deliverance for the righteous, so that the godless becomes for the righteous the כִּפּוּר, or, as we might say in a figure of similar import, the lightning conductor.

***9 The wicked with his mouth prepareth destruction for his neighbour;
But by knowledge the righteous are delivered from it.***

Pro. 11: 9. The LXX translate, ἐν στόματι ἀσεβῶν παγίς (רָשָׁע?) πολίταις, αἰσθησις δὲ δικαίους εὐδοκᾶς, (יִצְלַח). There is no reason for changing (with Hitzig and Ewald) the text, which in the form in which it is here translated was before all other translators (Aq., Symmachus, Theodotion, Syr., Targ., Jerome). The accentuation, which separates the two instrumental statements by greater disjunctives from that which follows, is correct. The “three” Greek versions [viz. of Aquila, Theodotion, and Symmachus] translate ὑποκριτής, which it means in the modern idiom; but in the ancient Hebr. it signifies, him who is resolved upon evil, as in Arab. *ḥanyf*, him who is resolved upon that which is right: he who turns aside to evil enters on a path far removed from that which is right. In יִשְׁחִית one is reminded (without any etymological reason) of שַׁחַת (pit), and so in יִחַלְצוּ of מִשְׁחִיתוֹתָם (Psa. 107:20) or a similar word; but בְּדַאֵת contains the reference, in this connection not easy to be mistaken, to the hostile purposes of the wicked masked by the words of the mouth, which are seen through by the righteous by virtue of knowledge which makes them acquainted with men. This penetrating look is their means of deliverance.

Three proverbs follow relating to the nature of city and national life, and between them two against mockery and backbiting:

***10 In the prosperity of the righteous the city rejoiceth;
And if the wicked come to ruin, there is jubilation.***

Pro. 11:10. The בּ of בְּטוֹב denotes the ground but not the object, as elsewhere, but the cause of the rejoicing, like the בּ 10b, and in the similar proverb, Pro. 29: 2, cf. 28:12. If it goes well with the righteous, the city has cause for joy, because it is for the advantage of the community; and if the wicked (godless) come to an end, then there is jubilation (substantival clause for תִּרְנַן), for although they are honoured in their lifetime, yet men breathe freer when the city is delivered from the tyranny and oppression which they exercised, and from the evil example which they gave. Such proverbs, in

which the city (*vicitas*) represents the state, the πόλις the πολιτεία, may, as Ewald thinks, be of earlier date than the days of an Asa or Jehoshaphat; for “from the days of Moses and Joshua to the days of David and Solomon, Israel was a great nation, divided indeed into many branches and sections, but bound together by covenant, whose life did not at all revolve around one great city alone.” We value such critical judgments according to great historical points of view, but confess not to understand why קְרָיָה must just be the chief city and may not be any city, and how on the whole a language which had not as yet framed the conception of the state (post-bibl. מְדִינָה), when it would described the community individually and as a whole, could speak otherwise than of city and people.

***11 By the blessing of the upright a city is exalted,
But by the mouth of the godless it is broken down.***

Pro. 11:11. This verse is related, in the way of confirming it, to v. 10. The LXX, which omits v. 4, here omits 10*b* and 11*a*, and combines 10*a* and 11*b* into one proverb (vid., Lagarde). The meaning is clear: “by the benedictions and pious prayers of the upright a city rises always to a higher eminence and prosperity; while, on the contrary, the deceitful, arrogant, blasphemous talk of the godless brings ruin to it” (Fl.). The nearest contrast to “by the blessing of the upright” would be “by the cursing of the wicked,” but not in the sense of the poet, who means to say that the city raises itself by the blessing of the upright, and on the contrary, when godless men are exalted, then by their words (whose blessing is no better than their curse) it comes to ruin. קְרָיָה (= קְרָיָה) occurs only four times in Proverbs, and in Job. 29: 7.

Pro. 11:12. There now follow two proverbs which refer to the intercourse of private life.

***He who mocketh his neighbour is devoid of understanding;
But the intelligent man remaineth silent.***

Pro. 14:21 is a proverb similarly beginning with בְּנוֹ לְרַעְהוּ, Pro. 13:13 is another beginning with בְּנוֹ לְדַבֵּר. From this one sees that בְּנוֹ לְ (cf. בְּנוֹה לְ, Isa. 37:22) does not mean a speaking contemptuously in one’s presence; as also from Pro. 6:30, that contemptuous treatment, which expresses itself not in mockery but in insult, is thus named; so that we do not possess a German [nor an English] expression which completely covers it. Whoever in a derisive or insulting manner, whether it be publicly or privately, degrades his neighbour, is unwise (חָסֵר-לֵב as pred., like Pro. 6:32); an intelligent man, on the contrary, keeps silent, keeps his judgment to himself, abstains from arrogant criticisms, for he knows that he is not infallible, that he is not acquainted with

the heart, and he possesses too much self-knowledge to raise himself above his neighbour as a judge, and thinks that contemptuous rejection, unamiable, reckless condemnation, does no good, but on the contrary does evil on all sides.

***13 He who goeth about tattling revealeth secrets;
But he who is of a faithful spirit concealeth a matter.***

Pro. 11:13. The tattler is called רביל (intensive form of רבל), from his going hither and thither. אנשי רביל, Eze. 22: 9, are men given to tattling, backbiters; הולך רביל (cf. Lev. 19:16), one of the tattlers or backbiters goes, a divulger of the matter, a tell-tale. It is of such an one that the proverb speaks, that he reveals the secret (סוד, properly the being close together for the purpose of private intercourse, then that intercourse itself, vid., at Psa. 25:14); one has thus to be on his guard against confiding in him. On the contrary, a נאמן רוח, *firmus (fidus) spiritu*, properly one who is established, or reflexively one who proves himself firm and true (vid., at Gen. 15: 6), conceals a matter, keeps it back from the knowledge and power of another. Zöckler rightly concludes, in opposition to Hitzig, from the parallelism that the רביל הולך is subject; the arrangement going before also shows that this is the “ground-word” (Ewald); in Pro. 20:19 *a* the relation is reversed: the revealer of secrets is rightly named (cf. Sir. 27:16, ὁ ἀποκαλύπτων μυστήρια, κ.τ.λ.).

***14 Where there is no direction a people fall;
But where there is no want of counsellors there is safety.***

Pro. 11:14. Regarding תחבלות, vid., at Pro. 1: 5. There it means rules of self-government; here, rules for the government of the people, or, since the *pluralet.* denotes a multiplicity in unity, circumspect κυβερνησις. With 14*b*, 24: 6*b* (where direction in war, as here in peace, is spoken of, and the meaning of the word specializes itself accordingly) agrees; cf. also Pro. 15:22*b*. Hitzig criticises the proverb, remarking, “we who have the longest resorted to many counsellors, as a consequence of the superabundance have learned to say, ‘Too many cooks spoil the broth,’ and, ‘He who asks long, errs.’” But the truth of the clause 14*b* is in modern times more fully illustrated in the region of ecclesiastical and political affairs; and in general it is found to be true that it is better with a people when they are governed according to the laws and conclusions which have resulted from the careful deliberation of many competent and authorized men, than when their fate is entrusted unconditionally to one or to a few. The proverb, it must be acknowledge, refers not to counsellors such as in Isa. 3: 3, but as in Isa. 1:26.

Pro. 11:15. There follow now two proverbs regarding kindness which brings injury and which brings honour:

*It fares ill, nothing but ill, with one who is surety for another;
But he who hateth suretyship remaineth in quietness.*

More closely to the original: It goes ill with him; for the proverb is composed as if the writer had before his eyes a definite person, whom one assails when he for whom he became security has not kept within the limits of the performance that was due. Regarding עֲרַב with the accus. of the person: to represent one as a surety for him, and נָר as denoting the other (the stranger), vid., at Pro. 6: 1. The meaning of רַע יְרוּא is seen from Pro. 20:16 *a.* יְרוּא is, like Pro. 13:20, the *fut. Niph.* of רָאע, or of רוא = רָאע, after the forms יָמוּל, יַעוֹר (Olsh. § 265e). The added רָאע has, like עָרַיָה, Hab. 3: 9, the same function as the *inf. absol. (intensivus)*; but as the *infin. form* רַע could only be *inf. constru.* after the form שָׁךְ, Jer. 5:26, the *infinitive absol.* must be יְרוּא: Thus רַע is an accus., or what is the same, an adverbial adj.: he is badly treated (maltreated) in a bad way, for one holds him to his words and, when he cannot or will not accomplish that which is due in the room of him for whom he is bail, arrests him. He, on the contrary, who hates תּוֹקְעִים has good rest. The persons of such as become surety by striking the hands cannot be meant, but perhaps people thus becoming surety by a hand-stroke, — such sureties, and thus such suretyship, he cannot suffer; תּוֹקְעִים approaches an abstract [“striking hands,” instead of “those who strike hands”] in connection with this שָׂנֵא, expressing only a strong impossibility, as חֲבָלִים, Zec. 2: 7, 14, means uniting together in the sense of combination.

*16 A gracious woman retaineth honour,
And strong men retain riches.*

Pro. 11:16. The LXX had אִשְׁתַּחֲנָה (not אִשְׁתַּחֲנָה) in view: γυνὴ εὐχάριστος ἐγείρει ἀνδρὶ δόξαν, — this ἀνδρὶ is an interpolation inserted for the sake of the added line, θρόνος δὲ ἀτιμίας γυνὴ μισοῦσα δίκαια. The proverb thus expanded is on both sides true: an amiable woman (*gratiosa*) brings honour to her husband, gives him relief, while one who hates the right (that which is good, gentle) is a disgraceful vessel (*opp.* כֶּסֶף כְּבוֹד, Isa. 22:23), which disfigures the household, makes the family unloved, and lowers it. But the commencing line, by which 16*b* is raised to an independent distich, is so much the more imperfect: πλούτου ἄκηροὶ ἐνδεεῖς γίνονται; for that the negligent (idle) bring it not to riches, is, as they are wont in Swabia to call such truisms, a *Binsenwahrheit*. But it is important that the translation of 16*b*, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖσι

ἐρείδονται πλούτῳ (the Syr. has “knowledge” for riches), presupposes the phrase תַּמְכוּ עֵשֶׁר (cf. Pro. 10: 4, LXX), and along with it this, that תַּמְכוּ עֵשֶׁר is so rendered as if the words were יִסְמְכוּ בְעֵשֶׁר, is to be regarded as unhistorical. If we now take the one proverb as it is found in the Hebr. text, then the repetition of the תַּמְךָ in the two lines excites a prejudice in favour of it. The meaning of this otherwise difficult תַּמְךָ is missed by Löwenstein and Zöckler: a gracious woman retaineth honour (Symm. ἀνθέξεται δόξης); for (1) תַּמְךָ חַיִל would better agree with this predicate, and (2) it is evident from Pro. 29:23 that תַּמְךָ כְּבוֹד is not to be understood in the sense of *firmiter tenere*, but in the inchoative sense of *consequi honorem*, whence also the ἐγείρει ἀνδρὶ of the LXX. It is true that Pro. 31:30 states that “grace (יְחַיִּי) is nothing,” and that all depends on the fear of God; but here the poet thinks on “grace” along with the fear of God, or he thinks on them as not separated from each other; and since it is boldly true, which is moreover besides this true, that a wife of gracious outward appearance and demeanour obtains honour, her company is sought, she finds her way into the best society, they praise her attractive, pleasant appearance, and that the husband also of such a wife participates to some extent in this honour. Experience also confirms it, that the עֲרִיצִים, strong men, obtain riches (cf. Isa. 49:25); and this statement regarding the עֲרִיצִים fits better as a contrast to 16a, as a like statement regarding the חַרְוִצִים, diligent, for the עֲרִיצִי (from עָרַץ, to place in terror, Psa. 10:18), whose power consists in terrorism or violence, is the most direct contrast of a wife, this σακεδος ἀσθενέστερον, who by heart-winning attraction makes yet better conquests: she thereby obtains a higher good, viz., honour, while the former gains only riches, for “a name” (viz., a good one) “is better than great riches,” Pro. 22: 1. If we read חַרְוִצִים, this thoughtful contrast is lost.

Three proverbs regarding benevolence:

***17 The benevolent man doeth good to his own soul,
And the violent man brings trouble on his own flesh.***

Pro. 11:17. Many interpreters reverse the relation of subject and predicate (Targ. only in 17b, after the phrase וְדַמּוּ בִיד, for which the Syr. has only (וּמוֹבַד): *qui sibi ipsi benefacit, is quidem erga alios quoque benignus praesumitur, quum caritas ordinata a se ipsa incipiat; qui vero carnem suam male habet, est crudelis erga alios* (Michaelis). But this cannot be established; for certainly it occurs that whoever does good to himself does good also to others, and that whoever is hard against himself also judges and treats others harshly; but in by far the greatest number of cases the fact is this, that he who

does not deny anything to himself is in relation to others an egoist, and this is not a “benevolent man;” and, on the contrary, that he who denies to himself lawful enjoyments is in relation to others capable of self-denial and self-sacrifice, and thus is the contrast of a “violent man.” The word of Sirach, 14: 5, **ὁ πονηρὸς ἑαυτῷ τίνα ἀγαθὸς ἔσται**, to which Bertheau appeals, alludes to the niggard, and it is true indeed that this **עֵבֶר שְׂאָרוֹ**, but not every **שְׂאָרוֹ**, is a niggard. Thus the “benevolent man” and the “violent man” will be the two subject conceptions, and as it is said of the benevolent (**חֶסֶד** as e.g., Hos. 6: 6, of a more restricted sense, as Isa. 57: 1) that he does good (**גַּמַּל**, viz., **טוֹב**, Pro. 31:12), so of the violent (unmerciful) (**אֶבְרָרִי** as Pro. 12:20, Jer. 6:23; 50:42) that he brings evil on his own flesh (LXX **αὐτοῦ σῶμα**); for **שְׂאָרוֹ** as a parallel word to **נֶפֶשׁוֹ** (cf. p. 141) signifies not blood-relations (Symm., Jerome, Luther, and Grotius), but it has here, as at Mic. 3: 2, its nearest signification, from which it then comes to signify those who are of our flesh and blood. But for that reason the meaning of the poet cannot be that given by Elster: “he who exercises benevolence toward others creates within himself a determination which penetrates his whole being with generous and fruitful warmth, as on the other hand the feeling of hatred deprives the heart of him who cherishes it of the true fountain of life.” If this were meant, then soul and spirit, not soul and flesh, would stand in parallelism. The weal and woe refers thus to the divine retribution which requites the conduct of a man toward his neighbours, according to its character, with reward or punishment (Hitzig, Zöckler).

Pro. 11:18. Man consists of body and soul. In regard to both, benevolence brings its reward, and hatred its punishment.

***The godless acquires deceptive gain;
But he that soweth righteousness, a true reward.***

Jerome makes 18*b* an independent clause, for he translates it as if the word were written **וְלִזְרָא**; the Syr. and Targ. also, as if **שָׂכְרוֹ אֱמִתּוֹ** (his fidelity is his reward). But according to the text as it stands, **עֲשֵׂה** extends its regimen to both parts of the verse; to make is here equivalent to, to work out, to acquire, **περιποιεῖσθαι**, as Gen. 31: 1, Jer. 17: 1, etc. The labour of the godless has selfishness as its motive, and what he acquires by his labour is therefore “delusive gain,” — it is no blessing, it profits him not (Pro. 10: 2), and it brings him no advantage (Pro. 10:16). He, on the contrary, acquires truth, i.e., a truly profitable and enduring reward, who sows right-doing, or better: good-doing, by which we also, as the biblical moral in **צְדָקָה**, think principally of well-doing, unselfish activity and self-sacrificing love. Hos. 10:12 speaks of

sowing which has only צדקה as the norm; and how צדקה is understood is seen from the parallel use of חסד [piety]. The “true reward” is just the harvest by which the sowing of the good seed of noble benevolent actions is rewarded.

**19 Genuine righteousness reaches to life,
And he who pursues evil does it to his death.**

Pro. 11:19. The LXX translate ὑὸς δίκαιος, and the Syrian follows this unwarrantable *quid pro quo*; the Bible uses the phrase בן־עולה and the like, but not בן־צדקה. The *Graec. Venet.* (translating οὕτω) deprives the distich of its supposed independence. The Targ. renders בן with the following ו as correlates, *sic...uti*; but בן in comparative proverbs stands naturally in the second, and not in the first place (vid., p. 9). Without doubt בן is here a noun. It appears to have a personal sense, according to the parallel וּמְרִירָה, on which account Elster explains it: he who is firm, steadfast in righteousness, and Zöckler: he who holds fast to righteousness; but בן cannot mean “holding fast,” nor does מְכוֹנֵן; — “fast” does not at all agree with the meaning of the word, it means upright, and in the ethical sense genuine; thus Ewald better: “he who is of genuine righteousness,” but “genuine in (of) righteousness” is a tautological connection of ideas. Therefore we must regard בן as a substantival neuter, but neither the *rectum* of Cocceius nor the *firmum* of Schultens furnishes a naturally expressed suitable thought. Or is בן a substantive in the sense of 2Ki. 7:31? The word denotes the pedestal, the pillar, the standing-place; but what can the basis refer to here (Euchel)? Rather read “aim” (Oetinger) or “direction” (Löwenstein); but בן does not take its meaning from the *Hiph.* הִכִּין. One might almost assume that the *Chokma* -language makes בן, *taliter*, a substantive, and has begun to use it in the sense of *qualitas* (like the post-bibl. אִיכוּת), so that it is to be explained: the quality of righteousness tendeth to life. But must we lose ourselves in conjectures or in modifications of the text (Hitzig, בָּנִים, as a banner), in order to gain a meaning from the word, which already has a meaning? We say דַּבֵּר בֵּן, to speak right (Num. 27: 7), and עֲשׂוֹת בֵּן, to do right (Ecc. 8:10); in both cases בֵּן means standing = consisting, steadfast, right, *recte*. The contrast is לֹא־בֵן, 2Ki. 7: 9, which is also once used as a substantive, Isa. 16: 6: the unrighteousness of his words. So here בֵּן is used as a substantive connected in the genitive, but not so that it denotes the right holding, retaining of righteousness, but its right quality, — אֲמָתָה שֶׁל־צִדְקָה, as Rashi explains it, i.e., as we understand it: genuineness, or genuine showing of righteousness, which is not mere appearance without reality. That בָּנִים denotes such people as seek to appear

not otherwise than what they truly are, is in favour of this interpretation. Such genuine righteousness as follows the impulse of the heart, and out of the fulness of the heart does good, has life as its result (Pro. 19:23), an inwardly happy and externally a prosperous life; on the other hand, he who wilfully pursues evil, and finds in it satisfaction, brings death upon himself: he does it to his death, or if we make (which is also possible) רָדַף the subject: it tends to his death. Thus in other words: Love is life; hatred destroys life.

The following proverbs are especially directed, as connected with this בן, against the contradiction of the external appearance and of the masked internal nature.

***20 An abomination to Jahve are the crookedly dishonest of heart,
And they who are of honest walk are his delight.***

Pro. 11:20. We read, Pro. 2:15; 8: 8, עֲקָשׁ (the form of the transgressions); but here, where the “crookedness” is transferred to the heart, we require another word, which renders the idea of falseness, the contrary of directness, lying in it, without any mixture of the fundamental conception *flexuosus* or *tortuosus*. תְּמִימֵי דָרָךְ are not only those whose walk is externally without offence and blameless, but, in conformity with the contrast, those whose manner of conduct proceeds from a disposition that is pure, free from deception and concealment. Jerome, *et voluntas ejus in iis qui qimpliciter ambulat*. But the word is not בתְּמִימֵי; they [the upright] are themselves His רָצוֹן (Pro. 11: 1) [delight]: He regards them, and only them, with satisfaction.

***21 Assuredly [the hand to it] the wicked remaineth not unpunished,
But the seed of the righteous is delivered.***

Pro. 11:21. The LXX render here, as Pro. 16: 5, where the יָד לְיָד repeats itself, χειρὶ χειρας ἔμβαλὼν ἀδίκως, which is not to be understood, as Evagrius supposes, of one that can be bribed, but only of a violent person; the Syr. and Targ. have the same reference; but the subject is certainly רָע, and a governing word, as נִשְׂאָ (2Sa. 20:21), is wanting, to say nothing of the fact that the phrase “one hand against the other” would require the words to be יָד בְּיָד. Jerome and the *Graec. Venet.*, without our being able, however, to see their meaning. The translation of the other Greek versions is not given. The Jewish interpreters offer nothing that is worthy, as e.g., Immanuel and *Meîri* explain it by “immediately,” which in the modern Hebr. would require מִיָּד, and besides is not here suitable. The Midrash connects with 21a the earnest warning that he who sins with the one hand and with the other does good, is nevertheless not free from punishment. Schultens has an explanation to give to the words which

is worthy of examination: hand to hand, i.e., after the manner of an inheritance *per posteros* (Exo. 20: 5), resting his opinion on this, that Arab. *yad* cf. יָד, Isa. 56: 5) is used among other significations in that of authorizing an inheritance. Gesenius follows him, but only urging the idea of the sequence of time (cf. Pres. *dest bedest*, hand to hand = continuing after one another), and interprets יָד בְּיָד as Fleischer does: *ab aetate in aetatem non* (i.e., *nullo unquam tempore futuro*) *erit impunis scelestus, sed posterius justorum salvi erunt*. According to Böttcher, “hand to hand” is equivalent to from one hand to another, and this corresponds to the thought expressed in Plutarch’s *de sera numinis vindicta*: if not immediately, yet at last. We may refer in vindication of this to the fact that, as the Arab. lexicographers say, *yad*, used of the course of time, means the extension (*madd*) of time, and then a period of time. But for the idea expressed by *nunquam*, or *neutiquam*, or *tandem aliquando*, the language supplied to the poet a multitude of forms, and we do not see why he should have selected just this expression with its primary meaning *alternatim* not properly agreeing with the connection. Therefore we prefer with Ewald to regard יָד לְיָד as a formula confirmation derived from the common speech of the people: hand to hand (לְ as in לְיָדִי, Job. 17: 3), i.e., the hand for it [I pledge it, guarantee it] (Bertheau, Hitzig, Elster, Zöckler). But if 21*a* assures by the pledge of the hand, and as it were lays a wager to it, that the wicked shall not go unpunished, then the genitive in זָרַע צְדִיקִים is not that of dependence by origin, but, as Isa. 65:23; 1: 4, the genitive of apposition, for זָרַע here, as דֹּרֶר, Psa. 24: 6; 112: 2, denotes a oneness of like origin and of like kind, but with a preponderance of the latter. נִמְלֵט is the 3rd *pret.*, which by the preceding fut. retains the reference to the future: the merited punishment comes on the wicked, but the generation of the righteous escapes the judgment. רָע has the ר dagheshed (*Michlol* 63*d*) according to the rule of the דְּחִיק, according to which the consonant first sounded after the word terminating in an accented *a* or *é* is doubled, which is here, as at Pro. 15: 1, done with the ר.

**22 A golden ring in a swine’s snout, —
A fair woman and without delicacy.**

Pro. 11:22. This is the first instance of an emblematical proverb in which the first and second lines are related to each other as figure and its import, vid., p. 8. The LXX translates rhythmically, but by its ὤσπερ... οὐτως it destroys the character of this picture-book proverbial form. The nose-ring, נֶזֶן, generally attached to the right nostril and hanging down over the mouth (vid., Lane’s *Manners, etc.*) is a female ornament that has been in use since the time of the patriarchs (Gen. 24:47). If one supposes such a ring in a swine’s snout, then in such a thing he has the emblem of a wife in whom beauty and the want of

culture are placed together in direct contrast. טַאם is taste carried over into the intellectual region, the capability of forming a judgment, Job. 12:20, and particularly the capability of discovering that which is right and adapted to the end in view, 1Sa. 25:33 (of Abigail), here in accordance with the figure of a beast with which the ideas of uncleanness, shamelessness, and rudeness are associated, a mind for the noble, the fine, the fitting, that which in the higher and at the same time intellectual and ethical sense we call tact (fine feeling); סָרַת (*alienata*) denotes the want of this capacity, not without the accompanying idea of self-guilt.

***23 The desire of the righteous is nothing but good,
The expectation of the godless is presumption.***

Pro. 11:23. This is usually explained with Fleischer: If the righteous wish for anything, their wish reaches to no other than a fortunate issue; but if the godless hope for anything, then there is to them in the end as their portion, not the good they hoped for, but wrath (Pro. 10:28, cf. 11: 4). However, that עֵבֶרָה is at once to be understood thus, as in יוֹם עֵבֶרָה, and that the phrase is to be rendered: the hope of the godless is God's wrath, is doubtful. But עֵבֶרָה denotes also want of moderation, and particularly in the form of presumption, Pro. 21:24, Isa. 16: 6; and thus we gain the thought that the desire of the righteous is directed only to that which is good, and thus to an object that is attainable because well-pleasing to God, while on the contrary the hope of the godless consists only in the suggestions of their presumption, and thus is vain self-deceit. The punctuation תֵּאוֹת צְדִיקִים is contrary to rule; correct texts have תֵּאוֹת צְדִיקִים, for *Dechi* stands before *Athnach* only if the *Athnach* - word has two syllables (*Torath Emeth*, p. 43; *Accentssystem*, xviii. § 4).

Three proverbs regarding giving which is not loss but gain.

***24 There is one who giveth bounteously, and he increaseth still more;
And (there is) one who withholdeth what is due, only to his loss.***

Pro. 11:24. The first of the proverbs with יֵשׁ (there is), which are peculiar to the first collection (vid., p. 24). The meaning is, that the possessions of the liberal giver do not decrease but increase, and that, on the contrary, the possessions of the niggardly do not increase but decrease. מִפְּזֹר is not to be understood after Psa. 112: 9. Instead of וְנִסְקַף עוֹד the three Erfurt codd. have וְנִסְקַף (with retrogression of the tone?), which Hitzig approves of; but the traditional phrase which refers (*et qui augetur insuper*) וְנִסְקַף not to the possession of him who scattereth, but to himself, is finer in the expression. In the characteristic of the other, מִיֵּשֶׁר is commonly interpreted comparatively:

plus aeguo (Cocceius) or *justo* (Schelling). But מן after קשׁך is to be regarded as governed by it, and ישר denotes not competence, riches, as Arab. *yusr* (Bertheau, Zöckler), also not uprightness = beneficence (Midrash, הצדקה מן), but duty, uprightness, as Job. 33:23, where it denotes that which is advantageous to man, as here that which befits him: he who holds back, namely himself, from that which is due to himself, and thus should permit to himself, such an one profits nothing at all by this ἀφειδία (17b, Col. 2:23), but it tends only to loss to him, only to the lessening of that which he possesses. We shall meet with this (אך למחסור למחסור) Pro. 14:23, and frequently again — it is a common Mashal formula (cf. καὶ τόσω μᾶλλον ὑστερεῖται, Sir. 11:11). The cause of the strange phenomenon that the liberal gains and the niggardly loses is not here expressed, but the following proverb gives the explanation of it:

***25 A liberal soul [soul of blessing] is made fat,
And he that watereth others is also watered.***

Pro. 11:25. A synonymous distich (vid., p. 7). A soul of blessing is one from whom blessings go out to others, who is even a blessing to all with whom he comes into fellowship; ברכה denotes also particularly the gifts of love, 1Sa. 25:27, ברך denotes, if the Arab. is right, which derives it from the fundamental idea “to spread out:” to cause to increase and prosper by means of word and deed. The blessing which goes out from such a soul comes back again to itself: תדשן (as Pro. 13: 4; 28:25), it is made fat, gains thereby sap and strength in fulness; the *Pual* refers to the ordinance of God; Pro. 22: 9 is kindred in meaning to this *anima benefica pinguefiet*. In 25b יורה is the Aramaic form of writing, but without the Aramaic vocalization (cf. Pro. 1:10. אַבא, Isa. 21:12 אַתא). Perhaps the א makes it noticeable that here a different word from יורה, morning rain, is used; however, Symm. translates πρωινός, and the *Graec. Venet.* (Kimchi following it) ὑετός. As a rule, we do not derive יורה from ירה, of which it would be the *Hophal* (= יורה, as הודע, Lev. 4:23, = הודע) (Ewald, § 131 f.); for the idea *conspergitur*, which the *Ho.* of the *Hiph.* יורה, Hos. 6: 3, expresses, is, as correlate to מרנה, as a parallel word to תדשן, one not of equal force. Jerome was guided by correct feeling, for he translates: *et qui inebriat ipse quoque inebriabitur*. The stem-word is certainly ירה, whether it is with Hitzig to be punctuated ירה = ירה, or with Fleischer we are to regard יורה as derived *per metathesin* from ירה, as for Arab. *ârây* (to cause to see) is used^{f108} the vulgar Arab. *ârway* (in the Syr. Arab.) and

âwray (in the Egypt. Arab.). We prefer the latter, for the passing of **יָרָה** (from **יָרָה**) into **יָרָה** is according to rule, vid., at Pro. 23:21.

**26 Whoso withholdeth corn, him the people curse;
But blessing is on the head of him that selleth it.**

Pro. 11:26. This proverb is directed against the corn-usurer, whose covetousness and deceitful conduct is described in Amo. 8: 4-8. But whilst it is there said that they cannot wait till the burdensome interruption of their usurious conduct on account of the sacred days come to an end, the figure here is of a different aspect of their character: they hold back their stores of corn in the times of scarcity, for they speculate on receiving yet higher prices for it. **בָּר** (from **בָּרַר**, to purify, to be pure) is thrashed grain, cf. Arab. *burr*, wheat, and *nakky* of the cleaning of the grain by the separation from it of the tares, etc. (Fl.); the word has *Kametz*, according to the Masora, as always in pause and in the history of Joseph. **מִנָּח** has *Munach* on the syllable preceding the last, on which the tone is thrown back, and *Metheg* with the *Tsere* as the sign of a pause, as Pro. 1:10 **בִּצָּא** (vid., p. 47). **מִשְׁבִּיר**, *qui annonam vendit*, is denom. of **שָׁבַר**, properly that which is crushed, therefore grain (Fl.). **לְאֵמִים**, which we would understand in the Proph. of nations, are here, as at Pro. 24:24, the individuals of the people. The **בְּרָכָה** which falls on the head of the charitable is the thanks of his fellow-citizens, along with all good wishes.

That self-sacrificing endeavour after the good of others finds its regard in the thought encircling the following proverbs.

**27 He that striveth after good, seeketh that which is pleasing;
And he that searcheth after evil, it shall find him.**

Pro. 11:27. Here we have together three synonyms of seeking: **בִּקֵּשׁ** (R. **בִּק**, *findere*), which has the general meaning *quaerere*, from the root-idea of penetrating and pressing forwards; **דָּרַשׁ** (R. **דַּר**, *terere*), which from the root-idea of trying (proving) corresponds to the Lat. *studere*; and **שָׁחַר** (whence here **שָׁחַר** instead of **מִשְׁחַר**, as **דָּבַר** instead of **מִדְּבַר**), which means *mane*, and thus *sedulo quaere* (vid., at Pro. 1:28). From 27b, where by **רָעָה** is meant evil which one prepares for another, there arises for **טוֹב** the idea of good thoughts and actions with reference to others. He who applies himself to such, seeks therewith that which is pleasing, i.e., that which pleases or does good to others. If that which is pleasing to God were meant, then this would have been said (cf. Pro. 12: 2); the idea here is similar to Pro. 10:32, and the word **יִבְקֹשׁ** is used, and not **יִמְצָא**, because reference is not made to a fact in the moral

government of the world, but a description is given of one who is zealously intent upon good, and thus of a noble man. Such an one always asks himself (cf. Mat. 7:12): what will, in the given case, be well-pleasing to the neighbour, what will tend to his true satisfaction? Regarding the punctuation here, שִׁחָר, vid., at v. 26. The subject to תִּבְנֶאֱנֹו, which, Pro. 10:24, stands as the fundamental idea, here follows from the governed רָעָה, which may be the gen. (Psa. 38:13) as well as the accus.

***28 He that trusteth in his riches shall fall,
And the righteous shall flourish like the green leaf.***

Pro. 11:28. יָפוּל (*plene* after the Masora) as well as the figure וְכִעֲלָה (cf. for the punctuation וְכִעֲשֵׁן, Pro. 10:26) are singular, but are understood if one observes that in 28*a* a withered tree, and in 28*b* a tree with leaves ever green, hovers before the imagination of the poet (cf. Psa. 1: 4, Jer. 17: 8). The proud rich man, who on the ground of his riches appears to himself to be free from danger, goes on to his ruin (יָפוּל as Pro. 11: 5, and frequently in the Book of Proverbs), while on the contrary the righteous continues to flourish like the leaf — the thus resemble the trees which perennially continue to flourish anew. Regarding עֲלָה as originally collective (Symm. θάλλος), vid., at Isa. 1:30, and regarding פָּרַח (R. פָּר, to break), here of the continual breaking forth of fresh-growing leaf-buds, vid., at Isa. 11: 1. The apostolic word names this continual growth the metamorphosis of believers, 2Co. 2:18. The LXX has read וּמֵעֲלָה (approved by Hitzig): and he who raiseth up the righteous.

***29 He that troubleth his own household shall inherit the wind,
And a fool becomes servant to the wise in heart.***

Pro. 11:29. Jerome well translates: *qui conturbat domum suam*, for עָבַר closely corresponds to the Lat. *turbare*; but with what reference is the troubling or disturbing here meant? The Syr. translates 29*a* doubly, and refers it once to deceit, and the second time to the contrary of avarice; the LXX, by ὁ μὴ συμπεριφερόμενος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ οἴκῳ, understands one who acts towards his own not unsociably, or without affability, and thus not tyrannically. But שָׂאֵרוּ עָבַר Pro. 11:17, is he who does not grudge to his own body that which is necessary; עָבַר יִשְׂרָאֵל is applied to Elijah, 1Ki. 18:17, on account of whose prayer there was a want of rain; and at Pro. 15:27 it is the covetous who is spoken of as עָבַר בֵּיתוֹ. The proverb has, accordingly, in the man who “troubles his own house” (Luth.), a niggard and sordid person (Hitzig) in view, one who does not give to his own, particularly to his own servants, a sufficiency of food and of necessary recreation. Far from raising himself by his

household arrangements, he shall only inherit wind (יִנְחַל, not as the Syr. translates, יִנְחִיל, in the general signification to inherit, to obtain, as Pro. 3:35; 28:10, etc.), i.e., he goes always farther and farther back (for he deprives his servants of all pleasure and love for their word in seeking the prosperity of his house), till in the end the reality of his possession dissolves into nothing. Such conduct is not only loveless, but also foolish; and a foolish person (vid., regarding אֲוִיל at 1: 7) has no influence as the master of a house, and generally is unable to maintain his independence: “and the servant is a fool to him who is wise of heart.” Thus the LXX (cf. also the LXX of Pro. 10: 5), Syr., Targ., Jerome, *Graec. Venet.*, Luth. construe the sentence. The explanation, *et servus stulti cordato* (sc. *addicitur*), i.e., even the domestics of the covetous fool are at last partakers in the wise beneficence (Fl.), places 29b in an unnecessary connection with 29a, omits the verb, which is here scarcely superfluous, and is not demanded by the accentuation (cf. e.g., Pro. 19:22b).

**30 The fruit of the righteous is a tree of life,
And the wise man winneth souls.**

Pro. 11:30. The LXX translate, ἐκ καρποῦ δικαιοσύνης φύεται δένδρον ζωῆς; Hitzig takes thence the word צֶדֶק; but this translation discredits itself by the unnatural reversal of the relation of fruit and tree. The fruit of the righteous is here not the good which his conduct brings to him, as Isa. 3:10, Jer. 32:19, but his activity itself proceeding from an internal impulse. This fruit is a tree of life. We need to supplement פֵּרִי [fruit] as little here as אֲרַח [a traveller] at Pro. 10:17; for the meaning of the proverb is, that the fruit of the righteous, i.e., his external influence, itself is a tree of life (vid., p. 23), namely for others, since his words and actions exert a quickening, refreshing, happy influence upon them. By this means the wise (righteousness and wisdom come together according to the saying of the *Chokma*, 1: 7a) becomes a winner of souls (לִקְחָה as Pro. 6:25, but taken *in bonam partem*), or, as expressed in the N.T. (Mat. 4:19), a fisher of men, for he gains them not only for himself, but also for the service of wisdom and righteousness.

**31 Lo, the righteous findeth on earth his reward;
How much more the godless and the sinner!**

Pro. 11:31. The particles אִם כִּי signify properly, interrogatively: Shall it yet be said that...; it corresponds to the German “*geschweige denn*” [*nedum*] (Fl.). הֵן is already in bibl. Hebr. in the way of becoming a conditional particle; it opens, as here, the antecedent of a *gradatio a minori ad majus* introduced by אִם כִּי, Job. 15:15 f., 25: 5 f., cf. הֵן (הִנֵּה) with וְאִיךָ following, Gen. 44: 8, 2Sa. 12:18. 13:13 presents itself as the nearest parallel to שָׁלֵם, where it means,

to be rewarded. It is a *vocabulum anceps*, and denotes full requital, i.e., according to the reference, either righteous reward or righteous punishment. If 30a is understood of reward, and 30b of punishment, then the force of the argument in the conclusion consists in this, that the righteous can put forth no claim to a recompense, because his well-doing is never so perfect as not to be mingled with win (Ecc. 7:20; Psa. 143: 2); while, on the contrary, the repression of the wicked, who, as רָשָׁע as to his intention, and חֹטֵא as to his conduct, actually denies his dependence on God, is demanded by divine holiness. But the conclusion is not stringent, since in the relation of God to the righteous His dispensation of grace and faithfulness to promises also come into view, and thus in both cases יִשְׁלַם appears to require the same interpretation: if the righteous does not remain unrevengeed, so much more shall not the godless and the sinner remain..., or how much less shall the godless and the sinner remain so. Thus the *Graec. Venet.*, Θεῶ ὁ δίκαιος ἐν τῇ γῆ ἀποτιθήσεται; thus also Luther, and among the moderns Löwenstein and Elster. Of the proverb so understood the LXX version, εἰ ὁ μὲν δίκαιος μόλις (μόγις) σώζεται, ὁ ἄσεβης καὶ ἁμαρτωλὸς ποῦ φανείται (cf. 1Pe. 4:18) may be a free translation, for in the יִשְׁלַם there certainty lies, according to the sense, a כִּמְאַט יִשְׁאָ. Also יִשְׁלַם has the principal tone, not בְּאַרְץ. The thought: even on this side (on earth), lies beyond the sphere of the O.T. consciousness. The earth is here the world of man.

CHAPTER 12

Three proverbs on knowledge, the favour of God, firmness and the means thereto.

*1 He loveth correction who loveth knowledge,
And he hateth instruction who is without reason.*

Pro. 12: 1. It is difficult in such cases to say which is the relation of the ideas that is intended. The sequence of words which lies nearest in the Semitic substantival clause is that in which the predicate is placed first; but the subject may, if it is to be made prominent, stand at the head of the sentence. Here, 1b, the placing of the subject in advance recommends itself: one who hates instruction is devoid of reason. But since we have no reason in 1a to invert the order of the words as they lie together, we take the conceptions placed first in both cases as the predicates. Thus: he who loves knowledge shows and proves that he does so by this, that he willingly puts himself in the place of a learner; and devoid of reason is he who with aversion rejects reproof, which is designed to guard him from future mistakes and false steps. Regarding the punctuation אָהַב דַּעַת (with *Mercha* on the ante-penult. and the הַעֲמִידָה-sign

on the penult.), vid., at Pro. 11:26 f., 1:19. In 1b the *Munach* in תוכחה is transformed from *Mugrash* (*Accentssystem*, xviii. § 2), as in Pro. 15:10b. בֵּאֵר (cf. 30: 2) is a being who is stupid as the brute cattle (בְּעִיר, from בֵּעַר, to graze, cattle of all kinds; Arab. *b'ayr*, the beast κατ' ἕξ., i.e., the camel); as a *homo brutus* is compared to a בְּהֵמָה (Psa. 49:21), 73:22), and is called Arab. *behymt*, from *bahym*, “shut up” (spec. *dabb*, a bear; *thwr*, an ox; *hamâr*, an ass) (Fl.).

***2 A good man obtaineth favour with Jahve,
But the man of wicked devices He condemns.***

Pro. 12: 2. He who is an אִישׁ מְזַמֵּמֹת (Pro. 14:17, cf. Psa. 37: 7) is defined in Pro. 24: 8 (cf. p. 28): he is a man of devices (vid., regarding the etymon, p. 39), namely, that are wicked, one who contrives evil against his neighbour. The meaning of the subject-conception טוֹב is defined according to this, although in itself also it is clear, for טוֹב, used of God (e.g., Psa. 73: 1; 86: 5) and of men (Pro. 13:22; 14:14), denotes the good (*bonus*) in the sense of the benevolent (*benignus*); the Scripture truths, that God is love, that love is the essence of goodness and is the fulfilling of the law, are so conformed to reason, that they stamp themselves as immediate component parts of the human consciousness. A טוֹב is thus a man who acts according to the ruling motive of self-sacrificing love; such an one obtains (vid., on יָפִיק, *educit* = *adipiscitur*, at Pro. 3:13) the favour of God, He is and shows Himself kind to him, while on the contrary He condemns the wicked intriguer. Hitzig translates: the former of intrigues in punishable (as the Syr.: is condemned; Targ.: his contrivance is shattered to pieces); but to become a רָשָׁע = *reus* הַרְשִׁיאַ does not denote, but either to practise רָשָׁע, Job. 34:12, or to set forth as רָשָׁע = to condemn, Isa. 50: 9. Taken in the former signification (Jerome, *impie agit*), a declaration is made which is not needed, since the moral badness already lies in the reference of the subject: thus יִרְשִׁיעַ will be used also of Jahve. In proof that the poet did not need to say וְאֶת־אִישׁ, Zöckler rightly points to 10: 6, Job. 22:29.

***3 A man does not stand by wickedness,
But the root of the righteous remains unmoved.***

Pro. 12: 3. In רָשָׁע there lies the idea of want of inward stay (vid., at Psa. 1: 1); in a manner of thought and of conduct which has no stay in God and His law, there can be expected no external endurance, no solidity. The righteous, on the contrary, have their root in God; nothing can tear them from the ground in which they are rooted, they are as trees which no storm outroots.

The very same thought is clothed in other words in Pro. 10:25, and another statement regarding the root of the righteous is found at Pro. 12:12.

We now place together vv. 4-12. One proverb concerning the house-wife forms the beginning of this group, and four regarding the management of the house and business form the conclusion.

***4 A good [brave] wife is the crown of her husband,
But as rottenness in his bones is one that causeth shame.***

Pro. 12: 4. As Pro. 11:16 says of אִשְׁתֵּי חַן, the pleasant wife (חַן = χάρις), that she obtaineth honour, so this proverb of אִשְׁתֵּי חַיִל, the good wife (חַיִל = ἀρετή, *virtus*), that she raises her husband to higher honour: she is for his self-consciousness στέφανος καυχήσεως (1Th. 2:19), and is also to him such a crown of honour before the world (cf. Pro. 31:23). On the contrary, a מְבִישָׁה, conducting herself shamefully (cf. regarding the double meaning of this *Mishle* word, which only here occurs in the fem., at Pro. 10: 5), is to her husband *instar cariei in ossibus*. רָקַב (רָקַב, Pro. 10: 7) denotes both the *caries* and the worm-hole (cf. Job. 41:19, עֵץ רָקַבּוֹן, worm-eaten wood). Like as the *caries* slowly but continuously increases, till at last the part of the body which the bone bears and the whole life of the man falls to ruin; so an unhappy marriage gnaws at the marrow of life, it destroys the happiness of life, disturbs the pursuit, undermines the life of the husband.

***5 The thoughts of the righteous are justice,
The counsels of the godless are deceit.***

Pro. 12: 5. They are so, that is, in their contents and their aim. To the righteous are ascribed מַחֲשָׁבוֹת, namely, simple and clear; to the godless, תַּחְבֻּלוֹת, carefully thought out, prudently thought through schemes and measures (regarding the word and the idea, vid., p. 40), but on that very account not simple, because with a tendency; for the righteous have an objective rule, namely, that which is right in the sight of God and of men, but the godless have only a selfish purpose, which they seek to attain by deceiving, and at the cost of, their neighbour.

***6 The word of the godless is to lie in wait for the blood of others,
But the mouth of the upright delivereth them.***

Pro. 12: 6. Our editions have דְּבַרֵי רָשָׁעִים, but the right sequence of the accents (in Cod. 1294 and elsewhere) is דְּבַרֵי רָשָׁעִים; the logical relation in this transformation, which is only rhythmically conditioned, remains the same. The vocalization wavers between אֲרָב־, which would be imper., and אֲרָב־,

which is infin., like אָמַר, Pro. 25: 7, עָבַשׁ, Pro. 21:11, אָכַל, Gen. 3:11. However one punctuates it, the infin. is intended in any case, in which the expression always remains sketchy enough: the words of the godless are lying in wait for blood, i.e., they are calculated to bring others to this, into the danger of their lives, e.g., before the tribunal by false charges and false witness. דָּם is the accus. of the object; for instead of אָרַב לְדָם (Pro. 1:11), to lurk for blood, a shorter expression, אָרַב דָּם, is used (Ewald, § 282a). The suffix of יִצְיִלִם^{f109} might appear, after Pro. 11: 6a, to refer back to the יִשְׁרָיִם; but the thought that their mouth saves the upright, that they thus know to speak themselves out of the danger, is by far less appropriate (vid., on the contrary, בְּרַעַת, 11: 9) than the thought that the mouth of the upright delivereth from danger those whose lives are threatened by the godless, as is rightly explained by Ewald, Bertheau, Elster. The personal subject or object is in the Mashal style often to be evolved from the connection, e.g., Pro. 14:26; 19:23.

**7 The godless are overturned and are no more,
But the house of the righteous stands.**

Pro. 12: 7. Bertheau and Zöckler explain: The wicked turn about, then are they no more; i.e., as we say: it is over with them “in the turning of a hand.” The noun in the *inf. absol.* may certainly be the subject, like Pro. 17:12, as well as the object (Ewald, § 328c), and הִפְךָ may be used of the turning about of oneself, Psa. 78: 9, 2Ki. 5:26, 2Ch. 9:12. That explanation also may claim for itself that הִפְךָ nowhere occurs with a personal object, if we except one questionable passage, Isa. 1: 7. But here the interpretation of the רַשְׁעִים as the object lies near the contrast of בֵּית, and moreover the interpretation of the הִפְךָ, not in the sense of στρέφωσθαι (LXX), but of καταστρέφειν (Syr., Targ., Jerome, Graec. Venet., Luther), lies near the contrast of יַעֲמֵד. The *inf. absol.* thus leaves the power from which the catastrophe proceeds indefinite, as the *pass. יִהְיֶה* would also leave it, and the act designedly presented in a vague manner to connect with ׀ the certain consequences therewith, as Pro. 25: 4 f., as if to say: there comes only from some quarter an unparalleled overthrow which overwhelms the godless; thus no rising up again is to be thought on, it is all over with them; while, on the contrary, the house of the righteous withstands the storm which sweeps away the godless.

**8 According to the measure of his intelligence is a man praised,
And whoever is of a perverse mind is despised.**

Pro. 12: 8. Everywhere in the *Mishle* שִׁבְל has no other meaning than *intellectus* (vid., p. 62). The praise which is given to a man measures itself

לפי שכלו (punctuate לְפִי־שְׁכָלוֹ, according to *Torath Emeth*, p. 41, *Accentssystem*, xx. § 1), i.e., according to the measure (so לפי is used in the oldest form of the language) of his intelligence, or as we may also say, of his culture; for in these proverbs, which make the fear of God the highest principle, שכל means also understanding of moral excellence, not merely the intellectual superiority of natural gifts. הלל is here a relative conception of manifold gradations, but it does not mean renown in general, but good renown. Parallel with לב, שכלו refers to the understanding (νοῦς); the rendering of Löwenstein, “who is of false heart,” is defective. נַעְיָה (synon. of נִפְתָּל and עֲקָשׁ, but nowhere else interchanging with it) means here *a vero et recto detortus et aversus* (Fl.). Such a man who has not a good understanding, nor any certain rule of judgment, falls under contempt (*Graec. Venet.* τῶ ὀντωτῆ εἰς μυσσαγμόν, after the false reading of יהוה instead of יהיה), i.e., he defames himself by his crooked judgment of men, of things and their relations, and is on this account in no position rightly to make use of them.

***9 Better is he who is lowly and has a servant,
Than he that makes himself mighty and is without bread.***

Pro. 12: 9. This proverb, like *Pro. 15:17*, commends the middle rank of life with its quiet excellences. נִקְלָה (like *1Sa. 18:23*), from קָלָה, cognate with קָלַל, Syr. ‘kly, to despise, properly *levi pendere, levem habere* (whence קָלוֹן, scorn, disgrace), here of a man who lives in a humble position and does not seek to raise himself up. Many of the ancients (*LXX*, Symmachus, Jerome, Syr., Rashi, Luther, Schultens) explain לוֹ וְעֶבֶד by, and is a servant to himself, serves himself; but in that case the words would have been לְנַפְשׁוֹ וְעֶבֶד (Syr. *דַּמְשַׁמֵּשׁ נַפְשָׁה*), or rather לוֹ וְאַבְדוֹ הוּא. But if one adheres to the traditional reading, and interprets this, as it must be interpreted: *et cui servus* (*Targ., Graec. Venet.*), then that supplies a better contrast to וְחֹסֵר־לֶחֶם, for “the first necessity of an oriental in only moderate circumstances is a slave, just as was the case with the Greeks and Romans” (Fl.). A man of lowly rank, who is, however, not so poor that he cannot support a slave, is better than one who boasts himself and is yet a beggar (*2Sa. 3:29*). The *Hithpa.* often expresses a striving to be, or to wish to appear to be, what the adj. corresponding to the verb states, e.g., הִתְנַדַּל, הִתְאַשֵּׁר; like the Greek middles, εἰςεσθαι, ἀξεσθαι, cf. הִתְחַבֵּם and σοφίζεσθαι. So here, where with *Fleischer* we have translated: who makes himself mighty, for כָּבֵד, *gravem esse*, is etymologically also the contrast of קָלָה. The proverb, *Sirach 10:26*: κρείσσων ἐργαζόμενος καὶ περισεύων ἐν πᾶσιν, ἢ δοξαζόμενος καὶ ἀπορῶν

ἄρτων (according to the text of Fritzsche), is a half remodelling, half translation of this before us.

***10 The righteous knows how his cattle feel,
And the compassion of the godless is cruel.***

Pro. 12:10. The explanation: the righteous taketh care for the life of his beast (Fl.), fails, for 10a is to be taken with Exo. 23: 9; נָפֶשׁ signifies also the state of one's soul, the frame of mind, the state of feeling; but יָדַע has, as in the related proverb, Pro. 27:23, the meaning of careful cognizance or investigation, in conformity with which one acts. If the *Torâ* includes in the law of the Sabbath (Exo. 20:10; 23:12) useful beasts and cattle, which are here especially meant, and secures to them the reward of their labour (Deu. 25: 4); if it forbids the mutilation, and generally the giving of unnecessary pain, to beasts; if it enjoins those who take a bird's nest to let the dam escape (Deu. 22: 6 f.), — these are the prefigurations of that דַּעַת נֶפֶשׁ בַּהֲמָה, and as the God of the *Torâ* thus appears at the close of the Book of Jonah, this wonderful apology (*defensio*) of the all-embracing compassion, the God also of the world-history in this sympathy for the beasts of the earth as the type of the righteous.

In 10b most interpreters find an oxymoron: the compassion of the godless is compassionless, the direct opposite of compassion; i.e., he possesses either altogether no compassion, or he shows such as in its principle, its expression, and in its effects is the opposite of what it ought to be (Fl.). Bertheau believes that in the sing. of the predicate אֲכֹרֵר he is justified in translating: the compassion of the wicked is a tyranny. And as one may speak of a loveless love, i.e., of a love which in its principle is nothing else than selfishness, so also of a compassionless compassion, such as consists only in gesture and speech without truth of feeling and of active results. But how such a compassionless compassion toward the cattle, and one which is really cruel, is possible, it may be difficult to show. Hitzig's conjecture, רַחֲמֵי, sprang from this thought: the most merciful among sinners are cruel — the sinner is as such not רַחֲמֵי. The LXX is right in the rendering, τὰ δὲ σπλάγχνα τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἀνελεήμονα. The noun רַחֲמֵי means here not compassion, but, as in Gen. 43:30 (LXX ἔντερα or ἔγκατα) and 1Ki. 3:26 (LXX μήτρα), has the meaning the bowels (properly tender parts, cf. Arab. *rakhuma*, to be soft, tender, with *rhm*), and thus the interior of the body, in which deep emotions, and especially strong sympathy, are wont to be reflected (cf. Hos. 10: 8). The singular of the predicate אֲכֹרֵר arises here from the unity of the subject-conception: the inwards, as Jer. 50:12, from the reference of the expression to each individual of the many.

**11 He that tilleth his own ground is satisfied with bread,
And he that followeth after vain pursuits is devoid of understanding.**

Pro. 12:11. Yet more complete is the antithetic parallelism in the *doublette*, Pro. 28:19 (cf. also Sir. 20:27a). The proverb recommends the cultivation of the field as the surest means of supporting oneself honestly and abundantly, in contrast to the grasping after vain, i.e., unrighteous means of subsistence, windy speculations, and the like (Fl.). רִיקִים are here not persons (Bertheau), but things without solidity and value (LXX μάταια; Aquila, Theodotion, κενά), and, in conformity with the contrast, not real business. Elsewhere also the mas. plur. discharges the function of a neut. noun of multitude, vid., נְגִידִים, *principalia*, Pro. 8: 6, and וְדִים, Psal. 19:14 — one of the many examples of the imperfect use of the gender in Hebr.; the speaker has in רִיקִים, *vana et inania*, not אֲנָשִׁים (Jud. 9: 4), but דְּבָרִים (Deu. 32:47) in view. The LXX erroneously at Pro. 28:19, and Symmachus and Jerome at both places understand רִיקִים of slothfulness.

**12 The godless lusteth after the spoil of evil-doers;
But the root of the righteous shoots forth.**

Pro. 12:12. This translation is at the same time an explanation, and agrees with Fleischer's "the godless strives by unrighteous gain like the wicked (Pro. 4:14) to enrich himself, namely, as must be understood from the antithetic members of the parallelism, in vain, without thereby making progress and gaining anything certain. The preterite, as Pro. 11: 2, 8, etc., places the general true proposition as a separate historic principle derived from experience. In 12b יָתֵן stands elliptically or pregnantly: *edet, scil. quod radix edere solet, sobolem stirpis, ramorum, etc.*, as in the Arab. *natan* and *ânatan* are specially used without an obj. of the spontaneousness of an odour." מְצוֹד (from צוֹד, to spy, to hunt) is elsewhere the instrument of the hunt (a net), here the object and end of it. If the words had been מְצוֹדֵי רָעִים, then we would explain after מְלֹאכֵי רָעִים, Psal. 78:49 (vid., comm. on), and אֲשֶׁת רָע, Pro. 6:24; but in the difference of number, רָעִים will not be the qualitative but the subjective personal genitive: *capturam qualem mali captant*. Ewald, who understands רִיקִים, 11b, of good-for-nothing-fellows, interprets רָעִים here, on the contrary, as neuter (§ 172b): the desire of the wicked is an evil net, i.e., wherein he catches all manner of evil for himself. The LXX has here two proverbs, in which מְצוֹד occurs in the plur. and in the sense of ὄχρωματα; 12b of the Hebr. text is rendered: αἶ δὲ ρίζαι τῶν ἐβσεβῶν ἐν ὄχρωμασι, which Schleusner explains *immotae erunt*. The Hebr. text can gain nothing

from this variation. That the LXX read **וְשֵׁרֵשׁ צְדִיקִים אֵיִתָּן** is not probable, since they nowhere thus translate **אֵיִתָּן**. But Reiske and Ziegler have, like Ewald and Hitzig, combined **יִתָּן** of this proverb with **יִתָּן** from **אֵיִתָּן** (Arab. *wâtin*), *firmum, perennem esse*. Hitzig translates the distich, after emending the text of 12a by the help of the LXX and the Arab.: the refuge of the wicked is crumbling clay, but the root of the righteous endures (**יִתָּן** from **יִתָּן**). Böttcher also reads **חֲמֵר** instead of **חֲמָד**, and translates (vid., p. 192, l. 11): the refuge of the wicked is miry clay, but the root of the righteous holdeth fast (**יִתָּן** = Arab. *wâtin*). But this derivation of a verb **יִתָּן** is not necessary. The *Graec. Venet.* rightly, **ρίζα δὲ δικαίων δώσει**. The obj. is self-evident. Rashi reads **יִתָּן וְהוּא הַפְּרִי מֵהָאֵרֶץ שֶׁהוּא רֵאשִׁי לִיתָּן וְהוּא הַפְּרִי**. So also Schultens. The root giveth, is equivalent to, it is productive in bringing forth that which lies in its nature. That the root of the righteous endures (Targ. **נִתְקַיֵּם**) is otherwise expressed, Pro. 12: 3.

Proverbs regarding injurious and beneficial words, wise hearing and prudent silence.

***13 In the transgression of the lips there lies a dangerous snare;
The righteous escapeth from trouble.***

Pro. 12:13. The consecutive *modus* (**וַיִּצֵא**) is here of greater weight than e.g., at 11: 8, where the connection follows without it (**וַיִּבֵּא**) from the idea of the change of place. The translation: but the righteous...restores **וַיִּצֵא וַיִּצֵּא**, and ignores the syllogistic relation of the members of the proverb, which shows itself here (cf. the contrary, Pro. 11: 9) to a certain degree by **וַיִּצֵּא**. Ewald displaces this relation, for he paraphrases: “any one may easily come into great danger by means of inconsiderate words; yet it is to be hoped that the righteous may escape, for he will guard himself against evil from the beginning.” He is right here in interpreting **צָרָה** and **מוֹקֵשׁ רָע** as the designation of danger into which one is betrayed by the transgressions of his lips, but “inconsiderate words” are less than **פְּשַׁע שְׁפָתַיִם**. One must not be misled into connecting with **פָּשַׁע** the idea of missing, or a false step, from the circumstance that **פָּשַׁע** means a step; both verbs have, it is true, the common R. **פָּשַׁע** with the fundamental idea of placing apart or separating, but **פָּשַׁע** has nothing to do with **פָּשַׁע** (step = placing apart of the legs), but denotes (as Arab. *fusuwwk fisk*, from the primary meaning *diruptio, diremtio*) a sinning, breaking through and breaking off the relation to God (cf. e.g., Pro. 28:24), or even the restraints of morality (Pro. 10:19). Such a sinning, which fastens itself to, and runs even among the righteous, would not be called **פְּשַׁע**, but rather

חַמָּאָה (Pro. 20: 9). According to this the proverb will mean that sinful words bring into extreme danger every one who indulges in them — a danger which he can with difficulty escape; and that thus the righteous, who guards himself against sinful words, escapes from the distress (cf. with the expression, Ecc. 7:18) into which one is thereby betrayed. רָע is the descriptive and expressive epithet to מוֹקֵשׁ (cf. Ecc. 9:12): a bad false trap, a malicious snare, for מוֹקֵשׁ is the snare which closes together and catches the bird by the feet. This proverb is repeated at Pro. 29: 6, peculiarly remodelled. The LXX has after v. 13 another distich:

*He who is of mild countenance findeth mercy;
He who is litigious oppresses souls.*

(נַפְשׁוֹת, or rather, more in accordance with the Hebrew original: oppresses himself, נַפְשׁוֹ.)

*14 From the fruit which the mouth
of the man bringeth forth is he satisfied with good,
And what the hands of the man accomplish returns back to him.*

Pro. 12:14. The proverb finds its final verification in the last judgment (cf. Mat. 12:37), but it is also illustrated in the present life. If the mouth of a man bringeth forth fruit, — namely, the fruit of wholesome doctrine, of right guidance, of comforting exhortation, of peace-bringing consolation for others, — this fruit is also to his own advantage, he richly enjoys the good which flows out of his own mouth, the blessing he bestows is also a blessing for himself. The same also is the case with the actions of a man. That which is done, or the service which is rendered by his hands, comes back to him as a reward or as a punishment. גְּמוּלָה signifies primarily accomplishment, execution, and is a twofold, double-sided conception: a rendering of good or evil, and merit on the side of men (whether merited reward or merited punishment), as well as recompense, requital on the side of God. The first line is repeated, somewhat altered, at Pro. 13: 2; 18:20. The whole proverb is prophetically echoed in Isa. 3:10 f. The *Keri* יִשְׁיבֵהוּ has Jahve as the subject, or rather the subject remains undefined, and “one requites him” is equivalent to: it is requited to him. The *Chethib* seems to us more expressive; but this use of the active with the undefined subject, instead of the passive, is certainly as much in the *Mishle* style (cf. Pro. 13:21) as the development of the subject of the clause from a foregoing genitive.

*15 The way of the fool is right in his own eyes,
But the wise listeneth to counsel.*

Pro. 12:15. Other proverbs, like Pro. 16: 2, say that generally the judgment of a man regarding his character does not go beyond a narrow subjectivity; but there are objective criteria according to which a man can prove whether the way in which he walks is right; but the fool knows not other standard than his own opinion, and however clearly and truly one may warn him that the way which he has chosen is the wrong way and leads to a false end, yet he obstinately persists; ^{f110} while a wise man is not so wise in his own eyes (Pro. 3: 7) as not to be willing to listen to well-meant counsel, because, however careful he may be regarding his conduct, yet he does not regard his own judgment so unerring as not to be inclined ever anew to try it and let it stand the test. Ewald has falsely construed: yet whoever hears counsel is wise. In consequence of the contrast, אָוִיל and חָכָם are the subject ideas, and with וְשָׂמָא לְעֵצָה is brought forward that which is in contrast to the self-complacency of the fool, the conduct of the wise man.

Pro. 12:16. The relations of the subject and the predicate are the same as in the preceding verse.

*The fool makes known his vexation on the same day [at once],
On the contrary, the prudent man hideth the offence.*

Very frequently in these proverbs the first line is only defined by the adducing of the second, or the second holds itself in the light of the first. A post-bibl. proverb says that a man is known by three things: by his כּוֹס (his behaviour in drinking), his כִּיס (his conduct in money transactions), and his כַּעַס (his conduct under deep inward excitement). So here: he is a fool who, if some injury is done to him, immediately shows his vexation in a passionate manner; while, on the contrary the prudent man maintains silence as to the dishonour that is done to him, and represses his displeasure, so as not to increase his vexation to his own injury. Passionless retaliation may in certain cases be a duty of self-preservation, and may appear to be necessary for the protection of truth, but passionate self-defence is always of evil, whether the injury which is inflicted be justifiable or unjustifiable. Regarding עָרוֹם, *callidus*, vid., p. 40; Schultens' comparison of the Greek γεγυμνασμένος is only a conceit in want of better knowledge. Regarding כֶּסֶה (only here and at v. 23) with מְכַסֶּה, as שָׁחַר (only Pro. 11:27) with מְשַׁחַר, vid., Ewald, § 170a. בְּיוֹם signifies on the self-same day = without delay, immediately, and is well translated by the LXX ἀβθήμερον. With another object, 16b is repeated in 23a.

Most of the remaining parables of this section refer to the right use and the abuse of the tongue.

**17 He that breathes the love of truth, utters that which is right;
But a lying tongue, deceit**

Pro. 12:17. This verse is similar in meaning to Pro. 14: 5 (where 5b = Pro. 6:19a); the second line of the distich = Pro. 14:25b. Everywhere else אֱמוּנָה וְיִפְיָהּ בְּנֹבִים stand together, only here יִפְיָהּ is joined to אֱמוּנָה; vid., regarding this יִפְיָהּ forming an attributive clause, and then employed as an adjective, but with distinct verbal force, at Pro. 6:19. Viewed superficially, the proverb appears tautological; it is not so, however, but places in causal connection the internal character of men and their utterances: whoever breathes אֱמוּנָה, truth or conscientiousness (the property of the אֱמוּנָה, vid., at Psa. 12: 2), i.e., lets the voice of this be heard in his utterances, such an one speaks צֶדֶק, i.e., uprightness, integrity, that which is correct, right (Isa. 45:19, cf. 41:26), in relation to truth in general, and to the present case in particular; but he who עַד שִׁקְרִים, i.e., he who, against better knowledge and the consciousness of untruth, confirms by his testimony (from עוֹד, *revertere*, to say again and again), therewith gives utterance to his impure character, his wicked intention, proceeding from delight in doing evil or from self-interest, and diverted towards the injury of his neighbour. As אֱמוּנָה and מִרְמָה correspond as statements of the contents of the utterances, so צֶדֶק and שִׁקְרִים as statements of their motive and aim. מִרְמָה is obj. accus. of the יָגִיד (from הִגִּיד, to bring to light, cf. נִגְדָה, visibility) to be supplied, not the pred. nom. *dolorum structor*, as Fleischer poetically finds.

**18 There is that babbleth like the thrusts of a sword,
But the tongue of the wise is healing.**

Pro. 12:18. The second (cf. Pro. 11:24) of the proverbs beginning with יִשׁ. The verb בָּטָה (בִּטָּה), peculiar to the Hebr., which in the modern Hebr. generally means “to speak out” (מִבְּטָה in the grammar: the pronunciation) (according to which the LXX, Syr., and Targ. translate it by אָמַר), means in biblical Hebr., especially with reference to the binding of oneself by an oath (Lev. 5: 4), and to solemn protestations (Num. 30: 7, 9, according to which Jerome, *promittit*): to utter incautiously in words, to speak without thought and at random, referred erroneously by Gesenius to the R. בַּט, to be hollow, probably a word imitative of the sound, like the Greek βατταρίζειν, to stammer, and βαττολογεῖν, to babble, which the lexicographers refer to a talkative person of the name of Βάττος, as our “salbadern” [= to talk foolishly] owes its origin to one Jenaer Bader on the Saal. Theod. and the *Graec. Venet.* give the false reading בּוֹטָה (πεποιθώς). בְּמִדְקָרוֹת חָרֵב stands

loco accusativi, the **רָפָא** being regarded as a noun: (*effutiens verba*) *quae sunt instar confossionum gladii* (Fl.). We also call such a man, who bridles his loquacity neither by reflection nor moderates it by indulgent reference to his fellow-men, a *Schwertmaul* (sword-mouth) or a *Schandmaul* (a mouth of shame = slanderer), and say that he has a tongue like a sword. But on the other hand, the tongue of the wise, which is in itself pure gentleness and a comfort to others, since, far from wounding, rather, by means of comforting, supporting, directing exhortation, exercises a soothing and calming influence. Regarding **רָפָא**, whence **מְרַפֵּא**, Dietrich in Gesenius' *Lex.* is right. The root-meaning of the verb **רָפָא** (cognate **רָפַח**, to be loose, *Hiph.* to let go, *Hithpa.* Pro. 18: 9, to show oneself slothful) is, as the Arab. kindred word *rafâ, rafâ, raf, rawf* (*râf*) shows, that of stilling, softening, soothing, whence arises the meaning of healing (for which the Arab. has *tabb* and *'alkh*); the meaning to repair, to mend, which the Arab. *rafâ* and *rafa* have, does not stand in a prior relation to to heal, as might appear from Job. 13: 4, but is a specializing of the general idea of *reficere* lying in *mitigare*, just as the patcher is called **ἀκέστρια** = **ἡπήτρια**,^{f111} from **ἀκέομαι**, which means equally to still and to heal. Since thus in **רָפָא** the meanings of mitigating and of healing are involved, it is plain that **מְרַפֵּא**, as it means healing (the remedy) and at the same time (cf. **θεραπεία**, Rev. 22: 2) the preservation of health, Pro. 4:22; 6:15; 16:24; 29: 1, so also may mean mildness (here and Pro. 15: 4), tranquillity (Pro. 14:30; Ecc. 10: 4, calm patience in contrast to violent passion), and refreshing (Pro. 13:17). Oetinger and Hitzig translate here "medicine;" our translation, "healing (the means of healing)," is not essentially different from it.

***19 The lip of truth endures for ever,
But the lying tongue only while I wink with the eye.***

Pro. 12:19. None of the old translators understood the phrase **וְאִם-אֶרְגִּיעַ**; the *Venet.* also, which follows Kimchi's first explanation, is incorrect: **ἕως ῥήξεως**, till I split (shatter) it (the tongue). *Abulwalid* is nearer the correct rendering when he takes **אֶרְגִּיעַ** as a noun = **רְגַע** with *He parag.* Ahron b. Joseph is better in rendering the phrase by: until I make a **רְגַע**, and quite correct if **רְגַע** (from **רָגַע** = Arab. *raj'*, which is used of the swinging of the balance) is taken in the sense of a twinkling of the eye (Schultens: *vibramen*); cf. Orelli's *Die hebr. Synonyme der Zeit und Ewigkeit*, p. 27 f., where the synonyms for a twinkling of the eye, a moment, are placed together. **אֶרְגִּיעַ** (properly progress) has in this phrase the meaning, while, so long as, and the cohortative signifies, in contradistinction to **אֶרְגִּיעַ**, which may also denote an unwilling movement of the eyelids, a movement proceeding from a free determination, serving for the measurement of a short space of time, Ewald, §

228a. אַרְגִּיעָה, Jer. 49:19; 50:44, where Ewald takes כִּי אַרְגִּיעָה (when I...) in the same sense as עַד־אַרְגִּיעָה here, which is more appropriate than the explanation of Hitzig, who regards כִּי as opening the principal clause, and attaches to הַרְגִיעַ the quite too pregnant signification “to need (for an action) only a moment.” The lip of truth, i.e., the lip which speaketh truth, endures for ever (for truth, אֱמֶת = אֲמִנֶת, is just the enduring); but the tongue of falsehood is only for a moment, or a wink of the eye, for it is soon convicted, and with disgrace brings to silence; for a post-bibl. Aram. proverb says: שִׁקְרָא לָא קָאִי קוֹשְׁמָא קָאִי, the truth endures, the lie endures not (*Schabbath* 104a), and a Hebrew proverb: הַשִּׁקְרָא אֵין לוֹ רַגְלִים, the lie has no feet (on which it can stand).^{f112}

*20 Deceit is in the heart of him who deviseth evil,
But those who devise peace cause joy.*

Pro. 12:20. Regarding the figure of forging, fabricating (LXX, Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, τεκταίνειν), or of ploughing, which underlies the phrase חָרַשׁ רָע, *moliri malum*, vid., at Pro. 3:29. That deceit is in the heart of him who deviseth evil (בְּלִב־חָרְשֵׁי רָע), as is correctly punctuated e.g., by Norzi) appears to be a platitude, for the חָרַשׁ רָע is as such directed against a neighbour. But in the first place, 20a in itself says that the evil which a man hatches against another always issues in a fraudulent, malicious deception of the same; and in the second place, it says, when taken in connection with 20b, where שְׂמֻחָה is the parallel word to מְרָמָה, that with the deception he always at the same time prepares for him sorrow. The contrast to חָרְשֵׁי רָע is שְׁלוֹם יוֹעֲצֵי, and thus denotes not those who give counsel to contending parties to conclude peace, but such as devise peace, viz., in reference to the neighbour, for יוֹעֵץ means not merely to impart counsel, but also mentally to devise, to resolve upon, to decree, 2Ch. 25:16, Isa. 32: 7 f.; cf. יוֹעֵץ עַל, Jer. 49:30. Hitzig and Zöckler give שְׁלוֹם the general idea of welfare (that which is salutary), and interpret the שְׂמֻחָה as the inner joy of the good conscience. Certainly שְׁלוֹם (R. של, *extrahere*, in the sense of deliverance from trouble) means not only peace as to the external relationship of men with each other, but also both internal and external welfare. Thus it is here meant of external welfare; Hitzig rightly compares Jer. 29:11 with Nah. 1:11 to the contrast between שְׁלוֹם and רָע. But as מְרָמָה is not self-deception, but the deception of another, so also שְׂמֻחָה is not the joy of those who devise the device in their hearts for the deception of others, but the joy they procure for others. Thoughts of peace for one's neighbour are always thoughts of procuring joy for him, as

thoughts of evil are thoughts of deceit, and thus of procuring sorrow for him. Thus **וְלִי־עֵצִי** is an abbreviated expression for **וּבְלִבִּי יִעֲצֵי**

**21 No evil befalls the righteous,
But the godless are full of evil.**

Pro. 12:21. Hitzig translates **אֲנִי** “sorrow,” and Zöckler “injury;” but the word signifies evil as ethical wickedness, and although it may be used of any misfortune in general (as in **בֶּן-אֲוִי**, *opp.* **בְּנֵי-מִיִן**); thus it denotes especially such sorrow as is the harvest and product of sin, Pro. 22: 8, Job. 4: 8, Isa. 59: 4, or such as brings after it punishment, Hab. 3: 7, Jer. 4:15. That it is also here thus meant the contrast makes evident. The godless are full of evil, for the moral evil which is their life-element brings out of itself all kinds of evil; on the contrary, no kind of evil, such as sin brings forth and produces, falls upon the righteous. God, as giving form to human fortune (Exo. 21:13), remains in the background (cf. *Psa.* 91:10 with 5: 1 f.); vid., regarding **אֱנִי**, the weaker power of **עָנָה**, to go against, to meet, to march against, *Fleischer, Levy’s Chald. Wörterbuch, 572.*

**22 Lying lips are an abhorrence to Jahve,
And they that deal truly are His delight.**

Pro. 12:22. The frame of the distich is like Pro. 11: 1, 20. **אֱמוּנָה** is probity as the harmony between the words and the inward thoughts. The LXX, which translates **ὁ δὲ ποιῶν πίστεις**, had in view **עֲשֵׂה אֱמוּנִים** (**עֲשֵׂה אֱמוּנִים**, cf. *Isa.* 26: 2); the text of all other translations agrees with that commonly received.

**23 A prudent man conceals knowledge,
And a heart-fool proclaims imbecility.**

Pro. 12:23. In *23a v. 16b* is repeated, only a little changed; also *16a* corresponds with *23a*, for, as is there said, the fool knows not how to keep his anger to himself, as here, that a heart-fool (cf. the lying mouth, *22a*) proclaims (trumpets forth), or as Pro. 13:16 says, displays folly without referring to himself the *si tacuisses*. To this forward charlatan blustering, which intends to preach wisdom and yet proclaims in the world mere folly, i.e., nonsense and imbecility, and thereby makes itself troublesome, and only to be laughed at and despised, stands in contrast the relation of the **אָדָם עָרוֹם**, *homo callidus*, who possesses knowledge, but keeps it to himself without bringing it forth till an occasion presents itself for setting it forth at the right place, at the right time, and to the right man. The right motive also regulates such silence as well as modesty. But this proverb places it under the point of view of prudence.

We take verses 24-28 together as a group. In these verses the subject is the means of rising (in the world), and the two ways, the one of which leads to error, and the other to life.

***24 The land of the diligent attains to dominion,
But slothfulness will become tributary.***

Pro. 12:24. In Pro. 10: 4 רַמְיָהּ was adj., but to כָּף standing beside it; here it is to be regarded as adj. to יָד (sluggish hand) supplied from 24a, but may be equally regarded as a subst. (slothfulness) (vid., at v. 27). Regarding חֲרִיבִי, vid., p. 153. מַסִּי signifies tribute and service, i.e., tributary service rendered to a master. in Pro. 11:29b עֲבָד stands for it. It is still the experience of to-day, as it was of Solomon's time, that slothfulness (indolence) brings down to a state of servitude, if not even deeper, but that vigorous activity raises to dominion or to the position of a master, i.e., to independence, wealth, respect, and power.

***25 Trouble in the heart of a man boweth it down,
And a friendly word maketh it glad.***

Pro. 12:25. The twofold anomaly that דָּאָגָה is construed as masc. and לב as fem. renders the text doubtful, but the LXX, Syr., Targum, which introduce another subject, φοβερός λόγος (דְּבַר מְדַאִיג?), do not improve it; Theodotion's is preferable, who translates μέριμνα ἐν καρδίᾳ ἀνδρὸς κατῖσχει αὐτόν, and thus reads יִשְׁחַנוּ. But the rhyme is thereby lost. As כָּבוֹד, Gen. 49: 6, so also may לב be used as fem., for one thereby thinks on נִפְשׁ; the plur. לְבוֹת (לְבָבוֹת), according to which in Eze. 16:30 we find the sing. לְבָה, may also conform to this. And יִשְׁחַנָּה as pred. to דָּאָגָה follows the scheme Pro. 2:10b, perhaps not without attractional co-operation after the scheme קָשַׁת גְּבוּרִים חֲתִים, 1Sa. 2: 4. הִשְׁחָה, from שָׁחָה, occurs only here; but הִנְשָׁח, from שָׁחַח, occurs only twice. דְּבַר טוֹב designates in the book of Joshua and in Kings (1Ki. 8:56) the divine promise; here it is of the same meaning as 1Ki. 12: 7: an appeasing word. Who has not in himself had this experience, how such a word of friendly encouragement from a sympathizing heart cheers the sorrowful soul, and, if only for a time, changes its sorrow into the joy of confidence and of hope!

***26 The righteous looketh after his pastures,
But the way of the godless leadeth them into error.***

Pro. 12:26. In 26a no acceptable meaning is to be gained from the traditional mode of vocalization. Most of the ancients translate יָתַר as part. to יָתַר, as it

occurs in post-bibl. Hebr., e.g., **הָבָה יִתְּרָה**, prevailing, altogether peculiar love. Thus the Targum, **מִבְּמֵן הַבְּרִיָּה**; Venet. **πεπερίττευται** (after Kimchi); on the other hand, Aquila, active: **περισσεύων τὸν πλησίον** (making the neighbour rich), which the meaning of the *Kal* as well as the form **יִתֵּר** oppose; Luther, “The righteous man is better than his neighbour,” according to which Fleischer also explains, “Probably **יִתֵּר** from **יָתַר**, **πλεονάζειν**, has the meaning of **πλέον ἔχων**, **πλεονεκτῶν**, he gains more honour, respect, riches, etc., than the other, viz., the unrighteous.” Yet more satisfactory Ahron b. Joseph: not the nobility and the name, but this, that he is righteous, raises a man above others. In this sense we would approve of the *praestantior altero justus*, if only the two parts of the proverb were not by such a rendering wholly isolated from one another. Thus **יִתֵּר** is to be treated as the fut. of **הִתִּיר**. The Syr. understands it of right counsel; and in like manner Schultens explains it, with Cocceius, of intelligent, skilful guidance, and the moderns (e.g., Gesenius) for the most part of guidance generally. Ewald rather seeks (because the proverb-style avoids the placing of a fut. verb at the commencement of the proverb [but cf. Pro. 17:10]) to interpret **יִתֵּר** as a noun in the sense of director, but his justification of the fixed *ā* is unfounded. And generally this sense of the word is exposed to many objections. The verb **הִיָּוַר** signifies, after its root, to go about, “to make to go about,” but is, however, not equivalent to, to lead (wherefore Böttcher too ingeniously derives **יִתֵּר** = **יִאֲתַר** from **אֲתַר** = **אָשַׁר**); and wherefore this strange word, since the Book of Proverbs is so rich in synonyms of leading and guiding! The *Hiph.* **הִתִּיר** signifies to send to spy, Jud. 1:23, and in this sense the poet ought to have said **יִתֵּר לְרַעְהוּ**: the righteous spies out (the way) for his neighbour, he serves him, as the Targum-Talmud would say, as **תִּתְּרֵי**. Thus connected with the obj. accus. the explanation would certainly be: the righteous searches out his neighbour (Löwenstein), he has intercourse with men, according to the maxim, “*Trauschau wem.*” But why not **רַעְהוּ**, but **מְרַעְהוּ**, which occurs only once, Pro. 19: 7, in the *Mishle*, and then for an evident reason? Therefore, with Döderlein, Dathe, J. D. Michaelis, Ziegler, and Hitzig, we prefer to read **מְרַעְהוּ**; it is at least not necessary, with Hitzig, to change **יִתֵּר** into **יָתַר**, since the *Hiphil* may have the force of the intens. of the *Kal*, but **יָתַר** without the jussive signification is a poetic licence for **יִתֵּר**. That **תִּוֵּר** can quite well be used of the exploring of the pasture, the deriv. **יִתִּוֵּר**, Job. 39:18, shows. Thus altered, 26a falls into an appropriately contrasted relation to 26b. The way of the godless leads them into error; the course of life to which they have given themselves up has such a power over them that they cannot set themselves free from it, and it leads the enslaved into destruction: the righteous, on the

contrary, is free with respect to the way which he takes and the place where he stays; his view (regard) is directed to his true advancement, and he looketh after his pasture, i.e., examines and discovers, where for him right pasture, i.e., the advancement of his outer and inner life, is to be found. With מְרַעְהוּ there is a combination of the thought of this verse with the following, whose catch-word is צִידוֹ, his prey.

**27 The slothful pursues not his prey;
But a precious possession of a man is diligence.**

Pro. 12:27. The LXX, Syr., Targ., and Jerome render יַחְרֹךְ in the sense of obtaining or catching, but the verbal stem חרך nowhere has this meaning. When Fleischer remarks, חֲרַךְ, ἄπ. λεγ., probably like לָכַד, properly to entangle in a noose, a net, he supports his opinion by reference to חֲרָכִים, which signifies lattice-windows, properly, woven or knitted like a net. But חֲרַךְ, whence this חֲרָכִים, appears to be equivalent to the Arab. *khark*, *fissura*, so that the plur. gives the idea of a manifoldly divided (lattice-like, trellis-formed) window. The Jewish lexicographers (Menahem, *Abulwalid*, Parchon, also Juda b. Koreish) all aim at that which is in accord with the meaning of the Aram. חֲרַךְ, to singe, to roast (= Arab. *ħark*): the slothful roasteth not his prey, whether (as Fürst presents it) because he is too lazy to hunt for it (Berth.), or because when he has it he prepares it not for enjoyment (Ewald). But to roast is צֵלָה, not דָּרַךְ, which is used only of singeing, e.g., the hair, and roasting, e.g., ears of corn, but not of the roasting of flesh, for which reason Joseph Kimchi (vid., Kimchi's *Lex.*) understands צִידוֹ of wild fowls, and יַחְרֹךְ of the singeing of the tips of the wings, so that they cannot fly away, according to which the *Venet.* translates οὐ μὲν εἶ... ἢ θήρα αὐτοῦ. Thus the Arab. must often help to a right interpretation of the ἄπ. λεγ. Schultens is right: *Verbum ħarak*, חֲרַךְ, *apud Arabes est movere, ciere, excitare, κινεῖν generatim, et speciatim excitare praedam e cubili, κινεῖν τὴν θήραν.* The Lat. *agitare*, used of the frightening up and driving forth of wild beasts, corresponds with the idea here, as e.g., used by Ovid, *Metam.* x. 538, of Diana:

***Aut pronos lepores aue celsum in cornua cervum
Aut agitat damas.***

Thus יַחְרֹךְ together with צִידוֹ gains the meaning of hunting, and generally of catching the prey. רַמְיָהּ is here incarnate slothfulness, and thus without ellipse equivalent to אִישׁ רַמְיָהּ. That in the contrasted clause חֲרוֹץ does not mean ἄποτόμως, decreed (Löwenstein), nor gold (Targ., Jerome, *Venet.*), nor that which is excellent (Syr.), is manifest from this contrast as well as from 10: 4;

12:24. The clause has from its sequence of words something striking about it. The LXX placed the words in a difference order: *κατῆμα δὲ τίμιον ἀνὴρ καθαρὸς* (חלויץ in the sense of Arab. *khâlas*). But besides this transposition, two others have been tried: הוון אדם חרוין יקר, the possession of an industrious man is precious, and הוון יקר אדם חרוין, a precious possession is that (supply הוון) of an industrious man. But the traditional arrangement of the words gives a better meaning than these modifications. It is not, however, to be explained, with Ewald and Bertheau: a precious treasure of a man is one who is industrious, for why should the industrious man be thought of as a worker for another and not for himself? Another explanation advanced by Kimchi: a valuable possession to men is industry, has the twofold advantage that it is according to the existing sequence of the words, and presents a more intelligible thought. But can חרוין have the meaning of חריצות (the being industrious)? Hitzig reads חרוין, to make haste (to be industrious). This is unnecessary, for we have here a case similar to Pro. 10:17, where שומר for שומר is to be expected: a precious possession of a man is it that, or when, he is industrious, חרוין briefly for חיותו חרוין. The accentuation fluctuates between יקר והוון אדם (so e.g., Cod. 1294), according to which the Targum translates, and והוון אדם יקר, which, according to our explanation, is to be preferred.

***28 In the path of righteousness is life,
And the way of its path is immortality.***

Pro. 12:28. All the old versions to the *Venet.* give אל instead of אל, and are therefore under the necessity of extracting from ודרך נתיבה a meaning corresponding to this, εἰς θάνατον, in which they are followed by Hitzig: “a devious way leadeth to death.” But נתיבה (נתיבה) signifies step, and generally way and street (vid., at Pro. 1:15), not “devious way,” which is expressed, Jud. 5: 6, by ארחות עקלקלות. And that אל is anywhere punctuated thus in the sense of אל is previously improbable, because the Babylonian system of punctuation distinguishes the negative אל with a short *Pathach*, and the prepositional אל (Arab. *ilâ*) with a short *Chirek*, from each other (vid., Pinsker, *Einl.* p. xxii.f.); the punctuation 2Sa. 18:16, Jer. 51: 3, gives no support to the opinion that here אל is vocalized thus in the sense of אל, and it is not to be thus corrected. Nothing is more natural than that the Chokma in its constant contrast between life and death makes a beginning of expressing the idea of the ἀθανασία (vid., p. 30), which Aquila erroneously read from the אל-מות, Psa. 48:15. It has been objected that for the formation of such negative

substantives and noun-adjectives לָא (e.g., לֹא-יָאֵל, לֹא-עָם) and not אֵל is used; but that אֵל also may be in close connection with a noun, 2Sa. 1:13 shows. There אֵל-טַל is equivalent to אֵל יְהִי טַל, according to which it may also be explained in the passage before us, with Luther and all the older interpreters, who accepted אֵל in its negative signification: and on (the בִּי governing) the way...is no death. The negative אֵל frequently stands as an intensifying of the objective לָא; but why should the Chokma, which has already shown itself bold in the coining of new words, not apply itself to the formation of the idea of immortality?: the idol name אֵלִיל is the result of a much greater linguistic boldness. It is certain that אֵל is here not equivalent to אֵל; the Masora is therefore right in affirming that נְתִיבָה is written with *Heraphatum pro mappicato* (vid., Kimchi, *Michlol* 31a, and in the *Lex.*), cf. 1Sa. 20:20, vid., Böttcher, § 418. Thus: the way of their step is immortality, or much rather, since דֶּרֶךְ is not a fixed idea, but also denotes the going to a distance (i.e., the journey), the behaviour, the proceeding, the walk, etc.: the walking (the stepping over and passing through) of their way is immortality. Rich in synonyms of the way, the Hebrew style delights in connecting them with picturesque expressions; but דֶּרֶךְ always means the way in general, which divides into אַרְחוֹת or נְתִיבוֹת (Job. 6:18, Jer. 18: 5), and consists of such (Isa. 3:16). The distich is synonymous: on the path of righteousness (accentuate בְּאַרְחַ צְדָקָה) is life meeting him who walks in it, and giving itself to him as a possession, and the walking in its path is immortality (cf. Pro. 3:17; 10:28); so that to go in it and to be immortal, i.e., to be delivered from death, to be exalted above it, is one and the same thing. If we compare with this, Pro. 14:32b, it is obvious that the Chokma begins (vid., *Psychol.* p. 410) to break through the limits of this present life, and to announce a life beyond the reach of death.

CHAPTER 13

Pro. 13: 1. The proverb Pro. 12:28 is so sublime, so weighty, that it manifestly forms a period and conclusion. This is confirmed from the following proverb, which begins like Pro. 10: 1 (cf. 5), and anew stamps the collection as intended for youth:

***1 A wise son is his father's correction;
But a scorner listens not to rebuke.***

The LXX, which the Syr. follows, translate Ὑἱὸς πανουργὸς ὑπήκοος πατρί, whence it is not to be concluded with Lagarde that they read נוֹסֵר in the sense of a *Ni. tolerativum*; they correctly understood the text according to the Jewish

rule of interpretation, “that which is wanting is to be supplied from the context.” The Targ. had already supplied שָׁמַע from 1b, and is herein followed by Hitzig, as also by Glassius in the *Philologia sacra*. But such an ellipse is in the Hebr. style without an example, and would be comprehensible only in passionate, hasty discourse, but in a language in which the representation *filius sapiens disciplinam patris audit* numbers among the anomalies is not in general possible, and has not even its parallel in Tacitus, *Ann. xiii. 56: deesse nobis terra, in qua vivamus — in qua moriemur, non potest*, because here the primary idea, which the one expression confirms, the other denies, and besides no particle, such as the ׀ of this passage before us, stands between them. Böttcher therefore maintains the falling out of the verb, and writes יָבִין before בָּן; but one says not בֵּין מוֹסֵר, but שָׁמַע מוֹסֵר, Pro. 1: 8; 4: 1; 19:27. Should not the clause, as it thus stands, give a sense complete in itself? But מוֹסֵר can hardly, with Schultens and Ewald, be taken as *part. Hoph.* of יָסַר: one brought up by his father, for the usage of the language knows מוֹסֵר only as *part. Hoph.* of סוּר. Thus, as Jerome and the *Venet.* translate: a wise son is the correction of his father, i.e., the product of the same, as also Fleischer explains, “Attribution of the cause, the ground, as elsewhere of the effect.” But we call that which one has trained (vegetable or animal) his *Zucht* (= παιδεία in the sense of παίδευμα). To the wise son (Pro. 10: 1) who is indebted to the אָב מוֹסֵר (Pro. 4: 1), stands opposed the לֵץ (vid., Pro. 1:22), the mocker at religion and virtue, who has no ear for גְּעָרָה, strong and stern words which awaken in him a wholesome fear (cf. Pro. 17:10, Jud. 1:23: ἐν φόβῳ).

**2 From the fruit of the mouth of a man he himself enjoys good;
But the delight of the godless is violence.**

Pro. 13: 2. 2a = 12:14a, where יִשְׁבַּע for יֹאכַל. A man with a fruit-bringing mouth, himself enjoys also the blessing of his fruit-producing speech; his food (cf. βρῶμα, Joh. 4:34) is the good action in words, which in themselves are deeds, and are followed by deeds; this good action affords enjoyment not merely to others, but also to himself. Ewald and Bertheau attract יֹאכַל to 2b; so also does Fleischer: “the violence which the בְּגָדִים wish to do to others turns back upon themselves; they must eat it also, i.e., bear its evil consequences.” The thought would then be like Pro. 10: 6: *os improborum obteget violentia*, and “to eat violence” is parallel to “to drink (Pro. 26: 6) violence (injury).” But wherefore then the naming of the soul, of which elsewhere it is said that it hungers or satiates itself, but never simply (but cf. Luk. 12:19) that it eats? On the contrary, נַפֶּשׁ means also *appetitus*, Pro. 23: 2, and particularly wicked desire, *Psa. 27:12*; here, as *Psa. 35:25*, the object of

this desire (*Psychol.* p. 202). Regarding בַּגְדִים, vid., above, p. 61. There are such as do injury in a cunning deceitful manner to their neighbour to their own advantage. While the former (the righteous) distributes to his neighbour from the inner impulse without having such a result in view, yet according to God's direction he derives enjoyment himself therefrom: the desire of the latter goes to סַמֶּךָ, ἀδικία, and thus to the enjoyment of good unrighteously and violently seized.

***3 He that guardeth his mouth keepeth his soul;
He that openeth his lips, to him it is destruction.***

Pro. 13: 3. 3a is extended in Pro. 21:23 to a distich. Mouth and soul stand in closest interchangeable relation, for speech is the most immediate and continuous expression of the soul; thus whoever guards his mouth keeps his soul (the *Venet.*, with excellent rendering of the synonym, ὁ τηρῶν τὸ στόμα ἑαυτοῦ φυλάσσει τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοῦ), for he watches that no sinful vain thoughts rise up in his soul and come forth in words, and because he thus keeps his soul, i.e., himself, safe from the destructive consequences of the sins of the tongue. On the contrary, he who opens wide his lips, i.e., cannot hold his mouth (LXX ὁ δὲ προπετιῆς χεῖλεσιν), but expresses unexamined and unconsidered whatever comes into his mind and gives delight, he is destruction to himself (supply הוֹנֵה), or to him it is destruction (supply זֵאֵת); both interpretations are possible, the parallelism brings nearer the former, and the parallel Pro. 18: 7 brings nearer the latter. פִּשַׁק means to spread (Schultens *diducere cum ruptura vel ad rupturam usque*), here the lips, *Pih.* Eze. 16:25, the legs, Arab. *fashkh, farshkh*; vid., regarding the R. פֶּשַׁח, to extend, to spread out, Fleischer in the supplements to the *A. L. Z.* 1843, col. 116. Regarding the *Mishle* word מִתְקַדְּחֵהוּ, vid., under Pro. 10:14.

Pro. 13: 4. The three proverbs (1-3) which refer to hearing and speaking are now following by a fourth which, like vv. 2 and 3, speaks of the נֶפֶשׁ.

***The soul of the sluggard desires, yet has not;
But the soul of the industrious is richly satisfied.***

The view that the *o* in נֶפֶשׁוֹ עֲצֵל is the *cholem compaginis*, Böttcher, § 835, meets with the right answer that this would be the only example of a vocal *casus* in the whole of gnomic poetry; but when on his own part (*Neue Aehrenlese*, § 1305) he regards נֶפֶשׁוֹ as the accus. of the nearer definition (= בְּנֶפֶשׁוֹ), he proceeds inadvertently on the view that the first word of the proverb is מִתְאָנֵה, while we read מִתְאָנֵה, and נֶפֶשׁוֹ is thus the nom. of the subject. נֶפֶשׁוֹ עֲצֵל means “his (the sluggard’s) soul” (for עֲצֵל occurs as

explanatory permutative briefly for **נפש עצל**), as **סְעִיפֶיהָ פְּרִיָּהּ** means “its branches (i.e., of the fruitful tree),” Isa. 17: 6. One might, it is true, add **ה** to the following word here, as at Pro. 14:13; but the similar expression appertaining to the *syntax ornata* occurs also 2Sa. 22:33, Psa. 71: 7, and elsewhere, where this is impracticable. *Meîri* appropriately compares the scheme Exo. 2: 6, she saw him, viz., the boy. With reference to the **אִין** here violently (cf. Pro. 28: 1) introduced, Böttcher rightly remarks, that it is an adverb altogether like *necquidquam*, Pro. 14: 6; 20: 4, Psa. 68:21, etc., thus: *appetit necquidquam anima ejus, scilicet pigri*. 4b shows the meaning of the desire that has not, for there **תִּרְשָׁן** occurs, a favourite strong *Mishle* word (Pro. 11:25; 28:25, etc.) for abundant satisfaction (the LXX here, as at 28:25, **ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ**, sc. **ἔσονται**, instead of which, Montfaucon supposed **πιμελείᾳ**, which is, however, a word not authenticated). The slothful wishes and dreams of prosperity and abundance (cf. Pro. 21:25 f., a parallel which the Syr. has here in view), but his desire remains unsatisfied, since the object is not gained but only lost by doing nothing; the industrious gain, and that richly, what the slothful wishes for, but in vain.

Pro. 13: 5. Two proverbs of the character of the righteous and of the effect of righteousness:

***A deceitful thing the righteous hateth;
But the godless disgraceth and putteth to shame.***

With **דְּבַר** in the sphere of an intelligible generality (as here of falsehood, or Psa. 41: 9 of worthlessness) a concrete event is in view, as with **דְּבָרִים** in the following plur. a general fact is separated into its individual instances and circumstances (vid., at Psa. 65: 4); for **דְּבַר** means not only the word in which the soul reveals itself, but also any fact in which an inner principle or a general fact or a whole comes forth to view. The righteous hateth all that bears in it the character of a falsehood (punctuate **דְּבַר־שָׁקֶר** with *Gaja*, cf. Pro. 12:19), but the godless...Should we now, with Bertheau, Hitzig, and others, translate “acteth basely and shamefully”? It is true that both *Hiph.* may be regarded as transitive, but this expression gives not right contrast to 5a, and is pointless. We have seen at Pro. 10: 5 that **הַבִּישׁ**, like **הַשְּׁבִיל**, has also a causative signification: to put to shame, i.e., bring shame upon others, and that Pro. 19:26, where **מְבִישׁ וּמְחַפֵּיר** are connected, this causative signification lies nearer than the intrinsically transitive. Thus it will also here be meant, that while the righteous hateth all that is false or that is tainted by falsehood, the godless on the contrary loves to disgrace and to put to shame. But it is a question whether **יְבֹאֵשׁ** is to be derived from **בָּאֵשׁ = בּוֹשׁ**, and thus is of the

same meaning as **יְבִישׁ**; **הַבְּאִישׁ**, Isa. 30: 5, which there signifies *pudefactum esse*, is pointed **הַבְּאִישׁ**, and is thus derived from a **יָבַשׁ** = **בָּוֶשׁ**, vid., 2Sa. 19: 6. But **הַבְּאִישׁ** occurs also as *Hiph.* of **בָּאֵשׁ**, and means transitively to make of an evil savour, Gen. 34:30, cf. Exo. 5:21, as well as intransitively to come into evil savour, 1Sa. 27:12. In this sense of *putidum faciens*, bringing into evil savour, **יְבִישׁ** occurs here as at Pro. 19:26, suitably along with **יְחַפִּיר**; Pro. 19:26 is the *putidum facere* by evil report (slander), into which the foolish son brings his parents, here by his own evil report, thus to be thought of as brought about by means of slander. The old translators here fall into error; Luther renders both *Hiphils* reflexively; only the *Venet.* (after Kimchi) is right: **ὀζώσει** (from an **ὀζῶν** as trans. to **ὀζέω**) **καὶ ἀτιμώσει**, he makes to be of ill odour and dishonours.

***6 Righteousness protecteth an upright walk,
And godlessness bringeth sinners to destruction.***

Pro. 13: 6. The double thought is closely like that of Pro. 11: 5, but is peculiarly and almost enigmatically expressed. As there, **רְשָׁעָה** and **צְדָקָה** are meant of a twofold inner relation to God, which consists of a ruling influence over man's conduct and a determination of his walk. But instead of naming the persons of the **תְּמִימֵי דֶרֶךְ** and **חַטָּאִים** as the objects of this influence, the proverb uses the abstract expression, but with personal reference, **תְּסֻדְדֶרֶךְ** and **חַטָּאת**, and designates in two words the connection of this twofold character with the principles of their conduct. What is meant by **תְּצַר** and **תְּסַלֵּף** proceeds from the contrasted relationship of the two (cf. Pro. 22:12). **נָצַר** signifies *observare*, which is not suitable here, but also *tueri* (**τηρεῖν**), to which **סַלֵּף** (vid., at 11: 3, and in Gesen. *Thesaurus*), not so much in the sense of "to turn upside down," *pervertere* (as Pro. 11: 3, Exo. 23: 8), as in the sense of "to overthrow," *evertere* (as e.g., Pro. 21:12), forms a fitting contrast. He who walks forth with an unfeigned and untroubled pure mind stands under the shield and the protection of righteousness (cf. with this prosopopoeia Psa. 25:21), from which such a walk proceeds, and at the same time under the protection of God, to whom righteousness appertains, is well-pleasing. but he who in his conduct permits himself to be determined by sin, godlessness (cf. Zec. 5: 8) from which such a love for sin springs forth, brings to destruction; in other words: God, from whom the **רָשָׁע**, those of a perverse disposition, tear themselves away, makes the sin their snare by virtue of the inner connection established by Him between the **רְשָׁעָה** and the destruction (Isa. 9:17). In the LXX this 6th verse was originally wanting; the translation in the version of

Aquila, in the Complut. and elsewhere, which the Syr. follows, falsely makes **תאמא** the subj.: **τὸς δὲ ἀσεβείας φαύλους ποιεῖ ἁμαρτία.**

Pro. 13: 7. Two proverbs of riches and poverty: —

***There is one who maketh himself rich and hath nothing;
There is another who representeth himself poor amid great riches.***

A sentence which includes in itself the judgment which Pro. 12: 9 expresses. To the *Hithpa.* **התכבד** (to make oneself of importance) there are associated here two others, in the meaning to make oneself something, without anything after it, thus to place oneself so or so, Ewald, § 124*a*. To the clauses with **ל** there is supplied a self-intelligible **לו**.

***8 A ransom for a man's life are his riches;
But the poor heareth no threatening.***

Pro. 13: 8. Bertheau falls into error when he understands **אזהרה** of warning; the contrast points to threatening with the loss of life. The wealth of the rich before the judgment is not here to be thought of; for apart from this, that the *Tora* only in a single case permits, or rather ordains (Exo. 21:29 f.), ransom from the punishment of death, and declares it in all other cases inadmissible, Num. 35:31 f. (one might indeed think of an administration of justice not strictly in accordance with the Mosaic law, or altogether accessible to bribery), *8b* does not accord therewith, since the poor in such cases would fare ill, because one would lay hold on his person. But one may think e.g., on waylayers as those introduced as speaking Pro. 1:11-14. The poor has no room to fear that such will threateningly point their swords against his breast, for there is nothing to be got from him: he has nothing, one sees it in him and he is known as such. But the rich is a valuable prize for them, and he has to congratulate himself if he is permitted to escape with his life. Also in the times of war and commotion it may be seen that riches endanger the life of their possessor, and that in fortunate cases they are given as a ransom for his life, while his poverty places the poor man in safety. To **לא שמע לו** Hitzig fittingly compares Job. 3:18; 39: 7: he does not hear, he has no need to hear. Michaelis, Umbreit, Löwenstein (who calls to remembrance the state of things under despotic governments, especially in the East) also explain *8b* correctly; and Fleischer remarks: *pauper minas hostiles non audit*, i.e., *non minatur ei hostis*. Ewald's syntactic refinement: "Yet he became poor who never heard an accusation," presents a thought not in harmony with *8a*.

The three following proverbs in vv. 9-11 have at least this in common, that the two concluding words of each correspond with one another almost rhythmically.

***9 The light of the righteous burneth joyously,
And the lamp of the godless goeth out.***

Pro. 13: 9. The second line = Pro. 24:20b, cf. 20:20. In the Book of Job. 18: 5 f., אור רשעים ידעך and נרו עליו ידעך (cf. Pro. 21:17) stand together, and there is spoken of (Pro. 29: 3) a divine נר as well as a divine אור which enlightens the righteous; however, one must say that the poet, as he, Pro. 6: 3, deliberately calls the *Torâ* אור, and the commandment, as derived from it and separated, נר, so also here designedly calls the righteous אור, viz., אור היום (Pro. 4:18, cf. 2Pe. 1:19), and the godless נר, viz., נר דלוק, — the former imparts the sunny daylight, the latter the light of tapers set in darkness. The authentic punctuation is אור-צדיקים, Ben-Naphtali's is אור צ' without *Makkeph*. To ישמח Hitzig compares the “laughing tongue of the taper” of *Meidâni*, iii. 475; Kimchi also the “laughing, i.e., amply measured span, שוהק טפח,” of the Talmud; for the light laughs when it brightly shines, and increases rather than decreases; in Arab. *samuha* has in it the idea of joy directly related to that of liberality. The LXX translates ישמח incorrectly by διαπαντός, and has a distich following v. 9, the first line of which is ψυχαι δόλιαι (נפש רמיה ?) πλανῶνται ἐν ἁμαρτίαις, and the second line is from Psa. 37:21b.

***10 Nothing comes by pride but contention;
But wisdom is with those who receive counsel.***

Pro. 13:10. The restrictive רק (only) does not, according to the sense, belong to בנדון (by pride), but to מצה, vid., under Psa. 32: 6 and Job. 2:10. Of יתן = there is, vid., under Pro. 10:24. Bertheau's “one causes” is not exact, for “one” [*man*] is the most general personal subject, but יתן is in such cases to be regarded as impersonal: by pride is always a something which causes nothing but quarrel and strife, for the root of pride is egoism. Line second is a variant to Pro. 11: 2b. *Bescheidenheit* (modesty) is in our old [German] language exactly equivalent to *Klugheit* (prudence). But here the צנועים are more exactly designated as permitting themselves to be advised; the elsewhere reciprocal נוֹאֵץ has here once a tolerative signification, although the reciprocal is also allowable: with such as reciprocally advise themselves, and thus without positiveness supplement each his own knowledge by means of that of another. Most interpreters regard 10b as a substantival clause, but why should

not יתן be carried forward? With such as permit themselves to be advised, or are not too proud to sustain with others the relation of giving and receiving, there is wisdom, since instead of hatred comes wisdom — the peaceful fruit resulting from an interchange of views.

***11 Wealth by means of fraud always becomes less;
But he that increaseth it by labour gains always more.***

Pro. 13:11. We punctuate הוֹן־מֶהָבֵל (with *Makkeph*, as in Ven. 1521, Antw. 1582, Frank.-on-the-Oder 1595, Gen. 1618, Leyden 1662), not מֶהָבֵל הוֹן (as other editions, and e.g., also Löwenstein); for the meaning is not that the wealth becomes less by הָבֵל (Targ., but not the Syr.), or that it is less than הָבֵל (Umbreit), but הוֹן־מֶהָבֵל is one idea: wealth proceeding from הָבֵל; but הָבֵל, properly a breath (Theod. ἀπὸ ἀτμοῦ or ἀτμίδος), then appearance without reality (Aquila, ἀπὸ ματαιότητος), covers itself here by that which we call swindle, i.e., by morally unrestrained fraudulent and deceitful speculation in contrast to solid and real gain. The translations: ἐπισπουδαζομένη μετὰ ἀνομίας (LXX), ὑπερσπουδαζομένη (Symmachus, *Quinta*^{f113}), *festinata* (Jerome), do not necessarily suppose the phrase מֶהָבֵל = מִבְּהָל, 20:21 *Kerî*, for wealth which comes מֶהָבֵל is obtained in a windy (unsubstantial) manner and as if by storm, of which the proverb holds good: “*so gewonnen so zerronnen*” (= quickly come, quickly go). מֶהָבֵל needs neither to be changed into that unhebraic מֶהָבֵל (Hitzig) nor into the cognate מִבְּהָל (Ewald), but yet inferior to מֶהָבֵל in the content of its idea. The contrast of one who by fraud and deception quickly arrives at wealth is one who brings it together in his hand, ἐπὶ χειρός (*Venet.*), i.e., always as often as he can bear it in his hand and bring it forth (Ewald, Bertheau, Elster, and Lagarde), or according to the measure of the hand, κατὰ χεῖρα (which means “according to external ability”), so that עַל, which is applied to the formation of adverbs, e.g., Psa. 31:24 (Hitzig), — by both explanations עַל־יָד has the meaning of “gradually,” — is used as in the post-bibl. Hebr. עַל יָד עַל יָד = מעט מעט, e.g., *Schabbath* 156a (vid., Aruch under עַל) (distinguish from בְּיָד = with thought, intentionally, *Berachoth* 52b). There is scarcely a word having more significations that יָד. Connected with עַל, it means at one time side or place, at another mediation or direction; that which is characteristic here is the omission of the pronoun (אֶל־יָדוֹ, אֶל־יָדָיו). The LXX translates עַל יָד with the unrestrained freedom which it allows to itself by μετ’ εὐσεβείας, and has following πληθυνθήσεται another line, δίκαιος οἰκτεῖρει καὶ κίχρᾱ (from Psa. 37:26).

The figures of paradise in vv. 12 and 14 require us to take along with them the intermediate verse (13).

***12 Deferred waiting maketh the heart sick,
And a tree of life is a wish accomplished.***

Pro. 13:12. Singularly the LXX $\text{Κρείσσων ἐναρχόμενος βοηθῶν καρδία}$, followed by the Syr. (which the Targ. transcribes ^{f114}): Better is he who begins to help than he who remains in hesitating expectation, by which תחלת is doubled, and is derived once from הוחיל, to wait, and the second time from החל, to begin. If the LXX, with its imitators, deteriorates to such a degree proverbs so clear, beautiful, and inviolable, what may one expect from it in the case of those not easily understood! מִשָּׁךְ signifies also, Isa. 18: 2, to be widely extended (cf. Arab. *meshak*), here in the sense of time, as נִמְשָׁךְ, to prolong, Isa. 13:22, and post-bibl. מִשָּׁךְ הַזְּמַן, the course of time. Regarding תְּוַחֵלֶת, vid., at Pro. 10:28, where as Pro. 11:27 תִּקְוֶה, here תִּשְׁאָלָה, as also Psa. 78:29 of the object of the wish, and with בּוֹא in the sense of being fulfilled (cf. Jos. 21:43), as there with הַבִּיא in the sense of accomplishing or performing. Extended waiting makes the heart sick, causes heart-woe (מַחֲלָה, *part. fem.* *Hiph.* of חָלָה, to be slack, feeble, sick; R. חל, to loosen, to make loose); on the contrary, a wish that has been fulfilled is a tree of life (cf. p. 23), of a quickening and strengthening influence, like that tree of paradise which was destined to renew and extend the life of man.

***13 Whoever despiseth the word is in bonds to it,
And he that feareth the commandment is rewarded.***

Pro. 13:13. The word is thought of as ordering, and thus in the sense of the commandment, e.g., 1Sa. 17:19, Dan. 9:23, 25. That which is here said is always true where the will of a man has subordinated itself to the authoritative will of a superior, but principally the proverb has in view the word of God, the מִצְוָה κατ' ἐξ. as the expression of the divine will, which (Pro. 6: 3) appears as the secondary, with the תּוֹרָה, the general record of the divine will. Regarding בּוֹז ל of contemptuous, spiteful opposition, vid., at Pro. 6:30, cf. 11:12. Joël (vid., p. 136, *note*) records the prevailing tradition, for he translates: “Whoever despises advice rushes into destruction; whoever holds the commandment in honour is perfect.” But that יִשְׁלָם is to be understood neither of perfection nor of peace (LXX and Jerome), but means *compensabitur* (here not in the sense of punishment, but of reward), we know from Pro. 11:31. The translation also of לוֹ יִחָבֵל לוֹ by “he rushes into destruction” (LXX καταφθαρήσεται , which the Syr.-Hexap. repeats; Luther, “he destroys himself;” the *Venet.* οὐχίησεται οὐ ,

periet sibi) fails, for one does not see what should have determined the poet to choose just this word, and, instead of the ambiguous *dat. ethicus*, not rather to say **יִחַבֵּל נַפְשׁוֹ**. So also this **יִחַבֵּל** is not with Gesenius to be connected with **חבל** = Arab. *khabl*, *corrumpere*, but with **חבל** = Arab. *ḥabl*, *ligare*, *obligare*. Whoever places himself contemptuously against a word which binds him to obedience will nevertheless not be free from that word, but is under pledge until he redeem the pledge by the performance of the obedience refused, or till that higher will enforce payment of the debt withheld by visiting with punishment. Jerome came near the right interpretation: *ipse se in futurum obligat*; *Abulwalid* refers to Exo. 22:25; and Parchon, Rashi, and others paraphrase: **מִשְׁכַּן יִתְמַשְׁכַּן עָלָיו**, he is confiscated as by mortgage. Schultens has, with the correct reference of the **לו** not to the contemner, but to the word, well established and illustrated this explanation: he is pledged by the word, Arab. *marhwan* (*rahyn*), viz., *pigneratus paenae* (Livius, xxix. 36). Ewald translates correctly: he is pledged to it; and Hitzig gives the right explanation: “A **חֲבֻלָה** [a pledge, cf. Pro. 20:16] is handed over to the offended law with the **חֲבֻלָה** [the bad conduct] by the despiser himself, which lapses when he has exhausted the forbearance, so that the punishment is inflicted.” The LXX has another proverb following v. 13 regarding **ὕψος δόλιος** and **οἰκέτης σοφός**; the Syr. has adopted it; Jerome has here the proverb of the *animae dolosae* (vid., at v. 9).

***14 The doctrine of the wise man is a fountain of life,
To escape the snares of death.***

Pro. 13:14. An *integral* distich, vid., p. 7 of the Introduction. Essentially like 14a, Pro. 10:11 says, “a fountain of life is the mouth of the righteous.” The figure of the fountain of life with the teleological **לְסוּר וְגוֹ'** (the **ל** of the end and consequence of the action) is repeated Pro. 14:27. The common non-biblical figure of the *laquei mortis* leads also to the idea of death as **יָקוּשׁ** [a fowler], Psa. 91: 3. If it is not here a mere formula for the dangers of death (Hitzig), then the proverb is designed to state that the life which springs from the doctrine of the wise man as from a fountain of health, for the disciple who will receive it, communicates to him knowledge and strength, to know where the snares of destruction lie, and to hasten with vigorous steps away when they threaten to entangle him.

Four proverbs follow, whose connection appears to have been occasioned by the sound of their words (**רִישׁ ... רשע, ברע ... ברעת, כל ... שכל**).

***15 Fine prudence produceth favour;
But the way of the malicious is uncultivated.***

Pro. 13:15. Regarding שְׂכַל טוֹב (thus to be punctuated, without *Makkeph* with *Munach*, after Codd. and old editions), vid., p. 60; for the most part it corresponds with that which in a deep ethical sense we call fine culture. Regarding יִתֵּן, vid., at *Pro. 10:10*: it is not used here, as there, impersonally, but has a personal subject: he brings forth, causes. Fine culture, which shows men how to take the right side and in all circumstances to strike the right key, exercises a kindly heart-winning influence, not merely, as would be expressed by יִמְצֵא הוּן, to the benefit of its possessor, but, as is expressed by יִתֵּן הוּן, such as removes generally a partition wall and brings men closer to one another. The אֵיתָן [*perennis*], touching it both for the eye and the ear, forms the contrast to יִתֵּן הוּן. This word, an elative formation from יִתֵּן = Arab. *wtn*, denotes that which stretches itself far, and that with reference to time: that which remains the same during the course of time. “That which does not change in time, continuing the same, according to its nature, strong, firm, and thus אֵיתָן becomes the designation of the enduring and the solid, whose quality remains always the same.” Thus Orelli, *Die hebr. Synonyme der Zeit u. Ewigkeit*, 1871. But that in the passage before us it denotes the way of the בַּגְרִים as “endlessly going forward,” the explanation of Orelli, after Böttcher (*Collectanea*, p. 135), is withdrawn by the latter in the new *Aehrenlese* (where he reads רִיב אֵיתָן, “constant strife”). And נַחַל אֵיתָן (*Deu. 21: 4*) does not mean “a brook, the existence of which is not dependent on the weather and the season of the year,” at least not in accordance with the traditional meaning which is given *Sota* ix. 5 (cf. the *Gemara*), but a stony valley; for the *Mishna* says: אֵיתָן כַּמְשַׁמְעוּ קֶשֶׁה, i.e., אֵיתָן is here, according to its verbal meaning, equivalent to קֶשֶׁה (hard). We are of the opinion that here, in the midst of the discussion of the law of the עֲגֻלַּת עֲרוּפָה (the ritual for the atonement of a murder perpetrated by an unknown hand), the same meaning of the אֵיתָן is certified which is to be adopted in the passage before us. Maimuni^{f115} (in *Sota* and *Hilchoth Rozeach* ix. 2) indeed, with the *Mishna* and *Gemara*, thinks the meaning of a “strong rushing *wādy*” to be compatible; but קֶשֶׁה is a word which more naturally denotes the property of the ground than of a river, and the description, *Deu. 21: 4*: in a נַחַל אֵיתָן, in which there is no tillage and sowing, demands for נַחַל here the idea of the valley, and not primarily that of the valley-brook. According to this tradition, the *Targum* places a תְּקִיפָא in the *Peshito* translation of *15b*, and the *Venet.* translates, after *Kimchi*, ὀδὸς δὲ ἀνταρτῶν (of ἀνταρτῆς from ἀνταίρειν) ἰσχυρά. The fundamental idea of remaining like itself, continuing, passes over into the idea of the firm, the hard, so that אֵיתָן is a word that interchanges with סֹלֶעַ, *Num. 24:21*, and serves as a figurative designation of the rocky mountains, *Jer. 49:19*, and the rocky

framework of the earth, Mic. 6: 2. Thus the meaning of hardness (πετρῶδες, Mat. 13: 5) connects itself with the word, and at the same time, according to Deu. 21: 4, of the uncultivable and the uncultivated. The way of the פְּגַדִּים, the treacherous (vid., p. 60), i.e., the manner in which they transact with men, is stiff, as hard as stone, and repulsive; they follow selfish views, never placing themselves in sympathy with the condition of their neighbour; they are without the tenderness which is connected with fine culture; they remain destitute of feeling in things which, as we say, would soften a stone. It is unnecessary to give a catalogue of the different meanings of this אִיתָן, such as vorago (Jerome), a standing bog (Umbreit), and ever trodden way (Bertheau), etc.; Schultens offers, as frequently, the relatively best: *at via perfidorum pertinacissime tensum*; but אִיתָן does not mean to strain, but to extend. The LXX has between 15a and 15b the interpolation: τὸ δὲ γνῶναι νόμον διανοίας ἔστιν ἀγαθῆς.

***16 Every prudent man acteth with understanding;
But a fool spreadeth abroad folly.***

Pro. 13:16. Hitzig reads, with the Syr. (but not the Targ.) and Jerome, כָּל (omnia agit), but contrary to the Hebr. syntax. The כָּל־ is not feeble and useless, but means that he always acts בְּדַאָת, mit Bedacht [with judgment] (opp. בְּבִלְי דַאָת, inconsulto, Deu. 4:42; 19: 4), while on the contrary the fool displays folly. Pro. 12:23 and Pro. 15: 2 serve to explain both members of the verse. Bedächtigkeit [judgment] is just knowledge directed to a definite practical end, a clear thought concentrated on a definite point. יִקְרָא, he calls out, and יִבְיֵא, he sputters out, are parallels to יִפְרֵשׁ. Fleischer: פָּרֵשׁ, expandit (opp. Arab. tawy, intra animum cohibuit), as a cloth or paper folded or rolled together, cf. Schiller's^{f116} —

***“He spreads out brightly and splendidly
The enveloped life.”***

There lies in the word something derisive: as the merchant unrolls and spreads out his wares in order to commend them, so the fool does with his foolery, which he had enveloped, i.e., had the greatest interest to keep concealed within himself — he is puffed up therewith.

***17 A godless messenger falls into trouble;
But a faithful messenger is a cordial.***

Pro. 13:17. The traditional text, which the translations also give (except Jerome, nuntius impii, and leaving out of view the LXX, which makes of v. 17 a history of a foolhardy king and a wise messenger), has not מְלֹאֵךְ, but מְלֹאֵךְ;

the Masora places the word along with **המלאך**, Gen. 48:16. And **יפל** is likewise testified to by all translators; they all read it as *Kal*, as the traditional text punctuates it; Luther alone departs from this and translates the *Hiph.*: “a godless messenger bringeth misfortune.” Indeed, this conj. **יפל** presses itself forward; and even though one read **יפל**, the sense intended by virtue of the parallelism could be no other than that a godless messenger, because no blessing rests on his godlessness, stumbles into disaster, and draws him who gave the commission along with him. The connection **מלאך רשע** is like **רשע אדם**, Pro. 11: 7 (cf. the fem. of this adj., Eze. 3:18). Instead of **ברעה** is **ברעה**, Pro. 17:20; 28:14, parallels (cf. also Pro. 11: 5) which the punctuators may have had in view in giving the preference to *Kal*. With **מלאך**, from **לאך**, R. **לך**, to make to go = to send, is interchanged **ציר**, from **צור**, to turn, whence to journey (cf. Arab. *šar*, to become, to be, as the vulg. “to be to Dresden = to journey” is used). The connection **ציר אמונים** (cf. the more simple **ציר נאמן**, Pro. 25:13) is like Pro. 14:15, **עד אמונים**; the *pluralet.* means faithfulness in the full extent of the idea. Regarding **מרפא**, the means of healing, here to strength, refreshment, vid., Pro. 4:22; 12:18.

***18 Poverty and shame (to him) who rejecteth correction;
But he who regardeth reproof is honoured.***

Pro. 13:18. We are neither to supply **איש** before **ריש וקלון** (or more correctly, *abstr. pro concr.*, as **רמיה**, Pro. 1:27), nor **ל** before **פורע**, as Gesenius (*Lehrgeb.* § 227a) does; nor has the *part.* **פורא** the value of a hypothetical clause like Pro. 18:13, Job. 41:18, although it may certainly be changed into such without destroying the meaning (Ewald, Hitzig); but “poverty and shame is he who is without correction,” is equivalent to, poverty and shame is the conclusion or lot of him who is without correction; it is left to the hearer to find out the reference of the predicate to the subject in the sense of the quality, the consequence, or the lot (cf. e.g., Pro. 10:17; 13: 1; 14:35).
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Regarding **פרע**, vid., p. 52. The Latin expression corresponding is: *qui detrectat disciplinam*. He who rejects the admonition and correction of his parents, his pastor, or his friend, and refuses every counsel to duty as a burdensome moralizing, such an one must at last gather wisdom by means of injury if he is at all wise: he grows poorer in consequence of missing the right rule of life, and has in addition thereto to be subject to disgrace through his own fault. On the contrary, to him who has the disgrace to deserve reproof, but who willingly receives it, and gives it effect, the disgrace becomes an honour, for not to reject reproof shows self-knowledge, humility, and good-will; and

these properties in the judgment of others bring men to honour, and have the effect of raising them in their position in life and in their calling.

Two pairs of proverbs regarding fools and wise men, ranged together by catchwords.

***19 Quickened desire is sweet to the soul,
And it is an abomination to fools to avoid evil.***

Pro. 13:19. A synthetic distich (vid., p. 7), the first line of which, viewed by itself, is only a feebler expression of that which is said in 12*b*, for תִּשְׂנֶה נְהִיָּה is essentially of the same meaning as תִּשְׂנֶה בְּאֵה, not the desire that has just arisen and is not yet appeased (Umbreit, Hitzig, Zöckler), which when expressed by a *part.* of the same verb would be הִוָּה (= אֲשַׁר הִיָּתָה), but the desire that is appeased (Jerome, Luther, also *Venet.* ἕφεσις γενομένη, i.e., after Kimchi: in the fulfilling of past desire; on the contrary, the Syr., Targ. render the phrase תִּשְׂנֶה of becoming desire). The *Niph.* הִיָּתָה denotes not the passing into a state of being, but the being carried out into historical reality, e.g., Eze. 21:12; 39: 8, where it is connected with בְּאֵה; it is always the expression of the completed fact to which there is a looking back, e.g., Jud. 20: 3; and this sense of the *Niph.* stands so fast, that it even means to be done, finished (brought to an end), to be out, to be done with anything, e.g., Dan. 2: 1. ^{f118}

The sentence, that fulfilled desire does good to the soul, appears commonplace (Hitzig); but it is comprehensive enough on the ground of Heb. 11 to cheer even a dying person, and conceals the ethically significant truth that the blessedness of vision is measured by the degree of the longing of faith. But the application of the clause in its pairing with 19*b* acquires another aspect. On this account, because the desire of the soul is pleasant in its fulfilment, fools abhor the renouncing of evil, for their desire is directed to that which is morally worthless and blameworthy, and the endeavour, which they closely and constantly adhere to, is to reach the attainment of this desire. This subordinate proposition of the conclusion is unexpressed. The pairing of the two lines of the proverb may have been occasioned by the resemblance in sound of תִּשְׂנֶה and תִּשְׂנֶה. סוּר is *n. actionis*, like Pro. 16:17, cf. 6. Besides, it in to be observed that the proverb speaks of fools and not of the godless. Folly is that which causes that men do not break free from evil, for it is the deceit of sinful lust which binds them fast thereto.

***20 Whoever goes with wise men, becomes wise;
And whoever has intercourse with fools, becomes base.***

Pro. 13:20. Regarding the significance of this proverb in the history of the religion and worship of Israel, vid., p. 28. We have translated 20a after the *Keri*; the translation according to the *Chethib* is: “go with wise men and become wise” (cf. Pro. 8:33), not הִלְכוּ, for the connection of the (meant imperatively) *infin. absol.* with an imper. (meant conclusively) is not tenable; but הִלְכוּ is an imper. form established by הִלְכוּ, Jer. 51:50 (cf. הִלְכוּ = לָכֵת, Num. 22:14), and appears to have been used with such shades of conception as here as intercourse and companionship for לָךְ. Regarding יְרוּסָה, vid., at 11:15; there it meant *malo afficietur*, here it means *malus (pejor) fiet*. The *Venet.* (contrary to Kimchi, who explains by *frangetur*) rightly has *κακωθήσεται*. There is here a play upon words; רָעָה means to tend (a flock), also in general to be considerate about anything (Pro. 15:14, Isa. 44:20), to take care of anything with the accusative of the person (Pro. 28: 7; 29: 3), to hold intercourse with any one: he who by preference seeks the society of fools, himself becomes such (Jerome, *similis efficietur*), or rather, as רָעָה expresses, he comes always morally lower down. “A wicked companion leads his associate into hell.”

**21 Evil pursueth sinners,
And the righteous is repaid with good.**

Pro. 13:21. To תְּרַדֶּה of the punishment which follows after sinners at their heels, cf. Nah. 1: 8. Greek art gives wings to Nemesis in this sense. To translate 21b, with Löwenstein, “The pious, the good rewards them,” is untenable, for טוֹב, the good (e.g., Pro. 11:27), never appears personified, only טוֹב, goodness, Psa. 23: 6, according to which the LXX τὸν δὲ δικαίους καταλήψεται (שׁוֹב) ἀγαθά. Still less is טוֹב meant personally, as the *Venet.* τὰ δὲ δίκαια ἀποδώσει χρηστός, which probably means: righteous conduct will a good one, viz., God, reward. טוֹב is an attribute of God, but never the name of God. So the verb שָׁלַח, after the manner of verbs of educating and leading (עֲבַד, עֲשֵׂה, גַּמַּל), is connected with a double accusative. The Syr., Targum, and Jerome translate passively, and so also do we; for while we must think of God in the *retribuēt*, yet the proverb does not name Him any more than at Pro. 12:14, cf. 10:24; it is designedly constructed, placing Him in the background, with vague generality: the righteous will one, will they, reward with good — this expression, with the most general personal subject, almost coincides with one altogether passive.

**22 The good man leaveth behind him for his children's children,
And the wealth of the sinner is laid up for the just.**

Pro. 13:22. As a commencing word, טוב signifies in the *Mishle* for the most part *bonum* (*prae*); but here, as at Pro. 12: 2, cf. 22: 9; 14: 4, it signifies *bonus*. As the expression that God is טוב (Psa. 25: 8, etc.) of the O.T. is equivalent to the N.T. that He is ἀγάπη, so that man who in his relation to others is determined by unselfish love is טוב for the good man [*der Gütige*], i.e., the man who is willing to communicate all good is truly good, because the essence of צדקה, righteousness of life, is love. Such an one suffers no loss by his liberality, but, according to the law, Pro. 11:25, by which a dispenser of blessings is at the same time also a recipient of blessings, he has only gain, so that he makes his children's children to inherit, i.e., leaves behind him an inheritance extending even to his grandchildren (vid., regarding הנחיל, p. 132; here trans. as containing its object in itself, as at Deu. 32: 8: to make to inherit, to place in possession of an inheritance). The sinner, on the contrary (הוטא sing. to חטאים, ἁμαρτωλοί), loses his wealth, it is already destined to pass over to the righteous who is worthy of it, and makes use (cf. Job. 27:17) of that which he possesses in accordance with the will and appointment of God — a revelation of justice appertaining to time, the exceptions to which the old limited doctrine of requital takes no notice of. חיל, strength, then like our “*Vermögen*” (cf. *opes, facultates*), that by means of which one is placed in circumstances to accomplish much (Fl.); cf. regarding the fundamental idea *contorquere, compingere*, p. 164, also regarding צפן, properly *condensare*, then *condere*, p. 43.

Connected with v. 22 there now follow two proverbs regarding sustenance, with one intervening regarding education.

**23 The poor man's fresh land gives food in abundance,
And many are destroyed by iniquity.**

Pro. 13:23. The Targ. and Theodotion (μέγας) translate רב, but the Masora has רב with short *Kametz*, as Pro. 20: 6, Ecc. 1: 8 (cf. Kimchi under רבב). The rendering: *multitudo cibi est ager pauperum*, makes the produce the property of the field (= *grugum fertilis*). ניר is the new field (*novale* or *novalis*, viz., *ager*), from ניר, to make arable, fruitful; properly to raise up, viz., by grubbing and freeing of stones (סקל). But why, asks Hitzig, just the new field? As if no answer could be given to this question, he changes ניר into ניב, and finds in 23a the description of a *rentier*, “a great man who consumes the income of his capital.” But how much more intelligible is the new field of the poor man than these capitals (ראשים) with their *per cents* (ניב)! A new field represents to us severe labour, and as belonging to a poor man, a moderate

field, of which it is here said, that notwithstanding its freshly broken up fallow, it yet yields a rich produce, viz., by virtue of the divine blessing, for the proverb supposes the *ora et labora*. Regarding רָשִׁים = רָאֲשִׁים, vid., at Pro. 10: 4. Jerome's translation, *patrum* (properly, heads), follows a false Jewish tradition. In the antithesis, 23b, one is tempted to interpret שׁ in the sense of Pro. 8:21 [substance, wealth], as Schultens, *opulentia ipsa raditur quum non est moderamen*, and Euchel: that which is essentially good, badly managed, goes to ruin. But שׁ and וישׁ at the beginning of a proverb, or of a line of a proverb, in every case means *est qui*. That a wealthy person is meant, the contrast shows. נִסְפָּה, which denotes anything taken away or gathered up, has the same meaning here as at 1Sa. 27: 1: *est qui* (Fl. *quod*, but the parallel does not demand this) *abripitur*, i.e., *quasi turbine auferatur et perdat*; the word reminds us of סוּפָּה, whirlwind, but in itself it means only something smooth and altogether carried off. The בּ is here as at Gen. 19:15; elsewhere בְּלֹא מִשְׁפָּט means with injustice (properly, not-right), Pro. 16: 8, Jer. 22:13, Eze. 22:29; here it is not the בּ of the means, but of the mediate cause. While the (industrious and God-fearing) poor man is richly nourished from the piece of ground which he cultivates, many a one who has incomparably more than he comes by his unrighteousness down to a state of beggary, or even lower: he is not only in poverty, but along with this his honour, his freedom, and the very life of his person perish.

**24 He that spareth his rod hateth his son,
And he who loveth him visits him early with correction.**

Pro. 13:24. The paedagogic rule of God, Pro. 3:12, avails also for men, Pro. 23:13 f., 29:15. The rod represents here the means of punishment, the *patria potestas*. He who spareth or avoideth this, and who does this even from love, has yet no true right love for his son; he who loveth him correcteth him early. With ἐπιμελῶς παιδεύει of the LXX (cf. Sir. 30: 1, ἐνδεδλεχῆσει μᾶστιγας) the thought is in general indicated, but the expression is not explained. Many erroneously regard the suffix of שָׁחַר as referring to the object immediately following (de Dieu, Ewald, Bertheau, Zöckler); Hitzig, on the contrary, rightly remarks, that in this case we should expect the words to be, after Pro. 5:22 (cf. Exo. 2: 6), אֶת־הַמוֹסֵר. He himself, without any necessity, takes שָׁחַר in the sense of the Arab. *skhar*, *compescere*. Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* ii. 2. 402) is right in saying that “שָׁחַר is connected with a double accusative as elsewhere קָדַם occurs; and the meaning is, that one ought much more to anticipate correction than restrain it where it is necessary.” שָׁחַר means to go out early to anything (vid., p. 52), according to which a Greek

rendering is ὀρθρίζει (*Venet.* ὀρθριεῖ) αὐτῷ παιδεῖαν: *maturat ei castigationem = mature eum castigat* (Fl.). שָׁחַר does not denote the early morning of the day (as Rashi, לַבִּקְרִים), but the morning of life (as Eichel, בְּשָׁחַר יָמִיו). “The earlier the fruit, the better the training.” A father who truly wishes well to his son keeps him betimes under strict discipline, to give him while he is yet capable of being influenced the right direction, and to allow no errors to root themselves in him; but he who is indulgent toward his child when he ought to be strict, acts as if he really wished his ruin.

***25 The righteous has to eat to the satisfying of his soul;
But the body of the godless must suffer want.***

Pro. 13:25. Jerome translates תַּחֲסַר freely by *insaturabilis* (he has want = has never enough), but in that case we would have expected תַּחֲסַר תָּמִיד; also in 25a אִשׁ-שָׂבַע would have been used. We have thus before us no commendation of temperance and moderation in contrast to gluttony, but a statement regarding the diversity of fortune of the righteous and the godless — another way of clothing the idea of Pro. 10: 3. שָׂבַע is a segolate form, thus an infin. formation, formally different from the similar שָׂבַע, Pro. 3:10. Regarding בֶּטֶן, vid., *Psychol.* p. 265 f.; it is a nobler word than “*Bauch*” [belly], for it denotes not the external arch, but, like κοιλία (R. בֶּטֶן, *concavus*), the inner body, here like Pro. 18:20, as that which receives the nourishment and changes it *in succum et sanguinem*. That God richly nourishes the righteous, and on the contrary brings the godless to want and misery, is indeed a rule with many exceptions, but understood in the light of the N.T., it has deep inward everlasting truth.

CHAPTER 14

Pro. 14. The division of chapters here corresponds to a new commencement made in v. 1. This proverb reminds us of the allegorical conclusion of the Introduction, and appears, since it is older, to have suggested it (vid., p. 25). The three proverbs 1-3 form a beautiful *trifolium*: wise management, God-fearing conduct, and wise silence, with their threefold contraries.

***1 The wisdom of the woman buildeth her house,
And folly teareth it down with its own hands.***

Pro. 14: 1. Were it חֲכָמוֹת נָשִׁים, after Jud. 5:29, cf. Isa. 19:11, then the meaning would be: the wise among women, each of them buildeth her house. But why then not just אִשָּׁה חֲכָמָה, as 2Sa. 14: 2, cf. Exo. 35:25? The Syr., Targum, and Jerome write *sapiens mulier*. And if the whole class must be

spoken of, why again immediately the individualizing in בְּנִתָּהּ? The LXX obliterates that by its ἀκαθοδότησαν. And does not אֲנִילָת [folly] in the contrasted proverb (1b) lead us to conclude on a similar abstract in 1a? The translators conceal this, for they translate אֲנִילָת personally. Thus also the Venet. and Luther; אֲנִילָת is, says Kimchi, an adj. like אֲנִירָת, *caeca*. But the linguistic usage does not point אֲנִיל with אֲנִילִי to any אֲנִיל. It is true that a fem. of אֲנִיל does not occur; there is, however, also no place in which אֲנִילָת may certainly present itself as such. Thus also חֲכָמוֹת must be an abstr.; we have shown at Pro. 1:20 how חֲכָמוֹת, as neut. plur., might have an abstr. meaning. But since it is not to be perceived why the poet should express himself so singularly, the punctuation חֲכָמוֹת is to be understood as proceeding from a false supposition, and is to be read חֲכָמוֹת, as at Pro. 9: 1 (especially since this passage rests on the one before us). Fleischer says: “to build the house is figuratively equivalent to, to regulate well the affairs of a house, and to keep them in a good condition; the contrary, to tear down the house, is the same contrast as the Arab. *‘amârat âlbyt* and *kharab albyt*. Thus e.g., in Burckhardt’s *Sprüchw.* 217, *harrt şabrt bythâ ‘amârat*, ‘a good woman (*ein braves Weib*) has patience (with her husband), and thereby she builds up her house (at the same time an example of the use of the preterite in like general sentences for individualizing); also No. 430 of the same work: *‘amârat âlbyt wla kharâbt*, it is becoming to build the house, not to destroy it; cf. in the *Thousand and One Nights*, where a woman who had compelled her husband to separate from her says: *âna âlty ‘amalt hadhâ barwḥy wâkhrnt byty bnfsy*. Burckhardt there makes the remark: *‘amârat âlbyt* denotes the family placed in good circumstances — father, mother, and children all living together happily and peacefully.” This conditional relation of the wife to the house expresses itself in her being named as house-wife (cf. *Hausehre* [= honour of a house] used by Luther, *Psa.* 68:13), to which the Talmudic דְּבִיתִי (= *uxor mea*) answers; the wife is noted for this, and hence is called עֵיקַר הַבַּיִת, the root and foundation of the house; vid., Buxtorf’s *Lex.* col. 301. In truth, the oneness of the house is more dependent on the mother than on the father. A wise mother can, if her husband be dead or neglectful of his duty, always keep the house together; but if the house-wife has neither understanding nor good-will for her calling, then the best will of the house-father cannot hinder the dissolution of the house, prudence and patience only conceal and mitigate the process of dissolution — folly, viz., of the house-wife, always becomes more and more, according to the degree in which this is a caricature of her calling, the ruin of the house.

**2 He walketh in his uprightness who feareth Jahve,
And perverse in his ways is he that despiseth Him.**

Pro. 14: 2. That which syntactically lies nearest is also that which is intended; the ideas standing in the first place are the predicates. Wherein it shows itself, and whereby it is recognised, that a man fears God, or stands in a relation to Him of indifference instead of one of fear and reverence, shall be declared: the former walketh in his uprightness, i.e., so far as the consciousness of duty which animates him prescribes; the latter in his conduct follows no higher rule than his own lust, which drives him sometimes hither and sometimes thither. הוֹלֵךְ בְּיִשְׁרוֹ (cf. יָשַׁר הוֹלֵךְ, Mic. 2: 7) is of kindred meaning with הוֹלֵךְ בְּתַמּוֹ, Pro. 28: 6 (הוֹלֵךְ בְּתוֹם, Pro. 10: 9), and נִכְחוֹ הוֹלֵךְ, Isa. 57: 2. The connection of נִלְוֹ דְרָבְרָיו follows the scheme of 2Ki. 18:37, and not 2Sa. 15:32, Ewald, § 288c. If the second word, which particularizes the idea of the first, has the reflexive suff. as here, then the accusative connection, or, as Pro. 2:15, the prepositional, is more usual than the genitive. Regarding לָוֹ, *flectere, inclinare* (a word common to the author of 1-9), vid., at Pro. 2:15. With בּוֹנֵהוּ, cf. 1Sa. 2:30; the suffix without doubt refers to God, for בּוֹהוּ is the word that stands in parallel contrast to יְרֵא ה'.

**3 In the mouth of the fool is a switch of pride;
But the lips of the wise preserve them.**

Pro. 14: 3. The noun חֵטֶר (Aram. חוֹטְרָא, Arab. *khitr*), which besides here occurs only at Isa. 11: 1, meaning properly a brandishing (from חָטַר = Arab. *khatr*, to brandish, to move up and down or hither and thither, whence *alkhittâr*, the brandisher, poet. the spear), concretely, the young elastic twig, the switch, i.e., the slender flexible shoot. Luther translates, “fools speak tyrannically,” which is the briefer rendering of his earlier translation, “in the mouth of the fool is the sceptre of pride;” but although the Targum uses חוֹטְרָא of the king’s sceptre and also of the prince’s staff, yet here for this the usual Hebr. שֵׁבֶט were to be expected. In view of Isa. 11: 1, the nearest idea is, that pride which has its roots in the heart of the fool, grows up to his mouth. But yet it is not thus explained why the representation of this proceeding from within stops with חֵטֶר cf. Pro. 11:30). The βακτηρία ὑβρεως (LXX, and similarly the other Greek versions) is either meant as the rod of correction of his own pride (as e.g., *Abulwalid*, and, among the moderns, Bertheau and Zöckler) or as chastisement for others (Syr., Targum: the staff of reviling). Hitzig is in favour of the former idea, and thinks himself warranted in translating: a rod for his back; but while גְּוֵה is found for גְּאוּה, we do not (cf. under Job. 41: 7: a pride are the, etc.) find גְּאוּה for גוּה, the body, or גוּ, the back. But in general it is to

be assumed, that if the poet had meant **חַטֵּר** as the means of correction, he would have written **נִאֲוָתוֹ**. Rightly Fleischer: “The tongue is often compared to a staff, a sword, etc., in so far as their effects are ascribed to it; we have here the figure which in Rev. 1:16 passes over into plastic reality.” Self-exaltation (R. **נָא**, to strive to be above) to the delusion of greatness is characteristic of the fool, the **אָוִיל** [godless], not the **בְּסִיל** [stupid, dull] — Hitzig altogether confounds these two conceptions. With such self-exaltation, in which the mind, morally if not pathologically diseased, says, like Nineveh and Babylon in the prophets, I am alone, and there is no one with me, there is always united the scourge of pride and of disgrace; and the meaning of *3b* may now be that the lips of the wise protect those who are exposed to this injury (Ewald), or that they protect the wise themselves against such assaults (thus most interpreters). But this reference of the *eos* to others lies much more remote than at Pro. 12: 6; and that the protection of the wise against injury inflicted on them by words is due to their own lips is unsatisfactory, as in this case, instead of *Bewahrung* [custodia], we would rather expect *Vertheidigung* [defensio], *Dämpfung* [damping, extinguishing], *Niederduckung* [stooping down, accommodating oneself to circumstances]. But also it cannot be meant that the lips of the wise preserve them from the pride of fools, for the thought that the mouth preserves the wise from the sins of the mouth is without meaning and truth (cf. the contrary, Pro. 13: 3). Therefore Arama interprets the verb as jussive: the lips = words of the wise mayest thou keep i.e., take to heart. And the *Venet.* translates: **χείλη δὲ σοφῶν φυλάξεις αὐτά**, which perhaps means: the lips of the wise mayest thou consider, and that not as a prayer, which is foreign to the gnome, but as an address to the hearer, which e.g., Pro. 20:19 shows to be admissible. but although in a certain degree of similar contents, yet *3a* and *3b* clash. Therefore it appears to us more probable that the subject of *3b* is the **חכמה** contained in **חכמים**; in Pro. 6:22 wisdom is also the subject to **עֲלִיד תִּשְׁמֵר** without its being named. Thus: while hurtful pride grows up to the throat of the fool, that, viz., wisdom, keeps the lips of the wise, so that no word of self-reflection, especially none that can wound a neighbour, escapes from them. The form **תִּשְׁמֹרֵם** is much more peculiar than **יִשְׁפֹּטוּ**, Exo. 18:26, and **תִּעְבְּרוּ**, Rut. 2: 8, for the latter are obscured forms of **יִשְׁפֹּטוּ** and **תִּעְבְּרוּ**, Rut. 2: 8, for the latter are obscured forms of **יִשְׁפֹּטוּ** and **תִּעְבְּרוּ**, while on the contrary the former arises from **תִּשְׁמֹרֵם**.^{f119}

If, according to the usual interpretation, we make **שִׁפְתָי** the subject, then the construction follows the rule, Gesen. § 146, 2. The LXX transfers it into Greek: **χείλη δὲ σοφῶν φυλάσσει αὐτούς**. The probable conjecture, that **תִּשְׁמֹרֵם** is an error in transcription for **תִּשְׁמֹרְנָה אִתָּם** (this is

found also in Luzzatto's *Gramm.* § 776; and Hitzig adduces as other examples of such transpositions of the **ו** Jer. 2:25; 17:23, Job. 26:12, and Jos. 2: 4, **והצפנו** for **והצפון**), we do not acknowledge, because it makes the lips the subject with an exclusiveness the justification of which is doubtful to us.

Pro. 14: 4. The switch and the preserving, v. 3, may have given occasion to the collector, amid the store of proverbs before him, now to present the agricultural figure:

*Without oxen the crib is empty;
But rich increase is by the strength of the plough-ox.*

This is a commendation of the breeding of cattle, but standing here certainly not merely as useful knowledge, but as an admonition to the treatment in a careful, gentle manner, and with thankful recompense of the ox (*Pro.* 12:10), which God has subjected to man to help him in his labour, and more generally, in so far as one seeks to gain an object, to the considerate adoption of the right means for gaining it. **אֲלָפִים** (from **אָלַף**, to cling to) are the cattle giving themselves willingly to the service of men (poet. equivalent to **בְּקָרִים שׁוֹר** (**תּוֹר**, Arab. *thwr*), Ved. *sthûras*, is the Aryan-Semitic name of the plough-ox. The noun **אָבוּס** (= **אָבוּס** like **אָמוֹן**, **אָמוֹן**) denotes the fodder-trough, from **אָבַס**, to feed, and thus perhaps as to its root-meaning related to **φάτνη**, **πάτνη**), and may thus also designate the receptacle for grain where the corn for the provender or feeding of the cattle is preserved — **מֵאָבוּס**, *Jer.* 50:26, at least has this wider signification of the granary; but there exists no reason to depart here from the nearest signification of the word: if a husbandman is not thoughtful about the care and support of the cattle by which he is assisted in his labour, then the crib is empty — he has nothing to heap up; he needs not only fodder, but has also nothing. **בָּר** (in pause **בָּר**), clean (synon. **נָקִי**, cf. at *Pro.* 11:26), corresponds with our *baar* [bare] = *bloss* [*nudus*]. Its derivation is obscure. The **ב**, 4*b*, is that of the mediating cause: by the strength of the plough-ox there is a fulness of grain gathered into the barn (**תְּבוּאוֹת**, from **בֹּאָה**, to gather in, anything gathered in). **רַב־** is the inverted **בָּר**. Striking if also accidental is the frequency of the **א** and **ב** in v. 4. This is continued in v. 5, where the collector gives two proverbs, the first of which commences with a word beginning with **א**, and the second with one beginning with **ב**:

*5 A faithful witness does not speak untruth;
But a lying witness breathes out falsehoods.*

Pro. 14: 5. The right vocalization and sequence of the accents is לִן חֲכָמָה (בִּקְשׁ with *Tsere* and the servile *Mahpach*, חֲכָמָה with *Munach*, because the following *Athnach* -word has not two syllables before the tone). As in 5a עַד אֱמוּנִים, so in 5b עַד שֶׁקֶר is the subject. Different is the relation of subject and predicate in the second line of the parallel proverbs, v. 25, *Pro. 19: 5.* With 5a cf. צִיר אֱמוּנִים, *Pro. 13:17*; and regarding נִפְיָה (one who breathes out), vid., at *Pro. 6:19*; *12:17*.

***6 In vain the scorner seeketh wisdom;
But to the man of understanding knowledge is easy.***

Pro. 14: 6. The general sentence is concrete, composed in the common historical form. Regarding נִאֲוֵן, *necquidquam*, vid., at *Pro. 13: 4.* The participle נִקְל is here neut. for נִקְלָה, something which makes itself easy or light. The frivolous man, to whom truth is not a matter of conscience, and who recognises no authority, not even the Supreme, never reaches to truth notwithstanding all his searching, it remains veiled to him and far remote; but to the man of understanding, who knows that the fear of God and not estrangement from God leads to truth, knowledge is an easy matter — he enters on the right way to this end, he brings the right receptivity, brings to bear on it the clear eye, and there is fulfilled to him the saying, “To him that hath it is given.”

Three proverbs regarding fools:

***7 Go from the presence of a foolish man,
And surely thou hast not known lips of knowledge;***

Pro. 14: 7. i.e., surely hast not brought into experience that he possesses lips which express experimental knowledge, or: surely thou must confess on reflection that no prudent word has come forth from his mouth. If 7b were intended to assign a motive, then the expression would be כִּי בַל־תֵּדַע or וּבַל־תֵּדַע (*Isa. 44: 9*), according to which *Aquila* and *Theodotion* translate, καὶ οὐ ἤν γινῶς. נִגַּד is the sphere of vision, and מִנְגַּד denotes either away from the sphere of vision, as e.g., *Isa. 1:16*, or, inasmuch as מֵן is used as in מֵאֵל, מֵתַחַת, and the like: at a certain distance from the sphere of vision, but so that one keeps the object in sight, *Gen. 21:16*. לִּנְגַד denotes, as the inverted expression *Deu. 28:66* shows, over against any one, so that he has the object visibly before him, and מִנְגַּד לִּי, *Jud. 20:34*, from the neighbourhood of a place where one has it in view. So also here: go away from the *vis-à-vis* (*vis = visûs*) of the foolish man, if thou hast to do with such an one; whence, 7b, follows

what he who has gone away must on looking back say to himself. **בל** (with the pret. as e.g., Isa. 33:23) expresses a negative with emphasis. Nolde and others, also Fleischer, interpret *7b* relatively: *et in quo non cognoveris labia scientiae*. If **וּבַל־יָדַעַתְּ** were the expression used, then it would be explained after 9:13, for the idea of the foolish man is extended: and of such an one as absolutely knows not how to speak anything prudent. But in **וּבַל־יָדַעַתְּ** the relative clause intended must be indicated by the added **בוֹ**: and of such an one in whom... Besides, in this case **וְלֹא** (vid., Psa. 35:15) would have been nearer than **וּבַל**. The LXX has modified this proverb, and yet has brought out nothing that is correct; not only the Syr., but also Hitzig follows it, when he translates, “The foolish man hath everything before him, but lips of knowledge are a receptacle of knowledge” (**וּבְכָלֵי דְאֵתָהּ**). It racks one’s brains to find out the meaning of the first part here, and, as Böttcher rightly says, who can be satisfied with the “lips of knowledge” as the “receptacle of knowledge”?

***8 The wisdom of the prudent is to observe his way,
And the folly of fools is deceit.***

Pro. 14: 8. The nearest idea is that of self-deceit, according to which the LXX, Syr., and Jerome render the word error (“*Irrsal*”). But **מִרְמָה** is nowhere else used of self-deception, and moreover is not the suitable word for such an idea, since the conception of the *dolus malus* is constantly associated with it. Thus the contrast will be this: the wisdom of the prudent shows itself in this, that he considers his conduct (**וְהִבִּיֵן** as Pro. 7: 7, cf. Psa. 5: 2), i.e., regulates it carefully, examining and considering (Pro. 13:16) it according to right and duty; and that on the contrary the folly of fools shows itself in this, that they aim at the malevolent deception of their neighbour, and try all kinds of secret ways for the gaining of this end. The former is wisdom, because from the good only good comes; the latter is folly or madness, because deception, however long it may sneak in darkness, yet at last comes to light, and recoils in its destructive effects upon him from whom it proceeds.

***9 The sacrificial offering of fools mocketh;
But between upright men there is good understanding***

Pro. 14: 9. We may not give to the *Hiph.* **הִלִּיץ** any meaning which it nowhere has, as, to excuse (Kimchi), or to come to an agreement by mediation (Schultens). So we may not make **אֹיִלִּים** the subject (Targ., Symmachus, Jerome, Luther, “fools make sport with sin”), for one is persuaded that **אֹיִלִּים** is equivalent to **כָּל אֶחָד מִן הָאֹיִלִּים** (Immanuel, *Meiri*, and others), which would be more admissible if we had **מִלִּיץ** (vid., 3:35), or if **לִיץ** did not

immediately follow (vid., Pro. 28: 1). Aquila and Theodotion rightly interpret the relation of the component parts of the sentence: ἄφρονας χλευάζει πλημμέλεια; and this translation of אֲשָׁם also is correct if we take πλημμέλεια in the sense of a θυσία περι πλημμελείας (Sir. 7:31), in which the Judaeo-Hellenic actually uses it (vid., Schleusner's *Lex.*). The idea of sacrificial offering is that of expiation: it is a penitential work, it falls under the prevailing point of view of an ecclesiastical punishment, a *satisfactio* in a church-disciplinary sense; the forgiveness of sins is conditioned by this,

(1) that the sinner either abundantly makes good by restitution the injury inflicted on another, or in some other way bears temporal punishment for it, and

(2) that he willingly presents the sacrifices of rams or of sheep, the value of which the priest has to determine in its relation to the offence (by a tax-scale from 2 shekels upwards).

The *Torâ* gives accurately the offences which are thus to be atoned for. Here, with reference to 9b, there particularly comes into view the offence against property (Lev. 5:20 ff.) and against female honour (Lev. 19:20-22). Fools fall from one offence into another, which they have to atone for by the presentation of sacrificial offerings; the sacrificial offering mocketh them (אֲשָׁם with *accus.-object*, as Pro. 19:28, Psa. 119:51), for it equally derides them on account of the self-inflicted loss, and on account of the efforts with which they must make good the effects of their frivolity and madness; while on the contrary, among men of upright character, רֵצוֹן, a relation of mutual favour, prevails, which does not permit that the one give to the other an indemnity, and apply the *Asham*- [אֲשָׁם = trespass-offering] *Torâ*. Symmachus rightly: καὶ ἀνάμεσον εὐθέων εὐδοκία. But the LXX confuses this proverb also. Hitzig, with the Syr., follows it and translates:

*The tents of the foolish are in punishment overthrown [verfällt];
The house of the upright is well-pleasing [wolgefällt].*

Is not this extravagant [*ungereimt* = not rhymed] in spite of the rhyme? These אֹהֶל [tents] extracted from אוֹלִים, and this בַּיִת [house] formed out of בֵּין, are nothing but an aimless and tasteless flourish.

Four proverbs of joy and sorrow in the present and the future:

*10 The heart knoweth the trouble of its soul,
And no stranger can intermeddle with its joy.*

Pro. 14:10. The accentuation **לב יודע** seems to point out **יודע** as an adjective (Löwenstein: a feeling heart), after 1Ki. 3: 9, or genit. (of a felling heart); but Cod. 1294 and the Jemen Cod., and others, as well as the editions of Jablonsky and Michaelis, have **לב** with *Rebia*, so that this is by itself to be taken as the subject (cf. the accentuation *Pro. 15: 5a* and under at 16a). **מַרְתָּ** has the **ר** with *Dagesh*, and consequently the short *Kametz* (*Michlol 63b*), like **שָׂרָדָה** *Pro. 3: 8*, cf. **בְּרַתָּהּ**, *Jud. 6:28*, and on the contrary **בְּרַתָּהּ**, *Eze. 16: 4*; it is the fem. of *mōr = morr*, from **מָרַר**, *adstringere, amarum esse*. Regarding **לב**, in contradistinction to **נַפְשׁ**, vid., *Psychol.* p. 251. “All that is meant by the Hellenic and Hellenistic **νοῦς, λόγος, συνείδησις, θυμός**, is comprehended in **καρδία**, and all by which the **בְּשָׂר** and **נַפְשׁ** are affected comes in **לב** into the light of consciousness.”

The first half of the proverb is clear: the heart, and only it, i.e., the man in the centre of his individuality, knows what brings bitterness to his soul, i.e., what troubles him in the sphere of his natural life and of the nearest life-circle surrounding him. It thus treats of life experiences which are of too complex a nature to be capable of being fully represented to others, and, as we are wont to say, of so delicate a nature that we shrink from uncovering them and making them known to others, and which on this account must be kept shut up in our own hearts, because no man is so near to us, or has so fully gained our confidence, that we have the desire and the courage to pour out our hearts to him from their very depths. Yet the saying, “Every one knows where the shoe pinches him” (1Ki. 8:38), stands nearer to this proverb; here this expression receives a psychological, yet a sharper and a deeper expression, for the knowledge of that which grieves the soul is attributed to the heart, in which, as the innermost of the soul- corporeal life, it reflects itself and becomes the matter-of-fact of the reflex consciousness in which it must shut itself up, but also for the most part without external expression. If we now interpret **לֹא־יִתְעַרְבּ** as prohibitive, then this would stand (with this exception, that in this case **אֵל** instead of **לֹא** is to be expected) in opposition, certainly not intended, to the exhortation, *Rom. 12:15*, “Rejoice with them that do rejoice,” and to the saying, “Distributed joy is doubled joy, distributed sorrow is half sorrow;” and an admonition to leave man alone with his joy, instead of urging him to distribute it, does not run parallel with 10a. Therefore we interpret the fut. as *potentialis*. As there is a soul-sorrow of the man whose experience is merely a matter of the heart, so there is also a soul-joy with which no other (vid., regarding **זָר**, p. 98, and cf. here particularly *Job. 19:27*) intermeddleth (**בְּהִתְעַרְבּ** like *Psa. 106:35*), in which no other can intermeddle, because his experience, as e.g., of blessed spiritual affection or of benevolent feeling, is

purely of a personal nature, and admits of no participation (cf. on ἔκρυψε, Mat. 13:44), and thus of no communication to others. Elster well observes: “By this thought, that the innermost feelings of a man are never fully imparted to another man, never perfectly cover themselves with the feelings of another, yea, cannot at all be fully understood by another, the worth and the significance of each separate human personality is made conspicuous, not one of which is the example of a species, but each has its own peculiarity, which no one of countless individuals possesses. At the same time the proverb has the significance, that it shows the impossibility of a perfect fellowship among men, because one never wholly understands another. Thereby it is indicated that no human fellowship can give true salvation, but only the fellowship with God, whose love and wisdom are capable of shining through the most secret sanctuary of human personality.” Thus also Dächsel (but he interprets 10*b* admonitorily): “Each man is a little world in himself, which God only fully sees through and understands. His sorrow appertaining to his innermost life, and his joy, another is never able fully to transfer to himself. yea, the most sorrowful of all experiences, the most inward of all joys, we possess altogether alone, without any to participate with us.”

***11 The house of the wicked is overthrown;
But the tent of the upright flourishes.***

Pro. 14:11. In the cogn. proverb, Pro. 12: 7, line 2 begins with **וּבַיִת**, but here the apparently firmly-founded house is assigned to the godless, and on the contrary the tent, easily destroyed, and not set up under the delusion of lasting for ever, is assigned to the righteous. While the former is swept away without leaving a trace behind (Isa. 14:23), the latter has blossoms and shoots (**הַפְּרִיָה**) as inwardly transitive, like Job. 14: 9, Psa. 92:14); the household of such remains not only preserved in the same state, but in a prosperous, happy manner it goes forward and upward.

***12 There is a way that seemeth right to one,
But the end thereof are the ways of death.***

Pro. 14:12. This is literally repeated in Pro. 16:25. The rightness is present only as a phantom, for it arises wholly from a terrible self-deception; the man judges falsely and goes astray when, without regard to God and His word, he follows only his own opinions. It is the way of estrangement from God, of fleshly security; the way of vice, in which the blinded thinks to spend his life, to set himself to fulfil his purposes; but the end thereof (**סְחָרֵיָהָ** with neut. fem.: the end of this intention, that in which it issues) are the ways of death. He who thus deceives himself regarding his course of life, sees himself at last arrived at a point from which every way which now further remains to him

leads only down to death. The self-delusion of one ends in death by the sentence of the judge, that of another in self-murder; of one in loathsome disease, of another in a slow decay under the agony of conscience, or in sorrow over a henceforth dishonoured and distracted life.

***13 Even in the midst of laughter the heart experiences sadness;
And to it, joy, the end is sorrow.***

Pro. 14:13. Every human heart carries the feeling of disquiet and of separation from its true home, and of the nothingness, the transitoriness of all that is earthly; and in addition to this, there is many a secret sorrow in every one which grows out of his own corporeal and spiritual life, and from his relation to other men; and this sorrow, which is from infancy onward the lot of the human heart, and which more and more depends and diversifies itself in the course of life, makes itself perceptible even in the midst of laughter, in spite of the mirth and merriment, without being able to be suppressed or expelled from the soul, returning always the more intensely, the more violently we may have for a time kept it under and sunk it in unconsciousness. Euchel cites here the words of the poet, according to which 13a is literally true:

***“No, man is not made for joy;
Why weep his eyes when in heart he laughs?”*** ^{f120}

From the fact that sorrow is the fundamental condition of humanity, and forms the background of laughter, it follows, 13b, that in general it is not good for man to give himself up to joy, viz., sensual (worldly), for to it, joy, the end (the issue) is sorrow. That is true also of the final end, which according to that saying, **μακάριοι οἱ κλαίοντες νῦν ὅτι γέλασατε**, changes laughter into weeping, and weeping into laughter. The correction **אֶחָרִית הַשְּׂמֵחָה** (Hitzig) presses upon the *Mishle* style an article in such cases rejected, and removes a form of expression of the Hebr. *syntaxis ornata*, which here, as at Isa. 17: 6, is easily obviated, but which is warranted by a multitude of other examples, vid., at Pro. 13: 4 (also Pro. 5:22), and cf. Philippi's *Status Const.* p. 14 f., who regards the second word, as here **שְׂמֵחָה**, after the Arab., as accus. But in cases like **שְׂמֵחָה שְׂמֵחָה**, although not in cases such as Ezr. 2:62, the accus. rendering is tenable, and the Arab. does not at all demand it. ^{f121}

In the old Hebr. this *solutio* of the *st. constr.* belongs to the elegances of the language; it is the precursor of the vulgar post-bibl. **אֶחָרִיתָהּ שְׂמֵחָה**. That the Hebr. may also retain a gen. where more or fewer parts of a sentence intervene between it and its governing word, is shown by such examples as Isa. 48: 9; 49: 7; 61: 7. ^{f122}

There follows a series of proverbs which treat of the wicked and the good, and of the relation between the foolish and the wise:

**14 He that is of a perverse heart is satisfied with his own ways;
And a good man from himself.**

Pro. 14:14. We first determine the subject conception. סוג לַב (one turning aside τῆς καρδίας or τὴν καρδίαν) is one whose heart is perverted, נְסוּג, turned away, viz., from God, Psa. 44:19. The Book of Proverbs contains besides of this verb only the name of dross (*recedanea*) derived from it; סוּג, separated, drawn away, is such a half passive as סוּר, Isa. 49:21, שׁוּב, Mic. 2: 8, etc. (Olsh. § 245a). Regarding אִישׁ טוֹב, vid., at Pro. 12: 2, cf. 13:22: a man is so called whose manner of thought and of action has as its impulse and motive self-sacrificing love. When it is said of the former that he is satisfied with his own ways, viz., those which with heart turned away from God he enters upon, the meaning is not that they give him peace or bring satisfaction to him (Löwenstein), but we see from Pro. 1:31; 18:20, that this is meant recompensatively: he gets, enjoys the reward of his wandering in estrangement from God. It is now without doubt seen that 14b expresses that wherein the benevolent man finds his reward. We will therefore not explain (after Pro. 4:15, cf. Num. 16:26, 2Sa. 19:10): the good man turns himself away from him, or the good man stands over him (as Jerome, *Venet.*, after Ecc. 5: 7); — this rendering gives no contrast, or at least a halting one. The מַעְלִיו מִן of מַעְלִיו must be parallel with that of מִדְּרָכָיו. From the LXX, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν διανοημάτων αὐτοῦ, the Syr. rightly: from the fruit (religiousness) of his soul; the Targ.: from his fruit. Buxtorf, against Cappellus, has already perceived that here no other phrase but the explanation of מַעְלִיו by *ex eo quod penes se est* lies at the foundation. We could, after Pro. 7:14, also explain: from that which he perceives as his obligation (duty); yet that other explanation lies proportionally nearer, but yet no so that we refer the suffix to the backslider of 14a: in it (his fate) the good man is satisfied, for this contrast also halts, the thought is not in the spirit of the Book of Proverbs (for Pro. 29:16 b does not justify it); and in how totally different a connection of thought מַעְלִיו is used in the Book of Proverbs, is shown by Pro. 24:17b; but generally the Scripture does not use שָׁבַע of such satisfaction, it has, as in 14a, also in 14b, the recompensative sense, according to the fundamental principle, δ' ἐὰν σπείρη ἄνθρωπος τοῦτο καὶ θερίσει (Gal. 6: 7). The suffix refers back to the subject, as we say: נִפְשִׁי עָלַי, רוּחִי עָלַי (Psychol. p. 152). But considerations of an opposite kind also suggest themselves. Everywhere else מַעַל refers not to that which a man has within himself, but that which he carries without; and also that מַעְלִיו can be used in the sense of מִשְׁעָלָיו, no evidence can be adduced: it

must be admitted to be possible, since the writer of the Chronicles (2Ch. 1: 4) ventures to use **בְּהַכִּין**. Is **מַעְלִיו** thus used substantively: by his leaves (Aben Ezra and others)? If one compares Pro. 11:28 with Psa. 1: 3, this explanation is not absurd; but why then did not the poet rather use **מַפְרִיו**? We come finally to the result, that **וּמַעְלִיו**, although it admits a connected interpretation, is an error of transcription. But the correction is not **וּמַאֲלִיו** (Elster) nor **וּמַעְלָלִיו** (Cappellus), for **אֲלִים** and **עֲלָלִים**, deeds, are words which do not exist; nor is it **וּמַפְעָלִיו** (Bertheau) nor **וּמִנְמָלִיו** (Ewald), but **וּמַמְעָלָלִיו** (which Cappellus regarded, but erroneously, as the LXX phrase); for (1) throughout almost the whole O.T., from Jud. 2:19 to Zec. 1:18, **דַּרְכִּים** and **מַעֲלָלִים** are interchangeable words, and indeed almost an inseparable pair, cf. particularly Jer. 17:10; and (2) when Isaiah (Isa. 3:10) says, **בִּיַּפְרֵי מַאֲלֵיהֶם יֹאכְלוּ** **אָמְרוּ צָדִיק כִּי־טוֹב**, this almost sounds like a prophetic paraphrase of the second line of the proverb, which besides by this emendation gains a more rhythmical sound and a more suitable compass. ^{f123}

***15 The simple believeth every word;
But the prudent takes heed to his step.***

Pro. 14:15. We do not translate, “every thing,” for “word” and faith are correlates, Psa. 106:24, and **פְּתִי** is the non-self-dependent who lets himself be easily persuaded by the talk of another (vid., p. 39 f.): he believes every word without proving it, whether it is well-meant, whether it is true, whether it is salutary and useful, so that he is thus, without having any firm principle, and without any judgment of his own, driven about hither and thither; the prudent, on the other hand, considers and marks his step, that he may not take a false step or go astray, he proves his way (8a), he takes no step without thought and consideration (**בִּין** or **הִבִּין** with **ל**, to consider or reflect upon anything, Psa. 73:17, cf. 33:15) — he makes sure steps with his feet (Heb. 12:13), without permitting himself to waver and sway by every wind of doctrine (Eph. 4:14).

***16 The wise feareth and departeth from evil;
But the fool loseth his wits and is regardless.***

Pro. 14:16. Our editions have **יָרָא** with *Munach*, as if **יָרָא חָכָם** were a substantive with its adjective; but Cod. 1294 has **חָכָם** with *Rebia*, and thus it must be: **חָכָם** is the subject, and what follows is its complex predicate. Most interpreters translate 16b: the fool is over-confident (Zöckler), or the fool rushes on (Hitzig), as also Luther: but a fool rushes wildly through, i.e., in a daring, presumptuous manner. But **הִתְאַבֵּר** denotes everywhere nothing else

than to fall into extreme anger, to become heated beyond measure, Pro. 26:17 (cf. Pro. 20: 2), Deu. 3:26, etc. Thus 16a and 16b are fully contrasted. What is said of the wise will be judged after Job. 1: 1, cf. Psa. 34:15; 37:27: the wise man has fear, viz., fear of God, or rather, since **האלהים** is not directly to be supplied, that careful, thoughtful, self-mistrusting reserve which flows from the reverential awe of God; the fool, on the contrary, can neither rule nor bridle his affections, and without any just occasion falls into passionate excitement. But on the other side he is self-confident, regardless, secure; while the wise man avoids the evil, i.e., carefully goes out of its way, and in N.T. phraseology “works out his own salvation with fear and trembling.”

Pro. 14:17. This verse, as if explanatory of **מתעבר**, connects itself with this interpretation of the contrasts, corresponding to the general *usus loquendi*, and particularly to the *Mishle* style.

*One who is quick to anger worketh folly,
And a man of intrigues is hated.*

Ewald finds here no right contrast. He understands **איש מזמה** in a good sense, and accordingly corrects the text, substituting for **ישנא, ישנא** (ישנא), for he translates: but the man of consideration bears (properly smooths, viz., his soul). On the other hand it is also to be remarked, that **איש מזמה**, when it occurs, is not to be understood necessarily in a good sense, since **מזמה** is used just like **מזמות**, at one time in a good and at another in a bad sense, and that we willingly miss the “most complete sense” thus arising, since the proverb, as it stands in the Masoretic text, is good Hebrew, and needs only to be rightly understood to let nothing be missed in completeness. The contrast, as Ewald seeks here to represent it (also Hitzig, who proposes **ישן**: the man of consideration remains quiet; Syr. *ramys*, circumspect), we have in v. 29, where the **μακρόθυμος** stands over against the **ὄξύθυμος** (**אס** or **אס**) of the breathing of anger through the nose, cf. Theocritus, 1:18: **καὶ οἱ αἰὲ δριμεῖα χολὰ ποτὶ ῥινὶ κάθηται**). Here the contrast is different: to the man who is quick to anger, who suddenly gives expression to his anger and displeasure, stands opposed the man of intrigues, who contrives secret vengeance against those with whom he is angry. Such a deceitful man, who contrives evil with calculating forethought and executes it in cold blood (cf. Psa. 37: 7), is hated; while on the contrary the noisy lets himself rush forward to inconsiderate, mad actions, but is not hated on that account; but if in his folly he injures or disgraces himself, or is derided, or if he even does injury to the body and the life of another, and afterwards with terror sees the evil done in its true light, then he is an object of compassion. Theodotion rightly: **(ἀνήρ δὲ) διαβουλιῶν μισηθήσεται**, and Jerome: *vir versutus odiosus est* (not the Venet. **ἀνήρ**

βδελυγμῶν, for this signification has only **זָמָה**, and that in the sing.); on the contrary, the LXX, Syr., Targum, and Symmachus incorrectly understand **אִישׁ מִזְמוֹת** in *bonam partem*.

***18 The simple have obtained folly as an inheritance;
But the prudent put on knowledge as a crown.***

Pro. 14:18. As a parallel word to **יִכְתְּרוּ**, **נִחְלוּ** (after the Masora defective), also in the sense of Arab. *âkthar*, *multiplicare*, *abundare* (from Arab. *kathura*, to be much, perhaps ^{f124} properly comprehensive, encompassing), would be appropriate, but it is a word properly Arabic. On the other hand, inappropriate is the meaning of the Heb.-Aram. **בָּתַר**, to wait (properly waiting to surround, to go round any one, cf. *manere aliquem* or *aliquod*), according to which Aquila, **ἀναμενοῦσιν**, and Jerome, *expectabunt*. Also **הִבְתִּיר**, to encompass in the sense of to embrace (LXX **κρατήσουσιν**), does not suffice, since in the relation to **נִחְלוּ** one expects an idea surpassing this. Certainly there is a heightening of the idea in this, that the *Hiph.* in contradistinction to **נָחַל** would denote an object of desire spontaneously sought for. But far stronger and more pointed is the heightening of the idea when we take **יִכְתְּרוּ** as the denom. of **כְּתָר** (Gr. **κίταρις**, **κίδαρις**, Babyl. **כּדּר**, *cudur*, cf. **בְּדוּר**, a rounding, *sphaera*). Thus Theodotion, **στεφθήσονται**. The *Venet.* better actively, **ἑστέψαντο** (after Kimchi: **יְשִׁימוּ הַדַּעַת כְּכַתָּר עַל רֵאשִׁים**), the Targ., Jerome, Luther (but not the Syr., which translates **נִחְלוּ** by “to inherit,” but **יִכְתְּרוּ** by **μεριῶνται**, which the LXX has for **נִחְלוּ**). The bibl. language has also (Psa. 142: 8) **הַכְתִּיר** in the denom. signification of to place a crown, and that on oneself; the non-bibl. has **מִכְתִּיר** (like the bibl. **מַעֲטִיר**) in the sense of distributor of crowns, ^{f125} and is fond of the metaphor **כְּתָר הַדַּעַת**, crown of knowledge. With those not self-dependent (vid., regarding the plur. form of **פְּתִי**, p. 39), who are swayed by the first influence, the issue is, without their willing it, that they become habitual fools: folly is their possession, i.e., their property. The prudent, on the contrary, as v. 15 designates them, have thoughtfully to ponder their step to gain knowledge as a crown (cf. **הָעֵשִׂיר**, to gain riches, **הַפְּרִיחַ**, 11b, to gain flowers, Gesen. § 53, 2). Knowledge is to them not merely an inheritance, but a possession won, and as such remains with them a high and as it were a kingly ornament.

***19 The wicked must bow before the good,
And the godless stand at the doors of the righteous.***

Pro. 14:19. The good, viz., that which is truly good, which has love as its principle, always at last holds the supremacy. The good men who manifest love to en which flows from love to God, come finally forward, so that the wicked, who for a long time played the part of lords, bow themselves willingly or unwillingly before them, and often enough it comes about that godless men fall down from their prosperity and their places of honour so low, that they post themselves at the entrance of the stately dwelling of the righteous (Pro. 13:22), waiting for his going out and in, or seeking an occasion of presenting to him a supplication, or also as expecting gifts to be bestowed (Psa. 37:25). The poor man Lazarus *πρὸς τὸν πτωχὸν* of the rich man, Luke 16:20, shows, indeed, that this is not always the case on this side of the grave. *אֲשֶׁר* has, according to the Masora (cf. Kimchi's *Wörterbuch* under *אֲשֶׁר*), the ultima accented; the accentuation of the form *אֲשֶׁר* wavers between the *ult.* and *penult.* Olsh. p. 482 f., cf. Gesen. 68, *Anm.* 10. The substantival clause 19*b* is easily changed into a verbal clause: they come (Syr.), appear, stand (incorrectly the Targ.: they are judged in the gates of the righteous).

Three proverbs on the hatred of men:

***20 The poor is hated even by his neighbour;
But of those who love the rich there are many.***

Pro. 14:20. This is the old history daily repeating itself. Among all people is the saying and the complaint:

***Donec eris felix multos numerabis amicos,
Tempora si fuerint nubilia solus eris.*** ^{f126}

The Book of Proverbs also speaks of this lamentable phenomenon. It is a part of the dark side of human nature, and one should take notice of it, so that when it goes well with him, he may not regard his many friends as all genuine, and when he becomes poor, he may not be surprised by the dissolution of earlier friendship, but may value so much the higher exceptions to the rule. The connection of the passive with *ל* of the subject (cf. Pro. 13:13), as in the Greek with the dative, as pure Semitic; sometimes it stands with *ל*, but in the sense of *ἀπό*, Son. 3:10, before the influence of the West led to its being used in the sense of *ὑπό* (Ges. § 143, 2); *אֲשֶׁר*, is hated (Cod. 1294: *אֲשֶׁר*), connects with the hatred which is directed against the poor also the indifference which makes him without sympathy, for one feels himself troubled by him and ashamed.

***21 Whoever despiseth his neighbour committeth sin;
But whoever hath compassion on the suffering — blessings on him!***

Pro. 14:21. One should regard every human being, especially such as God has placed near to him, as a being having the same origin, as created in the image of God, and of the same lofty destination, and should consider himself as under obligation to love him. He who despiseth his neighbour (write בֹּדֵד with *Metheg*, and vid., regarding the constr. with dat. object. Pro. 6:30, cf. 11:12; 13:13) sins in this respect, that he raises himself proudly and unwarrantably above him; that the honour and love he shows to him he measures not by the rule of duty and of necessity, but according to that which is pleasing to himself; and in that he refuses to him that which according to the ordinance of God he owes him. In v. 21b the *Chethîb* עֲנִיִּים and the *Kerî* עֲנִי (vid., at Psa. 9:13) interchange in an inexplicable way; עֲנִי is the bowed down (cf. Arab. *ma'nuww*, particularly of the prisoner, from 'ana, fut. *ya'nw*, to bow, bend), עָנָה (Arab. 'anin, with the art. *âl'niy*, from the intrans. 'aniya, to be bowed down) the patient bearer who in the school of suffering has learned humility and meekness. One does not see why the *Kerî* here exchanges that passive idea for this ethical one, especially since, in proving himself to be מְחַוֵּן (compassionate) (for which elsewhere the part. *Kal* חוֹנֵן, Pro. 14:31; 19:17; 28: 8), one must be determined only by the needy condition of his neighbour, and not by his (the neighbour's) moral worthiness, the want of which ought to make him twofold more an object of our compassion. All the old translators, from the LXX to the *Venet.* and Luther, on this account adopt the *Chethîb*.

Pro. 14:22. The proverb terminating (v. 21) with אֲשֶׁרֵי (cf. Pro. 16:20) is now followed by one not less singularly formed, commencing with הֵלֵא (cf. Pro. 8: 1).

*Will they not go astray who devise evil,
And are not mercy and truth to those who devise good?*

The part. חֹרֵשׁ signifies both the plougher and the artisan; but on this account to read with Hitzig both times חֹרֵשׁ, i.e., *machinatores*, is nothing less than advisable, since there is connected with this metaphorical חֹרֵשׁ, as we have shown at Pro. 3:29, not only the idea of fabricating, but also that of ploughing. Just so little is there any reason for changing with Hitzig, against all old translators, יִתְעוּ into יָרְעוּ: will it not go ill with them...; the fut. יִתְעוּ (cf. Isa. 63:17) is not to be touched; the perf. תֵּעוּ (e.g., Psa. 58: 4) would de note that those who contrive evil are in the way of error, the fut. on the contrary that they will fall into error (cf. Pro. 12:26 with Job. 12:24). But if הֵלֵא יִתְעוּ is the expression of the result which shall certainly come to such, then 22b stands as a contrast adapted thereto: and are not, on the contrary, mercy and truth those

who contrive that which is good, i.e., (for that which befalls them, as Pro. 13:18a, cf. 14:35b, is made their attribute) are they not an object of mercy and truth, viz., on the part of God and of men, for the effort which proceeds from love and is directed to the showing forth of good is rewarded by this, that God and men are merciful to such and maintain truth to them, stand in truth to them; for **חֶסֶד וְאֱמֶת** is to be understood here, as at 3: 3, neither of God nor of men exclusively, but of both together: the wicked who contrive evil lose themselves on the way to destruction, but grace and truth are the lot of those who aim at what is good, guarded and guided by which, they reach by a blessed way a glorious end.

There now follows a considerable series of proverbs (vv. 23-31) which, with a single exception (v. 24), have all this in common, that one or two key-words in them begin with **מ**.

***23 In all labour there is gain,
But idle talk leadeth only to loss.***

Pro. 14:23. Here the key-words are **מְחֹסֵר** and **מְזַתֵּר** (parallel Pro. 21: 5, cf. with Pro. 11:24), which begin with **מ**. **עֵצָב** is labour, and that earnest and unwearied, as at Pro. 10:22. If one toils on honestly, then there always results from it something which stands forth above the endeavour as its result and product, vid., at Job. 30:11, where it is shown how **יָתֵר**, from the primary meaning to be stretched out long, acquires the meaning of that which hangs over, shoots over, copiousness, and gain. By the word of the lips, on the contrary, i.e., purposeless and inoperative talk (**דְּבַר שְׁפִתַיִם** as Isa. 36: 5, cf. Job. 11: 2), nothing is gained, but on the contrary there is only loss, for by it one only robs both himself and others of time, and wastes strength, which might have been turned to better purpose, to say nothing of the injury that is thereby done to his soul; perhaps also he morally injures, or at least discomposes and wearies others.

***24 It is a crown to the wise when they are rich;
But the folly of fools remains folly.***

Pro. 14:24. From Pro. 12: 4, 31; 17: 6, we see that **עֲטֹרַת חֲכָמִים** is the predicate. Thus it is the riches of the wise of which it is said that they are a crown or an ornament to them. More than this is said, if with Hitzig we read, after the LXX, **עֲרָמָם**, their prudence, instead of **עֲשָׂרָם**. For then the meaning would be, that the wise need no other crown than that which they have in their prudence. But yet far more appropriately “riches” are called the crown of a wise man when they come to his wisdom; for it is truly thus that riches, when they are possessed along with wisdom, contribute not a little to heighten its

influence and power, and not merely because they adorn in their appearance like a crown, or, as we say, surround as with a golden frame, but because they afford a variety of means and occasions for self-manifestation which are denied to the poor. By this interpretation of 24a, 24b comes out also into the light, without our requiring to correct the first אֲנֹלֶת, or to render it in an unusual sense. The LXX and Syr. translate the first אֲנֹלֶת by διατριβή (by a circumlocution), the Targ. by gloria, fame — we know not how they reach this. Schultens in his *Com.* renders: *crassa opulentia elumbium crassities*, but in his *Animadversiones* he combines the first אֲנֹלֶת with the Arab. *awwale*, precedence, which Gesen. approves of. But although the meaning to be thick (properly *coalescere*) appertains to the verbal stem אֲנֹל as well as the meaning to be before (Arab. *âl, âwila, wâl*), yet the Hebr. אֲנֹלֶת always and everywhere means only folly, ^{f127} from the fundamental idea *crassities* (thickness). Hitzig's אֲנֹלֶת (which denotes the consequence with which the fool invests himself) we do not accept, because this word is Hitzig's own invention. Rather לְנֹת is to be expected: the crown with which fools adorn themselves is folly. But the sentence: the folly of fools is (and remains) folly (Symmachus, Jerome, *Venet.*, Luther), needs the emendation as little as Pro. 16:22 b, for, interpreted in connection with 24a, it denotes that while wisdom is adorned and raised up by riches, folly on the other hand remains, even when connected with riches, always the same, without being either thereby veiled or removed, — on the contrary, the fool, when he is rich, exhibits his follies always more and more. C. B. Michaelis compares Lucian's *simia est simia etiamsi aurea gestet insignia*.

**25 A witness of truth delivereth souls;
But he who breathes out lies is nothing but deception.**

Pro. 14:25. When men, in consequence of false suspicions or of false accusations, fall into danger of their lives (דִּינֵי נַפְשׁוֹת is the designation in the later language of the law of a criminal process), then a tongue which, pressed by conscientiousness and not deterred by cowardice, will utter the truth, saves them. But a false tongue, which as such (vid., 5b) is יָפֶה כּוֹבֵיִם (after the Masora at this place יָפֶה דֶּפֶק), i.e., is one who breathes out lies (vid., regarding פִּיחַ at Pro. 6:19), is mere deception (LXX, without reading מְרָמָה [as Hitzig does]: δόλιος). In Pro. 12:17 מְרָמָה is to be interpreted as the object accus. of גִּיד carried forward, but here to carry forward מְצִיל (Arama, Löwenstein) is impracticable — for to deliver deceit = the deceiver is not expressed in the Hebr. — מְרָמָה is, as possibly also Pro. 12:16 (LXX δόλιος), without אִישׁ or עַד being supplied, the pred. of the substantival clause: such an

one is deception (in bad Latin, *dolositas*), for he who utters forth lies against better knowledge must have a malevolent, deceitful purpose.

***26 In the fear of Jahve lies a strong ground of confidence,
And the children of such an one have a refuge.***

Pro. 14:26. The so-called **ב** *essentiae* stands here, as at Psa. 68: 5; 55:19, Isa. 26: 4, before the subject idea; the clause: in the fear of God exists, i.e., it is and proves itself, as a strong ground of confidence, does not mean that the fear of God is something in which one can rely (Hitzig), but that it has (Pro. 22:19, Jer. 17: 7, and here) an inheritance which is enduring, unwavering, and not disappointing in God, who is the object of fear; for it is not faith, nor anything else subjective, which is the rock that bears us, but this Rock is the object which faith lays hold of (cf. Isa. 28:16). Is now the **וּלְבָנָיו** to be referred, with Ewald and Zöckler, to **ה'**? It is possible, as we have discussed at Gen. 6: 1 f.; but in view of parallels such as Pro. 20: 7, it is not probable. He who fears God entails in the Abrahamic way (Gen. 18:19) the fear of God on his children, and in this precious paternal inheritance they have a **מְחֶסֶה** (not **מְחֶסֶה**, and therefore to be written with Masoretic exactness **מְחֶסֶה**), a fortress or place of protection, a refuge in every time of need (cf. Psa. 71: 5-7). Accordingly, **וּלְבָנָיו** refers back to the **יְרֵא ה'**, to be understood from **בִּירְאָת ה'** (LXX, Luther, and all the Jewish interpreters), which we find not so doubtful as to regard on this account the explanation after Psa. 73:15, cf. Deu. 14: 1, as necessary, although we grant that such an introduction of the N.T. generalization and deepening of the idea of sonship is to be expected from the Chokma.

***27 The fear of Jahve is a fountain of life,
To escape the snares of death.***

Pro. 14:27. There springs up a life which makes him who carries in himself (cf. Joh. 4:14, **ἐν αὐτῷ**) this welling life, penetrating and strong of will to escape the snares (write after the Masora **מִמְקָשׁ** *defective*) which death lays, and which bring to an end in death — a repetition of Pro. 13: 4 with changed subject.

***28 In the multitude of the people lies the king's honour;
And when the population diminishes, it is the downfall of his glory.***

Pro. 14:28. The honour or the ornament (vid., regarding **תְּהַרְרֵךְ**, *tumere*, *ampliari*, the root-word of **תְּהַרְרֵךְ** and **תְּהַרְרֵךְ** at Isa. 63: 1) of a king consists in this, that he rules over a great people, and that they increase and prosper; on the other hand, it is the ruin of princely greatness when the people decline in

number and in wealth. Regarding **מְחַתָּה**, vid., at Pro. 10:14. **בְּאִפְס** signifies prepositionally “without” (properly, by non-existence), e.g., Pro. 26:20, or adverbially “groundless” (properly, for nothing), Isa. 52: 4; here it is to be understood after its contrast **בְּרֵב**: in the non-existence, but which is here equivalent to in the ruin (cf. **אִפְס**, the form of which in conjunction is **אִפְסָ**, Gen. 47:15), lies the misfortune, decay, ruin of the principedom. The LXX **ἐν δὲ ἐκλείψει λαοῦ συντριβὴ δυνάστου**. Certainly **רִזּוֹן** (from **רִזַּן**, Arab. *razuna*, to be powerful) is to be interpreted personally, whether it be after the form **בְּגוֹד** with a fixed, or after the form **יְקוֹשׁ** with a changeable *Kametz*; but it may also be an abstract like **שְׁלוֹם** (= Arab. *selâm*), and this we prefer, because in the personal signification **רִזַּן**, Pro. 8:15; 31: 4, is used. We have not here to think of **רִזּוֹן** (from **רָזָה**), consumption (the *Venet.* against Kimchi, **πενίαις**); the choice of the word also is not determined by an intended amphibology (Hitzig), for this would be meaningless.

**29 He that is slow to anger is rich in understanding;
But he that is easily excited carries off folly.**

Pro. 14:29. **אִרְךָ אַפַּיִם** (constr. of **אִרְךָ**) is he who puts off anger long, viz., the outbreak of anger, **הִאֲרָרָה**, Pro. 19:11, i.e., lets it not come in, but shuts it out long (**μακρόθυμος** = **βραδύς εἰς ὀργήν**, Jam. 1:19); and **קָצַר־רוּחַ**, he who in his spirit and temper, viz., as regards anger (for **רוּחַ** denotes also the breathing out and snorting, Isa. 25: 4; 33:11), is short, i.e., (since shortness of time is meant) is rash and suddenly (cf. quick to anger, *praeceps in iram*, 17a) breaks out with it, not **ὀλιγόψυχος** (but here **ὀξύθυμος**), as the LXX translate 17a. The former, who knows how to control his affections, shows himself herein as “great in understanding” (cf. 2Sa. 23:20), or as a “man of great understanding” (Lat. *multus prudentiâ*); the contrary is he who suffers himself to be impelled by his affections into hasty, inconsiderate action, which is here expressed more actively by **מְרִים אַנְלָת**. Does this mean that he bears folly to the view (Luther, Umbreit, Bertheau, Elster, and others)? But for that idea the *Mishle* style has other expressions, Pro. 12:23; 13:16; 15: 2, cf. 14:17. Or does it mean that he makes folly high, i.e., shows himself highly foolish (LXX, Syr., Targum, Fleischer, and others)? But that would be expressed rather by **הִגְדִּיל** or **הִרְבֶּה**. Or is it he heightens folly (Löwenstein, Hitzig)? But the remark that the angry ebullition is itself a gradual heightening of the foolish nature of such an one is not suitable, for the choleric man, who lets the evenness of his disposition be interrupted by a breaking forth of anger, is by no means also in himself a fool. Rashi is right when he says, **מפרישה לחלקו**, i.e., (to which also Fleischer gives the preference) *aufert pro portione sua stultitiam*. The

only appropriate parallel according to which it is to be explained, is Pro. 3:35. But not as Ewald: he lifts up folly, which lies as it were before his feet on his life's path; but: he takes off folly, in the sense of Lev. 6: 8, i.e., he carries off folly, receives a portion of folly; for as to others, so also to himself, when he returns to calm blood, that which he did in his rage must appear as folly and madness.

***30 A quiet heart is the life of the body,
But covetousness is rottenness in the bones.***

Pro. 14:30. Heart, soul, flesh, is the O.T. trichotomy, Psa. 84: 3; 16: 9; the heart is the innermost region of the life, where all the rays of the bodily and the soul-life concentrate, and whence they again unfold themselves. The state of the heart, i.e., of the central, spiritual, soul-inwardness of the man, exerts therefore on all sides a constraining influence on the bodily life, in the relation to the heart the surrounding life. Regarding **לֵב מְרֵפֵא**, vid., at Pro. 12:18, p. 189. Thus is styled the quiet heart, which in its symmetrical harmony is like a calm and clear water-mirror, neither interrupted by the affections, nor broken through or secretly stirred by passion. By the close connection in which the corporeal life of man stands to the moral-religious determination of his intellectual and mediately his soul-life — this threefold life is as that of one personality, essentially one — the body has in such quiet of spirit the best means of preserving the life which furthers the well-being, and co-operates to the calming of all its disquietude; on the contrary, passion, whether it rage or move itself in stillness, is like the disease in the bones (Pro. 12: 4), which works onward till it breaks asunder the framework of the body, and with it the life of the body. The plur. **בְּשָׂרִים** occurs only here; Böttcher, § 695, says that it denotes the whole body; but **בְּשָׂר** also does not denote the half, **בְּשָׂרִים** is the surrogate of an *abstr.*: the body, i.e., the bodily life in the totality of its functions, and in the entire manifoldness of its relations. Ewald translates bodies, but **בְּשָׂר** signifies not the body, but its material, the animated matter; rather cf. the Arab. *âbshâr*, “corporeal, human nature,” but which (leaving out of view that this plur. belongs to a later period of the language) has the parallelism against it. Regarding **קִנְיָה** (jealousy, zeal, envy, anger) Schultens is right: *affectus inflammans aestuque indignationis fervidus*, from **קָנָה**, Arab. *kanâ*, to be high red.

***31 He who oppreseth the poor reproacheth his Maker;
And whosoever is merciful to the poor, it is an honour to him.***

Pro. 14:31. Line first is repeated in Pro. 17: 5 *a* somewhat varied, and the relation of the idea in 31*b* is as Pro. 19:17 *a*, according to which **וּמְכַבְּדוֹ** is the

predicate and חֲרֵף עִשָּׂהוּ the subject (Symmachus, Targ., Jerome, *Venet.*, Luther), not the reverse (Syr.); חֲרֵף is thus not the 3 per. *Po.* (LXX), but the *part. Kal* (for which 21b has the *part. Po.* (מְחַרֵּף). The predicates חֲרֵף עִשָּׂהוּ (vid., regarding the perf. Gesen. § 126, 3) and וּמִכְבָּדוֹ follow one another after the scheme of the *Chiasmus*. עֲשָׂק has *Munach* on the first syllable, on which the tone is thrown back, and on the second the הַעֲמָדָה sign (vid., *Torath Emeth*, p. 21), as e.g., פֹּזֵר, Pro. 17:14, and אֵהָב, Pro. 17:19. The showing of forbearance and kindness to the poor arising from a common relation to one Creator, and from respect towards a personality bearing the image of God, is a conception quite in the spirit of the Chokma, which, as in the Jahve religion it becomes the universal religion, so in the national law it becomes the human (vid., p. 29). Thus also Job. 31:15, cf. ch. 3: 9 of the Epistle of James, which in many respects has its roots in the Book of Proverbs. Mat. 25:40 is a New Testament side-piece to 31b.

Pro. 14:32. This verse also contains a key-word beginning with מ, but pairs acrostically with the proverb following:

***When misfortune befalls him, the godless is overthrown;
But the righteous remains hopeful in his death.***

When the subject is רָעָה connected with רָשָׁע (the godless), then it may be understood of evil thought and action (Ecc. 7:15) as well as of the experience of evil (e.g., Pro. 13:21). The LXX (and also the Syr., Targ., Jerome, and *Venet.*) prefers the former, but for the sake of producing an exact parallelism changes בְּמוֹתוֹ [in his death] into בְּטָמוֹ [in his uprightness], reversing also the relation of the subject and the predicate: ὁ δὲ πεπορθὼς τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὀσιότητι (the Syr.: in this, that he has no sin; Targ.: when he dies) δίκαιος. But no Scripture word commends in so contradictory a manner self-righteousness, for the verb חָסָה never denotes self-confidence, and with the exception of two passages (Jud. 9:15, Isa. 30: 2), where it is connected with בָּצַל, is everywhere the exclusive (vid., Psa. 118: 8 f.) designation of confidence resting itself in God, even without the בָּהּ, as here as at Psa. 17: 7. The parallelism leads us to translate בְּרַעְתּוֹ, not on account of his wickedness, but with Luther, in conformity with בְּמוֹתוֹ, in his misfortune, i.e., if it befall him. Thus Jeremiah (Jer. 23:12) says of the sins of his people: בְּאִפְלֵה יָדָחוּ, in the deep darkness they are driven on (*Niph.* of דָּחָה = רָחַח), and Pro. 24:16 contains an exactly parallel thought: the godless stumble בְּרַעָה, into calamity. Ewald incorrectly: in his calamity the wicked is overthrown — for what purpose then the pronoun? The verb דָּחָה frequently means, without any addition, “to stumble

over heaps,” e.g., Psa. 35: 5; 36:13. The godless in his calamity is overthrown, or he fears in the evils which befall him the intimations of the final ruin; on the contrary, the righteous in his death, even in the midst of extremity, is comforted, viz., in God in whom he confides. Thus understood, Hitzig thinks that the proverb is not suitable for a time in which, as yet, men had not faith in immortality and in the resurrection. Yet though there was no such revelation then, still the pious in death put their confidence in Jahve, the God of life and of salvation — for in Jahve ^{f128} there was for ancient Israel the beginning, middle, and end of the work of salvation — and believing that they were going home to Him, committing their spirit into His hands (Psa. 31: 6), they fell asleep, though without any explicit knowledge, yet not without the hope of eternal life. Job also knew that (Job. 27: 8 ff.) between the death of those estranged from God and of those who feared God there was not only an external, but a deep essential distinction; and now the Chokma opens up a glimpse into the eternity heavenwards, Pro. 15:24, and has formed, Pro. 12:28, the expressive and distinctive word אֱלֹהִים, for immortality, which breaks like a ray from the morning sun through the night of the *Sheol*.

**33 Wisdom rests in the heart of the man of understanding;
But the heart of fools it maketh itself known.**

Pro. 14:33. Most interpreters know not what to make of the second line here. The LXX (and after it the Syr.), and as it appears, also Aquila and Theodotion, insert οὐ; the Targ. improves the Peshito, for it inserts אֱלֹהִים (so that Pro. 12:23; 13:16, and Pro. 15: 2 are related). And *Abulwalid* explains: in the heart of fools it is lost; Euchel: it reels about; but these are imaginary interpretations resting on a misunderstanding of the passages, in which יָדַע means to come to feel, and הוֹדִיעַ to give to feel (to punish, correct). Kimchi rightly adheres to the one ascertained meaning of the words, according to which the *Venet.* μέσον δὲ ἀφρόνων γνωσθήσεται. So also the translation of Jerome: *et indoctos quosque (quoque) erudiet*, is formed, for he understands the “and is manifest among fools” (Luther) not merely, as C. B. Michaelis, after the saying: *opposita juxta se posita magis elucescunt*, but of a becoming manifest, which is salutary to these. Certainly בְּקִרְבֵּן can mean among = in the circle, of Pro. 15:31; but if, as here and e.g., Jer. 31:31, בְּקִרְבֵּן is interchanged with בְּלִבָּי, and if חִכְמָה בְּקִרְבֵּן is the subject spoken of, as 1Ki. 3:28, then בְּקִרְבֵּן does not mean among (in the midst of), but in the heart of the fool. According to this, the Talmud rightly, by comparison with the current proverb (*Mezia* 85b): אֶסְתִּירָא בְּלִגְנָא קִישׁ קִישׁ קְרִיא, a stater in a flaggon cries *Kish, Kish*, i.e., makes much clatter. In the heart of the understanding wisdom rests, i.e., remains silent and still, for the understanding feels himself

personally happy in its possession, endeavours always the more to deepen it, and lets it operate within; on the contrary, wisdom in the heart of fools makes itself manifest: they are not able to keep to themselves the wisdom which they imagine they possess, or the portion of wisdom which is in reality theirs; but they think, as it is said in Persius: *Scire tuum nihil est nisi scire hoc te sciat alter*. They discredit and waste their little portion of wisdom (instead of thinking on its increase) by obtrusive ostentatious babbling.

Two proverbs follow regarding the state and its ruler:

***34 Righteousness exalteth a nation,
And sin is a disgrace to the people.***

Pro. 14:34. The Hebr. language is richer in synonyms of “the people” than the German. גוֹי (formed like the non-bibl. מוֹי, water, and נוֹי, corporeality, from גָּנָה, to extend itself from within outward; cf. Pro. 9: 3, גִּפִּי, Pro. 10:13, גִּי) is, according to the *usus loq.*, like *natio* the people, as a mass swollen up from a common origin, and עַם, 28a (from עָמַם, to bind), the people as a confederation held together by a common law; לְאָם (from לָאָם, to unite, bind together) is the mass (multitude) of the people, and is interchanged sometimes with גוֹי, Gen. 25:23, and sometimes with עַם, v. 28. In this proverb, לְאָמִים stands indeed intentionally in the plur., but not גוֹי, with the plur. of which גוֹיִם, the idea of the non-Israelitish nations, too easily connects itself. The proverb means all nations without distinction, even Israel (cf. under Isa. 1: 4) not excluded. History everywhere confirms the principle, that not the numerical, nor the warlike, nor the political, nor yet the intellectual and the so-called civilized greatness, is the true greatness of a nation, and determines the condition of its future as one of progress; but this is its true greatness, that in its private, public, and international life, צְדָקָה, i.e., conduct directed by the will of God, according to the norm of moral rectitude, rules and prevails. Righteousness, good manners, and piety are the things which secure to a nation a place of honour, while, on the contrary, חַטָּאת, sin, viz., prevailing, and more favoured and fostered than contended against in the consciousness of the moral problem of the state, is a disgrace to the people, i.e., it lowers them before God, and also before men who do not judge superficially or perversely, and also actually brings them down. רוּם, to raise up, is to be understood after Isa. 1: 2, cf. Pro. 23: 4, and is to be punctuated תְּרוּם, with *Munach* of the penult., and the העמדה-sign with the *Tsere* of the last syllable. Ben-Naphtali punctuates thus: תְּרוּם. In 34b all the artifices of interpretation (from Nachmani to Schultens) are to be rejected, which interpret חָסֵד as the *Venet.* (ἔλεος δὲ λαῶν ἀμαρτία) in its predominant Hebrew signification. It has

here, as at Lev. 20:17 (but not Job. 6:14), the signification of the Syr. *chesdho*, *opprobrium*; the Targ. **חֲסֵדָה**, or more frequently **חֲסִידָה**, as among Jewish interpreters, is recognised by Chanan'el and Rashbam. That this **חֲסֵדָה** is not foreign to the *Mishle* style, is seen from the fact that **חֲסֵדָה**, Pro. 25:10, is used in the sense of the Syr. *chasedh*. The synonym. Syr. *chasam*, *invidere*, *obtrectare*, shows that these verbal stems are formed from the R. **חָסַד**, *stringere*, to strike. Already it is in some measure perceived how **חֲסֵדָה**, Syr. *chasadh*, Arab. *hasada*, may acquire the meaning of violent love, and by the mediation of the jealousy which is connected with violent love, the signification of grudging, and thus of reproach and of envy; yet this is more manifest if one thinks of the root-signification *stringere*, in the meaning of loving, as referred to the subject, in the meanings of disgrace and envy, as from the subject directed to others. Ewald (§ 51c) compares **חֲסֵדָה** and **חֲסִידָה**, Ethiop. *chasra*, in the sense of *carpere*, and on the other side **חֲסִידָה** in the sense of “to join;” but **חֲסִידָה** does not mean to join (vid., Psa. 2:12) and instead of *carpere*, the idea more closely connected with the root is that of *stringere*, cf. *stringere folia ex arboribus* (Caesar), and *stringere* (to diminish, to squander, strip) *rem ingluvie* (Horace, Sat. i. 2. 8). The LXX has here read **חֲסִידָה** (Pro. 28:22), diminution, decay, instead of **חֲסֵדָה** (shame); the *quid pro quo* is not bad, the Syr. accepts it, and the *miseros facit* of Jerome, and Luther's *verderben* (destruction) corresponds with this phrase better than with the common traditional reading which Symmachus rightly renders by **ὄνειδος**.

**35 The king's favour is towards a prudent servant,
And his wrath visits the base.**

Pro. 14:35. Regarding the contrasts **מְשִׁבִּיל** and **מְבִישׁ**, vid., at Pro. 10: 5; cf. Pro. 12: 4. The substantival clause 35a may mean: the king's favour has (possesses)...., as well as: it is imparted to, an intelligent servant; the arrangement of the words is more favourable to the latter rendering. In 35b the gender of the verb is determined by attraction after the pred., as is the case also at Gen. 31: 8, Job. 15:31, Ewald, § 317c. And “his wrath” is equivalent to is the object of it, cf. 22b, Pro. 13:18, and in general, p. 204. The syntactical character of the clause does not permit the supplying of **לְ** from 35a. Luther's translation proceeds only apparently from this erroneous supposition.

CHAPTER 15

Pro. 15: 1-6. We take these verses together as forming a group which beings with a proverb regarding the good and evil which flows from the tongue, and

closes with a proverb regarding the treasure in which blessing is found, and that in which no blessing is found.

***1 A soft answer turneth away wrath,
And a bitter word stirreth up anger.***

Pro. 15: 1. In the second line, the common word for anger (אִרָּה, from the breathing with the nostrils, Pro. 14:17) is purposely placed, but in the first, that which denotes anger in the highest degree (הַמָּה from יָחַם, cogn. חָמַם, Arab. *hamiya*, to glow, like שָׁנָה from יָשַׁן): a mild, gentle word turns away the heat of anger (*excandescientiam*), puts it back, cf. Pro. 25:15. The *Dagesh* in דָּבַר follows the rule of the דְּוִיק, i.e., of the close connection of a word terminating with the accented הַ—, הָ—, הֶ— with the following word (*Michlol* 63*b*). The same is the meaning of the Latin proverb:

***Frangitur ira gravis
Quando est responsio suavis.***

The דְּבַר־עֵצָב produces the contrary effect. This expression does not mean an angry word (Ewald), for עֵצָב is not to be compared with the Arab. *ghaḍab*, anger (Umbreit), but with Arab. *ʿadb*, cutting, wounding, paining (Hitzig), so that דְּבַר מְעַצִּיב is meant in the sense of Psa. 78:40: a word which causes pain (LXX λυπηρός, Theod. πονικός), not after the meaning, a word provoking to anger (Gesenius), but certainly after its effect, for a wounding word “makes anger arise.” As one says of anger שָׁב, “it turns itself” (e.g., Isa. 9:11), so, on the other hand, עָלָה, “it rises up,” Ecc. 10: 4. The LXX has a third line, ὀργὴ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ φρονίμους, which the Syr. forms into a distich by the repetition of Pro. 14:32 *b*, the untenableness of which is at once seen.

Pro. 15: 2. The πρᾶυτης σοφίας (Jam. 3:13) commended in v. 1 is here continued:

***The tongue of the wise showeth great knowledge,
And the mouth of fools poureth forth folly.***

As הִיטִיב נָגַן, Isa. 23:16, means to strike the harp well, and הִיטִיב לָכַת, 30:29, to go along merrily, so הִיטִיב דָּאָת, to know in a masterly manner, and here, where the subject is the tongue, which has only an instrumental reference to knowledge: to bring to light great knowledge (cf. 7*a*). In 2*b* the LXX translate στόμα δὲ ἀφρόνων ἀναγγέλλει κακά. From this Hitzig concludes that they read רְעוֹת as 2*b*, and prefers this phrase; but they also translated in Pro. 13:16; 14:28; 26:11, אֲנִלָּת by κακίαν, for they interpreted the

unintelligible word by combination with אֵלֶּה, and in Pro. 12:23 by ἀραις, for they thought they had before them אֵלֶּה (from אֵלֶּה).

3 The eyes of Jahve are in every place, Observing the evil and the good.

Pro. 15: 3. The connection of the dual עֵינַיִם with the plur. of the adjective, which does not admit of a dual, is like Pro. 6:17, cf. 18. But the first line is a sentence by itself, to which the second line gives a closer determination, as showing how the eyes of God are everywhere (cf. 2Ch. 16: 9, after Zec. 4:10) abroad over the whole earth, viz., beholding with penetrating look the evil and the good (צָפַח, to hold to, to observe, cf. ἐπιβλέποντες, Sir. 23:19), i.e., examining men whether they are good or evil, and keeping them closely before His eyes, so that nothing escapes him. This universal inspection, this omniscience of God, has an alarming but also a comforting side. The proverb seeks first to warn, therefore it speaks first of the evil.

4 Gentleness of the tongue is a tree of life; But falseness in it is a wounding to the spirit.

Pro. 15: 4. Regarding מַרְפֵּא, vid., at Pro. 12:18, and regarding סֵלֶף, at Pro. 11: 3; this latter word we derive with Fleischer from סֵלַף, to subvert, overthrow, but not in the sense of “violence, *asperitas*, in as far as violent speech is like a stormy sea,” but of perversity, *perversitas* (Venet. λοξότης), as the contrast to truthfulness, rectitude, kindness. Gentleness characterizes the tongue when all that it says to a neighbour, whether it be instruction or correction, or warning or consolation, it says in a manner without rudeness, violence, or obtrusiveness, by which it finds the easiest and surest acceptance, because he feels the goodwill, the hearty sympathy, the humility of him who is conscious of his own imperfection. Such gentleness is a tree of life, whose fruits preserve life, heal the sick, and raise up the bowed down. Accordingly, שֶׁבֶר בְּרוּחַ is to be understood of the effect which goes forth from perversity or falseness of the tongue upon others. Fleischer translates: *asperitas autem in ea animum vulnerat*, and remarks, “שֶׁבֶר בְּרוּחַ, *abstr. pro concreto*. The verb שֶׁבֶר, and the *n. verbale* שֶׁבֶר derived from it, may, in order to render the meaning tropical, govern the prep. בְּ, as the Arab. *kaser baḳlby*, he has broken my heart (opp. Arab. *jabar baḳlby*), cf. בְּפִנּוּי, Pro. 21:29, vid., *De Glossis Habichtianis*, p. 18; yet it also occurs with the accus., Psa. 69:21, and the corresponding gen. שֶׁבֶר רוּחַ, Isa. 65:14.” In any case, the breaking (deep wounding) is not meant in regard to his own spirit, but to that of the neighbour. Rightly Luther: but a lying (tongue) makes heart-sorrow (elsewhere, a false one troubles the cheerful); Euchel: a false tongue is soul-wounding; and the

translation of the year 1844: falsehood is a breach into the heart. Only for curiosity's sake are two other interpretations of 4a and 4b mentioned: the means of safety to the tongue is the tree of life, i.e., The *Torâ* (*Erachin* 15b); and: perversity suffers destruction by a breath of wind, after the proverb, **כל שיש בו גסות רוח רוח קימעה שוברתו**, a breath of wind breaks a man who is puffed up^{f129} (which *Meiri* presents for choice, vid., also Rashi, who understands **רוח** of the storm of judgment). The LXX translates, in 4b, a different text: **ὁ δὲ συντηρῶν αὐτὴν πλησθήσεται πνεύματος**; but the **רוח יִשְׁבַע** here supposed cannot mean “to be full of spirit,” but rather “to eat full of wind.” Otherwise the Syr. and Targ.: and he who eateth of his own fruit is satisfied (Heb. **וְאָכַל מִפְּרִיָו יִשְׁבַע**), — an attempt to give to the phrase **יִשְׁבַע** a thought correct in point of language, but one against which we do not give up the Masoretic text.

***5 A fool despiseth his father's correction;
But he that regardeth reproof is prudent.***

Pro. 15: 5. We may with equal correctness translate: he acts prudently (after 1Sa. 23:22); and, he is prudent (after Pro. 19:25). We prefer, with Jerome, *Venet.*, and Luther, the latter, against the LXX, Syr., and Targ., because, without a doubt, the **יִעֲרֹם** is so thought of at Pro. 19:25: the contrast is more favourable to the former. It is true that he who regardeth reproof is not only prudent, but also that he is prudent by means of observing it. With line first cf. Pro. 1: 7 and Pro. 1:30, and with line second, Pro. 12: 1. Luther translates: the fool calumniates...; but of the meanings of abuse (properly *pungere*) and scorn, the second is perhaps here to be preferred.

***6 The house of the righteous is a great treasure-chamber;
But through the gain of the wicked comes trouble.***

Pro. 15: 6. The contrast shows that **חֵסֶן** does not here mean force or might (LXX, Syr., Targ., Jerome, and *Venet.*), which generally this derivative of the verb **חָסַן** never means, but store, fulness of possession, prosperity (Luther: in the house of the righteous are goods enough), in this sense (cf. Pro. 27:24) placing itself, not with the Arab. *hasuna*, to be firm, fastened (Aram. *h̄sn*, **חָסַן**), but with Arab. *khazan*, to deposit, to lay up in granaries, whence our “Magazin.” **חֵסֶן** may indeed, like **חֵיל**, have the meaning of riches, and **חָסַן** does actually mean, in the Jewish-Aram., to possess, and the *Aphel* **חָסַן**, to take into possession (**κρατεῖν**); but the constant use of the noun **חֵסֶן** in the sense of store, with the kindred idea of laying up, e.g., Jer. 20: 5, and of the *Niph.* **נָחַסַן**, which means, Isa. 23:18, with **נָאָצַר**, “to be magazined,” gives

countenance to the idea that חֶסֶן goes back to the primary conception, *recondere*, and is to be distinguished from חֶסֶן, חֶסֶן, and other derivatives after the fundamental conception. We may not interpret בֵּית, with Fleischer, Bertheau, and Zöckler, as accus.: in the house (cf. בֵּית, Pro. 8: 2), nor prepositionally as *chez = casa*; but: “the house of the righteous is a great store,” equivalent to, the place of such. On the contrary, destruction comes by the gain of the wicked. It is impossible that נְעָרָה can have the house as the subject (Löwenstein), for בֵּית is everywhere mas. Therefore *Abulwalid*, followed by Kimchi and the *Venet.* (ὄλεθρος), interprets נְעָרָה as subst., after the form of the Mishnic נְבָרָה, a pool, cf. נְחָרָה, peremptorily decided, decreed; and if we do not extinguish the ב of וּבְתוֹאֵת (the LXX according to the second translation of this doubly-translated distich, Syr., and Targ.), there remains then nothing further than to regard נְעָרָה either as subst. neut. overturned = overthrow (cf. such part. nouns as מוֹעָקָה, מוֹסָדָה, but particularly נְסֻבָה, 2Ch. 10:15), or as impers. neut. pass.: it is overthrown = there is an overthrow, like נִשְׁעָרָה, Psa. 50: 3: it is stormed = a storm rages. The gain of the wicked has overthrow as its consequence, for the greed of gain, which does not shrink from unrighteous, deceitful gain, destroys his house, עֵבֶר בֵּיתוֹ, v. 27 (vid., regarding עֵבֶר, Pro. 11:29). Far from enriching the house, such gain is the cause of nothing but ruin. The LXX, in its first version of this distich, reads, in 6a, בְּרִבּוֹת צָדִק (ἐν πλεοναζούσῳ δικαιοσύνη), and in 6b, וּבְתוֹאֵת רְשָׁע נְעָרָה (and together with the fruit the godless is rooted out, ὀλόρριζοὶ ἐκ γῆς ἀπολοῦνται); for, as Lagarde has observed, it confounds עֵבֶר with עָרָה (to root, *privativ*: to root up).

Pro. 15: 7-17. A second series which begins with a proverb of the power of human speech, and closes with proverbs of the advantages and disadvantages of wealth.

**7 The lips of the wise spread knowledge;
But the direction is wanting to the heart of fools.**

Pro. 15: 7. It is impossible that לֹא-כֵן can be a second object. accus. dependent on יָרָו (dispersunt, not יִצְרָו, Pro. 20:28; φυλάσσουσι, as Symmachus translates): but the heart of fools is unrighteous (error or falsehood) (Hitzig after Isa. 16: 6); for then why were the lips of the wise and the heart of the fools mentioned? לֹא-כֵן also does not mean οὐχ οὕτως (an old Greek anonymous translation, Jerome, Targ., *Venet.*, Luther): the heart of the fool is quite different from the heart of the wise man, which spreads abroad knowledge (Zöckler), for it is not heart and heart, but lip and heart, that are

placed opposite to each other. Better the LXX *οὐκ ἀσφαλεις*, and yet better the Syr. *lo kinin* (not right, sure). We have seen, at Pro. 11:19, that כן as a participial adj. means standing = being, continuing, or also standing erect = right, i.e., rightly directed, or having the right direction; כִּנְיָן means there conducting oneself rightly, and thus genuine rectitude. What, after 7a, is more appropriate than to say of the heart of the fool, that it wants the receptivity for knowledge which the lips of the wise scatter abroad? The heart of the fool is not right, it has not the right direction, is crooked and perverse, has no mind for wisdom; and that which proceeds from the wise, therefore, finds with him neither estimation nor acceptance.

***8 The sacrifice of the godless is an abhorrence to Jahve;
But the prayer of the upright is His delight.***

Pro. 15: 8. Although the same is true of the prayer of the godless that is here said of their sacrifice, and of the sacrifice of the righteous that is here said of their prayer (vid., Pro. 28: 9, and cf. Psa. 4: 6 with Psa. 27: 6), yet it is not by accident that here (line first = Pro. 21:27) the sacrifice is ascribed to the godless and the prayer to the upright. The sacrifice, as a material and legally-required performance, is much more related to dead works than prayer freely completing itself in the word, the most direct expression of the personality, which, although not commanded by the law, because natural to men, as such is yet the soul of all sacrifices; and the Chokma, like the Psalms and Prophets, in view of the ceremonial service which had become formal and dead in the *opus operatum*, is to such a degree penetrated by the knowledge of the incongruity of the offering up of animals and of plants, with the object in view, that a proverb like “the sacrifice of the righteous is pleasing to God” never anywhere occurs; and if it did occur without being expressly and unavoidably referred to the legal sacrifice, it would have to be understood rather after Psa. 51:18 f. than Psa. 51:20 f., rather after 1Sa. 15:22 than after Psa. 66:13-15. זָבַח, which, when it is distinguished from עֹלָה, means (cf. Pro. 7:14) the sacrifice only in part coming to the altar, for the most part applied to a sacrificial feast, is here the common name for the bloody, and, *per synecdochen*, generally the legally-appointed sacrifice, consisting in external offering. The לְרִצּוֹן, Lev. 1: 3, used in the *Tôra* of sacrifices, is here, as at Psa. 19:15, transferred to prayer. The fundamental idea of the proverb is, that sacrifices well-pleasing to God, prayers acceptable to God (that are heard, Pro. 15:29), depend on the relations in which the heart and life of the man stand to God.

Pro. 15: 9. Another proverb with the key-word תּוֹעֵבָת

***An abomination to Jahve is the way of the godless;
But He loveth him who searcheth after righteousness.***

The manner and rule of life is called the way. **מַרְדֵּף** is the heightening of **דָּרַךְ**, Pro. 21:21, and can be used independently *in bonam*, as well as *in malam partem* (Pro. 11:19, cf. 13:21). Regarding the form **יִאֲדָבֵב**, vid., Fleischer in *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xv. 382.

**10 Sharp correction is for him who forsaketh the way;
Whoever hateth instruction shall die.**

Pro. 15:10. The way, thus absolute, is the God-pleasing right way (Pro. 2:13), the forsaking of which is visited with the punishment of death, because it is that which leadeth unto life (Pro. 10:17). And that which comes upon them who leave it is called **מוֹסֵר רָע**, *castigatio dura*, as much as to say that whoever does not welcome instruction, whoever rejects it, must at last receive it against his will in the form of peremptory punishment. The sharp correction (cf. Isa. 28:28, 19b) is just the death under which he falls who accepts of no instruction (Pro. 5:23), temporal death, but that as a token of wrath which it is not for the righteous (Pro. 14:32).

**11 The underworld [Sheol] and the abyss are before Jahve;
But how much more the hearts of the children of men!**

Pro. 15:11. A syllogism, *a minori ad majus*, with **אֵף כִּי** (LXX πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ, Venet. μᾶλλον οὖν), like Pro. 12:32. ^{f130} **אֲבַדוֹן** has a meaning analogous to that of **τάρταρος** (cf. **ταρταροῦν**, 2Pe. 2: 4, to throw down into the **τάρταρος**), which denotes the lowest region of Hades (**שְׂאוֹל תְּחֵתִית** or **שֵׁי תְּחֵתִיָּה**), and also in general, Hades. If **אֲבַדוֹן** and **מָוֶת** are connected, Job. 37:22, and if **אֲבַדוֹן** is the parallel word to **קֶבֶר**, Psa. 88:12, or also to **שְׂאוֹל**, as in the passage similar to this proverb, Job. 26: 6 (cf. Job. 38:17): "*Sheôl* is naked before Him, and Abaddon has no covering;" since **אֲבַדוֹן** is the general name of the underworld, including the grave, i.e., the inner place of the earth which receives the body of the dead, as the kingdom of the dead, lying deeper, does the soul. But where, as here and at Pro. 27:10, **שְׂאוֹל** and **אֲבַדוֹן** stand together, they are related to each other, as **ἄδης** and **ταρταρος** or **ἄβυσσος**, Rev. 9:11: **אֲבַדוֹן** is the lowest hell, the place of deepest descent, of uttermost destruction. The conclusion which is drawn in the proverb proceeds from the supposition that in the region of creation there is nothing more separated, and by a wide distance, from God, than the depth, and especially the undermost depth, of the realm of the dead. If now God has this region in its whole compass wide open before Him, if it is visible and thoroughly cognisable by Him (**נִגְדָה**, *acc. adv.: in conspectu*, from **נָגַד**, *eminere, conspicuum esse*), — for He is also present in the underworld, Psa. 139: 8, —

then much more will the hearts of the children of men be open, the inward thoughts of men living and acting on the earth being known already from their expressions. Man sees through man, and also himself, never perfectly; but the Lord can try the heart and prove the reins, Jer. 17:10. What that means this proverb gives us to understand, for it places over against the hearts of men nothing less than the depths of the underworld in eternity.

***12 The scorner liketh not that one reprove him,
To wise men he will not go.***

Pro. 15:12. The *inf. absol.*, abruptly denoting the action, may take the place of the object, as here (cf. Job. 9:18, Isa. 42:24), as well as of the subject (Pro. 25:27, Job. 6:25). Thus הוֹכִיחַ is (Pro. 9: 7) construed with the dat. obj. Regarding the probable conclusion which presents itself from passages such as Pro. 15:12 and Pro. 13:20, as to the study of wisdom in Israel, vid., p. 28. Instead of אָל, we read, Pro. 13:20 (cf. 22:24), אָתָּה; for לָכַת אִתָּךְ means to have intercourse with one, to go a journey with one (Mal. 2: 6, cf. Gen. 5:24, but not 2Sa. 15:22, where we are to translate with Keil), according to which the LXX has here μετὰ δὲ σοφῶν οὐχ ὁμιλήσει. The mocker of religion and of virtue shuns the circle of the wise, for he loves not to have his treatment of that which is holy reprov'd, nor to be convicted of his sin against truth; he prefers the society where his frivolity finds approbation and a response.

***13 A joyful heart maketh the countenance cheerful;
But in sorrow of the heart the spirit is broken.***

Pro. 15:13. The expression of the countenance, as well as the spiritual *habitus* of a man, is conditioned by the state of the heart. A joyful heart maketh the countenance טוב, which means friendly, but here happy-looking = cheerful (for טוב is the most general designation of that which makes an impression which is pleasant to the senses or to the mind); on the contrary, with sorrow of heart (אֲצַבֵּת, constr. of אֲצַבֵּת, Pro. 10:10, as הַטָּאֵת = הַטָּאֵת, from הַטָּאָה) there is connected a stricken, broken, downcast heart; the spiritual functions of the man are paralyzed; self-confidence, without which energetic action is impossible, is shattered; he appears discouraged, whereby רוּחַ is thought of as the power of self-consciousness and of self-determination, but לֵב, as our “*Gemüt*” [*animus*], as the oneness of thinking and willing, and thus as the seat of determination, which decides the intellectual-corporeal life-expression of the man, or without being able to be wholly restrained, communicates itself to them. The בָּ of וּבְאֲצַבֵּת is, as Pro. 15:16 f., 16: 8; 17: 1, meant in the force of being together or along with, so that רוּחַ וְנִבְאָה do not need to be taken separate from each other as subject and predicate: the sense of the noun-clause

is in the **כ**, as e.g., also Pro. 7:23 (it is about his life, i.e., it concerns his life). Elsewhere the crushed spirit, like the broken heart, is equivalent to the heart despairing in itself and prepared for grace. The heart with a more clouded mien may be well, for sorrow has in it a healing power (Ecc. 7: 3). But here the matter is the general psychological truth, that the corporeal and spiritual life of man has its regulator in the heart, and that the condition of the heart leaves its stamp on the appearance and on the activity of the man. The translation of the **רוח נכאה** by “oppressed breath” (Umbreit, Hitzig) is impossible; the breath cannot be spoken of as broken.

***14 The heart of the understanding seeketh after knowledge,
And the mouth of fools practiseth folly.***

Pro. 15:14. Luther interprets **רעה** as metaphor. for to govern, but with such ethical conceptions it is metaphor. for to be urgently circumspect about anything (vid., Pro. 13:20), like Arab. *ra'y* and *r'âyt*, intentional, careful, concern about anything. No right translation can be made of the **Chethib פני**, which Schultens, Hitzig, Ewald, and Zöckler prefer; the predicate can go before the **פני**, after the Semitic rule in the fem. of the sing., 2Sa. 10: 9, cf. Job. 16:16, *Chethib*, but cannot follow in the masc. of the sing.; besides, the operations of his look and aspect are ascribed to his face, but not spiritual functions as here, much more to the mouth, i.e., to the spirit speaking through it. The heart is within a man, and the mouth without; and while the former gives and takes, the latter is always only giving out. In Pro. 18:15, where a synonymous distich is formed from the antithetic distich, the ear, as hearing, is mentioned along with the heart as appropriating. **נבון** is not an adj., but is gen., like **צדיק**, 28a (opp. **ופי**). **חכם**, Pro. 16:23. The **φιλοσοφία** of the understanding is placed over against the **μωρολογία** of the fools. The LXX translates **καρδία ὀρθὴ ζητεῖ αἴσθησιν** (cf. Pro. 14:10, **καρδία ἀνδρὸς αἰσθητικῆς**); it uses this word after the Hellenistic *usus loq.* for **דעת**, of experimental knowledge.

***15 All the days of the afflicted are evil;
But he who is of a joyful heart hath a perpetual feast.***

Pro. 15:15. Regarding **עני** (the afflicted), vid., 21b. They are so called on whom a misfortune, or several of them, press externally or internally. If such an one is surrounded by ever so many blessings, yet is his life day by day a sad one, because with each new day the feeling of his woe which oppresses him renews itself; whoever, on the contrary, is of joyful heart (gen. connection as Pro. 11:13; 12: 8), such an one (his life) is always a feast, a banquet (not **משתה**, as it may be also pointed, but **משתה** and **תמיד** thus *adv.*, for it is

never adj.; the post-bib. usage is **עולות תמיד** for **תמידין** (Hitzig (and also Zöckler) renders 15b: And (the days) of one who is of a joyful heart are... Others supply **לו** (cf. Pro. 27: 7b), but our rendering does not need that. We have here again an example of that attribution (Arab. *isnâd*) in which that which is attributed (*musnad*) is a condition (*hal*) of a logical subject (the *musnad ilêhi*), and thus he who speaks has this, not in itself, but in the sense of the condition; the inwardly cheerful is feasts evermore, i.e., the condition of such an one is like a continual festival. The true and real happiness of a man is thus defined, not by external things, but by the state of the heart, in which, in spite of the apparently prosperous condition, a secret sorrow may gnaw, and which, in spite of an externally sorrowful state, may be at peace, and be joyfully confident in God.

***16 Better is little with the fear of Jahve,
Than great store and trouble therewith.***

Pro. 15:16. The **כ** in both cases the LXX rightly renders by **μετά**. How **מהומה** (elsewhere of wild, confused disorder, extreme discord) is meant of store and treasure, Psa. 39: 7 shows: it is restless, covetous care and trouble, as the contrast of the quietness and contentment proceeding from the fear of God, the noisy, wild, stormy running and hunting about of the slave of mammon. Theodotion translates the word here, as Aquila and Symmachus elsewhere, by words which correspond (**φαγέδαινα** = **φάγαινα** or **ἀχορτασία**) with the Syr. **יענותא**, greed or insatiability.

***17 Better a dish of cabbage, and love with it,
Than a fatted ox together with hatred.***

Pro. 15:17. With **ב** is here interchanged **בש**, which, used both of things and of persons, means to be there along with something. Both have the *Dag. forte conj.*, cf. to the contrary, Deu. 30:20, Mic. 1:11, Deu. 11:22; the punctuation varies, if the first of the two words is a *n. actionis* ending in **ת**. The dish (portion) is called **אֶרְרָה**, which the LXX and other Greek versions render by **ξενισμός**, entertainment, and thus understand it of that which is set before a guest, perhaps rightly so, for the Arab. *ârrakh* (to date, to determine), to which it is compared by Gesenius and Dietrich, is equivalent to *warrh*, a denom. of the name of the moon. Love and hatred are, according to circumstances, the disposition of the host, or of the participant, the spirit of the family:

***Cum dat oluscula mensa minuscula pace quietâ,
Ne pete grandia lautaque prandia lite repleta.***

Two proverbs of two different classes of men, each second line of which terminates with a catchword having a similar sound (וּאָרַח, וּאָרַךְ).

***18 A passionate man stirreth up strife,
And one who is slow to anger allayeth contention.***

Pro. 15:18. Pro. 28:25a and 29:22a are variations of the first line of this proverb. The *Pih.* גָּרָה גָּרָה occurs only these three times in the phrase גָּרָה מְדוֹן, R. גָּר, to grind, thus to strike, to irritate, cogn. to (but of a different root from) the verb עוֹרָר, to excite, Pro. 10:12, and חָרַחַר, to set on fire, Pro. 26:21, cf. שָׁלַח, Pro. 6:14. Regarding חָמָה, vid., Pro. 15: 1; we call such a man a “hot-head;” but the biblical conception nowhere (except in the Book of Daniel) places the head in connection with spiritual-psychical events (*Psychologie*, p. 254). Regarding אָרַךְ אַפַּיִם, vid., Pro. 14:29; the LXX (which contains a translation of this proverb, and after it of a variation) translates μακρόθυμος δὲ καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν καταπραύνει, i.e., (as the Syr. render it) he suppresses the strife in its origin, so that it does not break out. But both are true: that he who is slow to anger, who does not thus easily permit himself to become angry, allayeth the strife which one enters into with him, or into which he is drawn, and that he prevents the strife, for he places over against provoking, injurious conduct, patient gentleness (מְרַפֵּא, Ecc. 10: 4).

***19 The way of the slothful is as hedged with thorns;
But the path of the righteous is paved.***

Pro. 15:19. Hitzig misses the contrast between עָצֵל (slothful) and יִשְׂרָיִם (upright), and instead of the slothful reads עֲרִיץ, the tyrannical. But is then the slothful יִשָּׁר? The contrast is indeed not that of contradiction, but the slothful is one who does not act uprightly, a man who fails to fulfil the duty of labour common to man, and of his own special calling. The way of such an one is בְּמִשְׁבַּת חֶדֶק, like a fencing with thorns (from חֶדֶק, R. חָד, to be pointed, sharp, distinguished from Arab. *hadk*, to surround, and in the meaning to fix with the look, *denom.* of *khadaḳt*, the apple of the eye), so that he goes not forwards, and sees hindrances and difficulties everywhere, which frighten him back, excusing his shunning his work, his remissness of will, and his doing nothing; on the contrary, the path of those who wait truly and honestly on their calling, and prosecute their aim, is raised up like a skilfully made street, so that unhindered and quickly they go forward (סְלוּלָה, R. סָל, *aggerare*, cf. Jer. 18:15 with Isa. 49:11, and 4: 8, סָלְסַל, which was still in use in the common language of Palestine in the second cent., *Rosch haschana*, 26b).

This collection of Solomonic proverbs began, Pro. 10: 1, with a proverb having reference to the observance of the fourth commandment,^{f131} and a second chief section, Pro. 13: 1, began in the same way. Here a proverb of the same kind designates the beginning of a third chief section. That the editor was aware of this is shown by the homogeneity of the proverbs, Pro. 15:19; 12:28, which form the conclusion of the first and second sections. We place together first in this new section, vv. 20-23, in which (with the exception of v. 25) the **שִׂמְחָה** [maketh glad] of the first (Pro. 10: 1) is continued.

***20 A wise son maketh a glad father,
And a fool of a man despiseth his mother.***

Pro. 15:20. Line first = Pro. 10: 1. The gen. connection of **כְּסִיל אָדָם** (here and at Pro. 21:20) is not superlative [the most foolish of men], but like **אָדָם אִשָּׁר**, Gen. 16:12; the latter: a man of the wild ass kind; the former: a man of the fool kind, who is the exemplar of such a sort among men. Piety acting in willing subordination is wisdom, and the contrary exceeding folly.

***21 Folly is joy to him that is devoid of understanding;
But a man of understanding goeth straight forward.***

Pro. 15:21. Regarding **חֶסֶד-לֵב**, vid., at Pro. 6:32 (cf. *libib*, which in the Samaritan means “dearly beloved,” in Syr. “courageous,” in Arab. and Aethiop. *cordatus*); **אִישׁ תְּבוּנָה**, Pro. 10:23, and **יֵשֶׁר**, with the accus. of the way, here of the going, Pro. 3: 6 (but not Pro. 11: 5, where the going itself is not the subject). In consequence of the contrast, the meaning of 21a is different from that of Pro. 10:23, according to which sin is to the fool as the sport of a child. Here **אֲוִלָּת** is folly and buffoonery, drawing aside in every kind of way from the direct path of that which is good, and especially from the path of one’s duty. This gives joy to the fool; he is thereby drawn away from the earnest and faithful performance of the duties of his calling, and thus wastes time and strength; while, on the contrary, a man of understanding, who perceives and rejects the vanity and unworthiness of such trifling and such nonsense, keeps the straight direction of his going, i.e., without being drawn aside or kept back, goes straight forward, i.e., true to duty, prosecutes the end of his calling. **לָכֵת** is accus., like Pro. 30:29, Mic. 6: 8.

***22 A breaking of plans where no counsel is;
But where many counsellors are they come to pass.***

Pro. 15:22. On the other side it is also true according to the proverbs, “so viel Köpfe so viel Sinne” [quot homines, tot sententiae], and “viel Rath ist Unrath” [ne quid nimis], and the like. But it cannot become a rule of morals

not to accept of counsel that we may not go astray; on the contrary, it is and remains a rule of morals: not stubbornly to follow one's own heart (head), and not obstinately to carry out one's own will, and not in the darkness of wisdom to regard one's own plans as unimproveable, and not needing to be examined; but to listen to the counsel of intelligent and honest friends, and, especially where weighty matters are in hand, not affecting one's own person, but the common good, not to listen merely to one counsellor, but to many. Not merely the organism of the modern state, but also of old the Mosaic arrangement of the Israelitish community, with its representative organization, its courts and councils, rested on the acknowledged justice and importance of the saying uttered in Pro. 11:14, and here generalized. **הִפֵּר**, *infin. abs. Hiph.* of **פָּרַר**, to break, with the accus. following, stands here, like **הִפְּוֶה**, Pro. 12: 7, instead of the finite: the thoughts come to a fracture (failure), *irrita fiunt consilia*. **סוֹד** (= **סוֹדִי**, cf. **נוֹסֵד** Psa. 2: 2) means properly the being brought close together for the purpose of secret communication and counsel (cf. Arab. *sâwada*, to press close together = to walk with one privately). The LXX: their plans are unexecuted, **οἱ μὴ τιμῶντες συνέδρια**, literally Symmachus, **διασκεδάζονται λογισμοὶ μὴ ὄντος συμβουλίου**. **תִּקְוָם** has, after Jer. 4:14; 51:29, **מְחַשְׁבוֹת** as subject. The LXX (besides perverting **בָּרַב** [by a multitude] into **בָּלַב** [*ev καρδαίαις*]), the Syr. and Targ. introduce **עֲצָה** (Pro. 19:21) as subject.

***23 A man has joy by the right answer of his mouth;
And a word in its season, how fair is it!***

Pro. 15:23. If we translate **מַעֲנָה** only by “answer,” then 23a sounds as a praise of self-complaisance; but it is used of true correspondence (Pro. 29:19), of fit reply (Job. 32: 3, 5), of appropriate answer (cf. 28a, Pro. 16: 1). It has happened to one in his reply to hit the nail on its head, and he has joy from that (**שִׂמְחָה בְּ** after **בְּ שִׂמְחָה**, e.g., Pro. 23:24), and with right; for the reply does not always succeed. A reply like this, which, according to circumstances, stops the mouth of bringeth a kiss (Pro. 24:26), is a fortunate throw, is a gift from above. The synonymous parallel line measures that which is appropriate, not to that which is to be answered, but from a general point of view as to its seasonableness; **עֵת** (= **עֵדָת** from **יָאֵד**) is here “the ethically right, becoming time, determined by the laws of wisdom (moral)” (vid., Orelli, *Synonyma der Zeit u. Ewigkeit*, p. 48), cf. **אֶל-אֲפָנָיו** (translated by Luther ‘in its time’), Pro. 25:11. With **מַה-טּוֹב**, cf. Pro. 16:16; both ideas lie in it: that such a word is in itself well-conditioned and successful, and also that it is welcome, agreeable, and of beneficial influence.

Four proverbs of fundamentally different doctrines:

**24 The man of understanding goeth upwards on a way of life,
To depart from hell beneath.**

Pro. 15:24. The way of life is one, Pro. 5: 6, Psa. 16:11 (where, notwithstanding the want of the article, the idea is logically determined), although in itself forming a plurality of אַרְחֹת, Pro. 2:19. “A way of life,” in the translation, is equivalent to a way which is a way of life. לְמַעַלָּה, upwards (as Ecc. 3:21, where, in the doubtful question whether the spirit of a man at his death goes upwards, there yet lies the knowledge of the alternative), belongs, as the parallel מִשְׁאוֹל מִמָּטָה shows, to אַרְחָה חַיִּים as virtual adj.: a way of life which leads upwards. And the לְ of לְמִשְׁכִּיל is that of possession, but not as of quiet possession (such belongs to him), but as personal activity, as in לֵךְ לֵךְ לוֹ, he has a journey = he makes a journey, finds himself on a journey, 1Ki. 18:27; for לְמֵאן סוֹר is not merely, as לְסוֹר, Pro. 13:14; 14:27, the expression of the end and consequence, but of the subjective object, i.e., the intention, and thus supposes an activity corresponding to this intention. The O.T. reveals heaven, i.e., the state of the revelation of God in glory, yet not as the abode of saved men; the way of the dying leads, according to the O.T. representation, downwards into *Sheôl*; but the translations of Enoch and Elijah are facts which, establishing the possibility of an exception, break through the dark monotony of that representation, and, as among the Greeks the mysteries encouraged ἡδυστέρας ἐλπιδας, so in Israel the Chokma appears pointing the possessor of wisdom upwards, and begins to shed light on the darkness of *Sheôl* by the new great thoughts of a life of immortality, thus of a ζῶν ἀίώνιος (Pro. 12:28) (*Psychologie*, p. 407 ff.), now for the first time becoming prominent, but only as a foreboding and an enigma. The idea of the *Sheôl* opens the way for a change: the gathering place of all the living on this side begins to be the place of punishment for the godless (Pro. 7:27; 9:18); the way leading upwards, εἰς τὴν ζωὴν, and that leading downwards, εἰς τὴν ἀπώλειαν (Mat. 7:13 f.), come into direct contrast.

**25 The house of the proud Jahve rooteth out,
And He establisheth the landmark of the widow.**

Pro. 15:25. The power unnamed in יָסַח, Pro. 2:22 (cf. 14:11a), is here named יָסַח | יְהוָה (thus to be pointed with *Mercha* and *Pasek* following). יָצַב is the abbreviated fut. form which the elevated style, e.g., Deu. 32: 8, uses also as indic., — a syntactical circumstance which renders Hitzig’s correction יָצַב superfluous. It is the border of the land-possession of the widows, removed by the יָסַח (LXX ὑβριστῶν), that is here meant. The possession of land in Israel was secured by severe punishment inflicted in him who removed the

“landmark” (Deu. 19:14; 27:17), and the Chokma (Pro. 22:28; Job. 24: 2) as well as the prophets (e.g., Hos. 5:10) inculcate the inviolability of the borders of the possession, as the guardian of which Jahve here Himself appears.

***26 An abomination to Jahve are evil thoughts;
But gracious words are to Him pure.***

Pro. 15:26. Not personally (Luther: the plans of the wicked) but neutrally is רָע here meant as at Pro. 2:14, and in אִשֶּׁת רָע, Pro. 6:24 (cf. Pers. *merdi niku*, man of good = good man), vid., Friedr. Philippi’s *Status Constr.* p. 121. Thoughts which are of a bad kind and of a bad tendency, particularly (what the parallel member brings near) of a bad disposition and design against others, are an abomination to God; but, on the contrary, pure, viz., in His eyes, which cannot look upon iniquity (Hab. 1:13), are the אִמְרֵי־נֶאֱמָר, words of compassion and of friendship toward men, which are (after 26a) the expression of such thoughts, thus sincere, benevolent words, the influence of which on the soul and body of him to whom they refer is described, Pro. 16:24. The Syr., Targ., Symmachus, Theodotion, and the *Venet.* recognise in וְטַהוּרִים the pred., while, on the contrary, the LXX, Jerome, and Luther (who finally decided for the translation, “but the pure speak comfortably”) regard it as subject. But that would be an attribution which exceeds the measure of possibility, and for which אִמְרֵים or דְּבָרֵי must be used; also the parallelism requires that טַהוּרִים correspond with תּוֹעֵבַת ה'. Hence also the reference of וְטַהוּרִים to the judgment of God, which is determined after the motive of pure untainted law; that which proceeds from such, that and that only, is pure, pure in His sight, and thus also pure in itself.

***27 Whoever does service to [servit] avarice troubleth his own house;
But he that hateth gifts shall live.***

Pro. 15:27. Regarding בָּצַע בְּצַע, vid., at Pro. 1:19, and regarding בֵּיתוֹ עֵבֶר, Pro. 11:29, where it is subject, but here object.; Pro. 28:16 *b* is a variation of 27b. מַתְּנוֹת are here gifts in the sense of Ecc. 7: 7, which pervert judgment, and cause respect of persons. The LXX from this point mingles together a series of proverbs with those of the following chapter.

Two proverbs regarding the righteous and the wicked:

***28 The heart of the righteous considereth how to answer right,
And the mouth of the godless poureth forth evil.***

Pro. 15:28. Instead of לְעֲנוּת, the LXX (Syr. and Targ.) imagines אִמּוֹנוֹת πῖστεις; Jerome translates, but falsely, *obedientiam* (from עָנָה, to bend

oneself); *Meiri* thinks on **לְעֵנָה**, wormwood, for the heart of the righteous revolves in itself the misery and the vanity of this present life; *Hitzig* corrects this verse as he does the three preceding: the heart of the righteous thinks on **עֲנוּוֹת**, a plur. of verb **עֲנָה**, which, except in this correction, does not exist. The proverb, as it stands, is, in fineness of expression and sharpness of the contrast, raised above such manglings. Instead of the righteous, the wise might be named, and instead of the godless, fools (cf. *2b*); but the poet places the proverb here under the point of view of duty to neighbours. It is the characteristic of the righteous that he does not give the reins to his tongue; but as *Luther* has translated: the heart of the righteous considers [*tichet* from *dictare*, frequently to speak, here carefully to think over] what is to be answered, or rather, since **מַה־לְעֲנוֹת** is not used, he thinks thereupon to answer rightly, for that the word **עֲנוּת** is used in this pregnant sense is seen from *23a*. The godless, on the contrary, are just as rash with their mouth as the righteous are of a thoughtful heart: their mouth sputters forth (*effutit*) evil, for they do not first lay to heart the question what may be right and just in the case that has arisen.

***29 Jahve is far from the godless;
But the prayer of the righteous He heareth.***

Pro. 15:29. Line second is a variation of *8b*. God is far from the godless, viz., as *Polychronius* remarks, *non spatii intercapedine, sed sententiae diversitate*; more correctly: as to His gracious presence — **הִלָּץ מֵהֶם**, He has withdrawn Himself from them, *Hos. 10: 6*, so that if they pray, their prayer reaches not to Him. The prayer of the righteous, on the contrary, He hears, He is graciously near to them, they have access to Him, He listens to their petitions; and if they are not always fulfilled according to their word, yet they are not without an answer (*Psa. 145:18*).

Two proverbs regarding the eye and the ear:

***30 The light of the eye rejoiceth the heart,
And a good message maketh the bones fat.***

Pro. 15:30. *Hitzig* corrects also here: **מְרֹאָה עֵינִים**, that which is seen with the eyes, viz., after long desire; and certainly **מְרֹאָה עֵינִים** can mean not only that which the eyes see (*Isa. 11: 3*), but also this, that the eyes do see. But is it true what *Hitzig* says in justification of his correction, that **מְאוֹר** never means light, or ray, or brightness, but lamp (*φωστήρ*)? It is true, indeed, that **עֵינִים מְאוֹר** cannot mean a cheerful sight (*Luther*) in an objective sense (*LXX θεωρῶν ὀφθαλμὸς καλῶς*), as a verdant garden or a stream flowing through a

landscape (Rashi), for that would be **מְרֹאָה מְאִיר עֵינַיִם**, and “brightness which the eyes see” (Bertheau); the genitive connection certainly does not mean: the **מְאִיר** is not the light from without presenting itself to the eyes, but, like **אֹר עֵינַיִם** (Psa. 38:11) and similar expressions, the light of the eye itself [bright or joyous eyes]. But **מְאִיר** does not mean alone the body of light, but also the illumination, Exo. 35:14 and elsewhere, not only that which (**δ, τι**) gives light, but also this, that (**δτι**) light arises and is present, so that we might translate it here as at Psa. 90: 8, either the brightness, or that which gives light. But the clear brightness of one’s own eye cannot be meant, for then that were as much as to say that it is the effect, not that it is the cause, of a happy heart, but the brightness of the eyes of others that meet us. That this gladdens the heart of him who has a sight of it is evident, without any interchanging relation of the joy-beaming countenance, for it is indeed heart-gladdening to a man, to whom selfishness has not made the **χαίρειν μετὰ χαιρόντων** impossible, to see a countenance right joyful in truth. But in connection with Pro. 16:15, it lies nearer to think on a love-beaming countenance, a countenance on which joyful love to us mirrors itself, and which reflects itself in our heart, communicating this sense of gladness. The ancient Jewish interpreters understand **מְאִיר עֵינַיִם** of the enlightening of the eye of the mind, according to which Eichel translates: “clear intelligence;” but Rashi has remarked that that is not the explanation of the words, but the Midrash. That, in line second of this synonymous distich, **שְׂמוּעָה מְזֻבָּה** does not mean *alloquium humanum* (Fl.), nor a good report which one hears of himself, but a good message, is confirmed by Pro. 25:25; **שְׂמוּעָה** as neut. *part. pass.* may mean that which is heard, but the comparison of **שְׂבוּעָה**, **יְשׁוּעָה**, stamps it as an abstract formation like **גְּדֻלָּה**, **גְּדֻלָּה** (**גְּדוּלָּה**), according to which the LXX translates it by **ἀκοή** (in this passage by **φιήμη**). Regarding **דִּשְׁן**, richly to satisfy, or to refresh, a favourite expression in the *Mishle*, vid., at Pro. 11:25; 13: 4.

***31 An ear which heareth the doctrine of life
Keeps itself in the circle of the wise.***

Pro. 15:31. As, Pro. 6:33, **תּוֹכַחַת מוֹסֵר** means instructions aiming at discipline, so here **תּוֹכַחַת חַיִּים** means instructions which have life as their end, i.e., as showing how one may attain unto true life; Hitzig’s **הַחַיִּים**, for **חַיִּים**, is a fancy. Is now the meaning this, that the ear which willingly hears and receives such doctrine of life will come to dwell among the wise, i.e., that such an one (for **אֵזֶן** is *synecdoche partis pro persona*, as Job. 29:11) will have his residence among wise men, as being one of them, *inter eos sedem firman habebit iisque annumerabitur* (Fl.)? By such a rendering, one is surprised at

the harshness of the synecdoche, as well as at the circumstantiality of the expression (cf. Pro. 13:20, **יְהָכֵם**). On the contrary, this corresponds with the thought that one who willingly permits to be said to him what he must do and suffer in order that he may be a partaker of life, on this account remains most gladly in the circle of the wise, and there has his appropriate place. The “passing the night” (**לַיָּל**, cogn. **לַיָּל**, Syr. Targ. **בּוֹת**, Arab. *bât*) is also frequently elsewhere the designation of prolonged stay, e.g., Isa. 1:21. **בְּקָרֵב** is here different in signification from that it had in Pro. 14:23, where it meant “in the heart.” In the LXX this proverb is wanting. The other Greek translations have **οὐς ἀκοῶν ἐλέγχους ζωῆς ἐν μέσῳ σοφῶν ἀβλισθήσεται**. Similarly the Syr., Targ., Jerome, Venet., and Luther, admitting both renderings, but, since they render in the fut., bringing nearer the idea of prediction (Midrash: **זוֹכָה לִישֵׁב בִּישִׁיבַת חֲכָמִים**) than of description of character.

Two proverbs with the catchword **מוֹסֵר**:

**32 He that refuseth correction lightly values his soul;
But he that heareth reproof getteth understanding.**

Pro. 15:32. Regarding **פּוֹרֵא מוֹסֵר**, vid., Pro. 13:18, cf. 1:25, and **נִפְשׁוֹ מוֹאֵס**, Pro. 8:36. **נִפְשׁוֹ** contains more than the later expression **אֶצְמוֹ**, self; it is equivalent to **חַיָּיו** (Job. 9:21), for the **נִפְשׁוֹ** is the bond of union between the intellectual and the corporeal life. The despising of the soul is then the neglecting, endangering, exposing of the life; in a word, it is suicide (10*b*). Pro. 19: 8 *a* is a variation derived from this distich: “He who gains understanding loves his soul,” according to which the LXX translate here **ἀγαπᾷ ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ**. **לֵב** the Midrash explains by **חֲכָמָה שְׁנִתּוֹנָה בְּלֵב**; but the correct view is, that **לֵב** is not thought of as a formal power, but as operative and carried into effect in conformity with its destination.

**33 The fear of Jahve is a discipline to wisdom,
And before honour is humility.**

Pro. 15:33. We may regard **יְרֵאתָ ה'** (the fear of Jahve) also as pred. here. The fear of Jahve is an educational maxim, and the end of education of the Chokma; but the phrase may also be the subject, and by such a rendering Luther's parallelism lies nearer: “The fear of the Lord is discipline to wisdom;” the fear of God, viz., continually exercised and tried, is the right school of wisdom, and humility is the right way to honour. Similar is the connection **מוֹסֵר הַשִּׁבְלִי**, discipline binds understanding to itself as its consequence, Pro. 1: 3. Line second repeats itself, Pro. 18:12, “Pride comes

before the fall.” Luther’s “And ere one comes to honour, he must previously suffer,” renders עָנִי rather than עֲנָה. But the Syr. reverses the idea: the honour of the humble goeth before him, as also one of the anonymous Greek versions: προπορεύεται δὲ ταπεινοῖς δόξα. But the δόξα comes, as the above proverb expresses it, afterwards. The way to the height lies through the depth, the depth of humility under the hand of God, and, as עֲנָה expresses, of self-humiliation.

CHAPTER 16

Four proverbs of God, the disposer of all things:

*1 Man's are the counsels of the heart;
But the answer of the tongue cometh from Jahve.*

Pro. 16: 1. Gesen., Ewald, and Bertheau incorrectly understand *1b* of hearing, i.e., of a favourable response to what the tongue wishes; *1a* speaks not of wishes, and the gen. after מַעֲנֶה (answer) is, as at Pro. 15:23, Mic. 3: 7, and also here, by virtue of the parallelism, the *gen. subjecti* Pro. 15:23 leads to the right sense, according to which a good answer is joy to him to whom it refers: it does not always happen to one to find the fitting and effective expression for that which he has in his mind; it is, as this cog. proverb expresses it, a gift from above (δοθήσεται, Mat. 10:19). But now, since מַעֲנֶה neither means answering, nor yet in general an expression (Euchel) or report (Löwenstein), and the meaning of the word at *4a* is not here in question, one has to think of him whom the proverb has in view as one who has to give a reason, to give information, or generally — since עֲנָה, like ἀμείβεσθαι, is not confined to the interchange of words — to solve a problem, and that such an one as requires reflection. The scheme (project, premeditation) which he in his heart contrives, is here described as מֵאָרְכֵי־לֵב, from עָרַךְ, to arrange, to place together, metaphorically of the reflection, i.e., the consideration analyzing and putting a matter in order. These reflections, seeking at one time in one direction, and at another in another, the solution of the question, the unfolding of the problem, are the business of men; but the answer which finally the tongue gives, and which here, in conformity with the pregnant sense of מַעֲנֶה (vid., at Pro. 15:23, 28), will be regarded as right, appropriate, effective, thus generally the satisfying reply to the demand placed before him, is from God. It is a matter of experience which the preacher, the public speaker, the author, and every man to whom his calling or circumstances present a weighty, difficult theme, can attest. As the thoughts pursue one another in the mind, attempts are made, and again abandoned; the state of the heart is somewhat like that of chaos before the creation. But when, finally, the right thought and the right utterance for it are found, that which is found appears to us, not as if self-discovered, but as a

gift; we regard it with the feeling that a higher power has influenced our thoughts and imaginings; the confession by us, ἡ ἱκανότης ἡμῶν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ (2Co. 3: 5), in so far as we believe in a living God, is inevitable.

**2 Every way of a man is pure in his own eyes;
But a weigher of the spirits is Jahve.**

Pro. 16: 2. Variations of this verse are Pro. 21: 2, where יָשָׁר for יָדָה (according to the root-meaning: pricking in the eyes, i.e., shining clear, then: without spot, pure, vid., Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 424), לבות for רוחות, and כָּל־דָּרְבָּר for כָּל־דָּרְבָּר, whereupon here without synallage (for כל means the totality), the singular of the pred. follows, as Isa. 64:10, Eze. 31:15. For the rest, cf. with 2a, Pro. 14:12, where, instead of the subj. בְּעֵינַי, is used לִפְנֵי, and with 2b, Pro. 24:12, where God is described by לבות תִּכַּן. The verb תִּכַּן is a secondary formation from כִּוֵּן (vid., Hupfeld on Psa. 5: 7), like תִּכַּן from Arab. *tyakn* (to be fast, sure), the former through the medium of the reflex. הִתְכַּוֵּן, the latter of the reflex. Arab. *âtkn*; תִּכַּן means to regulate (from *regula*, a rule), to measure off, to weigh, here not to bring into a condition right according to rule (Theodotion, ἔδράζων *stabiliens*, Syr. Targ. מִתְקֵן, Venet. καταρτίζει; Luther, "but the Lord maketh the heart sure"), but to measure or weigh, and therefore to estimate rightly, to know accurately (Jerome, *spiritum ponderator est Dominus*). The judgment of a man regarding the cause of life, which it is good for him to enter upon, lies exposed to great and subtle self-deception; but God has the measure and weight, i.e., the means of proving, so as to value the spirits according to their true moral worth; his investigation goes to the root (cf. κριτικός, Heb. 4:12), his judgment rests on the knowledge of the true state of the matter, and excludes all deception, so that thus a man can escape the danger of delusion by no other means than by placing his way, i.e., his external and internal life, in the light of the word of God, and desiring for himself the all-penetrating test of the Searcher of hearts (Psa. 139:23 f.), and the self-knowledge corresponding to the result of this test.

**3 Roll on Jahve thy works,
So thy thoughts shall prosper.**

Pro. 16: 3. The proverbs vv. 1-3 are wanting in the LXX; their absence is compensated for by three others, but only externally, not according to their worth. Instead of גַּל, the Syr., Targ., and Jerome read גַּל, *revela*, with which the אַל, Psa. 37: 5, cf. 55:23, interchanging with אַל (here and at Psa. 22: 9), does not agree; rightly Theodotion, κύλισσον ἐπὶ κύριον, and Luther, "commend to the Lord thy works." The works are here, not those that are

executed, Exo. 23:16, but those to be executed, as Psa. 90:17, where בּוֹנֵן, here the active to וְבוֹנֵנוּ, which at Pro. 4:26 as jussive meant to be placed right, here with וְ of the consequence in the *apodosi imperativi*: to be brought about, and to have continuance, or briefly: to stand (cf. Pro. 12: 3) as the contrast of disappointment or ruin. We should roll on God all matters which, as obligations, burden us, and on account of their weight and difficulty cause us great anxiety, for nothing is too heavy or too hard for Him who can overcome all difficulties and dissolve all perplexities; then will our thoughts, viz., those about the future of our duty and our life-course, be happy, nothing will remain entangled and be a failure, but will be accomplished, and the end and aim be realized.

**4 Jahve hath made everything for its contemplated end;
And also the wicked for the day of evil.**

Pro. 16: 4. Everywhere else מַעֲנָה means answer (*Venet.* πρὸς ἀπόκρισιν αὐτοῦ), which is not suitable here, especially with the absoluteness of the כָּל; the Syr. and Targ. translate, *obedientibus ei*, which the words do not warrant; but also *propter semet ipsum* (Jerome, Theodotion, Luther) give to 4b no right parallelism, and, besides, would demand לְמַעַנְהוּ or לְמַעֲנָהוּ. The punctuation לְמַעֲנָהוּ, which is an anomaly (cf. בְּגִבְרֵתָהּ, Isa. 24: 2, and בְּעֵרֵינוּ, Ezr. 10:14), shows (Ewald) that here we have, not the prepositional לְמַאֵן, but לְ with the subst. מַעֲנָה, which in derivation and meaning is one with the form מַאֵן abbreviated from it (cf. מַאֵר, מַאֵל), similar in meaning to the Arab. *ma'anyn*, aim, intention, object, and end, and mind, from 'atay, to place opposite to oneself a matter, to make it the object of effort. Hitzig prefers לְמַעֲנָה, but why not rather לְמַעֲנָהוּ, for the proverb is not intended to express that all that God has made serve a purpose (by which one is reminded of the arguments for the existence of God from final causes, which are often prosecuted too far), but that all is made by God for its purpose, i.e., a purpose premeditated by Him, that the world of things and of events stands under the law of a plan, which has in God its ground and its end, and that also the wickedness of free agents is comprehended in this plan, and made subordinate to it. God has not indeed made the wicked as such, but He has made the being which is capable of wickedness, and which has decided for it, viz., in view of the "day of adversity" (Ecc. 7:14), which God will cause to come upon him, thus making His holiness manifest in the merited punishment, and thus also making wickedness the means of manifesting His glory. It is the same thought which is expressed in Exo. 9:16 with reference to Pharaoh. A *praedestinatio ad malum*, and that in the supralapsarian sense, cannot be here taught, for this horrible dogma (*horribile quidem decretrum, fateor*, says Calvin himself)

makes God the author of evil, and a ruler according to His sovereign caprice, and thus destroys all pure conceptions of God. What Paul, Romans 9, with reference to Exo. 9:16, wishes to say is this, that it was not Pharaoh's conduct that determined the will of God, but that the will of God is always the *antecedens*: nothing happens to God through the obstinacy and rebellion of man which determines Him to an action not already embraced in the eternal plan, but also such an one must against his will be subservient to the display of God's glory. The apostle adds v. 22, and shows that he recognised the factor of human self-determination, but also as one comprehended in God's plan. The free actions of men create no situation by which God would be surprised and compelled to something which was not originally intended by Himself. That is what the above proverb says: the wicked also has his place in God's order of the world. Whoever frustrates the designs of grace must serve God in this, *ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ γνωρίσαι τὸ δυνατόν αὐτοῦ* (Rom. 9:22).

Here follow three proverbs of divine punishment, *expiatio* [Versöhnung] and *reconciliatio* [Versöhnung].

***5 An abomination of Jahve is every one who is haughty;
The hand for it [assuredly] he remains not unpunished.***

Pro. 16: 5. Proverbs thus commencing we already had at Pro. 15: 9, 26. **גָּבַהּ** is a metaplastic connecting form of **גָּבַהּ**; on the contrary, **גָּבַהּ**, 1Sa. 16: 7, Psa. 103:11, means being high, as **גָּבַהּ**, height; the form underlying **גָּבַהּ** is not **גָּבַהּ** (as Gesen. and Olshausen write it), but **גָּבַהּ**. In *5b*, Pro. 11:21a is repeated. The translators are perplexed in their rendering of **יָד לְיָד**. Fleischer: *ab aetate in aetatem non* (i.e., *nullo unquam tempore futuro*) *impunis erit.*

***6 By love and truth is iniquity expiated,
And through the fear of Jahve one escapes from evil —***

Pro. 16: 6. literally, there comes (as the effect of it) the escaping of evil (**סוּר**, *n. actionis*, as Pro. 13:19), or rather, since the evil here comes into view as to its consequences (Pro. 14:27; 15:24), this, that one escapes evil. By **אֱמֶת וְחֶסֶד** are here meant, not the *χάρις καὶ ἀλήθεια* of God (Bertheau), but, like Pro. 20:28, Isa. 39: 8, love and faithfulness in the relation of men to one another. The **ב** is both times that of the mediating cause. Or is it said neither by what means one may attain the expiation of his sins, nor how he may attain to the escaping from evil, but much rather wherein the true reverence for Jahve, and wherein the right expiation of sin, consist? Thus von Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* i. 595. But the **ב** of **בַּחֶסֶד** is not different from that of **בְּאֵתָהּ**, Isa. 27: 9. It is true that the article of justification is falsified if good works

enter as *causa meritoria* into the act of justification, but we of the evangelical school teach that the *fides quâ justificat* is indeed inoperative, but not the *fides quae justificat*, and we cannot expect of the O.T. that it should everywhere distinguish with Pauline precision what even James will not or cannot distinguish. As the law of sacrifice designates the victim united with the blood in the most definite manner, but sometimes also the whole transaction in the offering of sacrifice even to the priestly feast as serving לִכְבֵּד, Lev. 10:17, so it also happens in the general region of ethics: the objective ground of reconciliation is the decree of God, to which the blood in the typical offering points, and man is a partaker of this reconciliation, when he accepts, in penitence and in faith, the offered mercy of God; but this acceptance would be a self-deception, if it meant that the blotting out of the guilt of sin could be obtained in the way of imputation without the immediate following thereupon of a blotting of it out in the way of sanctification; and therefore the Scriptures also ascribe to good works a share in the expiation of sin in a wider sense — namely, as the proofs of thankful (Luk. 7:47) and compassionate love (vid., at Pro. 10: 2), as this proverb of love and truth, herein according with the words of the prophets, as Hos. 6: 6, Mic. 6: 6-8. He who is conscious of this, that he is a sinner, deeply guilty before God, who cannot stand before Him if He did not deal with him in mercy instead of justice, according to the purpose of His grace, cannot trust to this mercy if he is not zealous, in his relations to his fellow-men, to practise love and truth; and in view of the fifth petition of the Lord's Prayer, and of the parable of the unmerciful steward rightly understood, it may be said that the love which covers the sins, Pro. 10:12, of a neighbour, has, in regard to our own sins, a covering or atoning influence, of "blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy." That "love and truth" are meant of virtues practised from religious motives, 6*b* shows; for, according to this line, by the fear of Jahve one escapes evil. The fear of Jahve is subjection to the God of revelation, and a falling in with the revealed plan of salvation.

*7 If Jahve has pleasure in the ways of a man,
He reconciles even his enemies to him —*

Pro. 16: 7. properly (for הַשְׁלִים is here the causative of the transitive, Jos. 10: 1): He brings it about that they conclude peace with him. If God has pleasure in the ways of a man, i.e., in the designs which he prosecutes, and in the means which he employs, he shows, by the great consequences which flow from his endeavours, that, even as his enemies also acknowledge, God is with him (e.g., Gen. 26:27 f.), so that they, vanquished in heart (e.g., 2Sa. 19: 9 f.), abandon their hostile position, and become his friends. For if it is manifest that God makes Himself known, bestowing blessings on a man, there lies in this a power of conviction which disarms his most bitter opponents, excepting only those who have in selfishness hardened themselves.

Five proverbs of the king, together with three of righteousness in action and conduct:

***8 Better is a little with righteousness,
Than rich revenues with unrighteousness.***

Pro. 16: 8. The cogn. proverb Pro. 15:16 commences similarly. Of תְּבוּאוֹתָּהּ בָּרַב, multitude or greatness of income, vid., Pro. 14: 4: “unrighteous wealth profits not.” The possessor of it is not truly happy, for sin cleaves to it, which troubles the heart (conscience), and because the enjoyment which it affords is troubled by the curses of those who are injured, and by the sighs of the oppressed. Above all other gains rises ἡ εὐσέβεια μετ’ ἀνταρκείας (1Ti. 6: 6).

***9 The heart of man deviseth his way;
But Jahve directeth his steps.***

Pro. 16: 9. Similar to this is the German proverb: “*Der Mensch denkt, Gott lenkt*” [= our “man proposes, God disposes”], and the Arabic *el-'abd* (الْعَبْدُ = man) *judebbir wallah juqaddir*; Latin, *homo proponit, Deus disponit*; for, as Hitzig rightly remarks, 9b means, not that God maketh his steps firm (*Venet.*, Luther, Umbreit, Bertheau, Elster), but that He gives direction to him (Jerome, *dirigere*). Man deliberates here and there (הִשָּׁב, intens. of הִשָּׁב, to calculate, reflect) how he will begin and carry on this or that; but his short-sightedness leaves much out of view which God sees; his calculation does not comprehend many contingencies which God disposes of and man cannot foresee. The result and issue are thus of God, and the best is, that in all his deliberations one should give himself up without self-confidence and arrogance to the guidance of God, that one should do his duty and leave the rest, with humility and confidence, to God.

***10 Oracular decision (belongeth) to the lips of the king;
In the judgment his mouth should not err.***

Pro. 16:10. The first line is a noun clause: דְּבַר־הַמֶּלֶךְ, as subject, thus needs a distinctive accent, and that is here, after the rule of the sequence of accents, and manuscript authority (vid., *Torath Emeth*, p. 49), not *Mehuppach legarme*, as in our printed copies, but *Dechi* (דְּבַר־הַמֶּלֶךְ). Jerome’s translation: *Divinatio in labiis regis, in judicio non errabit os ejus*, and yet more Luther’s: “his mouth fails not in judgment,” makes it appear as if the proverb meant that the king, in his official duties, was infallible; and Hitzig (Zöckler agreeing), indeed, finds here expressed the infallibility of the theocratic king, and that as an actual testimony to be believed, not only is a mere political fiction, like the phrase, “the king can do no wrong.” But while this political fiction is not strange even

to the Israelitish law, according to which the king could not be brought before the judgment, that testimony is only a pure imagination. For as little as the N.T. teaches that the Pope, as the legitimate *vicarius* of Christ, is infallible, *cum ex cathedra docet*, so little does the O.T. that the theocratic king, who indeed was the legitimate *vicarius Dei*, was infallible *in iudicio ferendo*. Yet Ewald maintains that the proverb teaches that the word of the king, when on the seat of justice, is an infallible oracle; but it dates from the first bright period of the strong uncorrupted kingdom in Israel. One may not forget, says Dächsel also, with von Gerlach, that these proverbs belong to the time of Solomon, before it had given to the throne sons of David who did evil before the Lord. Then it would fare ill for the truth of the proverb — the course of history would falsify it. But in fact this was never maintained in Israel. Of the idolizing flattering language in which, at the present day, rulers in the East are addressed, not a trace is found in the O.T. The kings were restrained by objective law and the recognised rights of the people. David showed, not merely to those who were about him, but also to the people at large, so many human weaknesses, that he certainly appeared by no means infallible; and Solomon distinguished himself, it is true, by rare kingly wisdom, but when he surrounded himself with the glory of an oriental potentate, and when Rehoboam began to assume the tone of a despot, there arose an unhallowed breach between the theocratic kingdom and the greatest portion of the people. The proverb, as Hitzig translates and expounds it: “a divine utterance rests on the lips of the king; in giving judgment his mouth deceives not,” is both historically and dogmatically impossible. The choice of the word **קָסַם** (from **קָסַם**, R. **קָס** **קָש**, to make fast, to take an oath, to confirm by an oath, *incantare*, vid., at Isa. 3: 2), which does not mean prediction (Luther), but speaking the truth, shows that 10a expresses, not what falls from the lips of the king in itself, but according to the judgment of the people: the people are wont to regard the utterances of the king as oracular, as they shouted in the circus at Caesarea of King Agrippa, designating his words as **θεοῦ θωνή και οὐκ ἀνθρώπων** (Act. 12:22). Hence 10b supplies an earnest warning to the king, viz., that his mouth should not offend against righteousness, nor withhold it. **לֹא יִמָּאֵל** is meant as warning (Umbreit, Bertheau), like **לֹא תִבָּא**, Pro. 22:24, and **ב** in **מָאֵל** is here, as always, that of the object; at least this is more probable than that **מַעַל** stands without object, which is possible, and that **ב** designates the situation.

***11 The scale and balances of a right kind are Jahve's;
His work are the weights of the bag.***

Pro. 16:11. Regarding **פָּלֵם**, *statera*, a level or steelyard (from **פָּלֵם**, to make even), vid., Pro. 4:26; **מֵאֲזָנִים** (from **אָזַן**, to weigh), *libra*, is another form of

the balance: the shop-balance furnished with two scales. **סִבְנֵי** are here the stones that serve for weights, and **בֵּיס**, which at Pro. 1:14 properly means the money-bag, money-purse (cf. Pro. 7:20), is here, as at Mic. 6:11, the bag in which the merchant carries the weights. The genit. **מִשְׁפַּחַת** belongs also to **פְּלִיס**, which, in our edition, is pointed with the disjunctive *Mehuppach legarme*, is rightly accented in Cod. 1294 (vid., *Torath Emeth*, p. 50) with the conjunctive *Mehuppach*. **מִשְׁפַּחַת**, as 11b shows, is not like **מִרְמָה**, the word with the principal tone; 11a says that the balance thus, or thus constructed, which weighs accurately and justly, is Jahve's, or His arrangement, and the object of His inspection, and 11b, that all the weight-stones of the bag, and generally the means of weighing and measuring, rest upon divine ordinance, that in the transaction and conduct of men honesty and certainty might rule. This is the declared will of God, the lawgiver; for among the few direct determinations of His law with reference to trade this stands prominent, that just weights and just measures shall be used, Lev. 19:36, Deu. 25:13-16. The expression of the poet here frames itself after this law; yet **יהוה** is not exclusively the God of positive revelation, but, as agriculture in Isa. 28:29, cf. Sirach 7:15, so here the invention of normative and normal means of commercial intercourse is referred to the direction and institution of God.

***12 It is an abomination to kings to commit wickedness,
For by righteousness the throne is established.***

Pro. 16:12. As 10b uttered a warning to the king, grounded on the fact of 10a, so 12a indirectly contains a warning, which is confirmed by the fact 12b. It is a fact that the throne is established by righteousness (**יְכוּן** as expressive of a rule, like **הִיָּכַן**, Isa. 16: 5, as expressive of an event); on this account it is an abomination to kings immediately or mediately to commit wickedness, i.e., to place themselves in despotic self-will above the law. Such wicked conduct shall be, and ought to be, an abhorrence to them, because they know that they thereby endanger the stability of their throne. This is generally the case, but especially was it so in Israel, where the royal power was never absolutistic; where the king as well as the people were placed under God's law; where the existence of the community was based on the understood equality of right; and the word of the people, as well as the word of the prophets, was free. Another condition of the stability of the throne is, after Pro. 25: 5, the removal of godless men from nearness to the king. Rehoboam lost the greater part of his kingdom by this, that he listened to the counsel of the young men who were hated by the people.

Pro. 16:13. History is full of such warning examples, and therefore this proverb continues to hold up the mirror to princes.

*Well-pleasing to kings are righteous lips,
And whoever speaketh uprightly is loved.*

Rightly the LXX ἀγαπᾶ, individ. plur., instead of the plur. of *genus*, מְלָכִים; on the contrary, Jerome and Luther give to the sing. the most general subject (one lives), in which case it must be distinctly said, that that preference of the king for the people who speak out the truth, and just what they think, is shared in by every one. צַדִּיק, as the property of the שִׁפְתָי, accords with the Arab. *sidk*, truth as the property of the *lasân* (the tongue or speech). יִשְׁרָיִם, from יִשְׂרָאֵל, means *recta*, as נְגִידִים, *principalia*, Pro. 8: 6, and רִיקִים, *inania*, Pro. 12:11. יִשְׁרָיִם, Dan. 11:10, neut. So neut. וְיִשְׂרָאֵל, Psa. 111: 8; but is rather, with Hitzig and Riehm, to be read וְיִשְׂרָאֵל. What the proverb ways cannot be meant of all kings, for even the house of David had murderers of prophets, like Manasseh and Joiakim; but in general it is nevertheless true that noble candour, united with true loyalty and pure love to the king and the people, is with kings more highly prized than mean flattery, seeking only its own advantage, and that, though this (flattery) may for a time prevail, yet, at last, fidelity to duty, and respect for truth, gain the victory.

*14 The wrath of the king is like messengers of death;
But a wise man appeaseth him.*

Pro. 16:14. The clause: the wrath of the king is many messengers of death, can be regarded as the attribution of the effect, but it falls under the point of view of likeness, instead of comparison: if the king is angry, it is as if a troop of messengers or angels of death went forth to visit with death him against whom the anger is kindled; the plur. serves for the strengthening of the figure: not one messenger of death, but at the same time several, the wrinkled brow, the flaming eye, the threatening voice of the king sends forth (Fleischer). But if he against whom the wrath of the king has thus broken forth is a wise man, or one near the king who knows that ὀργὴ ἀνδρὸς δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ οὐ κατεργάζεται (Jam. 1:20), he will seek to discover the means (and not without success) to cover or to propitiate, i.e., to mitigate and appease, the king's anger. The Scripture never uses כִּפֶּר, so that God is the object (*expiare Deum*), because, as is shown in the *Comm. zum Hebräerbrief*, that were to say, contrary to the *decorum divinum*, that God's holiness or wrath is covered, or its energy bound, by the offering up of sacrifices or of things in which there is no inherent virtue of atonement, and which are made the means of reconciliation only by the accommodative arrangement of God. On the contrary, כִּפֶּר is used here and at Gen. 32:21 of covering = reconciling (propitiating) the wrath of a man.

**15 In the light on the king's countenance there is life,
And his favour is as a cloud of the latter rains.**

Pro. 16:15. Hitzig regards אֹרֶךְ as the *inf.* (cf. Pro. 4:18), but one says substantively אֹרֶךְ פְּנֵי, Job. 29:24, etc., and in a similar sense מְאוֹרֵ עֵינַיִם, Pro. 15:30; light is the condition of life, and the exhilaration of life, wherefore אֹרֶךְ הַחַיִּים, Psa. 56:14, Job. 33:30, is equivalent to a fresh, joyous life; in the light of the king's countenance is life, means that life goes forth from the cheerful approbation of the king, which shows itself in his face, viz., in the showing of favour, which cheers the heart and beautifies the life. To speak of liberality as a shower is so common to the Semitic, that it has in Arab. the general name of *nadnâ*, rain. 15*b* conforms itself to this. מְלֻקָּשׁ (cf. Job. 29:23) is the latter rain, which, falling about the spring equinox, brings to maturity the barley-harvest; on the contrary, יְזֵרָה (מְזֵרָה) is the early rain, which comes at the time of ploughing and sowing; the former is thus the harvest rain, and the latter the spring rain. Like a cloud which discharges the rain that mollifies the earth and refreshes the growing corn, is the king's favour. The noun עֵבֶב, thus in the *st. constr.*, retains its *Kametz*. *Michlol* 191*b*. This proverb is the contrast to v. 14. Pro. 20: 2 has also the anger of the king as its theme. In Pro. 19:12 the figures of the darkness and the light stand together as parts of one proverb. The proverbs relating to the king are now at an end. V. 10 contains a direct warning for the king; v. 132 an indirect warning, as a conclusion arising from 12*b* (cf. 20:28, where יִצְרֹו is not to be translated *tueantur*; the proverb has, however, the value of a *nota bene*). V. 13 in like manner presents an indirect warning, less to the king than to those who have intercourse with him (cf. Pro. 25: 5), and vv. 14 and 15 show what power of good and evil, of wrath and of blessing, is given to a king, whence so much the greater responsibility arises to him, but, at the same time also, the duty of all to repress the lust to evil that may be in him, and to awaken and foster in him the desire for good.

Five proverbs regarding wisdom, righteousness, humility, and trust in God, forming, as it were, a succession of steps, for humility is the virtue of virtues, and trust in God the condition of all salvation. Three of these proverbs have the word טוֹב in common.

**16 To gain wisdom, how much better is it than gold;
And to attain understanding to be preferred to silver.**

Pro. 16:16. Commendation of the striving after wisdom (understanding) with which all wisdom begins, for one gains an intellectual possession not by inheritance, but by acquisition, Pro. 4: 7. A similar "parallel-comparative

clause” (Fl.), with the interchange of **טוֹב** and **נִבְחָר**, is Pro. 22: 1, but yet more so is Pro. 21: 3, where **נִבְחָר**, as here, is neut. pred. (not, as at Pro. 8:10 and elsewhere, adj.), and **עֲשֵׂה**, such an anomalous form of the *inf. constr.* as here **קִנְה**, Gesen. § § 75, Anm. 2; in both instances it could also be regarded as the *inf. absol.* (cf. Pro. 25:27) (*Lehrgebäude*, § 109, Anm. 2); yet the language uses, as in the case before us, the form **נָלַה** only with the force of an *abl.* of the gerund, as **עֲשֹׂה** occurs Gen. 31:38; the *inf.* of verbs **לִיָּה** as *nom.* (as here), *genit.* (Ge. 50:20), and *accus.* (Psa. 101: 3), is always either **נָלַת** or **נָלַה**. The meaning is not that to gain wisdom is more valuable than gold, but that the gaining of wisdom exceeds the gaining of gold and silver, the common *comparatio decurtata* (cf. Job. 28:18). Regarding **חֲרוּץ**, *vid.*, at 3:14.

**17 The path of the righteous is the avoiding of evil,
And he preserveth his soul who giveth heed to his way.**

Pro. 16:17. The meaning of **מַסְלָה**, occurring only here in the Proverbs, is to be learned from Pro. 15:19. The attribution denotes that wherein the way they take consists, or by which it is formed; it is one, a straight and an open way, i.e., unimpeded, leading them on, because they avoid the evil which entices them aside to the right and the left. Whoever then gives heed to his way, preserveth his soul (**שָׁמַר נַפְשׁוֹ**, as Pro. 13: 3, on the contrary Pro. 25: 5, subj.), that it suffer not injury and fall under death, for **סוֹר מַרַע** and **מוֹת סוֹר מְמוֹקְשֵׁי**, Pro. 14:27, are essentially the same. Instead of this distich, the LXX has three distichs; the thoughts presented in the four superfluous lines are all already expressed in one distich. Ewald and Hitzig find in this addition of the LXX a component part of the original text.

**18 Pride goeth before destruction,
And haughtiness cometh before a fall.**

Pro. 16:18. The contrast is **לְפָנַי כְּבוֹד עֲנוּה**, Pro. 15:33, according to which the “haughtiness comes before a fall” in Pro. 18:22 is expanded into the antithetic distich. **שִׁבְר** means the fracture of the limbs, destruction of the person. A Latin proverb says, “*Magna cadunt, inflata crepant, tumefacta premuntur.*” ^{f132}

Here being dashed in pieces and overthrown correspond. **שִׁבְר** means neither bursting (Hitzig) nor shipwreck (Ewald). **כְּשִׁלוֹן** (like **בְּטָחוֹן**, **זִכְרוֹן**, etc.), from **כָּשַׁל** or **נִכְשַׁל**, to totter, and hence, as a consequence, to come to ruin, is a **ὑπαξ. λεγ.** This proverb, which stands in the very centre of the Book of Proverbs, is followed by another in praise of humility.

**19 Better in humility to dwell among sufferers,
Than to divide spoil among the proud.**

Pro. 16:19. The form שָׁפַל is here not *adj.* as Pro. 29:23 (from שָׁפַל, like חָסַר, Pro. 6:32, from חָסַר), but *inf.* (like Ecc. 12:14, and חָסַר, *defectio*, Pro. 10:21). There existed here also no proper reason for changing עֲנִיִּים (*Chethîb*) into עֲנָוִים; Hitzig is right in saying that עָנִי may also be taken in the sense of עָנָו [the idea “sufferer” is that which mediates], and that here the inward fact of humility and the outward of dividing spoil, stand opposed to one another. It is better to live lowly, i.e., with a mind devoid of earthly pride (*Demut* [humility] comes from *dēo* with the deep *e*, *diu*, servant), among men who have experience of the vanity of earthly joys, than, intoxicated with pride, to enjoy oneself amid worldly wealth and greatness (cf. Isa. 9: 2).

**20 He that giveth heed to the word will find prosperity;
And he that trusteth in Jahve, blessed is he!**

Pro. 16:20. The “word” here is the word κατ’ ἐξ., the divine word, for מְשֻׁבֵּל אֶל-דָּבָר is the contrast of בָּז לְדָבָר, Pro. 13:13 *a*, cf. Neh. 8:13. טוֹב is meant, as in Pro. 17:20, cf. 13:21, Psa. 23: 6; to give heed to God’s word is the way to true prosperity. But at last all depends on this, that one stand in personal fellowship with God by means of faith, which here, as at Pro. 28:25; 29:25, is designated after its specific mark as *fiducia*. The Mashal conclusion אֲשֶׁר יִי occurs, besides here, only at Pro. 14:21; 29:18.

Four proverbs of wisdom with eloquence:

**21 The wise in heart is called prudent,
And grace of the lips increaseth learning.**

Pro. 16:21. Elsewhere (Pro. 1: 5; 9: 9) הוֹסִיף לִקְחָהּ means more than to gain learning, i.e., erudition in the ethico-practical sense, for sweetness of the lips (*dulcedo orationis* of Cicero) is, as to learning, without significance, but of so much the greater value for reaching; for grace of expression, and of exposition, particularly if it be not merely rhetorical, but, according to the saying *pectus disertos facit*, coming out of the heart, is full of mind, it imparts force to the instruction, and makes it acceptable. Whoever is wise of heart, i.e., of mind or spirit (לֵב = the N.T. νοῦς or πνεῦμα), is called, and is truly, נְבוֹן [learned, intelligent] (Fleischer compares to this the expression frequent in Isaiah, “to be named” = to be and appear to be, the Arab. *du’ay lah*); but there is a gift which highly increases the worth of this understanding or intelligence, for it makes it fruitful of good to others, and that is grace of the lips. On the lips (Pro. 10:13) of the intelligent wisdom is found; but the form also, and the whole manner

and way in which he gives expression to this wisdom, is pleasing, proceeding from a deep and tender feeling for the suitable and the beneficial, and thus he produces effects so much the more surely, and beneficently, and richly.

**22 A fountain of life is understanding to its possessor;
But the correction of fools is folly.**

Pro. 16:22. Oetinger, Bertheau, and others erroneously understand מוֹסֵר of the education which fools bestow upon others; when fools is the subject spoken of, מוֹסֵר is always the education which is bestowed on them, Pro. 7:22; 1: 7; cf. Pro. 5:23; 15: 5. Also מוֹסֵר does not here mean education, *disciplina*, in the moral sense (Symmachus, ἔννοια; Jerome, *doctrina*): that which fools gain from education, from training, is folly, for מוֹסֵר is the contrast to מְקוֹר חַיִּים, and has thus the meaning of correction or chastisement, Pro. 15:10, Jer. 30:14. And that the fruits of understanding (Pro. 12: 8, cf. שְׂכֵל טוֹב, fine culture, 13:15) represented by מְקוֹר חַיִּים (vid., Pro. 10:11) will accrue to the intelligent themselves, is shown not only by the contrast, but also by the expression: *Scaturigo vitae est intellectus praedictorum eo*, of those (= to those) who are endowed therewith (The LXX well, τῶς κερκτημένοις). The man of understanding has in this intellectual possession a fountain of strength, a source of guidance, and a counsel which make his life secure, deepen, and adorn it; while, on the contrary, folly punishes itself by folly (cf. to the form, Pro. 14:24), for the fool, when he does not come to himself (Psa. 107:17-22), recklessly destroys his own prosperity.

**23 The heat of the wise maketh his mouth wise,
And learning mounteth up to his lips.**

Pro. 16:23. Regarding הַשְׂפִיל as causative: to put into the possession of intelligence, vid., at Gen. 3: 6. Wisdom in the heart produceth intelligent discourse, and, as the parallel member expresses it, learning mounteth up to the lips, i.e., the learning which the man taketh into his lips (Pro. 22:18; cf. Psa. 16: 4) to communicate it to others, for the contents of the learning, and the ability to communicate it, are measured by the wisdom of the heart of him who possesses it. One can also interpret הוֹסִיף as extens. increasing: the heart of the wise increaseth, i.e., spreads abroad learning, but then בַּשְּׂפָתָיו (Psa. 119:13) would have been more suitable; אֶל-שְׂפָתָיו calls up the idea of learning as hovering on the lips, and thus brings so much nearer, for הוֹסִיף, the meaning of the exaltation of its worth and impression.

**24 A honeycomb are pleasant words,
Sweet to the soul, and healing to the bones.**

Pro. 16:24. Honeycomb, i.e., honey flowing from the **צוף**, the comb or cell (*favus*), is otherwise designated, Psa. 19:11. **מתוק**, with **מרפא** (vid., p. 94), is *neut.* **אמר־נאם** are, according to Pro. 15:26, words which love suggests, and which breathe love. Such words are sweet to the soul of the hearer, and bring strength and healing to his bones (Pro. 15:30); for **מרפא** is not only that which restores soundness, but also that which preserves and advances it (cf. **θεραπεία**, Rev. 22: 2).

A group of six proverbs follows, four of which begin with **איש**, and five relate to the utterances of the mouth.

**25 There is a way which appears as right to a man;
But the end thereof are the ways of death.**

Pro. 16:25. This verse = Pro. 14:12.

**26 The hunger of the labourer laboreth for him,
For he is urged on by his mouth.**

Pro. 16:26. The Syr. translates: the soul of him who inflicts woe itself suffers it, and from his mouth destruction comes to him; the Targ. brings this translation nearer the original text (**בִּיפּא**, humiliation, instead of **אבדנא**, destruction); Luther translates thus also, violently abbreviating, however. But **עמל** (from **עמל**, Arab. *'amila*, to exert oneself, *laborare*) means, like *laboriosus*, labouring as well as enduring difficulty, but not, as **πονών τινα**, causing difficulty, or (Euchel) occupied with difficulty. And labour and the mouth stand together, denoting that man labours that the mouth may have somewhat to eat (cf. 2Th. 3:10; **נפש**, however, gains in this connection the meaning of **ψυχή ὀρεκτικῆ**, and that of desire after nourishment, vid., at Pro. 6:30; 10: 3). **אש** also joins itself to this circle of ideas, for it means to urge (Jerome, *compulit*), properly (related to **כּפּר**, *incurvare*, **כּפּה כּפּא**, to constrain, necessitate), to bow down by means of a burden. The Aramaeo-Arab. signification, to saddle (Schultens: *clitellas imposuit ei os suum*), is a secondary denom. (vid., at Job. 33: 7). The *Venet.* well renders it after Kimchi: **ἐπειὸ κύπτει ἐπ' αὐτὸν τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ**. Thus: the need of nourishment on the part of the labourer works for him (*dat. commodi* like Isa. 40:20), i.e., helps him to labour, for (not: if, **ἐάν**, as Rashi and others) it presses upon him; his mouth, which will have something to eat, urges him. It is God who has in this way connected together working and eating. The curse *in sudore vultus tui comedes panem* conceals a blessing. The proverb has in view this reverse side of the blessing in the arrangement of God.

**27 A worthless man diggeth evil;
And on his lips is, as it were, scorching fire.**

Pro. 16:27. Regarding **אִישׁ בִּלְיָאֵל**, vid., Pro. 6:12, and regarding **בָּרַח**, to dig round, or to bore out, vid., at Gen. 49: 5; 50: 5; here the figure, “to dig for others a pit,” Pro. 26:27, Psa. 7:16, etc.: to dig evil is equivalent to, to seek to prepare such for others. **צָרַבְתָּ** Kimchi rightly explains as a form similar to **קָשַׁבְתָּ**; as a subst. it means, Lev. 13:23, the mark of fire (the healed mark of a carbuncle), here as an adj. of a fire, although not flaming (**אֵשׁ לְהִבָּה**, Isa. 4: 5, etc.); yet so much the hotter, and scorching everything that comes near to it (from **צָרַב**, to be scorched, cogn. **שָׂרַב**, to which also **שָׂרַף** is perhaps related as a stronger power, like *comburare* to *adurare*). The meaning is clear: a worthless man, i.e., a man whose disposition and conduct are the direct contrast of usefulness and piety, uses words which, like an iron glowing hot, scorches and burns; his tongue is **φλογιζομένη ὑπὸ τῆς γέεννης** (Jam. 3: 6).

**28 A man of falsehood scattereth strife,
And a backbiter separateth confidential friends.**

Pro. 16:28. Regarding **אִישׁ (מַדְבָּר) תְּהַפְכוֹת**, vid., Pro. 2:12, and **מְדוֹן יִשְׁלַח**, Pro. 6:14; the thought of 28*b* is found at Pro. 6:19. **נִרְנָן** (with **ן** *minusculum*, which occurs thrice with the terminal *Nun*) is a *Niphal* formation from **רָנַן**, to murmur (cf. **נָוִיד**, from **וִיד**), and denotes the whisperer, viz., the backbiter, **ψίθυρος**, Sir. 5:14, **ψιθυριστής**, *susurro*; the Arab. *nyrj* is abbreviated from it, a verbal stem of **נִרְגַּג** (cf. Aram. *norgo*, an axe, Arab. *naurag*, a threshing-sledge = **מִוֹרַג**) cannot be proved. Aquila is right in translating by **τονθυρυστής**, and Theodotion by **γόγγυσος**, from **רָנַן**, *Hiph.* **נִרְנָן**, **γογγύζειν**. Regarding **אֱלוֹף**, confidential friend, vid., p. 59; the sing., as Pro. 18: 9, is used in view of the mutual relationship, and **מִפְרִיד** proceeds on the separation of the one, and, at the same time, of the other from it. Luther, in translating by “a slanderer makes princes disagree,” is in error, for **אֱלוֹף**, **φύλαρχος**, is not a generic word for prince.

**29 A man of violence enticeth his neighbour,
And leadeth him in a way which is not good.**

Pro. 16:29. Cf. Gen. 4: 8. The subject is not moral enticement, but enticement to some place or situation which facilitates to the violent man the carrying out of his violent purpose (misdemeanour, robbery, extortion, murder). **חָמָס** (here with **אִישׁ** at Pro. 3:31) is the injustice of club-law, the conduct of him who puts his superior power in godless rudeness in the place of

God, Hab. 1:11, cf. Job. 12: 6. “A way not good” (cf. Psa. 36: 5) is the contradictory contrast of the good way: one altogether evil and destructive.

***30 He who shutteth his eyes to devise falsehood;
He who biteth his lips bringeth evil to pass.***

Pro. 16:30. A physiognomical *Caveto*. The **אפ. לעג. עצה** is connected with **עצם**, Isa. 33:15 (Arab. transp. *ghamḏ*), *comprimere*, formed from it.

Regarding **קרץ** of lips or eyes, vid., p. 104; the biting of the lips is the action of the deceitful, and denotes scorn, malice, knavery. The perf. denotes that he who is seen doing this has some evil as good as accomplished, for he is inwardly ready for it; Hitzig suitably compares 1Sa. 20: 7, 33. Our editions (also Löwenstein) have **בלה**, but the Masora (vid., *Mas. finalis*, p. 1) numbers the word among those which terminate in **ס**, and always writes **בלס**.

We now take together a series of proverbs, Pro. 16:31-17: 5, beginning with **עטרת**.

***31 A bright diadem is a hoary head,
In the way of righteousness it is found —***

Pro. 16:31. namely, this bright diadem, this beautiful crown (Pro. 4: 8), which silver hair is to him who has it as the result of his advanced age (Pro. 20:29), for “thou shalt rise up before the hoary head,” Lev. 19:32; and the contrast of an early death is to die in a good old age, Gen. 15:15, etc., but a long life is on one side a self-consequence, and on another the promised reward of a course of conduct regulated by God’s will, God’s law, and by the rule of love to God and love to one’s neighbour. From the N.T. standpoint that is also so far true, as in all the world there is no better established means of prolonging life than the avoidance of evil; but the clause corresponding to the O.T. standpoint, that evil punishes itself by a premature death, and that good is rewarded by long life, has indeed many exceptions arising from the facts of experience against it, for we see even the godless in their life of sin attaining to an advanced old age, and in view of the veiled future it appears only as a one-sided truth, so that the words, Wisd. 4: 9, “discretion is to man the right grey hairs, and an unstained life is the right old age,” which is mediated by life experiences, such as Isa. 57: 1 f., stand opposed to the above proverb as its reversed side. That old Solomonic proverb is, however, true, for it is not subverted; and, in contrast to self-destroying vice and wickedness; calling forth the judgment of God, it is and remains true, that whoever would reach an honoured old age, attains to it in the way of a righteous life and conduct.

**32 Better one slow to anger than a hero in war;
And whoever is master of his spirit, than he who taketh a city.**

Pro. 16:32. Regarding אָרֶךְ אַפַּיִם, vid., Pro. 14:29, where קָצַר־רוּחַ was the parallel of the contrast. The comparison is true as regards persons, with reference to the performances expressed, and (since warlike courage and moral self-control may be united in one person) they are properly those in which the טוֹב determines the moral estimate. In *Pirke Aboth* iv. 1, the question, “Who is the hero?” is answered by, “he who overcomes his desire,” with reference to this proverb, for that which is here said of the ruling over the passion of anger is true of all affections and passions.

***“Yet he who reigns within himself, and rules
Passions, desires, and fears, is more a king;
Which every wise and virtuous man attains.”*** ^{f133}

***On the other side, the comparison is suggested:
Break your head, not so sore;
Break your will — that is more.*** ^{f134}

**33 One casts the lot into the lap;
But all its decision cometh from Jahve.**

Pro. 16:33. The *Tôra* knows only in one instance an ordeal (a judgment of God) as a right means of proof, Num. 5:12-31. The lot is nowhere ordained by it, but its use is supported by a custom running parallel with the Mosaic law; it was used not only in private life, but also in manifold ways within the domain of public justice, as well as for the detection of the guilty, Jos. 7:14 f., 1Sa. 14:40-42. So that the proverb Pro. 18:18 says the same thing of the lot that is said in the Epistle to the Hebrews, Heb. 6:16, of the oath. The above proverb also explains the lot for an ordeal, for it is God who directs and orders it that it fall out thus and not otherwise. A particular sanction of the use of the lot does not lie in this, but it is only said, that where the lot is cast, all the decision that results from it is determined by God. That is in all cases true; but whether the challenging of the divine decision in such a way be right in this or that case is a question, and in no case would one, on the contrary, venture to make the person of the transgressor discoverable by lot, and let it decide regarding human life. But antiquity judged this matter differently, as e.g., the Book of Jonah (Jonah 1) shows; it was a practice, animated by faith, in God’s government of the world, which, if it did not observe the boundary between faith and superstition, yet stood high above the unbelief of the “Enlightenment.” Like the Greek κόλπος, קִיָּ (from קִיָּ, Arab. *ḥak, khak*, to encompass, to stretch out) means, as it is commonly taken, *gremium* as well as *sinus*, but the latter meaning is the more sure; and thus also here it is not the

lap as the middle of the body, so that one ought to think on him who casts the lot as seated, but also not the lap of the garment, but, like Pro. 6:27, cf. Isa. 40:11, the swelling, loose, external part of the clothing covering the bosom (the breast), where the lot covered by it is thrown by means of shaking and changing, and whence it is drawn out. The construction of the passive הוּטַל (from טוּל = Arab. *tall*, to throw along) with the object. accus. follows the old scheme, Gen. 4:18, and has its reason in this, that the Semitic passive, formed by the change of vowels, has not wholly given up the governing force of the active. מִשְׁפָּט signifies here decision as by the Urim and Thummim, Num. 27:21, but which was no lot-apparatus.

CHAPTER 17

Pro. 17: 1. A comparative proverb with טוב, pairing with Pro. 16:32:

*Better a dry piece of bread, and quietness therewith,
Than a house full of slain beasts with unquietness.*

Similar to this in form and contents are Pro. 15:16 f. and Pro. 16: 8. פַת חֲרֻבָה is a piece of bread (פַת, fem., as Pro. 23: 8) without savoury drink (Theodotion, καθ' ἑαυτόν, i.e., nothing with it), cf. Lev. 7:10, a meat-offering without the pouring out of oil. זְבָחִים are not sacrificial gifts (Hitzig), but, as always, slain animals, i.e., either offerings or banquets of slain beasts; it is the old name of the שְׁלָמִים (cf. Exo. 18:12; 24: 5; Pro. 7:14), part of which only were offered on the altar, and part presented as a banquet; and זְבַח (in contradist. to מִבַּח, Pro. 9: 2, Gen. 43:16) denotes generally any kind of consecrated festival in connection with the worship of God, 1Sa. 20:29; cf. Gen. 31:54. "Festivals of hatred" are festivals with hatred. מְלֵא is part. with object.-accus.; in general מְלֵא forms a constructive, מְלֵא occurs only once (Jer. 6:11), and מְלֵא not at all. We have already, Pro. 7:14, remarked on the degenerating of the *shelamîm* feasts; from this proverb it is to be concluded that the merriment and the excitement bordering on intoxication (cf. with Hitzig, 1Sa. 1:13 and 3), such as frequently at the *Kirmsen* merry-makings (vid., p. 119), brought quarrels and strife, so that the poor who ate his dry bread in quiet peace could look on all this noise and tumult without envy.

*2 A prudent servant shall rule over the degenerate son;
And he divides the inheritance among the brethren.*

Pro. 17: 2. Regarding the contrasts of מְשָׁבִיל and מְבִישׁ, vid., at Pro. 10: 5; 14:35. The printed editions present בֶּן־מְבִישׁ in genit. connection: a son of

the scandalous class, which is admissible (vid., p. 56 and p. 237); but Cod. 1294 and Cod. *Jaman*,^{f135} Erf. No. 2, 3, write **בִּבְן מַבִּישׁ** (with *Tsere* and *Munach*), and that is perhaps right, after Pro. 10: 5; 17:25. The futures have here also a fut. signification: they say to what it will come. Grotius remarks, with reference to this: *manumissus tutor filii relinquetur*; **יְחַלֵּק** *tutorio officio*. But if he is a conscientious, unselfish tutor, he will not enrich himself by property which belongs to another; and thus, though not without provision, he is yet without an inheritance. And yet the supplanting of the degenerate is brought about by this, that he loses his inheritance, and the intelligent servant steps into his place. Has one then to suppose that the master of the house makes his servant a co-heir with his own children, and at the same time names him as his executor? That were a bad anachronism. The idea of the **δισθήκη** was, at the time when this proverb was coined, one unknown — Israelitish iniquity knows only the intestate right of inheritance, regulated by lineal and gradual succession. Then, if one thinks of the degenerate son, that he is disowned by the father, but that the intelligent servant is not rewarded during the life of his master for his true services, and that, after the death of the master, to such a degree he possesses the esteem and confidence of the family, that he it is who divides the inheritance among the brethren, i.e., occupies the place amongst them of distributor of the inheritance, not: takes a portion of the inheritance, for **חָלַק** has not the double meaning of the Lat. *participare*; it means to divide, and may, with **בָּ**, mean “to give a part of anything” (Job. 39:17); but, with the accus., nothing else than to distribute, e.g., Jos. 18: 2, where it is to be translated: “whose inheritance had not yet been distributed (not yet given to them).” Jerome, *haereditatem dividet*; and thus all translators, from the LXX to Luther.

3 The fining-pot for silver, and the furnace for gold; And a trier of hearts is Jahve.

Pro. 17: 3. An emblematical proverb (vid., p. 8), which means that Jahve is for the heart what the smelting-pot (from **צָרַף**, to change, particularly to melt, to refine) is for silver, and what the smelting furnace (**כּוּר**, from **כּוּר**, R. **כּר**, to round, Exo. 22:20) is for gold, that Jahve is for the heart, viz., a trier (**בַּחַן**, to grind, to try by grinding, here as at Psa. 7:10) of their nature and their contents, for which, of the proof of metals, is elsewhere (Pro. 16: 2; 21: 2; 24:12) used the word (cf. **בַּחוּן**, the essay-master, Jer. 6: 7) **תִּבְּחַן**, weigher, or **דּוֹרֵשׁ**, searcher (1Ch. 28: 9). Wherever the subject spoken of is God, the searcher of hearts, the plur. **לְבָבוֹת**, once **לְבָבוֹת**, is used; the form **לְבָבִים** occurs only in the *status conjunctus* with the suffix. In Pro. 27:21 there follow

the two figures, with which there is formed a *priamel* (vid., p. 11), as at Pro. 26: 3, another *tertium comparationis*.

**4 A profligate person giveth heed to perverse lips;
Falsehood listeneth to a destructive tongue.**

Pro. 17: 4. The meaning, at all events, is, that whoever gives ear with delight to words which are morally reprobate, and aimed at the destruction of neighbours, thereby characterizes himself as a profligate. Though מַרְע is probably not pred. but subj., yet so that what follows does not describe the מַרְע (the profligate hearkens...), but stamps him who does this as a מַרְע (a profligate, or, as we say: only a profligate...). מַרְע, for מַרְא, is warranted by Isa. 9:16, where מַרְע (not מַרְע, according to which the *Venet.* here translates ὑπὸ κακοῦ) is testified to not only by correct codd. and editions, but also by the Masora (cf. *Michlol* 116b). הַקְשִׁיב (from קָשַׁב, R. קָש, to stiffen, or, as we say, to prick, viz., the ear) is generally united with לְ or אֶל, but, as here and at 29:12, Jer. 6:19, also with אֶל. אָנָן, wickedness, is the absolute contrast of a pious and philanthropic mind; הָיִתָּה, from הָיָה, not in the sense of eagerness, as Pro. 10: 3; 11: 6, but of yawning depth, abyss, catastrophe (vid., at Psa. 5:10), is equivalent to entire destruction — the two genitives denote the property of the lips and the tongue (*labium nequam, lingua pernicioso*), on the side of that which it instrumentally aims at (cf. Psa. 36: 4; 52: 4): practising mischief, destructive plans. שָׁקֵר beginning the second line is generally regarded as the subj. parallel with מַרְע, as Luther, after Jerome, “A wicked man gives heed to wicked mouths, and a false man listens willingly to scandalous tongues.” It is possible that שָׁקֵר denotes incarnate falsehood, as רַמְיָה, Pro. 12:27, incarnate slothfulness, cf. מַרְמָה, Pro. 14:25, and perhaps also Pro. 12:17; צָדָק, Psa. 58: 2, תּוֹשָׁעָה, Mic. 6: 9; יָצַר סַמוּד, Isa. 26:13, etc., where, without supplying אִישׁ (אָנָשׁ), the property stands instead of the person possession that property. The clause, that falsehood listeneth to a deceitful tongue, means that he who listens to it characterizes himself thereby, according to the proverb, *simile simili gaudet*, as a liar. But only as a liar? The punctuation before us, which represents מַרְע by *Dechi* as subj., or also pred., takes מִזִּין שָׁקֵר as obj. with מִזִּין as its governing word, and why should not that be the view intended? The representation of the obj. is an inversion less bold than Isa. 22: 2; 8:22, and that אֶל here should not be so closely connected with the verb of hearing, as 4a lies near by this, that אֶל הַקְשִׁיב is elsewhere found, but not אֶל הַאֲזִין. Jewish interpreters, taking שָׁקֵר as obj., try some other meaning of מִזִּין than *auscultans*; but neither זָוַן, to approach, nor זָוַן, to arm (*Venet.*

πεῦδος ὀπλίξει), gives a meaning suitable to this place. מִזֵּן is equivalent to מִשְׁנֵן. As מִשְׁנֵן, Job. 32:11, is contracted into מִשְׁן, so must מִשְׁנֵן, if the character of the part. shall be preserved, become מִזֵּן, mediated by מִזֵּיִן.

***5 He that mocketh the poor reproacheth his Maker;
He that rejoiceth over calamity remains not unpunished.***

Pro. 17: 5. Line first is a variation of Pro. 14:31 *a*. God is, according to Pro. 22: 2, the creator of the poor as well as of the rich. The poor, as a man, and as poor, is the work of God, the creator and governor of all things; thus, he who mocketh the poor, mocketh Him who called him into existence, and appointed him his lowly place. But in general, compassion and pity, and not joy (שִׂמְחָה לְ, commonly with לְ, of the person, e.g., Oba. 1:12, the usual formula for ἐπιχαιρεκακία), is appropriate in the presence of misfortune (דָּוָן, from דָּוָן, to be heavily burdened), for such joy, even if he on whom the misfortune fell were our enemy, is a *peccatum mortale*, Job. 31:29 f. There is indeed a hallowed joy at the actual revelation in history of the divine righteousness; but this would not be a hallowed joy if it were not united with deep sorrow over those who, accessible to no warning, have despised grace, and, by adding sin to sin, have provoked God's anger.

Pro. 17: 6. With this verse this series of proverbs closes as it began:

***A diadem of the old are children's children,
And the glory of children are their parents.***

Children are a blessing from God (Psalm 127, 128); thus, a family circle consisting of children and grandchildren (including great-grandchildren) is as a crown of glory surrounding the grey-haired patriarch; and again, children have glory and honour in their parents, for to have a man of an honoured name, or of a blessed memory, as a father, is the most effective commendation, and has for the son, even though he is unlike his father, always important and beneficial consequences. In *6b* a fact of experience is expressed, from which has proceeded the rank of inherited nobility recognised among men — one may abnegate his social rights, but yet he himself is and remains a part of the moral order of the world. The LXX has a distich after v. 4 [the Vatican text places it after v. 6]: “The whole world of wealth belongs to the faithful, but to the unfaithful not even an obolus.” Lagarde supposes that ὅλος ὁ κόσμος τῶν χρημάτων is a translation of שְׂפַת יִתָּר, instead of שְׂפַת יִתָּר, 7*a*. But this ingenious conjecture does not amount to the regarding of this distich as a variation of v. 7.

The proverbs following, 7-10, appear to be united acrostically by the succession of the letters ש (ש, ש) and ת.

**7 It does not become a fool to speak loftily,
How much less do lying lips a noble!**

Pro. 17: 7. As at Isa. 32: 5 f., נָבֵל and נְדִיב are placed opposite to one another; the latter is the nobly magnanimous man, the former the man who thinks foolishly and acts profligately, whom it does not become to use lofty words, who thereby makes the impression of his vulgarity so much the more repulsive (cf. Job. 2:10). שִׁפְתַי יִתֵּר (not יִתֵּר, for the word belongs to those which retain their *Pathach* or *Segol*, in *pausa*) is neither elevated (soaring) (Ewald) nor diffuse (Jo. Ernst Jungius in Oetinger: *lingua dicax ac sermonem ultra quam decorum verbis extendere solita*), rather imperative (Bertheau), better presumptuous (Hitzig) words, properly words of superfluity, i.e., of superabundant self-consciousness and high pretension (cf. the transitive bearing of the Arab. *watr* with وَطْرٌ, from وَطْرٌ, Aryan *upar*, Job, p. 363). Rightly *Me'iri*, שִׁפְתַי גִּאוּת וְשָׂרָה. It produces a disagreeable impression, when a man of vulgar mind and of rude conduct, instead of keeping himself in retirement, makes himself of importance, and weighty in a shameless, impudent manner (cf. Psa. 12: 9, where גִּלוּת, *vilitas*, in a moral sense); but yet more repulsive is the contrast, when a man in whom one is justified in expecting nobility of mind, in accordance with his life-position and calling, degrades himself by uttering deceitful words. Regarding the אֵף כִּי, concluding *a minori ad majus*, we have already spoken at Pro. 11:31; 15:11. R. Ismael, in *Bereschith Rabba*, at 44: 8, reckons ten such conclusions *a minori ad majus* in the Scriptures, but there are just as many *quanto magis*. The right accentuation (e.g., in Cod. 1294) is here אֵף כִּי־לנְדִיב, transformed from אֵף כִּי־לנְדִיב, according to *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. 2.

**8 The gift of bribery appears a jewel to its receiver;
Whitherso'er he turneth himself he acteth prudently.**

Pro. 17: 8. How 8b is to be understood is shown by 1Sa. 14:47, cf. Jos. 1: 7; the *quoque se vertit, prudenter rem agit*, has accordingly in both sentences the person meant by בְּעָלָיו as subject, not the gift (Hitzig), of which יִשְׁבִּיל, “it maketh prosperous,” is not said, for הִשְׁבִּיל means, used only of persons, prudent, and therefore successful, fortunate conduct. Such is said of him who has to give (Luther): he presses through with it whithersoever he turns. But the making of בְּעָלָיו the subj. does not accord with this: this means [gift] to one who has to give, appears to open doors and hearts, not merely as a golden key,

it is truly such to him. Thus **בעליו**, as at Pro. 3:27, will be meant of him to whom the present is brought, or to whom a claim thereto is given. But **שֶׁחָד** means here not the gift of seasonable liberality (Zöckler), but, as always, the gift of bribery, i.e., a gift by which one seeks to purchase for himself (Pro. 17:23) preference on the part of a judge, or to mitigate the displeasure of a high lord (Pro. 21:14); here (for one does not let it depend merely on the faithfulness of another to his duty) it is that by which one seeks to secure an advantage to himself. The proverb expresses a fact of experience. The gift of bribery, to which, as to a well-known approved means, **חֶשֶׁן**, refers, appears to him who receives and accepts it (Targ.) as a stone of pleasantness, a charming, precious stone, a jewel (*Juwel* from *joie* = *gaudium*); it determines and impels him to apply all his understanding, in order that he may reach the goal for which it shall be his reward. What he at first regarded as difficult, yea, impossible, that he now prudently carries out, and brings to a successful conclusion, wherever he turns himself, overcoming the seemingly insurmountable hindrances; for the enticement of the gift lifts him, as with a charm, above himself, for covetousness is a characteristic feature of human nature — *pecuniae obediunt omnia* (Ecc. 10:19, Vulg.).

***9 He covereth transgressions who seeketh after love,
And he who always brings back a matter separateth friends.***

Pro. 17: 9. The pred. stands first in the simple clause with the order of the words not inverted. That **מכסה פשע** is also to be interpreted here as pred. (cf. 19a) is shown by Pro. 10:12, according to which love covereth all transgressions. We write **מכסה־פשע** with *Dag. forte conjunctivum* of **פ** (as of **כ** in Eze. 18: 6), and *Gaja* with the *Sheva*, according to the *Meth.-Setzung*, § 37; the punctuation **מכסה־פשע** also occurs. What the expression “to seek love” here means, is to be judged, with Hitzig, after Zep. 2: 3, 1Co. 14: 1. It is in no case equivalent to seek to gain the love of another, rather to seek to preserve the love of men towards one another, but it is to be understood not after 9b, but after Pro. 10:12: he seeks to prove love who does not strike on the great bell when his neighbour has sinned however grievously against him, does not in a scandal-loving manner make much ado about it, and takes care not thereby to widen the breach between men who stand near to one another, but endeavours by a reconciling, soothing, rectifying influence, to mitigate the evil, instead of making it worse. He, on the contrary, who repeats the matter (**שָׁנָה** with **כ** of the obj., to come back with something, as Pro. 26:11), i.e., turns always back again to the unpleasant occurrence (Theodotion, **δευτερόν ἐν λόγῳ**; Symmachus, **δευτερόν λόγον**, as Sir. 7:14; 19: 7), divides friends (vid., Pro. 16:28), for he purposely fosters the strife, the disharmony, ill-will,

and estrangement which the offence produced; while the noble man, who has love for his motive and his aim, by prudent silence contributes to bring the offence and the division which it occasioned into forgetfulness.

**10 One reproof maketh more impression on a wise man
Than if one reckoned a hundred to the fool**

Pro. 17:10. One of the few proverbs which begin with a future, vid., Pro. 12:26, p. 192. It expresses what influence there is in one reproof with a wise man (מְבִיֵן, Pro. 8: 9); גְּעָרָה is the reproof expressed by the post-bibl. נְיִיפָה, as the lowest grade of disciplinary punishment, *admonitio*, connected with warning. The verbal form תַּחַת is the reading of the LXX and Syr. (συντριβει ἀπειλή καρδίαν φρονίμου) for they read תַּחַת גְּעָרָה לֵב מְבִיֵן, derived from תַּחַת, and thus תַּחַת (from *Hiph.* תַּחַת); thus Luther: reproof alarms more the intelligent, but תַּחַת with ב of the obj. is not Hebr.; on the contrary, the reading of the LXX is in accordance with the usage of the language, and, besides, is suitable. It is, however, first to be seen whether the traditional text stands in need of this correction. As *fut. Niph.* תַּחַת, apart from the ult. accent. to be expected, gives no meaning. Also if one derives it from תַּחַת, to snatch away, to take away, it gives no appropriate thought; besides, תַּחַת is construed with the object. accus., and the *fut. Apoc.*, in itself strange here, must be pointed either תַּחַת or תַּחַת (after יִחַד) (Böttcher, *Lehrb.* ii. p. 413). Thus תַּחַת, as at Job. 21:13, Jer. 21:13, will be *fut. Kal* of תַּחַת = תַּחַת, Psa. 38: 3 (Theodotion, Targ., Kimchi). With this derivation, also, תַּחַת is to be expected; the reference in the *Handwörterbuch* to Gesen. *Lehrgebäude*, § 51, 1, Anm. 1, where, in an extremely inadequate way, the retrogression of the tone (נִסּוּג אַחוֹר) is spoken of, is altogether inappropriate to this place; and Böttcher's explanation of the ult. tone from an intended expressiveness is ungrammatical; but why should not תַּחַת, from תַּחַת, with its first syllable originating from contraction, and thus having the tone be *Milel* as well as *Milra*, especially here, where it stands at the head of the sentence? With ב connected with it, תַּחַת means: to descend into anything, to penetrate; Hitzig appropriately compares *altius in pectus descendit* of Sallust, *Jug.* 11. Jerome rightly, according to the sense: *plus proficit*, and the *Venet.* ἀνεί (read ὄνει) ἀπειλή τῷ συνίοντι. In 10b מְפָה (cf. Deu. 25: 3; 2Co. 11:24) is to be supplied to מְפָה, not פְּעָמִים (an hundred times, which may be denoted correctly by מְפָה as well as מְפָה, Ecc. 8:12). With the wise (says a Talmudic proverb) a sign does as much as with the fool a stick does. Zehner, in his *Adagia sacra*

(1601), cites Curtius (vii. 4): *Nobilis equus umbra quoque virgae regitur, ignavus ne calcari quidem concitari potest.*

Five proverbs of dangerous men against whom one has to be on his guard:

***11 The rebellious seeketh only after evil,
And a cruel messenger is sent out against him.***

Pro. 17:11. It is a question what is subj. and what obj. in 11a. It lies nearest to look on מַרִּי as subj., and this word (from מָרָה, *stringere*, to make oneself exacting against any, to oppose, ἀντιτείνειν) is appropriate thereto; it occurs also at Eze. 2: 7 as *abstr. pro concreto*. That it is truly subj. appears from this, that בִּקֵּשׁ רָע, to seek after evil (cf. Pro. 29:10; 1Ki. 20: 7, etc.), is a connection of idea much more natural than בִּקֵּשׁ מַרִּי [to seek after rebellion]. Thus אֵד will be logically connected with רָע, and the reading אֵד מַרִּי will be preferred to the reading אֵד-מַרִּי; אֵד (corresponding to the Arab. *âinnama*) belongs to those particles which are placed before the clause, without referring to the immediately following part of the sentence, for they are much more regarded as affecting the whole sentence (vid., Pro. 13:10): the rebellious strives after nothing but only evil. Thus, as neut. obj. רָע is rendered by the Syr., Targ., *Venet.*, and Luther; on the contrary, the older Greek translators and Jerome regard רָע as the personal subject. If now, in reference to rebellion, the discourse is of a מְלַאֲךְ אֲכֹזֵרִי, we are not, with Hitzig, to think of the demon of wild passions unfettered in the person of the rebellious, for that is a style of thought and of expression that is modern, not biblical; but the old unpoetic yet simply true remark remains: *Loquendi formula inde petita quod regis aut summi magistratus minister rebelli supplicium nunciat infligitque.* מְלַאֲךְ is *n. officii*, not *naturae*. Man as a messenger, and the spiritual being as messenger, are both called מְלַאֲךְ. Therefore one may not understand מְלַאֲךְ אֲכֹזֵרִי, with the LXX, Jerome, and Luther, directly and exclusively of an angel of punishment. If one thinks of Jahve as the Person against whom the rebellion is made, then the idea of a heavenly messenger lies near, according to Psa. 35: 5 f., 78:49; but the proverb is so meant, that it is not the less true if an earthly king sends out against a rebellious multitude a messenger with an unlimited commission, or an officer against a single man dangerous to the state, with strict directions to arrest him at all hazards. אֲכֹזֵרִי we had already at Pro. 12:10; the root קָשׁ חֹשׁ means, to be dry, hard, without feeling. The fut. does not denote what may be done (Bertheau, Zöckler), which is contrary to the parallelism, the order of the words, and the style of the proverb, but what is done. And the relation of the clause is not, as Ewald interprets it, “scarcely does the sedition seek out evil when an inexorable messenger is sent.”

Although this explanation is held by Ewald as “unimprovable,” yet it is incorrect, because פָּסַח in this sense demands, e.g., Gen. 27: 3, the perf. (strengthened by the *infin. intensivus*). The relation of the clause is, also, not such as Böttcher has interpreted it: a wicked man tries only scorn though a stern messenger is sent against him, but not because such a messenger is called אֶכְזָרִי, against whom this “trying of scorn” helps nothing, so that it is not worth being spoken of; besides, שָׁלַח or מִשְׁלַח would have been used if this relation had been intended. We have in 11a and 11b, as also e.g., at Pro. 26:24; 28: 1, two clauses standing in internal reciprocal relation, but syntactically simply co-ordinated; the force lies in this, that a messenger who recognises no mitigating circumstances, and offers no pardon, is sent out against such an one.

**12 Meet a bear robbed of one of her whelps,
Only not a fool in his folly.**

Pro. 17:12. The name of the bear, as that of the cow, Job. 21:10, Psa. 144:14, preserves its masculine form, even when used in reference to sexual relationship (Ewald, § 174b); the *ursa catulis orbata* is proverbially a raging beast. How the abstract expression of the action פָּגַשׁ [to meet], here as e.g., Psa. 17: 5, with the subj. following, must sound as finite (*occurrat*, may always meet), follows from וְאֵלֹהִים יִפְגַּשׁ = וְאֵלֹהִים יִפְגַּשׁ (non autem occurrat). פָּגַשׁ has on the last syllable *Mehuppach*, and *Zinnorith* on the preceding open syllable (according to the rule, *Accentssystem*, vi. § 5d).^{f136}

פְּאוֹלָתוֹ, in the state of his folly, i.e., when he is in a paroxysm of his anger, corresponds with the conditional noun-adjective שְׂכוֹל, for folly morbidly heightened is madness (cf. Hos. 11: 7; *Psychol.* p. 291 f.).

**13 He that returneth evil for good,
From his house evil shall not depart.**

Pro. 17:13. If ingratitude appertains to the sinful manifestations of ignoble selfishness, how much more sinful still is black ingratitude, which recompenses evil for good! (מְשִׁיב, as 1Sa. 25:21, syn. נָמַל, to requite, Pro. 3:30; 31:12; שָׁלַם, to reimburse, Pro. 20:22). Instead of תְּמִישׁ, the *Keri* reads תְּמוֹשׁ; but that this verb, with a middle vowel, may be עָ"י as well as עָ"ו, Psa. 55: 2 shows.

**14 As one letteth out water is the beginning of a strife;
But cease thou from such strife ere it comes to showing teeth.**

Pro. 17:14. The meaning of this verb פָּתַר is certain: it means to break forth; and transitively, like Arab. *fātr*, to bring forth from a cleft, to make to break

forth, to let go free (Theodotion, ἀπολύων; Jerome, dimittit; Venet. ἀφίεις). The LXX, since it translates by ἔξουσίαν δίδωσι, thinks on the juristic signification, which occurs in the Chronicles: to make free, or to declare so; but here פּוֹטֵר מַיִם (vid., regarding the *Metheg* at 14:31, p. 225) is, as Luther translates, one who tears away the dam from the waters. And רֵאשִׁית מְדוֹן is not accus. dependent on פּוֹטֵר, to be supplied (Hitzig: he unfetters water who the beginning of strife, viz., unfetters); but the part is used as at Pro. 10:17: one who unfetters the water is the beginning of strife, i.e., he is thus related to it as when one... This is an addition to the free use of the part. in the language of the Mishna, where one would expect the *infin.*, e.g., בּוֹרֵא (= בּוֹרֵא), if one sows, בּמְזוֹד (= בּוֹדוֹן), of wantonness. It is thus unnecessary, with Ewald, to interpret פּוֹטֵר as neut., which lets water go = a water-outbreak; פּוֹטֵר is meant personally; it represents one who breaks through a water-dam, withdraws the restraint of the water, opens a sluice, and then emblematically the proverb says: thus conditioned is the beginning of a strife.

Then follows the warning to let go such strife (הִרִיב, with the article used in the more elevated style, not without emphasis), to break from it, to separate it from oneself ere it reach a dangerous height. This is expressed by הִתְגַּלֵּעַ לַפְּנֵי, a verb occurring only here and at Pro. 18: 1; 20: 3, always in the *Hithpa*. The Targum (misunderstood by Gesenius after Buxtorf; vid., to the contrary, Levy, under the word צַדִּי II) translates it at Pro. 18: 1; 20: 3, as the Syr., by “to mock,” also Aquila, who has at 20: 3, ἔξυβρισθήσεται, and the LXX at Pro. 18: 1, ἐπονειδίτοστος ἔσται, and Jerome, who has this in all the three passages, render the *Hithpa*. in this sense, passively. In this passage before us, the Targ., as Hitzig gives it, translates, “before it heats itself,” but that is an error occasioned by Buxtorf; vid., on the contrary, Levy, under the word קָרָא (κύριος); this translation, however, has a representative in Haja Gaon, who appeals for גַּלַּע, to glow, to *Nidda* viii. 2. ^{f137}

Elsewhere the LXX, at Pro. 20: 3, συμπλέκεται (where Jerome, with the amalgamation of the two significations, *miscetur contumeliis*); Kimchi and others gloss it by הִתְעַרַב, and, according to this, the *Venet.* translates, πρὸ τοῦ συνχυθῆνα, τῆν ἔριν); Luther, “before thou art mingled therein.” But all these explanations of the word: *insultare*, *excandescere*, and *commisceri*, are etymologically inadmissible. Bertheau’s and Zöckler’s “roll itself forth” is connected at least with a meaning rightly belonging to the R. גַּל. But the Arab. shows, that not the meaning *volvere*, but that of *retegere* is to be adopted. Aruch ^{f138} for *Nidda* viii. 2 refers to the Arab., where a wound is designated as דַּם יְכוּלָה לְהִגָּלָא וּלְהוּצֵא דַּם, i.e., as breaking up, as it were, when the crust of

that which is nearly healed is broken off (Maimuni glosses the word by **להתקלף**, were uncrusted), and blood again comes forth. The meaning *retegere* requires here, however, another distinction. The explanation mentioned there by Aruch: before the strife becomes public to thee, i.e., approaches thee, is not sufficient. The verbal stem **גלע** is the stronger power of **גלה**, and means laying bare; but here, not as there, in the Mishna of a wound covered with a crust. The Arab. *jal'* means to quarrel with another, properly to show him the teeth, the *Poël* or the tendency-stem from *jali'a*, to have the mouth standing open, so that one shows his teeth; and the Syr. *glas*, with its offshoots and derivatives, has also this meaning of *ringi*, opening the mouth to show, i.e., to make bare the teeth. Schultens has established this explanation of the words, and Gesenius further establishes it in the *Thesaurus*, according to which Fleischer also remarks, “**גלע**, of showing the teeth, the exposing of the teeth by the wide opening of the mouth, as happens in bitter quarrels.” But **הריב** does not agree with this. Hitzig’s translation, “before the strife shows its teeth,” is as modern as in v. 11 is the passion of the unfettered demon, and Fleischer’s *prius vero quam exacerbetur rixa* renders the *Hithpa.* in a sense unnecessarily generalized for Pro. 18: 1 and Pro. 20: 3. The accentuation, which separates **להתגלע** from **הריב** by *Rebia Mughash*, is correct. One may translate, as Schultens, *antequam dentes stringantur*, or, since the *Hithpa.* has sometimes a reciprocal signification, e.g., Gen. 42: 1, Psa. 41: 8: ere one reciprocally shows his teeth, Hitzig unjustly takes exception to the inversion **הריב נמוש**. Why should not the object precede, as at Hos. 12:15, the **נמוש**, placed with emphasis at the end? The same inversion for a like reason occurs at Ecc. 5: 6.

***15 He that acquitteth the guilty and condemneth the righteous —
An abomination to Jahve are they both.***

Pro. 17:15. The proverb is against the partisan judge who is open to bribery, like Pro. 24:24, cf. Isa. 5:23, where, with reference to such, the announcement of punishment is emphatically made. **רשע** and **צדיק**, in a forensic sense, are equivalent to *sons (reus)* and *insons*. **גם** (cf. the Arab. *jmy'na*, altogether, but particularly the Pers. *ham* and the Turkish *dkhy* standing wholly thus in the numeral) is here, as at Gen. 27:45, equivalent to **יחדיו**, Jer. 46:12 (in its unions = united). Whoever pronounces sentence of justification on the guilty, appears as if he must be judged more mildly than he who condemns the guiltless, but both the one and the other alike are an abhorrence to God.

We take vv. 16-21 together. This group begins with a proverb of the heartless, and ends with one of the perverse-hearted; and between these there are not

wanting noticeable points of contact between the proverbs that follow one another.

***16 Why the ready money in the hand of the fool;
To get wisdom when he has yet no heart?***

Pro. 17:16. The question is made pointed by וְיָ, thus not: why the ready money when...? Is it to obtain wisdom? — the whole is but one question, the reason of which is founded in וְלֵב אֵינִי (thus to be accented with *Mugrash* going before).^{f139}

The fool, perhaps, even makes some endeavours, for he goes to the school of the wise, to follow out their admonitions, קִנְיָהּ חֲכָמָה (Pro. 4: 5, etc.), and it costs him something (Pro. 4: 7), but all to no purpose, for he has no heart. By this it is not meant that knowledge, for which he pays his *honorarium*, remains, it may be, in his head, but goes not to his heart, and thus becomes an unfruitful theory; but the heart is equivalent to the understanding (vid., p. 127), in the sense in which the heart appears as the previous condition to the attainment of wisdom (Pro. 18:15), and as something to be gained before all (Pro. 15:32), viz., understanding, as the fitting intellectual and practical *habitus* to the reception, the appropriation, and realization of wisdom, the ability rightly to comprehend the fulness of the communicated knowledge, and to adopt it as an independent possession, that which the Greek called *νοῦς*, as in that “golden proverb” of Democritus: πολλοὶ πολυμαθεὲς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχουσι, or as in Luk. 24:25, where it is said that the Lord opened τὸν νοῦν of His disciples to understand the Scriptures. In the LXX a distich follows v. 16, which is made up of 19b and 20b, and contains a varied translation of these two lines.

***17 At all times the right friend shows himself loving;
And as a brother is he born for adversity.***

Pro. 17:17. Brother is more than friend, he stands to one nearer than a friend does, Psa. 35:14; but the relation of a friend may deepen itself into a spiritual, moral brotherhood, Pro. 18:24, and there is no name of friend that sounds dearer than חָסֵד, 2Sa. 1:26. 17a and 17b are, according to this, related to each other climactically. The friend meant in 17a is a true friend. Of no other is it said that he loves בְּכָל-עֵת, i.e., makes his love manifest; and also the article in חָסֵד not only here gives to the word more body, but stamps it as an ideal-word: the friend who corresponds to the idea of such an one.^{f140}

The *inf.* of the *Hiph.*, in the sense “to associate” (Ewald), cannot therefore be חָסֵד, because חָסֵד is not derived from חָסֵד, but from חָסֵד. Thus there exists no contrast between 17a and 17b, so that the love of a friend is thought of, in

contradistinction to that of a brother, as without permanency (Fl.); but 17*b* means that the true friend shows himself in the time of need, and that thus the friendship becomes closer, like that between brothers. The statements do not refer to two kinds of friends; this is seen from the circumstance that אָס has not the article, as הִרְע has. It is not the subj. but pred., as אָדָם, Job. 11:12: sooner is a wild ass born or born again as a man. The meaning of הִנָּלַד there, as at Psa. 87: 5 f., borders on the notion of *regenerari*; here the idea is not essentially much less, for by the saying that the friend is born in the time of need, as a brother, is meant that he then for the first time shows himself as a friend, he receives the right status or baptism of such an one, and is, as it were, born into personal brotherly relationship to the sorely-tried friend. The translation *comprobatur* (Jerome) and *erfunden* [is found out] (Luther) obliterates the peculiar and thus intentional expression, for נוֹלַד is not at all a metaphor used for passing into the light — the two passages in Proverbs and in Job have not their parallel. לְצָרָה is not equivalent to בְּצָרָה (cf. Psa. 9:10; 10: 1), for the interchange of the prep. in 17*a* and 17*b* would then be without any apparent reason. But Hitzig's translation also: as a brother he is born of adversity, is impossible, for לְ after נוֹלַד and יֵלַד always designates that for which the birth is an advantage, not that from which it proceeds. Thus לְ will be that of the purpose: for the purpose of the need, — not indeed to suffer (Job. 5: 7) on account of it, but to bear it in sympathy, and to help to bear it. Rightly Fleischer: *frater autem ad aerumnam* (sc. *levandam et removendam*) *nascitur*. The LXX gives this sense to the לְ: ἀδελφοὶ δὲ ἐν ἀνάγκαις χρήσιμοι ἔστωσαν, τοῦτο γὰρ χάριν γεννῶνται.

**18 A man void of understanding is he who striketh hands,
Who becometh surety with his neighbour.**

Pro. 17:18. Cf. Pro. 6: 1-5, where the warning against suretyship is given at large, and the reasons for it are adduced. It is incorrect to translate (Ges., Hitzig, and others) לְפָנַי רֵעֵהוּ, with the LXX, Jerome, the Syr., Targ., and Luther, “for his neighbour;” to become surety for any one is לְ עָרַב לְ, Pro. 6: 1, or, with the object. accus. Pro. 11:15, another suitable prep. is בְּאָד; but לְפָנַי never means *pro* (ὑπέρ), for at 1Sa. 1:16 it means “to the person,” and 2Sa. 3:31, “before Abner’s corpse (bier).” רֵעֵהוּ is thus here the person with whom the suretyship is entered into; he can be called the רֵעֵ of him who gives bail, so much the more as the reception of the bail supposes that both are well known to each other. Here also Fleischer rightly translates: *apud alterum* (sc. *creditorem pro debitore*).

**19 He loveth sin who loveth strife;
He who maketh high his doors seeketh destruction.**

Pro. 17:19. A synthetic distich (vid., p. 9). Böttcher finds the reason of the pairing of these two lines in the relationship between a mouth and a door (cf. Mic. 7: 6, פִּתְחוּ פִּיךָ). Hitzig goes further, and supposes that 19*b* figuratively expresses what boastfulness brings upon itself. Against Geier, Schultens, and others, who understand פִּתְחוּ directly of the mouth, he rightly remarks that פִּה הַגְּבוּיָה is not heard of, and that הַגְּדִיל פִּה would be used instead. But the two lines harmonize, without this interchangeable reference of *os* and *ostium*. *Zanksucht* [quarrelsomeness] and *Prunksucht* [ostentation] are related as the symptoms of selfishness. But both bear their sentence in themselves. He who has pleasure in quarrelling has pleasure in evil, for he commits himself to the way of great sinning, and draws others along with him; and he who cannot have the door of his house high enough and splendid enough, prepares thereby for himself, against his will, the destruction of his house. An old Hebrew proverb says, כָּל הַעוֹסֵם בְּבִנְיַן יִתְמַסְכֵּן, *aedificandi nimis studiosus ad mendicitatem redigitur*. Both parts of this verse refer to one and the same individual, for the *insanum aedificandi studium* goes only too often hand in hand with unjust and heartless litigation.

**20 He that is of a false heart findeth no good;
And he that goeth astray with his tongue falleth into evil.**

Pro. 17:20. Regarding עֲקֵשׁ-לֵב, vid., Pro. 11:20. In the parallel member, נִהְפֵּךְ בְּלִשׁוֹנוֹ is he who twists or winds (vid., at Pro. 2:12) with his tongue, going about concealing and falsifying the truth. The phrase וְנִהְפֵּךְ (the connecting form before a word with a prep.) is syntactically possible, but the Masora designates the word, in contradistinction to וְנִהְפֵּךְ, pointed with *Pathach*, Lev. 13:16, with לִית as *unicum*, thus requires וְנִהְפֵּךְ, as is also found in Codd. The contrast of רָעָה is here טוֹב, also neut., as Pro. 13:21, cf. 16:20, and רָע, Pro. 13:17.

The first three parts of the old Solomonic Book of Proverbs ([1] Pro. 10: 1-12:28; [2] Pro. 13: 1-15:19; [3] Pro. 15:20-17:20) are now followed by the fourth part. We recognise it as striking the same keynote as Pro. 10: 1. In Pro. 17:21 it resounds once more, here commencing a part; there, Pro. 10: 1, beginning the second group of proverbs. The first closes, as it begins, with a proverb of the fool.

**21 He that begetteth a fool, it is to his sorrow;
And the father of a fool hath no joy.**

Pro. 17:21. It is admissible to supply יָלַדוּ, developing itself from יָלַד, before לֹתוֹנָה לוֹ (vid., regarding this passive formation, at Pro. 10: 1, cf. 14:13), as at Isa. 66: 3, מַעֲלָה (Fl.: *in maerorem sibi genuit h. e. ideo videtur genuisse ut sibi maerorem crearet*); but not less admissible is it to interpret לוֹ לֹתוֹנָה as a noun-clause corresponding to the וְלֹא-יִשְׁמַח (thus to be written with *Makkeph*): it brings grief to him. According as one understands this as an expectation, or as a consequence, יָלַד, as at Pro. 23:24, is rendered either *qui gignit* or *qui genuit*. With נָבַל, seldom occurring in the Book of Proverbs (only here and at v. 7), בָּסִיל, occurring not unfrequently, is interchanged. Schultens rightly defines the latter etymologically: *marcidus h. e. qui ad virtutem, pietatem, vigorem omnem vitae spiritualis medullitus emarcuit*; and the former: *elumbis et mollitie segnitieve fractus*, the intellectually heavy and sluggish (cf. Arab. *kasal*, laziness; *kaslân*, the lazy).^{f141}

**22 A joyful heart bringeth good recovery;
And a broken spirit drieth the bones.**

Pro. 17:22. The heart is the centre of the individual life, and the condition and the tone of the heart communicates itself to this life, even to its outermost circumference; the spirit is the power of self-consciousness which, according as it is lifted up or broken, also lifts up or breaks down the condition of the body (*Psychol.* p. 199), vid., the similar contrasted phrases נִבְאָה לֵב שָׂמַח and נִבְאָה רֵיחַ, Pro. 15:13. The ἄπ. λεγ. גָּהָה (here and there in Codd. incorrectly written גִּיָּהָה) has nothing to do with the Arab. *jihat*, which does not mean sight, but direction, and is formed from *wjah* (whence *wajah*, sight), like עֵדָה, congregation, from נָאָד (נִאָד). The Syr., Targ. (perhaps also Symmachus: ἀγαθύνει ἡλικίαν; Jerome: *aetatem floridam facit*; Luther: makes the life *lüstig* [cheerful]) translate it by body; but for this גָּהָה (גִּוְיָהָה) is used, and that is a word of an entirely different root from גָּהָה. To what verb this refers is shown by Hos. 5:13: וְלֹא-יִנְקָה מִפֶּם מְזוֹר, and healed not for you her ulcerous wound. מְזוֹר is the compress, i.e., the bandage closing up the ulcer, then also the ulcer-wound itself; and גָּהָה is the contrary of עָלָה, e.g., Jer. 8:22; it means the removing of the bandage and the healing of the wound. This is confirmed by the Syr. *gho*, which in like manner is construed with *min*, and means to be delivered from something (vid., Bernstein's *Lex. Syr.* to Kirsch's *Chrestomathie*). The Aethiop. quadriliteral *gâhgêh*, to hinder, to cause to cease, corresponds to the causative Syr. *agahish*. Accordingly גָּהָה means to be in the condition of abatement, mitigation, healing; and גָּהָה (as synonym of בָּהָה, Neh. 3:19, with which Parchon combines it), *levamen*, *levatio*, in the sense of

bodily healing (LXX εὐεκτηῖν ποιεῖ; Venet., after Kimchi, ἀγαθυνεῖ θεραπεῖαν); and הִיטִיב גָּהָה (cf. Pro. 15: 2) denotes, to bring good improvement, to advance powerfully the recovery. Schultens compares the Arab. *jahy*, *nitescere*, *disserenari*, as Menahem has done הִיטִיב, but this word is one of the few words which are explained exclusively from the Syriac (and Aethiop.). הִיטִיב (here and at Pro. 25:15) is the word interchanging with הִיטִיב, Pro. 15:30; 16:24.

***23 Bribery from the bosom the godless receiveth,
To pervert the ways of justice.***

Pro. 17:23. Regarding שֹׁחַד, vid., Pro. 17: 8. The idea of this word, as well as the clause containing the purpose, demand for the רָשָׁע a high judicial or administrative post. The bosom, חֶק (חֵיק), is, as Pro. 16:23, that of the clothing. From the bosom, מִחֶק, where it was kept concealed, the gift is brought forth, and is given into the bosom, בְּחֶק, Pro. 21:14, of him whose favour is to be obtained — an event taking place under four eyes, which purposely withdraws itself from the observation of any third person. Since this is done to give to the course of justice a direction contrary to rectitude, the giver of the bribe has not right on his side; and, under the circumstances, the favourable decision which he purchases may be at once the unrighteous sentence of a צַדִּיק, accusing him, or accused by him, Pro. 18: 5.

***24 The understanding has his attention toward wisdom;
But the eyes of a fool are on the end of the earth.***

Pro. 17:24. Many interpreters explain, as Eichel:

***“The understanding finds wisdom everywhere;
The eyes of the fool seek it at the end of the world.”***

Ewald refers to Deu. 30:11-14 as an unfolding of the same thought. But although it may be said of the fool (vid., on the contrary, Pro. 15:14) that he seeks wisdom, only not at the right place, as at Pro. 14: 6, of the mocker that he seeks wisdom but in vain, yet here the order of the words, as well as the expression, lead us to another thought: before the eyes of the understanding (אֶת־פְּנֵי ה', as Gen. 33:18, 1Sa. 2:11, and frequently in the phrase אֶת־פְּנֵי ה' נִרְאָה, e.g., 1Sa. 1:22) wisdom lies as his aim, his object, the end after which he strives; on the contrary, the eyes of the fool, without keeping that one necessary thing in view, wander *in alia omnia*, and roam about what is far off, without having any fixed object. The fool is everywhere with his thoughts, except where he ought to be. Leaving out of view that which lies nearest, he loses himself in *aliena*. The understanding has an ever present theme of

wisdom, which arrests his attention, and on which he concentrates himself; but the fool flutters about fantastically from one thing to another, and that which is to him precisely of least importance interests him the most.

The series of proverbs, v. 25- Pro. 18: 2, begins and closes in the same way as the preceding, and only v. 26 stands by itself without apparent connection.

Pro. 17:25. This verse begins connecting itself with v. 21:

*A grief to his father is a foolish son,
And a bitter woe for her that bare him.*

The *ἀπ. λεγ.* מִמֶּר is formed from מָרַר (to be bitter, properly harsh), as מָכַס from כָּסַס. The Syr. and Targ. change the subst. into participles; some codd. also have מִמֶּר (after the forms מִחַל, מִסֵּב, מִפֶּר, מִרָא), but as may be expected in 25a, מִכְּבֵּיִם. The dat. obj. instead of the accus. may be possible; the verse immediately following furnishes a sufficient example of this.

*26 Also to inflict punishment on the righteous is not good;
This, that one overthrows the noble on account of his rectitude.*

Pro. 17:26. Does the גַּם [also] refer to a connection from which the proverb is separated? or is it tacitly supposed that there are many kinds of worthless men in the world, and that one from among them is brought forward? or is it meant, that to lay upon the righteous a pecuniary punishment is also not good? None of all these. The proverb must have a meaning complete in itself; and if pecuniary punishment and corporeal punishment were regarded as opposed to one another, 26b would then have begun with אִף כִּי (*quanto magis percutere ingenuos*). Here it is with גַּם as at Pro. 20:11, and as with אִף at 11a, and רַק at Pro. 13:10: according to the sense, it belongs not to the word next following, but to לְצַדִּיק; and עֲנֵשׁ (whence *inf.* עֲנוּשׁ, as Pro. 21:11, with the *ā* in ע, cf. also אֲבַד, Pro. 11:10, for אֲבָד) means here not specially to inflict a pecuniary fine, but generally to punish, for, as in *mulctare*, the meaning is generalized, elsewhere with the accus., Deu. 22:19, here to give to any one to undergo punishment. The ruler is the servant of God, who has to preserve rectitude, εἰς ὀργὴν τῷ τὸ κακὸν πράσσουντι (Rom. 13:14). It is not good when he makes his power to punish to be felt by the innocent as well as by the guilty.

In 26b, instead of הַכּוֹת, the proverb is continued with לְאַחֲמוֹב; לְאַחֲמוֹב, which is to be supplied, takes the *inf.* alone when it precedes, and the *inf.* with לְ when it follows, Pro. 18: 5; 28:21; 21: 9 (but cf. Pro. 21:19). הַכּוֹת is the usual word for punishment by scourging, Deu. 25: 1-3, cf. 2Co. 11:24, N.T. μαστιγοῦν, δέρειν, Rabb. מַכּוֹת, strokes, or מְלָקוֹת from לָקַח, *vapulare*, to

receive stripes. נְדִיבִים are here those noble in disposition. The idea of נְדִיב fluctuates between *generosus* in an outward and in a moral sense, wherefore אֶל-יִשָּׁר, or rather עַל-יִשָּׁר, is added; for the old editions, correct MSS, and e.g., also Soncin. 1488, present עָלַי (vid., Norzi). Hitzig incorrectly explains this, “against what is due” (יִשָּׁר, as Pro. 11:24); also Psa. 94:20, עַל-יִשָּׁר does not mean κατὰ προστάγματος (Symmachus), but ἐπὶ προστάγματι (LXX and Theod.), on the ground of right = *praetextu juris* (Vatabl.). Thus עַל-יִשָּׁר means here neither against nor beyond what is due, but: on the ground of honourable conduct, making this (of course mistakenly) a lawful title to punishment; Aquila, ἐπὶ εὐθύτητι, cf. Mat. 5:10, ἔνεκεν δικαιοσύνης. Besides, for עַל after הִבֵּה, the causal signification lies nearest Num. 22:32, cf. Isa. 1:5 (עַל-מֵה, on account of anything). If the power of punishment is abused to the punishing of the righteous, yea, even to the corporeal chastisement of the noble, and their straight, i.e., conscientious, firm, open conduct, is made a crime against them, that is not good — it is perversion of the idea of justice, and an iniquity which challenges the penal rectitude of the Most High (Ecc. 5:7 [8]).

*27 He that keepeth his words to himself hath knowledge,
And the cool of temper is a man of understanding.*

Pro. 17:27. The first line here is a variation of Pro. 10:19 *b*. The phrase דָּאֵת יָדַע (here and at Dan. 1:4) means to possess knowledge (*Novisse*); more frequently it is יָדַע בִּינָה, e.g., Pro. 4:1, where יָדַע has the inchoative sense of *noscere*. In 27*b* the *Kerî* is יִקְרָרוּחַ. Jerome translates it *pretiosi spiritus*, the *Venet.* τίμιος τὸ πνεῦμα. Rashi glosses יִקְרָ here, as at 1Sa. 3:1, by מְנוּעַ (thus to be read after codd.), *retentus spiritus*; most interpreters remark that the spirit here comes into view as expressing itself in words. It is scarcely correct to say that יִקְרָ דְּבָרִים could designate one who is sparing in his words, but יִקְרָרוּחַ is, according to the fundamental conception of the verb יִקְרָ, *gravis spiritu* (Schultens), of a dignified, composed spirit; it is a quiet seriousness proceeding from high conscientiousness, and maintaining itself in self-control, which is designated by this word. But the *Chethîb* יִקְרָרוּחַ presents almost the same description of character. יִקְרָ from יִקְרָ (of the same root as יִקְרָ) means to be firm, unmoveable, καρτερὸν εἶναι, hence to be congealed, frozen, cold (cf. *frigus* with *rigere*, *rigor*), figuratively to be cold-blooded, passionless, quiet, composed (Fl.); cf. post-bibl. קָרַת רוּחַ (Arab. *kurrat ʿain*), cooling = refreshing, ἀνάψυξις (Act. 3:20).^{f142}

Whether we read **קָר** or **יִקָּר**, in any case we are not to translate *rarus spiritu*, which, apart from the impossibility of the expression, makes 27*b* almost a tautological repetition of the thought of 27*a*. The first line recommends bridling of the tongue, in contrast to inconsiderate and untimely talk; the second line recommends coldness, i.e., equanimity of spirit, in contrast to passionate heat.

Pro. 17:28. Ver. 28 continues the same theme, the value of silence:

***Even a fool, when he keeps silence, is counted wise;
When he shutteth his mouth, discreet.***

The subj. as well as the pred. of the first line avail for the second. **מָטַם**, *obturare, occludere*, usually of the closing the ear, is here transferred to the mouth. The *Hiph.* **הִחָרִישׁ** means *mutum agere* (cf. Arab. *khars, mutum esse*), from **חָרַשׁ**, which, like **κωφός**, passes from the meaning *surdus* to that of *mutus* Fl.). The words of Job. 13: 5, and also those of Alexander: *si tacuisses sapiens mansisses*, are applicable to fools. An Arab. proverb says, “silence is the covering of the stupid.” In the epigrammatical hexameter,

πάς τις ἀπαίδευτος φρονιμώτατός ἐστι σιωπῶν,

the word **σιωπῶν** has the very same syntactical position as these two participles.^{f143}

CHAPTER 18

Pro. 18: 1. This series of proverbs now turns from the fool to the separatist:

***The separatist seeketh after his own pleasure;
Against all that is beneficial he showeth his teeth.***

The reflexive **נִפְרַד** has here the same meaning as the Rabbinical **מִן־הַצְּבוּר** **פָּרַשׁ**, to separate oneself from the congregation, *Aboth* ii. 5; **נִפְרַד** denotes a man who separates himself, for he follows his own counsel, Arab. *mnfrd* (*mtfrd*) *brāyh*, or *j̄hys alm̄h̄hl* (*seorsum ab aliis secedens*). Instead of **לְתַאֲנָה**, Hitzig, after Jerome, adopts the emendation **לְתַאֲנָה**, “after an occasion” (a pretext), and by **נִפְרַד** thinks of one pushed aside, who, thrown into opposition, seeks to avenge himself. But his translation of 1*b*, “against all that is fortunate he gnasheth his teeth,” shows how much the proverb is opposed to this interpretation. **נִפְרַד** denotes one who willingly (Jud. 4:11), and, indeed, obstinately withdraws himself. The construction of **יִבְקֹשׁ** with **לְ** (also Job. 10: 6) is explained by this, that the poet, giving prominence to the object,

would set it forward: a pleasure (תאוה), as Arab. *hawan*, unstable and causeless direction of the mind to something, pleasure, freak, caprice), and nothing else, he goes after who has separated himself (Fl.); the effort of the separatist goes out after a pleasure, i.e., the enjoyment and realization of such; instead of seeking to conform himself to the law and ordinance of the community, he seeks to carry out a separate view, and to accomplish some darling plan: *libidinem sectatur sui cerebri homo*. With this 1b accords. תושֵׁיה (vid., at Pro. 2: 7) is concretely that which furthers and profits. Regarding התנלע, vid., at Pro. 17:14. Thus putting his subjectivity in the room of the common weal, he shows his teeth, places himself in fanatical opposition against all that is useful and profitable in the principles and aims, the praxis of the community from which he separates himself. The figure is true to nature: the polemic of the schismatic and the sectary against the existing state of things, is for the most part measureless and hostile.

***2 The fool hath no delight in understanding;
But only that his heart may reveal itself therein.***

Pro. 18: 2. The verb חִפֵּץ forms the fut. יִחִפֵּץ as well as יִחַפֵּץ; first the latter from חִפֵּץ, with the primary meaning, to bow, to bend down; then both forms as intransitive, to bend oneself to something, to be inclined to something, Arab. *ʿf*. (Fl.). תְּבוּנָה is here the intelligence which consists in the understanding of one's own deficiency, and of that which is necessary to meet it. The inclination of the fool goes not out after such intelligence, but (כִּיאֵם; according to Ben-Naphtali, כִּיאֵם) only that his heart, i.e., the understanding which he thinks that he already possesses, may reveal itself, show itself publicly. He thinks thereby to show himself in his true greatness, and to render a weighty service to the world. This loquacity of the fool, proceeding from self-satisfaction, without self-knowledge, has already, Pro. 12:23, and often, been reprimanded.

The group beginning with v. 3 terminates in two proverbs (vv. 6 and 7), related to the concluding verse of the foregoing:

***3 If a godless man cometh, then cometh also contempt;
And together with disgrace, shame.***

Pro. 18: 3. J. D. Michaelis, and the most of modern critics, read רָשַׁע; then, contempt etc., are to be thought of as the consequences that follow godlessness; for that קָלוֹן means (Hitzig) disgracefulness, i.e., disgraceful conduct, is destitute of proof; קָלוֹן always means disgrace as an experience. But not only does the Masoretic text punctuate רָשַׁע, but also all the old

translators, the Greek, Aramaic, and Latin, have done so. And is it on this account, because a coming naturally seems to be spoken of a person? The “pride cometh, then cometh shame,” Pro. 11: 2, was in their recollection not less firmly, perhaps, than in ours. They read רָשָׁע, because בּוֹי does not fittingly designate the first of that which godlessness effects, but perhaps the first of that which proceeds from it. Therefore we adhere to the opinion, that the proverb names the fiends which appear in the company of the godless wherever he goes, viz., first בּוֹי, contempt (Psa. 31:19), which places itself haughtily above all due subordination, and reverence, and forbearance; and then, with the disgrace [*turpitude*], קִלּוֹן, which attaches itself to those who meddle with him (Isa. 22:18), there is united the shame, הַרְפָּה (Psa. 39: 9), which he has to suffer from him who has only always expected something better from him. Fleischer understands all the three words in the passive sense, and remarks, “עַם-קִלּוֹן וְהַרְפָּה, a more artificial expression for קִלּוֹן וְהַרְפָּה, in the Turkish quite common for the copula *wāw*, e.g., *swylh tbrāk*, earth and water, *wrtylh ār*, the man and the woman.” But then the expression would be tautological; we understand בּוֹי and הַרְפָּה of that which the godless does to others by his words, and קִלּוֹן of that which he does to them by his conduct. By this interpretation, עַם is more than the representative of the copula.

***4 Deep waters are the words from a man’s mouth,
A bubbling brook, a fountain of wisdom.***

Pro. 18: 4. Earlier, we added to *hominis* the supplement sc. *sapientis*, but then an unnecessary word would be used, and that which is necessary omitted. Rather it might be said that אִישׁ is meant in an ideal sense; but thus meant, אִישׁ, like גִּבּוֹר, denotes the valiant man, but not man as he ought to be, or the man of honour; and besides, a man may be a man of honour without there being said of him what this proverb expresses. Ewald comes nearer the case when he translates, “deep waters are the heart-words of many.” Heart-words — what an unbiblical expression! The LXX, which translates *λόγος ἐν καρδία*, has not read דְּבַרֵי לֵב, but דְּבַר בְּלֵב (as Pro. 20: 5, עֲצָה בְּלֵב). But that “of many” is certainly not a right translation, yet right in so far as אִישׁ (as at Pro. 12:14) is thought of as made prominent: the proverb expresses, in accordance with the form of narrative proverbs which present an example, what occurs in actual life, and is observed. Three different things are said of the words from a man’s mouth: they are deep waters, for their meaning does not lie on the surface, but can be perceived only by penetrating into the secret motives and aims of him who speaks; they are a bubbling brook, which freshly and powerfully gushes forth to him who feels this flow of words, for in this brook there never fails an always new gush of living water; it is a fountain or

well of wisdom, from which wisdom flows forth, and whence wisdom is to be drawn. Hitzig supposes that the distich is antithetic; מַיִם עֲמֻקִּים, or rather מַיִם מֵעֲמֻקִּים, “waters of the deep,” are cistern waters; on the contrary, “a welling brook is a fountain of wisdom.” But עֲמֻק means deep, not deepened, and deep water is the contrast of shallow water; a cistern also may be deep (cf. Pro. 22:14), but deep water is such as is deep, whether it be in the ocean or in a ditch. 4b also does not suggest a cistern, for thereby it would be indicated that the description, דְּבַרִּי פִּי־אִישׁ, is not here continued; the “fountain of wisdom” does not form a proper parallel or an antithesis to this subject, since this much rather would require the placing in contrast of deep and shallow, of exhausted (drained out) and perennial. And: the fountain is a brook, the well a stream — who would thus express himself! We have thus neither an antithetic nor a synonymous (LXX after the phrase ἀναπηδῶν, Jerome, *Venet.*, Luth.), but an integral distich (vid., p. 7) before us; and this leads us to consider what depths of thought, what riches of contents, what power of spiritual and moral advancement, may lie in the words of a man.

***5 To favour the person of the godless is not good,
And to oppress the righteous in judgment.***

Pro. 18: 5. As v. 4 has one subject, so v. 5 has one predicate. The form is the same as Pro. 17:26. שָׂאתָ פָּנַי (cf. Pro. 24:23), προσωποληψία, *acceptio personae*, is this, that one accepts the פָּנַי, *i.e.* the personal appearance of any one (πρόσωπον λαμβάνει), *i.e.*, regards it as acceptable, respectable, agreeable, which is a thing in itself not wrong; but in a judge who ought to determine according to the facts of the case and the law, it becomes sinful partiality. הַטּוֹת, in a forensic sense, with the accus. of the person, may be regarded in a twofold way: either as a turning aside, מִדִּין, Isa. 10: 2, from following and attaining unto the right, or as an oppression, for the phrase הִטָּה מִשְׁפָּט [to pervert justice] (cf. Pro. 17:23) is transferred to the person who experiences the oppression = perversion of the law; and this idea perhaps always underlies the expression, wherever, as e.g., Mal. 3: 5, no addition brings with it the other. Under Pro. 17:15 is a fuller explanation of לֹא־טוֹב.

***6 The lips of the fool engage in strife,
And his mouth calleth for stripes.***

Pro. 18: 6. We may translate: the lips of the fool cause strife, for בּוֹא בִּי, to come with anything, e.g., Psa. 66:13, is equivalent to bring it (to bring forward), as also: they engage in strife; as one says בּוֹא בְּדָמַי : to be engaged in bloodshed, 1Sa. 25:26. We prefer this *intransit* (*ingerunt se*), with

Schultens and Fleischer. תְּבִיאָנָה יָבֵאוּ for תְּבִיאָנָה, a *synallage generis*, to which, by means of a “self-deception of the language” (Fl.), the apparent masculine ending of such duals may have contributed. The stripes which the fool calleth for (קָרָא לְ, like, Pro. 2: 3) are such as he himself carries off, for it comes *a verbis ad verbera*. The LXX: his bold mouth calleth for death (מֹת יִקְרָא); לְמַהֲלָמוֹת; (פִּיּוֹ הָהֶמָּה); has, in codd. and old editions, the *Mem raphatum*, as also at Pro. 19:29; the sing. is thus מְהָלוֹם, like מְנַעֲלֵיו to מְנַעֲלֵיו, for the *Mem dagessatum* is to be expected in the inflected מְהָלֵם, by the passing over of the *ō* into *ū*.

**7 The mouth of the fool is to him destruction,
And his lips are a snare to his soul.**

Pro. 18: 7. As v. 6 corresponds to Pro. 17:27 of the foregoing group, so this v. 7 corresponds to Pro. 17:28. Regarding מְחַתֵּה־לֵלּוֹ, vid., Pro. 13: 3. Instead of פִּי כִסִּיל, is to be written פִּיכִסִּיל, according to *Torath Emeth*, p. 40, Cod. 1294, and old editions.

A pair of proverbs regarding the flatterer and the slothful:

**8 The words of the flatterer are as dainty morsels,
And they glide down into the innermost parts.**

Pro. 18: 8. An “analogy, with an epexegesis in the second member” (Fl.), which is repeated in Pro. 26:22. Ewald, Bertheau, Hitzig, and others, are constrained to interpret וְהֵם as introducing a contrast, and in this sense they give to מְתַלְהָמִים all kinds of unwarrantable meanings. Ewald translates: a burning (לָהֶם, cogn. לָהֵב), and offers next: as whispering (לָהֶם, cogn. רֵעִים, נָהֵם); Ch. B. Michaelis, Bertheau, and others: as sporting (לָהֶם, cogn. לָהֵא); Hitzig: like soft airs (לָהֶם, cogn. Arab. *hillam, flaccus, laxis*). All these interpretations are without support. The word לָהֶם has none of all these significations; it means, as the Arab. *lahima* warrants, *deglutire*. But Böttcher’s explanation also: “as swallowed down, because spoken with reserve,” proceeds, like those others, from the supposed syntactically fine yet false supposition, that 8*b* is an antithetic “*dennoch*” [*tamen*]. In that case the poet would have written וְהֵם יִרְדִּים (cf. וְהוּא, as the beginning of a conditional clause, Pro. 3:29; 23: 3). But וְהֵם, וְהוּא, with the finite following, introduces neither here nor at Deu. 33: 3, Jud. 20:34, Ps. 95:10, cf. Gen. 43:23, a conditional clause. Thus 8*b* continues the clause 8*a* by one standing on the same line; and thus we do not need to invent a meaning for

כמתלהמים, which forms a contrast to the penetrating into the innermost parts. The relation of the parts of the proverb is rightly given by Luther:

*The words of the slanderer are stripes,
And they go through the heart of one.*

Pro. 18: 8. He interprets להם as transposed from הלם (Rashi and others); but stripes cannot be called מתלהמים — they are called, 6b, מהלמות. This interpretation of the word has always more support than that of Symmachus: ὡς ἀκέραιοι; Jerome: *quasi simplicia*; Aquila, xxvi. 22: γοητικοί; which last, as also that of Capellus, Clericus, and Schultens: *quasi numine quodam afflata*, seems to support itself on the Arab. *âhn* iv. *inspirare*. But in reality *âhm* does not mean *afflare*; it means *deglutire*, and nothing else. The Jewish lexicographers offer nothing worth considering; Kimchi's הלקים, according to which the *Venet.* translates μαλθακιζόμενοι, is fanciful; for the Talm. הלם, striking = hitting, suitable, standing well, furnishes no transition to “smooth” and “soft.” Immanuel compares *âhm* = בלע; and Schultens, who is followed by Gesenius and others, has already, with perfect correctness, explained: *tanquam quae avidissime inglutiantur*. Thus also Fleischer: things which offer themselves to be eagerly gulped down, or which let themselves be thus swallowed. But in this way can one be truly just to the *Hithpa.*? The Arab. *âlthm* (stronger form, *âlthm*, according to which van Dyk translates *mthl uḡam ḥlwt*, like sweet morsels) means to swallow into oneself, which is not here appropriate. The *Hithpa.* will thus have here a passive signification: things which are greedily swallowed. Regarding נרנן from רנן, vid., at Pro. 16:28. והם refers to the words of the flatterer, and is emphatic, equivalent to *aeque illa, etiam illa, or illa ipsa*. ירד is here connected with the obj. accus. (cf. Pro. 1:12) instead of with אל, Pro. 7:27. תדררי, *penetralia*, we had already at Pro. 7:27; the root-word is (Arab.) *khdr*, to seclude, to conceal, different from *ḥdr, demittere*, and *ḥkhr* (cogn. חזר), to finish, *circumire*. בטן is the inner part of the body with reference to the organs lying there, which mediate not only the life of the body, but also that of the mind, — in general, the internal part of the personality. The LXX does not translate this proverb, but has in its stead Pro. 19:15, in a different version, however, from that it gives there; the Syr. and the Targ. have thereby been drawn away from the Hebr. text.

*9 He also who showeth himself slothful in his business,
Is a brother to him who proceedeth to destroy.*

Pro. 18: 9. The *Hithpa.* התרפה signifies here, as at Pro. 24:10, to show oneself slack, lazy, negligent. מלאכה is properly a commission for another, as

a king has a messenger, ambassador, commissioner to execute it; here, any business, whether an undertaking in commission from another, or a matter one engages in for himself. He who shows himself slack therein, produces in its way, viz., by negligence, destruction, as truly as the **בַּאֵל מְשַׁחֵת**, who does it directly by his conduct. Thus one is named, who is called, or who has his own delight in it, to destroy or overthrow. Jerome, incorrectly limiting: *sua opera dissipantis*. Hitzig well compares Mat. 12:30. In the variation, Pro. 28:24 *b*, the destroyer is called **אִישׁ מְשַׁחֵת**, the connection of the words being adjunct.; on the contrary, the connection of **בַּעַל מְשַׁחֵת** is genit. (cf. Pro. 22:24; 23: 2, etc.), for **מְשַׁחֵת** as frequently means that which destroys = destruction. Von Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* ii. 2, 403) understands **אִישׁ מְ** of the street robber, **מְ בַעַל** of the captain of robbers; but the designation for the latter must be **מְ שָׂר**, though at 1Ki. 11:24 he is called by the name **שָׂר גְּדוּד**. The form of the word in the proverb here is more original than at 38:24. There **חֵבֵר** [companion] is used, here **אָח** [brother], a general Semitic name of him who, or of that which, is in any way related to another, cf. Job. 30:29. Fleischer compares the Arab. proverb: *âlshbht âkht alkhtyât*, scepticism is the sister of sin.

Two proverbs, of the fortress of faith, and of the fortress of presumption:

***10 A strong tower is the name of Jahve;
The righteous runneth into it, and is high.***

Pro. 18:10. The name of Jahve is the Revelation of God, and the God of Revelation Himself, the creative and historical Revelation, and who is always continually revealing Himself; His name is His nature representing itself, and therefore capable of being described and named, before all the *Tetragramm*, as the *Anagramm* of the overruling and inworking historical being of God, as the *Chiffre* of His free and all-powerful government in grace and truth, as the self-naming of God the Saviour. This name, which is afterwards interwoven in the name Jesus, is **מִגְדַּל-עֵז** (Psa. 61: 4), a strong high tower bidding defiance to every hostile assault. Into this the righteous runneth, to hide himself behind its walls, and is thus lifted (*perf. consec.*) high above all danger (cf. **יִשָּׁבֵב**, 29:25). **רוּץ אֵל** means, Job. 15:26, to run against anything, **רוּץ**, *seq. acc.*, to invest, blockade anything, **רוּץ בְּ**, to hasten within; Hitzig's conjecture, **רוּץ** [riseth up high], instead of **רוּץ בְּ**, is a freak. **רוּץ בְּ** is speedily **בּוֹא בְּ**, the idea the same as Psa. 27: 5; 31:21.

***11 The possession of the righteous is his strong fort,
And is like a high wall in his imagination.***

Pro. 18:11. Line first = 10:15a. מְשִׁבִּית from שָׁבָה, Chald. סָבָא (whence after *Megilla* 14a, יִסְבָּה, she who looks), R. שָׁךְ, cogn. זָךְ, to pierce, to fix, means the image as a medal, and thus also intellectually: image (conception, and particularly the imagination) of the heart (Psa. 73: 7), here the fancy, conceit; Fleischer compares (Arab.) *tšwwr*, to imagine something to oneself, French *se figurer*. Translators from the LXX to Luther incorrectly think on שָׂכַךְ (סָכַךְ), to entertain; only the *Venet.* is correct in the rendering: ἐν φαντασίᾳ αὐτοῦ; better than Kimchi, who, after Ezr. 8:12, thinks on the chamber where the riches delighted in are treasured, and where he fancies himself in the midst of his treasures as if surrounded by an inaccessible wall.

We place together vv. 12-19, in which the figure of a secure fortress returns:

Pro. 18:12. This proverb is connected with the preceding of the rich man who trusts in his mammon.

*Before destruction the heat of man is haughty;
And humility goeth before honour.*

Line first is a variation of *Pro. 16:18 a*, and line second is similar to *Pro. 15:33 b*.

*13 If one giveth an answer before he heareth,
It is to him as folly and shame.*

Pro. 18:13. The *part.* stands here differently from what it does at *Pro. 13:18*, where it is subj., and at *Pro. 17:14*, where it is pred. of a simple sentence; it is also here, along with what appertains to it in accordance with the Semitic idiom, subj. to 13b (one who answers...is one to whom this...); but, in accordance with our idiom, it becomes a hypothetical antecedent (cf. p. 204). For “to answer” one also uses הָשִׁיב without addition; but the original full expression is הָשִׁיב דָּבָר, *reddere verbum, referre dictum* (cf. עָנָה דָּבָר, Jer. 44:20, absol. in the cogn., 15:28a); דָּבָר one may not understand of the word to which, but of the word with which, the reply is made. הֵיא לּוֹ comprehends the meaning: it avails to him (*ducitur ei*), as well as it reaches to him (*est ei*). In *Agricola’s Fünfhundert Sprüchen* this proverb is given thus: *Wer antwortet ehe er höret, der zaiget an sein torhait und wirdt ze schanden* [he who answers before he hears shows his folly, and it is to him a shame]. But that would require the word to be יבושׁ, *pudescit*; בְּלִמָּה (הֵיא לָהּ) means that it becomes to him a ground of merited disgrace. “בְּלִמָּה, properly wounding, i.e., shame (like *atteinte à son honneur*), from בָּלַם (cogn. הָלַם), to strike, hit, wound” (Fl.). *Sirach* (*Pro. 11: 8*) warns against such rash talking, as well as against the rudeness of interrupting others.

**14 The spirit of a man beareth his sickness;
But a broken spirit, who can bear it?**

Pro. 18:14. The breath of the Creator imparting life to man is spoken of as *spiritus spirans*, רוּחַ (רוּחַ חַיִּים), and as *spiritus spiratus*, נֶפֶשׁ (נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה); the spirit (*animus*) is the primary, and the soul (*anima*) the secondary principle of life; the double gender of רוּחַ is accounted for thus: when it is thought of as the primary, and thus in a certain degree (vid., *Psychol.* p. 103 ff.) the manly principle, it is mas. (Gen. 6: 3; Psa. 51:12, etc.). Here the change of gender is in the highest degree characteristic, and אִישׁ also is intentionally used (cf. 1Sa. 26:15) instead of אָדָם, 16a: the courageous spirit of a man which sustains or endures (כָּלֵל R. כָּל, *comprehendere, prehendere*; Luther, “who knows how to contain himself in his sufferings;” cf. Psa. 51:12, “may the free Spirit hold me”) the sickness [*Siechthum*] (we understand here “*siech*” in the old meaning = *sick*) with self-control, is *generis masculini*; while, on the contrary, the רוּחַ נִכְאָה (as Pro. 15:13; 17:22), brought down from its manliness and superiority to disheartened passivity, is *genere feminino* (cf. Psa. 51:12 with v. 19). Fleischer compares the Arab. proverb, *thbât âlnfs bâlghdhâ thbât alrwh balghnâ*, the soul has firmness by nourishment, the spirit by music. ^{f144}

The question מִי יִשְׁאָנָה is like Mar. 9:50: if the salt becomes tasteless, wherewith shall one season it? There is no seasoning for the spice that has become insipid. And for the spirit which is destined to bear the life and fortune of the person, if it is cast down by sufferings, there is no one to lift it up and sustain it. But is not God the Most High the lifter up and the bearer of the human spirit that has been crushed and broken? The answer is, that the manly spirit, 14a, is represented as strong in God; the discouraged, 14b, as not drawing from God the strength and support he ought to do. But passages such as Isa. 66: 2 do not bring it near that we think of the רוּחַ נִכְאָה as alienated from God. The spirit is נֶשְׁמָה, the bearer of the personal and natural life with its functions, activities, and experiences. If the spirit is borne down to powerless and helpless passivity, then within the sphere of the human personality there is no other sustaining power that can supply its place.

**15 The heart of a man of understanding gaineth knowledge,
And the ear of the wise seeketh after knowledge.**

Pro. 18:15. נְבוֹן may be also interpreted as an adj., but we translate it here as at Pro. 14:33, because thus it corresponds with the parallelism; cf. לֵב צַדִּיק, Pro. 15:28, and לֵב חָכָם, Pro. 16:23, where the adj. interpretation is

excluded. The gaining of wisdom is, after Pro. 17:16, referred to the heart: a heart vigorous in embracing and receiving it is above all necessary, and just such an one possesses the נבון, which knows how to value the worth and usefulness of such knowledge. The wise, who are already in possession of such knowledge, are yet at the same time constantly striving to increase this knowledge: their ear seeks knowledge, eagerly asking where it is to be found, and attentively listening when the opportunity is given of מצא, obtaining it.

***16 The gift of a man maketh room for him,
And bringeth him before the great.***

Pro. 18:16. That מתן may signify intellectual endowments, Hitzig supposes, but without any proof for such an opinion. Intellectual ability as the means of advancement is otherwise designated, Pro. 22:29. But Hitzig is right in this, that one mistakes the meaning of the proverb if he interprets מתן in the sense of שחרד (vid., at Pro. 17: 8): מתן is an indifferent idea, and the proverb means that a man makes free space, a free path for himself, by a gift, i.e., by this, that he shows himself to be agreeable, pleasing where it avails, not niggardly but liberal. As a proverb expresses it:

***Mit dem Hut in der Hand
Kommt man durchs ganze Land***

[with hat in hand one goes through the whole land], so it is said here that such liberality brings before the great, i.e., not: furnishes with introductions to them; but helps to a place of honour near the great, i.e., those in a lofty position (cf. לפני, Pro. 22:29; עם, Psa. 113: 8). It is an important part of practical wisdom, that by right liberality, i.e., by liberal giving where duty demands it, and prudence commends it, one does not lose but gains, does not descend but rises; it helps a man over the difficulties of limited, narrow circumstances, gains for him affection, and helps him up from step to step. The ā of מתן is, in a singular way (cf. מתנת, מתנה), treated as unchangeable.

***17 He that is first in his controversy is right;
But there cometh another and searcheth him thoroughly —***

Pro. 18:17. an exhortation to be cautious in a lawsuit, and not to justify without more ado him who first brings forward his cause, and supports it by reasons, since, if the second party afterwards search into the reasons of the first, they show themselves untenable. הראשון בריבו are to be taken together; the words are equivalent to אשר יבא בריבו בראשונה : *qui prior cum causa sua venit*, i.e., *eam ad judicem defert* (Fl.). הראשון may, however,

also of itself alone be *qui prior venit*; and **בְּרִיבוֹ** will be taken with **צָדִיק**: *justus qui prior venit in causa sua (esse videtur)*. The accentuation rightly leaves the relation undecided. Instead of **יָבֵא** (**יָבֵא**) the *Kerî* has **וְבֵא**, as it elsewhere, at one time, changes the fut. into the perf. with **ו** (e.g., Pro. 20: 4, Jer. 6:21); and, at another time, the perf. with **ו** into the fut. (e.g., Psa. 10:10, Isa. 5:29). But here, where the *perf. consec.* is not so admissible, as Pro. 6:11; 20: 4, the fut. ought to remain unchanged. **רָעָהוּ** is the other part, synon. with **בַּעַל דִּין חִבְרוֹ**, *Sanhedrin 7b*, where the **אֶזְהָרָה לְבֵית־דִּין** (admonition for the court of justice) is derived from Deu. 1:16, to hear the accused at the same time with the accuse, that nothing of the latter may be adopted beforehand. This proverb is just such an *audiatur et altera pars*. The *status controversiae* is only brought fairly into the light by the hearing of the *altera pars*: then comes the other and examines him (the first) to the very bottom. **חָקַר**, elsewhere with the accus. of the thing, e.g., **רִיב**, thoroughly to search into a strife, Job. 29:16, is here, as at 28:11, connected with the accus. of the person: to examine or lay bare any one thoroughly; here, so that the misrepresentations of the state of the matter might come out to view along with the reasons assigned by the accuser.

**18 The lot allayeth contentions,
And separateth between the mighty,**

Pro. 18:18. i.e., erects a partition wall between them — those contending (**הַפְּרִיד בֵּין**, as at 2Ki. 2:11, cf. Arab. *fiḵ byn*); **עֲצוּמִים** are not opponents who maintain their cause with weighty arguments (**אֲצֻמוֹת**, Isa. 41:21), *qui argumentis pollent* (vid., Rashi), for then must the truth appear in the *pro et contra*; but mighty opponents, who, if the lot did not afford a seasonable means of reconciliation, would make good their demands by blows and by the sword (Fl.). Here it is the lot which, as the judgment of God, brings about peace, instead of the *ultima ratio* of physical force. The proverb refers to the lot what the Epistle to the Hebrews, Heb. 6:16, refers to the oath, vid., at Pro. 16:33. Regarding **מִדְּיָנִים** and its altered forms, vid., p. 105.

**19 A brother toward whom it has been acted
perfidiously resists more than a strong tower;
And contentions are like the bar of a palace.**

Pro. 18:19. Luther rightly regarded the word **נוֹשֵׁעַ**, according to which the LXX, Vulg., and Syr. translated *frater qui adjuvatur a fratre*, as an incorrect reading; one would rather expect **אִחַ מוֹשִׁיעַ**, “a brother who stands by,” as Luther earlier translated; and besides, **נוֹשֵׁעַ** does not properly mean *adjuvari*, but *salvari*. His translation —

**Ein verletzt Bruder helt herter denn eine feste Stad,
Und Zanck helt herter, denn rigel am Palast**

[a brother wounded resisteth more than a strong city, and strife resisteth more than bolts in the palace], is one of his most happy renderings. **מְקַרְיָתָעוּ** in itself only means **ὕπερ πόλιν ὀχυράν** (*Venet.*); the noun-adjective (cf. Isa. 10:10) to be supplied is to be understood to **עוּ אִזְ הוּא** or **קָשָׁה הוּא** (Kimchi). The *Niph.* **נִפְשַׁע** occurs only here. If one reads **נִפְשַׁע**, then it means one who is treated falsely = **נִפְשַׁע בּוֹ**, like the frequently occurring **קָמִי**, my rising up ones = **קָמִים עָלַי**, those that rise up against me; but Codd. (Also Baer's *Cod. jaman.*) and old editions have **נִפְשַׁע**, which, as we have above translated, gives an impersonal attributive clause; the former: *frater perfidiose tractatus* (Fl.: *mala fide offensus*); the latter: *perfide actum est, scil. בּוֹ* in *eum* = *in quem perfide actum*. **אֵח** is, after Pro. 17:17, a friend in the highest sense of the word; **פָּשַׁע** means to break off, to break free, with **ב** or **אֵל** of him on whom the action terminates. That the **פָּשַׁא** is to be thought of as **אֵח** of the **אֵח נִפְשַׁע** is obvious; the translation, “brothers who break with one another” (Ges.) is incorrect: **אֵח** is not collective, and still less is **נִפְשַׁע** a *reciprocum*. The relation of **אֵח** is the same as that of **אֵלּוּף**, Pro. 16:28. The Targum (improving the Peshito) translates **אָחָא דְמַתְעוּי מִן אָחוּי**, which does not mean: a brother who renounces (Hitzig), but who is treated wickedly on the part of, his brother. That is correct; on the contrary, Ewald's “a brother resists more than...” proceeds from a meaning of **פָּשַׁע** which it has not; and Bertheau gives, with Schultens, an untenable ^{f145} reflexive meaning to the *Niph.* (which as denom. might mean “covered with crime,” *Venet.* **πλημμεληθεῖς**), and, moreover, one that is too weak, for he translates, “a brother is more obstinate then...” Hitzig corrects **אָחוּז פָּשַׁע**, to shut up sin = to hold it fettered; but that is not correct Heb. It ought to be **עָצַר**, **בָּכַשׁ**, or **רָדוּת**. In 19a the force of the substantival clause lies in the **מִן** (more than, i.e., harder = more difficult to be gained), and in 19b in the **ב**; cf. Mic. 7: 4, where they are interchanged. The parallelism is synonymous: strifes and lawsuits between those who had been friends form as insurmountable a hindrance to their reconciliation, are as difficult to be raised, as the great bars at the gate of a castle (Fl.). The point of comparison is not only the weight of the cross-beam (from **בָּרַח**, crosswise, across, to go across the field), but also the shutting up of the access. Strife forms a partition wall between such as once stood near each other, and so much thicker the closer they once stood.

With v. 19, the series of proverbs which began with that of the flatterer closes. The catchword **פִּי**, which occurred at its commencement, 9*b*, is repeated at its close, and serves also as a landmark of the group following 20-24. The proverb of the breach of friendship and of contentions is followed by one of the reaction of the use of the tongue on the man himself.

***20 Of the fruit which a man's mouth bringeth is his heart satisfied;
By the revenue of his lips is he filled.***

Pro. 18:20. He will taste in rich measure of the consequences not merely of the good (Pro. 12:14, cf. 13: 2), but of whatever he has spoken. This is an oxymoron like Mat. 15:11, that not that which goeth into the mouth, but that which cometh out of it, defileth a man. As at Joh. 4:34 the conduct of a man, so here his words are called his **βρῶμα**. Not merely the conduct (Pro. 1:31, Isa. 3:10), but also the words are fruit-bringing; and not only do others taste of the fruit of the words as of the actions of a man, whether they be good or bad, but above all he himself does so, both in this life and in that which is to come.

***21 Death and life are in the power of the tongue;
And whoever loveth it shall eat its fruit.***

Pro. 18:21. The hand, **יָד**, is so common a metaphor for power, that as here a hand is attributed to the tongue, so e.g., Isa. 47:14 to the flame, and Psa. 49:16 to Hades. Death and life is the great alternative which is placed, Deu. 30:15, before man. According as he uses his tongue, he falls under the power of death or attains to life. All interpreters attribute, 21*b*, **וְאֹהֲבֶיהָ** to the tongue: *qui eam (linguam) amant vescentur* (**אֹכְלֵי**, distrib. sing., as Pro. 3:18, 35, etc.) *fructu ejus*. But “to love the tongue” is a strange and obscure expression. He loves the tongue, says Hitzig, who loves to babble. Euchel: he who guards it carefully, or: he who takes care of it, i.e., who applies himself to right discourse. Combining both, Zöckler: who uses it much, as **εὐλογῶν** or **κακολογῶν**. The LXX translates, **οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες αὐτῆς**, i.e., **קַיְיִפִּים**; but **חָזַק** means *prehendere* and *tenere*, not *cohibere*, and the tongue kept in restraint brings forth indeed no bad fruit, but it brings no fruit at all. Why thus? Does the suffix of **וְאֹהֲבֶיהָ**, perhaps like Pro. 8:17, *Chethîb*, refer to wisdom, which, it is true, is not named, but which lies everywhere before the poet's mind? At Pro. 14: 3 we ventured to make **חַכְמָה** the subject of 3*b*. Then 21*b* would be as a miniature of Pro. 8:17-21. Or is **וְאֹהֲבֶיהָ** a mutilation of **וְאֹהֲבֵי יְהוָה**: and he who loves Jahve (Psa. 97:10) enjoys its (the tongue's) fruit?

***22 Whatso hath found a wife hath found a good thing,
And hath obtained favour from Jahve.***

Pro. 18:22. As **וְאִשָּׁה כִּי**, 21b, reminds us of Pro. 8:17, so here not only 22b, but also 22a harmonizes with Pro. 8:35 (cf. Pro. 12: 2). A wife is such as she ought to be, as v. 14, **אִישׁ**, a man is such as he ought to be; the LXX, Syr., Targ., and Vulgate supply *bonam*, but “gnomic brevity and force disdains such enervating adjectives, and cautious limitations of the idea” (Fl.). Besides, **אִשָּׁה טוֹבָה** in old Hebr. would mean a well-favoured rather than a good-dispositioned wife, which later idea is otherwise expressed, Pro. 19:14; 31:10. The *Venet.* rightly has **γυναῖκα**, and Luther *ein Ehefrau*, for it is a married woman that is meant. The first **מִצָּא** is *perf. hypotheticum*, Gesen. § 126, Anm. 1. On the other hand, Ecc. 7:26, “I found, **מִן־צָאֵן**, more bitter than death the woman,” etc.; wherefore, when in Palestine one married a wife, the question was wont to be asked: **מִצָּא אִם מוֹצָא**, has he married happily (after **מִצָּא** of the book of Proverbs) or unhappily (after **מוֹצָא** of Ecclesiastes) (*Jebamoth 63b*)? ^{f146}

The LXX adds a distich to v. 22, “He that putteth away a good wife putteth away happiness; and he that keepeth an adulteress, is foolish and ungodly.” He who constructed this proverb [added by the LXX] has been guided by **מִצָּא** to **מוֹצָא** (Ezr. 10: 3); elsewhere **ἐκβάλλειν, γυναῖκα**, Gal. 4:30, Sir. 28:15, is the translation of **גָּרַשׁ**. The Syr. has adopted the half of that distich, and Jerome the whole of it. On the other hand, vv. 23, 24, and Pro. 19: 1, 2, are wanting in the LXX. The translation which is found in some Codd. is that of Theodotion (vid., Lagarde).

23 The poor uttereth suppliant entreaties; And the rich answereth rudenesses.

Pro. 18:23. The oriental proverbial poetry furnishes many parallels to this. It delights in the description of the contrast between a suppliant poor man and the proud and avaricious rich man; vid., e.g., Samachschari's *Goldene Halsbänder*, No. 58. **תְּחַנְּנִים**, according to its meaning, refers to the *Hithpa. תְּחַנְּנִין*, *misericordiam alicujus pro se imploravit*; cf. the old vulgar “*barmen*,” i.e., to seek to move others to *Erbarmen* [compassion] (**רַחֲמִים**). **אִזּוֹת**, *dura*, from **עָז** (synon. **קָשָׁה**), hard, fast, of bodies, and figuratively of an unbending, hard, haughty disposition, and thence of words of such a nature (Fl.). Both nouns are accus. of the object, as Job. 40:27, **תְּחַנְּנִים** with the parallel **רַכּוֹת**. The proverb expresses a fact of experience as a consolation to the poor to whom, if a rich man insults him, nothing unusual occurs, and as a warning to the rich that he may not permit himself to be divested of humanity by mammon. A hard wedge to a hard clod; but whoever, as the Scripture saith,

grindeth the poor by hard stubborn-hearted conduct, and grindeth his bashful face (Isa. 3:15), challenges unmerciful judgment against himself; for the merciful, only they shall obtain mercy, *αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται* (Mat. 5: 7).

**24 A man of many friends cometh off a loser;
But there is a friend more faithful than a brother.**

Pro. 18:24. Jerome translates the commencing word by *vir*, but the Syr., Targ. by *אִישׁ*, which is adopted by Hitzig, Böttcher, and others. But will a German poet use in one line “*itzt*” [same as *jetzt* = now], and in the next “*jetzt*”? and could the Hebrew poet prefer to *אִישׁ* its rarer, and her especially not altogether unambiguous form *אִישׁ* (cf. to the contrary, Ecc. 7:15)? We write *אִישׁ*, because the Masora comprehends this passage, with 2Sa. 14:19, Mic. 6:10, as the *גַּם סְבִירִין אִישׁ*, i.e., as the three, where one ought to expect *אִישׁ*, and is thus exposed to the danger of falling into error in writing and reading; but erroneously *אִישׁ* is found in all these three places in the *Masora magna* of the Venetian Bible of 1526; elsewhere the Masora has the *defectiva scriptio* with like meaning only in those two other passages. While *אִישׁ* = *אִישׁ*, or properly *אִישׁ*, with equal possibility of *אִישׁ*,^{f147} and it makes no material difference in the meaning of 24a whether we explain: there are friends who serve to bring one to loss: or a man of many friends comes to loss, — the *inf.* with *ל* is used in substantival clauses as the expression of the most manifold relations, Gesen. § 132, Anm. 1 (cf. at Hab. 1:17), here in both cases it denotes the end, as e.g., Psal. 92: 8, to which it hastens with many friends, or with the man of many friends. It is true that *אִישׁ* (like *בְּאִל*) is almost always connected only with genitives of things; but as one says *אִישׁ אֱלֹהִים* : a man belongs to God, so may one also say *אִישׁ רַעִים* : a man belongs to many friends; the common language of the people may thus have named a man, to whom, because he has no definite and decided character, the rule that one knows a man by his friends is not applicable, a so-called every-man’s-friend, or all-the-world’s-friend. Theodotion translates *ἀνήρ ἐταιριῶν τοῦ ἐταιρεύσασθαι*; and thus also the Syr., Targ., and Jerome render (and among the moderns, Hitzig) *הִתְרַעַא* as reflexive in the sense of to cherish social intercourse; but this reflexive is *הִתְרַעַה*, Pro. 22:24. That *הִתְרוַעַא* is either *Hithpa.* of *רוַעַ*, to exult, Psal. 60:10; 65:14, according to which the *Venet.* translates (contrary to Kimchi) *ὥστε ἀλαλάζειν*: such an one can exult, but which is not true, since, according to 24b, a true friend outweighs the many; or it is *Hithpa.* of *רַעַ*, to be wicked, sinful (Fl.: *sibi perniciem paraturus est*); or, which we prefer, warranted by Isa. 24:19, of *רַעַ*, to become brittle (Böttcher and others) —

which not only gives a good sense, but also a similar alliteration with רעים, as Pro. 3:29; 13:20. In contradistinction to אר, which is a general, and, according to the usage of the language (e.g., 17b), a familiar idea, the true friend is called, in the antithetical parallel member, אהב (Pro. 27: 6); and after Pro. 17:17, דבק משה, one who remains true in misfortune. To have such an one is better than to have many of the so-called friends; and, as appears from the contrast, to him who is so fortunate as to have one such friend, there comes a blessing and safety. Immanuel has given the right explanation: “A man who sets himself to gain many friends comes finally to be a loser (סופו להשבר), for he squanders his means, and is impoverished in favour of others.” And Schultens:

At est amicus agglutinatus prae fratre. Rarum et carum esse genus insinuatur, ac proinde intimam illam amicitiam, quae conglutinet compingatque corda, non per multos spargendam, sed circumspecte et ferme cum uno tantum ineundam.

Thus closes this group of proverbs with the praise of friendship deepened into spiritual brotherhood, as the preceding, v. 19, with a warning against the destruction of such a relation by a breach of trust not to be made good again.

CHAPTER 19

Pro. 19: 1. The plur. רעים, Pro. 18:24, is emphatic and equivalent to רבים רעים. The group 1-4 closes with a proverb which contains this catchword. The first proverb of the group comes by שפתיו into contact with Pro. 18:20, the first proverb of the preceding group.

*1 Better a poor man walking in his innocence,
Than one with perverse lips, and so a fool.*

The contrast, Pro. 28: 6, is much clearer. But to correct this proverb in conformity with that, as Hitzig does, is unwarrantable. The Syr., indeed, translates here as there; but the Chald. assimilates this translation to the Heb. text, which Theodotion, and after him the Syro-Hexapl., renders by ὑπὲρ στρεβλόχειλον ἄφρονα. But does 1a form a contrast to 1b? Fleischer remarks: “From the contrast it appears that he who is designated in 1b must be thought of as עשיר” [rich]; and Ewald, “Thus early the ideas of a rich man and of a fool, or a despiser of God, are connected together.” Saadia understands כסיל [a fool], after Job. 31:24, of one who makes riches his כסל [confidence]. Euchel accordingly translates: the false man, although he builds himself greatly up, viz., on his riches. But כסיל designates the intellectually slothful,

in whom the flesh overweighs the mind. And the representation of the rich, which, for 1b certainly arises out of 1a, does not amalgamate with כסיל, but with עקש שִׁפְתָיו. Arama is on the right track, for he translates: the rich who distorts his mouth (cf. p. 104), for he gives to the poor suppliant a rude refusal. Better Zöckler: a proud man of perverse lips and haughty demeanour. If one with haughty, scornful lips is opposed to the poor, then it is manifestly one not poor who thinks to raise himself above the poor, and haughtily looks down on him. And if it is said that, in spite of this proud demeanour, he is a fool, then this presents the figure of one proud of his wealth, who, in spite of his emptiness and nequitia, imagines that he possesses a greatness of knowledge, culture, and worth corresponding to the greatness of his riches. How much better is a poor man than such an one who walketh (vid., on אָם, p. 56) in his innocence and simplicity, with his pure mind wholly devoted to God and to that which is good! — his poverty keeps him in humility which is capable of no malicious conduct; and this pious blameless life is of more worth than the pride of wisdom of the distinguished fool. There is in contrast to עֲקֻשׁוֹת a simplicity, ἀπλότης, of high moral worth; but, on the other side, there is also a simplicity which is worthless. This is the connecting thought which introduces the next verse.

***2 The not-knowing of the soul is also not good,
And he who hasteneth with the legs after it goeth astray.***

Pro. 19: 2. Fleischer renders נֶפֶשׁ as the subj. and לֹא-טוֹב as neut. pred.: in and of itself sensual desire is not good, but yet more so if it is without foresight and reflection. With this explanation the words must be otherwise accentuated. Hitzig, in conformity with the accentuation, before us: if desire is without reflection, it is also without success. But where נֶפֶשׁ denotes desire or sensuality, it is always shown by the connection, as e.g., Pro. 23: 2; here דָּאֵת, referring to the soul as knowing (cf. Ps. 139:14), excludes this meaning. But נֶפֶשׁ is certainly *gen. subjecti*; Luzzatto's "self-knowledge" is untenable, for this would require דַּעַת נֶפֶשׁוֹ; *Meiri* rightly glosses דַּעַת נֶפֶשׁ by שִׁבַּל. After this Zöckler puts Hitzig's translation right in the following manner: where there is no consideration of the soul, there is no prosperity. But that also is incorrect, for it would require אֵין-טוֹב; לֹא-טוֹב is always pred., not a substantival clause. Thus the proverb states that בלא-דעת נפשׁ is not good, and that is equivalent to הֵיזֵת בלא-דעת נפשׁ (for the subject to לֹא-טוֹב is frequently, as e.g., Pro. 17:26; 18: 5, an infinitive); or also: בלא-דעת נפשׁ is a virtual noun in the sense of the not-knowing of the soul; for to say לא-דעת בלי דעת was syntactically inadmissible, but the expression is בלא-דעת, not בלי דעת

(בְּבִלְיָ), because this is used in the sense unintentionally or unexpectedly. The נָם which begins the proverb is difficult. If we lay the principal accent in the translation given above on “not good,” then the placing of נָם first is a *hyperbaton* similar to that in Pro. 17:26; 20:11; cf. אָסָה, 17:11; רָקָה, 13:10, as if the words were: if the soul is without knowledge, then also (*eo ipso*) it is destitute of anything good. But if we lay the principal accent on the “also,” then the meaning of the poet is, that ignorance of the soul is, like many other things, not good; or (which we prefer without on that account maintaining ^{f148} the original connection of v. 1 and v. 2), that as on the one side the pride of wisdom, so on the other ignorance is not good. In this case נָם belongs more to the subject than to the predicate, but in reality to the whole sentence at the beginning of which it stands. To hasten with the legs (אָסָה, as Pro. 28:20) means now in this connection to set the body in violent agitation, without direction and guidance proceeding from the knowledge possessed by the soul. He who thus hastens after it without being intellectually or morally clear as to the goal and the way, makes a false step, goes astray, fails (vid., Pro. 8:36, where אָסָה is the contrast to מְצָאָה).

**3 The foolishness of a man overturneth his way,
And his heart is angry against Jahve.**

Pro. 19: 3. Regarding סָלַף, vid., at Pro. 11: 3; also the Arab. signification “to go before” proceeds from the root conception *pervertere*, for first a letting precede, or preceding (e.g., of the paying before the delivery of that which is paid for: *salaf*, a pre-numbering, and then also: advanced money), consisting in the reversal of the natural order, is meant. The way is here the way of life, the walking: the folly of a man overturns, i.e., destroys, his life’s-course; but although he is himself the fabricator of his own ruin, yet the ill-humour (אָסָה, *aestuate*, vid., at Psa. 11: 6) of his heart turns itself against God, and he blames (LXX essentially correct: ἀνομιᾶται) God instead of himself, viz., his own madness, whereby he has turned the grace of God into lasciviousness, cast to the winds the instruction which lay in His providences, and frustrated the will of God desiring his good. A beautiful paraphrase of this parable is found at Sir. 15:11-20; cf. Lam. 3:39.

**4 Wealth bringeth many friends;
But the reduced — his friend separateth himself.**

Pro. 19: 4. The very same contrast, though otherwise expressed, we had at Pro. 14:20. Regarding הֹוֹן, vid., p. 44. דָּל is the tottering, or he who has fallen into a tottering condition, who has no resources, possesses no means. The accentuation gives *Mugrash* to the word (according to which the Targ.

translates), for it is not the subject of **יָפַרְדּוּ**: the reduced is separated (pass. *Niph.*) by his misfortunes, or must separate himself (reflex. *Niph.*) from his friend (**מֵרֵעֵהוּ**, as Ecc. 4: 4, *prae socio suo*); but subject of the virtual pred. **יָפַרְדּוּ מֵרֵעֵהוּ**: the reduced — his friend (**מֵרֵעֵהוּ**, as v. 7) separates himself, i.e., (according to the nature of the Semitic substantival clause) he is such (of such a fate) that his friend sets himself free, whereby **מִמֶּנּוּ** may be omitted as self-obvious; **נִפְרַד** means one who separates himself, Pro. 18: 1. If we make **דָּל** the subject of the *separatur*, then the initiative of the separation from the friend is not expressed.

In vv. 5 and 9 we have the introductory proverb of two groups, the former of which, in its close as well as its beginning, cannot be mistaken.

***5 A lying witness remaineth not unpunished;
And he who breathes out lies escapeth not.***

Pro. 19: 5. Regarding **יָפִיחַ**, vid., p. 107: as here we read it of false witness at Pro. 6:19; 14: 5, 25. **לֹא יִנְקָה** occurs four times before, the last of which is at Pro. 17: 5. The LXX elsewhere translates **יָפִיחַ כֹּזְבִים** by *ἔκκαλιν ψευδῆ*, to kindle lies; but here by *ὁ δὲ ἐγκαλῶν ἀδίκως*, and at v. 9 by *ὁς δ' ἂν ἔκκαύσῃ κακίαν*, both times changing only because *ψευδής* goes before, and instead of *ψευδῆ*, the choice of a different rendering commended itself.

***6 Many stroke the cheeks of the noble;
And the mass of friends belongeth to him who gives.***

Pro. 19: 6. The phrase **חִלּוֹת פָּנָי פֹּל** signifies to stroke the face of any one, from the fundamental meaning of the verb **חָלָה**, to rub, to stroke, Arab. *khala*, with which the Heb., meaning to be sick, weak (*viribus attritum esse*), and the Arabic: to be sweet (properly *laevem et politum, glabrum esse, or palatum demulcere, leniter stringere, contrast asperum esse ad gustum*), are connected (Fl.). The object of such insinuating, humble suing for favour is the **נְדִיב** (from **נָדַב**, *instigare*), the noble, he who is easily incited to noble actions, particularly to noble-mindedness in bestowing gifts and in doing good, or who feels himself naturally impelled thereto, and spontaneously practises those things; cf. the Arab. *krym, nobilis* and *liberalis* (Fl.), and at Job. 21:28; parall. **אִישׁ מֵתֵן**, a man who gives willingly, as **אִישׁ חָמָה**, Pro. 15:18, one who is easily kindled into anger. Many (**רַבִּים**, as Job. 11:19) stroke the face of the liberal (Lat. *caput mulcent* or *demulcent*); and to him who gives willingly and richly belongs **כָּל-הָרֵא**, the mass (the totality) of good friends, cf. Pro. 15:17; there the art. of **הָרֵא**, according to the manner of expression of the Arab.

grammarians, stood for “the exhaustion of the characteristic properties of the genus”: the friend who corresponds to the nature (the idea) of such an one; here it stands for “the comprehension of the individuals of the genus;” all that is only always friend. It lies near with Ewald and Hitzig to read **וְכֹלֵהוּ רֵא** (and every one is friend...) (**כֹּלֵהוּ** = **כֹּלוּ**, as Jer. 8:10, etc.); but why could not **כָּל־הָרֵא** be used as well as **כָּל־הָאָדָם**, perhaps with the sarcastic appearance which the above translation seeks to express? The LXX also had **וְכֹל הָרַע** in view, which it incorrectly translates **πᾶς δὲ ὁ κακός**, whereby the Syr. and the Targ. are led into error; but **מִתֵּן** is not one and the same with **שָׁחַד**, vid., Pro. 18: 6. On the contrary, there certainly lies before us in v. 7 a mutilated text. The tristich is, as we have shown, p. 12, open to suspicion; and the violence which its interpretation needs in order to comprehend it, as a formal part of *7ab*, places it beyond a doubt, and the LXX confirms it that *7c* is the remainder of a distich, the half of which is lost.

Pro. 19: 7ab. We thus first confine our attention to these two lines, —

*All the brethren of the poor hate him;
How much more do his friends withdraw themselves from him?*

Regarding **אֵין כִּי**, *quanto magis*, vid., at Pro. 11:31; 15:11; 17: 7. In a similar connection Pro. 14:20 spake of hatred, i.e., the cooling of love, and the manifesting of this coldness. The brethren who thus show themselves here, unlike the friend who has become a brother, according to Pro. 17:17, are brothers-german, including kindred by blood relation. **כָּל** has *Mercha*, and is thus without the *Makkeph*, as at Psa. 35:10 (vid., the Masora in Baer’s *Liber Psalmorum*, 1861, p. 133). Kimchi (*Michlol* 205a), Norzi, and others think that *cāl* (with **קָמַץ רָחַב**) is to be read as at Isa. 40:12, where **וְכָל** is a verb. But that is incorrect. The case is the same as with **אֵת**, 3:12; Psa. 47: 5; 60: 2. As here *ě* with *Mercha* remains, so *ō* with *Mercha* in that twice occurring **וְכָל**; that which is exceptional is this, that the accentuated **כָּל** is written thus twice, not as the usual **כָּל**, but as **כָּל** with the *Makkeph*. The ground of the exception lies, as with other peculiarities, in the special character of metrical accentuation; the *Mercha* represents the place of the *Makkeph*, and — thus remains in the unchanged force of a *Kametz-Chatuph*. The plur. **רֵאקוּ** does not stamp **מַרְעֵהוּ** as the defectively written plur.; the suffix *ēhu* is always sing., and the sing. is thus, like **הָרֵא**, *6b*, meant collectively, or better: generally (in the sense of kind), which is the linguistic usage of these two words, 1Sa. 30:26; Job. 42:10. But it is worthy of notice that the Masoretic form here is not **מַרְעֵהוּ**, but **מְרַעֵהוּ**, with *Sheva*. The Masora adds to it the remark **לִית**,

and accordingly the word is thus written with *Sheva* by Kimchi (*Michlol* 202a and *Lex.* under the word **רעה**), in Codd., and older editions. The *Venet.*, translating by **ἀπὸ τοῦ φίλου αὐτοῦ**, has not noticed that. But how? Does the punctuation **מרעהו** mean that the word is here to be derived from **מַרְא**, *maleficus*? Thus understood, it does not harmonize with the line of thought. From this it is much more seen that the punctuation of the inflected **מַרְא**, *amicus*, fluctuates. This word **מַרְא** is a formation so difficult of comprehension, that one might almost, with Olshausen, § 210; Böttcher, § 794; and Lagarde, regard the **מ** as the partitive **מִן**, like the French *des amis* (cf. Eurip. *Med.* 560: **πένητα φεύγει πᾶς τις ἔκποδὼν φίλος**), or: something of friend, a piece of friend, while Ewald and others regard it as possible that **מרע** is abbreviated from **מרעה**. The punctuation, since it treats the *Tsere* in **מרעהו**, 4b^{f149} and elsewhere, as unchangeable, and here in **מרעהו** as changeable, affords proof that in it also the manner of the formation of the word was incomprehensible.

Seeking after words which are vain.

Pro. 19: 7c. If now this line belongs to this proverb, then **מַרְדֵּף** must be used of the poor, and **לֹא־הִקְמָה**, or **לֹא־הִקְמָה** (vid., regarding the 15 *Keris*, **לו** for **לא**, at Psa. 100: 3), must be the attributively nearer designation of the **אֲמָרִים**. The meaning of the *Kerî* would be: he (the poor man) hunts after mere words, which — but no actions corresponding to them — are for a portion to him. This is doubtful, for the principal matter, that which is not a portion to him, remains unexpressed, and the **לֹא־הִקְמָה** [to him they belong] affords only the service of guarding one against understanding by the **אֲמָרִים** the proper words of the poor. This service is not in the same way afforded by **לֹא־הִקְמָה** [they are not]; but this expression characterizes the words as vain, so that it is to be interpreted according to such parallels as Hos. 12: 2: words which are not, i.e., which have nothing in reality corresponding to them, *verba nihili*, i.e., the empty assurances and promises of his brethren and friends (Fl.). The old translators all^{f150} read **לא**, and the Syr. and Targ. translate not badly: **שְׂרִיר לֹא מְלוֹי לֹא**; Symmachus, **ρήσεσιν ἀνυπάρκτοις**. The expression is not to be rejected: **לֹא־הִקְמָה** sometimes means to come to **לא**, i.e., to nothing, Job. 6:21, Eze. 21:32, cf. Isa. 15: 6; and **לֹא־הוּא**, he is not = has no reality, Jer. 5:12, **אֲמָרִים לֹא־הִמָּה**, may thus mean words which are nothing (vain). But how can it be said of the poor whom everything forsakes, that one dismisses him with words behind which there is nothing, and now also that he pursues such words? The former supposes always a sympathy, though it be a feigned one,

which is excluded by **וַיִּשְׂנְאֻהוּ** [they hate him] and **וַיִּקְרָךְ** [withdraw themselves]; and the latter, spoken of the poor, would be unnatural, for his purposed endeavour goes not out after empty talk, but after real assistance. So 7c: pursuing after words which (are) nothing, although in itself not falling under critical suspicion, yet only of necessity is connected with this proverb regarding the poor. The LXX, however, has not merely one, but even four lines, and thus two proverbs following 7b. The former of these distichs is: **Ἐννοια ἀγαθὴ τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτὴν ἐγγιεῖ, ἀνὴρ δὲ φρόνιμος εὐρήσει αὐτήν**; it is translated from the Hebr. (**ἔννοια ἀγαθή**, 5: 2 = **תָּמַן**), but it has a meaning complete in itself, and thus has nothing to do with the fragment 7c. The second distich is: **Ὁ πολλὰ κακοποιῶν τελεσιουργεῖ κακίαν, ὃς δὲ ἐρεθίζει λόγους οὐ σωθήσεται**. This **ὃς δὲ ἐρεθίζει λόγους** is, without doubt, a translation of **מְרַדֵּם מְרַדֵּם** (7c); **λόγους** is probably a corruption of **λόγοις** (thus the Complut.), not, he who pursueth words, but he who incites by words, as Homer (*Il.* iv. 5 f.) uses the expression **ἐρεθίζεμεν ἐπέεσσι**. The concluding words, **οὐ σωθήσεται**, are a repetition of the Heb. **לֹא יִמְלֹךְ** (cf. LXX Pro. 19: 5 with Pro. 28:26), perhaps only a conjectural emendation of the unintelligible **הַמָּה לֹא**. Thus we have before us in that **ὁ πολλὰ κακοποιῶν, κ.τ.λ.**, the line lost from the Heb. text; but it is difficult to restore it to the Hebrew. We have attempted it, p. 13. Supposing that the LXX had before them **הַמָּה לֹא**, then the proverb is —

***“He that hath many friends is rewarded with evil,
Hunting after words which are nothing;”***

i.e., since this his courting the friendship of as many as possible is a hunting after words which have nothing after them and come to nothing.

***8 He that getteth understanding loveth his soul,
And he that values reasonableness will acquire good;***

Pro. 19: 8. or, more closely, since this would be the translation of **טוֹב יִמְצָא**, Pro. 16:20; 17:20: so it happens, or it comes to this, that he acquires good (= **לְמַצְאוֹ**); the *inf.* with **ל** is here, as at Pro. 18:24, the expression of a *fut. periphrasticum*, as in the Lat. *consecturus est*. Regarding **קִנְיַת לֵב**, vid., Pro. 15:32, and **שִׁמְרַת בּוֹנָה** p. 85. That the deportment of men is either care for the soul, or the contrary of that, is a thought which runs through the Book of Proverbs.

The group of proverbs (vv. 9-16) now following begins and closes in the same way as the preceding.

**9 A lying witness doth not remain unpunished,
And one who breathes out lies perisheth,**

Pro. 19: 9. or goeth to ruin, for **בָּדַד** (R. **בד**, to divide, separate) signifies to lose oneself in the place of the separated, the dead (Arab. in the infinite). In v. 5, instead of this **ἀπολείται** (LXX), the negative **οὐ σωθήσεται** is used, or as the LXX there more accurately renders it, **οὐ διαφεύξεται**.

**10 Luxury becometh not a fool;
How much less a servant to rule over princes.**

Pro. 19:10. Thus also with **לֹא נִשְׂתָּחַת** (3 p. *Pil. non decet*, cf. the adj. 26: 1) 17: 7 begins. **כִּי** rises here, as at v. 7, *a minori ad majus*: how much more is it unbecoming = how much less is it seemly. The contrast in the last case is, however, more rugged, and the expression harsher. “A fool cannot bear luxury: he becomes by it yet more foolish; one who was previously a humble slave, but how has attained by good fortune a place of prominence and power, from being something good, becomes at once something bad: an insolent *sceleratus*” (Fl.). Agur, xxx. 22 f., describes such a *homo novus* as an unbearable calamity; and the author of the Book of Ecclesiastes, written in the time of the Persian domination, speaks, Ecc. 10: 7, of such. The LXX translates, **καὶ ἐὰν οἰκέτης ἄρξηται μεθ’ ὑβρεως δυναστεύειν**, rendering the phrase **בְּשָׂרִים** by **μεθ’ ὑβρεως**, but all other translators had **בְּשָׂרִים** before them.

**11 The discretion of a man maketh him long-suffering,
And it is a glory for him to be forbearing toward transgression.**

Pro. 19:11. The Syr., Targum, Aquila, and Theodotion translate **הַאֲרִיךְ אָפוֹ** by **μακροθυμία**, and thus read **הַאֲרִיךְ**; but Rashi, Kimchi, and others remark that **הַאֲרִיךְ** is here only another vocalization for **הַאֲרִיךְ**, which is impossible. The *Venet.* also translates: **Νοῦς ἀνθρώπου μακρυνεῖ τὸν θυμὸν ἑαυτοῦ**; the correct word would be **ἀντοῦ**: the discretion (*intellectus* or *intelligentia*; vid., regarding **שָׂכַל**, Pro. 3: 4) of a man extends his anger, i.e., brings it about that it continues long before it breaks out (vid., Pro. 14:29). One does not stumble at the perf. in view of v. 7, Pro. 18: 8; 16:26, and the like; in the proverbial style the fut. or the particip. is more common. In the synonymous parallel member, **תִּפְאַרְתּוֹ** points to man as such: it is an honour to him to pass by a transgression (particularly that which affects himself), to let it go aside, i.e., to forbear revenge or punishment (cf. Arab. *tjāwz ʿaly*); thus also the divine **πάρεσις** (Rom. 3:25) is designated by Mic. 7:18; and in Amo. 7: 8; 8: 2, **עַבַּד** stands absol. for the divine remission or passing by, i.e., unavenging of sin.

**12 A murmuring as of a lion is the wrath of the king,
And as dew on plants is his favour.**

Pro. 19:12. Line 1 is a variation of 20: 2a; line 2a of Pro. 16:15 b. **נִאָרַץ** is not the being irritated against another, but generally ill-humour, fretfulness, bad humour; the murmuring or growling in which this state of mind expresses itself is compared to that of a lion which, growling, prepares and sets itself to fall upon its prey (vid., Isa. 5:29, cf. Amo. 3: 4). Opposed to the **זַעַף** stands the beneficial effect of the **רְצוֹן**, i.e., of the pleasure, the delight, the satisfaction, the disposition which shows kindness (LXX τὸ ἰλαρὸν αὐτοῦ). In the former case all are afraid; in the latter, everything lives, as when the refreshing dew falls upon the herbs of the field. The proverb presents a fact, but that the king may mirror himself in it.

**13 A foolish son is destruction for his father,
And a continual dropping are the contentions of a wife.**

Pro. 19:13. Regarding **הָוֵת**, vid., at Pro. 17: 4, cf. Pro. 10: 3. Line 2a is expanded, Pro. 27:15, into a distich. The dropping is **טָרַד**, properly striking (cf. Arab. *tirad*, from *tarad* III, hostile assault) when it pours itself forth, stroke (drop) after stroke = constantly, or with unbroken continuity. Lightning-flashes are called (*Jer Berachoth*, p. 114, Shitomir's ed.) **טורדין**, *opp.* **מפסיקין**, when they do not follow in intervals, but constantly flash; and *b. Bechoroth* 44a; **דומעות**, weeping eyes, **דולפות**, dropping eyes, and **טורדות**, eyes always flowing, are distinguished. An old interpreter (vid., R. Ascher in *Pesachim* II No. 21) explains **טָרַד** by: “which drops, and drops, and always drops.” An Arab proverb which I once heard from Wetzstein, says that there are three things which make our house intolerable: *âltakḵ* (= *âldhalf*), the trickling through of rain; *âlnakḵ*, the contention of the wife; and *âlbakḵ*, bugs.

**14 House and riches are a paternal inheritance,
But from Jahve cometh a prudent wife.**

Pro. 19:14. House and riches (*opulentia*), which in themselves do not make men happy, one may receive according to the law of inheritance; but a prudent wife is God's gracious gift, Pro. 18:22. There is not a more suitable word than **משֻׁבֶּלֶת** (fem. of **מִשְׁבִּיל**) to characterize a wife as a divine gift, making her husband happy. **שְׂבִיל** (**הַשְּׂבִיל**) is the property which says: “I am named modesty, which wears the crown of all virtues.” ^{f151}

**15 Slothfulness sinketh into deep sleep,
And an idle soul must hunger.**

Pro. 19:15. Regarding תִּרְדָּמָה and its root-word רָדַם, vid., at Pro. 10: 5. הִפִּיל, to befall, to make to get, is to be understood after Gen. 3:21; the obj. עַל-הָאָדָם, viz., הָעֵצֶל, is naturally to be supplied. In 15*b* the fut. denotes that which will certainly happen, the inevitable. In both of its members the proverb is perfectly clear; Hitzig, however, corrects 15*a*, and brings out of it the meaning, “slothfulness gives tasteless herbs to eat.” The LXX has two translations of this proverb, here and at Pro. 18: 8. That it should translate רַמְיָה by ἀνδρόγυνος was necessary, as Lagarde remarks, for the exposition of the “works of a Hebrew Sotades.” But the Hebrew literature never sunk to such works, wallowing in the mire of sensuality, and ἀνδρόγυνος is not at all thus enigmatical; the Greek word was also used of an effeminate man, a man devoid of manliness, a weakling, and was, as the LXX shows, more current in the Alexandrine Greek than elsewhere.

***16 He that keepeth the commandment keepeth his soul;
He that taketh no heed to his ways dies.***

Pro. 19:16. As at 6:23, cf. Ecc. 8: 5, מִצְוָה is here the commandment of God, and thus obligatory, which directs man in every case to do that which is right, and warns him against that which is wrong. And בּוֹנֵה דְרָכָיו (according to the Masora with *Tsere*, as in Codd. and old editions, not בּוֹנֵה) is the antithesis of נֹצֵר דְרָכָיו, Pro. 16:17. To despise one’s own way is equivalent to, to regard it as worth no consideration, as no question of conscience whether one should enter upon this way or that. Hitzig’s reading, פּוֹנֵר, “he that scattereth his ways,” lets himself be drawn by the manifold objects of sensuality sometimes in one direction and sometimes in another, is supported by Jer. 3:13, according to which it must be מִפְּנֵר; the conj. is not in the style of the Book of Proverbs, and besides is superfluous. The LXX, which is fond of a *quid pro quo* — it makes, 13*b*, a courtesan offering a sacrifice she had vowed of the wages of sin of the quarrelsome woman — has here, as the Heb. text: ὁ καταφρονῶν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ὀδῶν ἀπολείται. Thus after the *Kerî* יָמָת, as also the Targ., Syro-Hexap., and Luther; on the contrary, the Syr., Jerome, the *Venet.* adopt the *Chethîb* יָמָת: he will become dead, i.e., dies no natural death. The *Kerî* is more in the spirit and style of the Book of Proverbs (Pro. 15:10; 23:13; 10:21).

Pro. 19:17-21. These verses we take together. But we have no other reason for making a pause at v. 21, than that v. 22 is analogous to v. 17, and thus presents itself to us as an initial verse.

***17 He lendeth to Jahve who is compassionate to the lowly,
And his bounty He requites to him.***

Pro. 19:17. As at Pro. 14:31, חוֹנֵן is *part. Kal.* The Masoretically exact form of the word is חוֹנֵן (as חוֹנֵן, Pro. 20:14) with *Mercha* on the first syllable, on which the tone is thrown back, and the העמדה on the second. The Roman legal phrase, *mutui datione contrahitur obligatio*, serves to explain the fundamental conception of לָוֶה, *mutuo accipere*, and הֶלְוָה, *mutuum dare* (vid., 22: 7). The construction, Exo. 22:24, “to make any one bound as a debtor, *obligare*,” lies at the foundation of the genitive connection מְלוֹהָהּ (not מְלוֹהָהּ). With 17b cf. Pro. 12:14, where the subject of יָשִׁיב (*Keri*) remains in the background. גְּמֻלוֹ (not גְּמֻלוֹ) is here his work done in the sense of good exhibited. “Love,” Hedinger once said, “is an imperishable capital, which always bears interest.” And the Archbishop Walther: *nam Deo dat qui dat inopibus, ipse Deus est in pauperibus*. Dr. Jonas, as Dächsel relates, once gave to a poor man, and said, “Who knows when God restores it!” There Luther interposed: “As if God had not long ago given it beforehand!” This answer of Luther meets the abuse of this beautiful proverb by the covetous.

Pro. 19:18. This proverb brings to view once more the pedagogic character of this Older Book of Proverbs:

***Correct thy son, for yet there is hope;
But go not too far to kill him.***

That כִּי is meant relatively, as at Pro. 11:15, is seen from Job. 11:18; 14: 7; Jer. 31:16 f.; כִּי־יֵשׁ תִּקְוָה is the usual expression for *etemin spes est*. Though a son show obstinacy, and manifest a bad disposition, yet there is hope in the training of the youth of being able to break his self-will, and to wean him from his bad disposition; therefore his education should be carried forward with rigorous exactness, but in such a way that wisdom and love regulate the measure and limits of correction: *ad eum interficiendum animam ne tollas (animum ne inducas)*. נִפְשָׁךְ is not the subject, for in that case the word would have been תִּשְׂאֵךְ (2Ki. 14:10). It is the object: To raise the soul to something is equivalent to, to direct his desire to it, to take delight in it. The teacher should not seek correction as the object, but only as the means; he who has a desire after it, to put the child to death in the case of his guilt, changes correction into revenge, permits himself to be driven by passion from the proper end of correction, and to be pushed beyond its limits. The LXX translates freely εἰς δὲ ὑβρίν, for ὑβρίς is unrestrained abuse, מוֹסֵר אֲבוֹרִי as Immanuel glosses. Besides, all the ancients and also the *Venet.* translate הַמִּיתוֹ as the inf. of הִמִּית. But Oetinger (for he translates: lift not thy soul to his cry, for which Euchel: let not his complaining move thy compassion) follows the

derivation from **חמה** suggested by Kimchi, *Meiri*, and Immanuel, and preferred by Ralbag, so that **המיתו** after the from **בבית** is equivalent to **המיתו**. But leaving out of view that **חמה** means *strepere*, not *lamentari*, and that **נשא נפשו** means attention, not desire, Pro. 23:13 points out to us a better interpretation.

Pro. 19:19. Another proverb with **נשא**:

*A man of excessive wrath must suffer punishment;
For if thou layest hold of it, hindering it, thou makest it only worse.*

The LXX, Syr., and Targ. translate as if the words were **גבר חמה** (as **חמה באל**, Pro. 29:22). Theodotion, the *Venet.*, and Luther render the *Kerî*-**גדל**; Jerome's *impatiens* is colourless. The *Chethîb* **גרל** gives no appropriate meaning. The Arab. *jaril* means *lapidosus* (whence **גורל**, cf. Aram. **פסא** = **ψηφος**), and Schultens translates accordingly *aspere scruposus iracundiae*, which is altogether after the manner of his own heavy style. Ewald translates **גרל** as derived from the Arab *jazył*, *largus*, *grandis*; but the possibility of the passing over of **ר** into **ג**, as maintained by Ewald and also by Hitzig, or the reverse, is physiologically undemonstrable, and is confirmed by no example worthy of mention. Rather it may be possible that the Heb. had an adj. **גרל** or **גרל** in the sense of stony, gravel-like, hard as gravel, but tow rather than gravel would be appropriate to **חמה**. Hitzig corrects **גמל חמה**, “who acts in anger;” but he says **שלם חמה**, to recompense anger, Isa. 59:18; **גמל חמה** is without support. This correction, however, is incomparably more feasible than Böttcher's, “moderate inheritance bears expiation;” **חמה** = **חמאה** must mean not only thick [curdled] milk, but also moderation, and Böttcher finds this “sound.” From all these instances one sees that **גרל** is an error in transcription; the *Kerî*-**גדל-חמה** rightly improves it, a man is thus designated whose peculiarity it is to fall into a high degree of passionate anger (**חמה גדולה**, Dan. 11:44): such an one has to bear **עניש**, a fine, i.e., to compensate, for he has to pay compensation or smart-money for the injury suffered, as e.g., he who in strife with another pushes against a woman with child, so that injury befalls her, Exo. 21:22. If we compare this passage with 2Sa. 14: 6, there appears for **תציל** the meaning of taking away of the object (whether a person or a thing) against which the passionate hothead directs himself. Therewith the meaning of **ועוד תוסף** accords. The meaning is not that, **הציל**, once is not enough, but much rather must be repeated, and yet is without effect; but that one only increases and heightens the **חמה** thereby. It is in vain to seek to spare such a

violent person the punishment into which he obstinately runs; much more advisable is it to let him rage till he ceases; violent opposition only makes the evil the greater. With **כִּי אִם**, “denn wenn” [for then], cf. 2: 3, “ja wenn” [yea if], and with **וְעוֹד** in the conclusion, Job. 14: 7 (a parallelism syntactically more appropriate than Psa. 139:18).

***20 Hearken to counsel, and receive instruction,
That thou mayest become wise afterwards.***

Pro. 19:20. The rule of morals, Pro. 12:15 *b*, receives here the paraenetic tone which is the keynote of the introduction 1-9. Löwenstein translates: that thou mayest finally become wise. But **בְּאַחֲרֵי יָמָיךְ** corresponds rather to our “hinfort” [*posthac*] than to “endlich” [finally]. He to whom the warning is directed must break with the self-willed, undisciplined **רֵאשִׁית** [beginning] of his life, and for the future (**τὸν ἐπίλοιπον ἐν σαρκὶ χρόνον**, 1Pe. 4: 2) become wise. The relative contrast between the two periods of life is the same as at Job. 8: 7.

***21 Many are the thoughts in a man's heart;
But Jahve's counsel, that stands.***

Pro. 19:21. In **תְּקוּמָה** lies, as at Isa. 40: 8, both: that the counsel of God (His plan of the world and of salvation) is accomplished and comes into actual fact, and that it continues. This counsel is the true reality elevated above the checkered manifoldness of human purposes, aims, and subjectivities, which penetrates and works itself out in history. The thoughts of a man thus gain unity, substance, endurance, only in so far as he subjects himself to this counsel, and makes his thoughts and actions conformable and subordinate to this counsel.

Pro. 19:22. The series makes a new departure with a proverb regarding the poor (cf. v. 17):

***A man's delight is his beneficence;
And better is a poor man than a liar.***

The right interpretation will be that which presses upon **תְּאֵוֹתָי** no strange meaning, and which places the two parts of the verse in an inner mutual relation ethically right. In any case it lies nearer to interpret **תְּאֵוֹתָי**, in relation to man, actively than passively: that which makes man worthy of desire (Rashi), adorns and distinguishes him (Kimchi, Aben-Ezra); or, that which is desired by man, is above all things sought for (Luzzatto); and, in like manner, the Heb. meaning for **חֲסִדָּי** lies nearer than the Aram. (vid., Pro. 14:34): the

pleasure of a man is his disgrace (Ralbag). Thus Bertheau's translation: the desire of a man is his *charitas*, must mean: that which brings to a man true joy is to act amiably. But is that, thus generally expressed, true? And if this were the thought, how much more correctly and distinctly would it be expressed by **שְׂמֵחָה לְאָדָם עֲשׂוֹת חֶסֶד** (cf. Pro. 21:15)! Hitzig so rightly reminded by **חֶסֶד** of the Pharisee who thanks God that he is not as other men; the word ought to have been **חֶסֶד** to remove every trace of self-satisfaction. Hitzig therefore proposes from the LXX and the Vulgate the text-correction **מִתְבוֹאֵת**, and translates, "from the revenue of a man is his kind gift;" and Ewald, who is satisfied with **תְּבוֹאֵת**, "the gain of a man is his pious love." The latter is more judicious: **חֶסֶד** (love) distributed is in reality gain (according to v. 17); but 22*b* corresponds rather with the former: "better is he who from want does not give **תְּבוֹאָה**, than he who could give and says he has nothing." But was there then need for that **καρπός** of the LXX? If a poor man is better than a lord given to lying, — for **אִישׁ** with **רֶשֶׁת** is a man of means and position, — i.e., a poor man who would give willingly, but has nothing, than that man who will not give, and therefore lies, saying that he has nothing; then 22*a* means that the will of a man (cf. **תְּאוֹת**, Pro. 11:23) is his doing good (vid., regarding **חֶסֶד**, ad Pro. 3: 3), i.e., is its soul and very essence. Euchel, who accordingly translates: the philanthropy of a man consists properly in his goodwill, rightly compares the Rabbinical proverb, **אֶחָד הַמְרַבֵּה וְאֶחָד הַמִּמְעִיט וּבִלְבָד שִׁיתְכוּוֹן**, i.e., one may give more or less, it all depends on the intention, the disposition.

**23 The fear of Jahve tendeth to life;
Satisfied, one spendeth the night, not visited by evil.**

Pro. 19:23. The first line is a variation of Pro. 14:27 *a*. How the fear of God thus reacheth to life, i.e., helps to a life that is enduring, free from care and happy, 23*b* says: the promises are fulfilled to the God-fearing, Deu. 11:15 and Lev. 26: 6; he does not go hungry to bed, and needs fear no awakening in terror out of his soft slumber (Pro. 3:24). With **ו** *explic.*, 23*a* is explained. **שָׁבַא** **לַיִן** means to spend the night (the long night) hungry. as **לַיִן עָרוֹם**, Job. 24: 7, to pass the night in nakedness (cold). **נִפְקָד**, of visitation of punishment, we read also at Isa. 29: 6, and instead of **בְּרַע**, as it might be according to this passage, we have here the accus. of the manner placing the meaning of the *Niph.* beyond a doubt (cf. Pro. 11:15, **רַע**, in an evil manner). All is in harmony with the matter, and is good Heb.; on the contrary, Hitzig's ingenuity introduces, instead of **וְשָׁבַא**, an unheard of word, **וְשָׂרַע**, "and he stretches himself." One of the Greeks excellently translates: **καὶ ἐμπλησθεὶς ἀβλισθήσεται ἄνευ ἐπισκοπῆς πονηρᾶς**. The LXX, which instead of **רַע**,

γνώσις, translates thus, נִשְׂתִּי, discredits itself. The Midrash — Lagarde says of its translation — varies in colour like an opal. In other words, it handles the text like wax, and forms it according to its own taste, like the Midrash with its “read not so, but so.”

***24 The slothful hath thrust his hand into the dish;
He bringeth it not again to his mouth.***

Pro. 19:24. This proverb is repeated in a different form, Pro. 26:15. The figure appears, thus understood, an hyperbole, on which account the LXX understand by צִלְחָה the bosom of lap, κόλπον; Aquila and Symmachus understand by it the arm-pit, μασχάλην of μάλην; and the Jewish interpreters gloss it by חֵיק (Kimchi) or קֶרַע הַחֲלוּק, the slit (Ita. *fenditura*) of the shirt. But the domestic figure, 2Ki. 21:13, places before us a dish which, when it is empty, is wiped and turned upside down; ^{f152} and that the slothful when he eats appears too slothful to bring his hand, e.g., with the rice or the piece of bread he has taken out of the dish, again to his mouth, is true to nature: we say of such a man that he almost sleeps when he eats. The fut. after the perf. here denotes that which is not done after the former thing, i.e., that which is scarcely and only with difficulty done; לֹא ... נִשְׂתִּי may have the meaning of “yet not,” as at Psa. 129: 2; but the sense of “not once” = *ne...quidem*, lies here nearer Deu. 23: 3.

***25 The scorner thou smitest, and the simple is prudent;
And if one reprove the man of understanding, he gaineth knowledge***

Pro. 19:25. Hitzig translates in a way that is syntactically inexact: smite the scorner, so the simple becomes prudent; that would have required at least the word נִשְׂתִּי: fut. and fut. connected by ו is one of many modes of expression for the simultaneous, discussed by me at Hab. 3:10. The meaning of the proverb has a complete commentary at Pro. 21:11, where its two parts are otherwise expressed with perfect identity of thought. In regard to the לִץ, with whom denunciation and threatening bear no fruit (Pro. 13: 1; 15:12), and perhaps even produce the contrary effect to that intended (Pro. 9: 7), there remains nothing else than to vindicate the injured truths by means of the private justice of corporal punishment. Such words, if spoken to the right man, in the right spirit, at the right time, may affect him with wholesome terrors; but even though he is not made better thereby, yet the simple, who listens to the mockeries of such not without injury, will thereby become prudent (gain הַעֲרִים = עֲרָמָה, prudence, as at Pro. 15: 5), i.e., either arrive at the knowledge that the mockery of religion is wicked, or guard himself against incurring the same repressive measures. In 25b וְהוֹכַח is neither inf.

(Umbreit), which after Pro. 21:11b must be **וְבַהֲלוֹכָה**, nor impr. (Targ., Ewald), which according to rule is **הוֹלֵכָה**, but the hypothetic perf. (Syr.) with the most general subject (Merc., Hitzig): if one impart instruction to the (dat. obj. as Pro. 9: 7; 15: 2) man of understanding (vid., Pro. 16:21), then he acquires knowledge, i.e., gains an insight into the nature and value of that which one wishes to bring him to the knowledge of (**הַבֵּין דְּאִתָּה**), as Pro. 29: 7; cf. 8: 5). That which the deterring lesson of exemplary punishment approximately effects with the wavering, is, in the case of the man of understanding, perfectly attained by an instructive word.

We have now reached the close of the third chief section of the older Book of Proverbs. All the three sections begin with **בֵּן חָכָם**, Pro. 10: 1; 13: 1; 15:20. The Introduction, 1-9, dedicates this collection of Solomonian proverbs to youth, and the three beginnings accordingly relate to the relative duties of a son to his father and mother. We are now no longer far from the end, for Pro. 22:17 resumes the tone of the Introduction. The third principal part would be disproportionately large if it extended from Pro. 15: 1 to Pro. 22:15. But there does not again occur a proverb beginning with the words “son of man.” We can therefore scarcely go wrong if we take Pro. 19:26 as the commencement of a fourth principal part. The Masora divides the whole *Mishle* into eight *sedarim*, which exhibit so little knowledge of the true division, that the *parashas* (sections) Pro. 10: 1; 22:17 do not at all find their right place. ^{f153}

The MSS, however, contain evidences that this Hagiograph was also anciently divided into *parashas*, which were designated partly by spaces between the lines (*sethumoth*) and partly by breaks in the lines (*phethucoth*). In Baer's *Cod. Jamanensis*, ^{f154} after Pro. 6:19, there is the letter **פ** written on the margin as the mark of such a break. With Pro. 6:20 (vid., *l.c.*) there indeed commences a new part of the introductory *Mashal* discourses. But, besides, we only seldom meet with ^{f155} coincidences with the division and grouping which have commended themselves to us. In the MS of the *Graecus Venetus*, Pro. 19:11, 16, and 19 have their initial letters coloured red; but why only these verses, is not manifest. A comparison of the series of proverbs distinguished by such initials with the *Cod. Jaman.* and *Cod. II* of the Leipzig City Library, makes it more than probable that it gives a traditional division of the *Mishle*, which may perhaps yet be discovered by a comparison of MSS. ^{f156}

But this much is clear, that a historico-literary reconstruction of the *Mishle*, and of its several parts, can derive no help from this comparison.

Pro. 19:26. With Pro. 19:26 there thus begins the fourth principal part of the Solomonian collection of proverbs introduced by 1-9.

***He that doeth violence to his father and chaseth his mother,
Is a son that bringeth shame and disgrace.***

The right name is given in the second line to him who acts as is described in the first. שָׂדֵד means properly to barricade [*obstruere*], and then in general to do violence to, here: to ruin one both as to life and property. The part., which has the force of an attributive clause, is continued in the finite: *qui matrem fugat*; this is the rule of the Heb. style, which is not φιλομέτοχος, Gesen. § 134, Anm. 2. Regarding מְבִישׁ, vid., at Pro. 10: 5; regarding the placing together of הַבִּישׁ וְהַחֲפִיר, vid., Pro. 13: 5, where for הַבִּישׁ, to make shame, to be scandalous, the word הַבְּאִישׁ, which is radically different, meaning to bring into bad odour, is used. The putting to shame is in בּוֹשׁ (kindred with Arab. *bâth*) thought of as *disturbatio* (cf. σύγχυσις) (cf. at Psa. 6:11), in חֲפֵר (*khfr*) as *opertio* (cf. Cicero's *Cluent.* 20: *infamia et dedecore opertus*), not, as I formerly thought, with Fürst, as reddening, blushing (vid., Psa. 34: 6). Putting to shame would in this connection be too weak a meaning for מְחַפֵּיר. The paedagogic stamp which v. 26 impresses on this fourth principal part is made yet further distinct in the verse that now follows.

***27 Cease, my son, to hear instruction,
To depart from the words of knowledge.***

Pro. 19:27. Oetinger correctly: cease from hearing instruction if thou wilt make no other use of it than to depart, etc., i.e., cease to learn wisdom and afterwards to misuse it. The proverb is, as Ewald says, as “bloody irony;” but it is a dissuasive from hypocrisy, a warning against the self-deception of which Jam. 1:22-24 speaks, against heightening one's own condemnation, which is the case of that servant who knows his lord's will and does it not, Luk. 12:47. חָדַל, in the meaning to leave off doing something further, is more frequently construed with ל *seq. infin.* than with מִן (cf. e.g., Gen. 11: 8 with 1Ki. 15:21); but if we mean the omission of a thing which has not yet been begun, then the construction is with ל, Num. 9:13, Instead of לְשָׁנוֹת, there might have been also used מְלַשְׁנוֹת (omit rather...than...), and לְמֵאן שְׁנוֹת would be more distinct; but as the proverb is expressed, לְשָׁנוֹת is not to be mistaken as the subord. infin. of purpose. The LXX, Syr., Targ., and Jerome do violence to the proverb. Luther, after the example of older interpreters: instruction, that which leads away from prudent learning; but *musar* always means either discipline weaning from evil, or education leading to good.

***28 A worthless witness scoffeth at right;
And the mouth of the godless swalloweth up mischief.***

Pro. 19:28. The Mosaic law does not know the oath of witnesses; but the adjuring of witnesses to speak the truth, Lev. 4: 1, places a false statement almost in the rank of perjury. The **מִשְׁפָּט**, which legally and morally binds witnesses, is just their duty to state the matter in accordance with truth, and without deceitful and malicious reservation; but a worthless witness (vid., regarding **בְּלִיאַל**, Pro. 6:12) despiseth what is right (**לִיִּי** with accus.-obj. like Pro. 14: 9), i.e., scornfully disregards this duty. Under 28b Hitzig remarks that **בלע** only in *Kal* means to devour, but in *Piel*, on the contrary, to absorb = annihilate; therefore he reads with the LXX and Syr. **דִּין** [justice] instead of **אֵוֶן** [mischief]: the mouth of the wicked murders that which is right, properly, swallows down his feeling of right. But **בלע** interchanges with **בלע** in the sense of swallowing only, without the connected idea of annihilation; cf. **בְּבִלַע** for the continuance [duration] of a gulp = for a moment, Num. 4:20 with Job. 7:29; and one can thus understand 28b without any alteration of the text after Job. 15:16; cf. 20:12-15, as well as with the text altered after Isa. 3:12, by no means so that one makes **אֵוֶן** the subject: mischief swallows up, i.e., destroys, the mouth of the wicked (Rashi); for when “mouth” and “to swallow” stand connected, the mouth is naturally that which swallows, not that which is swallowed (cf. Ecc. 10:12: the mouth of the fool swallows, i.e., destroys, him). Thus 28b means that wickedness, i.e., that which is morally perverse, is a delicious morsel for the mouth of the godless, which he eagerly devours; to practise evil is for him, as we say, “*ein wahrer Genuss*” [a true enjoyment].

***29 Judgments are prepared for scorers,
And stripes for the backs of fools.***

Pro. 19:29. **שְׁפָטִים** never means punishment which a court of justice inflicts, but is always used of the judgments of God, even although they are inflicted by human instrumentality (vid., 2Ch. 24:24); the singular, which nowhere occurs, is the segolate *n. act.* **שְׁפָט** = **שְׁפֹט**, 2Ch. 20: 9, plur. **שְׁפֹטִים**. Hitzig’s remark: “the judgment may, after v. 25, consist in stripes,” is misleading; the stroke, **הַכּוֹת**, there is such as when, e.g., a stroke on the ear is applied to one who despises that which is holy, which, under the circumstances, may be salutary; but it does not fall under the category of *shephuthim*, nor properly under that of **מַהֲלָמוֹת**. The former are providential chastisements with which history itself, or God in history, visits the despiser of religion; the latter are strokes which are laid on the backs of fools by one who is instructing them, in order, if possible, to bring them to thought and understanding. **נְכוֹן**, here

inflected as *Niph.*, is used, as Job. 15:23, as meaning to be placed in readiness, and thus to be surely imminent. Regarding *mahalūmoth*, vid., at Pro. 18: 6.

CHAPTER 20

Pro. 20: 1. This proverb warns against the debauchery with which free-thinking is intimately associated.

***Wine is a mocker, mead boisterous;
And no one who is overtaken thereby is wise.***

The article stands with ׁ. Ewald maintains that in Proverbs 10-22: 6 the article occurs only here and at Pro. 21:31, and that it is here, as the LXX shows, not original. Both statements are incorrect. The article is found, e.g., at Pro. 19: 6; 18:18, 17, and here the personification of “wine” requires it; but that it is wanting to שָׁכַר shows how little poetry delights in it; it stands once for twice. The effects of wine and mead (שָׁכַר from שָׁכַר, to stop, obstruct, become stupid) are attributed to these liquors themselves as their property. Wine is a mocker, because he who is intoxicated with it readily scoffs at that which is holy; mead is boisterous (cf. הוֹמֵיָה, Pro. 7:11), because he who is inebriated in his dissolute madness breaks through the limits of morality and propriety. He is unwise who, through wine and the like, i.e., overpowered by it (cf. 2Sa. 13:28), staggers, i.e., he gives himself up to wine to such a degree that he is no longer master of himself. At Pro. 5:19 we read, שָׁנָה בּ, of the intoxication of love; here, as at Isa. 28: 7, of the intoxication of wine, i.e., of the passionate slavish desire of wine or for wine. The word “*Erpicht*” [avidissimus], i.e., being indissolubly bound to a thing, corresponds at least in some degree to the idea. Fleischer compares the French: *être fou de quelque chose*. Isa. 28: 7, however, shows that one has to think on actual staggering, being overtaken in wine.

***2 A roaring as of a lion is the terror of the king;
And he that provoketh him forfeiteth his life.***

Pro. 20: 2. Line first is a variation of Pro. 19:12. The terror which a king spreads around (מֶלֶךְ, *gen. subjecti.*, as, e.g., at Job. 9:34 and generally) is like the growling of a lion which threatens danger. The thought here suggested is that it is dangerous to arouse a lion. Thus מְתַאֲבֵרֵי does not mean: he who is angry at him (*Venet.*: *χολούμενος αὐτῷ*), but he who provokes him (LXX, Syr., Targ., Jerome, Luther). מְתַאֲבֵרֵי signifies, as we saw at Pro. 14:16, to be in a state of excessive displeasure, extreme anger. Here the meaning must be: he who puts him into a state of anger (LXX, *ὁ παροξύνων αὐτόν*, in other versions with the addition of *καὶ ἐπιμυγνύμενος*, who conducts himself

familiarly towards him = מתערבו). But can *mitharvo* have this meaning? That the *Hithpa.* of transitive stems, e.g., התחנן (1Ki. 8:59) and השתמר (Mic. 6:16), is construed with the accus. of that which any one performs for himself (cf. Ewald's *Gramm. Arab.* § 180), is not unusual; but can the *Hithpa.* of the intrans. עבר, which signifies to fall into a passion, “express with the accusative the passion of another excited thereby” (Ewald, § 282a)? There is no evidence for this; and Hitzig's conjecture, מתעברו (*Tiphel* of the Targ. תעבור = עברה), is thus not without occasion. But one might suppose that התאבר, as the reflexive of a *Piel* or *Hiphil* which meant to be put into a state of anger, may mean to draw forth the anger of any one, as in Arab., the VIIIth form (*Hithpa.*) of *ḥadr*, to be present, with the accus. as reflexive of the IVth form, may mean: *sibi aliquid praesens sistere*. Not so difficult is הָטָא with the accus. of that which is missing, vid., Pro. 8:36 and Hab. 2:10.

***3 It is an honour to a man to remain far from strife;
But every fool showeth his teeth.***

Pro. 20: 3. Or better: whoever is a fool *quisquis amens*, for the emphasis does not lie on this, that every fool, i.e., every single one of this sort, contends to the uttermost; but that whoever is only always a fool finds pleasure in such strife. Regarding התנלע, vid., Pro. 17:14; 18: 1. On the contrary, it is an honour to a man to be peaceable, or, as it is here expressed, to remain far from strife. The phrase may be translated: to desist from strife; but in this case the word would be pointed שבת, which Hitzig prefers; for שבת from שבת means, 2Sa. 23: 7, annihilation (the termination of existence); also Exo. 21:19, שבתו does not mean to be keeping holy day; but to be sitting, viz., at home, in a state of incapability for work. Rightly Fleischer: “ישב מן”, like Arab. *ḵ ad ṣan*, to remain sitting quiet, and thus to hold oneself removed from any kind of activity.” He who is prudent, and cares for his honour, not only breaks off strife when it threatens to become passionate, but does not at all enter into it, keeps himself far removed from it.

***4 At the beginning of the harvest the sluggard plougheth not;
And so when he cometh to the reaping-time there is nothing.***

Pro. 20: 4. Many translators (Symmachus, Jerome, Luther) and interpreters (e.g., Rashi, Zöckler) explain: *propter frigus*; but חרף is, according to its verbal import, not a synon. of קר and צננה, but means gathering = the time of gathering (synon. אסף), from חרף, *carpere*,^{f157} as harvest, the time of the καρπίζειν, the plucking off of the fruit; but the harvest is the beginning of the old Eastern agricultural year, for in Palestine and Syria the time of ploughing

and sowing with the harvest or early rains (יָרָה = חָרִיף, Neh. 7:24; Ezr. 2:18) followed the fruit harvest from October to December. The מֵן is thus not that of cause but of time. Thus rendered, it may mean the beginning of an event and onwards (e.g., 1Sa. 30:25), as well as its termination and onwards (Lev. 27:17): here of the harvest and its ingathering and onwards. In 4b, the *Chethîb* and *Kerî* vary as at Pro. 18:17. The *fut.* יִשְׁאַל would denote what stands before the sluggard; the *perf.* וְשָׂאֵל places him in the midst of this, and besides has this in its favour, that, interpreted as *perf. hypotheticum*, it makes the absence of an object to שָׂאֵל more tenable. The *Chethîb*, וְשָׂאֵל, is not to be read after Psa. 109:10: he will beg in harvest — in vain (Jerome, Luther), to which Hitzig well remarks: Why in vain? Amid the joy of harvest people dispense most liberally; and the right time for begging comes later. Hitzig conjecturally arrives at the translation:

***“A pannier the sluggard provideth not;
Seeketh to borrow in harvest, and nothing cometh of it.”***

But leaving out of view the “pannier,” the meaning “to obtain something as a loan,” which שָׂאֵל from the connection may bear, is here altogether imaginary. Let one imagine to himself an indolent owner of land, who does not trouble himself about the filling and sowing of his fields at the right time and with diligence, but leaves this to his people, who do only as much as is commanded them: such an one asks, when now the harvest-time has come, about the ingathering; but he receives the answer, that the land has lain unploughed, because he had not commanded it to be ploughed. When he asks, there is nothing, he asks in vain (וְאִין), as at Pro. 14: 6; 13: 4). *Meîri* rightly explains מַחְרֵף by מִתְחַלֵּת זֶמַן הַחֲרִישָׁה, and 4b by: “so then, when he asks at harvest time, he will find nothing;” on the other hand, the LXX and Aram. think on חָרַף, *carpere conviciis*, as also in Codd. here and there is found the meaningless מַחְרֵף.

***5 The purpose in the heart of a man is deep water;
But a man of understanding draweth it out.***

Pro. 20: 5. “Still waters are deep.” Like such deep waters (Pro. 18: 4) is that which a man hath secretly (Isa. 29:15) planned in his heart. He keeps it secret, conceals it carefully, craftily misleads those who seek to draw it out; but the man of תְּבוּנָה, i.e., one who possesses the right criteria for distinguishing between good and bad, true and false, and at the same time has the capacity to look through men and things, draws out (the *Venet.* well, ἀνέλξει) the secret עֲצָה, for he penetrates to the bottom of the deep water. Such an one does not deceive himself with men, he knows how to estimate their conduct according

to its last underlying motive and aim; and if the purpose is one that is pernicious to him, he meets it in the process of realization. What is here said is applicable not only to the subtle statesman and the general, but also the pragmatical historian and the expositor, as, e.g., of a poem such as the book of Job, the idea of which lies like a pearl at the bottom of deep water.

***6 Almost every one meeteth a man who is gracious to him;
But a man who standeth the test, who findeth such a one?***

Pro. 20: 6. As צִיר אֱמוּנִים, Pro. 13:17, signifies a messenger in whom there is confidence, and אֵד אֱמוּנִים, Pro. 14: 5, a witness who is altogether truthful, so אִישׁ אֱמוּנִים is a man who remains true to himself, and maintains fidelity toward others. Such an one it is not easy to find; but patrons who make promises and awaken expectations, finally to leave in the lurch him who depends on them — of such there are many. This contrast would proceed from 6a also, if we took קָרָא in the sense of to call, to call or cry out with ostentation: *multi homines sunt quorum suam quisque humanitatem proclamant* (Schelling, Fleischer, Ewald, Zöckler, and also, e.g., *Meïri*). But אִישׁ חֲסִדוֹ is certainly to be interpreted after 11:17, Isa. 57: 1. Recognising this, Hitzig translates: many a man one names his dear friend; but in point of style this would be as unsuitable as possible. Must אִישׁ חֲסִדוֹ then mean *vocat*? A more appropriate parallel word to אִישׁ חֲסִדוֹ is אִישׁ חֲסִדוֹ = אִישׁ חֲסִדוֹ, according to which, with Oetinger, Heidenheim, Euchel, and Löwenstein, we explain: the greater part of men meet one who shows himself to them (to this or that man) as אִישׁ חֲסִדוֹ, a man well-affectioned and benevolent; but it is rare to find one who in his affection and its fruits proves himself to be true, and actually performs that which was hoped for from him. Luther translates, with the Syr. and Targ. after Jerome: *Viel Menschen werden From gerühmt* [many men are reputed pious]; but if אִישׁ חֲסִדוֹ were equivalent to אִישׁ חֲסִדוֹ, then אִישׁ חֲסִדוֹ ought to have been used instead of אִישׁ חֲסִדוֹ. The LXX read רַב אָדָם יָקָר אִישׁ חֲסִדוֹ, man is something great, and a compassionate man is something precious; but it costs trouble to find out a true man. The fundamental thought remains almost the same in all these interpretations and readings: love is plentiful; fidelity, rare; therefore אִישׁ חֲסִדוֹ, of the right kind, after the image of God, is joined to אֱמוּנָה.

***7 He who in his innocence walketh as one upright,
Blessed are his children after him!***

Pro. 20: 7. We may not take the first line as a separate clause with צַדִּיק, as subject (Van Dyk, Elster) or predicate (Targ.); for, thus rendered, it does not appropriately fall in as parallel to the second line, because containing nothing of promise, and the second line would then strike in at least not so

unconnectedly (cf. on the contrary, Pro. 10: 9; 14:25). We have before us a substantival clause, of which the first line is the complex subject. But Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther erroneously: the just man walking in his innocence; this placing first of the adj. is in opposition to the Hebr. syntax. We must, if the whole is to be interpreted as nom., regard צַדִּיק as permutative: one walking in his innocence, a righteous one. But, without doubt, *tsedek* is the accus. of the manner; in the manner of one righteous, or in apposition: as one righteous; cf. Job. 31:26 with Mic. 2: 7. Thus Hitzig rightly also refers to these two passages, and Ewald also refers to Pro. 22:11; 24:15. To walk in his innocence as a righteous man, is equivalent to always to do that which is right, without laying claim to any distinction or making any boast on that account; for thereby one only follows the impulse and the direction of his heart, which shows itself and can show itself not otherwise than in unreserved devotion to God and to that which is good. The children after him are not the children after his death (Gen. 24:67); but, according to Deu. 4:40, cf. Job. 21:21, those who follow his example, and thus those who come after him; for already in the lifetime of such an one, the benediction begins to have its fulfilment in his children.

The following group begins with a royal proverb, which expresses what a king does with his eyes. Two proverbs, of the seeing eye and the necessary opening of the eyes, close it.

***8 A king sitting on the seat of justice,
Scattereth asunder all evil with his eyes.***

Pro. 20: 8. Excellently the *Venet.* ἐπὶ θρόνου δίκης, for כִּסֵּא־דִין is the name of the seat of rectitude (the tribunal), as the “throne of grace,” Heb. 4:17, is the name of the *capporeth* as the seat of mercy; the seat of the judge is merely called כִּסֵּא; on the other hand, כִּסֵּא־דִין is the contrast of כִּסֵּא־הַחַיִּים, Psa. 94:20: the seat from which the decision that is in conformity with what is right (cf. e.g., Jer. 5:28) goes forth, and where it is sought. As little here as at v. 26 is there need for a characterizing adj. to *melek*; but the LXX hits the meaning for it, understands such to ἵπ: ὅταν βασιλεὺς δίκαιος καθίσῃ ἐπὶ θρόνου. By the “eyes” are we then to understand those of the mind: he sifts, *dignoscit*, with the eyes of the mind all that is evil, i.e., distinguishes it subjectively from that which is not evil? Thus Hitzig by a comparison of Psa. 11: 4; 139: 3 (where Jerome has *eventilasti*, the Vulg. *investigasti*). Scarcely correctly, for it lies nearer to think on the eyes in the king’s head (vid., Pro. 16:15); in that case: to winnow (to sift) means to separate the good and the bad, but first mediately: to exclude the bad; finally, v. 26 leads to the conclusion that מִזְרָה is to be understood, not of a subjective, but of an actual scattering, or separating, or driving away. Thus the penetrating, fear-inspiring

eyes of the king are meant, as Immanuel explains: **ומפזר אותם בכל פיאה** **בראיית עיניו מבריהם מפניו**. But in this explanation the personal rendering of **כָּל־רָע** is incorrect; for *mezareh*, meant of the driving asunder of persons, requires as its object a plur. (cf. 26a). *Col-ra* is understood as neut. like 5:14. Before the look of a king to whom it belongs to execute righteousness and justice (Isa. 16: 5), nothing evil stands; criminal acts and devices seen through, and so also judged by these eyes, are broken up and scattered to all the winds, along with the danger that thereby threatened the community. It is the command: “put away the evil” (Deu. 13: 6 [5]), which the king carries into effect by the powerful influence of his look. With *col-ra* there is connected the thought that in the presence of the heavenly King no one is wholly free from sin.

***9 Who can say I have made my heart clean,
I am pure from my sins?***

Pro. 20: 9. It is the same time thought that Solomon expresses in his prayer at the consecration of the temple, 1Ki. 8:46: there is no man who sinneth not. To cleanse his heart (as Psa. 73:13), is equivalent to to empty it, by self-examination and earnest effort after holiness, of all impure motives and inclinations; vid., regarding **זכה**, to be piercing, shining brightly, cloudlessly pure, Fleischer in Levy’s *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 424. The consequence of **זכות** is, becoming pure; and the consequence of **זכוּת לֵב**, i.e., of the purifying of the heart, the being pure from sinful conduct: I have become pure from my sins, i.e., from such as I might fall into by not resisting temptations; the suffix is not understood as actual, but as potential, like Psa. 18:24. No one can boast of this, for man’s knowledge of himself and of his sins remains always limited (Jer. 17: 9 f.; Psa. 19:13); and sin is so deeply rooted in his nature (Job. 14: 4; 15:14-16), that the remains of a sinful tendency always still conceal themselves in the folds of his heart, sinful thoughts still cross his soul, sinful inclinations still sometimes by their natural force overcome the moral resistance that opposes them, and stains of all kinds still defile even his best actions.

Pro. 20:10. This proverb passes sentence of condemnation against gross sins in action and life.

***Diverse stones, diverse measures —
An abomination to Jahve are they both.***

The stones are, as at Pro. 11: 1; 16:11, those used as weights. Stone and stone, ephah and ephah, means that they are of diverse kinds, one large and one small (the LXX, in which the sequence of the proverbs from v. 10 is different, has

μέγα καὶ μικρόν), so that one may be able deceitfully to substitute the one for the other. אִיפָה (from אָפָה, to bake) may originally have been used to designate such a quantity of meal as supplied a family of moderate wants; it corresponds to the *bath* (Eze. 45:11) as a measure for fluids, and stands here synecdochically instead of all the measures, including, e.g., the *cor*, of which the *ephah* was a tenth part, and the *seah*, which was a third part of it. 10b = 17: 5, an echo of Lev. 19:36; Deu. 25:13-16. Just and equal measure is the demand of a holy God; the contrary is to Him an abhorrence.

***11 Even a child maketh himself known by his conduct,
Whether his disposition be pure and whether it be right.***

Pro. 20:11. If מַעֲלָל may be here understood after the use of עוֹלָל, to play, to pass the time with anything, then גַּם refers thereto: even by his play (Ewald). But granting that מַעוּלָל [children], synon. with נַעַר, had occasioned the choice of the word מַעֲלָל (vid., Fleischer on Isa. 3: 4), yet this word never means anything else than work, an undertaking of something, and accomplishing it; wherefore Böttcher proposes מַעֲלוּלָיו, for מַעֲלוּל may have meant play, in contradistinction to מַעֲלָל. This is possible, but conjectural. Thus *gam* is not take along with *b'amalalay*. That the child also makes himself known by his actions, is an awkward thought; for if in anything else, in these he must show what one has to expect from him. Thus *gam* is after the syntactical method spoken of at Pro. 17:26; 19: 2, to be referred to נַעַר (also the child, even the child), although in this order it is referred to the whole clause. The verb נָכַר is, from its fundamental thought, to perceive, observe from an ἐναντιόσημον: to know, and to know as strange, to disown (vid., under Isa. 3: 9); the *Hithpa.* elsewhere signifies, like (Arab.) *tankkar*, to make oneself unknowable, but here to make oneself knowable; Symmachus, ἐπιγνωρισθήσεται, Venet. γνωσθήσεται. Or does the proverb mean: even the child dissembles in his actions (Oetinger)? Certainly not, for that would be a statement which, thus generally made, is not justified by experience. We must then interpret 11b as a direct question, though it has the form of an indirect one: he gives himself to be known, viz., whether his disposition be pure and right. That one may recognise his actions in the conduct of any one, is a platitude; also that one may recognise his conduct in these, is not much better. פֶּאֵל is therefore referred by Hitzig to God as the Creator, and he interprets it in the sense of the Arab. *khulk*, being created = *natura*. We also in this way explain יִצְרָנוּ, Psa. 103:14, as referable to God the יִצְרָ; and that *Poal* occurs, e.g., Isa. 1:31, not merely in the sense of action, but also in that of performance or structure, is favourable to this interpretation. But one would think that *poal*, if thus used in the sense of the nature of man, would have more frequently

occurred. It everywhere else means action or work. And thus it is perhaps also here used to denote action, but regarded as habitual conduct, and according to the root-meaning, moral disposition. The N.T. word ἔργον approaches this idea in such passages as Gal. 6: 4. It is less probable that 11*b* is understood with reference to the future (Luther and others); for in that case one does not see why the poet did not make use of the more intelligible phrase יְהִיָּה פְעֵלֹו אִם זָךְ וַיִּשָּׂר. It is like our (Germ.) proverb: *Was ein Haken werden will krümmt sich bald* [what means to become a hook bends itself early]; or: *Was ein Dörnchen werden will spitzt sich bei Zeiten* ^{f158} [what means to become a thorn sharpens itself early], and to the Aram. בּוֹצִיץ בּוֹצִיץ מִקִּמְפִּיָּה יְדִיעַ = that which will become a gourd shows itself in the bud, *Berachoth* 48a.

12 The hearing ear and the seeing eye — Jahve hath created them both.

Pro. 20:12. Löwenstein, like the LXX: the ear hears and the eye sees — it is enough to refer to the contrary to v. 10 and *Pro. 17:15*. In itself the proverb affirms a fact, and that is its *sensus simplex*; but besides, this fact may be seen from many points of view, and it has many consequences, none of which is to be rejected as contrary to the meaning:

- (1.) It lies nearest to draw the conclusion, *viâ eminentiæ*, which is drawn in *Psa. 94: 9*. God is thus the All-hearing and the All-seeing, from which, on the one side, the consolation arises that everything that is seen stands under His protection and government, *Pro. 15: 3*; and on the other side, the warning, *Aboth* ii. 1: “Know what is above thee; a Seeing eye and a Hearing ear, and all thy conduct is marked in His book.”
- (2.) With this also is connected the sense arising out of the combination in *Psa. 40: 7*: man ought then to use the ear and the eye in conformity with the design which they are intended to subserve, according to the purpose of the Creator (*Hitzig* compares *Pro. 16: 4*); it is not first applicable to man with reference to the natural, but to the moral life: he shall not make himself deaf and blind to that which it is his duty to hear and to see; but he ought also not to hear and to see with pleasure that from which he should turn away (*Isa. 33:15*), — in all his hearing and seeing he is responsible to the Creator of the ear and the eye.
- (3.) One may thus interpret “hearing” and “seeing” as commendable properties, as *Fleischer* suggests from comparison of *Pro. 16:11*: an ear that truly hears (the word of God and the lessons of Wisdom) and an eye that truly sees (the works of God) are a gift of the Creator, and are (Arab.) *lillhi*, are to be held as high and precious. Thus the proverb, like a polished gem, may be

turned now in one direction and now in another; it is to be regarded as a many-sided fact.

***13 Love not sleep, lest thou become poor;
Open thine eyes, and have enough to eat.***

Pro. 20:13. What is comprehended in the first line here is presented in detail in Pro. 6: 9-11. The *fut. Niph.* of רוש, to become poor (cf. Pro. 10: 4), is formed metaplastically from ירש, Pro. 23:21; 30: 9, as at 1Sa. 2: 7; Hitzig compares (Arab.) *ryth*, which, however, means to loiter or delay, not to come back or down. The R. רש signifies either to be slack without support (cf. ירל), or to desire (cf. ארביין, Arab. *fkyr*, properly *hiscens*, R. פק, as in פקה, to open widely, which here follows). Regarding the second imper. 13b, vid., Pro. 3: 4: it has the force of a consequence, *Las deine augen wacker sein, So wirstu brots gnug haben* (Luth.) [Let thine eyes be open, so shalt thou have bread enough]. With these two proverbs of the eyes, the group beginning with v. 8 rounds itself off.

The following group has its natural limit at the new point of departure at v. 20, and is internally connected in a diversity of ways.

***14 “Bad, bad!” saith the buyer;
And going his way, he boasteth then.***

Pro. 20:14. Luther otherwise:

***“Bad, bad!” saith one if he hath it;
But when it is gone, then he boasteth of it.***

This rendering has many supporters. Geier cites the words of the Latin poet:

“Omne bonum praesens minus est, sperata videntur Magna.”

Schultens quotes the proverbs τὸ παρὸν βαρὺ and *Praesentia laudato*, for with Luther he refers וואזל לו to the present possession (אזל, as 1Sa. 9: 7 = (Arab.) *zâl*, to cease, to be lost), and translates: *at dilapsum sibi, tum demum pro splendido celebrat*. But by this the *Hithpa.* does not receive its full meaning; and to extract from הקנינה the idea to which וואזל לו refers, if not unnecessary, is certainly worthless. *Hakkoneh* may also certainly mean the possessor, but the possessor by acquisition (LXX and the *Venet.* ὁ κτῶμενος); for the most part it signifies the possessor by purchase, the buyer (Jerome, *emptor*), as correlate of מבר, Isa. 24: 2; Eze. 4:12. It is customary for the buyer to undervalue that which he seeks to purchase, so as to obtain it as cheaply as possible; afterwards he boasts that he has bought that which is

good, and yet so cheap. That is an every-day experience; but the proverb indirectly warns against conventional lying, and shows that one should not be startled and deceived thereby. The subject to **וְאָזַל לוֹ** is thus the buyer; **אָזַל** with **לוֹ** denotes, more definitely even than **הֵלֵךְ לוֹ**, going from thence, *s'en aller*. Syntactically, the punctuation **וְאָזַל לוֹ** [and he takes himself off] (*perf. hypoth.*, Ewald, 357a) would have been near (Jerome: *et cum recesserit*); but yet it is not necessary, with Hitzig, thus to correct it. The poet means to say: making himself off, he then boasts. We cannot in German place the “*alsdann*” [then] as the **אִשׁ** here, and as also, e.g., at 1Sa. 20:12; but Theodotion, in good Greek: **καὶ πορευθεὶς τότε καυχῆσεται**. We may write **וְאָזַל לוֹ** with *Mercha* on the antepenult, on which the accent is thrown back, cf. **חֹנֵן**, Pro. 19:17, but not **לוֹ**; for the rule for *Dagesh* does not here, with the retrogression of the tone, come into application, as, e.g., in **אוֹכַל לְחֶמֶי**, Psa. 41:10. Singularly the Syr. and Targ. do not read **רַע רַע**, but **רַע לְרַא**, and couple v. 15 with 14. In the LXX, vv. 14-19 are wanting.

**15 There is indeed gold, and many pearls;
But a precious treasure are lips full of knowledge.**

Pro. 20:15. In order to find a connection between this proverb and that which precedes, we need only be reminded of the parable of the merchantman who sought goodly pearls, Mat. 13:45 f. The proverb rises to a climax: there is gold, and there are pearls in abundance, the one of which has always a higher value than the other; but intelligent lips are above all such jewels — they are a precious treasure, which gold and all pearls cannot equal. In a similar manner the N.T. places the one pearl above the many goodly pearls. So might **דַּעַת** (*chokma*) be called the pearl above all pearls (Pro. 3:15; 8:11); but the lips as the organ of knowledge are fittingly compared with a precious vessel, a vessel of more precious substance than gold and pearls are.

**16 Take from him the garment, for he hath become surety for another;
And for strangers take him as a pledge.**

Pro. 20:16. The same proverb Pro. 27:13, where **קָח**, with the usual aphaeresis, here interchanges with it the fuller form **לְקַח**, which is also found at Eze. 37:16. To this imperative **תְּבַלְהוּ** is parallel: take him as a pledge (Theodotion, Jerome, the *Venet.* and Luther); it is not a substantive: his pledge (Targ.), which would require the word **תְּבַלְתּוּ** (**תְּבַלְתּוּ**); nor is it to be read with the Syr. **תְּבַלְהוּ**, one pledges him; but it is imperative, not however of the *Piel*, which would be **תְּבַלְהוּ**, and would mean “destroy him;” but, as Aben Ezra rightly, the imperative of *Kal* of **תְּבַלְ**, to take as a pledge, Exo. 22:25, for

חֲבֵלָהּ without any example indeed except חֲנֻנִי, Psa. 9:14; cf. 80:16. The first line is clear: take his garment, for he has become good for another (cf. Pro. 11:15), who has left him in the lurch, so that he must now become wise by experience. The second line also is intelligible if we read, according to the *Chethîb*, נְכָרִים (Jerome, the *Venet.*), not נְכָרִים, as Schultens incorrectly points it, and if we interpret this plur. like בְּנִים, Gen. 21: 7, with Hitzig following Luther, as plur. of the category: take him as a pledge, hold fast by his person, so as not to suffer injury from strange people for whom he has become surety. But the *Kerî* requires נְכָרִיָּה (according to which Theodotion and the Syr., and, more distinctly still than these, the Targ. translates), and thus, indeed, it stands written, Pro. 27:13, without the *Kerî*, thus *Bathra* 173*b* reads and writes also here. Either נְכָרִיָּה is a strange woman, a prostitute, a *maitresse* for whom the unwise has made himself surety, or it is neut. for *aliena res* (LXX Pro. 27:13, τὰ ἀλλότρια), a matter not properly belonging to this unwise person. We regard נְכָרִים in this passage as original. בְּעַד coincides with Pro. 6:26: it does not mean ἀντί, but ὑπέρ; “for strange people” is here equivalent to “for the sake of, on account of strange people” is here equivalent to for the sake of, on account of strange people (χάριν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, as the *Venet.* translates it).

***17 Sweet to a man is the bread of deceit;
Yet at last his mouth is full of gravel.***

Pro. 20:17. “Bread of deceit” is not deceit itself, as that after which the desire of a man goes forth, and that for which he has a relish (thus, e.g., Immanuel and Hitzig); but that which is not gained by labour, and is not merited. Possession (vid., Pro. 4:17) or enjoyment (Pro. 9:17) obtained by deceit is thus called, as לֶחֶם פְּנוּבִים, Pro. 23: 3, denotes bread; but for him who has a relish for it, it is connected with deceit. Such bread of lies is sweet to a man, because it has come to him without effort, but in the end not only will he have nothing to eat, but his tongue, teeth, and mouth will be injured by small stones; i.e., in the end he will have nothing, and there will remain to him only evil (Fleischer). Or: it changes itself (Job. 20:14) at last into gravel, of which his mouth is filled full, as we might say, “it lies at last in his stomach like lead.” חֲצָיִץ is the Arab. *ḥatny*, gravel (Hitzig, *grien* = *gries*, coarse sand, grit), R. חֲצִי, *scindere*. Similarly in Arab. *ḥajar*, a stone, is used as the image of disappointed expectations, e.g., the adulterer finds a stone, i.e., experiences disappointment.

***18 Plans are established by counsel,
And with prudent government make war.***

Pro. 20:18. From the conception of a thought, practically influencing the formation of our own life and the life of the community, to its accomplishment there is always a long way which does not lead to the end unless one goes forward with counsel and strength combined, and considers all means and eventualities. The *Niph.* of פִּוֵן means, in a passive sense: to be accomplished or realized (Psa. 141: 2). The clause 18a is true for times of war as well as for times of peace; war is disastrous, unless it is directed with strategic skill (vid., regarding תַּחְבֻּלוֹת, Pro. 1: 5). Grotius compares the proverb, Γνωμαί πλέον κρατούσιν ἢ σθένος χειρῶν. In Pro. 24: 6, the necessity of counsel is also referred to the case of war. Ewald would read [the infin.] עֲשֵׂה, or עֲשֵׂה: with management it is that one carries on war. But why? Because to him the challenge to carry on war appears to be contrary to the spirit of proverbial poetry. But the author of the proverb does certainly mean: if thou hast to carry on war, carry it on with the skill of a general; and the imper. is protected by Pro. 24: 6 against that infin., which is, besides, stylistically incongruous.

***19 He that goeth out gossiping revealeth a secret;
And the babbler have nothing to do.***

Pro. 20:19. Luther otherwise (like Hitzig) —

***Be not complicated with him who revealeth a secret,
And with the slanderer, and with the false (better: loquacious) mouth,***

so that לָ and the warning apply to the threefold description, a rendering which Kimchi also, and Immanuel, and others at least suggest. But in connection with Pro. 11:13, the first line has the force of a *judicium*, which includes the warning to entrust nothing to a babbler which ought to be kept silent. Write גִּזְלֵה סוֹד, as found in Codd. and old Edd., with *Munach* on the *penultima*, on which the tone is thrown back, and *Dagesh* to ם, after the rule of the דְּחִיק (Ges. § 20, 2a), altogether like קִנְיָה לֵב, Pro. 15:32. 19b the *Venet.* translates after the first meaning of the word by Kimchi, τῷ ἀπαταιῶνι τοῖς χεῖλεσι, to him who slanders and befools, for it thus improves Theodotion's τῷ ἀπαταιῶντι τὰ χεῖλη αὐτοῦ. But פִּתְיָה means, Job. 5: 2, — cf. Hos. 7:11, — not him who befools another, but him who is befooled, is slandered, by another (Aben Ezra: שִׁפְתוֹהוּ אַחֲרָיִם), with which שִׁפְתָיו here does not agree. But now he who is easily befooled is called פִּתְיָה, as being open to influence (susceptible), *patens*; and if this particip. is used, as here, transitively, and, on account of the object שִׁפְתָיו standing near cannot possibly be equivalent to מִפְתָּה, the usage of the language also just noticed is against it, then it means *patefaciens* or *dilatans* (cf. הִפְתָּה, Gen. 9:27, Targ. אִפְתִּי = הִרְחִיב), and

places itself as synon. to פֶּשֶׁק, 13: 3; thus one is called who does not close his mouth, who cannot hold his mouth, who always idly babbles, and is therefore, because he can keep nothing to himself, a dangerous companion. The Complut. rightly translates: μετὰ πλατύνοντος τὰ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ μίχθητι χεῖλη.

The following group begins, for once more the aim of this older Book of Proverbs becomes prominent, with an inculcation of the fourth ^{f159} commandment.

***20 He that curseth his father and his mother,
His light is extinguished in midnight darkness.***

Pro. 20:20. The divine law, Exo. 21:17, Lev. 20: 9, condemns such an one to death. But the proverb does not mean this sentence against the criminal, which may only seldom be carried into execution, but the fearful end which, because of the righteousness of God ruling in history, terminates the life of such an unnatural son (Pro. 30:17). Of the godless, it has already been said that their light is extinguished, Pro. 13: 9, there is suddenly an end to all that brightened, i.e., made happy and embellished their life; but he who acts wickedly (קָלֵל, R. קל, *levem esse*, synon. הִקְלָה, Deu. 27:16), even to the cursing of his father and mother, will see himself surrounded by midnight darkness (Symmachus, σκοτομήνη, moonless night), not: he will see himself in the greatest need, forsaken by divine protection (Fleischer), for Jansen rightly: *Lux et lucerna in scripturis et vitae claritatem et posteritatem et prosperitatem significat*. The apple of the eye, אִישׁוֹן, of darkness (vid., 7: 9), is that which forms the centre of centralization of darkness. The Syr. renders it correctly by *bobtho*, pupil [of the eye], but the Targ. retains the אִישׁוֹן of the *Kerî*, and renders it in Aram. by אִתְוִן, which Rashi regards as an infin., Parchon as a particip. after the form אִרְוִן; but it may be also an infin. substantive after the form אִוִּוּ, and is certainly nothing else than the abbreviated and vocally obscured אִישׁוֹן. For the Talm. אִשׁוֹן, to be hard, furnishes no suitable idea; and the same holds true of אִשׁוֹנֵי, times, Lev. 15:25 of the Jerusalem Targ.; while the same abbreviation and the same passing over of *o* into *u* represents this as the inflected אִישׁוֹן (= עֵת). There is also no evidence for a verb אִשׁוֹן, to be black, dark; the author of Aruch interprets אִשׁוֹנָא, *Bereschith Rabba*, c. 33, with reference to the passage before us, of a dark bathing apartment, but only tentatively, and אִישׁוֹן is there quoted as the Targ. of צֶלַע, Gen. 19: 8, which the text lying before us does not ratify. *Ishon* means the little man (in the eye), and neither the blackness (Buxtorf and others) nor the point of strength, the central point (Levy) of the eye. ^{f160}

**21 An inheritance which in the beginning is obtained in haste,
Its end will not be blessed.**

Pro. 20:21. The partic. **מְבַהֵל** may, after Zec. 11: 8, cf. Syr. *bhlā*^c, *nauseans*, mean “detested,” but that affords here no sense; rather it might be interpreted after the Arab. *bajila*, to be avaricious, “gotten by avarice, niggardliness,” with which, however, neither **נִחְלָה**, inheritance, nor, since avarice is a chronic disease, **בְּרֵאשׁוֹנָה** agrees. On the contrary, the *Kerî* **מְבַהֵלָת** [hastened] perfectly agrees, both linguistically (vid., Pro. 28:22; cf. 13:11) and actually; for, as Hitzig remarks, the words following v. 20 fully harmonize with the idea of an inheritance, into the possession of which one is put before it is rightly due to him; for a son such as that, the parents may live too long, and so he violently deprives them of the possession (cf. Pro. 19:26); but on such a possession there rests no blessing. Since the *Piel* may mean to hasten, Est. 2: 9, so **מְבַהֵל** may mean hastened = speedy, Est. 8:14, as well as made in haste. All the old interpreters adopt the *Kerî*; the Aram. render it well by **מְסַרְהָבָא**, from **מְסַרְהָב**, overturned; and Luther, like Jerome, *haereditas ad quam festinatur*.

**22 Say not: I will avenge the evil;
Hope in Jahve, so will He help thee.**

Pro. 20:22. Men ought always to act toward their neighbours according to the law of love, and not according to the *jus talionis*, Pro. 24:29; they ought not only, by requiting good with evil (Pro. 16:13; Psa. 7: 5a, 35:12), not to transgress this law of requital, but they ought to surpass it, by also recompensing not evil with evil (vid., regarding **שָׁלֵם**, and synon. to 17:13); and that is what the proverb means, for **22b** supposes injustice suffered, which might stir up a spirit of revenge. It does not, however, say that men ought to commit the taking of vengeance to God; but, in the sense of Rom. 12:17-19, 1Pe. 3: 9, that, renouncing all dependence on self, they ought to commit their deliverance out of the distress into which they have fallen, and their vindication, into the hands of God; for the promise is not that He will avenge them, but that He will help them. The jussive **וַיִּשַׁע** (write **וַיִּשַׁע**, according to *Metheg-setzung*, § 42, with *Gaja* as **הַעֲמִדָה**, with the **ע** to secure distinct utterance to the final guttural) states as a consequence, like, e.g., 2Ki. 5:10, what will then happen (Jerome, Luther, Hitzig) if one lets God rule (Ges. § 128, 2c); equally possible, syntactically, is the rendering: that He may help thee (LXX, Ewald); but, regarded as a promise, the words are more in accordance with the spirit of the proverb, and they round it off more expressively.

**23 An abomination to Jahve are two kinds of weights;
And deceitful balances are not good.**

Pro. 20:23. A variant to v. 10, Pro. 11: 1. The pred. לֹא-טוֹב (Pro. 17:26; 18: 5; 19: 3) is conceived of as neut.; they are not good, much rather bad and pernicious, for the deceiver succeeds only in appearance; in reality he fails.

**24 The steps of a man depend on Jahve;
And a man — how can he understand his way?**

Pro. 20:24. Line first is from Psa. 37:23, but there, where the clause has the verbal predicate בְּיָנִי, the meaning is that it is the gracious assistance of God, by virtue of which a man takes certain steps with his feet, while here we have before us a variation of the proverb “*der Mensch denkt, Gott lenkt*” [= man proposes, God disposes], Pro. 16: 9, Jer. 10:23; for יָ, as at 2Sa. 3:37, Psa. 118:23, denotes God in general as conditioning, as the ultimate cause. Man is indeed free to turn himself hither or thither, to decide on this course of conduct or on that, and is therefore responsible for it; but the relations co-operating in all his steps as the possible and defining conditions are God’s contrivance and guidance, and the consequences which are connected with his steps and flow therefrom, lie beyond the power of man, — every one of his steps is a link of a chain, neither the beginning nor the end of which he can see; while, on the other hand, God’s knowledge comprehends the beginning, middle, and end, and the wisdom of God ruling in the sphere of history, makes all human activity, the free action of man, subservient to his world-plan. The question, which has a negative answer, is applicable to man: what, i.e., how shall he understand his way? מַה is like, e.g., Exo. 10:26, Job. 9: 2; 19:28, accus., and fluctuates between the functions of a governed accusative: What does he understand...(Job. 11: 8) and an adv.: how, i.e., how so little, how even not, for it is the מַה of the negative question which has become in (Arab.) *mâ* a word of negation. The way of a man is his life’s-course. This he understands in the present life only relatively, the true unravelling of it remains for the future.

**25 It is a snare to a man to cry out hastily “holy;”
And first after vows to investigate.**

Pro. 20:25. Two other interpretations of the first line have been proposed. The snare of a man devours, i.e., destroys the holy; but then מוֹקֵשׁ אֲדָם must be an expression of an action, instead of an expression of an endurance, which is impossible. The same is true against the explanation: the snare of a man devours, i.e., consumes, eats up the holy, which as such is withdrawn from common use. Jerome with his *devotare sanctos*, and Luther with his *das Heilige lestern* [to calumniate the holy], give to לוֹא = בָּלַע a meaning which

loses itself in the arbitrary. Accordingly, nothing is to be done with the meaning *καταπίεται* (Aquila, the *Venet.*). But יִלַע will be the abbreviated fut. of לוּע (from יִלוּא), or לֵאע (יִלַע), Job. 6: 3 = (Arab.) *laghâ temere loqui* (*proloqui*); and קִדַּשׁ (after Hitzig: consecration, which is contrary to usage) is like κορβᾶν, Mar. 7:11, the exclamation to which one suddenly gives utterance, thereby meaning that this or that among his possessions henceforth no longer belongs to him, but is consecrated to God, and thus ought to be delivered up to the temple. Such a sudden vow and halting deference to the oath that has been uttered is a snare to a man, for he comes to know that he has injured himself by the alienation of his property, which he has vowed beyond that which was due from him, or that the fulfilling of his vow is connected with difficulties, and perhaps also to others, with regard to whom its disposal was not permitted to him, is of evil consequences, or it may be he is overcome by repentance and is constrained to break his oath. The LXX hits the true meaning of the proverb with rare success: Παγίς ἀνδρὶ ταχὺ τι τῶν ἰδίων ἀγιάσαι, μετὰ δὲ τὸ εὐξασθαι μετανοεῖν γίνεται. יִדְרִים is plur. of the category (cf. 16*b* *Chethîb*), and בִּקֵּר, as 2Ki. 16:15, Arab. *baḵr*, *examinare, inquirere*, means to subject to investigation, viz., whether he ought to observe, and might observe, a vow such as this, or whether he might not and ought not rather to renounce it (Fleischer). Viewed syntactically, 25*a* is so difficult, that Bertheau, with Hitzig, punctuates יִלַע; but this substantive must be formed from a verb יִלַע (cf. Hab. 3:13), and this would mean, after (Arab.) *wala'*, “to long eagerly for,” which is not suitable here. The punctuation shows יֵלַע as the 3rd fut. What interpreters here say of the doubled accent of the word arises from ignorance: the correct punctuation is יִלַע, with *Gaja* to ע, to give the final guttural more force in utterance. The poet appears to place in the foreground: “a snare for a man,” as a *rubrum*; and then continuing the description, he cries out suddenly “holy!” and after the vow, he proceeds to deliberate upon it. Fleischer rightly: *post vota inquisiturus est (in ea)* = יִדְהָה לְבִקֵּר; vid., at Hab. 1:17, which passage Hitzig also compares as syntactically very closely related.

**26 A wise king winnoweth the godless,
And bringeth over them the wheel.**

Pro. 20:26. A variant to Pro. 20: 8, but here with the following out of the figure of the winnowing. For אֶפְסַן with מְזַרְהָ is, without doubt, the wheel of the threshing-cart, עֲגָלָה, Isa. 28:27 f.; and thus with מְזַרְהָ, the winnowing fork, מְזַרְהָ is to be thought of; vid., a description of them along with that of the winnowing shovel, רִחַת, in Wetzstein's *Excursus* to Isa., p. 707 ff. We are not to think of the punishment of the wheel, which occurs only as a terrible

custom of war (e.g., Amo. 1: 3). It is only meant that a wise king, by sharp and vigorous procedure, separates the godless, and immediately visits them with merited punishment, as he who works with the winnowing shovel gives the chaff to the wind. Most ancient interpreters think on אֹפֶן (from אָפַן, *vertere*) in its metaphorical meaning: τροπος (thus also Löwenstein, he deals with them according to merit), or the wheel of fortune, with reference to the constellations; thus, misfortune (Immanuel, *Meiri*). Arama, Oetinger, and others are, however, on the right track.

With a proverb of a light that was extinguished, v. 20 began the group; the proverb of God's light, which here follows, we take as the beginning of a new group.

27 A candle of Jahve is the soul of man, Searching through all the chambers of the heart.

Pro. 20:27. If the O.T. language has a separate word to denote the self-conscious personal human spirit in contradistinction to the spirit of a beast, this word, according to the usage of the language, as Reuchlin, in an appendix to Aben Ezra, remarks, is נְשָׁמָה; it is so called as the principle of life breathed immediately by God into the body (vid., at Gen. 2: 7; 7:22). Indeed, that which is here said of the human spirit would not be said of the spirit of a beast: it is “the mystery of self-consciousness which is here figuratively represented” (Elster). The proverb intentionally does not use the word נֶפֶשׁ, for this is not the power of self-consciousness in man, but the medium of bodily life; it is related secondarily to נְשָׁמָה (רוּחַ), while רוּחַ נְשָׁמַת חַיִּים is used, חַיִּים נֶפֶשׁ is an expression unheard of. Hitzig is in error when he understands by נְשָׁמָה here the soul in contradistinction to the spirit, and in support of this appeals to an expression in the *Cosmography* of *Kazwîni*: “the soul (Arab. *âl-nefs*) is like the lamp which moves about in the chambers of the house;” here also *en-nefs* is the self-conscious spirit, for the Arab. and post-bibl. Heb. terminology influenced by philosophy reverses the biblical usage, and calls the rational soul נֶפֶשׁ, and, on the contrary, the animal soul רוּחַ נְשָׁמָה (*Psychologie*, p. 154). חֶפֶשׁ is the particip. of חָפַשׁ, Zep. 1:12, without distinguishing the *Kal* and *Piel*. Regarding חֲדָרֵי-בֶטֶן, LXX ταμεία κοιτίας, vid., at 18: 8: בֶּטֶן denotes the inner part of the body (R. בַּטַּן, to be deepened), and generally of the personality; cf. Arab. *bâtn âl-rwḥ*, the interior of the spirit, and 22:18, according to which Fleischer explains: “A candle of Jahve, i.e., a means bestowed on man by God Himself to search out the secrets deeply hid in the spirit of another.” But the candle which God has kindled in man has as the nearest sphere of illumination, which goes forth from it, the condition of the

man himself — the spirit comprehends all that belongs to the nature of man in the unity of self-consciousness, but yet more: it makes it the object of reflection; it penetrates, searching it through, and seeks to take it up into its knowledge, and recognises the problem proposed to it, to rule it by its power. The proverb is thus to be ethically understood: the spirit is that which penetrates that which is within, even into its many secret corners and folds, with its self-testing and self-knowing light — it is, after Mat. 6:22, the inner light, the inner eye. Man becomes known to himself according to his moral as well as his natural condition in the light of the spirit; “for what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him?” says Paul, 1Co. 2:11. With reference to this Solomonic proverb, the seven-branched candlestick is an ancient symbol of the soul, e.g., on the Jewish sepulchral monuments of the Roman *viâ Portuensis*. Our texts present the phrase נֵר יְהוָה ; but the Talm. *Pesachim 7b, 8a*, the *Pesikta* in part 8, the Midrash *Othijoth de-Rabbi Akiba*, under the letter נ, Alphasi (ר"י) in *Pesachim*, and others, read נֵר אֱלֹהִים ; and after this phrase the Targum translates, while the Syr. and the other old versions render by the word “Lord” (*Venet. ὀντωτής*), and thus had הוה before them.

***28 Love and truth guard the king;
And he supports his throne by love.***

Pro. 20:28. We have not in the German [nor in the Eng.] language a couple of words that completely cover חֶסֶד וְאֱמֶת ; when they are used of God, we translate them by grace and truth [*Gnade u. Wahrheit*], Psa. 40:12 (‘צְרוּנִי); when of men, by love and truth [*Liebe u. Treue*], Pro. 16: 6; and when of the two-sided divine forces, by kindness and truth, Pro. 3: 3. Love and truth are the two good spirits that guard the king. If it is elsewhere said that the king’s throne is supported “with judgment and with justice,” Isa. 9: 6 [7]; here, on the other side, we see that the exercise of government must have love as its centre; he has not only to act on the line of right, שׁוֹרֵת הַדִּין ; but, as the later proverb says, in such a way, that within this circle his conduct is determined by the central motive of love. In this sense we give the king not only the title of *Grossmächtigster* [most high and mighty], but also that of “*Allernädigster*” [most gracious], for the king can and ought to exercise grace before other men; the virtue of condescension establishes his throne more than the might of greatness.

***29 The ornament of young men is their strength;
And the honour of the old is grey hairs.***

Pro. 20:29. Youth has the name **בַּחֹר** (different from **בְּחֹר**, chosen), of the maturity (R. **בַּחַר**, cogn. **בַּכַּר**, **בַּגַּר**, whence Mishn. **בְּגִירוּת**, manhood, in contradistinction to **נְעִירוּת**) into which he enters from the bloom of boyhood; and the old man is called **זָקֵן** (Arab. *dhikn*, as Schultens says, *a mento pendulo*, from the hanging chin **זָקֵן**, (Arab.) *dhakan*, chin, beard on the chin). To stand in the fulness of fresh unwasted strength is to youth, as such, an ornament (**תְּפִאֲרֹת**, cf. **פְּאֲרוֹר**, blooming colour of the countenance); on the contrary, to the old man who has spent his strength in the duties of his office, or as it is said at 16:31, “in the way of righteousness,” grey hairs (**שֵׂיבָה**, from **שָׁב**, Arab. *shâb*, *canescere*) give an honourable appearance (**הִדָּר**, from **הָדַר**, *turgidum, amplum esse*, vid., at Isa. 63: 1).

**30 Cutting wounds cleanse away evil,
And reach the inner parts of the body.**

Pro. 20:30. The two words for wounds in line first stand in the *st. constr.*; **חַבּוּרָה** (from **חָבַר**, to be bound around with stripes, to be striped) is properly the streak, the stripe; but is here heightened by **פָּצַע** (from **פָּצַע**, to cleave, split, tear open), beyond the idea of the stripe-wound: tearing open the flesh, cuts tearing into the flesh. The pred. is after the *Kerî* **תְּמָרוֹק**; but this substantive, found in the Book of Esther, where it signifies the purification of the women for the harem (according to which, e.g., Ahron B. Joseph explains **הֵם כַּמּוֹ תְּמָרוֹק לַנְּשִׂיִם שֶׁהוּא יָפָה לָהֶם**), is syntactically hard, and scarcely original. For if we explain with Kimchi: wounds of deep incision find their cleansing (cure) by evil, i.e., by means which bring suffering (according to which, probably the *Venet.* **μῶλωπες τραύματος λάμπουσιν ἐν κακῷ**), then **תְּמָרוֹק**, with the pronoun pointing back, one would have expected. But the interpretation of **בְּרַע**, of severe means of cure, is constrained; that which lies nearest, however, is to understand **רַע** of evil. But if, with this understanding of the word, we translate: *Vibices plagarum sunt lustratio quae adhibetur malo* (Fleischer), one does not see why **בְּרַע**, and not rather gen. **רַע**, is used. But if we read after the *Chethîb* **תְּמָרִיק**, then all is syntactically correct; for (1.) that the word **יְמָרִיקוּ**, or **תְּמָרִקְנָה**, is not used, is in accordance with a well-known rule, Gesen. § 146. 3; and (2.) that **הִמְרִיק** is connected, not directly with an accus. obj., but with **ב**, has its analogy in **בְּ הַתְּעָה**, Jer. 42: 2, **הַשְּׂרִישׁ ב**, Job. 31:12, and the like, and besides has its special ground in the metaphorical character of the cleansing. Thus, e.g., one uses Syr. *ʿā* of external misleading; but with Syr. *k* of moral misleading (Ewald, § 217, 2); and Arab. *ṣ* of erecting a building; but with Arab. *b* of the intellectual erection of a

memorial (monument). It is the so-called *Bâ-âlmojâz*; vid., de Sacy's *Chrest Arab.* i. 397. The verb מָרַק means in Talm. also, "to take away" (a metaph. of *abstergere*; cf. Arab. *marak*, to wipe off^{f161}); and that meaning is adopted, *Schabbath* 33a, for the interpretations of this proverb: stripes and wounds a preparedness for evil carries away, and sorrow in the innermost part of the body, which is explained by דְּרוֹקָן (a disease appearing in diverse forms; cf. "Drachenschuss,"; as the name of an animal disease); but granting that the biblical מָרַק may bear this meaning, the כּ remains unaccountable; for we say מָרַק עֲצָמוֹ לְעִבְרָה, for to prepare oneself for a transgression (sin of excess), and not כּעִבְרָה. We have thus to abide by the primary meaning, and to compare the proverb, *Berachoth* 5a: "afflictive providences wash away all the transgressions of a man." But the proverb before us means, first at least, not the wounds which God inflicts, but those which human educational energy inflicts: deep-cutting wounds, i.e., stern discipline, leads to the rubbing off of evil, i.e., rubs it, washes it, cleanses it away. It may now be possible that in 30b the subject idea is permutatively continued: *et verbera penetralium corporis* (thus the *Venet.*: *πληγαὶ τῶν ταμειῶν τοῦ γαστροῦ*), i.e., *quorum vis ad intimos corporis et animi recessus penetrat* (Fleischer). But that is encumbered, and חֲדָרֵי־בֶטֶן (cf. v. 27, Pro. 18: 8), as referring to the depths to which stern corporal discipline penetrates, has not its full force. וּמִכּוֹת is either a particip.: and that is touching (*ferientes*) the inner chambers of the body, or חֲדָרֵי־בֶטֶן is with the כּ, or immediately the second object of תִּמְרִיק to be supplied: and strokes (rub off, cleanse, make pure) the innermost part. Jerome and the Targ. also supply כּ, but erroneously, as designating place: *in secretioribus ventris*, relatively better the LXX and Syr.: *εἰς ταμεία κοιλίας*. Luther hits the sense at least, for he translates:

***One must restrain evil with severe punishment,
And with hard strokes which one feels.***

CHAPTER 21

Pro. 21: 1. The group, like the preceding one, now closes with a proverb of the king.

***A king's heart in Jahve's hand is like brooks of water;
He turneth it whithersoever He will.***

Brook and canal (the *Quinta*: *ὕδραγωγός*) are both called פְּלַג, or פְּלָג, Job. 20:17, Arab. *falaj* (from פָּלַג, to divide, according to which Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, *διαρέσεις*; *Venet.* *διανομαί*; Jerome, *divisiones*); *Jâkût* has the explanation of the word: "*falaj* is the name given to flowing

water, particularly the brook from a spring, and every canal which is led from a spring out over flat ground.” Such brooks of water are the heart of a king, i.e., it is compared to such, in Jahve’s hand. The second line contains the point of comparison: He inclines it, gives to it the direction (הִטָּה, causat. of נָטָה, Num. 21:15) toward whatever He will (יִּפְּחֵן denotes willing, as a bending and inclining, viz., of the will; vid., at Pro. 18: 2). Rightly Hitzig finds it not accidental that just the expression “brooks of water” is chosen as the figure for tractableness and subjection to government. In Isa. 32: 2, the princes of Judah are compared to “rivers of water in a dry place” with reference to the exhaustion of the land during the oppression of the Assyrian invasion; the proverb has specially in view evidences of kindness proceeding from the heart, as at Pro. 16:15 the favour of the king is compared to clouds of latter rain emptying themselves in beneficent showers, and at Pro. 19:12 to the dew refreshing the plants. But the speciality of the comparison here is, that the heart of the king, however highly exalted above his subjects, and so removed from their knowledge he may be, has yet One above it by whom it is moved by hidden influences, e.g., the prayer of the oppressed; for man is indeed free, yet he acts under the influence of divinely-directed circumstances and divine operations; and though he reject the guidance of God, yet from his conduct nothing results which the Omniscient, who is surprised by nothing, does not make subservient to His will in the world-plan of redemption. Rightly the Midrash: God gives to the world good or bad kings, according as He seeks to bless it or to visit it with punishment; all decisions that go forth from the king’s mouth come לכתחלה, i.e., in their first commencement and their last reason they come from the Holy One.

The next group extends from v. 2 to v. 8, where it closes as it began.

***2 Every way of a man is right in his own eyes;
But a weigher of hearts is Jahve.***

Pro. 21: 2. A proverb similar to Pro. 16: 2 (where יָדָרְךָ, for יָדָרְךָ, יָדָרְךָ for יָשָׁר, רוחות, לבות). God is also, Pro. 17: 3, called a trier, בִּחֵן, of hearts, as He is here called a weigher, תִּבָּן. The proverb indirectly admonishes us of the duty of constant self-examination, according to the objective norm of the revealed will of God, and warns us against the self-complacency of the fool, of whom Pro. 12:15 says (as Trimberg in “*Renner*”): “all fools live in the pleasant feeling that their life is the best,” and against the self-deception which walks in the way of death and dreams of walking in the way of life, Pro. 14:12 (Pro. 16:25).

***3 To practice justice and right
Hath with Jahve the pre-eminence above sacrifice.***

Pro. 21: 3. We have already (p. 30) shown how greatly this depreciation of the works of the ceremonial *cultus*, as compared with the duties of moral obedience, is in the spirit of the Chokma; cf. also at Pro. 15: 8. Prophecy also gives its testimony, e.g., Hos 6: 7, according to which also here (cf. Pro. 20: 8b with Isa. 9: 8) the practising of צְדָקָה וּמִשְׁפָּט (sequence of words as at Gen. 18:19, Psa. 33: 5, elsewhere צְדָק וּמִשְׁפָּט, and yet more commonly צְדָקָה וּמִשְׁפָּט) does not denote legal rigour, but the practising of the *justum et aequum*, or much rather the *aequum et bonum*, thus in its foundation conduct proceeding from the principle of love. The *inf.* עֲשֵׂה (like קָנָה, Pro. 16:16) occurs three times (here and at Gen. 50:20; Psa. 101: 3); once עֲשׂוּ is written (Gen. 31:18), as also in the *infin. absol.* the form עֲשֵׂה and עֲשׂוּ interchange (vid., Norzi at Jer. 22: 4); once עֲשׂוּתוֹ for עֲשֵׂהוּ (Exo. 18:18) occurs in the *status conjunctus*.

4 Loftiness of eyes and swelling of heart — The husbandry of the godless is sin.

Pro. 21: 4. If נֵר, in the sense of light, gives a satisfactory meaning, then one might appeal to 1Ki. 11:36 (cf. 2Sa. 21:17), where נֵר appears to signify lamp, in which meaning it is once (2Sa. 22:29) written נֵי (like חֵיק); or since נֵר = נַי (ground-form, *nawir*, lightening) is as yet certainly established neither in the Heb. nor Syr., one might punctuate נַר instead of נֵר, according to which the Greeks, Aram., and Luther, with Jerome, translate. But of the lamp of the godless we read at Pro. 13: 9 and elsewhere, that it goeth out. We must here understand by נַר the brilliant prosperity (Bertheau and others) of the wicked, or their “proud spirit flaming and flaring like a bright light” (Zöckler), which is contrary to the use of the metaphor as found elsewhere, which does not extend to a prosperous condition. We must then try another meaning for נַר; but not that of yoke, for this is not Heb., but Aram.-Arab., and the interpretation thence derived by Lagarde: “Haughtiness and pride; but the godless for all that bear their yoke, viz., sin,” seeks in vain to hide behind the “for all that” the breaking asunder of the two lines of the verse. In Heb. נַר means that which lightens (burning) = lamp, נֹר, the shining (that which burns) = fire, and נֵר, Pro. 13:23, from נֵר, to plough up (Targ. 1Sa. 8:12, לְחַרֵּשׁ = לְמַנֵּר) the fresh land, i.e., the breaking up of the fallow land; according to which the *Venet.* as Kimchi: νέωμα ἀσεβῶν ἀμαρτία, which as Ewald and Elster explain: “where a disposition of wicked haughtiness, of unbridled pride, prevails, there will also sin be the first-fruit on the field of action; נַר, *novale*, the field turned up for the first time, denotes here the first-fruits of sin.” But why just the first-fruits,

and not the fruit in general? We are better to abide by the field itself, which is here styled נֶר, not שְׂדֵה (or as once in Jer. 39:10, יִגְבּ); because with this word, more even than with שְׂדֵה, is connected the idea of agricultural work, of arable land gained by the digging up or the breaking up of one or more years' fallow ground (cf. *Pea* ii. 1, נִיר, Arab. *sikâk*, opp. בּוֹר, Arab. *bûr*, *Menachoth* 85a, שְׂדוֹת מְנִירוֹת, a fresh broken-up field, *Erachin* 29b, נֶר, opp. הַבִּיר, to let lie fallow), so that נֶר רְשָׁעִים may mean the cultivation of the fields, and generally the husbandry, i.e., the whole conduct and life of the godless. נֶר is here ethically metaph., but not like Hos. 10:12, Jer. 4: 3, where it means a new moral commencement of life; but like חָרַשׁ, *arare*, Job. 4: 8, Hos. 10:13; cf. Pro. 3:29. רָחַב is not adj. like Pro. 28:25, Psa. 101: 5, but infin. like חָסַר, Pro. 10:21; and accordingly also רִוּם is not adj. like חִוּם, or past like סוּג, but infin. like Isa. 10:12. And חָטְאָת is the pred. of the complex subject, which consists of רִוּם עֵינַיִם, a haughty looking down with the eyes, רָחַב-לֵב, breadth of heart, i.e., excess of self-consciousness, and נֶר רְשָׁעִים taken as an *asyndeton summativum*: pride of look, and making oneself large of heart, in short, the whole husbandry of the godless, or the whole of the field cultivated by them, with all that grows thereon, is sin.

***5 The striving of the diligent is only to advantage.
And hastening all [excessive haste] only to loss;***

or in other words, and agreeably to the Heb. construction:

***The thoughts of the industrious are (reach) only to gain,
And every one who hastens — it (this his hastening) is only to loss.***

Pro. 21: 5. Vid., at Pro. 17:21. At Pro. 10: 4, Luther translates “the hand of the diligent,” here “the plans of an expert [*endelichen*],” i.e., of one actively striving (Pro. 22:29, *endelich* = מְדַיֵּר) to the end. The אָץ, hastening overmuch, is contrasted with the diligent: Luther well: but he who is altogether too precipitant. Everywhere else in the Proverbs אָץ has a closer definition with it, wherefore Hitzig reads אֶצֶר, which must mean: he who collects together; but אָץ along with חֲרוּץ is perfectly distinct. The thought is the same as our “*eile mit Weile*” [= *festina lente*], and Goethe’s

***Wie das Gestirn ohne Hast,
Aber ohne Rast
Drehe sich jeder
Um die eigne Last.***

“Like the stars, without haste but without rest, let every one carry about his own burden,” viz., of his calling that lies upon him. The fundamental meaning of אָרַס is to throng, to urge (Exo. 5:13), here of impatient and inconsiderate rashness. While on the side of the diligent there is nothing but gain, such haste brings only loss; over-exertion does injury, and the work will want care, circumspection, and thoroughness. In the Book of Proverbs, the contrasts “gain” and “loss” frequently occur, Pro. 11:24; 14:23; 22:16: profit (the increase of capital by interest), opp. loss (of capital, or of part thereof), as commercial terms.

**6 The gaining of treasures by a lying tongue
Is a fleeting breath of such as seek death.**

Pro. 21: 6. One may, at any rate, after the free manner of gnomic resemblances and comparisons, regard “fleeting breath” and “such as seek death” as two separated predicates: such gain is fleeting breath, so those who gain are seeking death (Caspari’s *Beiträge zu Jes.* p. 53). But it is also syntactically admissible to interpret the words rendered “seekers of death” as gen.; for such interruptions of the *st. constr.*, as here by נָדַף [fleeting], frequently occur, e.g., Isa. 28: 1; 32:13; 1Ch. 9:13; and that an idea, in spite of such interruption, may be thought of as gen., is seen from the Arab. ^{f162}

But the text is unsettled. Symmachus, Syr., Targ., the *Venet.*, and Luther render the phrase מְבַקְשֵׁי [seekers]; but the LXX and Jerome read מֹקְשֵׁי [snares] (cf. 1Ti. 6: 9); this word Rashi also had before him (vid., Norzi), and Kennicott found it in several Codd. Bertheau prefers it, for he translates:...is fleeting breath, snares of death; Ewald and Hitzig go further, for, after the LXX, they change the whole proverb into: הֶבֶל רִדְף אֶל-מֹקְשֵׁי (בְּמֹקְשֵׁי) מָוֶת, with פֶּעַל in the first line. But δῶκεῖ of the LXX is an incorrect rendering of נָדַף, which the smuggling in of the ἐπι, παγίδας θανάτου) drew after it, without our concluding therefrom that אֶל-מֹקְשֵׁי, or לְמֹקְשֵׁי (Lagarde), lay before the translators; on the contrary, the word which (Cappellus) lay before them, מֹקְשֵׁי, certainly deserves to be preferred to מְבַקְשֵׁי: the possession is first, in view of him who has gotten it, compared to a fleeting (נָדַף, as Isa. 42: 2) breath (cf. e.g., smoke, Psa. 68: 3), and then, in view of the inheritance itself and its consequences, is compared to the snares of death (Pro. 13:14; 14:27); for in פָּאָל (here equivalent to עֲשׂוֹת, *acquisitio*, Gen. 31: 1; Deu. 8:17) lie together the ideas of him who procures and of the thing that is procured or effected (vid., at Pro. 20:11).

**7 The violence of the godless teareth them away,
For they have refused to do what is right.**

Pro. 21: 7. The destruction which they prepare for others teareth or draggeth them away to destruction, by which wicked conduct brings punishment on itself; their own conduct is its own executioner (cf. Pro. 1:19); for refusing to practise what is right, they have pronounced judgment against themselves, and fallen under condemnation. Rightly Jerome, *detrahent*, with Aquila, **κατασπάσει** = *j'gurrem* (as Hab. 1:15), from **גָּרַם**; on the contrary, the LXX incorrectly, **ἐπιξενωθήσεται**, from **גָּרַג**, to dwell, to live as a guest; and the *Venet.*, as Luther, in opposition to the *usus loq.*: **δεδιξεται** (fut. of **δεδίσσεσθαι**, to terrify), from **גָּרַג**, to dread, fear, which also remains intrans., with the accus. following, Deu. 32:27. The Syr. and the Targ. freely: robbery (Targ. **גָּבֹוּנָא**, perhaps in the sense of usury) will seize them, viz., in the way of punishment. In Arab. *jarr* (*jariyratn*) means directly to commit a crime; not, as Schultens explains, *admittere crimen paenam trahens*, but *attrahere (arripere)*, like (Arab.) *jany* (*jinâytñ*), *contrahere crimen*; for there the crime is thought of as violent usurpation, here as wicked accumulation.

**8 Winding is the way of a man laden with guilt;
But the pure — his conduct is right.**

Pro. 21: 8. Rightly the accentuation places together “the way of a man” as subject, and “winding” as predicate: if the poet had wished to say (Schultens, Bertheau) “one crooked in his way” (*quoad viam*), he would have contented himself with the phrase **גָּבֹוּנָא דְּדַרְךְ**. But, on the other hand, the accentuation is scarcely correct (the second *Munach* is a transformed *Mugrash*), for it interprets **וְנָךְ** as a second pred.; but **וְנָךְ** is adj. to **אִישׁ**. As **הַפְּכַכְךָ** (synon. **פְּתַלְתַּלְךָ**, **עַקְלַקְלְךָ**) is a *hapax leg.*, so also *vazar*, which is equivalent to (Arab.) *mawzwr*, *crimine onustus*, from *wazria*, *crimen committere*, properly to charge oneself with a crime. The ancient interpreters have, indeed, no apprehension of this meaning before them; the LXX obtain from the proverb a thought reminding us of *Psa. 18:27*, in which *vazar* does not at all appear; the Syr. and Targ. translate as if the *vav* of *vazar* introduces the conclusion: he is a barbarian (*nuchrojo*); Luther: he is crooked; Jerome also sets aside the syntax: *perversa via viri aliena est*; but, syntactically admissible, the *Venet.* and Kimchi, as the Jewish interpreters generally, **διαστροφωτάτη ὁδὸς ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀλλόκοτος**. Fleischer here even renounces the help of the Arab., for he translates: *Tortuosa est via viri criminibus onusti, qui autem sancte vivit, is recte facit*; but he adds thereto the remark that “*vazar* thus explained, with Cappellus, Schultens, and Gesenius, would, it is true, corresponding to the Arab. *wazar*, have first the abstract meaning of a verbal noun from *wazira*;^{f163} the old explanation is therefore perhaps better: *tortuosa est via viri et deflectens (scil. a recta linea, thus devia est)*, when the ‘*viri*’ is to be taken in

the general sense of ‘many, this and that one;’ the closer definition is reflected from the **רַב־** of the second clause.” But

- (1) **רַב־** as an adj. signifies *peregrinus*; one ought thus rather to expect **רַב־**, degenerated, corrupt, although that also does not rightly accord;
- (2) the verbal noun also, e.g., ‘*all*, passes over into a subst. and adj. signification (the latter without distinction of number and gender);
- (3) **רַב־**, after its adj. signification, is related to (Arab.) *wazyr*, as **רַב־** is to *ḥakym*, **רַב־** to *rahyb*; it is of the same form as **רַב־**, with which it has in common its derivation from a root of similar meaning, and its ethical signification.

In 8b, **רַב־** is rightly accented as subj. of the complex pred. **רַב־** is the pure in heart and of a good conscience. The laden with guilt (guilty) strikes out all kinds of crooked ways; but the pure needs not stealthy ways, he does not stand under the pressure of the bondage of sin, the ban of the guilt of sin; his conduct is straightforward, directed by the will of God, and not by cunning policy. Schultens: *Integer vitae scelerisque purus non habet cur vacillet, cur titubet, cur sese contorqueat*. The choice of the designation **רַב־** [and the pure] may be occasioned by **רַב־** (Hitzig); the expression 8b reminds us of Pro. 20:11.

The group now following extends to v. 18, where a new one begins with a variation of its initial verse.

***9 Better to sit on the pinnacle of a house-roof,
Than a contentious wife and a house in common.***

Pro. 21: 9. We have neither to supplement the second line: than with a contentious wife... (Symmachus, Theodotion, Jerome, Luther), nor: than that one have a contentious...; but the meaning is, that sitting on the roof-top better befits one, does better than a quarrelsome wife and a common house (rightly the Targ. and *Venet.*), i.e., in a common house; for the connecting together of the wife and the house by *vav* is a Semitic *hendiadys*, a juxtaposition of two ideas which our language would place in a relation of subordination (Fleischer). This *hendiadys* would, indeed, be scarcely possible if the idea of the married wife were attached to **אִשָּׁתָּה**; for that such an one has with her husband a “house of companionship, i.e., a common house,” is self-evident. But may it not with equal right be understood of the imperious positive mother-in-law of a widower, a splenetic shrewish aunt, a sickly female neighbour disputing with all the world, and the like? A man must live together with his wife in so far as he does not divorce her; he must then escape from

her; but a man may also be constrained by circumstances to live in a house with a quarrelsome mother-in-law, and such an one may, even during the life of his wife, and in spite of her affection, make his life so bitter that he would rather, in order that he might have rest, sit on the pinnacle or ridge of a house-roof. **פִּנְהָ** is the battlement (Zep. 1:16) of the roof, the edge of the roof, or its summit; he who sits there does so not without danger, and is exposed to the storm, but that in contrast with the alternative is even to be preferred; he sits alone. Regarding the *Chethîb* **מְדֹנִים**, *Kerî* **מְדֹנִים**, vid., at Pro. 6:14; and cf. the figures of the “continual dropping” for the continual scolding of such a wife, embittering the life of her husband, Pro. 19:13.

**10 The soul of the godless hath its desire after evil;
His neighbour findeth no mercy in his eyes.**

Pro. 21:10. The interchange of perf. and fut. cannot be without intention. Löwenstein renders the former as *perf. hypotheticum*: if the soul of the wicked desires anything evil...; but the **רָשָׁע** wishes evil not merely now and then, but that is in general his nature and tendency. The perf. expresses that which is actually the case: the soul of the wicked has its desire directed (write **אֶתָּה** with *Munach*, after Codd. and old Ed., not with *Makkeph*) toward evil, and the fut. expresses that which proceeds from this: he who stands near him is not spared. **יָחַן** is, as at Isa. 26:10, *Hoph.* of **יָחַן**, to incline, viz., oneself, compassionately toward any one, or to bend to him. But in what sense is **בְּעֵינָיו** added? It does not mean, as frequently, e.g., v. 2, according to his judgment, nor, as at Pro. 20: 8; 6:13: with his eyes, but is to be understood after the phrase **מִצָּא חֵן בְּעֵינָיו**: his neighbour finds no mercy in his eyes, so that in these words the sympathy ruling within him expresses itself: “his eyes will not spare his friends,” vid., Isa. 13:18.

**11 When the scorner is punished, the simple is made wise;
And when insight is imparted to a wise man, he receives knowledge.**

Pro. 21:11. The thought is the same as at Pro. 19:25. The mocker at religion and virtue is incorrigible, punishment avails him nothing, but yet it is not lost; for as a warning example it teaches the simple, who might otherwise be easily drawn into the same frivolity. On the other hand, the wise man needs no punishment, but only strengthening and furtherance: if “instruction” is imparted to him, he embraces it, makes it his own **דָּאָתָה**; for, being accessible to better insight, he gains more and more knowledge. De Dieu, Bertheau, and Zöckler make “the simple” the subject also in 11b: and if a wise man prospers, he (the simple) gains knowledge. But **הַשְּׂכִיל לְ**, used thus impersonally, is unheard of; wherefore Hitzig erases the **לְ** before **חָכָם**: if a wise man has

prosperity. But **הַשְׂכִּיל** does not properly mean to have prosperity, but only mediately: to act with insight, and on that account with success. The thought that the simple, on the one side, by the merited punishment of the mocker; on the other, by the intelligent prosperous conduct of the wise, comes to reflection, to reason, may indeed be entertained, but the traditional form of the proverb does not need any correction. **הַשְׂכִּיל** may be used not only transitively: to gain insight, Gen. 3: 6, Psa. 2:10, and elsewhere, but also causatively: to make intelligent, with the accus. following, Pro. 16:23, Psa. 32: 8, or: to offer, present insight, as here with the dat.-obj. following (cf. Pro. 17:26). Instead of **בְּעִנְשׁ־**, the *Kametz* of which is false, Codd. and good Edd. have, rightly, **בְּעִנְשׁ־**. Hitzig, making “the wise” the subject to **בְּהַשְׂכִּיל** (and accordingly “the scorner” would be the subject in 11a), as a correct consequence reads **בְּעִנְשׁ־ = בְּהַעֲנִישׁ־**. For us, with that first correction, this second one also fails. “Both *infinitivi constr.*,” Fleischer remarks, “are to be taken passively; for the Semitic infin., even of transitive form, as it has no designation of gender, time, and person, is an indeterminate *modus*, even in regard to the *generis verbi* (Act. and Pass.)” ^{f164}

To this proverb with *u-behaskil* there is connected the one that follows, beginning with *maskil*.

***12 A righteous One marketh the house of the godless;
He hurleth the godless to destruction.***

Pro. 21:12. If we understand by the word **צַדִּיק** a righteous man, then 12a would introduce the warning which he gives, and the unexpressed subject of 12b must be God (Umbreit). But after such an *introitus*, **יְהוָה** ought not to be wanting. If in 12a “the righteous man” is the subject, then it presents itself as such also for the second parallel part. But the thought that the righteous, when he takes notice of the house of the godless, shows attention which of itself hurls the godless into destruction (Löwenstein), would require the sing. **רָשַׁע** in the conclusion; also, instead of **מִסְלָף** the fut. **יִסְלַף** would have been found; and besides, the judicial **סֵלַף** (vid., regarding this word at Pro. 11: 3; 19: 3) would not be a suitable word for this confirmation in evil. Thus by **צַדִּיק** the proverb means God, and **מִסְלָף** has, as at Pro. 22:12, Job. 12:19, this word as its subject. “A righteous One” refers to the All-righteous, who is called, Job. 34:17, “the All-just One,” and by Rashi, under the passage before us, **צַדִּיקוֹ שֶׁל־עוֹלָם**. Only do not translate with Bertheau and Zöckler: the Righteous One (All-righteous), for (1) this would require **הַצַּדִּיק**, and (2) **הַצַּדִּיק** is never by itself used as an attributive designation of God. Rightly, Fleischer and Ewald: a Righteous One, viz., God. It is the indetermination

which seeks to present the idea of the great and dreadful: a Righteous One, and such a Righteous One! ^{f165} השכיל with על, Pro. 16:20, or אל, Psa. 41: 2, Neh. 8:13, here with ל, signifies to give attention to anything, to look attentively on it. The two participles stand in the same line: *animus advertit...evertit*. Hitzig changes לבית רשע into לביתו, and makes רשע the subject of 12b; but the proverb as it lies before us is far more intelligible.

**13 He that stoppeth his ear at the cry of the poor —
he also calls and is not heard.**

Pro. 21:13. Only the merciful find mercy, Mat. 5: 7; the unmerciful rich man, who has no ear for the cry of the ל, i.e., of him who is without support and means of subsistence, thus of one who is needing support, will also remain unheard when he himself, in the time of need, calls upon God for help. Cf. the parable of the unmerciful servant of the merciful king, Mat. 18:23 ff. מן in מנעקת, as Isa. 23:15, Gen. 4:13; 27: 1; no preposition of our [German] language [nor English] expresses, as Fleischer here remarks, such a fulness of meaning as this מן does, to which, after a verb of shutting up such as אטם (cf. Pro. 17:28), the Arab. ‘n would correspond, e.g., *âmy ‘n âltryk*: blind, so that he does not see the way.

**14 A gift in secret turneth away anger;
And a bribe into the bosom violent wrath.**

Pro. 21:14. Hitzig reads with Symmachus, the Targ., and Jerome, כִּבְה, and translates: “extinguishes anger;” but it does not follow that they did read כִּבְה; for the Talm. Hebrew כִּבְה signifies to cover by turning over, e.g., of a vessel, *Sanhedrin 77a*, which, when it is done to a candle or a fire, may mean its extinction. But כִּפָּה of the post-bibl. Heb. also means to bend, and thence to force out (Aram. כִּפָּא, כִּפִּי), according to which Kimchi hesitates whether to explain: overturns = smothers, or: bends = forces down anger. The *Venet.* follows the latter signification: κάμψει (for Villoison’s καλύψει rests on a false reading of the MS). But there is yet possible another derivation from the primary signification, *curvare, flectere, vertere*, according to which the LXX translates ἀνατρέπει, for which ἀποτρέπει would be yet better: כִּפָּה, to bend away, to turn off, ἀρκείν, *arcere*, altogether like the Arab. (compared by Schultens) *kfā*, and *kfy*, ἀρκείν, to prevent, whence, e.g., *ikfini hada*: hold that away from me, or: spare me that (Fleischer); with the words *hafika sharran* (Lat. *defendaris semper a malo*) princes were anciently saluted; *kfy* signifies “to suffice,” because enough is there, where there is a keeping off of want. Accordingly we translate: *Donum clam acceptum avertit iram*, which also the

Syr. meant by *mephadka* (מִפְרָק). This verb is naturally to be supplied to 14*b*, which the LXX has recognised (it translates: but he who spares gifts, excites violent anger). Regarding שָׂחַד, vid., at Pro. 17: 8; and regarding בָּחַק, at Pro. 17:23. Also here חָק (חֵיק = חֵיק), like Arab. *jayb*, ‘*ubb*, حَب, denotes the bosom of the garment; on the contrary (Arab.) *hijr*, *hidn*, حֵצֵן, is more used of that of the body, or that formed by the drawing together of the body (e.g., of the arm in carrying a child). A present is meant which one brings with him concealed in his bosom; perhaps 13*b* called to mind the judge that took gifts, Exo. 23: 8 (Hitzig).

***15 It is a joy to the just to do justice,
And a terror for them that work iniquity.***

Pro. 21:15. To act according to the law of rectitude is to these as unto death; injustice has become to them a second nature, so that their heart strives against rectitude of conduct; it also enters to little into their plan of life, and their economy, that they are afraid of ruining themselves thereby. So we believe, with Hitzig, Elster, Zöckler, and Luther, this must be explained in accordance with our interpretation of Pro. 10:29. Fleischer and others supplement the second parallel member from the first: וּפְעַל אֲוֵן מַחְתָּה לַפְּעֵלֵי אֲוֵן; others render 15*b* as an independent sentence: ruin falls on those who act wickedly. But that ellipsis is hard and scarcely possible; but in general מַחְתָּה, as contrasted correlate to שִׁמְחָה, can scarcely have the pure objective sense of ruin or destruction. It must mean a revolution in the heart. Right-doing is to the righteous a pleasure (cf. Pro. 10:23); and for those who have אֲוֵן, and are devoid of moral worth, and thus simply immoral as to the aim and sphere of their conduct, right-doing is something which alarms them: when they act in conformity with what is right, they do so after an external impulse only against their will, as if it were death to them.

***16 A man who wanders from the way of understanding,
Shall dwell in the assembly of the dead.***

Pro. 21:16. Regarding הַשְּׁבַל, vid., Pro. 1: 3; and regarding רַפְּאִים, Pro. 2:18. The verb נוּחַ means to repose, to take rest, Job. 3:13, and to dwell anywhere, Pro. 14:33; but originally like (Arab.) *nākh* and *hadd*, to lay oneself down anywhere, and there to come to rest; and that is the idea which is here connected with נוּחַ, for the figurative description of יֹאבֵד or יְמוּת is formed after the designation of the subject, 16*a*: he who, forsaking the way of understanding, walks in the way of error, at length comes to the assembly of the dead; for every motion has an end, and every journey a goal, whether it be one that is self-appointed or which is appointed for him. Here also it is

intimated that the way of the soul which loves wisdom and follows her goes in another direction than earthwards down into hades; hades and death, its background appear here as punishments, and it is true that as such one may escape them.

***17 He who loveth pleasure becometh a man of want;
He who loveth wine and oil doth not become rich.***

Pro. 21:17. In Arab. *samh* denotes the joyful action of the “cheerful giver,” 2Co. 9: 7; in Heb. the joyful affection; here, like *farah*, pleasure, delight, festival of joy. Jerome: *qui diligit epulas*. For feasting is specially thought of, where wine was drunk, and oil and other fragrant essences were poured (cf. Pro. 27: 9; Amo. 6: 6) on the head and the clothes. He who loves such festivals, and is commonly found there, becomes a man of want, or suffers want (cf. Jud. 12: 2, אִישׁ רִיב, a man of strife); such an one does not become rich (הָעֲשִׂיר, like Pro. 10: 4, = עָשָׂה עָשָׂר, Jer. 17:11); he does not advance, and thus goes backwards.

***18 The godless becometh a ransom for the righteous;
And the faithless cometh into the place of the upright.***

Pro. 21:18. The thought is the same as at Pro. 11: 8. An example of this is, that the same world-commotion which brought the nations round Babylon for its destruction, put an end to Israel’s exile: Cyrus, the instrument in God’s hands for inflicting punishment on many heathen nations, was Israel’s liberator, Isa. 43: 3. Another example is in the exchange of places by Haman and Mordecai, to which Rashi refers. כֹּפֶר is equivalent to λύτρον, ransom; but it properly signifies price of atonement, and generally, means of reconciliation, which covers or atones for the guilt of any one; the poll-tax and “oblations” also, Exo. 30:15 f., Num. 31:50, are placed under this point of view, as blotting out guilt: if the righteousness of God obtains satisfaction, it makes its demand against the godless, and lets the righteous go free; or, as the substantival clause 18b expresses, the faithless steps into the place of the upright, for the wrath passes by the latter and falls upon the former. Regarding בּוֹגֵד, vid., 2:22. Thus, in contrast to the יֵשֶׁר, he is designated, who keeps faith neither with God nor man, and with evil intention enters on deceitful ways, — the faithless, the malicious, the assassin.

Pro. 21:19. With this verse, a doublet to v. 9 (Pro. 25:24), the collector makes a new addition; in v. 29 he reaches a proverb which resembles the closing proverb of the preceding group, in its placing in contrast the רשע and יֵשֶׁר; —

*It is better to dwell in a waste land,
Than a contentious wife and vexation.*

The corner of the roof, Hitzig remarks, has been made use of, and the author must look further out for a lonely seat. But this is as piquant as it is devoid of thought; for have both proverbs the same author, and if so, were they coined at the same time? Here also it is unnecessary to regard **מַאֲשֶׁת** as an abbreviation for **מְשֻׁבֶּת עִם אִשָּׁה**. Hitzig supplies **שָׁכֵן**, by which **אִשָּׁה**, as the accus.-obj., is governed; but it is not to be supplied, for the proverb places as opposite to one another dwelling in a waste land (read **שָׁבֶת בְּאֶרֶץ־מִדְבָּר**, with Codd. and correct Ed.) and a contentious wife (*Chethîb*, **מְדַוְּנִים**, *Kerî*, **מְדַוְּנִים**) and vexation, and says the former is better than the latter. For **וְכַאֲס** [and vexation] is not, as translated by the ancients, and generally received, a second governed genitive to **אִשָּׁה**, but dependent on **מִן**, follows “contentious woman” (cf. 9b): better that than a quarrelsome wife, and at the same time vexation.

*20 Precious treasure and oil are in the dwelling of the wise;
And a fool of a man squanders it.*

Pro. 21:20. The wise spares, the fool squanders; and if the latter enters on the inheritance which the former with trouble and care collected, it is soon devoured. The combination **אוֹצֵר נְחָמִד וְשֶׁמֶן** [desirable treasure and oil] has something inconcinnate, wherefore the accentuation places **אוֹצֵר** by itself by *Mehuppach Legarmeh*; but it is not to be translated “a treasure of that which is precious, and oil,” since it is punctuated **אוֹצֵר**, and not **אוֹצֵר**; and besides, in that case **מִחֲמַדִּים** would have been used instead of **נְחָמִד**. Thus by **נְחָמִד אוֹצֵר**, a desirable and splendid capital in gold and things of value (Isa. 23:18; Psa. 19:11); and by **שֶׁמֶן**, mentioned by way of example, stores in kitchen and cellar are to be thought of, which serve him who lives luxuriously, and afford noble hospitality, — a fool of a man (**בְּסִיל אָדָם**, as at Pro. 15:20), who finds this, devours it, i.e., quickly goes through it, makes, in short, a *tabula rasa* of it; cf. **בָּלַע**, Isa. 28: 4, with **בָּלַע**, 2Sa. 20:26, and Pro. 19:28. The suffix of **וַיִּבְלַעֵנוּ** refers back to **אוֹצֵר** as the main idea, or distributively also both to the treasure and the oil. The LXX (**θησαυρὸς ἐπιθυμητὸς ἀναπαύσεται ἐπὶ στόματος σοφοῦ**, i.e., **שָׁכֵן בְּפִה חָכָם**), according to which Hitzig corrects; but the fool, he who swallows down “the precious treasure with a wise mouth,” is a being we can scarcely conceive of. His taste is not at all bad; why then a fool? Is it perhaps because he takes more in than he can at one time digest? The reading of the LXX is corrected by 20b.

**21 He that followeth after righteousness and kindness
Will obtain life, righteousness, and honour.**

Pro. 21:21. How we are to render צדקה וחסד is seen from the connection of Pro. 21: 3 and Hos. 6: 7: *tsedakah* is conduct proceeding from the principle of self-denying and compassionate love, which is the essence of the law, Mic. 6: 8; and *hēsēd* is conduct proceeding from sympathy, which, placing itself in the room of another, perceives what will benefit him, and sets about doing it (cf. e.g., Job. 6:14: to him who is inwardly melted [disheartened] חסד is due from his neighbour). The reward which one who strives thus to act obtains, is designated 21*b* by חיים and כבוד. Honour and life stand together, Pro. 22: 4, when עשר precedes, and here צדקה stands between, which, Pro. 8:18, Psa. 24: 5, is thought of as that which is distributed as a gift of heaven, Isa. 45: 8, which has glory in its train, Isa. 58: 8; as Paul also says, “Whom He justified, them He also glorified.” The LXX has omitted *tsedakah*, because it can easily appear as erroneously repeated from 21*a*. But in reality there are three good things which are promised to those who are zealous in the works of love: a prosperous life, enduring righteousness, true honour. Life as it proceeds from God, the Living One, righteousness as it avails the righteous and those doing righteously before God, honour or glory (Psa. 29: 3) as it is given (Psa. 84:12) by the God of glory. Cf. with חיים צדקה, Pro. 10: 2, and with צדקה, especially Jam. 2:13, κατακαυχᾶται ἔλεος κρίσεως.

**22 A wise man scaleth a city of the mighty;
And casteth down the fortress in which they trusted.**

Pro. 21:22. Ecc. 9:14 f. is a side-piece to this, according to which a single wise man, although poor, may become the deliverer of a city besieged by a great army, and destitute of the means of defence. עלה, *seq. acc.*, means to climb up, Joe. 2: 7; here, of the scaling of a fortified town, viz., its fortress. עז is that which makes it עיר עז, Isa. 26: 1: its armour of protection, which is designated by the genit. מבטחה, as the object and ground of their confidence. The vocalization מבטחה, for *mibtachcha* (cf. Jer. 48:13 with Job. 18:14), follows the rule Gesen. § 27, *Anm. 2b*. The suff., as in לאתנה, Isa. 23:17, is lightened, because if its *mappik*, *Michlol 30b*; vid., regarding the various grounds of these *formae raphatae pro mappicatis*, Böttcher, § 418. If a city is defended by ever so many valiant men, the wise man knows the point where it may be overcome, and knows how to organize the assault so as to destroy the proud fortress. With ויך, he brings to ruin, cf. אר רדתה, Deu. 20:20.

**23 He that guardeth his mouth and his tongue,
Keepeth his soul from troubles.**

Pro. 21:23. Pro. 13: 3 resembles this. He guardeth his mouth who does not speak when he does better to be silent; and he guardeth his tongue who says no more than is right and fitting. The troubles comprehend both external and internal evils, hurtful incidents and (נפש) צרות לבב, Psa. 25:17; 31: 8, i.e., distress of conscience, self-accusation, sorrow on account of the irreparable evil which one occasions.

**24 A proud and arrogant man is called mocker (free-spirit);
One who acteth in superfluity of haughtiness.**

Pro. 21:24. We have thus translated (p. 28): the proverb defines almost in a formal way an idea current from the time of Solomon: לַיֵּץ (properly, the distorter, vid., Pro. 1: 7) is an old word; but as with us in the west since the last century, the names of *free-thinkers* and *esprits forts* (cf. Isa. 46:12) have become current for such as subject the faith of the Church to destructive criticism, so then they were called לְצַיִם, who mockingly, as men of full age, set themselves above revealed religion and prophecy (Isa. 28: 9); and the above proverb gives the meaning of this name, for it describes in his moral character such a man. Thus we call one זָד, haughty, and זָד יְהִיר, i.e., destroying himself, and thus thoughtlessly haughty, who בַּעֲבַרְתָּ זָדוֹן acts in superfluity or arrogance (vid., at Pro. 11:23) of haughtiness; for not only does he inwardly raise himself above all that is worthy of recognition as true, of faith as certain, of respect as holy; but acting as well as judging frivolously, he shows reverence for nothing, scornfully passing sentence against everything. *Abulwalid* (vid., Gesen. *Thes.*) takes יְהִיר in the sense of obstinate; for he compares the Arab. *jahr* (*jahar*), which is equivalent to *lijâj*, constancy, stubbornness. But in the Targ. and Talm. (vid., at Hab. 2: 5, Levy's Chald. *Wörterb.* under יְהִיר) יְהִיר in all its offshoots and derivations has the sense of pride; we have then rather to compare the Arab. *istaihara*, to be insane (= *dhahb aḳlh, mens ejus alienata est*), perhaps also to *hajjir, mutahawwir*, being overthrown, *praeceps*, so that יְהִיר denotes one who by his υπερφρονεῖν is carried beyond all σωφρονεῖν (vid., Rom. 12: 3), one who is altogether mad from pride. The Syr. *madocho* (Targ. מְרִיחָא), by which יְהִיר (Targ. יְהִיר) is rendered here and at Hab. 2: 5, is its synonym; this word also combines in itself the ideas foolhardy, and of one acting in a presumptuous, mad way; in a word, of one who is arrogant. Schultens is in the right way; but when he translates by *tumidus mole cava ruens*, he puts, as it is his custom to do, too much into the word; *tumidus*, puffed up, presents an idea which, etymologically at least, does not lie in it. The *Venet.*: ἀκρατῆς θρασὺς

βωμολόχος τοῦμόνά όί, which may be translated: an untractable reckless person we call a fool [*homo ineptus*], is not bad.

**25 The desire of the slothful killeth him;
For his hands refuse to be active.**

Pro. 21:25. The desire of the עֲצִיל, Hitzig remarks, goes out first after meat and drink; and when it takes this direction, as hunger, it kills him indeed. but in this case it is not the desire that kills him, but the impossibility of satisfying it. The meaning is simply: the inordinate desire after rest and pleasure kills the slothful; for this always seeking only enjoyment and idleness brings him at last to ruin. תִּשְׁאָה means here, as in *Kibroth ha-tava*, Num. 11:34, inordinate longing after enjoyments. The proverb is connected by almost all interpreters (also Ewald, Bertheau, Hitzig, Elster, Zöckler) as a tetrastich with v. 25: he (the slothful) always eagerly desires, but the righteous giveth and spareth not. But (1) although צַדִּיק, since it designates one who is faithful to duty, might be used particularly of the industrious (cf. Pro. 15:19), yet would there be wanting in 26a נֶאֱמָר, Pro. 13: 4, cf. 20: 4, necessary for the formation of the contrast; (2) this older Book of Proverbs consists of pure distichs; the only tristich, Pro. 19: 7, appears as the consequence of a mutilation from the LXX. Thus the pretended tetrastich before us is only apparently such.

**26 One always desireth eagerly;
But the righteous giveth and holdeth not back.**

Pro. 21:26. Otherwise Fleischer: *per totum diem avet avidus*, i.e., *avarus*; but that in תִּשְׁאָה תִּשְׁאָה the verb is connected with its inner obj. is manifest from Num. 11: 4; it is the mode of expression which is called in the Greek syntax *schema etymologicum*, and which is also possible without an adj. joined to the obj., as in the ὕβριον θ' ὑβρίζεις (Eurip. *Herc. fur.* 706), the Arab. *mârâhu miryatn*: he had a strife with him. Euchel impossibly: necessities will continually be appeased, which would have required תִּתְאָה or מִתְאָה. The explanation also cannot be: each day presents its special demand, for כָּל-הַיּוֹם does not mean each day, but the whole day, i.e., continually. Thus we render תִּתְאָה with the most general subject (in which case the national grammarians supply הַמִּתְאָה): continually one longs longing, i.e., there are demands, solicitations, wishes, importunate petitions; but still the righteous is not embarrassed in his generosity, he gives as unceasingly (cf. Isa. 14: 6; 58: 1) as one asks. Thus the perf. is explained, which is related hypothetically to the fut. following: though one, etc.

**27 The sacrifice of the godless is an abomination;
How much more if it is brought for evil!**

Pro. 21:27. Line first = Pro. 15: 8a. Regarding the syllogistic **כִּי אָרַף**, vid., 12:31; Pro. 15:11; regarding **זָמָה**, crime, particularly the sin of lewdness (from **זָמַן**, to press together, to collect the thoughts upon something, to contrive, cf. *raffinement de la volupté*), at Pro. 10:23. **בְּזָמָה** is too vaguely rendered in the LXX by *παρονόμως*, falsely by Jerome, *ex scelere* (cf. *ἐξ ἀδίκου*, Sir. 31:18, with Mal. 1:13). The **כ** is not meant, as at Eze. 22:11, of the way and manner; for that the condition of life of the **רָשָׁע** is not a pure one, is not to be supposed. It is as Hitzig, rightly, that of price: for a transgression, i.e., to atone for it; one is hereby reminded, that he who had intercourse with a betrothed bondmaid had to present an *ascham* [trespass-offering], Lev. 19:20-22. But frequently enough would it occur that rich sensualists brought trespass-offerings, and other offerings, in order thereby to recompense for their transgressions, and to purchase for themselves the connivance of God for their dissolute life. Such offerings of the godless, the proverb means, are to God a twofold and a threefold abomination; for in this case not only does the godless fail in respect of repentance and a desire after salvation, which are the conditions of all sacrifices acceptable to God, but he makes God directly a minister of sin.

**28 A false witness shall perish;
But he who heareth shall always speak truth.**

Pro. 21:28. The LXX translate 28b by *ἀνὴρ δὲ φυλασσόμενος λαλήσει*. Cappellus supposes that they read **לִנְצַח** for **לִנְצַח**, which, however, cannot mean “taking care.” Hitzig further imagines **שָׂמַח** for **שָׁמַע**, and brings out the meaning: “the man that rejoiceth to deliver shall speak.” But where in all the world does **נָצַח** mean “to deliver”? It means, “to guard, preserve;” and to reach the meaning of “to deliver,” a clause must be added with **מִן**, as **מִרְע**. When one who speaks lies (**עַד בְּזָבִים**), and a man who hears (**אִישׁ שׁוֹמֵא**, *plene*, and with the orthophonic Dagesh), are contrasted, the former is one who fancifully or malevolently falsifies the fact, and the latter is one who before he speaks hears in order that he may say nothing that he has not surely heard. As **לֵב שֹׂמֵא**, 1Ki. 3: 9, means an obedient heart, so here **אִישׁ שׁוֹמֵא** means a man who attentively hears, carefully proves. Such an one will speak **לִנְצַח**, i.e., not: according to the truth, and not: for victory (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, *εἰς νῆκος*), i.e., so that accomplishes it (Oetinger); for the Heb. **נָצַח** has neither that Arab. nor this Aram. signification; but, with the transference of the root meaning of radiating or streaming over, to time, continuous existence (vid.,

Orelli, *Synonyma der Zeit und Ewigkeit*, pp. 96-97), thus: he will speak for continuance, i.e., either: without ever requiring to be silent, or, which we prefer: so that what he says stands; on the contrary, he who testifies mere fictions, i.e., avers that they are truth, is destroyed (28a = 19: 9b, cf. 5): he himself comes to nothing, since his testimonies are referred to their groundlessness and falsity; for **שֶׁקֶר אֵין לוֹ רַגְלִים**, the lie has no feet on which it can stand, it comes to nothing sooner or later.

Pro. 21:29. Another proverb with **אִישׁ**: —

*A godless man showeth boldness in his mien;
But one that is upright — he proveth his way.*

The *Chethîb* has **יָכוֹן**; but that the upright directeth, *dirigit*, his way, i.e., gives to it the right direction (cf. 2Ch. 27: 6), is not a good contrast to the boldness of the godless; the *Kerî*, **הַבֵּן יִרְכָּבֵהוּ**, deserves the preference. Aquila, Symmachus, the Syr., Targ., and *Venet.* adhere to the *Chethîb*, which would be suitable if it could be translated, with Jerome, by *corrigit*; Luther also reads the verb with **כ**, but as if it were **יָכוֹן** (whoever is pious, his way will stand) — only the LXX render the *Kerî* (**συστῆ**); as for the rest, the ancients waver between the *Chethîb* **יִרְכָּבֵהוּ** and the *Kerî* **יִרְכָּבֵהוּ**: the former refers to manner of life in general; the latter (as at Pro. 3:31 and elsewhere) to the conduct in separate cases; thus the one is just as appropriate as the other. In the circumstantial designation **אִישׁ רָשָׁע** (cf. Pro. 11: 7) we have the stamp of the distinction of different classes of men peculiar to the Book of Proverbs. **הִעֲזֹ** (to make firm, defiant) had, Pro. 7:13, **פְּנִים** as accus.; the **ב** here is not that used in metaphoristic expressions instead of the accus. obj., which we have spoken of at Pro. 15: 4; 20:30, but that of the means; for the face is thought of, not as the object of the action, but, after Gesen. § 138, 1, as the means of its accomplishment: the godless makes (shows) firmness, i.e., defiance, accessibility to no admonition, which is countenance; but the upright considers, i.e., proves (Pro. 14: 8), his way. **בֵּין** (**הַבֵּין**) means a perceiving of the object in its specific peculiarity, an understanding of its constituent parts and essential marks; it denotes knowing an event analytically, as **הַשְּׂכִיל**, as well as synthetically (cf. Arab. *shakl*), and is thus used as the expression of a perception, which apprehends the object not merely immediately, but closely examines into its circumstances.

If we further seek for the boundaries, the proverbs regarding the rich and the poor, Pro. 22: 2, 7, 16, present themselves as such, and this the more surely as Pro. 22:16 is without contradiction the terminus. Thus we take first together Pro. 21:30-22: 2.

*30 No wisdom and no understanding,
And no counsel is there against Jahve.*

Pro. 21:30. The expression might also be לְפָנָי ה' ; but the predominating sense would then be, that no wisdom appears to God as such, that He values none as such. With לִנְגַד the proverb is more objective: there is no wisdom which, compared with His, can be regarded as such (cf. 1Co. 3:19), none which can boast itself against Him, or can at all avail against Him (לִנְגַד, as Dan. 10:12; Neh. 3:37); whence it follows (as Job. 28:28) that the wisdom of man consists in the fear of God the Alone-wise, or, which is the same thing, the All-wise. Immanuel interprets חֲכָמָה of theology, תְּבוּנָה of worldly science, עֲצָה of politics; but חֲכָמָה is used of the knowledge of truth, i.e., of that which truly is and continues; תְּבוּנָה of criticism, and עֲצָה of system and method; vid., at Pro. 1: 2; 8:14, from which latter passage the LXX has substituted here גְּבוּרָה instead of תְּבוּנָה. Instead of לִנְגַד ה' it translates πρὸς τὸν ἄσεβῆ, i.e., for that which is נגד ה' against Jahve.

*31 The horse is harnessed for the day of battle;
But with Jahve is the victory,*

Pro. 21:31. i.e., it remains with Him to give the victory or not, for the horse is a vain means of victory, Isa. 33:17; the battle is the Lord's, 1Sa. 17:47, i.e., it depends on Him how the battle shall issue; and king and people who have taken up arms in defence of their rights have thus to trust nothing in the multitude of their war-horses (סוּס, horses, including their riders), and generally in their preparations for the battle, but in the Lord (cf. Psa. 20: 8, and, on the contrary, Isa. 31: 1). The LXX translates הַתְּשׁוּעָה by ἡ βοήθεια, as if the Arab. name of victory, *naṣr*, proceeding from this fundamental meaning, stood in the text; תְּשׁוּעָה (from יִשַׁע, Arab. *ws'*, to be wide, to have free space for motion) signifies properly prosperity, as the contrast of distress, oppression, slavery, and victory (cf. e.g., Psa. 144:10, and יִשׁוּעָה, 1Sa. 14:45). The post-bibl. Heb. uses נִצָּח (נִצְחוֹן) for victory; but the O.T. Heb. has no word more fully covering this idea than תְּשׁוּעָה (יִשׁוּעָה)^{f165a}

PRO. 22: 1-16

*1 A good name has the preference above great riches;
For more than silver and gold is grace.*

Pro. 22: 1. The proverb is constructed chiasmically; the commencing word נְבוֹרָה (cf. Pro. 21: 3), and the concluding word טוֹב, are the parallel

predicates; rightly, none of the old translators have been misled to take together **הָן טוֹב**, after the analogy of **שָׁמַיִם טוֹב**, 3:14; 13:15. **שָׁמַיִם** also does not need **טוֹב** for nearer determination; the more modern idiom uses, **שָׁמַיִם טוֹב** ^{f165b}, the more ancient uses **שָׁמַיִם** alone (e.g., Ecc. 7: 1), in the sense of **ὄνομα καλόν** (thus here LXX); for being well known (renowned) is equivalent to a name, and the contrary to being nameless (Job. 30: 8); to make oneself a name, is equivalent to build a monument in honour of oneself; possibly the derivation of the word from **שָׁמַיִם**, to be high, prominent, known, may have contributed to this meaning of the word *sensu eximio*, for **שָׁמַיִם** has the same root word as **שָׁמַיִם**. Luther translates **שָׁמַיִם** by *Das Gerücht* [rumour, fame], in the same pregnant sense; even to the present day, *renom, recommandée, riputazione*, and the like, are thus used. The parallel **חַן** signifies grace and favour (being beloved); grace, which brings favour (Pro. 11:16); and favour, which is the consequence of a graceful appearance, courtesy, and demeanour (e.g., Est. 2:15).

***2 The rich and the poor meet together;
The creator of them all is Jahve.***

Pro. 22: 2. From this, that God made them all, i.e., rich and poor in the totality of their individuals, it follows that the meeting together is His will and His ordinance; they shall in life push one against another, and for what other purpose than that this relationship of mutual intercourse should be a school of virtue: the poor shall not envy the rich (Pro. 3:31), and the rich shall not despise the poor, who has the same God and Father as himself (Pro. 14:31; 17: 5; Job. 31:15); they shall remain conscious of this, that the intermingling of the diversities of station is for this end, that the lowly should serve the exalted, and the exalted should serve the lowly. Pro. 29:13 is a variation; there also for both, but particularly for the rich, lies in the proverb a solemn warning.

The group of proverbs beginning here terminates at v. 7, where, like the preceding, it closes with a proverb of the rich and the poor.

***3 The prudent seeth the evil, and hideth himself;
But the simple go forward, and suffer injury.***

Pro. 22: 3. This proverb repeats itself with insignificant variations, Pro. 27:12. The *Kerî* **וַיִּסְתֵּר** makes it more conformable to the words there used. The *Chethîb* is not to be read **וַיִּסְתֵּר**, for this *Kal* is *inusit.*, but **וַיִּסְתֵּר**, or much rather **וַיִּסְתֵּר**, since it is intended to be said what immediate consequence on the part of a prudent man arises from his perceiving an evil standing before him; he sees, e.g., the approaching overthrow of a decaying

house, or in a sudden storm the fearful flood, and betimes betakes himself to a place of safety; the simple, on the contrary, go blindly forward into the threatening danger, and must bear the punishment of their carelessness. The *fut. consec.* 3*a* denotes the hiding of oneself as that which immediately follows from the being observant; the two *perf.* 3*b*, on the other hand, with or without ׀, denote the going forward and meeting with punishment as occurring contemporaneously (cf. *Psa.* 48: 6, and regarding these diverse forms of construction, at *Hab.* 3:10). “The interchange of the sing. and plur. gives us to understand that several or many simple ones are found for one prudent man” (Hitzig). The *Niph.* of עָנַשׁ signifies properly to be punished by pecuniary fine (*Exo.* 21:22) (cf. the post-bibl. קָנַם, קָנַם, to threaten punishment, which appears to have arisen from *censere*, to estimate, to lay on taxes); here it has the general meaning of being punished, viz., of the self-punishment of want of foresight.

4 The reward of humility is the fear of Jahve, Is riches, and honour, and life.

Pro. 22: 4. As אֲנִיָּהּ צַדִּיק, *Psa.* 45: 5, is understood of the two virtues, meekness and righteousness, so here the three Göttingen divines (Ewald, Bertheau, and Elster), as also Dunasch, see in עָנָה יְרֵאתָ ה' an asyndeton; the poet would then have omitted *vav*, because instead of the copulative connection he preferred the appositional (Schultens: *praemium mansuetudinis quae est reverentia Jehovae*) or the permutative (the reward of humility; more accurately expressed: the fear of God). It is in favour of this interpretation that the verse following (v. 5) also shows an asyndeton. Luther otherwise: where one abides in the fear of the Lord; and Oetinger: the reward of humility, endurance, calmness in the fear of the Lord, is...; Fleischer also interprets ה' יְרֵאתָ as *Pro.* 21: 4, חֲטָאתָ (*lucerna impiorum vitiosa*), as the accus. of the nearer definition. But then is the nearest-lying construction: the reward of humility is the fear of God, as all old interpreters understand 4*a* (e.g., Symmachus, ὡςτερον πρᾶυτητος φόβος κυρίου), a thought so incomprehensible, that one must adopt one or other of these expedients? On the one side, we may indeed say that the fear of God brings humility with it; but, on the other hand, it is just as conformable to experience that the fear of God is a consequence of humility; for actually to subordinate oneself to God, and to give honour to Him alone, one must have broken his self-will, and come to the knowledge of himself in his dependence, nothingness, and sin; and one consequence by which humility is rewarded, may be called the fear of God, because it is the root of all wisdom, or as is here said (cf. 3:16; 8:18), because riches, and honour, and life are in its train. Thus 4*a* is a concluded sentence, which in 4*b* is so continued, that from 4*a* the predicate is to be continued: the

reward of humility is the fear of God; it is at the same time riches... Hitzig conjectures **רְאוּת ה'**, the beholding Jahve; but the *visio Dei* (*beatifica*) is not a dogmatic idea thus expressed in the O.T. **עֲקַב** denotes what follows a thing, from **עָקַב**, to tread on the heels (Fleischer); for **עֲקַב** (Arab. *ʿakīb*) is the heels, as the incurvation of the foot; and **עֲקַב**, the consequence (cf. Arab. *ʿakb*, *ʿukb*, *posteritas*), is mediated through the *v. denom.* **עֲקַב**, to tread on the heels, to follow on the heels (cf. denominatives, such as Arab. *batn*, *zahr*, *ʿân*, **עֵינַן**, to strike the body, the back, the eye).

***5 Thorns, snares, are on the way of the crooked;
He that guardeth his soul, let him keep far from them.***

Pro. 22: 5. Rightly the *Venet.* ἄκανθα παγίδες ἐν ὁδῷ στρεβλοῦ. The meaning of **צְנִיִּים** (plur. of **צָן**, or **צִנָּה**, the same as **צְנִינִים**) and **פָּחִים** (from **פָּח**, Arab. *fah*), stands fast, though it be not etymologically verified; the placing together of these two words (the LXX obliterating the asyndeton: **τρίβολος καὶ παγίδες**) follows the scheme **שָׁמַשׁ יִרְחַח**, Hab. 3:11. The **עֲקֹשׁ-לֵב** (perverse of heart, crooked, Pro. 17:20; 11:20) drives his crooked winding way, corresponding to his habit of mind, which is the contrast and the perversion of that which is just, a way in which there are thorns which entangle and wound those who enter thereon, snares which unexpectedly bring them down and hold them fast as prisoners; the hedge of thorns, Pro. 15:19, was a figure of the hindrances in the way of the wicked themselves. The thorn and snares here are a figure of the hindrances and dangers which go forth from the deceitful and the false in the way of others, of those who keep their souls, i.e., who outwardly and morally take heed to their life (Pro. 16:17; 13: 3, pred. here subj.), who will keep, or are disposed to keep, themselves from these thorns, these snares into which the deceitful and perverse-hearted seek to entice them.

***6 Give to the child instruction conformably to His way;
So he will not, when he becomes old, depart from it.***

Pro. 22: 6. The first instruction is meant which, communicated to the child, should be **אֶל-לְפִי**, after the measure (Gen. 43: 7 = post-bibl. **לְפִי** and **בְּפִי**) of his way, i.e., not: of his calling, which he must by and by enter upon (Bertheau, Zöckler), which **דֶּרֶךְ** of itself cannot mean; also not: of the way which he must keep in during life (*Kidduschin* 30a); nor: of his individual nature (Elster); but: of the nature of the child as such, for **נֶאֱרָךְ דֶּרֶךְ נַאֲרָךְ** is the child's way, as e.g., *derek col-haarets*, Gen. 19:31, the general custom of the land; *derek Mitsrâyim*, Isa. 10:24, the way (the manner of acting) of the Egyptians. The instruction of youth, the education of youth, ought to be

conformed to the nature of youth; the matter of instruction, the manner of instruction, ought to regulate itself according to the stage of life, and its peculiarities; the method ought to be arranged according to the degree of development which the mental and bodily life of the youth has arrived at. The verb חָנַךְ is a denominative like עָקַב, v. 4; it signifies to affect the taste, חָדַךְ (= חָנַךְ), in the Arab. to put date syrup into the mouth of the suckling; so that we may compare with it the saying of Horace, [Ep. i. 2, 69]: *Quo semel est imbuta recens servabit odorem Testa diu*. In the post-bibl. Heb. חֲנוּךְ denotes that which in the language of the Church is called *catechizatio*; חֲנוּךְ (לְנֵעֵר) סֵפֶר is the usual title of the catechisms. It is the fundamental and first requisite of all educational instruction which the proverb formulates, a suitable motto for the lesson-books of pedagogues and catechists. מִמְּנָה [from it] refers to that training of youth, in conformity with his nature, which becomes a second nature, that which is imprinted, inbred, becomes accustomed. V. 6 is wanting in the LXX; where it exists in MSS of the LXX, it is supplied from Theodotion; the Complut. translates independently from the Heb. text.

***7 A rich man will rule over the poor,
And the borrower is subject to the man who lends.***

Pro. 22: 7. “This is the course of the world. As regards the sing. and plur. in *7a*, there are many poor for one rich; and in the Orient the rule is generally in the hands of one” (Hitzig). The fut. denotes how it will and must happen, and the substantial clause *7b*, which as such is an expression of continuance (Arab. *thabât*, i.e., of the remaining and continuing), denotes that contracting of debt brings naturally with it a slavish relation of dependence. לָוֶה, properly he who binds himself to one *se ei obligat*, and מְלוֹוֶה, as Pro. 19:17 (vid., *l.c.*), *qui alterum (mutui datione) obligat*, from לוֹוֶה, Arab. *lwy*, to wind, turn, twist round (*cog. root laff*), whence with Fleischer is also to be derived the Aram. לוֹוֶה, “into connection;” so אָלַף, properly “pushing against,” refers to the radically related אָלַף (= וּלָהּ), *contiguum esse*. אִישׁ מְלוֹוֶה is one who puts himself in the way of lending, although not directly in a professional manner. The pred. precedes its subject according to rule. Luther rightly translates: and he who borrows is the lender’s servant, whence the pun on the proper names: “Borghart [= the borrower] is Lehnhart’s [= lender’s] servant.”

The group now following extends to the end of this first collection of Solomon’s proverbs; it closes also with a proverb of the poor and the rich.

***8 He that soweth iniquity shall reap calamity;
And the rod of his fury shall vanish away.***

Pro. 22: 8. “Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap” (Gal. 6: 7); he that soweth good reapeth good, 11:18; he that soweth evil reapeth evil, Job. 4: 8; cf. Hos. 10:12 f. אֲוִלָּה is the direct contrast of צְדָקָה or יֵשֶׁר (e.g., Psa. 125: 3; 107:42), proceeding from the idea that the good is right, i.e., straight, *rectum*; the evil, that which departs from the straight line, and is crooked. Regarding אֲוִן, which means both perversity of mind and conduct, as well as destiny, calamity, vid., Pro. 12:21. That which the poet particularly means by אֲוִלָּה is shown in 8*b*, viz., unsympathizing tyranny, cruel misconduct toward a neighbour. שֶׁבֶט עֲבָרָתוֹ is the rod which he who soweth iniquity makes another to feel in his anger. The saying, that an end will be to this rod of his fury, agrees with that which is said of the despot’s sceptre, Isa. 14: 5 f.; Psa. 125: 3. Rightly Fleischer: *baculus insolentiae ejus consumetur h. e. facultas qua pollet alios insolenter tractandi evanescet.* Hitzig’s objection, that a rod does not vanish away, but is broken, is answered by this, that the rod is thought of as brandished; besides, one uses בָּלָה of anything which has an end, e.g., Isa. 16: 4. Other interpreters understand “the rod of his fury” of the rod of God’s anger, which will strike the אֲוִלָּה and יִבְלָה, as at Eze. 5:13; Dan. 12: 7: “and the rod of His punishment will surely come” (Ewald, and similarly Schultens, Euchel, Umbreit). This though also hovers before the LXX: πλῆγὴν δὲ ἔργων αὐτοῦ (עֲבָרָתוֹ) συντελέσει (יִבְלָה). But if the rod of punishment which is appointed for the unrighteous be meant, then we would have expected יִבְלָה. Taken in the future, the שֶׁבֶט of the בְּלוּת is not its *confectio* in the sense of completion, but its termination or annihilation; and besides, it lies nearer after 8*a* to take the suffix of עֲבָרָתוֹ subjectively (Isa. 14: 6; 16: 6) than objectively. The LXX has, after v. 8, a distich: —

*ἄνδρα ἰλαρὸν καὶ δότην εὐλογεῖ ὁ θεός,
ματαιότητα δὲ ἔργων αὐτοῦ συντελέσει.*

The first line (2Co. 9: 7) is a variant translation of 9*a* (cf. Pro. 21:17), the second (וְשֹׂא עֲבָדָתוֹ) is a similar rendering of 8*b*.

*9 He who is friendly is blessed;
Because he giveth of his bread to the poor.*

Pro. 22: 9. The thought is the same as at Pro. 11:25. טוֹב אֵינִי (thus to be written without *Makkeph*, with *Munach* of the first word, with correct Codd., also 1294 and *Jaman*), the contrast of רָע אֵינִי, Pro. 23: 6; 22:22, i.e., the envious, evil-eyed, ungracious (post-bibl. also צַר אֵינִי), is one who looks kindly, is good-hearted, and as ἰλαρὸς δότης, shows himself benevolent. Such gentleness and kindness is called in the Mishna אֵינִי טוֹבָה (Aboth ii. 13), or

אֵין יָפֵה. Such a friend is blessed, for he has also himself scattered blessings (cf. אֵין יָפֵה, Pro. 11:25; 21:13); he has, as is said, looking back from the blessing that has happened to him, given of his bread (Luther, as the LXX, with partitive genitive: *seines brots* [= of his bread]) to the poor; cf. the unfolding of this blessing of self-denying love, Isaiah 8. The LXX has also here another distich:

*Νίκην καὶ τιμὴν περιποιεῖται ὁ δῶρα δούς,
Τὴν μέντοι ψυξὴν ἀφαιρεῖται τῶν κεκτημένων.*

The first line appears a variant translation of Pro. 19: 6 *b*, and the second of Pro. 1:19 *b*, according to which selfishness, in contrast to liberality, is the subject to be thought of. Ewald translates the second line:

And he (who distributes gifts) conquers the soul of the recipients.

But κεκτημένος = בַּעֲלִים (בְּעָלִים) signifies the possessor, not the recipient of anything as a gift, who cannot also be here meant because of the μέντοι.

*10 Chase away the scorner, and contention goeth out,
And strife and reproach rest.*

Pro. 22:10. If in a company, a circle of friends, a society (LXX ἔκβαλε ἐκ συνεδρίου), a wicked man is found who (vid., the definition of לָץ, Pro. 21:24) treats religious questions without respect, moral questions in a frivolous way, serious things jestingly, and in his scornful spirit, his passion for witticism, his love of anecdote, places himself above the duty of showing reverence, veneration, and respect, there will arise ceaseless contentions and conflicts. Such a man one ought to chase away; then there will immediately go forth along with him dispeace (מְדוֹן), there will then be rest from strife and disgrace, viz., of the strife which such a one draws forth, and the disgrace which it brings on the society, and continually prepares for it. קָלוֹן is commonly understood of the injury, abuse, which others have to suffer from the scoffer, or also (thus Fleischer, Hitzig) of the *opprobria* of the contentious against one another. But קָלוֹן is not so used; it means always disgrace, as something that happens, an experience, vid., at Pro. 18: 3. The praise of one who is the direct contrast of a לָץ is celebrated in the next verse.

*11 He that loveth heart-purity,
Whose grace of lips, the king is his friend.*

Pro. 22:11. Thus with Hitzig, it is to be translated not: he who loveth with a pure heart, — we may interpret טְהוֹר־לֵב syntactically in the sense of *puritate cordis* or *purus corde* (Ralbag, Ewald, after Pro. 20: 7), for that which follows

אהב and is its supplement has to stand where possible as the accus. of the object; thus not: *qui amat puritatem cordis, gratiose erunt labia ejus* (de Dieu, Geier, Schultens, C. B. Michaelis, Fleischer), for between heart-purity and graciousness of speech there exists a moral relation, but yet no necessary connection of sequence; also not: he who loves purity of heart, and grace on his lips (Aben Ezra, Schelling, Bertheau), for “to love the grace of one’s own lips” is an awkward expression, which sounds more like reprehensible self-complacency than a praiseworthy endeavour after gracious speech. Excellently Luther:

*“He who has a true heart and amiable speech,
The king is his friend.”*

מְהוֹרֵ־לֵב is not adjectival, but substantival; מְהוֹרֵ־ is thus not the constr. of the mas. מְהוֹרֵ, as Job. 17:10, but of the segolate מְהוֹרֵ, or (since the ground-form of נְבִיָּה, 1Sa. 16: 7, may be נְבִיָּה as well as נְבִיָּה) of the neut. מְהוֹרֵ, like קֹדֶשׁ, Psal. 46: 5; 65: 5: that which is pure, the being pure = purity (Schultens). הֵן שְׂפָתָיו (gracefulness of his lips) is the second subject with the force of a relative clause, although not exactly thus thought of, but: one loving heart-purity, gracefulness on his lips — the king is his friend. Ewald otherwise: “he will be the king’s friend,” after the scheme Pro. 13: 4; but here unnecessarily refined. A counsellor and associate who is governed by a pure intention, and connects therewith a gentle and amiable manner of speech and conversation, attaches the king to himself; the king is the רֵעָה (רֵא), the friend of such an one, and he also is “the friend of the king,” 1Ki. 4: 5. It is a Solomonic proverb, the same in idea as Pro. 16:13. The LXX, Syr., and Targ. introduce after אהב the name of God; but 11b does not syntactically admit of this addition. But it is worth while to take notice of an interpretation which is proposed by Jewish interpreters: the friend of such an one is a king, i.e., he can royally rejoice in him and boast of him. The thought is beautiful; but, as the comparison of other proverbs speaking of the king shows, is not intended.

*12 The eyes of Jahve preserve knowledge;
So he frustrateth the words of the false.*

Pro. 22:12. The phrase “to preserve knowledge” is found at Pro. 5: 2; there, in the sense of to keep, retain; here, of protecting, guarding; for it cannot possibly be said that the eyes of God keep themselves by the rule of knowledge, and thus preserve knowledge; this predicate is not in accord with the eyes, and is, as used of God, even inappropriate. On the other hand, after “to preserve,” in the sense of watching, guarding a concrete object is to be expected, cf. Isa. 26: 3. We need not thus with Ewald supply יִרְדָּא; the

ancients are right that **דָּאָת**, knowledge, stands metonymically for **אִישׁ** (Meiri) or **אֲנָשִׁי** (Aben Ezra), or **יֹדְעֵי דַעַת** (Arama); Schultens rightly: *Cognitio veritatis ac virtutis practica fertur ad homines eam colentes ac praestantes*. Where knowledge of the true and the good exists, there does it stand under the protection of God. 12b shows how that is meant, for there the perf. is continued in the second *consec. modus (fut. consec.)*: there is thus protection against the assaults of enemies who oppose the knowledge which they hate, and seek to triumph over it, and to suppress it by their crooked policy. But God stands on the side of knowledge and protects it, and consequently makes vain the words (the outspoken resolutions) of the deceitful. Regarding **סִלְף** (**סִלְפָּה**), vid., Pro. 11: 3 and Pro. 19: 3. The meaning of **סִלְפָּה דְבַרֵּי** is here essentially different from that in Exo. 23: 8, Deu. 16:19: he perverteth their words, for he giveth them a bearing that is false, i.e., not leading to the end. Hitzig reads **רַעוּת** [wickedness] for **דַּעַת**, which Zöckler is inclined to favour: God keeps the evil which is done in His eyes, and hinders its success; but “to observe wickedness” is an ambiguous, untenable expression; the only passage that can be quoted in favour of this “to observe” is Job. 7:20. The word **דַּעַת**, handed down without variation, is much rather justified.

***13 The sluggard saith, “A lion is without,
I shall be slain in the midst of the streets.”***

Pro. 22:13. Otherwise rendered, Pro. 26:13. There, as here, the perf. **אָמַר** has the meaning of an abstract present, Gesen. § 126. 3. The activity of the industrious has its nearest sphere at home; but here a work is supposed which requires him to go forth (Psa. 104: 3) into the field (Pro. 24:27). Therefore **חוּץ** stands first, a word of wide signification, which here denotes the open country outside the city, where the sluggard fears to meet a lion, as in the streets, i.e., the rows of houses forming them, to meet a **רֵצָח** (**מַרְצָח**), i.e., a murder from motives of robbery of revenge. This strong word, properly to destroy, crush, Arab. *radkh*, is intentionally chosen: there is designed to be set forth the ridiculous hyperbolic pretence which the sluggard seeks for his slothfulness (Fleischer). Luther right well: “I might be murdered on the streets.” But there is intentionally the absence of **אוּלַּי** [perhaps] and of **בִּין** [lest]. *Meiri* here quotes a passage of the moralists: **מִמּוֹפְתֵי הָעֵצֶל הַנְּבוֹאָה** (prophesying) belongs to the evidences of the sluggard; and Euchel, the proverb **מִתְנַבְּאִים הָעֵצֶלִים** (the sluggard’s prophecy), i.e., the sluggard acts like a prophet, that he may palliate his slothfulness.

***14 A deep pit is the mouth of a strange woman;
He that is cursed of God falleth therein.***

Pro. 22:14. The first line appears in a different form as a synonymous distich, Pro. 23:27. The LXX translate στόμα παρανόμου without certainly indicating which word they here read, whether רַע (Pro. 4:14), or רשע (Pro. 29:12), or נלוז (Pro. 3:32). Pro. 23:27 is adduced in support of זָרוֹת (vid., Pro. 2:16); זָנוֹת (harlots) are meant, and it is not necessary thus to read with Ewald. The mouth of this strange woman or depraved Israelitess is a deep ditch (שׁוֹחַה עֲמֻקָּה, otherwise עֲמֻקָּה, as Pro. 23:27 *a*, where also occurs עֲמוּקָה^{f166}), namely, a snare-pit into which he is enticed by her wanton words; the man who stands in fellowship with God is armed against this syren voice; but the זַעֲמִים ה' (i.e., he who is an object of the divine זַעֲמִים (Venet. κεχολωμένος τῷ ὄντωτι)), indignation, punishing evil with evil, falls into the pit, yielding to the seduction and the ruin. Schultens explains זַעֲמִים ה' by, *is in quem despumat indignabundus*; but the meaning *despumat* is not substantiated; זַעֲמִים, cf. Arab. *zaghm*, is probably a word which by its sound denoted anger as a hollow roaring, and like pealing thunder. The LXX has, after v. 14, three tedious moralizing lines.

***15 Folly is bound to the heart of a child;
The rod of correction driveth it forth.***

Pro. 22:15. Folly, i.e., pleasure in stupid tricks, silly sport, and foolish behaviour, is the portion of children as such; their heart is as yet childish, and folly is bound up in it. Education first driveth forth this childish, foolish nature (for, as Menander says:

Ὁ μὴ δαρεῖς ἄνθρωπος οὐ παιδεύεται),

and if effects this when it is unindulgently severe: the שִׁבְט מוֹסֵר (vid., Pro. 23:13) removeth אִוְלָה from the heart, for it imparts intelligence and makes wise (Pro. 29:15). The LXX is right in rendering 16*a*: ἀνοία ἐξίπταται (from ἐξάπτειν καρδίας νέου; but the Syr. has “here mangled the LXX, and in haste has read ἀνοία ἐξίπταται: folly makes the understanding of the child fly away” (Lagarde).

***16 Whosoever oppreseth the lowly, it is gain to him;
Whosoever giveth to the rich, it is only loss.***

Pro. 22:16. It is before all clear that לְהַרְבּוֹת and לְמַחְסוֹר, as at Pro. 21: 5, לְמוֹתָר and לְמַחְסוֹר, are contrasted words, and form the conclusions to the participles used, with the force of hypothetical antecedents. Jerome recognises this: *qui calumniatur pauperem, ut augeat divitias suas, dabit ipse ditiori et egebit*. So Rashi, who by עשיר thinks on heathen potentates. Proportionally

better Eichel, referring עֲשֵׂק and נִתָּן, not to one person, but to two classes of men: he who oppresses the poor to enrich himself, and is liberal toward the rich, falls under want. The antithetic distich thus becomes an integral one, — the antithesis manifestly intended is not brought out. This may be said also against Bertheau, who too ingeniously explains: He who oppresses the poor to enrich himself gives to a rich man, i.e., to himself, the enriched, only to want, i.e., only to lose again that which he gained unrighteously. Ralbag is on the right track, for he suggests the explanation: he who oppresses the poor, does it to his gain, for he thereby impels him to a more energetic exercise of his strength; he who gives to the rich man does it to his own loss, because the rich man does not thank him for it, and still continues to look down on him. But if one refers לוֹ to the poor, then it lies nearer to interpret אֵךְ לְמַחְסוֹר of the rich: he who gives presents to the rich only thereby promotes his sleepy indolence, and so much the more robs him of activity (Elster); for that which one gives to him is only swallowed up in the whirlpool of his extravagance (Zöckler). Thus Hitzig also explains, who remarks, under 17a: “Oppression produces reaction, awakens energy, and thus God on the whole overrules events” (Exo. 1:12). Similarly also Ewald, who thinks on a mercenary, unrighteous rich man: God finally lifts up the oppressed poor man; the rich man always becoming richer, on the contrary, is “punished for all his wickedness only more and more.” But with all these explanations there is too much read between the lines. Since אֵךְ לְמַחְסוֹר (Pro. 11:24; 21: 5) refers back to the subject: himself to mere loss, so also will it be here; and the LXX, Symmachus, Jerome (cf. also the Syr. *auget malum suum*) are right when they also refer לוֹ, not to the poor man, but to the oppressor of the poor. We explain: he who extorts from the poor enriches himself thereby; but he who gives to the rich has nothing, and less than nothing, thereby — he robs himself, has no thanks, only brings himself by many gifts lower and lower down. In the first case at least, 17a, the result corresponds to the intention; but in this latter case, 17b, one gains only bitter disappointment.

First Appendix to the First Collection of Solomonic Proverbs — Pro. 22:17-24:22

The last group of distiches, beginning with Pro. 10: 1, closed at Pro. 22:16 with a proverb of the poor and the rich, as that before the last, vid., at Pro. 22: 7. In 22:17 ff., the law of the distich form is interrupted, and the tone of the introductory Mashals is again perceptible. Here begins an appendix to the older Book of Proverbs, introduced by these Mashals. Vid., regarding the style and proverbial form of this introduction, at pages 5 and 13.

PRO. 22:17-29

Pro. 22:17-21. Vv. 17-21, forming the introduction to this appendix, are these Words of the Wise:

*17 Incline thine ear and hear the words of the wise,
And direct thine heart to my knowledge!*

*18 For it is pleasant if thou keep them in thine heart;
Let them abide together on thy lips.*

*19 That thy trust may be placed in Jahve,
I have taught thee to-day, even thee!*

*20 Have not I written unto thee choice proverbs,
Containing counsels and knowledge,*

*21 To make thee to know the rule of the words of truth,
That thou mightest bring back words
which are truth to them that send thee?*

From Pro. 10: 1 to Pro. 22:16 are the “Proverbs of Solomon,” and not “The Words of the Wise;” thus the above *παράινεσις* is not an epilogue, but a prologue to the following proverbs. The perfects *הוֹדַעְתִּיךָ* and *כִּתְבַּתִּי* refer, not to the Solomonic proverbial discourses, but to the appendix following them; the preface commends the worth and intention of this appendix, and uses perfects because it was written after the forming of the collection. The author of this preface (vid., pp. 17, 26) is no other than the author of 1-9. The *הַט* (with *Mehuppach*, after *Thorath Emeth*, p. 27) reminds us of Pro. 4:20; 5: 1. The phrase *שִׁית לִב*, *animus advertere*, occurs again in the second appendix, Pro. 24:32. *נָשִׂים* is repeated at Pro. 23: 8; 24: 4; but *נָאִם* with *נָאִם* is common in the preface, 1-9. *בִּי־נָעִים* contains, as at Psa. 135: 3; 147: 1, its subject in itself. *בִּי־תִשְׁמְרֵם* is not this subject: this that thou preservest them, which would have required rather the infin. *שְׁמַרְם* (Psa. 133: 1) or *לְשַׁמְרֵם*; but it supposes the case in which appears that which is amiable and praiseworthy: if thou preservest them in thy heart, i.e., makest them thoughtfully become thy mental possession. The suffix *—ם* refers to the Words of the Wise, and mediately also to *לְדַעְתִּי*, for the author designates his practical wisdom *דַּעְתִּי*, which is laid down in the following proverbs, which, although not composed by him, are yet penetrated by his subjectivity. Regarding *בְּטֶמֶן*, which, from meaning the inner parts of the body, is transferred to the inner parts of the mind, vid., under Pro. 20:27. The clause 18*b*, if not dependent on *כִּי*, would begin with *וַיִּכְנֹנוּ*. The absence of the copula and the antecedence of the verb

bring the optative rendering nearer. Different is the syntactical relation of Pro. 5: 2, where the infin. is continued in the fin. The *fut. Niph.* יִכְנֹוּ, which, Pro. 4:27, meant to be rightly placed, rightly directed, here means: to stand erect, to have continuance, *stabilem esse*. In v. 19, the fact of instruction precedes the statement of its object, which is, that the disciple may place his confidence in Jahve, for he does that which is according to His will, and is subject to His rule. מִבְּמַחֲדָה, in Codd. and correct editions with *Pathach* (vid., *Michlol* 184*b*); the ה is as virtually doubled; vid., under Pro. 21:22. In 19*b* the accentuation הוּם הוּדַעְתִּיךְ הוּם is contrary to the syntax; Codd. and old editions have rightly הוּם הוּדַעְתִּיךְ הוּם, for אֶף-אֶף-אֶף is, after Gesen. § 121. 3, an emphatic repetition of “thee;” אֶף, like גַּם, 23:15; 1Ki. 21:19. Hitzig knows of no contrast which justifies the emphasis. But the prominence thus effected is not always of the nature of contrast (cf. Zec. 7: 5, have ye truly fasted to me, i.e., to serve me thereby), here it is strong individualizing; the *te etiam te* is equivalent to, thee as others, and thee in particular. Also that, as Hitzig remarks, there does not appear any reason for the emphasizing of “to-day,” is incorrect: הוּם is of the same signification as at Psa. 95: 7; the reader of the following proverbs shall remember later, not merely in general, that he once on a time read them, but that he to-day, that he on this definite day, received the lessons of wisdom contained therein, and then, from that time forth, became responsible for his obedience or his disobedience.

Pro. 22:20. In 20*a* the *Chethîb* שלשום denotes no definite date; besides, this word occurs only always along with אֶתְמוּל (תְּמוּל). Umbreit, Ewald, Bertheau, however, accept this “formerly (lately),” and suppose that the author here refers to a “Book for Youths,” composed at an earlier period, without one seeing what this reference, which had a meaning only for his contemporaries, here denotes. The LXX reads בְּתִבְיָה, and finds in 20*a*, contrary to the syntax and the *usus loq.*, the exhortation that he who is addressed ought to write these good doctrines thrice (τρισσῶς) on the tablet of his heart; the Syr. and Targ. suppose the author to say that he wrote them three times; Jerome, that he wrote them threefold — both without any visible meaning, since threefold cannot be equivalent to *manchfeltiglich* (Luther) [= several times, in various ways]. Also the *Kerî* שְׁלֹשִׁים, which without doubt is the authentic word, is interpreted in many unacceptable ways; Rashi and Elia Wilna, following a Midrash explanation, think on the lessons of the Law, the Prophets, and the Hagiographa; Arama, on those which are referable to three classes of youth; Malbim (as if here the author of the whole Book of Proverbs, from 1 to 31, spake), on the supposed three chief parts of the *Mishle*; Dächsel better, on 1-9, as the product of the same author as this appendix. Schultens compares Ecc. 4:12, and translates *triplici filo nexa*. Kimchi, *Meîri*, and others, are right,

who gloss שלישים by דברים נכבדים, and compare נגידים, 8: 6; accordingly the *Veneta*, with the happy *quid pro quo*, by τρισμέγιστα. The LXX translates the military שליש by τριστάτης; but this Greek word is itself obscure, and is explained by Hesychius (as well as by Suidas, and in the *Etymologicum*) by *Regii satellites qui ternas hastas manu tenebant*, which is certainly false. Another Greek, whom Angellius quotes, says, under Exo. 15: 4, that τριστάτης was the name given to the warriors who fought from a chariot, every three of whom had one war-chariot among them; and this appears, according to Exo. 14: 7; 15: 4, to be really the primary meaning. In the period of David we meet with the word שלישים as the name of the heroes (the *Gibbôrîm*) who stood nearest the king. The *shalish* -men form the *élite* troops that stood highest in rank, at whose head stood two triads of heroes, — Jashobeam at the head of the first trias, and thus of the *shalish* -men generally; Abishai at the head of the second trias, who held an honourable place among the *shalish* -men, but yet reached not to that first trias, 2Sa. 23: 8 ff. (= 1Ch. 11:11 ff.). The name השלישים (*Apoc.* 2Sa. 23: 8, השלשי, and v. 13, 1Ch. 27: 6, incorrectly השלשים) occurs here with reference to the threefold division of this principal host; and in regard to the use of the word in the time of Pharaoh, as well as in the time of the kings, it may be granted that *shalish* denotes the Three-man (*triumvir*), and then generally a high military officer; so that שלשים here has the same relation to נגידים, Pro. 8: 6, as *ducalia* to *principalia*. The name of the chief men (members of the chief troop) is transferred to the chief proverbs, as, Jam. 2: 8, that law which stands as a king at the head of all the others is called the “royal law;” or, as Plato names the chief powers of the soul, μέρη ἡγεμόνες. As in this Platonic word-form, so *shalishim* here, like *negidim* there, is understood neut. cf. under Pro. 8: 6, and ריקים, Pro. 12:11; ישרים, Pro. 16:13. The ב of במעצות (occurring at Pro. 1:31 also) Fleischer rightly explains as the ב of uniting or accompanying: chief proverbs which contain good counsels and solid knowledge.

Pro. 22:21. In the statement of the object in v. 21, we interpret that which follows להודיעך not permutat.: *ut te docerem recta, verba vera* (Fleischer); but קשם (ground-form to קשם, Psa. 60: 6) is the bearer of the threefold idea: *rectitudinem*, or, better, *regulam verborum veritatis*. The (Arab.) verb *kasîta* means to be straight, stiff, inflexible (synon. צדק, to be hard, tight, proportionately direct); and the name *kîst* denotes not only the right conduct, the right measure (*quantitas justa*), but also the balance, and thus the rule or the norm. In 21b, אמרים אמת (as e.g., Zec. 1:13; vid., Philippi, *Status Constr.* p. 86 f.) is equivalent to אמרי אמת; the author has this second time intentionally chosen the appositional relation of connection: words which are

truth; the idea of truth presents itself in this form of expression more prominently. Impossible, because contrary to the *usus loq.*, is the translation: *ut respondeas verba vera iis qui ad te mittunt* (Schultens, Fleischer), because **שְׁלַח**, with the accus. following, never means “to send any one.” Without doubt **הַשִּׁיב** and **שְׁלַח** stand in correlation to each other: he who lets himself be instructed must be supposed to be in circumstances to bring home, to those that sent him out to learn, doctrines which are truth, and thus to approve himself. The subject spoken of here is not a right answer or a true report brought back to one giving a commission; and it lies beyond the purpose and power of the following proverbs to afford a universal means whereby persons sent out are made skilful. The **שְׁלַחִים** [senders] are here the parents or guardians who send him who is to be instructed to the school of the teacher of wisdom (Hitzig). Yet it appears strange that he who is the learner is just here not addressed as “my son,” which would go to the support of the expression, “to send to school,” which is elsewhere unused in Old Hebrew, and the **שְׁלַחִי** of another are elsewhere called those who make him their *mandatar*, Pro. 10:26; 25:13; 2Sa. 24:13. The reference to the parents would also be excluded if, with Norzi and other editors, **לְשַׁלְּחֶיךָ** were to be read instead of **לְשַׁלְּחֶיךָ** (the *Venet.* 1521, and most editions). Therefore the phrase **לְשַׁאֲלֶיךָ**, which is preferred by Ewald, recommends itself, according to which the LXX translates, **τοῖς προβαλλομένοις σοι**, which the Syro-Hexap. renders ^{f167} **לְךָ אוֹחַדְתָּא** **לְהַנּוֹן דְּאַחַדִּין**, i.e., to those who lay problems before thee (vid., Lagarde). The teacher of wisdom seeks to qualify him who reads the following proverbs, and permits himself to be influenced by them, to give the right answer to those who question him and go to him for counsel, and thus to become himself a teacher of wisdom.

Pro. 22:22, 23. After these ten lines of preliminary exhortation, there now begins the collection of the “Words of the Wise” thus introduced. A tetrastich which, in its contents, connects itself with the last proverb of the Solomonic collection, Pro. 22:16, forms the commencement of this collection:

**22 Rob not the lowly because he is lowly;
And oppress not the humble in the gate.**

**23 For Jahve will conduct their cause,
And rob their spoilers of life.**

Though it may bring gain, as said Pro. 22:16 *a*, to oppress the **דָּל**, the lowly or humble, yet at last the oppressor comes to ruin. The poet here warns against robbing the lowly because he is lowly, and thus without power of defence, and not to be feared; and against doing injustice to the **עָנִי**, the bowed down, and

therefore incapable of resisting in the gate, i.e., in the court of justice. These poor men have not indeed high human patrons, but One in heaven to undertake their cause: Jahve will conduct their cause (נָרִיב רִיבָם), as at Pro. 23:10), i.e., will undertake their vindication, and be their avenger. (דָּבָה) דָּבָא, Aram. and Arab. *daḳḳ* (cf. דָּקַק, [Arab.] *daḳḳ*), signifies to crush anything so that it becomes broad and flat, figuratively to oppress, synonym. עָשַׂק (Fleischer). The verb קָבַע has, in Chald. and Syr., the signification to stick, to fix (according to which Aquila here translates καθήλοον, to nail; Jerome, *configere*); and as root-word to קָבַעַת, the signification to be arched, like (Arab.) *ḳab*ʿ, to be humpbacked; both significations are here unsuitable. The connection here requires the meaning to rob; and for Mal. 3: 8 also, this same meaning is to be adopted, robbery and taking from one by force (Parchon, Kimchi), not: to deceive (Köhler, Keil), although it might have the sense of robbing by withholding or refraining from doing that which is due, thus of a sacrilege committed by omission or deception. The Talm. does not know the verb קָבַע in this meaning; but it is variously found as a dialectic word for גָּוַל.^{f168}

Schultens' etymological explanation, *capitium injicere* (after [Arab.] *ḳab*ʿ, to draw back and conceal the head), is not satisfactory. The construction, with the double accus., follows the analogy of הִבְהִי נִפְשׁ and the like, Gesen. § 139. 2. Regarding the sing. נִפְשׁ, even where several are spoken of, vid., under Pro. 1:19.

Pro. 22:24, 25. Another tetrastich follows:

*24 Have no intercourse with an angry man,
And with a furious man go thou not;*

*25 Lest thou adopt his ways,
And bring destruction upon thy soul.*

The *Piel* רָעָה, Jud. 14:20, signifies to make or choose any one as a friend or companion (רָעָה, רָאָ); the *Hithpa.* הִתְרַעָה (cf. at Pro. 18:24), to take to oneself (for oneself) any one as a friend, or to converse with one; אֶל-תִּתְרַעָה sounds like אֶל-תִּשְׁתַּע, Isa. 41:10, with *Pathach* of the closed syllable from the apocope. The angry man is called בָּאֵל אַף, as the covetous man נִפְשׁ בָּאֵל, Pro. 23: 2, and the mischievous man בָּאֵל מְזֻמּוֹת, Pro. 24: 8; vid., regarding בָּאֵל at Pro. 1:19 and Pro. 18: 9. אִישׁ חָמוֹת is related superlat. to אִישׁ חָמָה, Pro. 15:18 (cf. Pro. 29:22), and signifies a hot-head of the highest degree. בּוֹא עִם, or בּוֹא אֵת, is meant as warning (cf. Pro. 16:10b). בּוֹא עִם, Psa. 26: 4, to come along with one, is equivalent to go into fellowship or

companionship with one, which is expressed by **הַלֵּךְ אִתָּךְ**, Pro. 13:20, as **בֹּא** means, Jos. 23: 7, 12, to enter into communion with one, *venire in consuetudinem*. This **בֹּא אִתָּךְ** is not a trace of a more recent period of the language. Also **תִּלְמַדְךָ**, *discas*, cannot be an equivalent for it: Heb. poetry has at all times made use of Aramaisms as elegancies. **אִלְפָה**, Arab. **أَلْفَا**, Arab. *âlifâ*, signifies to be entrusted with anything = to learn (*Piel* **אִלְפָה**, to teach, Job. 15:15, and in Elihu's speeches), or also to become confidential with one (whence **אִלְפָה**, companion, confidant, Pro. 2:17); this **אִלְפָה** is never a Heb. prose word; the bibl. **אִלְפָה** is only used at a later period in the sense of teacher. **אִרְחֹת** are the ways, the conduct (Pro. 2:20, etc.), or manner of life (Pro. 1:19) which any one enters upon and follows out, thus manners as well as lot, condition. In the phrase "to bring destruction," **לִקַּח** is used as in our phrase *Schaden nehmen* [to suffer injury]; the ancient language also represented the forced entrance of one into a state as a being laid hold on, e.g., Job. 18:20, cf. Isa. 13: 8; here **מוֹקֵשׁ** is not merely equivalent to danger (Ewald, falsely: that thou takest not danger for thy soul), but is equivalent to destruction, sin itself is a snare (Pro. 29: 6); to bring a snare for oneself is equivalent to suffer from being ensnared. Whosoever comes into a near relation with a passionate, furious, man, easily accommodates himself to his manners, and, hurried forward by him and like him to outbreaks of anger, which does that which is not right before God, falls into ruinous complications.

Pro. 22:26, 27. A third distich follows:

**26 Be not among those who strike hands,
Among those who become surety for loans.**

**27 If thou hast nothing to pay,
Why shall he take away thy bed from under thee?**

To strike hands is equivalent to, to be responsible to any one for another, to stake one's goods and honour for him, Pro. 6: 1; 11:15; 17:18, — in a word, **עָרַב**, *seq. acc.*, to pledge oneself for him (Gen. 43: 9), or for the loan received by him, **מִשְׁאָה**, Deu. 24:10 (from **הִשָּׂה**, with **ב**, of the person and accus. of the thing: to lend something to one on interest). The proverb warns against being one of such sureties (write **בְּעֶרְבִים** with Cod. 1294, and old impressions such as the Venice, 1521), against acting as they do; for why wouldest thou come to this, that when thou cast not pay (**שָׁלַם**, to render a full equivalent reckoning, and, generally, to pay, Pro. 6:31), ^{f169} he (the creditor) take away thy bed from under thee? — for, as Pro. 20:16 says, thus improvident suretyships are wont to be punished.

Pro. 22:28. A fourth proverb — a distich — beginning with the warning אַל:

**28 Remove not the perpetual landmark
Which thy ancestors have set up.**

28a = Pro. 23:10 a. Regarding the inviolability of boundaries established by the law, vid., at Pro. 15:25. גְּבוּל עֲזָלָם denotes “the boundary mark set up from ancient times, the removal of which were a double transgression, because it is rendered sacred by its antiquity” (*Orelli*, p. 76). נָסַג = סוּג signifies to remove back, *Hiph.* to shove back, to move away. אֲשֶׁר has the meaning of (ὄριον) ὄ, τι, *quippe quod*. Instead of עוֹלָם, the *Mishna* reads, *Pea* v. 6, עוֹלָיִם, which in the Jerusalem Gemara one Rabbi understands of those brought up out of Egypt, another of the poor; for “to rise” (in the world) is a euphemism (לְשׁוֹן כְּבוֹד) for “to come down” (be reduced in circumstances).^{f170}

Pro. 22:29. After these four proverbs beginning with אַל, a new series begins with the following tristich:

**29 Seest thou a man who is expert in his calling —
Before kings may he stand;
Not stand before obscure men;**

i.e., he can enter into the service of kings, and needs not to enter into the service of mean men = he is entitled to claim the highest official post. חֲזִיָּת, in Pro. 26:12 = Pro. 29:20, interchanging with רְאִיָּת, is *perf. hypotheticum* (cf. Pro. 24:10; 25:16): *si videris*; the conclusion which might begin with דַּע כִּי expresses further what he who sees will have occasion to observe. Rightly Luther: *Sihestu einen Man endelich* (vid., at Pro. 21: 5) *in seinem geschefft*, u.s.w. [= seest thou a man expert in his business, etc.]. מְהִיר denotes in all the three chief dialects one who is skilful in a manner not merely by virtue of external artistic ability, but also by means of intellectual mastery of it. לִפְנֵי הַתִּצֵּב, to enter on the situation of a servant before any one; cf. Job. 1: 6; 2: 1. עָמַד לִפְנֵי, 1Sa. 16:21, 1Ki. 10: 8. Along with the pausal form וַתִּצֵּב, there is also found in Codd. the form וַתִּצֵּב (the ground-form to יִתְצֵב, whence that pausal form is lengthened), which Ben-Bileam defends, for he reckons this word among “the pathachized pausal forms.” חֲשָׁבִים, in contrast to מְלָכִים, are the *obscuri* = *ignobiles*. The Targ. translate the Hebrew דָּל and אֲבִיוֹן by חֲשִׁיד and חֲשׂוּד. Kimchi compares Jer. 39:10, where הָעַם הַדְּלִים is translated by חֲשִׁיכִיא (cf. 2Ki. 24:14; 25:12). חֲלָפָה (חֲלָפָה) is the old

Heb. synonym in Psalm ch. 10. The poet seems here to transfer the Aram. *usus loq.* into the Heb.

CHAPTER 23

Pro. 23: 1-3. Pro. 22:29, which speaks of a high position near the king, is appropriately followed by a hexastich referring to the slipperiness of the smooth ground of the king's court.

*1 When thou sittest to eat with a ruler,
Consider well whom thou hast before thee.*

*2 And put thy knife to thy throat
If thou art a man of good appetite.*

*3 Be not lustful after his dainties,
Because it is deceitful food.*

The ל of לְלַחֵם is that of end: *ad cibum capiendum*, thus as one invited by him to his table; in prose the expression would be לֶאֱכַל לֶחֶם; לֶחֶם, to eat, is poet., Pro. 4:17; 9: 5. The fut. תִּבִּין clothes the admonition in the form of a wish or counsel; the *infin. intens.* בִּין makes it urgent: consider well him whom thou hast before thee, viz., that he is not thine equal, but one higher, who can destroy thee as well as be useful to thee. With וְשָׁמַתְּ the jussive construction begun by תִּבִּין is continued. Zöckler and Dächsel, after Ewald and Hitzig, translate incorrectly: thou puttest..., the *perf. consec.* after an imperf., or, which is the same thing, a fut. meant optatively (e.g., Lev. 19:18 with לֹא, and also v. 34 without לֹא) continues the exhortation; to be thus understood, the author ought to have used the expression שָׁבִין שְׁמַתָּ and not וְשָׁמַתְּ שְׁבִין. Rightly Luther: “and put a knife to thy throat,” but continuing: “wilt thou preserve thy life,” herein caught in the same mistake of the idea with Jerome, the Syr., and Targ., to which נִפְשׁ here separates itself. שְׁבִין (סְבִין) (Arab. with the assimilated *a sikkîn*, plur. *sekâkîn*, whence *sekâkîni*, cutler) designates a knife (R. סֵד שֵׁד, to stick, vid., at Isa. 9:10). לֹא, from לָא, to devour, is the throat; the word in Aram. signifies only the cheek, while Lagarde seeks to interpret בִּלְעָדָה infinitively in the sense of (Arab.) *bwlw'ak*, if thou longest for (from *wl'a*); but that would make 2b a tautology. The verb לָא (cf. Arab. *l'al'*, to pant for) shows for the substantive the same primary meaning as *glutus* from *glutire*, which was then transferred from the inner organ of swallowing (Kimchi, בֵּית הַבְּלִיעָה, Parchon; הַנְּשִׁמָּה, *aesophagus*) to the external. “Put a knife to thy throat, is a proverbial expression, like our: the knife stands at his throat; the poet means to say: restrain thy too eager desire by means of the

strongest threatening of danger — threaten as it were death to it” (Fleischer). In **נפש באל נפש**, means, as at Pro. 13: 2, desire, and that desire of eating, as at Pro. 6:30. Rightly Rashi: if thou art greedy with hunger, if thou art a glutton; cf. Sir. 34 (31):12, “If thou sittest at a great table, then open not widely thy throat (**φάρυγγα**), and say not: There is certainly much on it!” The knife thus denotes the restraining and moderating of too good an appetite.

Pro. 23: 3. In *3a* the punctuation fluctuates between **תתאו** (*Michlol* 131a) and **תתאו**; the latter is found in Cod. 1294, the Erfurt 2 and 3, the Cod.

Jaman., and thus it is also to be written at v. 6 and 24: 1; **ויתאו**, 1Ch. 11:17 and Psa. 45:12, Codd. and older Edd. (e.g., Complut. 1517, Ven. 1515, 1521) write with *Pathach*. **מטאמות**, from **טאם**, signifies savoury dishes, dainties, like (Arab.) *dhwâkt*, from *dhâk* (to taste, to relish); cf. *sapres*, from *sapere*, in the proverb: the tit-bits of the king burn the lips (vid., Fleischer, *Ali's Hundred Proverbs*, etc., pp. 71, 104). With **יהוא** begins, as at Pro. 3:29, a conditioning clause: since it is, indeed, the bread of deceit (the connection like **עד־כַּנְבִּים**, Pro. 21:28), food which, as it were, deceives him who eats it, i.e., appears to secure for him the lasting favour of princes, and often enough herein deceives him; cf. the proverb by Burckhardt and Meidani: whoever eats of the sultan's soup burns his lips, even though it may be after a length of time (Fleischer). One must come near to a king, says Calovius, hitting the meaning of the proverb, as to a fire: not too near, lest he be burned; nor too remote, so that he may be warmed therewith.

Pro. 23: 4, 5. All the forms of proverbs run through these appended proverbs. There now follows a pentastich:

***4 Do not trouble thyself to become rich;
Cease from such thine own wisdom.***

***5 Wilt thou let thine eyes fly after it, and it is gone?
For it maketh itself, assuredly it maketh itself wings,
Like an eagle which fleeth toward the heavens.***

The middle state, according to Pro. 30: 8, is the best: he who troubleth himself (cf. Pro. 28:20, hasteth) to become rich, placeth before himself a false, deceitful aim. **נגע** is essentially one with (Arab.) *waji'a*, to experience sorrow, *dolere*, and then signifies, like **ποιεῖν** and **κάμνειν**, to become or to be wearied, to weary or trouble oneself, to toil and moil (Fleischer). The **בינה** (cf.

Pro. 3: 5) is just wisdom, prudence directed towards becoming rich; for striving of itself alone does not accomplish it, unless wisdom is connected with it, which is not very particular in finding out means in their moral relations; but

is so much the more crafty, and, as we say, speculative. Rightly Aquila, the *Venet.*, Jerome, and Luther: take not pains to become rich. On the contrary, the LXX reads **אל תיגע להעשיר**, stretch not thyself (if thou art poor) after a rich man; and the Syr. and Targ. **אל תגע להעשיר**, draw not near to the rich man; but, apart from the uncertainty of the expression and the construction in both cases, poetry, and proverbial poetry too, does not prefer the article; it never uses it without emphasis, especially as here must be the case with it not elided. These translators thought that **בו וגו'**, v. 5, presupposed a subject expressed in v. 4; but the subject is not **העשיר**, but the **עשר** [riches] contained in **להעשיר**. The self-intelligible *it* [in “it maketh wings,” etc.] is that about which trouble has been taken, about which there has been speculation. That is a deceitful possession; for what has been gained by many years of labour and search, often passes away suddenly, is lost in a moment. To let the eyes fly after anything, is equivalent to, to direct a (flying) look toward it: wilt thou let thine eyes rove toward the same, and it is gone? i.e., wilt thou expose thyself to the fate of seeing that which was gained with trouble and craft torn suddenly away from thee? Otherwise Luther, after Jerome: Let not thine eyes fly after that which thou cast not have; but apart from the circumstance that **בו ואיננו** cannot possibly be understood in the sense of *ad opes quas non potes habere* (that would have required **באשר איננו**), in this sense after the analogy of (**ל**) **נשא נפש אל**, the end aimed at would have been denoted by **לו** and not by **בו**. Better Immanuel, after Rashi: if thou doublest, i.e., shuttest (by means of the two eyelids) thine eyes upon it, it is gone, i.e., has vanished during the night; but **עוף**, *duplicare*, is Aram. and not Heb. Rather the explanation is with *Chafûg*, after Isa. 8:22 f.: if thou veilest (darkenest) thine eyes, i.e., yieldest thyself over to carelessness; but the noun **אפאפה** shows that **עוף**, spoken of the eyes, is intended to signify to fly (to rove, flutter). Hitzig too artificially (altering the expression to **להעשיר**): if thou faintest, art weary with the eyes toward him (the rich patron), he is gone, — which cannot be adopted, because the form of a question does not accord with it. Nor would it accord if **ואיננו** were thought of as a conclusion: “dost thou let thy look fly toward it? It is gone;” for what can this question imply? The **ו** of **ואיננו** shows that this word is a component part of the question; it is a question *lla nakar*, i.e., in rejection of the subject of the question: wilt thou cast thy look upon it, and it is gone? i.e., wilt thou experience instant loss of that which is gained by labour and acquired by artifice? On **בו**, cf. Job. 7: 8. **עיניך וגו'**, “thou directest thine eyes to me: I am no more.” We had in 12:19 another mode of designating [viz. till I wink again] an instant. The *Chethib* **התעור וגו'** is syntactically correct (cf. Pro. 15:22; 20:30), and might remain. The *Keri* is mostly falsely accentuated

הַתְּעִיר, doubly incorrectly; for (1) the tone never retreats from a shut syllable terminating in *i*, e.g., לְהַכִּין, Isa. 40:20; בְּהַכִּין, 1Ch. 1: 4; אָבִין, Job. 23: 8; and (2) there is, moreover, wanting here any legitimate occasion for the retrogression of the tone; thus much rather the form הַתְּעִיר (with *Mehuppach* of the last, and *Zinnorith* of the preceding open syllable) is to be adopted, as it is given by Opitz, Jablonsky, Michaelis, and Reineccius.

The subject of *5b* is, as of *5a*, riches. That riches take wings and flee away, is a more natural expression than that the rich patron flees away, — a quaint figure, appropriate however at Nah. 3:16, where the multitude of craftsmen flee out of Nineveh like a swarm of locusts. עֲשָׂה has frequently the sense of *acquirere*, Gen. 12: 5, with לוֹ, *sibi acquirere*, 1Sa. 15: 1; 1Ki. 1:15; Hitzig compares *Silius Ital.* xvi. 351: *sed tum sibi fecerat alas*. The *inf. intensivus* strengthens the assertion: it will certainly thus happen.

In *5c* all unnecessary discussion regarding the *Chethîb* וְעִיר is to be avoided, for this *Chethîb* does not exist; the *Masora* here knows only of a simple *Chethîb* and *Kerî*, viz., וְעִיר (read וְעִיר), not of a double one (וְעִיר), and the word is not among those which have in the middle a ׀, which is to be read like ׀. The manuscripts (e.g., also the Bragadin. 1615) have וְעִיר, and the *Kerî* וְעִיר; it is one of the ten words registered in the *Masora*, at the beginning of which a ׀ is to be read instead of the written ׀. Most of the ancients translate with the amalgamation of the *Kerî* and the *Chethîb*: and he (the rich man, or better: the riches) flees heavenwards (Syr., Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Jerome, and Luther). After the *Kerî* the *Venet.* renders: ὡς ἀετὸς πτήσεται τοῖς οὐρανοῖς (viz., ὁ πλοῦτος). Rightly the Targ.: like an eagle which flies to heaven (according to which also it is accentuated), only it is not to be translated “*am Himmel*” [to heaven], but “*gen Himmel*” [towards heaven]: הַשָּׁמַיִם is the accusative of direction — the eagle flies heavenward. Bochart, in the *Hierozoïcon*, has collected many parallels to this comparison, among which is the figure in Lucian’s *Timon*, where Pluto, the god of wealth, comes to one limping and with difficulty; but going away, outstrips in speed the flight of all birds. The LXX translates ὡς περ ἀετοῦ καὶ ὑποστρέφει εἰς τὸν οἶκον τοῦ προεστηκότος αὐτοῦ. Hitzig accordingly reads וְשָׁב לְבֵית מִשְׁנָבוֹ, and he (the rich patron) withdraws from thee to his own steep residence. But ought not οἶκος τοῦ προεστηκότος αὐτοῦ to be heaven, as the residence of Him who administers wealth, i.e., who gives and again takes it away according to His free-will?

Pro. 23: 6-8. There now follows a proverb with unequally measured lines, perhaps a heptastich:

**6 Eat not the bread of the jealous,
And let not thyself lust after his dainties;**

**7 For as one who calculates with himself, so is he:
“Eat and drink,” saith he to thee;
But his heart is not with thee.**

**8 Thy morsel which thou hast enjoyed wilt thou cast up,
And hast lost thy pleasant words.**

As טוב אֵין, Pro. 22: 9, *benignus oculo*, denotes the pleasantness and joy of social friendship; so here (cf. Deu. 15: 9; Mat. 15:15) רע אֵין, *malignus oculo*, the envy and selfishness of egoism seeking to have and retain all for itself. The LXX ἀνδρὶ βασκάνω, for the look of the evil eye, עינא בישא, *cattivo occhio*), refers to enchantment; cf. βασκαίνειν, *fascinare*, to bewitch, to enchant, in modern Greek, to envy, Arab. ‘an, to eye, as it were, whence *ma jûn, ma în*, hit by the piercing look of the envious eye, *invidiae*, as Apuleius says, *letali plaga percussus* (Fleischer). Regarding פתאח with *Pathach*, vid., the parallel line 3a. 7a is difficult. The LXX and Syr. read שַׁעַר [hair]. The Targ. renders פתאח רמא, and thus reads שַׁאֲר [fool], and thus brings together the soul of the envious person and a high portal, which promises much, but conceals only deception behind (Rabag). Joseph ha-Nakdan reads ^{f171}

שַׁאֲר with *sin*; and Rashi, retaining the *schîn*, compares the “sour figs,” Jer. 29:17. According to this, Luther translates: like a ghost (a monster of lovelessness) is he inwardly; for, as it appears in שַׁאֲר, the goat-like spectre שַׁעִיר hovered before him. Schultens better, because more in conformity with the text: *quemadmodum suam ipsius animam abhorret* (i.e., as he does nothing to the benefit of his own appetite) *sic ille (erga alios multo magis)*. The thought is appropriate, but forced. Hitzig for once here follows Ewald; he does not, however, translate: “like as if his soul were divided, so is it;” but: “as one who is divided in his soul, so is he;” but the verb שַׁאֲר, to divide, is inferred from שַׁאֲר, gate = division, and is as foreign to the extra-bibl. *usus loq.* as it is to the bibl. The verb שַׁאֲר signifies to weigh or consider, to value, to estimate. These meanings Hitzig unites together: *in similitudinem arioli et conjectoris aestimat quod ignorat*, perhaps meaning thereby that he conjecturally supposes that as it is with him, so it is with others: he dissembles, and thinks that others dissemble also. Thus also Jansen explains. The thought is far-fetched, and does not cover itself by the text. The translation of the *Venet.* also: ὡς γὰρ ἐμέτρησεν ἐν ψυχῇ οἱ οὕτως ἔστιν (perhaps: he measures to others as penuriously as to himself), does not elucidate the text, but obscures it. Most

moderns (Bertheau, Zöckler, Dächsel, etc.): as he reckons in his soul, so is he (not as he seeks to appear for a moment before thee). Thus also Fleischer: *quemadmodum reputat apud se, ita est* (sc. *non ut loquitur*), with the remark that **שָׂאָר** (whence **שְׂאָר**, measure, market value, Arab. *si'r*), to measure, to tax to as to determine the price, to reckon; and then like **חָשַׁב**, in general, to think, and thus also *Meiri* with the neut. rendering of *ita est*. But why this circumlocution in the expression? The poet ought in that case just to have written **כִּי לֹא כִּמוֹ דְּפָר בְּשִׁפְתָיו כֵּן הוּא**, for he is not as he speaks with his mouth. If one read **שָׂעַר** (Symmachus, *εἰκάζων*), then we have the thought adapted to the portrait that is drawn; for like one calculating by himself, so is he, i.e., he is like one who estimates with himself the value of an object; for which we use the expression: he reckons the value of every piece in thy mouth. However, with this understanding the punctuation also of **שָׂעַר** as finite may be retained and explained after Isa. 26:18: for as if he reckoned in his soul, so is he; but in this the perf. is inappropriate; by the particip. one reaches the same end ^{f172} by a smoother way. True, he says to thee: eat and drink (Son. 5: 1 b), he invites thee with courtly words; but his heart is not with thee (**בַּל**, like Pro. 24:23): he only puts on the appearance of joy if thou partakest abundantly, but there lurks behind the mask of liberal hospitality the grudging niggardly calculator, who poisons thy every bite, every draught, by his calculating, grudging look. Such a feast cannot possibly do good to the guest: thy meal (**פַּת**, from **פָּתַת**; cf. *κλᾶν τὸν ἄρτον*, Aram. **פָּרַס לְחֶמְאָה**, to divide and distribute bread, whence **פָּרַס**, to receive aliment, is derived) which thou hast eaten thou wilt spue out, i.e., wilt vomit from disgust that thou hast eaten such food, so that that which has been partaken of does thee no good.

פָּתַתְךָ is also derived from **פָּתַתָּה**: ^{f173} has he deceived thee (with his courtly words), but with this **אֲכַלְתָּ**, which, as the *Makkeph* rightly denotes, stands in an attributive relation to **פָּתַתְךָ**, does not agree. **תְּקִיאָנָה** is *Hiph.* of **קָוָה**, as transitive: to make vomiting; in Arab. the fut. *Kal* of *ka* terminates in *î*. The fair words which the guest, as the *perf. consec.* expresses, has lavished, are the words of praise and thanks in which he recognises the liberality of the host appearing so hospitable. Regarding the penult. accenting of the *perf. consec.* by *Mugrasch*, as Pro. 30: 9, vid., under Psa. 27: 1. Pinsker (*Babyl.-Hebr. Punktationssystem*, p. 134) conjectures that the line 8b originally formed the concluding line of the following proverb. But at the time of the LXX (which erroneously expresses **וְשִׂחַת**) it certainly stood as in our text.

Pro. 23: 9. Another case in which good words are lost:

***Speak not to the ears of a fool,
For he will despise the wisdom of thy words.***

To speak in the ears of any one, does not mean to whisper to him, to so to speak that it is distinctly perceived. **בְּסִיל**, as we have no often explained, is the intellectually heavy and dull, like *pinguis* and *tardus*; Arab. *balyd*, clumsy, intellectually immoveable (cf. *bld*, the place where one places himself firmly down, which one makes his point of gravity). The heart of such an one is covered over (Psa. 119:70), as with grease, against all impressions of better knowledge; he has for the knowledge which the words spoken design to impart to him, no susceptibility, no mind, but only contempt. The construction **בְּוֹל** has been frequently met with from Pro. 6:30.

Pro. 23:10, 11. The following proverb forms a new whole from component parts of Pro. 22:28 and Pro. 22:22 f.:

***10 Remove not ancient landmarks;
And into the fields of orphans enter thou not.***

***11 For their Saviour is a mighty one;
He will conduct their cause against thee.***

בְּוֹל separates itself here to the meaning of *injuste invadere et occupare*; French, *empiéter sur son voisin*, advance not into the ground belonging to thy neighbour (Fleischer). If orphans have also no *goel* among their kindred (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, **ἀγγισταεύς**) to redeem by purchase (Lev. 25:25) their inheritance that has passed over into the possession of another, they have another, and that a mighty Saviour, *Redemptor*, who will restore to them that which they have lost, — viz. God (Jer. 50:34), — who will adopt their cause against any one who has unjustly taken from them.

Pro. 23:12. The following proverb warrants us to pause here, for it opens up, as a compendious echo of Pro. 22:17-21, a new series of proverbs of wisdom:

***12 Apply thine heart to instruction,
And thine ear to the utterances of knowledge.***

We may, according as we accent in **לְמוֹסֵר** the divine origin or the human medium, translate, *offer disciplinae* (Schultens), or *adhibe ad disciplinam cor tuum* (Fleischer). This general admonition is directed to old and young, to those who are to be educated as well as to those who are educated. First to the educator:

***13 Withhold not correction from the child;
For thou will beat him with the rod, and he will not die.***

**14 Thou beatest him with the rod,
And with it deliverest his soul from hell.**

Pro. 23:13, 14. The exhortation, 13a, presupposes that education by word and deed is a duty devolving on the father and the teacher with regard to the child. In 13b, כִּי is in any case the relative conjunction. The conclusion does not mean: so will he not fall under death (destruction), as Luther also would have it, after Deu. 19:21, for this thought certainly follows v. 14; nor after 19:18: so may the stroke not be one whereof he dies, for then the author ought to have written אֶל-תִּמּוֹתָנִי; but: he will not die of it, i.e., only strike if he has deserved it, thou needest not fear; the bitter medicine will be beneficial to him, not deadly. The אֶתָּה standing before the double clause, v. 14, means that he who administers corporal chastisement to the child, saves him spiritually; for שְׂאוּל does not refer to death in general, but to death falling upon a man before his time, and in his sins, vid., Pro. 15:24, cf. 8:26.

Pro. 23:15, 16. The following proverb passes from the educator to the pupil:

**15 My son, if thine heart becometh wise,
My heart also in return will rejoice;**

**16 And my reins will exult
If thy lips speak right things.**

Wisdom is inborn in no one. A true Arab. proverb says, “The wise knows how the fool feels, for he himself was also once a fool;”^{f174} and folly is bound up in the heart of a child, according to Pro. 22:15, which must be driven out by severe discipline. 15b, as many others, cf. Pro. 22:19 b, shows that these “words of the wise” are penetrated by the subjectivity of an author; the author means: if thy heart becomes wise, so will mine in return, i.e., corresponding to it (cf. נָגַח, Gen. 20: 6), rejoice. The thought of the heart in v. 15 repeats itself in v. 16, with reference to the utterance of the mouth. Regarding מִשְׁרֵיִם, vid., 1: 5. Regarding the “reins,” בְּלִיּוֹת (perhaps from בְּלָה, to languish, Job. 19:21), with which the tender and inmost affections are connected, vid., *Psychologie*, p. 268 f.

Pro. 23:17, 18. The poet now shows how one attains unto wisdom — the beginning of wisdom is the fear of God:

**17 Let not thine heart strive after sinners,
But after the fear of Jahve all the day.**

**18 Truly there is a future,
And thy hope shall not come to naught.**

The LXX, Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther, and the Arab. interpreters, render 17b as an independent clause: “but be daily in the fear of the Lord.” That is not a substantival clause (cf. Pro. 22: 7), nor can it be an interjectional clause, but it may be an elliptical clause (Fleischer: from the prohibitive אַל־תִּקְנֵא is to be taken for the second parallel member the *v. subst.* lying at the foundation of all verbs); but why had the author omitted הִיָּה? Besides, one uses the expressions, to act (עָשָׂה), and to walk (הִלֵּךְ) in the fear of God, but not the expression to be (הִיָּה) in the fear of God. Thus בִּירְאָתָא, like בְּחַטָּאִים, is dependent on אַל־תִּקְנֵא; and Jerome, who translates: *Non aemuletur cor tuum peccatores, sed in timore Domini esto tota die*, ought to have continued: *sed timorem Domini tota die*; for, as one may say in Latin: *aemulari virtutes*, as well as *aemulari aliquem*, so also in Heb. קִנְיָא בָּ, of the envying of those persons whose fortune excites to dissatisfaction, because one has not the same, and might yet have it, Pro. 3:31; 24: 1, 19, as well as of emulation for a thing in which one might not stand behind others: envy not sinners, envy much rather the fear of God, i.e., let thyself be moved with eager desire after it when its appearance is presented to thee. There is no O.T. parallel for this, but the Syr. *tan* and the Greek ζηλοτυποῦν are used in this double sense. Thus Hitzig rightly, and, among the moderns, Malbim; with Aben Ezra, it is necessary to take בִּירְאָתָא for בְּאִישׁ יִרְאָתָא, this proverb itself declares the fear of God to be of all things the most worthy of being coveted.

In v. 18, Umbreit, Elster, Zöckler, and others interpret the כִּי as assigning a reason, and the אִם as conditioning: for when the end (the hour of the righteous judgment) has come; Bertheau better, because more suitable to the יֵשׁ and the אַחֲרֵיתָא: when an end (an end adjusting the contradictions of the present time) comes, as no doubt it will come, then thy hope will not be destroyed; but, on the other hand, the succession of words in the conclusion (vid., at 3:34) opposes this; also one does not see why the author does not say directly כִּי יֵשׁ אַחֲרֵיתָא, but expresses himself thus conditionally. ^{f175}

If אִם is meant hypothetically, then, with the LXX ἐὰν γὰρ τηρήσης αὐτὰ ἔσται σοὶ ἔκγονα, we should supply after it תִּשְׂמְרֵנָה, that had fallen out. Ewald's: much rather there is yet a future (Dächsel: much rather be happy there is...), is also impossible; for the preceding clause is positive, not negative. The particles אִם כִּי, connected thus, mean: for if (e.g., Lam. 3:32); or also relatively: that if (e.g., Jer. 26:15). After a negative clause they have the meaning of “unless,” which is acquired by means of an ellipsis; e.g., Isa. 55:10, it turns not back thither, unless it has watered the earth (it returns back not before then, not unless this is done). This “unless” is, however, used like the Lat. *nisi*, also

without the conditioning clause following, e.g., Gen. 28:17, *hic locus non est nisi domus Dei*. And hence the expression כִּי אִם, after the negation going before, acquires the meaning of “but,” e.g., 17b: let not thy heart be covetous after sinners, for thou canst always be zealous for the fear of God, i.e., much rather for this, but for this. This pleonasm of אִם sometimes occurs where כִּי is not used confirmatively, but affirmatively: the “certainly if” forms the transition, e.g., 1Ki. 20: 6 (vid., Keil’s *Comm. l.c.*), whose “if” is not seldom omitted, so that אִם כִּי has only the meaning of an affirmative “certainly,” not “truly no,” which it may also have, 1Sa. 25:34, but “truly yes.” Thus אִם כִּי is used Jud. 15: 7; 2Sa. 15:21 (where אִם is omitted by the *Keri*); 2Ki. 5:20; Jer. 51:14; and thus it is also meant here, 18a, notwithstanding that אִם כִּי, in its more usual signification, “besides only, but, *nisi*,” precedes, as at 1Sa. 21: 6, cf. 5. The objection by Hitzig, that with this explanation: “certainly there is a future,” vv. 18 and 17 are at variance, falls to the ground, if one reflects on the Heb. idiom, in which the affirmative signification of כִּי is interpenetrated by the confirmative. אַחֲרַיִת used thus pregnantly, as here (Pro. 24:14), is the glorious final issue; the word in itself designates the end into which human life issues (cf. Ps. 37:37 f.); here, the end crowning the preceding course. Jeremiah (Jer. 29:11) in this sense connects אַחֲרַיִת וְתִקְוָה [end and expectation]. And what is here denied of the תִּקְוָה, the hope (not as certain Jewish interpreters dream, the thread of life) of him who zealously strives after the fear of God, is affirmed, at Ps. 37:38, of the godless: the latter have no continuance, but the former have such as is the fulfilling of his hope.

Pro. 23:19-21. Among the virtues which flow from the fear of God, temperance is made prominent, and the warning against excess is introduced by the general exhortation to wisdom:

*19 Hear thou, my son, and become wise,
And direct thy heart straight forward on the way.*

*20 And be not among wine-drinkers,
And among those who devour flesh;*

*21 For the drunkard and glutton become poor,
And sleepiness clotheth in rags.*

The אָתָּה, connected with שָׁמַע, imports that the speaker has to do with the hearer altogether by himself, and that the latter may make an exception to the many who do not hear (cf. Job. 33:33; Jer. 2:31). Regarding אֲשֶׁר, to make to go straight out, vid., at Pro. 4:14; the *Kal*, Pro. 9: 6, and also the *Piel*, Pro. 4:14, mean to go straight on, and, generally, to go. The way merely, is the

one that is right in contrast to the many byways. Fleischer: “the way *sensu eximio*, as the Oriental mystics called the way to perfection merely (Arab.) *âlatryk*; and him who walked therein, *âlsâlak*, the walker or wanderer.”^{f176}

בְּאֵלֵי תְהִי בִּ, as at Pro. 22:26, the “Words of the Wise,” are to be compared in point of style. The degenerate and perverse son is more clearly described, Deu. 21:20, as זֹלֶל וְסָבָא. These two characteristics the poet distributes between 20a and 20b. סָבָא means to drink (whence סָבָא, drink = wine, Isa. 1:22) wine or other intoxicating drinks; Arab. *sabâ*, *vinum potandi causa emere*. To the וְנִי here added, בְּשָׂר in the parallel member corresponds, which consequently is not the fleshly body of the gluttons themselves, but the prepared flesh which they consume at their luxurious banquets. The LXX incorrectly as to the word, but not contrary to the sense, “be no wine-bibber, and stretch not thyself after *picknicks* (συμβολαίς), and buying in of flesh (κρεῶν τε ἀγορασμοῖς),” whereby זֹלֶל is translated in the sense of the Aram. זְבִי (Lagarde). זָלֵל denotes, intransitively, to be little valued (whence זֹלֶל, opp. זָקַךְ, Jer. 15:19), transitively to value little, and as such to squander, to lavish prodigally; thus: *qui prodigi sunt carnis sibi*; לָמוֹ is *dat. commodi*. Otherwise Gesenius, Fleischer, Umbreit, and Ewald: *qui prodigi sunt carnis suae*, who destroy their own body; but the parallelism shows that flesh is meant wherewith they feed themselves, not their own flesh (בְּשָׂר לָמוֹ, like חֲמַת־לָמוֹ, Psa. 58: 5), which, i.e., its health, they squander. זֹלֶל also, in phrase used in Deu. 21:20 (cf. with Hitzig the formula φάγος καὶ οἰνοπότης, Mat. 11:19), denotes not the dissolute person, as the sensualist, πορνοκόπος (LXX), but the συμβολοκόπος (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion), κρεωβόρος (Venet.), זָלֵל בְּסָר (Onkelos), i.e., flesh-eater, ravenous person, glutton, in which sense it is rendered here, by the Syr. and Targ., by אַסוּט (אַסִּיט), i.e., ἄσωτος. Regarding the metaplastic *fut. Niph.* וְנָרַשׁ (LXX πτωχεύσει), vid., at Pro. 20:13, cf. 11:25. נֹמָה (after the form of בּוֹשָׁה, דּוֹנָה, צוֹרָה) is drowsiness, lethargy, long sleeping, which necessarily follows a life of riot and revelry. Such a slothful person comes to a bit of bread (Pro. 21:17); and the disinclination and unfitness for work, resulting from night revelry, brings it about that at last he must clothe himself in miserable rags. The rags are called קָרַע and ῥάκος, from the rending (tearing), Arab. *ruk’at*, from the patching, mending. Lagarde, more at large, treats of this word here used for rags.

The *parainesis* begins anew, and the division is open to question. Vv. 22-24 can of themselves be independent distichs; but this is not the case with v. 25, which, in the resumption of the address and in expression, leans back on v. 22. The author of this appendix may have met with vv. 23 and 24 (although here

also his style, as conformed to that of Pro. 1: 9, is noticeable, cf. 23b with 1: 2), but vv. 22 and 25 are the form which he has given to them.

Pro. 23:22-25. Thus 22-25 are a whole: —

*22 Hearken to thy father, to him who hath begotten thee,
And despise not thy mother when she has grown old.*

*23 Buy the truth, and sell it not,
Wisdom and discipline and understanding.*

*24 The father of a righteous man rejoiceth greatly;
(And) he that is the father of a wise man — he will rejoice.*

*25 Let thy father and thy mother be glad;
And her that bare thee exult.*

The octastich begins with a call to childlike obedience, for **שִׁמַע לְ**, to listen to any one, is equivalent to, to obey him, e.g., Psa. 81: 9, 14 (cf. “hearken to his voice,” Psa. 95: 7). **זֶה יְלֵדֶךָ** is a relative clause (cf. Deu. 32:18, without **זֶה** or **אִשְׁרָ**), according to which it is rightly accented (cf. on the contrary, Psa. 78:54). 22b, strictly taken, is not to be translated *neve contemne cum senuerit matrem tuam* (Fleischer), but *cum senuerit mater tua*, for the logical object to **אֶל-תִּבּוֹז** is attracted as subj. of **יִקְנֶה** (Hitzig). There now follows the exhortation comprehending all, and formed after Pro. 4: 7, to buy wisdom, i.e., to shun no expense, no effort, no privation, in order to attain to the possession of wisdom; and not to sell it, i.e., not to place it over against any earthly possession, worldly gain, sensual enjoyment; not to let it be taken away by any intimidation, argued away by false reasoning, or prevailed against by enticements into the way of vice, and not to become unfaithful to it by swimming with the great stream (Exo. 23: 2); for truth, **אֱמֶת**, is that which endures and proves itself in all spheres, the moral as well as the intellectual. In 23b, in like manner as Pro. 1: 3; 22: 4, a threefold object is given to **יִקְנֶה** instead of **אֱמֶת**: there are three properties which are peculiar to truth, the three powers which handle it: **חִכְמָה** is knowledge solid, pressing into the essence of things; **מוֹסֵר** is moral culture; and **בִּינָה** the central faculty of proving and distinguishing (vid., Pro. 1: 3-5). Now v. 24 says what consequences are for the parents when the son, according to the exhortation of 23, makes truth his aim, to which all is subordinated. Because in **אֱמֶת** the ideas of practical and theoretical truth are inter-connected. **צְדִיק** and **חָכֵם** are also here parallel to one another. The *Chethîb* of 24a is **גּוֹל גּוֹל**, which Schultens finds tenable in view of (Arab.) *jal*, fut *jajûlu* (to turn round; Heb. to turn oneself for joy) but

the Heb. *usus loq.* knows elsewhere only גִּיל יְגִיל, as the *Kerî* corrects. The LXX, misled by the *Chethîb*, translates καλῶς ἐκτρέφει (incorrect ἐκτροφήσει), i.e., גִּדַּל יְגִדַּל. In 24b, וַיִּשְׂמַח is of the nature of a pred. of the conclusion (cf. Gen. 22:24; Psa. 115: 7), as if the sentence were: has one begotten a wise man, then (cf. Pro. 17:21) he has joy of him; but the *Kerî* effaces this *Vav apodosis*, and assigns it to יוֹלַד as *Vav copul.* — an unnecessary mingling of the syntactically possible, more emphatic expression. This proverbial whole now rounds itself off in v. 25 by a reference to v. 22, — the Optative here corresponding to the Impr. and Prohib. there: let thy father and thy mother rejoice (LXX εὐφρανέσθω), and let her that bare thee exult (here where it is possible the Optat. form וְתִגֵּל).

Pro. 23:26-28. This hexastich warns against unchastity. What, in 1-9, extended discourses and representations exhibited to the youth is here repeated in miniature pictures. It is the teacher of wisdom, but by him Wisdom herself, who speaks:

*26 Give me, my son, thine heart;
And let thine eyes delight in my ways.*

*27 For the harlot is a deep ditch,
And the strange woman a narrow pit.*

*28 Yea, she lieth in wait like a robber,
And multiplieth the faithless among men*

We have retained Luther's beautiful rendering of v. 26, ^{f177} in which this proverb, as a warning word of heavenly wisdom and of divine love, has become dear to us. It follows, as Symmachus and the *Venet.*, the *Chethîb* תִּרְצֵנָה (for תִּרְצִינָה, like Exo. 2:16; Job. 5:12), the stylistic appropriateness of which proceeds from Pro. 16: 7, as on the other hand the *Kerî* תִּצְרֵנָה (cf. 1Sa. 14:27) is supported by Pro. 22:12, cf. 5: 2. But the correction is unnecessary, and the *Chethîb* sounds more affectionate, hence it is with right defended by Hitzig. The ways of wisdom are ways of correction, and particularly of chastity, thus placed over against "the ways of the harlot," Pro. 7:24 ff. Accordingly the exhortation, v. 26, verifies itself; warning, by v. 27, cf. Pro. 22:14, where עֲמֻקָּה was written, here as at Job. 12:22, with the long vowel עֲמוּקָה (עֲמֻקָּה). בְּיַר צָרָה interchanges with שׁוּקָה עֲמוּקָה, and means, not the fountain of sorrow (Löwenstein), but the narrow pit. בְּיַר is fem. gen., Pro. 26:21 f., and צָר means narrow, like *étroit* (old French, *estreit*), from *strictus*. The figure has, after Pro. 22:14, the mouth of the harlot in view. Whoever is enticed by her syren voice falls into a deep ditch, into a pit with a

narrow mouth, into which one can more easily enter than escape from. V. 28 says that it is the artifice of the harlot which draws a man into such depth of wickedness and guilt. With אָרַף, which, as at Jud. 5:29, belongs not to הִיאַ but to the whole sentence, the picture of terror is completed. The verb חָתַף (whence Arab. *ḥataf*, death, natural death) means to snatch away. If we take חָתַף as *abstr.*: a snatching away, then it would here stand elliptically for חָתַף (אִישׁ בְּאֵל) which in itself is improbable (vid., Pro. 7:22, עֲבַם) and also unnecessary, since, as מָלַךְ, עָבַד, הִלָּךְ, etc. show, such *abstracta* can pass immediately into *concreta*, so that חָתַף thus means the person who snatches away, i.e., the street robber, *latro* (cf. חָטַף, [Arab.] *khataf*, Psa. 10: 9, rightly explained by Kimchi as cogn.). In 28b, תּוֹסִיף cannot mean *abripit* (as LXX, Theodotion, and Jerome suppose), for which the word תִּסְפְּדָה (תִּאֲסֹף) would have been used. ^{f178}

But this verbal idea does not harmonize with the connection; תּוֹסִיף means, as always, *addit* (*auget*), and that here in the sense of *multiplicat*. The same thing may be said of בּוֹגְדִים as is said (Pro. 11:15) of תּוֹקְעִים. Hitzig's objection, "הוֹסִיף, to multiply, with the accusative of the person, is not at all used," is set aside by Pro. 19: 4. But we may translate: the faithless, or: the breach of faith she increases. Yet it always remains a question whether בְּאֵדָם is dependent on בּוֹגְדִים, as Ecc. 8: 9, cf. 2Sa. 23: 3, on the verb of ruling (Hitzig), or whether, as frequently בְּאֵדָם, e.g., Psa. 78:60, it means *inter homines* (thus most interpreters). Uncleanness leads to faithlessness of manifold kinds: it makes not only the husband unfaithful to his wife, but also the son to his parents, the scholar to his teacher and pastor, the servant (cf. the case of Potiphar's wife) to his master. The adulteress, inasmuch as she entices now one and now another into her net, increases the number of those who are faithless towards men. But are they not, above all, faithless towards God? We are of opinion that not בּוֹגְדִים, but תּוֹסִיף, has its complement in בְּאֵדָם, and needs it: the adulteress increases the faithless among men, she makes faithlessness of manifold kinds common in human society. According to this, also, it is accentuated; וּבּוֹגְדִים is placed as object by *Mugrasch*, and בְּאֵדָם is connected by *Mercha* with תּוֹסִיף.

Pro. 23:29-35. The author passes from the sin of uncleanness to that of drunkenness; they are nearly related, for drunkenness excites fleshly lust; and to wallow with delight in the mire of sensuality, a man, created in the image of God, must first brutalize himself by intoxication. The *Mashal* in the number of its lines passes beyond the limits of the distich, and becomes a *Mashal* ode.

*29 Whose is woe? Whose is grief?
Whose are contentions, whose trouble, whose wounds without cause?
Whose dimness of eyes?*

*30 Theirs, who sit late at the wine,
Who turn in to taste mixed wine.*

*31 Look not on the wine as it sparkleth red,
As it showeth its gleam in the cup,
Glideth down with ease.*

*32 The end of it is that it biteth like a serpent,
And stingeth like a basilisk.*

*33 Thine eyes shall see strange things,
And thine heart shall speak perverse things;*

*34 And thou art as one lying in the heart of the sea,
And as one lying on the top of a mast.*

*35 “They have scourged me — it pained me not;
They have beaten me — I perceived it not.
When shall I have wakened from sleep?
Thus on I go, I return to it again.”*

The repeated **למי** ^{f179} asks who then has to experience all that; the answer follows in v. 30. With **אוי**, the **אָבוֹי** occurring only here accords; it is not a substantive from **אָבָה** (whence **אָבוֹן**) after the form of **צָחֵק**, in the sense of *egestas*; but, like the former [**אוי**], an interjection of sorrow (*Venet.* **τὶνι ἄλ**, **τὶνι φεῖδ**). Regarding **מְדַיְנִים** (*Chethîb* **מְדוֹנִים**), vid., at Pro. 6:14. **שִׁיחַ** signifies (vid., at 6:22) meditation and speech, here sorrowful thought and sorrowful complaint (1Sa. 1:16; Psa. 55:18; cf. **הִגִּיג**, **הִגָּה**), e.g., over the exhausted purse, the neglected work, the anticipated reproaches, the diminishing strength. In the connection **חֲנָם פְּצָעִים** (cf. Psa. 35:19) the accus. adv. **חֲנָם** (French *gratuitement*) represents the place of an adjective: strokes which one receives without being in the situation from necessity, or duty to expect them, strokes for nothing and in return for nothing (Fleischer), wounds for a long while (Oetinger). **חֲכַלְלוֹת עֵינַיִם** is the darkening (clouding) of the eyes, from **חָכַל**, to be dim, closed, and transferred to the sensation of light: to be dark (vid., at Gen. 49:12; Psa. 10: 8); the copper-nose of the drunkard is not under consideration; the word does not refer to the reddening, but the dimming of the eyes, and of the power of vision. The answer, v. 30, begins, in conformity with the form of the question, with **ל** (write **לְמַאֲחָרִים**, with *Gaja*

to ל, according to *Metheg-Setzung*, § 20, *Michlol* 46b): pain, and woe, and contention they have who tarry late at the wine (cf. Isa. 5:11), who enter (viz., into the wine-house, Ecc. 2: 4, the house of revelry) “to search” mingled drink (vid., at Pro. 9: 2; Isa. 5:22). Hitzig: “they test the mixing, as to the relation of the wine to the water, whether it is correct.” But לְהַקִּיר is like גְּבֵרִים, Isa. 5:22, meant in mockery: they are heroes, viz., heroes in drinking; they are searchers, such, namely, as seek to examine into the mixed wine, or also: thoroughly and carefully taste it (Fleischer).

The evil consequences of drunkenness are now registered. That one may not fall under this common sin, the poet, v. 31, warns against the attraction which the wine presents to the sight and to the sense of taste: one must not permit himself to be caught as a prisoner by this enticement, but must maintain his freedom against it. הִתְאָדָם, to make, i.e., to show oneself red, is almost equivalent to הִתְאָדָם; and more than this, it presents the wine as itself co-operating and active by its red play of colours (Fleischer). Regarding the *antiptosis* (*antiphonesis*): Look not on the wine that is..., vid., at Gen. 1: 3; yet here, where רָאָה means not merely “to see,” but “to look at,” the case is somewhat different. In 31b, one for the most part assumes that עֵינוֹ signifies the eye of the wine, i.e., the pearls which play on the surface of the wine (Fleischer). And, indeed, Hitzig’s translation, after Num. 11: 7: when it presents its appearance in the cup, does not commend itself, because it expresses too little. On the other hand, it is saying too much when Böttcher maintains that עֵין never denotes the mere appearance, but always the shining aspect of the object. But used of wine, עֵין appears to denote not merely aspect as such, but its gleam, glance; not its pearls, for which עֵינֵי would be the word used, but shining glance, by which particularly the bright glance, as out of deep darkness, of the Syro-Palestinian wine is thought of, which is for the most part prepared from red (blue) grapes, and because very rich in sugar, is thick almost like syrup. Jerome translates עֵינוֹ well: (*cum splenduerit in vitro*) *color ejus*. But one need not think of a glass; Böttcher has rightly said that one might perceive the glittering appearance also in a metal or earthen vessel if one looked into it. The *Chethib* בְּכִים is an error of transcription; the *Midrash* makes the remark on this, that בְּכִים fits the wine merchant, and בְּכֹס the wine drinker. From the pleasure of the eye, 31c passes over to the pleasures of the taste: (that, or, as it) goeth down smoothly (Luther); the expression is like Ecc. 7:10. Instead of הַלֵּךְ (like *jâry*, of fluidity) there stands here הַתְּהַלֵּךְ, commonly used of pleasant going; and instead of לְמִישְׁרִים with ל, the norm בְּמִישְׁרִים with ב of the manner; directness is here easiness, facility (Arab.

just); it goes as on a straight, even way unhindered and easily down the throat.
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Pro. 23:32. V. 32 shows how it issues with the wine, viz., with those who immoderately enjoy it. Is אַחֲרֵיתוֹ [its end] here the subject, as at 5: 4? We must in that case interpret יִשָּׁךְ and יִפְרֹשׁ as attributives, as the Syr. and Targ. translate the latter, and Ewald both. The issue which it brings with it is like the serpent which bites, etc., and there is nothing syntactically opposed to this (cf. e.g., Psa. 17:12); the future, in contradistinction to the participle, would not express properties, but intimations of facts. But the end of the wine is not like a serpent, but like the bite of a serpent. The wine itself, and independent of its consequences, is in and of itself like a serpent. In accordance with the matter, אַחֲרֵיתוֹ may be interpreted, with Hitzig (after Jerome, *in novissimo*), as *acc. adverb.* = בְּאַחֲרֵיתוֹ, Jer. 17:11. But why did not the author more distinctly write this word בֵּא? The syntactic relation is like Pro. 29:21: אַחֲרֵיתוֹ is after the manner of a substantival clause, the subject to that which follows as its virtual predicate: “its end is: like a serpent it biteth = this, that it biteth like a serpent.” Regarding צִפְעֹנִי, *serpens regulus* (after Schultens, from צִפַּע = (Arab.) *saf*, to breathe out glowing, scorching), vid., at Isa. 7: 8. The *Hiph.* הִפְרִישׁ Schultens here understands of the division of the liver, and Hitzig, after the LXX, Vulgate, and *Venet.*, of squirting the poison; both after the Arab. *farth*. But הִפְרִישׁ, Syr. *afrês*, also signifies, from the root-idea of dividing and splitting, to sting, *poindre, pointer*, as Rashi and Kimchi gloss, whence the Aram. פְּרִישׁ, an ox-goad, with which the ancients connect פֶּרֶשׁ (of the spur), the name for a rider, *eques*, and also a horse (cf. on the contrary, Fleischer in Levy, *W.B.* ii. 574); a serpent’s bite and a serpent’s sting (Lat. *morsus, ictus*, Varro: *cum pepugerit colubra*) are connected together by the ancients. f181

Pro. 23:33, 34. The excited condition of the drunkard is now described. First, v. 33 describes the activity of his imagination as excited to madness. It is untenable to interpret זָרוֹת here with Rashi, Aben Ezra, and others, and to translate with Luther: “so shall thine eyes look after other women” (*circumspicient mulieres impudicas*, Fleischer, for the meaning to perceive, to look about for something, to seek something with the eyes, referring to Gen. 41:33). For זָרוֹת acquires the meaning of *mulieres impudicae* only from its surrounding, but here the parallel תְּהַפְכוֹת (perverse things) directs to the neut. *aliena* (cf. Pro. 15:28, רְעוֹת), but not merely in the sense of unreal things (Ralbag, *Meïri*), but: strange, i.e., abnormal, thus bizarre, mad, dreadful things. An old Heb. parable compares the changing circumstances which wine

produces with the manner of the lamb, the lion, the swine, the monkey; here juggles and phantoms of the imagination are meant, which in the view and fancy of the drunken man hunt one another like monkey capers. Moreover, the state of the drunken man is one that is separated from the reality of a life of sobriety and the safety of a life of moderation, 34a: thou act like one who lies in the heart of the sea. Thus to lie in the heart, i.e., the midst, of the sea as a ship goes therein, Pro. 30:19, is impossible; there one must swim but swimming is not lying, and to thing on a situation like that of Jonah, Jon. 1: 5, one must think also of the ship; but **שָׁכַב** does not necessarily mean “to sleep,” and, besides, the sleep of a passenger in the cabin on the high sea is of itself no dangerous matter. Rightly Hitzig: on the depth of the sea (cf. Jon. 2: 4) — the drunken man, or the man overcome by wine (Isa. 28: 7), is like one who has sunk down into the midst of the sea; and thus drowned, or in danger of being drowned, he is in a condition of intellectual confusion, which finally passes over into perfect unconsciousness, cut off from the true life which passes over him like one dead, and in this condition he has made a bed for himself, as **שָׁכַב** denotes. With **בְּרֹאשׁ בַּלַּב**, stands in complete contrast: he is like one who lies on the top of the mast. **חֵבֶל**, after the forms **דְּבַר**, **שָׁלֵם**, is the sail-yard fastened by ropes, **חֲבָלִים** (Isa. 33:23). To lay oneself down on the sail-yard happens thus to no one, and it is no place for such a purpose; but as little as one can quarter him who is on the ridge of the roof, in the *‘Alija*, because no one is able to lie down there, so little can he in the bower [*Mastkorb*] him who is here spoken of (Böttcher). The poet says, but only by way of comparison, how critical the situation of the drunkard is; he compares him to one who lies on the highest sail-yard, and is exposed to the danger of being every moment thrown into the sea; for the rocking of the ship is the greater in proportion to the height of the sail-yard. The drunkard is, indeed, thus often exposed to the peril of his life; for an accident of itself not great, or a stroke, may suddenly put an end to his life.

Pro. 23:35. The poet represents the drunken man as now speaking to himself. He has been well cudgelled; but because insensible, he has not felt it, and he places himself now where he will sleep out his intoxication. Far from being made temperate by the strokes inflicted on him, he rejoices in the prospect, when he has awaked out of his sleep, of beginning again the life of drunkenness and revelry which has become a pleasant custom to him. **חָלָה** means not only to be sick, but generally to be, or to become, affected painfully; cf. Jer. 5: 3, where **חָלוּ** is not the 3rd pl. mas. of **חִיל**, but of **חָלָה**. The words **מִתִּי אֶקְרֹא** are, it is true, a cry of longing of a different kind from Job. 7: 4. The sleeping man cannot forbear from yielding to the constraint of nature: he is no longer master of himself, he becomes giddy, everything goes round about

with him, but he thinks with himself: Oh that I were again awake! and so little has his appetite been appeased by his sufferings, that when he is again awakened, he will begin where he left off yesterday, when he could drink no more. מְתִי is here, after Nolde, Fleischer, and Hitzig, the relative *quando* (*quum*); but the bibl. *usus loq.* gives no authority for this. In that case we would have expected הַקִּיצוֹתִי instead of אֶקִּיץ. As the interrog. מֵתִי is more animated than the relat., so also אוֹסִיף אֲבַקְשֶׁנוּ is more animated (1Sa. 2: 3) than אוֹסִיף לְבַקֵּשׁ. The suffix of אֲבַקְשֶׁנוּ refers to the wine: raised up, he will seek that which has become so dear and so necessary to him.

PRO. 24: 1-22

Pro. 24: 1, 2. After this divergence (in Pro. 23:29-35) from the usual form of the proverb, there is now a return to the tetrastich:

*1 Envy not evil men,
And desire not to have intercourse with them.*

*2 For their heart thinketh of violence,
And their lips speak mischief.*

The warning, not to envy the godless, is also found at Pro. 3:31; 23:17; 24:19, but is differently constructed in each of these passages. Regarding פְּתָאִי with *Pathach*, vid., at Pro. 23: 3. אֲנָשֵׁי רָעָה (cf. רָע, Pro. 28: 5) are the wicked, i.e., such as cleave to evil, and to whom evil clings. The warning is grounded in this, that whoever have intercourse with such men, make themselves partners in greater sins and evil: for their heart broodeth (write כִּי שָׂדֵה, *Munach Dechi*) violence, i.e., robbery, plunder, destruction, murder, and the like. With שָׂדֵה (in the *Mishle* only here and at Pro. 21: 7, cf. שָׂדֵד, Pro. 19:26) connects itself elsewhere חָמָס, here (cf. Hab. 1: 3) עֲמָל, *labor, molestia*, viz., those who prepare it for others by means of slanderous, crafty, uncharitable talk.

Pro. 24: 3, 4. The warning against fellowship with the godless is followed by the praise of wisdom, which is rooted in the fear of God.

*3 By wisdom is the house builded,
And by understanding is it established.*

*4 And by knowledge shall the chambers be filled
With all manner of precious and pleasant goods.*

What is meant by the “building of the house” is explained at Pro. 14: 1. It is wisdom, viz., that which originates from God, which is rooted in fellowship with Him, by which every household, be it great or small, prospers and attains

to a successful and flourishing state; **בִּוְנֵן**, as parallel word to **בְּנָה** (Pro. 3:19; Hab. 2:12), is related to it as *statuere* to *extruere*; the *Hithpal* (as at Num. 21:17) means to keep oneself in a state of continuance, to gain perpetuity, to become established. That **יְמִלְאוּ** by *Athnach* has not passed over into the pausal **יְמִלְאוּ**, arises from this, that the *Athnach*, by the poetical system of accents, has only the force of the prose accent *Sakef*; the clause completes itself only by *4b*; the pausal form on that account also is not found, and it is discontinued, because the *Athnach* does not produce any pausal effect (vid., at Psa. 45: 6). The form of expression in v. 4 is like Pro. 1:13; 3:10. But the **חֲדָרִים**, of storerooms (LXX as Isa. 26:20, **ταμεία**), and **נְעִים**, like Pro. 22:18; 23: 8, is peculiar to this collection.

Pro. 24: 5, 6. The praise of wisdom is continued: it brings blessings in the time of peace, and gives the victory in war.

**5 A wise man is full of strength;
And a man of understanding showeth great power.**

**6 For with wise counsel shalt thou carry on successful war;
And safety is where counsellors are not wanting.**

The **ב** of **בְּעוֹז** (thus with *Pathach* in old impressions, Cod. 1294, Cod. *Jaman.*, and elsewhere with the Masoretic note **לִית וּמְלֵא**) introduces, as that of **בְּכֹחַ**, Psa. 24: 4, the property in which a person or thing appears; the article (cf. **הַעֹבִים**, 2:13, Gesen, § 35, 2A) is that of gender. The parallel **מִצְמִיץ כַּח**, a Greek translates by **ὑπὲρ κραταιὸν ἰσχυρὸν** = **מִצְמִיץ כַּח** (Job. 9: 4; Isa. 40:26). But after *5a* it lies nearer that the poet means to express the power which lies in wisdom itself (Ecc. 7:19), and its superiority to physical force (Pro. 21:22); the LXX, Syr., and Targ. also, it is true, translate *5a* as if **מְעוֹז** (*prae potente*) were the words used. **צִמְצַם כַּח** means to strengthen the strength, and that is (Nah. 2: 2) equivalent to, to collect the strength (to take courage), here and at Amo. 2:14, to show strong (superior) strength. The reason is gathered from Pro. 20:18 *b* and Pro. 11:14 *b*. The **לְךָ** here added, Hitzig is determined to read **תַּעֲשֶׂה**: for with prudent counsel the war shall be carried out by thee. The construction of the passive with **ל** of the subject is correct in Hebrews (vid., at Pro. 14:20) as well as in Aram.,^{f182} and **עֲשֶׂה** frequently means, in a pregnant sense: to complete, to carry out, to bring to an end; but the phrase **מִלְחָמָה עֲשֶׂה** means always to carry on war, and nothing further. **לְךָ** is the *dat. commod.*, as in **לְלַחֵם**, to wage war (to contend) for any one, e.g.,

Exo. 14:14. Instead of ברב, the LXX reads בלב; regarding γεωργίου μεγάλου for מאמץ כח, without doubt a corrupt reading, vid., Lagarde.

Till now in this appendix we have found only two distichs (vid., p. 14); now several of them follow. From this, that wisdom is a power which accomplishes great things, it follows that it is of high value, though to the fool it appears all too costly.

***7 Wisdom seems to the fool to be an ornamental commodity;
He openeth not his mouth in the gate.***

Pro. 24: 7. Most interpreters take ראמות for רמות (written as at 1Ch. 6:58; cf. Zec. 14:10; ראש, Pro. 10: 4; קאם, Hos 10:14), and translate, as Jerome and Luther: “Wisdom is to the fool too high;” the way to wisdom is to him too long and too steep, the price too costly, and not to be afforded. Certainly this thought does not lie far distant from what the poet would say; but why does he say חכמות, and not חכמה? This חכמות is not a numerical plur., so as to be translated with the *Venet.*: μετέωροι τῷ ἄφρονι αἱ ἐπιστήμαι; it is a plur., as Psa. 49: 4 shows; but, as is evident from the personification and the construction, Pro. 1:20, one inwardly multiplying and heightening, which is related to חכמה as science or the contents of knowledge is to knowledge. That this plur. comes here into view as in 1-9 (vid., p. 25), is definitely accounted for in these chapters by the circumstance that wisdom was to be designated, which is the *mediatrix* of all wisdom; here, to be designated in intentional symphony with ראמות, whose plur. ending *ôth* shall be for that very reason, however, inalienable. Thus ראמות will be the name of a costly foreign *bijouterie*, which is mentioned in the Book of Job, where the unfathomableness and inestimableness of wisdom is celebrated; vid., Job. 27:18, where we have recorded what we had to say at the time regarding this word. But what is now the meaning of the saying that wisdom is to the fool a pearl or precious coral? Joël Brill explains: “The fool uses the sciences like a precious stone, only for ornament, but he knows not how to utter a word publicly,” This is to be rejected, because ראמות is not so usual a trinket or ornament as to serve as an expression of this thought. The third of the comparison lies in the rarity, costliness, unattainableness; the fool despises wisdom, because the expenditure of strength and the sacrifices of all kinds which are necessary to put one into the possession of wisdom deter him from it (Rashi). This is also the sense which the expression has when ראמות = רמות; and probably for the sake of this double meaning the poet chose just this word, and not פנינים, גביש, or any other name, for articles of ornament (Hitzig). The Syr. has incorrectly

interpreted this play upon words: *sapientia abjecta stulto*; and the Targumist: the fool grumbles (מְרַעַם) against wisdom. ^{f183}

He may also find the grapes to be sour because they hang too high for him; here it is only said that wisdom remains at a distance from him because he cannot soar up to its attainment; for that very reason he does not open his mouth in the gate, where the council and the representatives of the people have their seats: he has not the knowledge necessary for being associated in counselling, and thus must keep silent; and this is indeed the most prudent thing he can do.

Pro. 24: 8. From wisdom, which is a moral good, the following proverb passes over to a kind of σοφία δαιμονιώδης:

*He that meditateth to do evil,
We call such an one an intriguer.*

A verbal explanation and definition like Pro. 21:24 (cf. p. 29), formed like Pro. 16:21 from נִבּוֹן. Instead of בַּאֲל־מְזֻמּוֹת [lord of mischief] in Pro. 12: 2, the expression is אִישׁ מַ' (cf. at Pro. 22:24). Regarding מְזֻמּוֹת in its usual sense, vid., Pro. 5: 2. Such definitions have of course no lexicographical, but only a moral aim. That which is here given is designed to warn one against gaining for himself this ambiguous title of a refined (cunning, *versutus*) man; one is so named whose schemes and endeavours are directed to the doing of evil. One may also inversely find the turning-point of the warning in 8b: “he who projects deceitful plans against the welfare of others, finds his punishment in this, that he falls under public condemnation as a worthless intriguer” (Elster). But מְזֻמּוֹת is ῥήμα μέσον, vid., Pro. 5: 2; the title is thus equivocal, and the turning-point lies in the bringing out of his kernel: מְחַשֵּׁב לְהָרָא = meditating to do evil.

Pro. 24: 9. This proverb is connected by זְמַת with v. 8, and by אוֹיִל with v. 7; it places the fool and the mocker over against one another.

*The undertaking of folly is sin;
And an abomination to men is the scorner.*

Since it is certain that for 9b the subject is “the scorner,” so also “sin” is to be regarded as the subject of 9a. The special meaning *flagitium*, as Pro. 21:27, זָמָה will then not have here, but it derives it from the root-idea “to contrive, imagine,” and signifies first only the collection and forthputting of the thoughts towards a definite end (Job. 17:11), particularly the refined preparation, the contrivance of a sinful act. In a similar way we speak of a sinful beginning or undertaking. But if one regards sin in itself, or in its

consequences, it is always a contrivance or desire of folly (*gen. subjecti*), or: one that bears on itself (*gen. qualitatis*) the character of folly; for it disturbs and destroys the relation of man to God and man, and rests, as Socrates in *Plato* says, on a false calculation. And the mocker (the mocker at religion and virtue) is תועבת לאדם. The form of combination stands here before a word with ל, as at Job. 18: 2; 24: 5, and frequently. but why does not the poet say directly תועבת אדם? Perhaps to leave room for the double sense, that the mocker is not only an abomination to men, viz., to the better disposed; but also, for he makes others err as to their faith, and draws them into his frivolous thoughts, becomes to them a cause of abomination, i.e., of such conduct and of such thoughts as are an abomination before God (Pro. 15: 9, 26).

Pro. 24:10. The last of these four distichs stands without visible connection:

*Hast thou shown thyself slack in the day of adversity,
Then is thy strength small.*

The perf. 10a is the hypothetical, vid., at Pro. 22:29. If a man shows himself remiss (Pro. 18: 9), i.e., changeable, timorous, incapable of resisting in times of difficulty, then shall he draw therefrom the conclusion which is expressed in 10b. Rightly Luther, with intentional generalization, “he is not strong who is not firm in need.” But the address makes the proverb an earnest admonition, which speaks to him who shows himself weak the judgment which he has to pronounce on himself. And the *paronomasia* צרה and צר may be rendered, where possible, “if thy strength becomes, as it were, pressed together and bowed down by the difficulty just when it ought to show itself (viz., לך להרחיב), then it is limited, thou art a weakling.” Thus Fleischer accordingly, translating: *si segnis fueris die angustiae, angustae sunt vires tuae*. Hitzig, on the contrary, corrects after Job. 7:11, ריחך “*Klemm (klamm) ist dein Mut*” [= strait is thy courage]. And why? Of כח [strength], he remarks, one can say כשל [it is weak] (Psa. 31:11), but scarcely צר [strait, straitened]; for force is exact, and only the region of its energy may be wide or narrow. To this we answer, that certainly of strength in itself we cannot use the word כח in the sense here required; the confinement (limitation) may rather be, as with a stream, Isa. 59:19, the increasing (heightening) of its intensity. But if the strength is in itself anything definite, then on the other hand its expression is something linear, and the force in view of its expression is that which is here called צר, i.e., not extending widely, not expanding, not inaccessible. צר is all to which narrow limits are applied. A little strength is limited, because it is little also in its expression.

Pro. 24:11, 12. Now, again, we meet with proverbs of several lines. The first here is a hexastich:

*11 Deliver them that are taken to death,
And them that are tottering to destruction, oh stop them!*

*12 If thou sayest, “We knew not of it indeed,” —
It is not so: The Weigher of hearts, who sees through it,
And He that observeth thy soul, He knoweth it,
And requiteth man according to his work.*

If אִם is interpreted as a particle of adjuration, then אִם-תִּחְשׁוּךְ is equivalent to: I adjure thee, forbear not (cf. Neh. 13:25 with Isa. 58: 1), viz., that which thou hast to do, venture all on it (LXX, Syr., Jerome). But the parallelism requires us to take together מְטִים לְהִרְגַּל (such as with tottering steps are led forth to destruction) as object along with אִם-תִּחְשׁוּךְ, as well as לְקַחִים לְמָוֶת (such as from their condition are carried away to death, cf. Exo. 14:11) as object to הִצֵּל, in which all the old interpreters have recognised the *imepr.*, but none the *infin.* (*eripere...ne cesses*, which is contrary to Heb. idiom, both in the position of the words and in the construction). אִם also is not to be interpreted as an interrogative; for, thus expressed, *an retinetis* ought rather to have for the converse the meaning: thou shalt indeed not do it! (cf. e.g., Isa. 29:16). And אִם cannot be conditional: *si prohibere poteris* (Michaelis and others), for the fut. after אִם has never the sense of a potential. Thus אִם is, like לוֹ, understood in the sense of *utinam*, as it is used not merely according to later custom (Hitzig), but from ancient times (cf. e.g., Exo. 32:32 with Gen. 23:13). פִּי־תֹאמַר (reminding^{f184} us of the same formula of the Rabbinical writings) introduces an objection, excuse, evasion, which is met by הֲלֵא; introducing “so say I on the contrary,” it is of itself a reply, vid., Deu. 7:17 f. וְהָאֵלֹהִים we will not have to interpret personally (LXX τοῦτόν); for, since v. 11 speaks of several of them, the neut. rendering (Syr., Targ., Venet., Luther) in itself lies nearer, and זֶה, *hoc*, after יָדַע, is also in conformity with the *usus loq.*; vid., at Psa. 56:10. But the neut. זֶה does not refer to the moral obligation expressed in v. 11; to save human life when it is possible to do so, can be unknown to no one, wherefore Jerome (as if the words of the text were אִין לְאֵל יָדְנִי זֶה): *vires non suppetunt*. זֶה refers to the fact that men are led to the tribunal; only thus is explained the change of יָדַעְתִּי, which was to be expected, into יָדְעֵנוּ: the objection is, that one certainly did not know, viz., that matters had come to an extremity with them, and that a short process will be made with them. To this excuse, with pretended ignorance, the reply of the omniscient God stands opposed, and suggests to him who makes the excuse to consider: It is not so:

the Searcher of hearts (vid., at Pro. 16: 2), He sees through it, viz., what goes on in thy heart, and He has thy soul under His inspection (נִצֵּר), as Job. 7:20: LXX καὶ ὁ πλάσας; נִצֵּר, which Hitzig prefers, for he thinks that נִצֵּר must be interpreted in the sense of to guard, preserve; Luther rightly); He knows, viz., how it is with thy mind, He looks through it, He knows (cf. for both, Psa. 139: 1-4), and renders to man according to his conduct, which, without being deceived, He judges according to the state of the heart, out of which the conduct springs.

It is to be observed that v. 11 speaks of one condemned to death generally, and not expressly of one innocently condemned, and makes no distinction between one condemned in war and in peace. One sees from this that the Chokma generally has no pleasure in this, that men are put to death by men, not even when it is done legally as punishment for a crime. For, on the one side, it is true that the punishment of the murderer by death is a law proceeding from the nature of the divine holiness and the inviolability of the divine ordinance, and the worth of man as formed in the image of God, and that the magistrate who disowns this law as a law, disowns the divine foundation of his office; but, on the other side, it is just as true that thousands and thousands of innocent persons, or at least persons not worthy of death, have fallen a sacrifice to the abuse or the false application of this law; and that along with the principle of recompensative righteousness, there is a principle of grace which rules in the kingdom of God, and is represented in the O.T. by prophecy and the Chokma. It is, moreover, a noticeable fact, that God did not visit with the punishment of death the first murderer, the murderer of the innocent Abel, his brother, but let the principle of grace so far prevail instead of that of law, that He even protected his life against any avenger of blood. But after that the moral ruin of the human race had reached that height which brought the Deluge over the earth, there was promulgated to the post-diluvians the word of the law, Gen. 9: 6, sanctioning this inviolable right of putting to death by the hand of justice. The conduct of God regulates itself thus according to the aspect of the times. In the Mosaic law the greatness of guilt was estimated no externally (cf. Num. 35:31), but internally, a very flexible limitation in its practical bearings. And that under certain circumstances grace might have the precedence of justice, the parable having in view the pardon of Absalom (2 Samuel 14) shows. But a word from God, like Eze. 18:23, raises grace to a principle, and the word with which Jesus (Joh. 8:11) dismisses the adulteress is altogether an expression of this purpose of grace passing beyond the purpose of justice. In the later Jewish commonwealth, criminal justice was subordinated to the principle of predominating compassion; practical effect was given to the consideration of the value of human life during the trial, and even after the sentence was pronounced, and during a long time no sentence of death was

passed by the Sanhedrim. But Jesus, who was Himself the innocent victim of a fanatical legal murder, adjudged, it is true, the supremacy to the sword; but He preached and practised love, which publishes grace for justice. He was Himself incarnate Love, offering Himself for sinners, the Mercy which Jahve proclaims by Eze. 18:23. The so-called Christian state [“*Citivas Dei*”] is indeed in manifest opposition to this. But Augustine declares himself, on the supposition that the principle of grace must penetrate the new ear, in all its conditions, that began with Christianity, for the suspension of punishment by death, especially because the heathen magistrates had abused the instrument of death, which, according to divine right, they had control over, to the destruction of Christians; and Ambrosius went so far as to impress it as a duty on a Christian judge who had pronounced the sentence of death, to exclude himself from the Holy Supper. The magisterial control over life and death had at that time gone to the extreme height of bloody violence, and thus in a certain degree it destroyed itself. Therefore Jansen changes the proverb (v. 11) with the words of Ambrosius into the admonition: *Quando indulgentia non nocet publico, eripe intercessione, eripe gratia tu sacerdos, aut tu imperator eripe subscriptionie indulgentiae*. When Samuel Romilly’s Bill to abolish the punishment of death for a theft amounting to the sum of five shillings passed the English House of Commons, it was thrown out by a majority in the House of Lords. Among those who voted against the Bill were one archbishop and five bishops. Our poet here in the Proverbs is of a different mind. Even the law of Sinai appoints the punishment of death only for man-stealing. The Mosaic code is incomparably milder than even yet the *Carholina*. In expressions, however, like the above, a true Christian spirit rules the spirit which condemns all blood-thirstiness of justice, and calls forth to a crusade not only against the inquisition, but also against such unmerciful, cruel executions even as they prevailed in Prussia in the name of law in the reign of Friedrich Wilhelm I, the Inexorable.

Pro. 24:13, 14. The proverb now following stands in no obvious relation with the preceding. But in both a commencement is made with two lines, which contain, in the former, the principal thought; in this here, its reason:

*13 My son, eat honey, for it is good,
And honeycomb is sweet to thy taste.*

*14 So apprehend wisdom for thy soul;
When thou hast found it, there is a future,
And thy hope is not destroyed.*

After its nearest fundamental thought, טוֹב, Arab. *tejjib*, means that which smells and tastes well; honey (דְּבֵשׁ), from דָּבַשׁ, to be thick, consistent) has,

besides, according to the old idea (e.g., in the Koran), healing virtue, as in general bitterness is viewed as a property of the poisonous, and sweetness that of the wholesome. **וְנִפְתָּ** is second accus. dependent on **אֶכְלֶה**, for honey and honeycomb were then spoken of as different; **נִפְתָּ** (from **נִפַּת**, to pour, to flow out) is the purest honey (virgin-honey), flowing of itself out of the comb. With right the accentuation takes 13b as independent, the substantival clause containing the reason, “for it is good:” honeycomb is sweet to thy taste, i.e., applying itself to it with the impression of sweetness; **אֵל**, as at Neh. 2: 5; Psa. 16: 6 (Hitzig).

In the **כִּן** of 14a, it is manifest that v. 13 is not spoken for its own sake. To apprehend wisdom, is elsewhere equivalent to, to receive it into the mind, 1: 2, Ecc. 1:17 (cf. **דַּעַת בִּינָה**, 4: 1, and frequently), according to which Böttcher also here explains: learn to understand wisdom. But **כִּן** unfolds itself in 14bc: even as honey has for the body, so wisdom has for the soul, beneficent wholesome effects. **דַּעַת חִכְמָה** is thus not absolute, but is meant in relation to these effects. Rightly Fleischer: *talem reputa*; Ewald: *sic (talem) scito spaientiam (esse) animae tuae*, know, recognise wisdom as something advantageous to thy soul, and worthy of commendation. Incorrectly Hitzig explains **אִם־תִּמְצָאָהּ**, “if the opportunity presents itself.” Apart from this, that in such a case the words would rather have been **כִּי תִמְצָא**, to find wisdom is always equivalent to, to obtain it, to make it one’s won, Pro. 3:13; 8:35; cf. 2: 5; 8: 9. **דַּעַת** ^{f185} stands for **דַּעַת**, after the form **רָדָה**; **שָׁבָה** (after Böttcher, § 396, not without the influence of the following commencing sound), cf. the similar transitions of **—ָ** into **—ַ** placed together at Psa. 20: 4; the form **דַּעַת** is also found, but **דַּעַת** is the form in the *Cod. Hilleli*, ^{f186} as confirmed by Moses Kimchi in *Comm.*, and by David Kimchi, *Michlol* 101b. With **וַיֵּשׁ** begins the apodosis (LXX, Jerome, Targ., Luther, Rashi, Ewald, and others). In itself, **וַיֵּשׁ** (cf. Gen. 47: 6) might also continue the conditional clause; but the explanation, *si inveneris (eam) et ad postremum ventum erit* (Fleischer, Bertheau, Zöckler), has this against it, that **וַיֵּשׁ אַחֲרֶיהָ** does not mean: the end comes, but: there is an end, Pro. 23:18; cf. 19:18; here: there is an end for thee, viz., an issue that is a blessed reward. The promise is the same as at Pro. 23:18. In our own language we speak of the hope of one being cut off; (Arab.) *jaz’a*, to be cut off, is equivalent to, to give oneself up to despair.

**15 Lie not in wait, oh wicked man, against the dwelling of the righteous;
Assault not his resting-place.**

**16 For seven times doth the righteous fall and rise again,
But the wicked are overthrown when calamity falls on them.**

Pro. 24:15, 16. The אָרַב [lying in wait] and שָׂדֵד [practising violence], against which the warning is here given, are not directed, as at Pro. 1:11; 19:26, immediately against the person, but against the dwelling-place and resting-place (רִבְיָ, e.g., Jer. 50: 6, as also נָוָה, Pro. 3:33) of the righteous, who, on his part, does injustice and wrong to no one; the warning is against coveting his house, Exo. 20:17, and driving him by cunning and violence out of it. Instead of רָשָׁע, Symmachus and Jerome have incorrectly read רִשָּׁע, and from this misunderstanding have here introduced a sense without sense into v. 15; many interpreters (Löwenstein, Ewald, Elster, and Zöckler) translate with Luther appositionally: as a wicked man, i.e., “with mischievous intent,” like one stealthily lurking for the opportunity of taking possession of the dwelling of another, as if this could be done with a good intent: רִשָּׁע is the vocative (Syr., Targ., Venet.: ἄσεβής), and this address (cf. Psa. 75: 5 f.) sharpens the warning, for it names him who acts in this manner by the right name. The reason, 16a, sounds like an echo of Job. 5:19. שִׁבַּע signifies, as at Psa. 119:164, seven times; cf. מֵאָה, Pro. 17:10. וְקָם (not וְקָם) is *perf. consec.*, as וַיָּחִי, e.g., Gen. 3:22: and he rises afterwards (notwithstanding), but the transgressors come to ruin; בַּרְעָה, if a misfortune befall them (cf. Pro. 14:32), they stumble and fall, and rise no more.

Pro. 24:17, 18. Warning against a vindictive disposition, and joy over its satisfaction.

*17 At the fall of thine enemy rejoice not,
And at his overthrow let not thine heart be glad;*

*18 That Jahve see it not, and it be displeasing to Him,
And He turns away His anger from Him.*

The *Chethîb*, which in itself, as the plur. of category, אֹיִבִּיךָ, might be tolerable, has 17b against it: with right, all interpreters adhere to the *Kerî* אֹיִבְךָ with *i* from *ē* in doubled close syllable, as in the like *Kerî*, 1Sa. 24: 5). וּבִבְשָׁלוֹ, for וּבִהֲבִשָׁלוֹ, is the syncope usual in the *inf. Niph.* and *Hiph.*, which in *Niph.* occurs only once with the initial guttural (as בִּעְטָר) or half guttural (לְרִאוֹת). וְרַע is not adj. here as at 1Sa. 25: 3, but *perf.* with the force of a *fut.* (Symmachus: καὶ μὴ ἀρέσῃ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ). The proverb extends the duty of love even to an enemy; for it requires that we do good to him and not evil, and warns against rejoicing when evil befalls him. Hitzig, indeed, supposes that the noble morality which is expressed in v. 17 is limited to a moderate extent by the motive assigned in 18b. Certainly the poet means to say that God could easily give a gracious turn for the better, as to the punishment of the wicked, to

the decree of his anger against his enemy; but his meaning is not this, that one, from joy at the misfortune of others, ought to desist from interrupting the process of the destruction of his enemy, and let it go on to its end; but much rather, that one ought to abstain from this joy, so as not to experience the manifestation of God's displeasure thereat, but His granting grace to him against whom we rejoice to see God's anger go forth. ^{f187}

Pro. 24:19, 20. Warning against envying the godless for their external prosperity:

*19 Be not enraged on account of evil-doers,
Envy not the godless;*

*20 For the wicked men shall have no future,
The light of the godless is extinguished.*

Ver. 19 is a variation of Psal. 37: 1; cf. also 3:21 (where with **בכל־דרכיו** following the traditional **תתחר** is more appropriate than **תבהר**, which Hupfeld would here insert). **תתחר** is *fut. apoc.* of **התחרה**, to be heated (to be indignant), distinguished from the *Tiphel* **תחרה**, to be jealous. The ground and occasion of being enraged, and on the other side, of jealousy or envy, is the prosperity of the godless, Psal. 73: 3; cf. Jer. 12: 1. This anger at the apparently unrighteous division of fortune, this jealousy at the success in which the godless rejoice, rest on short-sightedness, which regards the present, and looks not on to the end. **אחרית**, merely as in the expression **יש אחר**, 14b (cf. Psal. 37:37), always denotes the happy, glorious issue indemnifying for past sufferings. Such an issue the wicked man has not; his light burns brightly on this side, but one day it is extinguished. In 20b is repeated Pro. 13: 9; cf. 20:20.

Pro. 24:21, 22. A warning against rebellious thoughts against God and the king:

*21 My son, honour Jahve and the king,
And involve not thyself with those who are otherwise disposed;*

*22 For suddenly their calamity ariseth,
And the end of their years, who knoweth it?*

The verb **שנה**, proceeding from the primary idea of folding (*complicare, duplicare*), signifies transitively to do twice, to repeat, Pro. 17: 9; 26:11, according to which Kimchi here inappropriately thinks on relapsing; and intransitively, to change, to be different, Est. 1: 7; 3: 8. The Syr. and Targ. translate the word **שמי**, fools; but the *Kal* **שנה (טעמו)** occurs, indeed, in the Syr., but not in the Heb., in the meaning *alienata est (mens ejus)*; and besides,

this meaning, *alieni*, is not appropriate here. A few, however, with Saadia (cf. *Deutsch-Morgenländische Zeitschr.* xxi. 616), the dualists (Manichees), understand it in a dogmatic sense; but then שְׁנוֹיִם must be denom. of שָׁנִים, while much more it is its root-word. Either שְׁנוֹיִם means those who change, *novantes = novarum rerum studiosi*, which is, however, exposed to this objection, that the Heb. שָׁנָה, in the transitive sense to change, does not elsewhere occur; or it means, according to the *usus loq.*, *diversos = diversum sentientes* (C. B. Michaelis and others), and that with reference to 21a: מְשֻׁנִּים מִנְהַג הַחֲכָמָה (Meiri Immanuel), or שְׁנוֹיִם (Ahron b. Joseph). Thus they are called (for it is a common name of a particular class of men) dissidents, oppositionists, or revolutionaries, who recognise neither the monarchy of Jahve, the King of kings, nor that of the earthly king, which perhaps Jerome here means by the word *detractoribus* (= *detractoribus*). The *Venet.* incorrectly, שְׁנוֹיִם, i.e., שֹׁנֵי אִים, with כ at 14:10, הִתְעָרַב meant to mix oneself up with something, here with עִם, to mix oneself with some one, i.e., to make common cause with him.

The reason assigned in v. 22 is, that although such persons as reject by thought and action human and divine law may for a long time escape punishment, yet suddenly merited ruin falls on them. אִיד is, according to its primary signification, weighty, oppressive misfortune, vid., i. 27. In יְקוּם it is thought of as hostile power (Hos. 10:14); or the rising up of God as Judge (e.g., Isa. 33:10) is transferred to the means of executing judgment. פִּיד (= פְּוֹד of פוֹד or פִּיד, Arab. *fād*, fut. *jafūdu* or *jafidu*, a stronger power of *bād*, cogn. אָבַד) is destruction (Arab. *fied*, *fid*, death); this word occurs, besides here, only thrice in the Book of Job. But to what does שְׁנִיָּהֶם refer? Certainly not to Jahve and the king (LXX, Schultens, Umbreit, and Bertheau), for in itself it is doubtful to interpret the genit. after פִּיד as designating the subject, but improper to comprehend God and man under one cipher. Rather it may refer to two, of whom one class refuse to God, the other to the king, the honour that is due (Jerome, Luther, and at last Zöckler); but in the foregoing, two are not distinguished, and the want of reverence for God, and for the magistrates appointed by Him, is usually met with, because standing in interchangeable relationship, in one and the same persons. Is there some misprint then in this word? Ewald suggests שְׁנִיָּהֶם, i.e., of those who show themselves as שְׁנוֹיִם (*altercatores*) towards God and the king. In view of קָמִיָּהֶם, Exo. 32:25, this brevity of expression must be regarded as possible. But if this were the meaning of the word, then it ought to have stood in the first member (שְׁנִיָּהֶם אִיד), and not in the second. No other conjecture presents itself. Thus שְׁנִיָּהֶם is

perhaps to be referred to the שׁוֹנִים, and those who engage with them: join thyself not with the opposers; for suddenly misfortune will come upon them, and the destruction of both (of themselves and their partisans), who knows it? But that also is not satisfactory, for after the address שְׁנִיכֶם was to have been expected, 22*b*. Nothing remains, therefore, but to understand שְׁנִיָּהֶם, with the Syr. and Targ., as at Job. 36:11; the proverb falls into rhythms פְּתָאִים and פִּידִים, שׁוֹנִים and שְׁנִיָּהֶם. But “the end of their year” is not equivalent to the hour of their death (Hitzig), because for this פִּידֶם (cf. Arab. *feid* and *fid*, death) was necessary; but to the expiring, the vanishing, the passing by of the year during which they have succeeded in maintaining their ground and playing a part. There will commence a time which no one knows beforehand when all is over with them. In this sense, “who knoweth,” with its object, is equivalent to “suddenly ariseth,” with its subject. In the LXX, after Pro. 24:22, there follow one distich of the relations of man to the word of God as deciding their fate, one distich of fidelity as a duty towards the king, and the duty of the king, and one pentastich or hexastich of the power of the tongue and of the anger of the king. The Heb. text knows nothing of these three proverbs. Ewald has, *Jahrb.* xi. 18 f., attempted to translate them into Heb., and is of opinion that they are worthy of being regarded as original component parts of 1-29, and that they ought certainly to have come in after Pro. 24:22. We doubt this originality, but recognise their translation from the Heb. Then follows in the LXX the series of Proverbs, Pro. 30: 1-14, which in the Heb. text bear the superscription of “the Words of Agur;” the second half of the “Words of Agur,” together with the “Words of Lemuel,” stand after Pro. 24:34 of the Heb. text. The state of the matter is this, that in the copy from which the Alexandrines translated the Appendix Pro. 30-31: 9, stood half of it, after the “Words of the Wise” [which extend from Pro. 22:17 to Pro. 24:22], and half after the supplement headed “these also are from wise men” [Pro. 24:23-34], so that only the proverbial ode in praise of the excellent matron [Pro. 31:10] remains as an appendix to the Book of Hezekiah’s collection, 25-29.

SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO THE FIRST SOLOMONIC COLLECTION — PRO. 24:23-34

There now follows a brief appendix to the older Book of Proverbs, bearing the superscription, 23*a*, “*These also are from wise men,*” i.e., also the proverbs here following originate from wise men. The old translators (with the exception of Luther) have not understood this superscription; they mistake the *Lamed auctoris*, and interpret the ל as that of address: also these (proverbs) I speak to wise men, *sapientibus* (LXX, Syr., Targ., Jerome, *Venet.*). The formation of the superscription is like that of the Hezekiah collection,

Pro. 25: 1, and from this and other facts we have concluded (vid., pp. 19, 20) that this second supplement originated from the same source as the extension of the older Book of Proverbs, by the appending of the more recent, and its appendices. The linguistic complexion of the proverbs here and there resembles that of the first appendix (cf. 29*b* with 12*d*, and יַנְעִם, 25*a*, with נְעִים, Pro. 22:18; 23: 8; 24: 4); but, on the other hand, 23*b* refers back to Pro. 28:21 of the Hezekiah collection, and in v. 33 f. is repeated Pro. 6:10 f. This appendix thus acknowledges its secondary character; the poet in minute details stands in the same relation to the Solomonic Mashal as that in which in general he stands to the author of the Introduction, 1-9. That 23*b* is not in itself a proverb, we have already (p. 6) proved; it is the first line of a hexastich (vid., p. 13).

Pro. 24:23-25. The curse of partiality and the blessing of impartiality:

23b Respect of persons in judgment is by no means good:

*24 He that saith to the guilty, "Thou art in the right,"
Him the people curse, nations detest.*

*25 But to them who rightly decide, it is well,
And upon them cometh blessing with good.*

Partiality is either called שְׂאֵת פְּנִים, Pro. 18: 5, respect to the person, for the partisan looks with pleasure on the פְּנִי, the countenance, appearance, personality of one, by way of preference; or הִפְרֵ-פְּנִים, as here and at Pro. 28:21, for he places one person before another in his sight, or, as we say, has a regard to him; the latter expression is found in Deu. 1:17; 16:19. הִפִּיר (vid., 20:11) means to regard sharply, whether from interest in the object, or because it is strange. בַּל Heidenheim regards as weaker than לֹא; but the reverse is the case (vid., p. 148), as is seen from the derivation of this negative (= *balj*, from בָּלָה, to melt, to decay); thus it does not occur anywhere else than here with the pred. adj. The two supplements delight in this בַּל, Pro. 22:29; 23: 7, 35. The thesis 23*b* is now confirmed in vv. 24 and 25, from the consequences of this partiality and its opposite: He that saith (אָמַר |), with *Mehuppach Legarmeh* from the last syllable, as rightly by Athias, Nissel, and Michaelis, vid., *Thorath Emeth* p. 32) to the guilty: thou art right, i.e., he who sets the guilty free (for רָשָׁע and צַדִּיק have here the forensic sense of the post-bibl. חַיָּב and זָכַי), him they curse, etc.; cf. the shorter proverb, Pro. 17:15, according to which a partial, unjust judge is an abomination to God. Regarding נָקַב (קָבַב) here and at Pro. 11:26, Schultens, under Job. 3: 8, is right; the word signifies *figere*, and hence to distinguish and make prominent

by distinguishing as well as by branding; cf. *defigere*, to curse, properly, to pierce through. Regarding **נָאֵם**, vid., at Pro. 22:14. **נְאֻמִים** and **לְאֻמִים** (from **עָמַם** and **לָאֵם**, which both mean to bind and combine) are plur. of categ.: not merely individuals, not merely families, curse such an unrighteous judge and abhor him, but the whole people in all conditions and ranks of society; for even though such an unjust judge bring himself and his favourites to external honour, yet among no people is conscience so blunted, that he who absolves the crime and ennobles the miscarriage of justice shall escape the *vox populi*. On the contrary, it goes well (**נִנְאֵם**, like Pro. 2:10; 9:17, but here with neut. indef. subj. as **יִיטֵב**, Gen. 12:13, and frequently) with those who place the right, and particularly the wrong, fully to view; **מוֹכִיחַ** is he who mediates the right, Job. 9:33, and particularly who proves, censures, punishes the wrong, 9: 7, and in the character of a judge as here, Amo. 5:10; Isa. 29:21. The genitive connection **בְּרֶפֶת־טוֹב** is not altogether of the same signification as **יַיִן הַטּוֹב**, wine of a good sort, Son. 7:10, and **אִשְׁתֵּי רָע**, a woman of a bad kind, 6:24, for every blessing is of a good kind; the gen. **טוֹב** thus, as at Psa. 21: 4, denotes the contents of the blessing; cf. Eph. 1: 3, “with all spiritual blessings,” in which the manifoldness of the blessing is presupposed.

Pro. 24:26. Then follows a distich with the watchword **נִבְחִים**:

**26 He kisseth the lips
Who for the end giveth a right answer.**

The LXX, Syr., and Targ. translate: one kisseth the lips who, or: of those who...; but such a meaning is violently forced into the word (in that case the expression would have been **שִׁפְתֵי מְשִׁיבִים** or **שִׁפְתֵי מְשִׁיב**). Equally impossible is Theodotion's *χείλεσι καταφιληθήσεται*, for **יִשָּׁק** cannot be the *fut. Niph.* Nor is it: lips kiss him who... (Rashi); for, to be thus understood, the word ought to have been **לִמְשִׁיב**. **מְשִׁיב** is naturally to be taken as the subj., and thus it supplies the meaning: he who kisseth the lips giveth an excellent answer, viz., the lips of him whom the answer concerns (Jerome, *Venet.*, Luther). But Hitzig ingeniously, “the words reach from the lips of the speaker to the ears of the hearer, and thus he kisses his ear with his lips.” But since to kiss the ear is not a custom, not even with the Florentines, then a welcome answer, if its impression is to be compared to a kiss, is compared to a kiss on the lips. Hitzig himself translates: he commends himself with the lips who...; but **נִשָּׁק** may mean to join oneself, Gen. 41:40, as kissing is equivalent to the joining of the lips; it does not mean intrans. to cringe. Rather the explanation: he who joins the lips together...; for he, viz., before reflecting, closed his lips together (suggested by *Meiri*); but **נִשָּׁק**, with **שִׁפְתֵי**, brings the idea of

kissing, *labra labris jungere*, far nearer. This prevails against Schultens' *armatus est (erit) labia*, besides נִשְׁק, certainly, from the primary idea of connecting (laying together) (vid., Psa. 78: 9), to equip (arm) oneself therewith; but the meaning arising from thence: with the lips he arms himself... is direct nonsense. Fleischer is essentially right, *Labra osculatur* (i.e., *quasi osculum oblatum reddit*) *qui congrua respondet*. Only the question has nothing to do with a kiss; but if he who asks receives a satisfactory answer, an enlightening counsel, he experiences it as if he received a kiss. The Midrash incorrectly remarks under דְּבָרִים נְכֹחִים, "words of merited denunciation," according to which the Syr. translates. Words are meant which are corresponding to the matter and the circumstances, and suitable for the end (cf. Pro. 8: 9). Such words are like as if the lips of the inquirer received a kiss from the lips of the answerer.

Pro. 24:27. Warning against the establishing of a household where the previous conditions are wanting:

*Set in order thy work without,
And make it ready for thyself beforehand in the fields, —
After that then mayest thou build thine house.*

The interchange of בְּחֹמֶיךָ and בְּשָׂדֶךָ shows that by מְלֵאכֶת הַשָּׂדֶה field-labour, 1Ch. 27:26, is meant. הַכֵּין, used of arrangement, procuring, here with מְלֵאכָה, signifies the setting in order of the word, viz., the cultivation of the field. In the parallel member, אֶתְדָּה, carrying also its object, in itself is admissible: make preparations (LXX, Syr.); but the punctuation אֶתְדָּה (Targ., *Venet.*; on the other hand, Jerome and Luther translate as if the words were וְעַתְדָּה הַשָּׂדֶה) is not worthy of being contended against: set it (the work) in the fields in readiness, i.e., on the one hand set forward the present necessary work, and on the other hand prepare for that which next follows; thus: do completely and circumspectly what thy calling as a husbandman requires of thee, — then mayest thou go to the building and building up of thy house (vid., at v. 3, 14: 1), to which not only the building and setting in order of a convenient dwelling, but also the bringing home of a housewife and the whole setting up of a household belongs; prosperity at home is conditioned by this — one fulfils his duty without in the fields actively and faithfully. One begins at the wrong end when he begins with the building of his house, which is much rather the result and goal of an intelligent discharge of duty within the sphere of one's calling. The *perf.*, with ו after a date, such as אַחֲרַי, and the like, when things that will or should be done are spoken of, has the fut. signification of a *perf. consec.*, Gen. 3: 5; Exo. 16: 6 f., 17: 4; Ewald, § 344*b*.

Pro. 24:28. Warning against unnecessary witnessing to the disadvantage of another:

*Never be a causeless witness against thy neighbour;
And shouldest thou use deceit with thy lips?*

The phrase עֲדָה־הֵנָּם does not mean a witness who appears against his neighbour without knowledge of the facts of the case, but one who has no substantial reason for his giving of testimony; הֵנָּם means groundless, with reference to the occasion and motive, Pro. 3:30; 23:29; 26: 2. Other designations stood for false witnesses (LXX, Syr., Targ.). Rightly Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther, without, however, rendering the gen. connection עֲדָה־הֵנָּם, as it might have been by the adj.

In 28*b*, *Chajûg* derives וְהִפְתִּיתָ from פָּתַת, to break in pieces, to crumble; for he remarks it might stand, with the passing over of *ô* into *î*, for וְהִפְתִּיתָ [and thou wilt whisper]. But the ancients had no acquaintance with the laws of sound, and therefore with *naive* arbitrariness regarded all as possible; and Böttcher, indeed, maintains that the *Hiphil* of פָּתַת may be הִפְתִּיתָ as well as הִפְתִּיתָ; but the former of these forms with *î* could only be metaplastically possible, and would be הִפְתִּיתָ (vid., Hitzig under Jer. 11:20). And what can this *Hiph.* of פָּתַת mean? “To crumble” one’s neighbours (*Chajûg*) is an unheard of expression; and the meanings, to throw out crumbs, viz., crumbs of words (Böttcher), or to speak with a broken, subdued voice (Hitzig), are extracted from the rare Arab. *fâtâfit* (*fâtafiṭ*), for which the lexicographers note the meaning of a secret, moaning sound. When we see וְהִפְתִּיתָ standing along with בְּשִׁפְתֶיךָ, then before all we are led to think of פָּתַח [to open], Pro. 20:19; Psa. 73:36. But we stumble at the interrog. הֲ, which nowhere else appears connected with ה. Ewald therefore purposes to read וְהִפְתִּיתָ [and will open wide] (LXX μηδὲ πλατύνου): “that thou usest treachery with thy lips;” but from הִפְתַּח, to make wide open, Gen. 9:27, “to use treachery” is, only for the flight of imagination, not too wide a distance. On הֲ, *et num*, one need not stumble; וְהִלּוּא, 2Sa. 15:35, shows that the connection of a question by means of ה is not inadmissible; Ewald himself takes notice that in the Arab. the connection of the interrogatives ‘*a* and *hal* with *w* and *f* is quite common; ^{f188} and thus he reaches the explanation: wilt thou befooled then by thy lips, i.e., pollute by deceit, by inconsiderate, wanton testimony against others? This is the right explanation, which Ewald hesitates about only from the fact that the interrog. הֲ comes in between the ה *consec.* and its *perf.*, a thing which is elsewhere unheard of. But this difficulty is removed by the syntactic

observation, that the *perf.* after interrogatives has often the modal colouring of a conj. or optative, e.g., after the interrog. pronoun, Gen. 21: 7, *quis dixerit*, and after the interrogative particle, as here and at 2Ki. 20: 9, *iveritne*, where it is to be supplied (vid., at Isa. 38: 8). Thus: *et num persuaseris (deceperis) labiis tuis*, and shouldst thou practise slander with thy lips, for thou bringest thy neighbour, without need, by thy uncalled for rashness, into disrepute? “It is a question, *âl‘nakar* (cf. 23: 5), for which ‘*a* (not *hal*), in the usual Arab. interrogative: how, thou wouldst? one then permits the inquirer to draw the negative answer: “No, I will not do it” (Fleischer).

Pro. 24:29. The following proverb is connected as to its subject with the foregoing: one ought not to do evil to his neighbour without necessity; even evil which has been done to one must not be requited with evil:

***Say not, “As he hath done to me, so I do to him:
I requite the man according to his conduct.”***

On the ground of public justice, the *talio* is certainly the nearest form of punishment, Lev. 24:19 f.; but even here the Sinaitic law does not remain in the retortion of the injury according to its external form (it is in a certain manner practicable only with regard to injury done to the person and to property), but places in its stead an atonement measured and limited after a higher point of view. On pure moral grounds, the *jus talionis* (“as thou to me, so I to thee”) has certainly no validity. Here he to whom injustice is done ought to commit his case to God, Pro. 20:22, and to oppose to evil, not evil but good; he ought not to set himself up as a judge, nor to act as one standing on a war-footing with his neighbour (Jud. 15:11); but to take God as his example, who treats the sinner, if only he seeks it, not in the way of justice, but of grace (Exo. 34: 6 f.). The expression 29*b* reminds of Pro. 24:12. Instead of □□ִּשְׁלֵי, there is used here, where the speaker points to a definite person, the phrase שִׁשְׁלֵי. Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther translate: to each one, as if the word were vocalized thus, שִׁשְׁלֵי (Psa. 62:13).

Pro. 24:30-34. A Mashal ode of the slothful, in the form of a record of experiences, concludes this second supplement (vid., p. 14):

***30 The field of a slothful man I came past,
And the vineyard of a man devoid of understanding.***

***31 And, lo! it was wholly filled up with thorns;
Its face was covered with nettles;
And its wall of stones was broken down.***

**32 But I looked and directed my attention to it;
I saw it, and took instruction from it:**

**33 “A little sleep, a little slumber,
A little folding of the hands to rest.**

**34 Then cometh thy poverty apace,
And thy want as an armed man.”**

The line 29*b* with **לֹאִישׁ** is followed by one with **אִישׁ**. The form of the narrative in which this warning against drowsy slothfulness is clothed, is like Psa. 37:35 f. The distinguishing of different classes of men by **אִישׁ** and **אָדָם** (cf. Pro. 24:20) is common in proverbial poetry. **עֵבֶרְתִּי**, at the close of the first parallel member, retains its *Pathach* unchanged. The description: and, lo! (**וְהִנֵּה**, with *Pazer*, after *Thorath Emeth*, p. 34, Anm. 2) it was... refers to the vineyard, for **נֶדֶר אֲבָנָיו** (its stone wall, like Isa. 2:20, “its idols of silver”) is, like Num. 22:24, Isa. 5: 5, the fencing in of the vineyard. **עָלָה בָּלוּ**, *totus excreverat (in carduos)*, refers to this as subject, cf. in Ausonius: *apex vitibus assurgit*; the Heb. construction is as Isa. 5: 6; 34:13; Gesen. § 133, 1, Anm. 2. The sing. **קִמְשׁוֹן** of **קִמְשׁוֹנִים** does not occur; perhaps it means properly the weed which one tears up to cast it aside, for (Arab.) *kumâsh* is matter dug out of the ground. ^{f189}

The ancients interpret it by *urticae*; and **חֲרוּל**, plur. **חֲרוּלִים** (as from **חָרַל**), R. **חַר**, to burn, appears, indeed, to be the name of the nettle; the botanical name (Arab.) *khullar* (beans, pease, at least a leguminous plant) is from its sound not Arab., and thus lies remote. ^{f190}

The Pual **בָּסוּ** sounds like Psa. 80:11 (cf. **בָּלוּ**, Psa. 72:20); the position of the words is as this passage of the Psalm; the Syr., Targ., Jerome, and the *Venet.* render the construction actively, as if the word were **בָּסוּ**.

In v. 32, Hitzig proposes to read **וְאֶחְזָה**: and I stopped (stood still); but **אָחַז** is trans., not only at Ecc. 7: 9, but also at 2:15: to hold anything fast; not: to hold oneself still. And for what purpose the change? A contemplating and looking at a thing, with which the turning and standing near is here connected, manifestly includes a standing still; **רְאִיתִי**, after **וְאֶחְזָה**, is, as commonly after **הִבִּיט** (e.g., Job. 35: 5, cf. Isa. 42:18), the expression of a lingering looking at an object after the attention has been directed to it. In modern impressions, **וְאֶחְזָה אֲנִי** are incorrectly accentuated; the old editions have rightly **וְאֶחְזָה** with *Rebîa*; for not **וְאִ' אֲנִי**, but **אֲנִי אֲשִׁית** are connected. In 8:17, this prominence of the personal pronoun serves for the expression of reciprocity;

elsewhere, as e.g., Gen. 21:24, 2Ki. 6: 3, and particularly, frequently in Hosea, this circumstantiality does not make the subject prominent, but the action; here the suitable extension denotes that he rightly makes his comments at leisure (Hitzig). שִׁית לֵב is, as at Pro. 22:17, the turning of attention and reflection; elsewhere לָקַח מוֹסֵר, to receive a moral, Pro. 8:10, Jer. 7:28, is here equivalent to, to abstract, deduce one from a fact, to take to oneself a lesson from it. In vv. 33 and 34 there is a repetition of Pro. 6: 9, 10. Thus, as v. 33 expresses, the sluggard speaks to whom the neglected piece of ground belongs, and v. 34 places before him the result. Instead of כְּמַהֲלֵךְ of the original passage [6: 9, 10], here מַתְהַלֵּךְ, of the coming of poverty like an avenging Nemesis; and instead of וּמַחְסְרֵךְ, here וּמַחְסְרֵיךְ (the Cod. *Jaman.* has it without the ם), which might be the *plene* written pausal form of the sing. (vid., at 6: 3, cf. 6:11), but is more surely regarded as the plur.: thy deficits, or wants; for to thee at one time this, and at another time that, and finally all things will be wanting. Regarding the variants רִישֶׁךְ and רֵאשֶׁךְ (with א in the original passage, here in the borrowed passage with ם), vid., at 10: 4. כְּאִישׁ מְגִן is translated in the LXX by ὡς περ ἀγαθὸς δρομεύς (vid., at 6:11); the Syr. and Targ. make from it a גַּבְרָא מְבַלְרָא, *tabellarius*, a letter-carrier, coming with the speed of a courier.

Second Collection of Solomonic Proverbs 25-29

CHAPTER 25

The older Solomonic Book of Proverbs, with its introduction, Pro. 1: 9, and its two supplements, (1) Pro. 22:17-24:22, (2) Pro. 24:23-24, is now followed by a more modern Solomonic Book of Proverbs, a second extensive series of שְׁלֹמֹה מְשָׁלִי, which the collector has introduced with the superscription:

*1 These also are proverbs of Solomon,
Which the men of Hezekiah the king of Judah have collected.*

Pro. 25: 1. Hezekiah, in his concern for the preservation of the national literature, is the Jewish Pisistratos, and the “men of Hezekiah” are like the collectors of the poems of Homer, who were employed by Pisistratos for that purpose. גַּם־אֵלֶּה is the subject, and in Cod. 1294, and in the editions of Bomberg 1515, Hartmann 1595, Nissel, Jablonsky, Michaelis, has *Dechi*. This title is like that of the second supplement, Pro. 24:23. The form of the name חֲזַקְיָה, abbreviated from חֲזַקְיָהוּ (חֲזַקְיָהוּ), is not favourable to the derivation of the title from the collectors themselves. The LXX translates: Ἀδται αἱ παιδεῖαι Σαλωμῶντος αἱ ἀδιάκριτοι (cf. Jam. 3:17), ἃς ἐξεγράψαντο οἱ φίλοι

Ἐζεκιῶν, for which Aquila has ἄς μετήραν ἄνδρες Ἐζεκιῶν, Jerome, *transtulerunt*. הַעֲתִיק signifies, like (Arab.) *nsah*, نَسَى, to snatch away, to take away, to transfer from another place; in later Heb.: to transcribe from one book into another, to translate from one language into another: to take from another place and place together; the Whence? remains undetermined: according to the anachronistic rendering of the Midrash מַגְנִיזָהּ, i.e., from the Apocrypha; according to Hitzig, from the mouths of the people; more correctly Eichel and others: from their scattered condition, partly oral, partly written. Vid., regarding הַעֲתִיק, Zunz, in *Deutsch-Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xxv. 147 f., and regarding the whole title, pp. 5, 6; regarding the forms of proverbs in this second collection, p. 14; regarding their relation to the first, and their end and aim, pp. 19, 20. The first Collection of Proverbs is a Book for Youth, and this second a Book for the People.

Pro. 25: 2. It is characteristic of the purpose of the book that it begins with proverbs of the king:

***It is the glory of God to conceal a thing;
And the glory of the king to search out a matter.***

That which is the glory of God and the glory of the king in itself, and that by which they acquire glory, stand here contrasted. The glory of God consists in this, to conceal a matter, i.e., to place before men mystery upon mystery, in which they become conscious of the limitation and insufficiency of their knowledge, so that they are constrained to acknowledge, Deu. 29:28, that “secret things belong unto the Lord our God.” There are many things that are hidden and are known only to God, and we must be contented with that which He sees it good to make known to us. ^{f191}

The honour of kings, on the contrary, who as pilots have to steer the ship of the state (Pro. 11:14), and as supreme judges to administer justice (1Ki. 3: 9), consists in this, to search out a matter, i.e., to place in the light things that are problematical and subjects of controversy, in conformity with their high position, with surpassing intelligence, and, in conformity with their responsibility, with conscientious zeal. The thought that it is the glory of God to veil Himself in secrecy (Isa. 55:15; cf. 1Ki. 8:12), and of the king, on the contrary, not to surround himself with an impenetrable nimbus, and to withdraw into inaccessible remoteness, — this thought does not, immediately at least, lie in the proverb, which refers that which is concealed, and its contrary, not to the person, but to a matter. Also that God, by the concealment of certain things, seeks to excite to activity human research, is not said in this proverb; for *2b* does not speak of the honour of wise men, but of kings; the searching out, *2b*, thus does not refer to that which is veiled by God. But since

the honour of God at the same time as the welfare of men, and the honour of the king as well as the welfare of his people, is to be thought of, the proverb states that God and the king promote human welfare in very different ways, — God, by concealing that which sets limits to the knowledge of man, that he may not be uplifted; and the king, by research, which brings out the true state of the matter, and thereby guards the political and social condition against threatening danger, secret injuries, and the ban of offences unatoned for. This proverb, regarding the difference between that which constitutes the honour of God and of the king, is followed by one which refers to that in which the honour of both is alike.

**3 The heavens in height, and the earth in depth,
And the heart of kings are unsearchable.**

Pro. 25: 3. This is a proverb in the priamel-form, vid., p. 11. The *praeambulum* consists of three subjects to which the predicate אִין חֶקֶר [= no searching out] is common. “As it is impossible to search through the heavens and through the earth, so it is also impossible to search the hearts of common men (like the earth), and the hearts of kings (like the heavens)” (Fleischer). The meaning, however, is simple. Three unsearchable things are placed together: the heavens, with reference to their height, stretching into the impenetrable distance; the earth, in respect to its depth, reaching down into the immeasurable abyss; and the heart of kings — it is this third thing which the proverb particularly aims at — which in themselves, and especially with that which goes on in their depths, are impenetrable and unsearchable. The proverb is a warning against the delusion of being flattered by the favour of the king, which may, before one thinks of it, be withdrawn or changed even into the contrary; and a counsel to one to take heed to his words and acts, and to see to it that he is influenced by higher motives than by the fallacious calculation of the impression on the view and disposition of the king. The ל in both cases is the expression of the reverence, as e.g., at 2Ch. 9:22. וְאֶרֶץ, not = וְהָאָרֶץ, but like Isa. 26:19; 65:17, for וְאֶרֶץ, which generally occurs only in the *st. constr.*

Pro. 25: 4, 5. There now follows an emblematic (vid., p. 9) tetrastich:

**4 Take away the dross from silver,
So there is ready a vessel for the goldsmith;**

**5 Take away the wicked from the king,
And his throne is established by righteousness.**

The form הָגוֹ (cf. the *inf. Poal* הִגֵּוּ, Isa. 59:13) is regarded by Schultens as showing a ground-form הִגֵּוּ; but there is also found e.g., עָשׂוּ, whose ground-

form is עָשִׂי; the verb הִגָּה, R. הַג (whence Arab. *hajr, discedere*), cf. הָגָה (whence הִגָּה, *semovit*, 2Sa. 20:13 = Syr. *âwagy*, cf. Arab. *âwjay*, to withhold, to abstain from), signifies to separate, withdraw; here, of the separation of the סִינִיִּים, the refuse, i.e., the dross (vid., regarding the *plena scriptio*, Baer's *krit. Ausg. des Jesaia*, under 1:22); the goldsmith is designated by the word צָרַף, from צָרַף, to turn, change, as he who changes the as yet drossy metal by means of smelting, or by purification in water, into that which is pure. In 5a הִגָּה is, as at Isa. 27: 8, transferred to a process of moral purification; what kind of persons are to be removed from the neighbourhood of the king is shown by Isa. 1:22, 23. Here also (as at Isa. *l.c.*) the emblem or figure of v. 4 is followed in v. 5 by its moral antitype aimed at. The punctuation of both verses is wonderfully fine and excellent. In v. 4, וַיִּצָּא is not pointed וַיִּצָּא, but as the consecutive *modus* וַיִּצָּא; this first part of the proverb refers to a well-known process of art: the dross is separated from the silver (*inf. absol.*, as Pro. 12: 7; 15:22), and so a vessel (utensil) proceeds from the goldsmith, for he manufactures pure silver; the ל is here similarly used as the designation of the subject in the passive, Pro. 13:13; 14:20. In v. 5, on the contrary, וַיִּכּוֹן (וַיִּכּוֹן) is not the punctuation used, but the word is pointed indicatively וַיִּכּוֹן; this second part of the proverb expresses a moral demand (*inf. absol.* in the sense of the imperative, Gesen. § 131, 4b like 17:12, or an optative or concessive conjunction): let the godless be removed, לִפְנֵי מֶלֶךְ, i.e., not from the neighbourhood of the king, for which the words are מִלְּפָנֵי מֶלֶךְ; also not those standing before the king, i.e., in his closest neighbourhood (Ewald, Bertheau); but since, in the absolute, הִגָּה, not an act of another in the interest of the king, but of the king himself, is thought of: let the godless be removed from before the king, i.e., because he administers justice (Hitzig), or more generally: because after that Psalm (101), which is the “mirror of princes,” he does not suffer him to come into his presence. Accordingly, the punctuation is בְּצַדִּיק, not בְּצַדִּיק (Pro. 16:12); because such righteousness is meant as separates the רָשָׁע from it and itself from him, as Isa. 16: 5 (vid., Hitzig), where the punctuation of בְּחֶסֶד denotes that favour towards Moab seeking protection.

Pro. 25: 6, 7. There now follows a second proverb with מֶלֶךְ, as the one just explained was a second with מַלְכִים: a warning against arrogance before kings and nobles.

*6 Display not thyself before the king,
And approach not to the place of the great.*

**7 For better than one say to thee, “Come up hither,”
Than that they humble thee before a prince,
Whom thine eyes had seen.**

The **גְּדֹלִים** are those, like Pro. 18:16, who by virtue of their descent and their office occupy a lofty place of honour in the court and in the state. **נָדִיב** (vid., under Pro. 8:16) is the noble in disposition and the nobleman by birth, a general designation which comprehends the king and the princes. The *Hithpa.* **הִתְהַדָּר** is like the reflex forms Pro. 12: 9; 13: 7, for it signifies to conduct oneself as **הִדָּר** or **נִהְדָּר** (vid., Pro. 20:29), to play the part of one highly distinguished. **עָמַד** has, *6b*, its nearest signification: it denotes, not like **נָצַב**, standing still, but approaching to, e.g., Jer. 7: 2. The reason given in v. 7 harmonizes with the rule of wisdom, Luk. 14:10 f.: better is the saying to thee, i.e., that one say to thee (Ewald, § 304*b*), **עָלָה הִנָּה** (so the *Olewejored* is to be placed), **προσανάβηθι ἀνώτερον** (thus in Luke), than that one humble thee **לִפְנֵי נָדִיב**, not: because of a prince (Hitzig), for **לִפְנֵי** nowhere means either *pro* (Pro. 17:18) or *propter*, but before a prince, so that thou must yield to him (cf. Pro. 14:19), before him whom thine eyes had seen, so that thou art not excused if thou takest up the place appropriate to him. Most interpreters are at a loss to explain this relative. Luther: “which thine eyes must see,” and Schultens: *ut videant oculi tui*. Michaelis, syntactically admissible: *quem videre gestiverunt oculi tui*, viz., to come near to him, according to Bertheau, with the request that he receives some high office. Otherwise Fleischer: before the king by whom thou and thine are seen, so much the more felt is the humiliation when it comes upon one after he has pressed so far forward that he can be perceived by the king. But **נָדִיב** is not specially the king, but any distinguished personage whose place he who has pressed forward has taken up, and from which he must now withdraw when the right possessor of it comes and lays claim to his place. **אֲשֶׁר** is never used in poetry without emphasis. Elsewhere it is equivalent to **ὄντις**, *quippe quem*, here equivalent to **ὄντερ**, *quem quidem*. Thine eyes have seen him in the company, and thou canst say to thyself, this place belongs to him, according to his rank, and not to thee, — the humiliation which thou endurest is thus well deserved, because, with eyes to see, thou wert so blind. The LXX, Syr., Symmachus (who reads *8a*, **לָרֵב**, εἰς πλῆθος), and Jerome, refer the words “whom thine eyes had seen” to the proverb following; but **אֲשֶׁר** does not appropriately belong to the beginning of a proverb, and on the supposition that the word **לָרֵב** is generally adopted, except by Symmachus, they are also heterogeneous to the following proverb:

8 Go not forth hastily to strife,
That it may not be said, “What wilt thou do in the end thereof,
When now thy neighbour bringeth disgrace upon thee?”

9 Art thou striving with thy neighbour? strive with him,
But disclose not the secret of another;

10 That he who heareth it may not despise thee,
And thine evil name depart no more.

Pro. 25: 8-10. Whether **לְרִיב** in **רִיב** is *infin.*, as at Jud. 21:22, or *subst.*, as at 2Ch. 19: 8, is not decided: *ad litigandum* and *ad litem* harmonize. As little may it be said whether in **אַל־תֵּצֵא** [go not forth], a going out to the gate (court of justice), or to the place where he is to be met who is to be called to account, is to be thought of; in no respect is the sense metaphorical: let not thyself transgress the bounds of moderation, *ne te laisse pas emporter*; **יִצֵא לָרֵב** is correlate to **בּוֹא לָרוֹב**, Jud. 21:22. The use of **פֶּן** in 8*b* is unprecedented. Euchel and Löwenstein regard it as an *imper.*: reflect upon it (test it); but **פְּנֵה** does not signify this, and the interjectional **הִם** does not show the possibility of an *imer. Kal פֶּן*, and certainly not **פֶּן** (**פֶּן**). The conj. **פֶּן** is the connecting form of an original *subst.* (= *panj*), which signifies a turning away. It is mostly connected with the future, according to which Nolde, Oetinger, Ewald, and Bertheau explain **מָה** *indefinite*, something, viz., unbecoming. In itself, it may, perhaps, be possible that **פֶּן מָה** was used in the sense of *ne quid* (*Venet. μήποτε τι*); but “to do something,” for “to commit something bad,” is improbable; also in that case we would expect the words to be thus: **תַּעֲשֶׂה מָה פֶּן**. Thus **מָה** will be an interrogative, as at 1Sa. 20:10 (vid., Keil), and the expression is brachylogical: that thou comest not into the situation not to know what thou oughtest to do (Rashi: **פֶּן תְּבֹא לִידֵי לֹא תִדַע מָה לַעֲשׂוֹת**), or much rather anakoluth.; for instead of saying **פֶּן־לֹא תִדַע מָה־לַּעֲשׂוֹת**, the poet, shunning this unusual **לֹא פֶּן**, adopts at once the interrogative form: that it may not be said at the end thereof (viz., of the strife); what wilt thou do? (Umbreit, Stier, Elster, Hitzig, and Zöckler). This extreme perplexity would occur if thy neighbour (with whom thou disputest so eagerly and unjustly) put thee to shame, so that thou standest confounded (**כָּלַם**, properly to hurt, French *blessé*). If now the summons 9*a* follows this warning against going out for the purpose of strife: fight out thy conflict with thy neighbour, then **רִיבְךָ**, set forth with emphasis, denotes not such a strife as one is surprised into, but that into which one is drawn, and the *tuam* in *causam tuam* is accented in so far as 9*b* localizes the strife to the personal relation of the two, and warns against the

drawing in of an אָחַר, i.e., in this case, of a third person: and expose not the secret of another אֶל־תִּגַּל (after *Michlol* 130a, and Ben-Bileam, who places the word under the פִּתְחֵיךָ בַסִּיפִי, is vocalized with *Pathach* on ג, as is Cod. 1294, and elsewhere in correct texts). One ought not to bring forward in a dispute, as material of proof and means of acquittal, secrets entrusted to him by another, or secrets which one knows regarding the position and conduct of another; for such faithlessness and gossiping affix a stigma on him who avails himself of them, in the public estimation, v. 10; that he who hears it may not blame thee (חָסַד = Aram. חֶסֶד, vid., under Pro. 14:34), and the evil report concerning thee continue without recall. Fleischer: *ne infamia tua non recedat* i.e., *nunquam desinat per ora hominum propagari*, with the remark, “in דְּבַהּ, which properly means in stealthy creeping on of the rumour, and in שׁוֹב lies a (Arab.) *tarshyhh*,” i.e., the two ideas stand in an interchangeable relation with a play upon the words: the evil rumour, once put in circulation, will not again retrace its steps; but, on the contrary, as Virgil says:

Mobilitate viget viresque acquirit eundo.

In fact, every other can sooner rehabilitate himself in the public estimation that he who is regarded as a prattler, who can keep no secret, or as one so devoid of character that he makes public what he ought to keep silent, if he can make any use of it in his own interest. In regard to such an one, the words are continually applicable, *hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto*, 20:19. The LXX has, instead of וּדְבַתְךָ 10b, read וּמְרִיבֶתְךָ, and translated it with the addition of a long appendix: “They quarrel, and hostilities will not cease, but will be to thee like death. Kindness and friendship deliver, let these preserve thee, that thou mayest not become one meriting reproaches (Jerome: *ne exprobrabilis fias*), but guard thy ways, εὐσυναλλάκτως.”

Pro. 25:11. The first emblematical distich of this collection now follows:

***11 Golden apples in silver salvers.
A word spoken according to its circumstances.***

The Syr. and Jerome vocalize דְּבַר דְּבַר, and the Targ. דְּבַר דְּבַר; both are admissible, but the figure and that which is represented are not place din so appropriate a relation as by דְּבַר דְּבַר; the wonderfully penetrating expression of the text, which is rendered by the traditional *nikkud*, agrees here with the often occurring דְּבַר (= מְדַבֵּר), also its passive דְּבוֹר. The defective writing is like, e.g., בְּמַח, Psa. 112: 7, and gives no authority to prefer דְּבַר = מְדַבֵּר (Böttcher). That דְּבַר, corresponding to the plur. תְּפִיחוֹי, is not used, arises from this, that דְּבַר is here manifestly not a word without connection,

but a sentence of motive, contents, and aim united. For אֶל-אֲפַנְיוֹ, the meaning of בַּעֲתוֹ presents itself from Pro. 15:23, according to which, among the old interpreters, Symmachus, Jerome, and Luther render “at its time.” *Abulwalid* compared the Arab. *âiffân* (*âibban*, also ‘*iffan*, whence ‘*aly* ‘*iffanihi*, *justo tempore*), which, as Orelli has shown in his *Synon. der Zeitbegriffe*, p. 21 f., comes from the roots *af ab*, to drive (from within) going out, time as consisting of individual moments, the one of which drives on the other, and thus denotes time as a course of succession. One may not hesitate as to the prep. אֶל, for אֲפַנְיִם would, like עֲתוֹת, denote the circumstances, the relations of the time, and אֶל would, as e.g., in אֶל-פִּי and אֶל-דְּבַרְתִּי, have the meaning of *κατά*. But the form אֲפַנְיוֹ, which like חֲפַנְיוֹ, Lev. 16:12, sounds dualistic, appears to oppose this. Hitzig supposes that אֲפַנְיִם may designate the time as a circle, with reference to the two arches projecting in opposite directions, but uniting themselves together; but the circle which time describes runs out from one point, and, moreover, the Arab. names for time *âlaf*, *âifaf*, and the like, which interchange with *âiffan*, show that this does not proceed from the idea of circular motion. Ewald and others take for אֲפַנְיוֹ the meaning of wheels (the *Venet.*, after Kimchi, ἐπὶ τῶν τροχῶν αὐτῆς), whereby the form is to be interpreted as dual of אֲפַן = אֲנַפַן, “a word driven on its wheels,” — so Ewald explains: as the potter quickly and neatly forms a vessel on his wheels, thus a fit and quickly framed word. But דָּבַר signifies to drive cattle and to speak = to cause words to follow one another (cf. Arab. *syâk*, pressing on = flow of words), but not to drive = to fashion in that artisan sense. Otherwise Böttcher, “a word fitly spoken, a pair of wheels perfect in their motion,” to which he compares the common people “in their jesting,” and adduces all kinds of heterogeneous things partly already rejected by Orelli (e.g., the Homeric ἐπιτροχάδην, which is certainly no commendation). But “jesting” is not appropriate here; for what man conceives of human speech as a carriage, one only sometimes compares that of a babbler to a sledge, or says of him that he shoves the cart into the mud. ^{f192}

Is it then thus decided that אֲפַנְיוֹ is a dual? It may be also like אֲשַׁרְיוֹ, the plur. especially in the adverbial expression before us, which readily carried the abbreviation with it (vid., Gesen. *Lehrgebr.* § 134, Anm. 17). On this supposition, Orelli interprets אֲפַן from אֲפַן, to turn, in the sense of turning about, circumstances, and reminds of this, that in the post-bibl. Heb. this word is used as indefinitely as τροπος, e.g., באופן מה, *quodammodo* (vid., Reland’s *Analecta Rabbinica*, 1723, p. 126). This late Talm. usage of the word can, indeed, signify nothing as to the bibl. word; but that אֲפַנְיִם, abbreviated אֲפַנְיִם, can mean circumstances, is warranted by the synon. אֲדוֹת. Aquila

and Theodotion appear to have thus understood it, for their ἐπι ἀρμόζουσιν αὐτῷ, which they substitute for the colourless οὕτως of the LXX, signifies: under the circumstances, in accordance therewith. So Orelli thus rightly defines: “אפנים denote the *âhwâl*, circumstances and conditions, as they form themselves in each turning of time, and those which are ascribed to דבר by the suffix are those to which it is proper, and to which it fits in. Consequently a word is commended which is spoken whenever the precise time arrives to which it is adapted, a word which is thus spoken at its time as well as at its place (van Dyk, *fay mahllah*), and the grace of which is thereby heightened.” Aben Ezra’s explanation, על פנים הראויים, in the approved way, follows the opinion of *Abulwalid* and Parchon, that אפניו is equivalent to פניו (cf. *aly wajhihi, sua ratione*), which is only so far true, that both words are derived from R. פן, to turn.

In the figure, it is questionable whether by תפוחי זהב, apples of gold, or gold- coloured apples, are meant (Luther: as pomegranates and citrons); thus oranges are meant, as at Zec. 4:12. הנהב denotes golden oil. Since כסף, besides, signifies a metallic substance, one appears to be under the necessity of thinking of apples of gold; cf. the brazen pomegranates. But (1) apples of gold of natural size and massiveness are obviously too great to make it probable that such artistic productions are meant; (2) the material of the emblem is usually not of less value than that of which it is the emblem (Fleischer); (3) the Scriptures are fond of comparing words with flowers and fruits, Pro. 10:31; 12:14; 13: 2; 18:20, and to the essence of the word which is rooted in the spirit, and buds and grows up to maturity through the mouth and the lips, the comparison with natural fruits corresponds better in any case than with artificial. Thus, then, we interpret “golden apples” as the poetic name for oranges, *aurea mala*, the Indian name of which with reference to *or* (gold) was changed into the French name *orange*, as our *pomeranze* is equivalent to *pomum aurantium*. משביות is the plur. of משבית, already explained, Pro. 18:11; the word is connected neither with שָׁבַד, to twist, wreath (Ewald, with most Jewish interpreters^{f193}), nor with שָׁבַה, to pierce, *infigere* (Redslob, vid., under Psa. 73: 7); it signifies medal or ornament, from שָׁבַה, to behold (cf. שְׁבִיחַ, *θέα* = *θέαμα*, Isa. 2: 6), here a vessel which is a delight to the eyes. In general the *Venet.* rightly, ἐν μορφώμασιν ἀργύρου; Symmachus and Theodotion, more in accordance with the fundamental idea, ἐν περιβλέπτους ἀργύρου; the Syr. and Targ. specially: in vessels of embossed work (נְגִידִי, from נָגַד, to draw, to extend); yet more specially the LXX, ἐν ὀρμίσκῳ σαρδίου, on a chain of cornelian stone, for which, perhaps, ἐν φορμίσκῳ (Jäger) ἀργυρίου, in a little silver basket, is the original phrase. Aquila, after

Bereschith rabba c. 93, translates by *μῆλα χρύσου ἐν δίσκοις ἀργυρίου*.

Jerome: *in lectis argenteis*, appears to have fallen into the error of taking *מִשְׁכָּב* for *מִשְׁכָּב*, *lectus*. Hitzig here emends a self-made *ἄπαξ λεγ.* Luther's "golden apples in silver baskets" is to be preferred. ^{f194}

A piece of sculpture which represents fruit by golden little disks or points within groups of leaves is not meant, — for the proverb does not speak of such pretty little apples, — but golden oranges are meant. A word in accordance with the circumstances which occasion it, is like golden oranges which are handed round in silver salvers or on silver waiters. Such a word is, as adopting another figure we might say, like a well-executed picture, and the situation into which it appropriately fits is like its elegant frame. The comparison with fruit is, however, more significant; it designates the right word as a delightful gift, in a way which heightens its impression and its influences.

Pro. 25:12. Another proverb continues the commendation of the effective word; for it represents, in emblem, the interchangeable relation of speaker and hearer:

***A golden earring and an ornament of fine gold —
A wise preacher to an ear that heareth;***

i.e., as the former two ornaments form a beautiful *ensemble*, so the latter two, the wise preacher of morality and an attentive ear, form a harmonious whole: *אָל*, down upon, is explained by Deu. 32: 2. *נֶזֶם*, at 11:12, standing along with *בָּאָרְךָ*, meant a ring for the nose; but here, as elsewhere, it means an earring (LXX, Jerome, *Venet.*), translated by the Syr. and Targ. by *קְדָשָׁא*, because it serves as a talisman. A ring for the nose ^{f195} cannot also be here thought of, because this ornament is an emblem of the attentive ear: willingly accepted chastisement or instruction is an ear-ornament to him who hears (Stier). But the gift of the wise preacher, which consists in rightly dividing the word of truth, 2Ti. 2:15, is as an ornament for the neck or the breast *לְהַלְיָהּ* (= Arab. *khaly*, fem. *הַלְיָהּ* = *hilyt*), of fine gold (*בְּתָם*, jewel, then particularly precious gold, from *בְּתָם*, Arab. *katam*, *recondere*). ^{f196}

The *Venet.* well: *κόσμος ἀπυροχρύσου* (fine gold); on the contrary (perhaps in want of another name for gold), *בְּתָם* is translated, by the LXX and Syr., by sardine; by the Targ., by emerald; and by Jerome, by *margaritum*. ^{f197}

It looks well when two stand together, the one of whom has golden earrings, and the other wears a yet more precious golden necklace — such a beautiful mutual relationship is formed by a wise speaker and a hearer who listens to his admonitions.

Pro. 25:13. The following comparative tristich refers to faithful service rendered by words:

*Like the coolness of snow on a harvest day
Is a faithful messenger to them that send him:
He refresheth the soul of his master.*

The coolness (צָנָה from צָנַן, צָנַן, to be cool) of snow is not that of a fall of snow, which in the time of harvest would be a calamity, but of drink cooled with snow, which was brought from Lebanon or elsewhere, from the clefts of the rocks; the peasants of Damascus store up the winter's snow in a cleft of the mountains, and convey it in the warm months to Damascus and the coast towns. Such a refreshment is a faithful messenger (vid., regarding צִיר, Pro. 13:17, here following קָצִיר as a kind of echo) to them that send him (vid., regarding this plur. at Pro. 10:26, cf. Pro. 22:21); he refreshes, namely (א explicativum, as e.g., Eze. 18:19, *etenim filius*, like the א *et quidem*, Mal. 1:11, different from the א of conditional clause Pro. 23: 3), the soul of his master; for the answer which he brings to his master refreshes him, as does a drink of snow-cooled water on a hot harvest day.

Pro. 25:14. This proverb relates to the word which promises much, but remains unaccomplished:

*Clouds and wind, and yet no rain —
A man who boasteth with a false gift.*

Incorrectly the LXX and Targ. refer the predicate contained in the concluding word of the first line to all the three subjects; and equally incorrectly Hitzig, with Heidenheim, interprets מַתַּת שֶׁקֶר, of a gift that has been received of which one boasts, although it is in reality of no value, because by a lying promise a gift is not at all obtained. But as לֶחֶם כּוֹזְבִים, Pro. 23: 3, is bread which, as it were, deceives him who eats it, so מַתַּת שֶׁקֶר is a gift which amounts to a lie, i.e., a deceitful pretence. Rightly Jerome: *vir gloriosus et promissa non complens*. In the Arab. *ṣaliḍ*, which Fleischer compares, the figure 14a and its counterpart 14b are amalgamated, for this word signifies both a boaster and a cloud, which is, as it were, boastful, which thunders much, but rains only sparsely or not at all. Similar is the Arab. *khullab*, clouds which send forth lightning, and which thunder, but yet give no rain; we say to one, *magno promissor hiatu*: thou art (Arab.) *kabaraḡn khullabin*, i.e., as Lane translates it: "Thou art only like lightning with which is no rain." Schultens refers to this proverbial Arabic, *fulmen nubis infecundae*. Liberality is called (Arab.) *nadnay*, as a watering, cf. Pro. 11:25. The proverb belongs to this

ἀρκοῦν σοι), i.e., as much as appeases thine appetite, that thou mayest not become surfeited and vomit it out (וְהִקְשִׁיתוּ with *Tsere*, and שׁ quiesc., as at 2Sa. 14:10; vid., *Michlol* 116a, and Parchon under שׁ קוּ). Fleischer, Ewald, Hitzig, and others, place vv. 16 and 17 together, so as to form an emblematic tetrastich; but he who is surfeited is certainly, in v. 16, he who willingly enjoys, and in 17, he to whom it is given to enjoy without his will; and is not, then, v. 16 a sentence complete in itself in meaning? That it is not to be understood in a purely dietetic sense (although thus interpreted it is a rule not to be despised), is self-evident. As one can suffer injury from the noblest of food if he overload his stomach therewith, so in the sphere of science, instruction, edification, there is an injurious overloading of the mind; we ought to measure what we receive by our spiritual want, the right distribution of enjoyment and labour, and the degree of our ability to change it *in succum et sanguinem*, — else it at last awakens in us dislike, and becomes an evil to us.

Pro. 25:17. This proverb is of a kindred character to the foregoing. “If thy comrade eats honey,” says an Arabic proverb quoted by Hitzig, “do not lick it all up.” But the emblem of honey is not continued in this verse:

***Make rare thy foot in thy neighbour’s house,
Lest he be satiated with thee, and hate thee.***

To make one’s foot rare or dear from a neighbour’s house is equivalent to: to enter it seldom, and not too frequently; הִזְקַר includes in itself the idea of keeping at a distance (Targ. בְּלֵה רִגְלֶךָ; Symmachus, ὑπόστειλον; and another: φίμωσον πόδα σου), and מִן has the sense of the Arab. ‘an, and is not the comparative, as at Isa. 13:12: regard thy visit dearer than the house of a neighbour (Heidenheim). The proverb also is significant as to the relation of friend to friend, whose reciprocal love may be turned into hatred by too much intercourse and too great fondness. But רַעֵךְ is including a friend, any one with whom we stand in any kind of intercourse. “Let him who seeks to be of esteem,” says a German proverb, “come seldom;” and that may be said with reference to him whom his heart draws to another, and also to him who would be of use to another by drawing him out of the false way and guiding on the right path, — a showing of esteem, a confirming of love by visiting, should not degenerate into forwardness which appears as burdensome servility, as indiscreet self-enjoyment; nor into a restless impetuosity, which seeks at once to gain by force that which one should allow gradually to ripen.

Pro. 25:18-22. This group of proverbs has the word רַע in each of them, connecting them together. The first of the group represents a false tongue:

**18 A hammer, and a sword, and a sharp arrow —
A man that beareth false witness against his neighbour.**

An emblematic, or, as we might also say, an iconological proverb; for 18a is a *quodlibet* of instruments of murder, and 18b is the subscription under it: that which these weapons of murder accomplish, is done to his neighbour by a man who bears false witness against him — he ruins his estate, takes away his honour, but yet more: he murders him, at one time more grossly, at another time with more refinement; at one time slowly, at another time more quickly. מפיץ, from פוץ, is equivalent to מפץ, and מפץ from נפץ; the Syr. and Targ. have instead פדועא (פדיעא) from פדע = פצע; the word פריעא, on which Hitzig builds a conjecture, is an error of transcription (vid., Lagarde and Levy). The expression, 18b, is from the decalogue, Exo. 20:16; Deu. 5:17. It is for the most part translated the same here as there: he who speaks against his neighbour as a false witness. But rightly the LXX, Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther: false testimony. As אל signifies both that which is mighty = power, and Him who is mighty = God, so עד signifies both him who bears testimony and the testimony that is borne, properly that which repeats itself and thereby strengthens itself; accordingly we say ענה עד, to give testimony in reply, — viz. to the judge who asks, — or generally to offer testimony (even unasked); as well as ענה לעד, Deu. 31:21, i.e., as evidence (Jerome, *pro testimonio*). The prep. ב with this ענה has always the meaning of *contra*, also at 1Sa. 12: 3; Gen. 30:33 is, however, open to question.

**19 A worthless tooth and an unsteady foot —
Trust in a faithless man in the day of need.**

Pro. 25:19. The form רעה (with *Mercha* on the antepenult), Isa. 29:19, takes the place of an *inf. absol.*; רעה here (about the tone syllable of which *Dechî* does not decide, thus without doubt *Milra*) is certainly not a subst.: tooth of breaking (Ges.); for how strange such a designation of a worthless tooth! שן is indeed mas. in 1Sa. 14: 5, but it can also be used as fem., as רגל, which is for the most part fem., also occurs as mas., Göttche. § 650. Böttcher, in the new *Aehrenlese*, and in the *Lehrbuch*, takes רעה as fem. of an adj. רא, after the form חל; but חל is not an adj., and does not form a fem., although it means not merely profanity, but that which is profane; this is true also of the Aram. חול; for חולתא, Est. 2: 9, Targ., is a female name mistaken by Buxtorf. Are we then to read רעה, with Hitzig, after the LXX? — an unimportant change. We interpret the traditional רעה, with Fleischer, as derived from רועעה, from רועא, breaking to pieces (crumbling), in an intransitive sense. The form

מוֹעֵדָה is also difficult. Böttcher regards it as also, e.g., Aben Ezra after the example of Gecatilia as *part. Kal.* = מוֹעֵדָה, “only on account of the pausal tone and the combination of the two letters מע with *û* instead of *ô*.” But this vocal change, with its reasons, is merely imaginary. מוֹעֵדָה is the *part. Pual*, with the preformative מ struck out, Ewald 169*d*. The objection that the *part. Pual* should be מִמְעֵד, after the form מִבְּאֵר, does not prove anything to the contrary; for מוֹעֵדָה cannot be the fem. so as not to coincide with the fem. of the *part. Kal.*, cf. besides to the long *û* the form without the Dagesh יוֹקְשִׁים, Ecc. 9:12 = מִיִּקְשִׁים (Arnheim, *Gramm.* p. 139). רֵגֶל מוֹעֵדָה is a leg that has become tottering, trembling. He who in a time of need makes a faithless man his ground of confidence, is like one who seeks to bite with a broken tooth, and which he finally crushes, and one who supports himself on a shaking leg, and thus stumbles and falls. The gen. connection מִבְּטַח בּוֹגֵד signifies either the ground of confidence consisting in a faithless man, or the confidence place *din* one who is faithless. But, after the Masora, we are to read here, as at Psa. 65: 6, מִבְּטַח, which *Michlol* 184*a* also confirms, and as it is also found in the Venice 1525, Basel 1619, and in Norzi. This מִבְּטַח is constr. according to Kimchi, notwithstanding the *Kametz*; as also מִשְׁקָל, Ezr. 8:30 (after *Abulwalid*, Kimchi, and Norzi). In this passage before us, מִבְּטַח בּוֹגֵד may signify a deceitful ground of confidence (cf. Hab. 2: 5), but the two other passages present a genit. connection of the words. We must thus suppose that the ׀ of מִבְּטַח and מִשְׁקָל, in these three passages, is regarded as fixed, like the *â* of the form (Arab.) *mif^ââl*.

The above proverb, which connects itself with v. 18, not only by the sound רע, but also by שן, which is assonant with שנון, is followed by another with the catchword רע:

**20 He that layeth aside his coat on a day of frost, vinegar on nitre,
And he who welcomes with songs a dejected heart.**

Pro. 25:20. Is not this intelligible, sensible, ingenious? All these three things are wrong. The first is as wrong as the second, and the third, which the proverb has in view, is morally wrong, for one ought to weep with those that weep, Rom. 12:15; he, on the contrary, who laughs among those who weep, is, on the most favourable judgment, a fool. That which is wrong in 20*a*, according to Böttcher in the *Aehrenlese*, 1849, consists in this, that one in severe cold puts on a fine garment. As if there were not garments which are at the same time beautiful, and keep warm? In the new *Aehrenlese* he prefers the reading מִשְׁנָה: if one changes his coat. But that surely he might well enough do, if the one

were warmer than the other! Is it then impossible that **מַעֲדָה**, in the connection, means *transire faciens = removens*? The *Kal* **עָדָה**, *tarnsiit*, occurs at Job. 28: 8. So also, in the poetic style. **הַעֲדָה** might be used in the sense of the Aram. **אֲעָדָה**. Rightly Aquila, Symmachus, **περιαιρω̄ν**; the *Venet.* better, **ἀφαιρούμενος** (Mid.). **בִּגְד** is an overcoat or mantle, so called from covering, as **לְבוּשׁ** (R. **ל.ב.**, to fasten, fix), the garment lying next the body, vid., at Psa. 22:19. Thus, as it is foolish to lay off upper clothing on a frosty day, so it is foolish also to pour vinegar on nitre; carbonic acid nitre, whether it be mineral (which may be here thought of) or vegetable, is dissolved in water, and serves diverse purposes (vid., under Isa. 1:25); but if one pours vinegar on it, it is destroyed. **לְבַדָּע** ^{f198} is, at Pro. 26:23 and elsewhere, a heart morally bad, here a heart badly disposed, one inclined to that which is evil; for **שֵׁר שִׁיר** is the contrast of **קוֹנֵן קִינָה**, and always the consequence of a disposition joyfully excited; the inconsistency lies in this, that one thinks to cheer a sorrowful heart by merry singing, if the singing has an object, and is not much more the reckless expression of an animated pleasure in view of the sad condition of another. **שִׁיר אֵל** signifies, as at Job. 33:27, to sing to any one, to address him in singing; cf. **דְּבַר אֵל**, Jer. 6:10, and particularly **אֵל-לֵב**, Hos. 2:16; Isa. 40: 2. The **ב** of **בְּשִׁירִים** is neither the partitive, Pro. 9: 5, nor the transitive, Pro. 20:30, but the instrumental; for, as e.g., at Exo. 7:20, the obj. of the action is thought of as its means (Ges. § 138, Anm. 3*); one sings “with songs,” for definite songs underlie his singing. The LXX, which the Syr., Targ., and Jerome more or less follow, has formed from this proverb one quite different: “As vinegar is hurtful to a wound, so an injury to the body makes the heart sorrowful; as the moth in clothes, and the worm in wood, so the sorrow of a man injures his heart.” The wisdom of this pair of proverbs is not worth much, and after all inquiry little or nothing comes of it. The Targ. at least preserves the figure *20b*: as he who pours vinegar (Syr. *chalo*) on nitre; the Peshito, however, and here and there also the Targum, has *jathro* (arrow-string) instead of *methro* (nitre). Hitzig adopts this, and changes the tristich into the distich:

***He that meeteth archers with arrow on the string,
Is like him who singeth songs with a sad heart.***

The Hebrew of this proverb of Hitzig’s (**מְרִים קָרָה אֵל-יָתֶר**) is unhebraic, the meaning dark as an oracle, and its moral contents *nil*.

***21 If thine enemy hunger, feed him with bread;
And if he thirst, give him water to drink.***

***22 For thereby thou heapest burning coals on his head,
And Jahve will recompense it to thee.***

Pro. 25:21, 22. The translation of this proverb by the LXX is without fault; Paul cites therefrom Rom. 12:20. The participial construction of 22a, the LXX, rightly estimating it, thus renders: for, doing this, thou shalt heap coals on his head. The expression, “thou shalt heap” (σωρεύσεις), is also appropriate; for הִתְהַיָּהוּ certainly means first only to fetch or bring fire (vid., Pro. 6:27); but here, by virtue of the *constructio praegnans* with עָל, to fetch, and hence to heap up, — to pile upon. Burning pain, as commonly observed, is the figure of burning shame, on account of undeserved kindness shown by an enemy (Fleischer). But how burning coals heaped on the head can denote burning shame, is not to be perceived, for the latter is a burning on the cheeks; wherefore Hitzig and Rosenmüller explain: thou wilt thus bring on him the greatest pain, and appease thy vengeance, while at the same time Jahve will reward thy generosity. Now we say, indeed, that he who rewards evil with good takes the noblest revenge; but if this doing of good proceed from a revengeful aim, and is intended sensibly to humble an adversary, then it loses all its moral worth, and is changed into selfish, malicious wickedness. Must the proverb then be understood in this ignoble sense? The Scriptures elsewhere say that guilt and punishment are laid on the head of any one when he is made to experience and to bear them. Chrysostom and others therefore explain after Psa. 140:10 and similar passages, but thereby the proverb is morally falsified, and v. 22 accords with v. 21, which counsels not to the avenging of oneself, but to the requital of evil with good. The burning of coals laid on the head must be a painful but wholesome consequence; it is a figure of self-accusing repentance (Augustine, Zöckler), for the producing of which the showing of good to an enemy is a noble motive. That God rewards such magnanimity may not be the special motive; but this view might contribute to it, for otherwise such promises of God as Isa. 58: 8-12 were without moral right. The proverb also requires one to show himself gentle and liberal toward a needy enemy, and present a twofold reason for this: first, that thereby his injustice is brought home to his conscience; and, secondly, that thus God is well-pleased in such practical love toward an enemy, and will reward it; — by such conduct, apart from the performance of a law grounded in our moral nature, one advances the happiness of his neighbour and his own.

The next group of proverbs extends from v. 23 to v. 28.

***23 Wind from the north produceth rain;
And a secret tongue a troubled countenance.***

Pro. 25:23. The north is called צָפוֹן, from צָפַן, to conceal, from the firmament darkening itself for a longer time, and more easily, like the old Persian *apâkhtara*, as (so it appears) the starless, and, like *aquilo*, the north wind, as bringing forward the black clouds. But properly the “fathers of rain”

are, in Syria, the west and the south-west; and so little can צפון here mean the pure north wind, that Jerome, who knew from his own experience the changes of weather in Palestine, helps himself, after Symmachus (διαλύει βροχήν), with a *quid pro quo* out of the difficulty: *ventus aquilo dissipat pluvias*; the Jewish interpreters (Aben Ezra, Joseph Kimchi, and Meîri) also thus explain, for they connect together תחולל, in the meaning תמנע, with the unintelligible הלילה (far be it!). But צפון may also, perhaps like ζόφος (*Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xxi. 600 f.), standing not without connection therewith, denote the northwest; and probably the proverb emphasized the northern direction of the compass, because, according to the intention of the similitude, he seeks to designate such rain as is associated with raw, icy-cold weather, as the north wind (Pro. 27:16, LXX, Sir. 43:20) brings along with it. The names of the winds are *gen. fem.*, e.g., Isa. 43: 6. תחולל (Aquila, ὠδίνει; cf. 8:24, ὠδινήθη) has in Codd., e.g., the *Jaman.*, the tone on the penult., and with *Tsere Metheg (Thorath Emeth*, p. 21) serving as העמדה. So also the Arab. *nataj* is used of the wind, as helping the birth of the rain-clouds. Manifestly פנים נועמים, countenances manifesting extreme displeasure (vid., the *Kal נאם*, Pro. 24:24), are compared to rain. With justice Hitzig renders פנים, as e.g., Joh. 2: 6, in the plur. sense; because, for the influence which the tongue slandering in secret (Psa. 101: 5) has on the slandered, the “sorrowful countenance” would not be so characteristic as for the influence which it exercises on the mutual relationships of men: the secret babler, the confidential communication throwing suspicion, now on this one and now on that one, behind their backs, excites men against one another, so that one shows to another a countenance in which deep displeasure and suspicion express themselves.

**24 Better to sit on the top of a roof,
Than a quarrelsome woman and a house in common.**

Pro. 25:24. A repetition of Pro. 21: 9.

**25 Fresh water to a thirsty soul;
And good news from a far country.**

Pro. 25:25. Vid., regarding the form of this proverb, p. 8; we have a similar proverb regarding the influence of good news at Pro. 15:30. Fresh cold water is called at Jer. 18:14 מים קרים; vid., regarding קר, Pro. 18:27. “עֵינַי, cogn. עֵינַי, and עוֹרַי, properly to become darkened, therefore figuratively like (Arab.) *gushiya* ‘alyh, to become faint, to become feeble unto death, of the darkness which spreads itself over the eyes” (Fleischer).

This proverb, with the figure of “fresh water,” is now followed by one with the figure of a “fountain”:

**26 A troubled fountain and a ruined spring —
A righteous man yielding to a godless man.**

Pro. 25:26. For the most part, in מַטְּ one thinks of a yielding in consequence of being forced. Thus e.g., Fleischer: as a troubled ruined spring is a misfortune for the people who drink out of it, or draw from it, so is it a misfortune for the surrounding of the righteous, when he is driven from his dwelling or his possession by an unrighteous man. And it is true: the righteous can be compared to a well (מַעֵין, well-spring, from אֵין, a well, as an eye of the earth, and מַקוֹר, fountain, from קוֹר, R. קו, בר, to round out, to dig out), with reference to the blessing which flows from it to its surroundings (cf. Pro. 10:11 and Joh. 7:38). But the words “yielding to” (contrast “stood before,” 2Ki. 10: 4, or Jos. 7:12), in the phrase “yielding to the godless,” may be understood of a spontaneous as well as of a constrained, forced, wavering and yielding, as the expression in the Psalm בַּל־אֲמוֹט [non movebor, Psa. 10: 6] affirms the certainty of being neither inwardly nor outwardly ever moved or shaken. The righteous shall stand fast and strong in God without fearing the godless (Isa. 51:12 f.), unmoveable and firm as a brazen wall (Jer. 1:17 f.). If, however, he is wearied with resistance, and from the fear of man, or the desire to please man, or from a false love of peace he yields before it, and so gives way, — then he becomes like to a troubled fountain (רַפְּטָה, cogn. רָמַס, Eze. 34:18; Isa. 41:25; Jerome: *fans turbatus pede*), a ruined spring; his character, hitherto pure, is now corrupted by his own guilt, and now far from being a blessing to others, his wavering is a cause of sorrow to the righteous, and an offence to the weak — he is useful no longer, but only injurious. Rightly Lagarde: “The verse, one of the most profound of the whole book, does not speak of the misfortunate, but of the fall of the righteous, whose sin compromises the holy cause which he serves, 2Sa. 12:14.” Thus also e.g., Löwenstein, with reference to the proverb *Sanhedrin* 92b: also in the time of danger let not a man disown his honour. Bachja, in his *Ethics*, referring to this figure, 26a, thinks of the possibility of restoration: the righteous wavers only for the moment, but at last he comes right (מתמוטט ועולה). But this interpretation of the figure destroys the point of the proverb.

Pro. 25:27. This verse, as it stands, is scarcely to be understood. The *Venet.* translates 27b literally: ἔρευνά τε δόξα αὐτῶν δόξα; but what is the reference of this כְּבֹדָם? Euchel and others refer it to men, for they translate: “to set a limit to the glory of man is true glory;” but the “glory of man” is denoted by the phrase כְּבֹד אָדָם, not by כְּבֹדָם; and, besides, חֶקֶר does not mean

measure and limit. Oetinger explains: “To eat too much honey is not good; whereas the searching after their glory, viz., of pleasant and praiseworthy things, which are likened to honey, is glory, cannot be too much done, and is never without utility and honour;” but how can כְּבֹדִים be of the same meaning as כְּבֹד הַדְּבָרִים אֲשֶׁר or הַנִּמְשָׁלִים בְּדָבָר — such an abbreviation of the expression is impossible. Schultens, according to Rashi: *vestigatio gravitatis eorum est gravitas*, i.e., the searching out of their difficulty is a trouble; better Vitringa (since כְּבֹד nowhere occurs in this sense of *gravitas molesta ac pondere oppressura*): *investigatio praestantiae eorum est gloriosa*; but Vitringa, in order to gain a connection to 27a, needs to introduce *etiamsi*, and in both explanations the reference of the כְּבֹדִים is imaginary, and it by no means lies near, since the Scripture uses the word כְּבֹד of God, and His kingdom and name, but never of His law or His revelation. Thus also is an argument against Bertheau, who translates: the searching out of their glory (viz., of the divine law and revelation) is a burden, a strenuous occupation of the mind, since חֶקֶר does not in itself mean searching out, and is equivocally, even unintelligibly, expressed, since כְּבֹד denotes, it is true, here and there, a great multitude, but never a burden (as כְּבֹד). The thought which Jerome finds in 27b: *qui scrutator est majestatis opprimetur a gloria*, is judicious, and connects itself synonym. with 27a; but such a thought is unwarranted, for he disregards the suff. of כְּבֹדִים, and renders כְּבֹד in the sense of difficulty (oppression). Or should it perhaps be vocalized כְּבֹדִים (Syr., Targ., Theodotion, *δεδοξασμένα* = (נְכִבְדוֹת)? Thus vocalized, Umbreit renders it in the sense of *honores*; Elster and Zöckler in the sense of *difficultates (difficilia)*; but this plur., neither the biblical, nor, so far as I know, the post-bibl. usage of the word has ever adopted. However, the sense of the proverb which Elster and Zöckler gain is certainly that which is aimed at. We accordingly translate:

***To surfeit oneself in eating honey is not good,
But as an inquirer to enter on what is difficult is honour.***

We read כְּבֹדִים instead of כְּבֹדִים. This change commends itself far more than כְּבֹד מִכְּבֹד (וְחֶקֶר), according to which Gesenius explains: *nimum studium honoris est sine honore* — impossible, for חֶקֶר does not signify *nimum studium*, in the sense of striving, but only that of inquiry: one strives after honour, but does not study it. Hitzig and Ewald, after the example of J. D. Michaelis, Arnoldi, and Ziegler, betake themselves therefore to the Arabic; Ewald explains, for he leaves the text unchanged: “To despise their honour (that is, of men) is honour (true, real honour);” Hitzig, for he changes the text like Gesenius: “To despise honour is more than honour,” with the ingenious

remark: To obtain an order [*insigne ordinis*] is an honour, but not to wear it then for the first time is its *bouquet*. Nowhere any trace either in Hebrew or in Aramaic is to be found of the verb חָקַר, to despise (to be despised), and so it must here remain without example.^{f199}

Nor have we any need of it. The change of כְּבֹדָם into כְּבֹדֵם is enough. The proverb is an antithetic distich; 27a warns against inordinate longing after enjoyments, 27b praises earnest labour. Instead of דְּבַשׁ הַרְבּוֹת, if honey in the mass were intended, the words would have been דְּבַשׁ הַרְבֵּה (Ecc. 5:11; 1Ki. 10:10), or at least הַרְבּוֹת דְּבַשׁ (Amo. 4: 9); הַרְבּוֹת can only be a *n. actionis*, and אָכַל דְּבַשׁ its inverted object (cf. Jer. 9: 4), as Böttcher has discerned: to make much of the eating of honey, to do much therein is not good (cf. v. 16). In 27b Luther also partly hits on the correct rendering: “and he who searches into difficult things, to him it is too difficulty,” for which it ought to be said: to him it is an honour. כְּבֹדֵם, viz., דְּבָרִים, signifies difficult things, as רֵיקִים, Pro. 12:11, vain things. The Heb. כְּבֹד, however, never means difficult to be understood or comprehended (although more modern lexicons say this),^{f200} but always only burdensome and heavy, *gravis*, not *difficilis*. כְּבֹדֵם are also things of which the חֲקִיר, i.e., the fundamental searching into them (Pro. 18:17; 25: 2 f.), costs an earnest effort, which perhaps, according to the first impression, appears to surpass the available strength (cf. Exo. 18:18). To overdo oneself in eating honey is not good; on the contrary, the searching into difficult subjects is nothing less than an eating of honey, but an honour. There is here a *paronomasia*. Fleischer translates it: *explorare gravia grave est*; but we render *grave est* not in the sense of *molestiam creat*, but *gravitatem parit* (weight = respect, honour).

Pro. 25:28. This verse, counselling restraint as to the spirit, is connected with the foregoing, which counsels to self-control as to enjoyment:

***A city broken through, now without walls —
A man without self-control over his spirit.***

A “city broken down” is one whose wall is “broken,” 2Ch. 32: 5, whether it has met with breaches (פְּרָצִים), or is wholly broken; in the former case also the city is incapable of being defended, and it is all one as if it had no wall. Such a city is like a man “who hath no control over his own spirit” (for the accentuation of the Heb. words here, vid., *Thorath Emeth*, p. 10): *cujus spiritui nulla cohibitio* (Schultens), i.e., *qui animum suum cohibere non potest* (Fleischer: עָצַר, R. צָר, to press together, to oppress, and thereby to hold back). As such a city can be plundered and laid waste without trouble, so a man who knows not to hold in check his desires and affections is in constant

danger of blindly following the impulse of his unbridled sensuality, and of being hurried forward to outbreaks of passion, and thus of bringing unhappiness upon himself. There are sensual passions (e.g., drunkenness), intellectual (e.g., ambition), mingled (e.g., revenge); but in all of these a false *ego* rules, which, instead of being held down by the true and better *ego*, rises to unbounded supremacy. ^{f201}

Therefore the expression used is not לִנְפֶשׁוֹ, but לְרוּחוֹ; desire has its seat in the soul, but in the spirit it grows into passion, which in the root of all its diversities is selfishness (*Psychol.* p. 199); self-control is accordingly the ruling of the spirit, i.e., the restraining (keeping down) of the false enslaved ego-life by the true and free, and powerful in God Himself.

CHAPTER 26

There now follows a group of eleven proverbs of the fool; only the first of the group has after it a proverb of different contents, but of similar form:

*As snow in summer, and rain in harvest;
So honour befitteth not a fool.*

Pro. 26: 1. If there is snow in high summer (קִיץ, to be glowing hot), it is contrary to nature; and if there is rain in harvest, it is (according to the alternations of the weather in Palestine) contrary to what is usually the case, and is a hindrance to the ingathering of the fruits of the field. Even so a fool and respect, or a place of honour, are incongruous things; honour will only injure him (as according to Pro. 19:10, luxury); he will make unjust use of it, and draw false conclusions from it; it will strengthen him in his folly, and only increase it. נֶאֱאָה (= נֶאֱאָה) is the adj. to the *Pil.* נֶאֱאָה, Psa. 93: 5 (plur. נֶאֱאָה); נֶאֱאָה, Pro. 19:10, and נֶאֱאָה, Pro. 17: 7, are also masc. and fem. of the adj., according to which, that which is said under Pro. 19:10 is to be corrected. Symmachus and Theodotion have translated οὐκ ἔπρεψεν, and have therefore read נֶאֱאָה. The root word is נֶאֱאָה (as שָׁחָה to שָׁחָה) = נֶאֱאָה, to aim at something (vid., Hupfeld under Psa. 23: 2).

Pro. 26: 2. This verse is formed quite in the same way as the preceding:

*As the sparrow in its fluttering, as the swallow in its flying,
So the curse that is groundless: it cometh not.*

This passage is one of those fifteen (vid., under Psa. 100: 3) in which the ל of the text is changed by the *Kerî* into לו; the Talm., Midrash, and Sohar refer this לו partly to him who utters the curse himself, against whom also, if he is a judge, such inconsiderate cursing becomes an accusation by God; partly to him

who is cursed, for they read from the proverb that the curse of a private person also (הַדְּיוּטָ, ἰδιώτης) is not wont to fall to the ground, and that therefore one ought to be on his guard against giving any occasion for it (vid., Norzi). But Aben Ezra supposes that לֹא and לוֹ interchange, as much as to say that the undeserved curse falls on him (לוֹ) who curses, and does not fall (לֹא) on him who is cursed. The figures in 2a harmonize only with לֹא, according to which the LXX, the Syr., Targ., Venet., and Luther (against Jerome) translate, for the principal matter, that the sparrow and the swallow, although flying out (Pro. 27: 8), return home again to their nest (Rabag), would be left out of view in the comparison by לוֹ. This emphasizes the fluttering and flying, and is intended to affirm that a groundless curse is a פֶּרֶחַ בְּאֵיִר, aimless, i.e., a thing hovering in the air, that it fails and does not take effect. Most interpreters explain the two *Lameds* as declaring the destination: *ut passer* (sc. *natus est*) *ad vagandum*, as the sparrow, through necessity of nature, roves about... (Fleischer). But from Pro. 25: 3 it is evident that the *Lamed* in both cases declares the reference or the point of comparison: as the sparrow in respect to its fluttering about, etc. The names of the two birds are, according to Aben Ezra, like dreams without a meaning; but the Romanic exposition explains rightly צְפוּר by *passereau*, and דְּרוֹר by *hirondelle*, for צְפוּר (Arab. *uṣfuwr*), twitterer, designates at least preferably the sparrow, and דְּרוֹר the swallow, from its flight shooting straight out, as it were radiating (vid., under Psa. 84: 4); the name of the sparrow, *dūrī* (found in courtyards), which Wetstein, after Saadia, compares to דְּרוֹר, is etymologically different. ^{f202}

Regarding חָנָם, vid., under Pro. 24:28. Rightly the accentuation separates the words rendered, “so the curse undeserved” (קָלִילָה, after Kimchi, *Michlol* 79b, קָלִילָה), from those which follow; לֹא תָבֵא is the explication of כֵּן: thus hovering in the air is a groundless curse — it does not come (בֹּא, like e.g., Jos. 21:43). After this proverb, which is formed like v. 1, the series now returns to the “fool.”

3 A whip for the horse, a bridle for the ass, And a rod for the back of fools.

Pro. 26: 3. J. D. Michaelis supposes that the order should be reversed: a bridle for the horse, a whip for the ass; but Arnoldi has here discovered the figure of speech *merismus* (cf. Pro. 10: 1); and Hitzig, in the manner of the division, the rhythmical reason of the combination (cf. וְהָם וְיָפֶתָה for וְהָם וְיָפֶתָה): whip and bridle belong to both, for one whips a horse (Neh. 3: 2) and also bridles him; one bridles an ass (Psa. 32: 9) and also whips him

(Num. 22:28 f.). As whip and bridle are both serviceable and necessary, so also serviceable and necessary is a rod, לִגְוֹן בְּסִילִים, Pro. 10:13; 19:29.

***4 Answer not the fool according to his folly,
Lest thou thyself also become like unto him.***

Pro. 26: 4. After, or according to his folly, is here equivalent to recognising the foolish supposition and the foolish object of his question, and thereupon considering it, as if, e.g., he asked why the ignorant man was happier than the man who had much knowledge, or how one may acquire the art of making gold; for “a fool can ask more than ten wise men can answer.” He who recognises such questions as justifiable, and thus sanctions them, places himself on an equality with the fool, and easily himself becomes one. The proverb that follows affirms apparently the direct contrary:

***5 Answer the fool according to his folly,
Lest he regard himself as wise.***

Pro. 26: 5. עֲנֵה-כִסִּיל (with *Makkeph*, and *Gaja*, and *Chatef*^{f203}) here stands opposed to אֵל-תֵּעַן כִּסִּיל. The Gospel of John, e.g., 5:31, cf. 8:31, ^{f204} is rich in such apparently contradictory sayings. The *sic et non* here lying before us is easily explained; after, or according to his folly, is this second time equivalent to, as is due to his folly: decidedly and firmly rejecting it, making short work with it (returning a sharp answer), and promptly replying in a way fitted, if possible, to make him ashamed. Thus one helps him, perhaps, to self-knowledge; while, in the contrary case, one gives assistance to his self-importance. The Talmud, *Schabbath 30b*, solves the contradiction by referring v. 4 to worldly things, and v. 5 to religious things; and it is true that, especially in the latter case, the answer is itself a duty toward the fool, and towards the truth. Otherwise the Midrash: one ought not to answer when one knows the fool as such, and to answer when he does not so know him; for in the first instance the wise man would dishonour himself by the answer, in the latter case he would give to him who asks the importance appertaining to a superior.

***6 He cutteth off the feet, he drinketh injury,
Who transacteth business by a fool.***

Pro. 26: 6. He cutteth off, i.e., his own feet, as we say: he breaks his neck, *il se casse le cou*; Lat. *frangere brachium, crus, coxam; frangere navem* (Fleischer). He thinks to supplement his own two legs by those of the messenger, but in reality he cuts them off; for not only is the commission not carried out, but it is even badly carried out, so that instead of being refreshed (Pro. 13:17; 25:13) by the quick, faithful execution of it, he has to swallow nothing but damage; cf. Job. 34: 7, where, however, drinking scorn is meant of

another (LXX), not his own; on the contrary, **חָמָס** here refers to injury suffered (as if it were **חָמָסוֹ**, for the suff. of **חָמָס** is for the most part objective); cf. the similar figures Pro. 10:26. So **בִּיד שְׁלַח בִּיד**, to accomplish anything by the mediation of another, cf. Exo. 4:13; with **דָּבָר (דְּבָרִים)**, 2Sa. 15:36. The reading **מִקְצֵה** includes it in the *sibi*. The Syr. reads, after the LXX (the original text of which was **ἐκ τῶν ποδῶν ἑαυτοῦ**), **מִקְצֵה**, for he errs, as also does the Targumist, in thinking that **מִקְצֵה** can be used for **מִקְצֵץ**; but Hitzig adopts this reading, and renders: “from the end of the legs he swallows injury who sends messages by a fool.” The end of the legs are the feet, and the feet are those of the foolish messenger. The proverb in this form does not want in boldness, but the wisdom which Hitzig finds in it is certainly not mother-wit. ^{f205}

Böttcher, on his part, also with **מִקְצֵה**, renders: “from the end of his feet he drinks in that which is bitter...” — that also is too artificial, and is unintelligible without the explanation of its discoverer. But that he who makes a fool his messenger becomes himself like unto one who cuts off his own legs, is a figure altogether excellent.

**7 The hanging down of the legs of a lame man;
And a proverb in a fool's mouth.**

Pro. 26: 7. With reference to the obscure **דָּלִיּוֹ**, the following views have been maintained: —

(1) The form as punctuated appears directly as an imperative. Thus the LXX translate, the original text of which is here: **ἀφελου̅ πορείαν̅ κυλλῶν̅** (conj. Lagarde's) **καὶ παροιμίαν̅ ἐκ στόματος̅ ἀφρόνων̅**, which the Syr. (with its imitator, the Targ.) has rendered positively: “If thou canst give the power of (sound) going to the lame, then wilt thou also receive (prudent) words from the mouth of a fool.” Since Kimchi, **דָּלִיּוֹ** has been regarded by many as the softening of the *Imp. Piel* **דָּלָה**, according to which the *Venet.* translates: **ἐπάρατε κνήμας̅ χωλοῦ**; and Bertheau and Zöckler explain: always take away his legs from the lame, since they are in reality useless to him, just as a proverb in the mouth of the fool is useless, — something that without loss might be never there.” But why did not the poet write **הָרִימוֹ**, or **הִסִּירוֹ**, or **קָחוּ**, or the like? **דָּלִיּוֹ**, to carry away, to dispense with, is Syriac (Targ. *Jer.* I, under Deu. 32:50), but not Hebrew. And how meaningless is this expression! A lame man would withstand a surgeon (as he would a murderer) who would amputate his legs; for lame legs are certainly better than none, especially since there is a great distinction between a lame man (**פֶּסַח**, from **פָּסַח**, *luxare*; cf. (Arab.)

fasah, laxare, vid., Schultens) who halts or goes on crutches (2Sa. 3:29), and one who is maimed (paralytic), who needs to be carried. It comes to this, that by this rendering of 7a one must, as a consequence, with the LXX, regard **וּמִשְׁלַל** [and a proverb] as object. accus. parallel to **שְׁקִים** [legs]; but “to draw a proverb from one’s mouth” is, after Pro. 20: 5, something quite different from to tear a proverb away from him, besides which, one cannot see how it is to be caught. Rather one would prefer: *attollite crura claudi (ut incedat, et nihil promovebitis)*; but the **מִן** of **מִבְּסִים** does not accord with this, and 7b does not connect itself with it. But the explanation: “take away the legs from a lame man who has none, at least none to use, and a proverb in the mouth of fools, when there is none,” is shattered against the “leg-taking-away,” which can only be used perhaps of frogs’ legs.

(2) Symmachus translates: *ἐξέλιπον κνήμαι ἀπὸ χωλοῦ*; and *Chajûg* explains **דְּלִיּוֹ** as 3 *pret. Kal*, to which Kimchi adds the remark, that he appears to have found **דְּלִיּוֹ**, which indeed is noted by Norzi and J. H. Michaelis as a variant. But the Masoretic reading is **דְּלִיּוֹ**, and this, after Gesenius and Böttcher (who in this, without any reason, sees an Ephraimitic form of uttering the word), is a softened variation from **דְּלוֹ**. Only it is a pity that this softening, while it is supported by *alius* = *ἄλλος*, *folium* = *φύλλον*, *faillir* = *fallere*, and the like, has yet not a single Hebrew or Semitic example in its favour.

(3) Therefore Ewald finds, “all things considered,” that it is best to read **דְּלִיּוֹ**, “the legs are too loose for the lame man to use them.” But, with Dietrich, we cannot concur in this, nor in the more appropriate translation: “the legs of the lame hang down loose,” to say nothing of the clearly impossible: “high are the legs of the lame (one higher than the other),” and that because this form **נְלִיּוֹ** for **דְּלִיּוֹ** also occurs without pause, Psa. 57: 2; 73: 2; 122: 6, Isa. 21:12; but although thus, as at Psa. 36: 9; 68:32, at the beginning of a clause, yet always only in connection, never at the beginning of an address. (4) It has also been attempted to interpret **דְּלִיּוֹ** as abstr., e.g., Euchel: “he learns from a cripple to dance, who seeks to learn proverbs from the mouth of a fool.” **דְּלִיּוֹ שְׁקִים** must mean the lifting up of the legs = springing and dancing. Accordingly Luther translates:

***“As dancing to a cripple,
So does it become a fool to speak of wisdom.”***

The thought is agreeable, and according to fact; but these words do not mean dancing, but much rather, as the Arabic shows (vid., Schultens at 20: 5, and on the passage before us), a limping, waddling walk, like that of ducks, after the manner of a well-bucket dangling to and fro. And **דְּלִיּוֹ**, after the form **מְלָכוֹ**,

would be an unheard-of Aramaism. For forms such as שָׁחוּ, swimming, and שָׁלוּ, security, Psa. 30: 7, on which C. B. Michaelis and others rest, cannot be compared, since they are modified from *sachw*, *salw*, while in דָּלְיוּ the *û* ending must be, and besides the Aramaic דָּלְיוּ must in *st. constr.* be דְּלִיּוֹת. Since none of these explanations are grammatically satisfactory, and besides דָּלְיוּ = דְּלָלוּ = דָּלוּ gives a parallel member which is heterogeneous and not conformable to the nature of an emblematical proverb, we read דָּלוּ after the forms צָפוּי שָׁקוּי (cf. חֲבוּק, Pro. 6:10; 24:33), and this signifies loose, hanging down, from דָּלָה, to hang at length and loosely down, or transitively: to hang, particularly of the hanging down at length of the bucket-rope, and of the bucket itself, to draw water from the well. The מָן is similar to that of Job. 28: 4, only that here the connecting of the hanging down, and of that from which it hangs down, is clear. Were we to express the purely nominally expressed emblematical proverb in the form of a comparative one, it would thus stand as Fleischer translates it: *ut laxa et flaccida dependent (torpent) crura a claudo, sic sententia in ore stultorum (sc. torpet h. e. inutilis est)*. The fool can as little make use of an intelligent proverb, or moral maxim (*dictum sententiosum*), as a lame man can of his feet; the word, which in itself is full of thought, and excellent, becomes halting, lame, and loose in his mouth (Schultens: *deformiter claudicat*); it has, as spoken and applied by him, neither hand nor foot. Strangely, yet without missing the point, Jerome: *quomodo pulcras frustra habet claudus tibias, sic indecens est in ore stultorum parabola*. The lame man possibly has limbs that appear sound; but when he seeks to walk, they fail to do him service, — so a *bon-mot* comes forth awkwardly when the fool seeks to make use of it. Hitzig's conjecture: as leaping of the legs on the part of a lame man..., Böttcher has already shown sufficient reasons for rejecting; leaping on the part of any one, for the leaping of any one, were a court style familiar to no poet.

Pro. 26: 8. This proverb presents to us a new difficulty.

*As one binds a stone in a sling,
So is he who giveth honour to a fool.*

This translation is warranted by tradition, and is in accordance with the actual facts. A sling is elsewhere called קֶלֶע; but that מְרִגְמָה also in the passage before us signifies a sling (from רָגַם, to throw with stones = to stone or to throw stones = to sling, cf. Targ. Est. 5:14 רָגַם, of David's slinging stones against Goliath), is supported by the LXX, Syr., and Targ. on the one side, and the Jewish Glossists on the other (Rashi: *fronde*, Ital. *frombola*). Rightly the LXX renders כְּצִרּוֹר as a verb: ὥς ἀποδεσμεύει; on the contrary, the Syr. and

Targ. regard it as a substantive: as a piece of stone; but צָרוּר as a substantive does not mean a piece, as one would put into a sling to use as a weapon, but a grain, and thus a little piece, 2Sa. 17:13; cf. Amo. 9: 9. Erroneously Ewald: “if one binds to the sling the stone which he yet seeks to throw, then all this throwing and aiming are in vain; so it is in vain to give to a fool honour which does not reach him.” If one seeks to sling a stone, he must lay the *lapis missilis* so in the sling that it remains firm there, and goes forth only by the strong force of the slinging; this fitting in (of the stone), so that it does not of itself fall out, is expressed by צָרַר בְּ (cf. Pro. 30: 4; Job. 26: 8). The giving is compared to the binding, the stones to the honour, and the sling to the fool: the fool is related to the honour which one confers on him, as the stone to the sling in which one lays it — the giving of honour is a slinging of honour. Otherwise (after Kimchi) the Venet. ὥς συνδεσμὸς λίθου ἐν λιθάδι, i.e., as Fleischer translates: *ut qui crumenam gemmarum plenam in acervum lapidum conjicit*. Thus also Ralbag, Ahron b. Josef, and others, and lastly Zöckler. The figure is in the form of an address, and מְרַגְמָה (from רָגַם, *accumulare, congerere*, vid., under Psa. 67:28) might certainly mean the heaping of stones. But אֶבֶן אֶבֶן (precious stone); also one does not see why one precious stone is not enough as the figure of honour, and a whole heap is named; but in the third place, בֵּן נוֹתֵן requires for כְּצָרוּר a verbal signification. Therefore Jerome translates: *sicut qui mittit lapidem in acervum Mercurii*; in this the echo of his Jewish teacher, for the Midrash thus explains literally: every one who gives honour to a fool is like one who throws a stone on a heap of stones consecrated to Mercury. Around the Hermes (Ἑρμῆς), i.e., pillars with the head of Mercury (*statuae mercuriales* or *viales*), were heaps of stones (ἑρμακες), to which the passer-by was wont to throw a stone; it was a mark of honour, and served at the same time to improve the way, whose patron was Mercurious (מַרְקוּלִים). It is self-evident that this Graeco-Roman custom to which the Talm. makes frequent reference, cannot be supposed to have existed in the times of Solomon. Luther translates independently, and apparently rendering into German that *in acervum Mercurii*: that is as if one threw a precious stone on the “*Rabenstein*,” i.e., the heap of stones raised at the foot of the gallows. This heap of stones is more natural and suitable to the times of Solomon than the heap of stones dedicated to Mercury, if, like Gussetius, one understands מְרַגְמָה of a heap of stones, *supra corpus lapidatum*. But against this and similar interpretations it is enough to remark that כְּצָרוּר cannot signify *sicut qui mittit*. Had such a meaning been intended, the word would have been בְּהַשְׁלִיד or בְּמַשְׁלִיד. Still different is the rendering of Joseph Kimchi, Aben Ezra, and finally Löwenstein: as when one wraps up a stone in a piece of purple stuff. But אֶרְגָּמָן, purple, has nothing to do with the

verb רָגַם; it is, as the Aramaic אַרְגָּן shows, a compound word; the supposition of a denom. מְרַגְמָה thus proceeds from a false etymological supposition. And Hitzig's combination of מְרַגְמָה with (Arab.) *munjam*, handle and beam of a balance (he translates: as a stone on the beam of a balance, i.e., lies on it), is nothing but refined ingenuity, since we have no need at all of such an Arab. word for a satisfactory clearing up of מְרַגְמָה. We abide by the rendering of the sling. Böttcher translates: a sling that scatters; perhaps מְרַגְמָה in reality denotes such a sling as throws many stones at once. Let that, however, be as it may: that he who confers a title of honour, a place of honour, and the like, on a fool, is like one who lays a stone in a sling, is a true and intelligibly formed thought: the fool makes the honour no honour; he is not capable of maintaining it; that which is conferred on him is uselessly wasted.

***9 A thorn goeth into the hand of a drunkard,
And a proverb in a fool's mouth;***

Pro. 26: 9. I.e., if a proverb falls into a fool's mouth, it is as if a thorn entered into the hand of a drunken man; the one is as dangerous as the other, for fools misuse such a proverb, which, rightly used, instructs and improves, only to the wounding and grieving of another, as a drunken man makes use of the pointed instrument which he has possession of for coarse raillery, and as a welcome weapon of his strife. The LXX, Syr. (Targ.?), and Jerome interpret עָלָה in the sense of shooting up, i.e., of growing; Böttcher also, after Pro. 24:31 and other passages, insists that the thorn which has shot up may be one that has not grown to perfection, and therefore not dangerous. But thorns grow not in the hand of any one; and one also does not perceive why the poet should speak of it as growing in the hand of a drunken man, which the use of the hand with it would only make worse. We have here עָלָה בְיָדִי, i.e., it has come into my hand, commonly used in the *Mishna*, which is used where anything, according to intention, falls into one's hands, as well as where it comes accidentally and unsought for, e.g., *Nazir* 23a, וְעָלָה בִידוֹ בֶשֶׂר טָלָה, he who designs to obtain swine's flesh and (accidentally) obtains lamb's flesh. Thus rightly Heidenheim, Löwenstein, and the *Venet.*: ἄκανθα ἀνέβη εἰς χεῖρα μεθύοντος. חֹרֶךְ signifies a thorn bush, 2Ki. 14: 9, ^{f206} as well as a thorn, Son. 2: 2, but where not the thorns of the rose, and indeed no rose at all, is meant. Luther thinks of the rose with the thorn when he explains: "When a drunkard carries and brandishes in his hand a thorn bush, he scratches more with it than allows the roses to be smelled — so a fool with the Scriptures, or a right saying, often does more harm than good." This paraphrase of Luther's interprets עָלָה בִיד more correctly than his translation does; on the other hand, the latter more correctly is satisfied with a

thorn twig (as a thorn twig which pierces into the hand of a drunken man); the roses are, however, assumed contrary to the text. This holds good also against Wessely's explanation: "the Mashal is like a rose not without thorns, but in the mouth of a fool is like a thorn without a rose, as when a drunken man seeks to pluck roses and gains by his effort nothing but being pierced by thorns." The idea of roses is to be rejected, because at the time when this proverb was formed there were no roses in Palestine. The proverb certainly means that a right Mashal, i.e., an ingenious excellent maxim, is something more and better than a חִיךְ (the prick as of the Jewish thorn, *Zizyphus vulgaris*, or the *Christus*-thorn, the *Ziz spina Christi*); but in the mouth of a fool such a maxim becomes only a useless and a hurtful thing; for the fool so makes use of it, that he only embarrasses others and recklessly does injury to them. The LXX translates מַשָּׁל by δουλεία, and the Aram. by שְׁמִיּוֹתָא; how the latter reached this "folly" is not apparent; but the LXX vocalized מַשָּׁל, according to which Hitzig, at the same time changing שְׂכוֹר into שָׂכוֹר, translates: "thorns shoot up by the hand of the hireling, and tyranny by the mouth of fools." Although a hired labourer, yet, on this account, he is not devoid of conscience; thus 9a so corrected has something in its favour: one ought, as far as possible, to do all with his own hand; but the thought in 9b is far-fetched, and if Hitzig explains that want of judgment in the state councils creates despotism, so, on the other hand, Pro. 24: 7 says that the fool cannot give counsel in the gate, and therefore he holds his mouth.

Pro. 26:10. All that we have hitherto read is surpassed in obscurity by this proverb, which is here connected because of the resemblance of ושְׂכוֹר to שְׂכוֹר. We translate it thus, vocalizing differently only one word:

***Much bringeth forth from itself all;
But the reward and the hirer of the fool pass away.***

The LXX translates πολλὰ χειμάζεται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἀφρόνων (all the flesh of fools suffers much), συντριβήσεται γὰρ ἡ ἕκστασις αὐτῶν, which is in Hebrew:

רַב מִחוּלָל דָּל בְּשָׂר דָּסִיל
שְׂבַר עֲבָרָתָם

An unfortunate attempt so to rectify the words that some meaning might be extracted from them. The first line of this translation has been adopted by the Syr. and Targ., omitting only the כָּל, in which the self-condemnation of this deciphering lies (for כָּל בְּשָׂר means elsewhere, humanity, not the whole body of each individual); but they translate the second line as if the words were:

ישׁכר עִבְרִים

i.e., and the drunken man sails over the sea (עִבְרִים is separated into עִבְרִים, as בְּבַקְרִים, Amo. 6:12, is to be separated into בְּבַקְרִים); but what does that mean? Does it mean that to a drunkard (but שָׂכֹר, the drunken man, and not סִבָּא, the drunkard, is used) nothing remains but to wander over the sea? or that the drunken man lets his imagination wander away over the sea, while he neglects the obligation that lies upon him? Symmachus and Theodotion, with the Midrash (Rashi) and Saadia (Kimchi), take שָׂכֹר in 10b = סִגְר (like Isa. 19:10, שָׂכֹר = embankment, cf. סִבְרִין, *Kelim*, Pro. 23: 5); the former translates by *καὶ ὁ φράσων ἄφρονα ἔμφράσσει τὰς ὀργὰς αὐτοῦ*, the latter by *καὶ φιμῶν ἄφρονα φιμοῖ χόλους*, yielding to the imagination that עִבְרִים, like עֲבָרוֹת, may be the plur. of עֲבָרָה, anger. Jerome punctuates רַב as, Pro. 25: 8, רַב, and interprets, as Symmachus and Theodotion, שָׂכֹר both times = סִגְר, translating: *Judicium determinat causas, et qui imponit stulto silentium iras mitigat*; but רַב does not mean *judicium*, nor מַחֲלֵל *determinat*, nor כָּל *causas*. As Gussetius, so also Ralbag (in the first of his three explanations), *Meiri*, Elia Wilna interpret the proverb as a declaration regarding quarrelsome persons: he causeth woe to all, and hireth fools, hireth transgressors, for his companions; but in that case we must read רַב for רַב; מַחֲלֵל, bringing woe, would be either the *Po.* of חָלַל, to bore through, or *Pilel* of חִיל (חֹל), to put into distress (as with pangs); but עִבְרִים, transgressors = sinners, is contrary to the O.T. *usus loq.*, Pro. 22: 3 (Pro. 27:12) is falsely cited in its favour; besides, for רַב there should have been at least אִישׁ רַב and why וְשָׂכֹר is repeated remains inexplicable. Others take מַחֲלֵל-כָּל as the name of God, the creator of all men and things; and truly this is the nearest impression of these two words, for חֹלֵל is the usual designation for divine production, e.g., Psa. 90: 2. Accordingly Kimchi explains: The Lord is the creator of all, and He gives to fools and to transgressors their maintenance; but עִבְרִים, transgressors, is Mishnic, not bibl.; and שָׂכֹר means to hire, but not to supply with food. The proverb is thus incapable of presenting a thought like Mat. 5:45 (He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good). Others translate: “The Lord is creator of all, and takes fools, takes idlers, into His service.” Thus rendered, the proverb is offensive; wherefore Rashi, Moses Kimchi, Arama, and others regard the Mashal as in the mouth of fools, and thus they take vv. 9 and 10 together as a tetrastich. Certainly this second collection of proverbs contains also tetrastiches; but vv. 9 and 10 cannot be regarded as together forming a tetrastich, because רַב (which is valid against Kimchi) cannot mean God

the Lord: **רַב**, Lord, is unheard of in bibl. Heb., and at least the word **הָרַב** must be used for God. The *Venet.* on this account does not follow Kimchi, but translates, *Ἀρχὼν πλάττει πάντα, καὶ μισθοῦται μωρὸν καὶ μισθοῦται ὡς παραβάτης* (ought to have been *παραβάτας*); but who could this cunning man be? Perhaps the *Venet.* is to be understood, after Gecatilia (in Rashi): a great (rich) man performs all manner of things; but if he hires a fool, it is as if he hired the first best who pass along the way. But that **חולל** is used in the general sense of to execute, to perform, is without example, and improbable. Also the explanation: a ruler brings grief, i.e., severe oppression, upon all (*Abulwalid*, Immanuel, Aben Ezra, who, in his smaller grammar, explains **רַב** = **רַב** after Isa. 49: 9; C. B. Michaelis: *dolore afficit omnes*), does not recommend itself; for **חולל**, whether it be from **חלל**, Isa. 51: 9 (to bore through), or from **חיל**, Psa. 29: 9 (to bring on the pangs of birth), is too strong a word for hurting; also the clause, thus generally understood, is fortunately untrue. Translated as by Euchel: “the prominent persons destroy all; they keep fools in pay, and favour vagabonds,” — it sounds as if it had been picked up in an assembly of democrats. On the other hand, the proverb, as translated by Luther:

*A good master maketh a thing right;
But he who hireth a bungler, by him it is spoiled,*

is worthy of the Book of Proverbs. The second line is here freely rendered, but it is also appropriate, if we abide closer by the words of the text, in this connection. Fleischer: *Magister (artifex peritus) effingit omnia* (i.e., *bene perficit quaecunque ei committuntur*); *qui autem stultum conducit, conducit transeuntes* (i.e., *idem facit ac si homines ignotos et forte transeuntes ad opus gravius et difficilium conduceret*). Thus also Gesenius, Böttcher, and others, who all, as Gecatilia above, explain **עבריים**, *τοὺς τυχόντας*, the first best. But we are reluctantly constrained to object to this thought, because **רַב** nowhere in bibl. Hebrew signifies a master; and the **ו** of the second **וְשֹׂכֵר** cannot bear that rendering, *ac si*. And if we leave it out, we nevertheless encounter a difficulty in **חולל**, which cannot be used of human production. Many Christian interpreters (Cocceius, Schultens, Schelling, Ewald, Bertheau, Stier, Zöckler) give to **רַב** a meaning which is found in no Jewish interpreter, viz., *sagittarius*, from **רַבב** (**רַבֵּב**), Gen. 49:23 (and perhaps Psa. 18:15), after the forms **צַר**, **שָׂר**, the plur. of which, **רַבִּים**, is found at Job. 16:13, Jer. 50:29, but in a connection which removes all doubt from the meaning of the word. Here also **רַב** may be more closely defined by **מְחַלֵּל**; but how then does the proverb stand? “an archer who wounds everything, and he who hires a fool, and hires

passers-by” (Ewald: street-runners), i.e., they are alike. But if the archer piercing everything is a comic *Hercules furens*, then, in order to discover the resemblance between the three, there is need of a portion of ingenuity, such as is only particularly assigned to the favoured. But it is also against the form and the usage of the word to interpret עֲבָרִים simply of rogues and vagabonds. Several interpreters have supposed that רַב and כָּל must stand in a certain interchangeable relation to each other. Thus, e.g., Ahron b. Josef: “Much makes amazement to all, but especially one who hires a fool...” But this “especially” (Before all) is an expression smuggled in. Agreeing with Umbreit and Hitzig, we translate line first; but in translating line second, we follow our own method:

Much bringeth all out of it;

i.e., where there is much, then one has it in his power, if he begins right, to undertake everything. רַב has by כָּל the definition of a neuter, so as to designate not only many men, Exo. 19:21, but also much ability in a pecuniary and facultative sense (cf. the subst. רַב, Isa. 63: 7; Psa. 145: 7); and of the much which bringeth forth all out of itself, effects all by itself, חוֹלֵל with equal right might be used, as Pro. 25:23, of the north wind. The antithesis 10b takes this form:

***But the reward (read וְשֹׁכֵר) and the master
(who hires him for wages) of the fool pass away,***

i.e., perish; עֲבָרִים, as if עֵבֶר, is used of chaff, Isa. 29: 5; of stubble, Jer. 13:24; of shadow, Psa. 144: 4. That which the fool gains passes away, for he squanders it; and he who took him into his service for wages is ruined along with him, for his work is only pernicious, not useful. Although he who possesses much, and has great ability, may be able to effect everything of himself, yet that is not the case when he makes use of the assistance therein of foolish men, who not only do not accomplish anything, but, on the contrary, destroy everything, and are only ruinous to him who, with good intention, associates them with himself in his work. That the word must be more accurately וְשֹׁכֵר, instead of וְשֹׁכְרוֹ, one may not object, since וְשֹׁכֵר is perfectly unambiguous, and is manifestly the object.

Pro. 26:11. The series of proverbs regarding fools is continued:

***Like a dog which returneth to his vomit,
Is a fool who cometh again with his folly.***

בֹּשֵׁב is like שֹׁנֵה, particip.; only if the punctuation were בְּכֶלֶב, ought “which returneth to his vomit” to be taken as a relative clause (vid., under Psa. 38:14). Regarding עַל as designating the *terminus quo* with verbs of motions, vid., Köhler under Mal. 3:24. On קָיָא = קָיָא, cf. 23: 8. Luther rightly; as a dog devours again his vomit. The LXX translate: ὥσπερ κύων ὅταν ἐπέλθῃ ἐπὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἔμετον; the reference in 2Pe. 2:22: κύων ἐπιστρέψας ἐπὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἐξέραμα, is thus not from the LXX; the *Venet.* is not connected with this N.T. citation, but with the LXX, if its accordance with it is not merely accidental. To devour again its vomit is common with the dog. ^{f207}

Even so, it is the manner of fools to return again in word and in deed to their past folly (vid., regarding שֹׁנֵה with ב of the object. Pro. 17: 9); as an Aram. popular saying has it: the fool always falls back upon his foolish conduct. ^{f208}

He must needs do so, for folly has become to him a second nature; but this “must” ceases when once a divine light shines forth upon him. The LXX has after v. 11 a distich which is literally the same as Sir. 4:21.

***12 Seest thou a man who is wise in his own eyes?
The fool hath more hope than he.***

Pro. 26:12. Regarding the *perf. hypotheticum* רְאִיָּה, vid., at Pro. 22:29. Line second is repeated, Pro. 29:20, unchanged. מִמֶּנּוּ, *prae eo*, is equivalent to the Mishnic יוֹתֵר מִמֶּנּוּ, *plus quam ei*. As the conversion of a sinner, who does not regard himself as righteous, is more to be expected than that of a self-righteous man (Mat. 9:12 f.), so the putting right of a fool, who is conscious that he is not wise (cf. 24: 7), is more likely to be effected than that of one deeming himself wise; for the greatest hindrance to any turning toward that which is better lies in the delusion that he does not need it. ^{f209}

Thus far the group of proverbs regarding fools.

There follows now a group of proverbs regarding the slothful:

***13 The slothful saith there is a lion without,
A lion in the midst of the streets;***

Pro. 26:13. cf. the original of this proverb, Pro. 22:13. שׁוֹעֵל, to say nothing of שְׁחַל, is not the jackal; שְׁחַל is the bibl. name for the lion. בֵּין is the more general expression for בְּקִרְבּוֹ, Isa. 5:25; by the streets he thinks of the rows of houses that form them.

***14 The door turneth on its hinges,
And the sluggard on his bed.***

Pro. 26:14. The comparison is clear. The door turns itself on its hinges, on which it hangs, in and out, without passing beyond the narrow space of its motion; so is the fool on his bed, where he turns himself from the one side to the other. He is called עֲצֵל, because he is fast glued to the place where he is (Arab. ‘azila), and cannot be free (contrast of the active, cf. Arab. ḥafyf, moving nimbly, agilis). But the door offers itself as a comparison, because the diligent goes out by it to begin his work without (Pro. 24:27; Psa. 104:23), while the sluggard rolls himself about on his bed. The hook, the hinge, on which the door is moved, called צִיר, from צוּר, to turn, ^{f210} has thus the name of הסּוּב.

**15 The slothful has thrust his hand into the dish,
It is hard for him to bring it back to his mouth again.**

Pro. 26:15. A variation of Pro. 19:24; the fut. יִשְׁיבְנָה there, is here explained by נִלְאָה לְהַשִּׁיבָה

**16 The sluggard is wise in his own eyes,
More than seven men who give an excellent answer.**

Pro. 26:16. Between slothfulness and conceit there exists no inward necessary mutual relation. The proverb means that the sluggard as such regards himself as wiser than seven, who all together answer well at any examination: much labour — he thinks with himself — only injures the health, blunts men for life and its joys, leads only to over-exertion; for the most prudent is, as a general rule, crack-brained. Böttcher’s “maulfaule” [slow to speak] belongs to the German style of thinking; עַטַּל לְשׁוֹנָא in Syr. is not he who is slow to speak, but he who has a faltering tongue. ^{f211}

Seven is the number of manifoldness in completed unfolding (Pro. 9: 1). *Meîri* thinks, after Ezr. 7:14, on the council of seven of the Asiatic ruler. But seven is a round number of plurality, v. 25, Pro. 24:16; 6:31. Regarding טַאֵם, vid., at Pro. 11:22.

A series of proverbs which recommend the love of peace, for they present caricatures of the opposite:

**17 He seizeth by the ears of a dog passing by,
Who is excited by a strife which concerns him not.**

Pro. 26:17. According to the accentuation in the text, the proverb is to be translated with Fleischer: *Qualis est quiprehendit aures canis, talis est qui forte transiens ira abripitur propter rixam alienam (eique temere se immiscent)*. Since he is cautioned against unwarranted interference, the

expression **מִתְעַרֵב בְּדִין** might have been used (Pro. 14:10), according to which the Syr. translates; but **אֶל-רִיב** substantiates the originality of **מִתְאַבֵּר** (vid., Pro. 14:16; 20: 2). On the other hand, the placing together, without any connection of the two participles, is perplexing; why not **עֵבֵר וּמִתְאַבֵּר** ? For it is certainly not meant, that falling into a passion he passes by; but that passing by, he falls into a passion; for he stands to this object. The Targumist, feeling this also, renders **עֵבֵר** in the sense of being angry, but contrary to the *usus loq.* Wherefore the conjecture of Euchel and Abramsohn commends itself, that **עֵבֵר** belongs to **כָּלֵב** — the figure thereby becomes more distinct. To seize one's own dog by the ear is not dangerous, but it is not advisable to do this with a strange dog. Therefore **עֵבֵר** belongs as a necessary attribute to the dog. The dog accidentally passing by corresponds to the strife to which one stands in no relation (**רִיב לְאֶלֶף**, vid., regarding the *Makkeph*, Baer's *Genesis*, p. 85, *not.* 9). Whoever is excited to passion about a strife that does not belong to him, is like one who lays hold by the ears (the LXX arbitrarily: by the tail) of a dog that is passing by — to the one or to the other it happens right when he brings evil upon himself thereby.

Pro. 26:18, 19. These verses form a tetrastich:

*18 As a man who casteth brands,
And arrows, and death;*

*19 So is the man who deceiveth his neighbour,
And saith: I only make sport.*

The old translations of **מִתְלַהֵל** are very diverse. Aquila has rendered it by **κακοηθιζόμενος**; Symmachus: **πειρώμενοι**; the Syr.: the vainglorious; the Targ.: **מִתְחַת** (from **נִחַת**), a successor (spiritually); Jerome: *noxius* (injurious; for which Luther: secret). There is thus no traditional translation. Kimchi explains the word by **הַשְׁתַּנֵּג** (*Venet.* **ἕξειστώς**); Aben Ezra by **הַשְׁתַּמָּה** (from **שָׂמָה**), to behave thoughtlessly, foolishly; but both erroneously, confounding with it **נִתְלַהֵל**, Gen. 47:13, which is formed from **לָהֵל** and not from **לָהֵה**, and is related to **לָאָה**, according to which **מִתְלַהֵל** would designate him who exerts himself (Rashi, **הַמְתַּיֵּג**), or who is worn out (Saadia: who does not know what to do, and in weariness passes his time). The root **לָהֵה לָהֵל**, whence the reflex form **הִתְלַהֵל**, like **הִתְמַהֵמָה**, from **מָהָה מָהָה** leads to another primary idea. The root **לָהֵה לָהֵל** presents in (Arab.) *âliha* (vid., Fleischer in the *Comm. zur Genesis*, p. 57), *waliha*, and *taliha*, formed from the 8th form of this verb (*Aittalah*), the fundamental meaning of internal and external unrest; these verbs are used of the effect of fear (shrinking back from fear), and,

generally, the want of self-command; the Syr. *otlahlah*, to be terrified, *obstupescere*, confirms this primary conception, connecting itself with the R. לָה. Accordingly, he who shoots every possible death-bringing arrow, is thought of as one who is beside himself, one who is of confused mind, in which sense the passive forms of (Arab.) *âlah* and *talah* are actually used. Schultens' reference to (Arab.) *lâh micare*, according to which כמתלהלה must mean *sicut ludicram micationem exercens* (Böttcher: one who exerts himself; Malbim: one who scoffs, from התל), is to be rejected, because מתלהלה must be the direct opposite of משחק; and Ewald's comparison of (Arab.) *wâh* and *akhhk*, to be entangled, distorted, *lâh*, to be veiled, confounds together heterogeneous words. Regarding זָקִים (from זָק), burning arrows, vid., under Isa. 50:11. Death stands third, not as comprehensive (that which is deadly of every kind), but as a climax (yea, even death itself). The בַּן of the principal sentence, correlate to בַּן of the contiguous clause, has the *Makkeph* in our editions; but the laws of the metrical *Makkeph* require בַּן אִישׁ (with *Munach*), as it occurs e.g., in Cod. 1294. A man who gives vent to his malice against his neighbour, and then says: seest thou not that... (הֲלֹא), like Arab. *âlâ*, i.e., I am only jesting, I have only a joke with thee: he exhibits himself as being mad, who in blind rage scatters about him deadly arrows.

There now follow proverbs regarding the *nirgân*, the slanderer (vid., regarding the formation and import of this word at 26:28):

***20 Where the wood faileth, the fire goeth out;
And where no tale-bearer, discord cometh to silence.***

Pro. 26:20. Wood, as material for building or for burning, is called, with the plur. of its product, עֵצִים. Since אָפֶס is the absolute end of a thing, and thus expresses its no longer existing, so it was more appropriate to wood (Fleischer: *consumtis lignis*) than to the tale-bearer, of whom the proverb says the same thing as Pro. 22:10 says of the mocker.

***21 Black coal to burning coal, and wood to fire;
And a contentious man to stir up strife.***

Pro. 26:21. The *Venet.* translates פָּחַם by καρβών, and גַּחְלֵת by ἄνθραξ; the former (from פָּחַם, Arab. *fahuma*, to be deep black) is coal in itself; the latter (from גַּחַל, *jaham*, to set on fire, and intrans. to burn), coal in a glowing state (e.g., Pro. 25:22; Eze. 1:13). Black coal is suited to glowing coal, to nourish it; and wood to the fire, to sustain it; and a contentious man is suited for and serves this purpose, to kindle up strife. חָרַר signifies to be hot, and the *Pilpel*

חֲרָחֵר, to heat, i.e., to make hot or hotter. The three — coal, wood, and the contentious man — are alike, in that they are a means to an end.

**22 The words of the tale-bearer are like dainty morsels;
And they glide down into the innermost parts.**

Pro. 26:22. A repetition of Pro. 18: 8.

The proverbs next following treat of a cognate theme, hypocrisy (the art of dissembling), which, under a shining [*gleissen*] exterior, ^{f212} conceals hatred and destruction:

**23 Dross of silver spread over an earthen vessel —
Lips glowing with love and a base heart.**

Pro. 26:23. Dross of silver is the so-called *glätte* (French, *litharge*), a combination of lead and oxygen, which, in the old process of producing silver, was separated (Luther: *silberschaum*, i.e., the silver litharge; Lat. *spuma argenti*, having the appearance of foam). It is still used to glaze over potter's ware, which here (Greek, κέραμος) is briefly called חֲרָשׁ for כְּלֵי חֲרָשׁ; for the vessel is better in appearance than the mere potsherd. The glossing of the earthenware is called צִפָּה אֶל-חֲרָשׁ, which is applicable to any kind of covering (צִפָּה, R. צָרַף, to spread or lay out broad) of a less costly material with that which is more precious. 23a contains the figure, and 23b its subscription: שִׁפְתַּיִם דֹּלְקִים וְלֵב רָע. Thus, with the taking away of the *Makkeph* after Codd., to be punctuated: burning lips, and therewith a base heart; burning, that is, with the fire of love (*Meîri*, אֵשׁ הַחֶשֶׁק), while yet the assurances of friendship, sealed by ardent kisses, serve only to mask a far different heart. The LXX translate דֹּלְקִים [burning] by λαῖα, and thus have read חֲלֻקִים [smooth], which Hitzig without reason prefers; burning lips (Jerome, incorrectly: *tumentia*; Luther, after Deu. 32:33, חֲמַת: *Gifftiger mund* = a poisonous mouth) are just flattering, and at the same time hypocritical ^{f213} lips. Regarding שִׁפְתַּיִם as masc., vid., p. 85; לֵב רָע means, at Pro. 25:20, *animus maestus*; here, *inimicus*. The figure is excellent: one may regard a vessel with the silver gloss as silver, and it is still earthen; and that also which gives forth the silver glance is not silver, but only the refuse of silver. Both are suitable to the comparison: the lips only glitter, the heart is false (Heidenheim).

Pro. 26:24, 25. Vv. 24 and 25 form a tetrastich.

**24 With his lips the hater dissembleth,
And in his heart he museth deceit.**

**25 If he maketh his voice agreeable, believe him not,
For seven abominations are in his heart.**

All the old translators (also the *Venet.* and Luther) give to **יִכְבֵּר** the meaning, to become known; but the *Niph.* as well as the *Hithpa.* (vid., at Pro. 20:11; Gen. 47:17) unites with this meaning also the meaning to make oneself known: to make oneself unknown, unrecognisable = (Arab.) *tanakkr*, e.g., by means of clothing, or by a changed expression of countenance. ^{f214}

The contrast demands here this latter signification: *labiis suis alium se simulat osor, intus in pectore autem reconditum habet dolium* (Fleischer). This rendering of **יְשִׁית מְרֵמָה** is more correct than Hitzig's ("in his breast) he prepares treachery;" for **יְשִׁית מְרֵמָה** is to be rendered after **שִׁית עֲצוֹת**, Psa. 13: 3 (vid., Hupfeld's and also our comm. on this passage), not after Jer. 9: 7; for one says **שִׁית מִזְקָשִׁים**, to place snares, **שִׁית אָרֶב**, to lay an ambush, and the like, but not to place or to lay deceit. If such a dissembler makes his voice agreeable (*Piel* of **יָנַן** only here, for the form Psa. 9:14 is, as it is punctuated, *Kal*), trust not thyself to him (**יְהַאֲמִין**, with **ב**: to put firm trust in anything, vid., *Genesis*, p. 312 ^{f215}); for seven abominations, i.e., a whole host of abominable thoughts and designs, are in his heart; he is, if one may express it, after Mat. 12:45, possessed inwardly of seven devils. The LXX makes a history of 24a: an enemy who, under complaints, makes all possible allowances, but in his heart **τεκταίνεται δόλος**. The history is only too true, but it has no place in the text.

**26 Hatred may conceal itself behind deceit:
Its wickedness shall be exposed in the assembly.**

Pro. 26:26. Proverbs which begin with the fut. are rarely to be found, it is true; yet, as we have seen, Pro. 12:26, they are sometimes to be met with in the collection. This is one of the few that are of such a character; for that the LXX and others translate **ὁ κρύπτων**, which gives for **רָעָתוֹ** a more appropriate reference, does not require us to agree with Hitzig in reading **הַכֶּסֶה** (Pro. 12:16, 23), — the two clauses rendered fut. stand in the same syntactical relation, as e.g., Job. 20:24. Still less can the rendering of **בַּמִּשְׁאוֹן** by **συνίστησι δόλον**, by the LXX, induce us to read with Hitzig **חָרַשׁ אֶן**, especially since it is doubtful whether the Heb. words which floated before those translators (the LXX) have been fallen upon. **מִשְׁאוֹן** (beginning and ending with a formative syllable) is certainly a word of rare formation, to be compared only to **מִסְדֵּרוֹן**, Jud. 3:23; but since the nearest-lying formation **מִשְׁנָא** signifies usury (from **נָשָׂא**, to credit) (according to which Symmachus,

διὰ λήμματα, to desire gain), it is obvious that the language preferred this double formation for the meaning deceiving, illusion, or, exactly: fraud. It may also be possible to refer it, like מְשׂוּאוֹת (vid., under Psa. 23:18), to שׂוּא = הִשָּׁף, to be confused, waste, as this is done by Parchon, Kimchi (*Venet. ἐν ἐρημίᾳ*), Ralbag, and others; מְשׂוּאָן, in this sense of deepest concealment, certainly says not a little as the contrast of קָהָל [an assembly], but יְשִׁמוֹן [a desert] stood ready for the poet to be used in this sense; he might also have expressed himself as Job. 30: 3; 38:27. The selection of this rare word is better explained if it denotes the superlative of deceit, — a course of conduct maliciously directed toward the deception of a neighbour. That is also the impression which the word has made on Jerome (*fraudulenter*), the Targ. (בְּמִוְרֵסְתָא, in grinding), Luther (to do injury), and according to which it has already been explained, e.g., by C. B. Michaelis and Oetinger (“with dissembled, deceitful nature”). The punctuation of תְּכִסָּה, Codd. and editions present in three different forms. Buxtorf in his *Concordance* (also Fürst), and the Basel *Biblia Rabbinica*, have the form תְּכִסָּה; but this is a mistake. Either תְּכִסָּה (*Niph.*) תְּכִפְסָה (*Hithpa.*, with the same assimilation of the preformative ת as in הַכְּבִסָּה, Lev. 13:55; נִכְפַּר, Deu. 21: 8) is to be read; Kimchi, in his *Wörterbuch*, gives תְּכִפְסָה, which is certainly better supported. A surer contrast of מְשׂוּאָן and בְּקָהָל remains in our interpretation; only we translate not as Ewald: “hatred seeks to conceal itself by hypocrisy,” but: in deceitful work. Also we refer רָעַתוֹ, not to מְשׂוּאָן, but to שְׂנְאָה, for hatred is thought of in connection with its personal representative. We see from 26b that hatred is meant which not only broods over evil, but also carries it into execution. Such hatred may conceal itself in cunningly-contrived deception, yet the wickedness of the hater in the end comes out from behind the mask with the light of publicity.

**27 He who diggeth a pit falleth therein;
And he that rolleth up a stone, upon himself it rolleth back.**

Pro. 26:27. The thought that destruction prepared for others recoils upon its contriver, has found its expression everywhere among men in divers forms of proverbial sayings; in the form which it here receives, 27a has its oldest original in Psa. 7:16, whence it is repeated here and in Ecc. 10: 8, and Sir. 27:26. Regarding כָּרַה, vid., at Pro. 16:27. כָּרַה here has the sense of *in eam ipsam*; expressed in French, the proverb is: *celui qui creuse la fosse, y tombera*; in Italian: *chi cava la fossa, caderà in essa*. The second line of this proverb accords with Psa. 7:17 (vid., Hupfeld and Riehm on this passage). It is natural to think of the rolling as a rolling upwards; cf. Sir. 27:25, ὁ βάλλων

λίθον εἰς ὕψος ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ βάλλει, i.e., throws it on his own head. אָבֵן וְגִלְגַּל is to be syntactically judged of like Pro. 18:13.

**28 The lying tongue hateth those whom it bruiseeth;
And a flattering mouth causeth ruin.**

Pro. 26:28. The LXX, Jerome, the Targ., and Syr. render יִשְׁנֵא דָבָרוֹ in the sense of *non amat veritatem*; they appear by דָבָרוֹ to have thought of the Aram. דְּבָא, that which is pure; and thus they gain nothing else but an undeniable plain thought. Many Jewish interpreters gloss: מוֹכִיחַי, also after the Aram.: דְּבָרוֹ = מְדַבְּרוֹ; but the Aram. דְּבָא does not mean pure in the sense of being right, therefore Elia Wilna understands him who desires to justify himself, and this violent derivation from the Aram. thus does not lead to the end. Luther, translating: “a false tongue hates those who punish it,” explains, as also Gesenius, *conterentes = castigantes ipsam*; but דָּבַד signified, according to the usage of the language before us, “bruised” (vid., Psa. 9:10), not: bruising; and the thought that the liar hates him who listens to him, leads *ad absurdum*; but that he does not love him who bruises (punishes) him, is self-evident. Kimchi sees in דְּבָרוֹ another form of דְּבָא; and *Meîri*, Jona Gerundi in his ethical work (שַׁעֲרֵי תְשׁוּבָה = The gates of Repentance), and others, accordingly render דָבָרוֹ in the sense of עָנָו (עָנָיו): the lying tongue hates — as Löwenstein translates — the humble [pious]; also that for דְּבָרוֹ, by the omission of ו, דְּבָרִי = דְּבָרִי may be read, is supposable; but this does not harmonize with the second half of the proverb, according to which לְשׁוֹן שָׂקָר must be the subject, and יִשְׁנֵא דָבָרוֹ must express some kind of evil which proceeds from such a tongue. Ewald: “the lying tongue hates its master (אֲדָנָיו),” but that is not in accordance with the Heb. style; the word in that case should have been בְּעָלָיו. Hitzig countenances this אֲדָנָיו, with the remark that the tongue is here personified; but personified, the tongue certainly means him who has it (Psa. 120: 3). Böttcher’s conjecture יִשְׁנֵא דָבָרוֹ, “confounds their talk,” is certainly a curiosity. Spoken of the sea, those words would mean, “it changes its surge.” But is it then at all necessary to uncover first the meaning of 28a? Rashi, Arama, and others refer דְּבָרוֹ to דְּבָאִים = נְדָבָאִים (מְדַבְּרִים). Thus also perhaps the *Venet.*, which translates τὸς ἐπιτριμμοῦς (not: ἐπιτριμμένους) αὐτῆς. C. B. Michaelis: *Lingua falsitatis odio habet contritos suos, h. e. eos quos falsitate ac mendacio laedit contritosque facit.* Hitzig objects that it is more correct to say: *conterit perosos sibi.* And certainly this lay nearer, on which account Fleischer remarks: in 28a there is to be supposed a poetic transposition of the ideas (Hypallage): *homo qui lingua ad*

calumnias abutitur conterit eos quos odit. The poet makes שָׁנָא the main conception, because it does not come to him so readily to say that the lying tongue bruises those against whom it is directed, as that it is hatred, which is active in this. To say this was by no means superfluous. There are men who find pleasure in repeating and magnifying scandalously that which is depreciatory and disadvantageous to their neighbour unsubstantiated, without being at all conscious of any particular ill-will or personal enmity against him; but this proverb says that such untruthful tongue-thrashing proceeds always from a transgression of the commandment, “Thou shalt not hate thy brother,” Lev. 19:17, and not merely from the want of love, but from a state of mind which is the direct opposite of love (vid., Pro. 10:18). Ewald finds it incongruous that 28a speaks of that which others have to suffer from the lying tongue, whereas the whole connection of this proverb requires that the tongue should here be regarded as bringing ruin upon its owner himself. But of the destruction which the wicked tongue prepares for others many proverbs also speak, e.g., Pro. 12:13, cf. Pro. 17: 4, לִשׁוֹן הָוֶה ; and 28b does not mention that the smooth tongue (written וּפְהֵ-חֶלֶק with *Makkeph*) brings injury upon itself (an idea which must be otherwise expressed; cf. Pro. 14:32), but that it brings injury and ruin on those who have pleasure in its flatteries (חֶלְקוֹת, Psa. 12: 3; Isa. 30:10), and are befooled thereby: *os blandiloquum (blanditiis dolum tegens) ad casum impellit, sc. alios* (Fleischer).

CHAPTER 27

In the group 1-6 of this chapter every two proverbs form a pair. The first pair is directed against unseemly boasting:

***1 Boast not thyself of to-morrow,
For thou knowest not what a day bringeth forth.***

Pro. 27: 1. The ב of בְּיוֹם is like, e.g., that in Pro. 25:14, the ב of the ground of boasting. One boasts of to-morrow when he boasts of that which he will then do and experience. This boasting is foolish and presumptuous (Luk. 12:20), for the future is God’s; not a moment of the future is in our own power, we know not what a day, this present day or to-morrow (Jam. 4:13), will bring forth, i.e., (cf. Zep. 2: 2) will disclose, and cannot therefore order anything beforehand regarding it. Instead of לֹא-תִדַע (with *Kametz* and *Mugrash*), לֹא-תִדַע (thus e.g., the Cod. *Jaman*) is to be written; the Masora knows nothing of that pausal form. And instead of מָה-יָלֵד יוֹם, we write יוֹם מָה יָלֵד with *Zinnorith*. יָלֵד before יוֹם has the tone thrown back on the *penult.*, and consequently a shortened *ult.*; the Masora reckons this word among the twenty-five words with only one *Tsere*.

**2 Let another praise thee, and not thine own mouth;
A stranger, and not thine own lips.**

Pro. 27: 2. The negative אֵל is with פִּיךָ, as in (Arab.) *ghyra fyk*, bound into one compact idea: that which is not thine own mouth (Fleischer), “not thine own lips,” on the other hand, is not to be interpreted as corresponding to it, like אֵל־מִוֶּת, Pro. 12:28; since after the prohibitive אֵל יְהַלְלוּךָ [praise thee] easily supplies itself. רֵךְ is properly the stranger, as having come from a distance, and נֶכְרִי he who comes from an unknown country, and is himself unknown (vid., under Pro. 26:24); the idea of both words, however, passes from *advena* and *alienigena* to *alius*. There is certainly in rare cases a praising of oneself, which is authorized because it is demanded (2Co. 11:18), which, because it is offered strongly against one’s will, will be measured by truth (Pro. 10:13); but in general it is improper to applaud oneself, because it is a vain looking at oneself in a glass; it is indecent, because it places others in the shade; imprudent, because it is of no use to us, but only injures, for *propria laus sordet*, and as Stobäus says, οὐδὲν οὕτως ἄκουσμα φορτικὸν ὡς ὁ καθ’ αὐτοῦ ἔπαινος. Compare the German proverb, “*Eigenlob stinkt, Freundes Lob hinkt, fremdes Lob klinget*” [= self-praise stinks, a friend’s praise is lame, a stranger’s praise sounds].

Pro. 27: 3. The second pair of proverbs designates two kinds of violent passion as unbearable:

**3 The heaviness of a stone, the weight of sand —
A fool’s wrath is heavier than both.**

We do not translate: *Gravis est petra et onerosa arena*, so that the substantives stand for strengthening the idea, instead of the corresponding adjective (Fleischer, as the LXX, Jerome, Syr., Targum); the two pairs of words stand, as 4a, in genit. relation (cf. on the contrary, Pro. 31:30), and it is as if the poet said: represent to thyself the heaviness of a stone and the weight of sand, and thou shalt find that the wrath of a fool compared thereto is still heavier, viz., for him who has to bear it; thus heavier, not for the fool himself (Hitzig, Zöckler, Dächsel), but for others against whom his anger goes forth. A Jewish proverb (vid., Tendlau, No. 901) says, that one knows a man by his wine-glass (כּוּס), his purse (כֵּס), and his anger (כַּעַס), viz., how he deports himself in the tumult; and another says that one reads what is in a man בְּיוֹם כַּעַסוֹ, when he is in an ill-humour. Thus also כַּעַס is to be here understood: the fool in a state of angry, wrathful excitement is so far not master of himself that the worst is to be feared; he sulks and shows hatred, and rages without being appeased; no one can calculate what he may attempt, his behaviour is

unendurable. Sand, **חול**, ^{f216} as it appears, as to the number of its grains innumerable, so as to its mass (in weight) immeasurable, Job. 6: 3; Sir. 22:13. **נמל** the *Venet.* translates, with strict regard to the etymology, by *ἄμμα*.

**4 The madness of anger, and the overflowing of wrath —
And before jealousy who keeps his place!**

Pro. 27: 4. Here also the two pairs of words *4a* stand in connection; **אֲכַזְרִית** (for which the *Cod. Jaman* has incorrectly **אֲכַזְרִית**) is the connecting form; vid., regarding **אֲכַזְרִי**, *Pro. 5: 9*. Let one imagine the blind, relentless rage of extreme excitement and irritation, a boiling over of anger like a water-flood, which bears everything down along with it — these paroxysms of wrath do not usually continue long, and it is possible to appease them; but jealousy is a passion that not only rages, but reckons calmly; it incessantly ferments through the mind, and when it breaks forth, he perishes irretrievably who is its object. *Fleischer* generalizes this idea: “enmity proceeding from hatred, envy, or jealousy, it is difficult or altogether impossible to withstand, since it puts into operation all means, both secretly and openly, to injure the enemy.” But after *Pro. 6:34 f.*, cf. *Son. 8: 8*, there is particularly meant the passion of scorned, mortified, deceived love, viz., in the relation of husband and wife.

Pro. 27: 5. The third pair of proverbs passes over from this special love between husband and wife to that subsisting between friends:

**5 Better is open accusation
Than secret love.**

An integral distich; **מֵאֲהָבָה** has *Munach*, and instead of the second *Metheg Tarcha*, after *Thorath Emeth*, p. 11. *Zöckler*, with *Hitzig*, incorrectly: better than love which, from false indulgence, keeps concealed from his neighbour his faults, when he ought to tell him of them. That would require the phrase **מֵאֲהָבָה מְסֻתֶּרֶת**, not **מֵמֻסְתֶּרֶת**. *Dächsel*, in order to accommodate the text to this meaning, remarks: concealed censure is concealed love; but it is much rather the neglected duty of love, — love without mutual discipline is weak, faint-hearted, and, if it is not too blind to remark in a friend what is worthy of blame, is altogether too forbearing, and essentially without conscience; but it is not “hidden and concealed love.” The meaning of the proverb is different: it is better to be courageously and sternly corrected — on account of some fault committed — by any one, whether he be a foe or a friend, than to be the object of a love which may exist indeed in the heart, but which fails to make itself manifest in outward act. There are men who continually assure us of the reality and depth of their friendship; but when it is necessary for them to prove their love to be self-denying and generous, they are like a torrent which is dry when

one expects to drink water from it (Job. 6:15). Such “secret” love, or, since the word is not **נִסְתָּרֶת**, but **מִסְתָּרֶת**, love confined to the heart alone, is like a fire which, when it burns secretly, neither lightens nor warms; and before such a friend, any one who frankly and freely tells the truth has by far the preference, for although he may pain us, yet he does us good; while the former deceives us, for he leaves us in the lurch when it is necessary to love us, not merely in word and with the tongue, but in deed and in truth (1Jo. 3:18). Rightly Fleischer: *Praestat correptio aperta amicitiae tectae, i.e., nulla re probatae.*

**6 Faithful are the wounds of a friend,
And overloaded [plentiful] the kisses of an enemy.**

Pro. 27: 6. The contrast to **נְאֻמֵי נִי**, true, i.e., honourable and good (with the transference of the character of the person to his act), would be *fraudulenta* (Jerome), or **נְהַפְכוּת**, i.e., false (Rabag); Ewald seeks this idea from **עָתַר**, to stumble, make a false step; ^{f217}

Hitzig, from **עָתַר** = (Arab.) *dadhr*, whence *dādhir, perfidus*, to gain from; but

(1) the comparison does not lie near, since usually the Arab. *t* corresponds to the Heb. **שׁ**, and the Arab. *d* to the Heb. **ז**;

(2) the Heb. **עָתַר** has already three meanings, and it is not advisable to load it with yet another meaning assumed for this passage, and elsewhere not found. The three meanings are the following: (a) to smoke, Aram. **עֵמַר**, whence **עָתַר**, vapour, Eze. 8:11, according to which the *Venet.*, with Kimchi’s and Parchon’s *Lex.*, translates: the kisses of an enemy **συνωμίχλωνται**, i.e., are fog; (b) to sacrifice, to worship, Arab. *atar*; according to which Aquila: **ἰκετικά** (as, with Grabe, it is probably to be read for **ἑκούσια** of the LXX); and agreeably to the *Niph.*, but too artificially, Arama: obtained by entreaties = constrained; (c) to heap up, whence *Hiph.* **הֵעֵתִיר**, Eze. 35:13, cf. Jer. 33: 6, according to which Rashi, *Meiri*, Gesenius, Fleischer, Bertheau, and most explain, cogn. with **עֵשֶׂר**, whose Aram. form is **עֵתַר**, for **עֵשֶׂר** is properly a heap of goods or treasures. ^{f218}

This third meaning gives to the kisses of an enemy a natural adjective: they are too abundant, so much the more plentiful to veil over the hatred, like the kisses by means of which Judas betrayed his Lord, not merely denoted by **φιλεῖν**, but by **καταφιλεῖν**, Mat. 26:49. This, then, is the contrast, that the strokes inflicted by one who truly loves us, although they tear into our flesh (**פָּצַע**, from **פָּצַע**, to split, to tear open), yet are faithful (cf. *Psa.* 141: 5); on the contrary, the

enemy covers over with kisses him to whom he wishes all evil. Thus also **נַעֲתְרוּת** forms an indirect contrast to **נֶאֱמָנִים**.

In 7-10 there is also visible a weaving of the external with the internal. First, there are two proverbs, in each of which there is repeated a word terminating with **נ**.

***7 A satisfied soul treadeth honeycomb under foot;
And a hungry soul — everything bitter is (to it) sweet.***

Pro. 27: 7. It is unnecessary to read **תְּבוּז** (Hitzig); **תְּבוּס** is stronger; “to tread with the feet” is the extreme degree of scornful despte. That satiety and hunger are applicable to the soul, vid., under Pro. 10: 3. In *7b*, the adverb **לָהּ**, relative to the *nomin. absol.*, like Pro. 28: 7, but not Pro. 13:18. “Hunger is the best cook,” according to a German proverb; the Hebrew proverb is so formed that it is easily transferred to the sphere of the soul. Let the man whom God has richly satisfied with good things guard himself against ingratitude towards the Giver, and against an undervaluing of the gifts received; and if they are spiritual blessings, let him guard himself against self-satisfaction and self-contentment, which is, in truth, the worst poverty, Rev. 3:17; for life without God is a constant hunger and thirst. There is in worldly things, even the most pleasing, a dissatisfaction felt, and a dissatisfaction awakening disgust; and in spiritual life, a satiety which supposes itself to be full of life, but which is nothing else than the decay of life, than the changing of life into death.

***8 As a bird that wandereth from her nest,
So is a man that wandereth from his home.***

Pro. 27: 8. It is not a flying out that is meant, from which at any moment a return is possible, but an unwilling taking to flight (LXX *8b*: **ὅταν ἀποξενωθῆ**; Venet.: **πλανούμενον... πλανούμενος**); for **עוֹף נוֹדָד**, Isa. 16: 2, cf. Jer. 4:25, birds that have been frightened; and **נֹדָד**, Pro. 21:15 f., designates the fugitive; cf. **נָע וְנָד**, Gen. 4:14, and above, Pro. 26: 2, where **נוֹד** designates aimless roving about. Otherwise Fleischer: “warning against unnecessary roaming about, in journeyings and wanderings far from home: as a bird far from its nest is easily wounded, caught, or killed, so, on such excursions, one easily comes to injury and want. One may think of a journey in the East. The Arabs say, in one of their proverbs: *âlsafâr kat‘at man âlklyym* (= journeying is a part of the pains of hell).” But **נֹדָד** here is not to be understood in the sense of a *libere vagari*. Rightly C. B. Michaelis: *qui vagatur extorris et exul a loco suo sc. natali vel habitationis ordinariae*. This proverb mediately recommends the love of one’s fatherland, i.e., “love to the land in which our father has his home; on which our paternal mansion stands; in which we have spent the years

of our childhood, so significant a part of one's whole life; from which we have derived our bodily and intellectual nourishment; and in which home we recognise bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh." ^{f219}

But next it says, that to be in a strange land must be an unhappiness, because a man never feels better than at home, as the bird in its nest. We say: *Heimat* [home] — this beautiful word becomes the German language, which has also coined the expressive idea of *Heimweh* [longing for home]; the Heb. uses, to express the idea of home, the word **מְקוֹמִי**; and of fatherland, the word **אֶרֶץ** or **אֶדְמָתִי**. The Heb. **שְׁבוּת** corresponds ^{f220} to the German *Elend*, but = *Ellend, elilenti*, of another land, strange.

The two following proverbs have in common the catchword **רֵץ**, and treat of the value of friendship: —

***9 Oil and frankincense rejoice the heart;
And the sweet discourse of a friend from a counselling of soul.***

Pro. 27: 9. Regarding the perfuming with dry aromas, and sprinkling with liquid aromas, as a mark of honour towards guests, and as a means of promoting joyful social fellowship, vid., at Pro. 7:16 f., 21:17. The pred. **שִׁמְחָה** comprehends frankincense or oil as the two sides of one and the same thing; the LXX introduces, from Psa. 104:15, also wine. It also reads **וּמִתְקַרְעָה** as one word, **וּמִתְקַרְעָה**: *καταβρῆγγυσται δὲ ὑπὸ συμπτωμάτων ψυχὴ*, which Hitzig regards as original; for he translates, understanding **מַעֲצָה** after Psa. 13: 3, “but the soul is torn by cares.” But why **מִתְקַרְעָה**, this *Hithpa.* without example, for **נִקְרָעָה**? and now connected with **מִן** in the sense of **ὑπὸ**! And what does one gain by this Alexandrian wisdom [of the LXX] — a contrast to 9a which is altogether incongruous? Döderlein's rendering accords far better with 9a: “but the sweetness of a friend surpasses fragrant wood.” But although this rendering of the word [**עֲצָה**] by “fragrant wood” is found in Gesen. *Lex.*, from one edition to another, yet it must be rejected; for the word signifies wood as the contents of trees, the word for aromatic wood must be **עֲצִים**; and if the poet had not intentionally aimed at dubiety, he ought to have written **עֲצֵי כֶּשֶׂם**, since **נִפְשׁ**, which the exception of Isa. 3:20, where it is beyond doubt, nowhere means fragrance. If we read **עֲצָה** and **נִפְשׁ** together, then we may suppose that the latter designates the soul, as at Psa. 13: 3; and the former, counsel (from the verb **נִצַּח**). But to what does the suffix of **רַעְיוֹ** refer? One may almost conjecture that the words originally were **מַעֲצַת רַעְיוֹ** **וּמִתְקַנְפֵּשׁ**, and the sweetness of the soul (i.e., a sweet relish for it, cf. v. 7 and 16:24) consists in the counsel of a friend, according to which Jerome

translates: *et bonis amici conciliis anima dulcoratur*. By this transposition רעהו refers back to נפש; for is *nephesh* denote a person or a living being, it can be construed *ad sensum* as masc., e.g., Num. 31:28. But the words may remain in the order in which they are transmitted to us. It is possible that רעהו is (Böttcher refers to Job. 12: 4) of the same meaning as הרה (the friend of one = the friend), as בלו denotes directly the whole; חציו, the half; עתו, the right time. Recognising this, Cocceius, Umbreit, Stier, and Zöckler explain: sweetness, i.e., the sweet encouragement (מתק, in the sense of “sweetness [grace] of the lips,” 16:21) of a friend, is better than one’s own counsel, than prudence seeking to help oneself, and trusting merely to one’s own resources; thus also Rashi: better than what one’s own soul advises him. But

- (1) נפש cannot mean one’s own person (oneself) in contrast to another person; and
- (2) this does not supply a correct antithesis to 9a. Thus מן will not express the preference, but the origin.

Accordingly Ewald, e.g., explains: the sweetness of a friend whom one has proceedeth from the counsel of soul, i.e., from such counsel as is drawn from a deep, full soul. But no proof can be brought from the usage of the language that עצת-נפש can be so meant; these words, after the analogy of דעת נפש, Pro. 19: 2, mean ability to give counsel as a quality of the soul (Pro. 8:14; Job. 12:13), i.e., its ability to advise. Accordingly, with Bertheau, we explain שמחה-לב as the common predicate for 9a and 9b: ointment and perfume rejoice the heart, and (The Syr., Targ., well: even so) the sweet exhortation of a friend, from a soul capable of rendering counsel; also, this and this, more than that fragrance. This proverb is formed in the same way as Pro. 26: 9, 14. In this explanation רעהו is well referred back to לב: and (more than) the sweet advice of his friend. But not so that רעהו is equivalent to ראה הלב, for one does not thus speak; but the construction is as when we say, in the German language: *Nichts thut einem Herzen woler als wenn sein Freund es mitfühlend tröstet* [nothing does more good to a heart than when a friend sympathizingly comforts it]; or: *Zage nicht, tief betrübtes Herz! Dein Freund lebt und wird dir bald sich zeigen* [Be not dismayed, deeply-troubled heart! thy friend lives, and will soon show himself to thee]. In such cases the word “*Herz*” [heart] does not designate a distinct part of the person, but, synecdochically, it denotes the whole person.

Pro. 27:10. Another proverb, consisting of three lines, in commendation of friendship:

*Thine own friend and the friend of thy father forsake not,
And into thy brother's house go not in the day of thy misfortune —
Better is a near neighbour than a far-off brother.*

In our editions רַעֲיָ is incorrectly appointed with *Pasek* after it, so that the accent is *Asla Legarmeh*; the *Pasek* is, after the example of older editions, with Norzi, to be cancelled, so that only the conjunctive *Asla* remains; “thine own and the friend of thy father” denotes the family friend, like some family heirloom, descending from father to son. Such an old tried friend one must certainly not give up. The *Keri* changes the second ורעה into ורַא, but ורעה (which, after the Masora in *st. constr.*, retains its *segol*, Ewald, § 211e) is also admissible, for a form of comparison (Hitzig) this רעה is not, but the fuller form of the abbreviated ורַא, from רעה, to take care of, to tend, to pasture — an infinitive formation (= רַעֲיָ) like the Arab. cogn. *rāʿin* a participial. Such a proved friend one ought certainly not to give up, and in the time of heavy trial (vid., regarding אִיד, Pro. 1:26) one should go to him and not to a brother's house — it is by this supposed that, as Pro. 18:24 says, there is a degree of friendship (cf. Pro. 17:17) which in regard to attachment stands above that of mere fraternal relationship, and it is true; blood-relationship, viewed in itself, stands as a relationship of affection on natural grounds below friendship, which is a relationship of life on moral grounds. But does blood-relationship exclude friendship of soul? cannot my brother be at the same time my heart-friend? and is not friendship all the firmer when it has at the same time its roots in the spirit and in natural grounds? The poet seems to have said this, for in 10c, probably a popular saying (cf. “*Besser Nachbar an der Wand als Bruder über Land*” [Better a neighbour by one's side than a brother abroad]), he gives to his advice a foundation, and at the same time a limitation which modifies its ruggedness. But Dächsel places (like Schultens) in קרוב and רחוק meanings which the words do not contain, for he interprets them of inward nearness and remoteness; and Zöckler reads between the lines, for he remarks, a “near neighbour” is one who is near to the oppressed to counsel and help them, and a “distant brother” is one who with an unamiable disposition remains far from the oppressed. The state of the matter is simple. If one has a tried friend in neighbourly nearness, so in the time of distress, when he needs consolation and help, he must go to this friend, and not first to the house of a brother dwelling at a distance, for the former certainly does for us what the latter probably may and probably may not do for us.

Pro. 27:11. This proverb has, in common with the preceding tristich, the form of an address:

*Become wise, my son, and make my heart rejoice,
That I may give an answer to my accusers.*

Better than “be wise” (Luther), we translate “become wise” (LXX σοφὸς γίνου); for he who is addressed might indeed be wise, though not at present so, so that his father is made to listen to such deeply wounding words as these, “Cursed be he who begat, and who educated this man” (Malbim). The cohortative clause 11*b* (cf. Psa. 119:42) has the force of a clause with a purpose (Ges. § 128: 1): *ut habeam quod iis qui me conviciantur regerere possim*; it does not occur anywhere in the Hezekiah collection except here.

Pro. 27:12. ערום appears to lean on חכם.

*The prudent man seeth the misfortune, hideth himself;
The simple pass on, suffer injury.*

= 22: 3, where וּפְתָיִים for פְּתָאִים, וְנִסְתָּר for נִסְתָּר, and וְנִעְנָשׁוּ for נִעְנָשׁוּ; the three *asyndeta* make the proverb clumsy, as if it counted out its seven words separately to the hearer. Ewald, § 349*a*, calls it a “*Steinschrift*” [an inscription on a stone]. The perfects united in pairs with, and yet more without, *Vav*, express the coincidence ^{f221} as to time.

Pro. 27:13. ערום alliterates with ערב.

*Take from him the garment, for he hath become surety for another,
And for the sake of a strange matter put him under bonds.*

= Pro. 20:16, vid., there. נִכְרָה we interpret neut. (LXX τὰ ἀλλότρια; Jerome, *pro alienis*), although certainly the case occurs that one becomes surety for a strange woman (Aquila, Theodotion, περὶ ξένης), by whose enticements and flatteries he is taken, and who afterwards leaves him in the lurch with the debts for which he had become security, to show her costly favour to another.

Pro. 27:14. This proverb, passing over the three immediately intervening, connects itself with vv. 9 and 10. It is directed against cringing, noisy complimenting:

*He who blesseth his neighbour with a loud voice,
rising early in the morning,
It is reckoned as a curse to him.*

The first line is intentionally very heavy, in order to portray the *empressement* of the maker of compliments: he calls out to another his good wishes with a loud voice, so as to make the impression of deep veneration, of deeply felt thankfulness, but in reality to gain favour thereby, and to commend himself to

greater acts of kindness; he sets himself to meet him, having risen up (הַשְׂבִים), adverbial *inf. abs.*; cf. Jer. 44: 4 with Pro. 25: 4) early in the morning, to offer his *captatio benevolentiae* as speedily as possible; but this salutation of good wishes, the affected zeal in presenting which is a sign of a selfish, calculating, servile soul, is reckoned to him as קָלָה, viz., before God and every one who can judge correctly of human nature, also before him who is complimented in so ostentatious and troublesome a manner, the true design of which is thus seen. Others understand the proverb after the example of *Berachoth* 14a, that one ought to salute no one till he has said his morning's prayer, because honour is due before all to God (the Book of Wisdom, 10:28); and others after *Erachin* 16a, according to which one is meant who was invited as a guest of a generous lord, and was liberally entertained, and who now on the public streets blesses him, i.e., praises him for his nobility of mind — such blessing is a curse to him whom it concerns, because this trumpeting of his praise brings upon him a troublesome, importunate crowd. But plainly the particularity of וְגוֹר בְּקוֹל וְגוֹר lays the chief emphasis on the servility manifested; and one calls to mind the case of the clients besieging the doors of their patrons, those *clientes matutini*, each of whom sought to be the first in the *salutatio* of his distinguished wealthy patron.

Pro. 27:15. This proverb passes from the *complimentarius* to its opposite, a shrewish wife:

***A continual dropping in a rainy day
And a contentious woman are alike.***

Thus we have already translated (p. 8), where, when treating of the manifold forms of parabolic proverbs, we began with this least poetic, but at the same time remarked that vv. 15 and 16 are connected, forming a tetrastich, which is certainly the case according to the text here lying before us. In verse 15, 19:13b is expanded into a distich, and made a complete verse. Regarding דָּלֵף טוֹרֵד, vid., the explanation there given. The noun סְגִירִיר, which the Syr. translates by *magyā*^c, but the Targumist retains, because it is in common use in the post-bibl. Heb. (*Bereschith rabba*, c. 1) and the Jewish Aramaic, signifies violent rain, after the Jewish interpreters, because then the people remain shut up in their houses; more correctly, perhaps, from the unbroken continuousness and thickness (cf. the Arab. *insajara*, to go behind each other in close column) with which the rain pours down. Regarding מְדוֹנִים, *Kerī* מְדוֹנִים, vid., 6:14; the genit. connection of אִשְׁתֵּי מִ we have already at Pro. 21: 9. The form נִשְׁתָּוָה is doubtful. If accented, with Löwenstein and others, as *Milra*, then we would have a *Nithkatal* before us, as at Num. 1:47, or a *Hothkatal* — a passive form of the *Kal*, the existence of which, however, is not fully established.

Rather this word is to be regarded as **נִשְׁתָּה** (*Nithpa.* as Deu. 21: 8; Eze. 23:48) without the *dagesh*, and lengthened; the form of the word **נִשְׁתָּה**, as found in the Cod. *Jaman.*, aims at this. But the form **נִשְׁתָּה** is better established, e.g., by Cod. 1294, as *Milel. Kimchi, Michlol 131a* (cf. Ewald, § 132c), regards it as a form without the *dagesh*, made up the *Niph.* and *Hithpa.*, leaving the *penultima* toning unexplained. Bertheau regards it as a voluntative: let us compare (as **נִשְׁתָּה**, Isa. 41:23); but as he himself says, the reflexive form does not accord with this sense. Hitzig has adopted the right explanation (cf. Olshausen, § 275, and Böttcher, § 1072, who, however, registers it at random as an Ephraimitism). **נִשְׁתָּה** is a *Niphal*, with a transposition of consonants for **נִשְׁתָּה**, since **נִשְׁתָּה** passes over into **נִשְׁתָּה**. Such is now the *genus* in the arrangement; the *Milra* form would be as masc. syntactically inaccurate. “The finite following the subjects is regulated by the gender and number of that which is next before it, as at 2Sa. 3:22; 20:20; Psa. 55: 6; Job. 19:15” (Hitzig).

Pro. 27:16. This verse stands in close connection with the preceding, for it speaks of the contentious woman:

***He that restraineth her restraineth the wind,
And oil meeteth his right hand.***

The connection of the plur. subject **צִפְנִיָּה** = *quicumque eam cohibet*, with a sing. predicate, is not to be disputed (vid., Pro. 3:18 and Pro. 28:16, *Chethîb*); but can **צִפְנִיָּה** gain from the meaning of preserving, laying up, also the meanings of keeping, of confining, and shutting up? — for these meanings we have **כָּלָא** and **עָצַר** (cf. **צָרַר**, Pro. 30: 4). In 16b it lies nearer to see in **יְמִינוֹ** the object of the clause (oil meeteth his right hand) than the subject (his right hand meeteth oil), for the gender of **יְמִין** directs to **יָד** (e.g., Eze. 15: 6b; cf. 6a, where **נִאֲדָרִי** is as to gender indifferent): it is fem., while on the contrary **שְׁמֵן** is generally masc. (cf. Son. 1: 3). There is no reason for regarding **יְמִינוֹ** as an adverbial accus. (he meets oil with his right hand), or, with Hitzig, as a second subject (he meets oil, his right hand); the latter, in the order of the words lying before us, is not at all possible. We suppose that **יִקְרָא**, as at Gen. 49: 1, is equivalent to **יִקְרָה** (Ewald, § 116c), for the explanation *oleum dexteræ ejus praeconem agit* (Cocceius, Schultens) does not explain, but only darkens: and *oleum dexterâ suâ legit*, i.e., *colligit* (Fleischer), is based on an untenable use of the word. As one may say of person to person, **קָרַךְ**, *occurrit tibi*, Num. 25:18, so also **יִקְרָא** (**יִקְרָה**), of a thing that meets a man or one of his members; and if we compare **לִקְרָאתָ** and **קָרַי**, then for 16b the meaning is possible: oil meets

his right hand; the quarrelsome woman is like oil that cannot be held in the hand, which struggles against that which holds it, for it always glides out of the hand. Thus also Luther: “and seeks to hold oil with his hand,” as if he read **יִקְמֹץ**. In fact, this word was more commonly used as the expression of untenableness than the colourless and singular word **יִקְרָא**, which, besides, is so ambiguous, that none of the old translators has thought on any other **קָרָא** than that which signifies “to call,” “to name.” The Jewish interpreters also adhere to this nearest lying **קָרָא**, and, moreover, explain, as the Syr., Targ., Aquila, Symmachus, Jerome, and the *Venet.*, **שֶׁמֶן יְמִינוֹ**, according to the accentuation as genit. connected, e.g., Rashi: he calls for oil to his right hand, viz., as the means of purification from leprosy, Lev. 8:14 [14:16]; and Aben Ezra: even when he calls for oil to his right hand, i.e., would move them to silence with the precious anointing oil. Perhaps v. 16 was originally an independent proverb as follows:

**צִפְנֵי הוֹן צִפְנֵי רוּחַ
וְשֶׁמֶן יְמִינוֹ יִקְרָא**

***He who layeth up riches in store layeth up the wind,
And he nameth them the fat of his right hand;***

i.e., he sees in them that which makes his right hand fat and strong (**שֶׁמֶן**), as at Psa. 109:24, *opp.* Zec. 11:17; cf. **בְּמִשְׁמְנוֹ**, Isa. 10:16, and regarding **Ἐσμούν**, the Phoenician god of health, at Isa. 59:10), and yet it is only the wind, i.e., something that is worthless and transient, which he stored up (**צִפְנֵי**), as at Pro. 13:22, and in **מִצְפְּנָיו**, Oba. 1: 6). **הוֹן** is used as it frequently occurs in the Book of Proverbs, e.g., Pro. 11: 4, and the whole proverb expresses by another figure the same as Pro. 18:11. The fact that **צִפְנֵי (רוּחַ)**, 25:23, and as a contrast thereto in the compass **יָמִין** (the south), hovered before the poet, may not have been without its influence on the choice of the words and expression here.

Pro. 27:17. This proverb expresses the influence arising from the intercourse of man with man:

***Iron is sharpened by iron,
And a man may sharpen the appearance of another.***

When the Masora reads **יָחַד**, Ewald remarks, it interprets the word as denoting “at the same time,” and the further meaning of the proverb must then accord therewith. Accordingly he translates: “iron together with iron! and one together with the face of another!” But then the prep. **בְּ** or **עִם** is wanting after

the second יָחַד — for יָחַד is, in spite of Ewald, § 217*h*, never a prep. — and the “face,” 17*b*, would be a perplexing superfluity. Hitzig already replies, but without doing homage to the traditional text-punctuation, that such a violence to the use of language, and such a darkening of the thought, is not at all to be accepted. He suggests four ways of interpreting יָחַד:

- (1) the adverb יָחַד, united, properly (taken accusat.) union;
- (2) יָחַד, Psa. 86:11, imper. of the *Piel* יָחַד, unite;
- (3) יָחַד, Job. 3: 6, jussive of the *Kal* יָחַד, *gaudeat*; and
- (4) as Kimchi, in *Michlol* 126*a*, jussive of the *Kal* יָחַד (= יָחַד) *acuere*, after the form יָחַד, Mic. 4:11. יָחַד, Gen. 32: 8, etc. *in p.* יָחַד, after the form יָחַד, Job. 23: 9. יָחַד, 2Ki. 1: 2 (= יָחַד, 2Ch. 16:12).

If we take יָחַד with בְּרִנָּה, then it is *à priori* to be supposed that in יָחַד the idea of sharpening lies; in the Arab. iron is simply called *hadyda* = יָחַד, that which is sharpened, sharp; and a current Arab. proverb says: *alḥadyd balḥadyd yuflah* = *ferrum ferro diffinditur* (vid., Freytag under the word *falah*). But is the traditional text-punctuation thus understood to be rightly maintained? It may be easily changed in conformity with the meaning, but not so that with Böttcher we read יָחַד and יָחַד, the *fut. Kal* of יָחַד: “iron sharpeneth itself on iron, and a man sharpeneth himself over against his neighbour” — for פָּנִי after a verb to be understood actively, has to be regarded as the object — but since יָחַד is changed into יָחַד (*fut. Hiph.* of יָחַד), and יָחַד into יָחַד or יָחַד (*fut. Hiph.* of יָחַד, after the form יָחַד, *incipiam*, Deu. 2:25, or יָחַד, *profanabo*, Eze. 39: 7; Num. 30: 3). The passive rendering of the idea 17*a* and the active of 17*b* thus more distinctly appear, and the unsuitable jussive forms are set aside: *ferrum ferro exacuitur, et homo exacuit faciem amici sui* (Jerome, Targ., the *Venet.*). But that is not necessary. As יָחַד may be the *fut.* of the *Hiph.* (he brought up) as well as of the *Kal* (he went up), so יָחַד may be regarded as *fut. Kal*, and יָחַד as *fut. Hiph.* Fleischer prefers to render יָחַד also as *Hiph.*: *aciem exhibet*, like יָחַד, *divitias acquirit*, and the like; but the jussive is not favourable to this supposition of an intransitive (inwardly transitive) *Hiph.* It may indeed be said that the two jussives appear to be used, according to poetic licence, with the force of indicatives (cf. under Pro. 12:26), but the repetition opposes it. Thus we explain: iron is sharpened [*gewetzt*, Luther uses this appropriate word] by iron (כּ of the means, not of the object, which was rather to be expected in 17*b* after Pro. 20:30), and a man whets פָּה, the appearance, the deportment, the nature, and manner of the conduct of his neighbour. The

proverb requires that the intercourse of man with man operate in the way of sharpening the manner and forming the habits and character; that one help another to culture and polish of manner, rub off his ruggedness, round his corners, as one has to make use of iron when he sharpens iron and seeks to make it bright. The jussive form is the oratorical form of the expression of that which is done, but also of that which is to be done.

The following three proverbs are connected with 17 in their similarity of form:

***18 Whosoever watcheth the fig-tree will enjoy its fruit;
And he that hath regard to his master attaineth to honour.***

Pro. 27:18. The first member is, as in v. 17, only the means of contemplating the second; as faithful care of the tree has fruit for a reward, so faithful regard for one's master, honour; נָצַר is used as at Isa. 27: 3, שָׁמַר as at Hos. 4:10, etc. — the proverb is valid in the case of any kind of master up to the Lord of lords. The fig-tree presented itself, as Heidenheim remarks, as an appropriate figure; because in the course of several years' training it brings forth its fruit, which the language of the Mishna distinguishes as פִּגְיוֹן, unripe, בּוֹחַל, half ripe, and צֶמֶל, fully ripe. To fruit in the first line corresponds honour in the second, which the faithful and attentive servant attains unto first on the part of his master, and then also from society in general.

***19 As it is with water, face correspondeth to face,
So also the heart of man to man.***

Pro. 27:19. Thus the traditional text is to be translated; for on the supposition that כַּמַּיִם must be used for כְּבַמַּיִם, yet it might not be translated: as in waters face corresponds to face (Jerome: *quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus respicientium*), because כִּי (*instar*) is always only a prep. and never conj. subordinating to itself a whole sentence (vid., under Psa. 38:14). But whether כַּמַּיִם, "like water," may be an abridgment of a sentence: "like as it is with water," is a question, and the translation of the LXX (Syr., Targ., Arab.), ὡςπερ οὐχ ὁμοια πρόσωπα προσώποις, κ.τ.λ., appears, according to Böttcher's ingenious conjecture, to have supposed כַּאֲשֶׁר בַּמַּיִם, from which the LXX derived כַּאֲשֶׁר בַּמַּיִם, *sicut non pares*. The thought is beautiful: as in the water-mirror each one beholds his own face (Luther: *der Scheme* = the shadow), so out of the heart of another each sees his own heart, i.e., he finds in another the dispositions and feelings of his own heart (Fleischer) — the face finds in water its reflection, and the heart of a man finds in man its echo; men are ὁμοιοπαθεῖς, and it is a fortunate thing that their heart is capable of the same sympathetic feelings, so that one can pour into the heart of another that which

fills and moves his own heart, and can there find agreement with it, and a re-echo. The expression with לְ is extensive: one corresponds to another, one belongs to another, is adapted to the other, turns to the other, so that the thought may be rendered in manifold ways: the divinely-ordained mutual relationship is always the ground-thought. This is wholly obliterated by Hitzig's conjecture בְּמוֹם, "what a mole on the face is to the face, that is man's heart to man," i.e., the heart is the dark spot in man, his *partie honteuse*. But the Scripture nowhere speaks of the human heart after this manner, at least the Book of Proverbs, in which לֵב frequently means directly the understanding. Far more intelligible and consistent is the conjecture of Mendel Stern, to which Abrahamsohn drew my attention: בְּמַיִם הַפְּנִיִּים לְפְנֵיִם, like water (viz., flowing water), which directs its course always forward, thus (is turned) the heart of man to man. This conjecture removes the syntactic harshness of the first member without changing the letters, and illustrates by a beautiful and excellent figure the natural impulse moving man to man. It appears, however, to us, in view of the LXX, more probable that בְּמַיִם is abbreviated from the original כְּאֲשֶׁר בְּמַיִם (cf. Pro. 24:29).

Pro. 27:20. The following proverb has, in common with the preceding, the catchword הָאָדָם, and the emphatic repetition of the same expression:

***20 The under-world and hell are not satisfied,
And the eyes of man are not satisfied.***

A *Kerî* וְאֲבֵדוֹן is here erroneously noted by Löwenstein, Stuart, and others. The *Kerî* to וְאֲבֵדָה is here וְאֲבָדוֹ, which secures the right utterance of the ending, and is altogether wanting ^{f222} in many MSS (e.g., Cod. *Jaman*). The stripping off of the ך from the ending וֹן is common in the names of persons and places (e.g., שְׁלֹמֹה, LXX Σολομών and שְׁלֹה); we write at pleasure either וֹ or הָ— (e.g., מְגִדוֹ), Olsh. § 215g. אֲבָדָה (אֲבָדוֹ) of the nature of a proper name, is already found in its full form אֲבֵדוֹן at Pro. 15:11, along with שְׁאוֹל; the two synonyms are, as was there shown, not wholly alike in the idea they present, as the underworld and realm of death, but are related to each other almost the same as Hades and Gehenna; אֲבֵדוֹן is what is called ^{f223} in the Jonathan-Targum בֵּית אֲבֵדָנָא, the place of destruction, i.e., of the second death (מְוֵתָא תִּנְיָנָא). The proverb places Hades and Hell on the one side, and the eyes of man on the other, on the same line in respect of their insatiableness. To this Fleischer adds the remark: cf. the Arab. *al'ayn l'a taml'aha all'a altrab*, nothing fills the eyes of man but at last the dust of the grave — a strikingly beautiful expression! If the dust of the grave fills the open eyes, then

they are full — fearful irony! The eye is the instrument of seeing, and consequently in so far as it always looks out after and farther, it is the instrument and the representation of human covetousness. The eye is filled, is satisfied, is equivalent to: human covetousness is appeased. But first “the desire of the eye,” 1Jo. 2:16, is meant in the proper sense. The eyes of men are not satisfied in looking and contemplating that which is attractive and new, and no command is more difficult to be fulfilled than that in Isa. 33:15, “...that shutteth his eyes from seeing evil.” There is therefore no more inexhaustible means, *impiae sepculationis*, than the desire of the eyes.

There follow here two proverbs which have in common with each other the figures of the crucible and the mortar:

***21 The crucible for silver and the furnace for gold,
And a man according to the measure of his praise;***

Pro. 27:21. i.e., silver and gold one values according to the result of the smelting crucible and the smelting furnace; but a man, according to the measure of public opinion, which presupposes that which is said in Pro. 12: 8, “according to the measure of his wisdom is a man praised.” מְהַלֵּל is not a ῥῆμα μέσον like our *Leumund* [renown], but it is a graduated idea which denotes fame down to evil *Lob* [fame], which is only *Lob* [praise] *per antiphrasin*. Ewald otherwise: “according to the measure of his glorying;” or Hitzig better: “according to the measure with which he praises himself,” with the remark: “מְהַלֵּל is not the act, the glorifying of self, but the object of the glorying (cf. מְדוֹן, מְבַטֵּחַ), i.e., that in which he places his glory.” Böttcher something further: “one recognises him by that which he is generally wont to praise in himself and others, persons and things.” Thus the proverb is to be understood; but in connection with Pro. 12: 8 it seems to us more probable that מְהַלֵּל is thought of as going forth from others, and not as from himself. In line first, Pro. 17: 3 *a* is repeated; the second line there is conformable to the first, according to which it should be here said that the praise of a man is for him what the crucible and the furnace is for metal. The LXX, Syr., Targ., Jerome, and the *Venet.* read לְפִי מְהַלְלוּ, and thereby obtain more concinnity. Luther accordingly translates:

***A man is tried by the mouth of his praise,
As silver in the crucible and gold in the furnace.***

Others even think to interpret man as the subject examining, and so they vocalize the words. Thus e.g., Fleischer: *Qualis est catinus argento et fornax auro, talis sit homo ori a quo laudatur*, so that “mouth of his praise” is equivalent to the man who praises him with his mouth. But where, as here, the

language relates to relative worth, the supposition for לָפִי, that it denotes, as at Pro. 12: 8, *pro ratione*, is tenable. And that the mouth of him who praises is a smelting crucible for him who is praised, or that the praised shall be a crucible for the mouth of him who praises, would be a wonderful comparison. The LXX has here also an additional distich which has no place in the Heb. text.

**22 Though thou bruise a fool in a mortar among grit with a pestle,
Yet would not his folly depart from him.**

Pro. 27:22. According to the best accredited accentuations, אִסְתַּכְתּוֹשׁ has *Illuj.* and בְּמִכְתֵּשׁ has *Pazer*, not *Rebia*, which would separate more than the *Dechi*, and disturb the sequence of the thoughts. The first line is long; the chief disjunctive in the sphere of the *Athnach* is *Dechi* of הָרֵי, this disjoins more than the *Pazer* of בְּמִ, and this again more than the *Legarmeh* of אֶת־הָאוֹיֵל. The ה of הַרְפּוֹת does not belong to the stem of the word (*Hitzig*), but is the article; רְפוֹת (from רוּף, to shake, to break; according to *Schultens*, from רָפַת, to crumble, to cut in pieces, after the form קִטּוֹר, which is improbable) are bruised grains of corn (peeled grain, grit), here they receive this name in the act of being bruised; rightly *Aquila* and *Theodotion*, ἐν μέσῳ ἔμπυρροσσομένων (grains of corn in the act of being pounded or bruised), and the *Venet.* μέσον τῶν πυρροσάνων. ^{f224}

In בְּעֵלִי (thus to be written after *Michlol* 43b, not בְּעֵלִי, as *Heidenheim* writes it without any authority) also the article is contained. מִכְתֵּשׁ is the vessel, and the ב of בְּעֵלִי is *Beth instrumenti*; עֵלִי (of lifting up for the purpose of bruising) is the club, pestle (*Luther: stempffel* = pounder); in the *Mishna*, *Beza* Pro. 1: 5, this word denotes a pounder for the cutting out of flesh. The proverb interprets itself: folly has become to the fool as a second nature, and he is not to be delivered from it by the sternest discipline, the severest means that may be tried; it is not indeed his substance (*Hitzig*), but an inalienable accident of his substance.

Pro. 27:23-27. An exhortation to rural industry, and particularly to the careful tending of cattle for breeding, forms the conclusion of the foregoing series of proverbs, in which we cannot always discern an intentional grouping. It is one of the *Mashal-odes* spoken of p. 10. It consists of 11 = 4 + 7 lines.

**23 Give heed to the look of thy small cattle,
Be considerate about the herds.**

**24 For prosperity continues not for ever;
And does the diadem continue from generation to generation?**

**25 (But) the hay is gone, and the after-growth appears,
And the grass of the mountains is gathered:**

**26 Lambs serve to clothe thee,
And goats are the price of a field.**

**27 And there is plenty of goats' milk for thy nourishment,
And for the nourishment of thy house,
And subsistence for thy maidens.**

The beginning directs to the fut., as is not common in these proverbs, vid., Pro. 26:26. With **ידע**, to take knowledge, which is strengthened by the *inf. intensivus*, is interchanged **שית לב**, which means at Pro. 24:32 to consider well, but here, to be careful regarding anything. **צאן** is the small or little cattle, thus sheep and goats. Whether **לעדרים** (here and at Isa. 17: 2) contains the article is questionable (Ges. § 35. 2 A), and, since the herds are called **העדרים**, is not probable; thus: direct thy attention to the herds, that is, to this, that thou hast herds. **פני** is the external side in general; here, the appearance which the sheep present; thus their condition as seen externally. In v. 24 I formerly regarded **נור** as a synonym of **גו**, to be understood of the produce of wool, or, with Hitzig, of the shearing of the meadow, and thus the produce of the meadow. But this interpretation of the word is untenable, and v. 25 provides for v. 24, thus understood, no natural continuation of thought. That **חסן** signifies a store, fulness of possessions, property, and abundance, has already been shown under Pro. 15: 6; but **נור** is always the mark of royal, and generally of princely dignity, and here denotes, *per meton. signi pro re signata*, that dignity itself. With the negative expression in 24a the interrogative in 24b is interchanged as at Job. 40: 9, with the implied negative answer; **ואם**, of an oath (“and truly not,” as at Isa. 62: 8), presents the same thought, but with a passionate colouring here unnecessary. Rightly Fleischer: “ready money, moveable property, and on the other hand the highest positions of honour, are far more easily torn away from a man, and secure to him far less of quiet prosperity, than husbandry, viewed particularly with respect to the rearing of cattle.” In other words: the possession of treasures and of a lofty place of power and of honour has not in itself the security of everlasting duration; but rural economy, and particularly the rearing of cattle, gives security for food and clothing. The *Chethib* **לדור דור** is found, e.g., at Exo. 3:15; the *Keri* **לדור ודור** substitutes the more usual form. If v. 25 was an independent whole (Hitzig: grass vanishes and fresh green appears, etc.), then the meaning here and onward would be that in the sphere of husbandry it is otherwise than is said in v. 24: there that which is consumed renews itself,

and there is an enlarging circulation. But this contrast to v. 24 must be expressed and formed unambiguously. The connection is rather this, that v. 23 commends the rearing of cattle, v. 24 confirms it, and 25 ff. discuss what real advantages, not dependent on the accidents of public and social life, it brings.

I rejoice to agree with Fleischer in the opinion that the perfects of v. 25 form a complex hypothetical antecedent to v. 26: *Quum evanuerit gramen (sc. vetus) et apparuerint herbae recentes et collecta fuerint pabula montium, agni vestitui tuo (inservient) et pretium agri (sc. a te emendi) erunt hirci*, i.e., then wilt thou nourish thy herds of sheep and goats with the grass on thy fields, and with the dried gathered hay; and these will yield for thee, partly immediately and partly by the money derived therefrom (viz., from the valuable goats not needed for the flocks), all that is needful for thy life. He also remarks, under גָּלָה, that it means to make a place void, empty (viz., to quit the place, *évacuer la forteresse*); hence to leave one's fatherland or home, to wander abroad; thus, rhetorically and poetically of things and possessions: to disappear. הָצִיר (from הָצַר, to be green) is hay, and דִּשְׂאָ the after-growing second crop (after-grass); thus a meadow capable of being mowed a second time is thought of. עֲשֻׁבוֹת הָרִים (with *Dag. dirimens*, as e.g., עֲנָבִי Deu. 32:32) are the herbage of the mountains. The time when one proceeds to sheep-shearing, v. 25 cannot intend to designate; it sets before us an interesting rural harvest scene, where, after a plentiful ingathering of hay, one sees the meadows again overspread with new grass (Ewald); but with us the shearing of sheep takes place in the month of May, when the warm season of the year is just at hand. The poet means in general to say, that when the hay is mown and now the herbage is grown up, and also the fodder from the mountains (Psa. 106:20) has been gathered home, when thus the barns are filled with plenty, the husbandman is guaranteed against the future on all sides by his stock of cattle. הָלַב (from הָלַב, Arab. *halyb*, with *halab*) is the usual metaplastic connecting form of הָלַב, milk. דִּי (from דִּי, like הִי from הִי), generally connected with the genitive of the person or thing, for which anything is sufficient (e.g., Pro. 25:16, דִּיֶּךָ, to which Fleischer compares Arab. *hasbuha, tassuha kifayuha*), has here the genitive of the thing of which, or in which, one has enough. The complex subject-conception is limited by *Rebia*, and the governing דִּי has the subordinated disjunctive *Legarmeh*. עֲנִים is a word of two genders (*epicoenum*), Gesen. § 107, 1d. In וְחַיִּים the influence of the ל still continues; one does not need to supply it meanwhile, since all that maintains and nourishes life can be called חַיִּים (*vita = victus*), e.g., 3:22. The LXX translates בִּיְהוָה by *σὺν θεραπόντων*, and omits (as also the Syr., but not the Syro-Hexap.) the last line as now superfluous; but that the maids attending

to the cattle — by whom we particularly think of milkers — are especially mentioned, intentionally presents the figure of a well-ordered household, full of varied life and activity (Job. 40:29).

CHAPTER 28

The preceding Mashal-ode (Pro. 27:23-27), commending the rearing of cattle, is a boundary. The series of proverbs beginning with the next chapter is not, however, a commencement, like that at Pro. 22:17; and Hitzig's supposition, that Pro. 28: 1-16 and 22:17 ff. have one and the same author, stands on a false foundation. The second proverb of the twenty-eighth chapter shows directly that this new series of proverbs is subordinated to the aim of the Hezekiah-collection beginning with 25, and thus has to be regarded as an original component part of it. The traces of the post-exilic period which Hitzig discovers in Pro. 28: 1-16 are not sufficient to remove the origin of the proverbs so far down from the times of Hezekiah. We take the first group, Pro. 28: 1-11, together; for **מבין** and **בינו**, pervading these eleven proverbs, gives to them, as a whole, a peculiar colouring; and Pro. 28:12 presents itself as a new beginning, going back to v. 2, which v. 1 precedes as a prelude.

***1 The godless flee without any one pursuing them;
But the righteous are bold like a lion.***

Pro. 28: 1. We would misinterpret the sequence of the accents if we supposed that it denoted **רשע** as obj.; it by no means takes **ואין־רודף** as a parenthesis. **רשע** belongs thus to **נסו** as collective sing. (cf. e.g., Isa. 16: 4b); ^{f225} in 1b, **יבטח**, as comprehensive or distributive (individualizing) singular, follows the plur. subject. One cannot, because the word is vocalized **בבכפיר** and not **בבכפיר**, regard **יבטח** as an attributive clause thereto (Ewald, like Jerome, *quasi leo confidens*); but the article, denoting the idea of kind, does not certainly always follow **כ**. We say, indifferently, **בארי** or **באר**, or **בלבאי**, and always **בארניה**, not **בארניה**. In itself, indeed, **יבטח** may be used absolutely: he is confident, undismayed, of the lion as well as of the leviathan, Job. 40:23. But it is suitable thus without any addition for the righteous, and **נסו** and **יבטח** correspond to each other as predicates, in accordance with the parallelism; the accentuation is also here correct. The perf. **נסו** denotes that which is uncaused, and yet follows: the godless flee, pursued by the terrible images that arise in their own wicked consciences, even when no external danger threatens. The fut. **יבטח** denotes that which continually happens: the righteous remains, even where external danger really threatens,

bold and courageous, after the manner of a young, vigorous lion, because feeling himself strong in God, and assured of his safety through Him.

Pro. 28: 2. There now follows a royal proverb, whose key-note is the same as that struck at Pro. 25: 2, which states how a country falls into the **ὄβκ ἀγαθόν** of the rule of the many:

***Through the wickedness of a land the rulers become many;
And through a man of wisdom, of knowledge, authority continues.***

If the text presented **בַּפְּשָׁא** as Hitzig corrects, then one might think of a political revolt, according to the usage of the word, 1Ki. 12:19, etc.; but the word is **בַּפְּשַׁע**, ^{f226} and **פְּשַׁע** (from **פָּשַׁע**, *dirumpere*) is the breaking through of limits fixed by God, apostasy, irreligion, e.g., Mic. 1: 5. But that many rulers for a land arise from such a cause, shows a glance into the Book of Hosea, e.g., Hos. 7:16: “They return, but not to the Most High (*sursum*); they are become like a deceitful bow; their princes shall then fall by the sword;” and Hos. 8: 4: “They set up kings, but not by me; they have made princes, and I knew it not.” The history of the kingdom of Israel shows that a land which apostatizes from revealed religion becomes at once the victim of party spirit, and a subject of contention to many would-be rulers, whether the fate of the king whom it has rejected be merited or not. But what is now the contrast which *2b* brings forward? The translation by Bertheau and also by Zöckler is impossible: “but through intelligent, prudent men, he (the prince) continueth long.” For *2a* does not mean a frequent changing of the throne, which in itself may not be a punishment for the sins of the people, but the appearance at the same time of many pretenders to the throne, as was the case in the kingdom of Israel during the interregnum after the death of Jeroboam II, or in Rome at the time of the thirty tyrants; **יְרִיבֵי** must thus refer to one of these “many” who usurp for a time the throne. **בְּאִנְשֵׁי** may also mean, Pro. 23:28, *inter homines*; but **אִישׁ**, with the adjective following, e.g., Pro. 11: 7; 12:23; 17:18; 21:16, always denotes one; and that translation also changes the **כֵּן** into a “so,” “then” introducing the concluding clause, which it altogether disregards as untranslatable. But equally impossible is Böttcher’s: “among intelligent, prudent people, one continues (in the government),” for then the subject-conception on which it depends would be slurred over. Without doubt **כֵּן** is here a substantive, and just this subject-conception. That it may be a substantive has been already shown at Pro. 11:19. There it denoted integrity (properly that which is right or genuine); and accordingly it means here, not the *status quo* (Fleischer: *idem rerum status*), but continuance, and that in a full sense: the jurisdiction (properly that which is upright and right), i.e., this, that right continues and is carried on in the land. Similarly Heidenheim, for he

glosses **כֵּן** by **מִכּוֹן הָאָרֶץ** ; and Umbreit, who, however, unwarned by the accent, subordinates this **כֵּן** [in the sense of “right”] to **יָדָא** as its object. Zöckler, with Bertheau, finds a difficulty in the *asyndeton* **מִבֵּין יָדָא**. But these words also, Neh. 10:29, stand together as a formula; and that this formula is in the spirit and style of the Book of Proverbs, passages such as Pro. 19:25; 29: 7 ^{f227} show. A practical man, and one who is at the same time furnished with thorough knowledge, is thus spoken of, and prudence and knowledge of religious moral character and worth are meant. What a single man may do under certain circumstances is shown in Pro. 21:22; Ecc. 9:15. Here one has to think of a man of understanding and spirit at the helm of the State, perhaps as the nearest counsellor of the king. By means of such an one, right continues long (we do not need to supply **לְהֵיוֹת** after “continues long”). If, on the one side, the State falls asunder by the evil conduct of the inhabitants of the land, on the other hand a single man who unites in himself sound understanding and higher knowledge, for a long time holds it together.

Pro. 28: 3. A proverb of a tyrant here connects itself with that of usurpers:

*A poor man and an oppressor of the lowly —
A sweeping rain without bringing bread.*

Thus it is to be translated according to the accents. Fleischer otherwise, but also in conformity with the accents: *Quales sunt vir pauper et oppressor miserorum, tales sunt pluvia omnia secum abripiens et qui panem non habent*, i.e., the relation between a poor man and an oppressor of the needy is the same as that between a rain carrying all away with it and a people robbed thereby of their sustenance; in other words: a prince or potentate who robs the poor of their possessions is like a pouring rain which floods the fruitful fields — the separate members of the sentence would then correspond with each other after the scheme of the chiasmus. But the comparison would be faulty, for **גֹּבֵר רָשָׁע** and **אִין לֶחֶם** fall together, and then the explanation would be *idem per idem*. A “sweeping rain” is one which has only that which is bad, and not that which is good in rain, for it only destroys instead of promoting the growth of the corn; and as the Arab, according to a proverb compared by Hitzig, says of an unjust sultan, that he is a stream without water, so an oppressor of the helpless is appropriately compared to a rain which floods the land and brings no bread. But then the words, “a poor man and an oppressor of the lowly,” must designate one person, and in that case the Heb. words must be accentuated, **גֹּבֵר רָשָׁע וְעֶשֶׂק דְּלִים** (cf. Pro. 29: 4 a). For, that the oppressor of the helpless departs himself toward the poor man like a sweeping rain which brings no bread, is a saying not intended to be here used, since this is altogether too obvious, that the poor man has nothing to hope for from such an extortioner.

But the comparison would be appropriate if 3a referred to an oppressive master; for one who belongs to a master, or who is in any way subordinated to him, has before all to expect from him that which is good, as a requital for his services, and as a proof of his master's condescending sympathy. It is thus asked whether "a poor man and an oppressor of the lowly" may be two properties united in the person of one master. This is certainly possible, for he may be primarily a poor official or an upstart (Zöckler), such as were the Roman proconsuls and procurators, who enriched themselves by impoverishing their provinces (cf. LXX Pro. 28:15); or a hereditary proprietor, who seeks to regain what he has lost by extorting it from his relatives and workmen. But רש (poor) is not sufficient to give this definite feature to the figure of the master; and what does this feature in the figure of the master at all mean? What the comparison 3b says is appropriate to any oppressive ruler, and one does not think of an oppressor of the poor as himself poor; he may find himself in the midst of shattered possessions, but he is not poor; much rather the oppressor and the poor are, as e.g., at Pro. 29:13, contrasted with each other. Therefore we hold, with Hitzig, that רש of the text is to be read *rosh*, whether we have to change it into ראש, or to suppose that the Jewish transcriber has here for once slipped into the Phoenician writing of the word; ^{f228} we do not interpret, with Hitzig, גבר ראש in the sense of ἄνθρωπος δυνάστης, Sir. 8: 1, but explain: a man (or master = גביר) is the head (cf. e.g., Jud. 11: 8), and oppresses the helpless. This rendering is probable, because רש גבר, a poor man, is a combination of words without a parallel; the Book of Proverbs does not once use the expression איש רש, but always simply רש (e.g., Pro. 28: 6; 29:13); and גבר is compatible with חכם and the like, but not with רש. If we stumble at the isolated position of ראש, we should consider that it is in a certain measure covered by דלים; for one has to think of the גבר, who is the ראש, also as the ראש of these דלים, as one placed in a high station who numbers poor people among his subordinates. The LXX translates ἀνδρείος ἐν ἀσεβείαις as if the words of the text were גבור רשע (cf. the interchange of גבר and גבור in both texts of Psa. 18:26), but what the LXX read must have been גבור להרשיא (Isa. 5:22); and what can גבור here mean? The statement here made refers to the ruinous conduct of a גבר, a man of standing, or גביר, a high lord, a "wicked ruler," Pro. 28:15. On the contrary, what kind of rain the rule of an ideal governor is compared to, Psa. 72: 1-8 tells.

***4 They who forsake the law praise the godless;
But they who keep the law become angry with them,***

Pro. 28: 4. viz. the godless, for רָשָׁע is to be thought of collectively, as at v. 1. They who praise the godless turn away from the revealed word of God (Psa. 73:11-15); those, on the contrary, who are true to God's word (Pro. 28:18) are aroused against them (vid., regarding גֵּרָה, Pro. 15:18), they are deeply moved by their conduct, they cannot remain silent and let their wickedness go unpunished; הַתְּנָרָה is zeal (excitement) always expressing itself, passing over into actions (syn. הַתְּעוֹרָר, Job. 17: 8).

Pro. 28: 5. A similar antithetic distich:

***Wicked men understand not what is right;
But they who seek Jahve understand all.***

Regarding the gen. expression אֲנִשְׁיֵרָע, vid., under Pro. 2:14. He who makes wickedness his element, falls into the confusion of the moral conception; but he whose end is the one living God, gains from that, in every situation of life, even amid the greatest difficulties, the knowledge of that which is morally right. Similarly the Apostle Joh. (1Jo. 2:20): “ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things” (οἶδατε πάντα): i.e., ye need to seek that knowledge which ye require, and which ye long after, not without yourselves, but in the new divine foundation of your personal life; from thence all that ye need for the growth of your spiritual life, and for the turning away from you of hostile influences, will come into your consciences. It is a potential knowledge, all-comprehensive in its character, and obviously a human relative knowledge, that is here meant.

Pro. 28: 6. What is stated in this proverb is a conclusion from the preceding, with which it is also externally connected, for רָשָׁע (= ראש, רשע, רע, and now רש), follow each other:

***Better a poor man who walketh in his innocence,
Than a double-going deceiver who is rich thereby.***

A variation of Pro. 19: 1. Stainlessness, *integritas vitae*, as a consequence of unreserved devotion to God, gives to a man with poverty a higher worth and nobility than riches connected with falsehood which “halts between two opinions” (1Ki. 18:21), and appears to go one way, while in reality it goes another. The two ways דְּרָבִיִּם (cf. Sir. 2:12, οὐαὶ ἀμαρτωλῶ... ἐπιβαίνοντι ἐπὶ δύο τρίβους) are, as v. 18, not ways going aside to the right or to the left of the right way, but the evil way which the deceiver truly walks in, and the good way which he pretends to walk in (Fleischer); the two ways of action placed over against one another, by one of which he masks the other.

7 He who keepeth instruction is a wise son;

But he that is a companion of profligates bringeth his father into shame.

Pro. 28: 7. We have translated תורה at v. 4 by “law;” here it includes the father’s instruction regarding the right way of life. נוֹצֵר תּוֹרָה, according to the nearest lying syntax, has to be taken as pred. זוללים are such as squander their means and destroy their health, vid., under Pro. 23:20 f. רָעָה signifies, as frequently from the idea of (cf. Pro. 29: 3) pasturing, or properly of tending, to take care of, and to have fellowship with. יִבְלִים [shall put to shame] denotes both that he himself does disgrace to him, and that he brings disgrace to him on the part of others.

Pro. 28: 8. This verse continues a series of proverbs (commencing in v. 7) beginning with a participle:

***He who increaseth his wealth by interest and usury,
Gathereth it for one who is benevolent toward the lowly.***

Wealth increased by covetous plundering of a neighbour does not remain with him who has scraped it together in so relentless a manner, and without considering his own advantage; but it goes finally into the possession of one who is merciful towards the poor, and thus it is bestowed in a manner that is pleasing to God (cf. Pro. 13:22, Job. 22:16 f.). The *Kerî*, which drops the second כ appears to wish to mitigate the sharpness of the distinction of the second idea supposed in its repetition. But Lev. 25:35-37, where an Israelite is forbidden to take usury and interest from his brother, the two are distinguished; and Fleischer rightly remarks that there נשך means usury or interest taken in money, and תרבית usury or interest taken in kind; i.e., of that which one has received in loan, such as grain, or oil, etc., he gives back more than he has received. In other words: נשך is the name of the interest for the capital that is lent, and מַרְבִּית, or, as it is here called תרבית, the more, the addition thereto, the increase (Luther: *ubersatz*). This meaning of gain by means of lending on interest remains in נשך; but תרבית, according to the later *usus loq.*, signifies gain by means of commerce, thus business-profit, vid., *Baba Mezîa*, v. 1. Instead of יִקְבְּצֵנּוּ, more recent texts have the *Kal*^{f229} לְחֹנֵן יִקְבְּצֵנּוּ also is, as Pro. 14:31; 19:17, *part. Kal*, not *inf. Poel*: *ad largiendum pauperibus* (Merc., Ewald, Bertheau), for there the person of him who presents the gift is undefined; but just this, that it is another and better-disposed, for whom, without having it in view, the collector gathers his stores, is the very point of the thought.

**9 He who turneth away his ear not to hear of the law,
Even his prayer is an abomination.**

Pro. 28: 9. Cf. Pro. 15: 8 and the argument 1Sa. 15:22. Not only the evil which such an one does, but also the apparent good is an abomination, an abomination to God, and *eo ipso* also in itself: morally hollow and corrupt; for it is not truth and sincerity, for the whole soul, the whole will of the suppliant, is not present: he is not that for which he gives himself out in his prayer, and does not earnestly seek that which he presents and expresses a wish for in prayer.

Pro. 28:10. A tristich beginning with a participle:

***He who misleads the upright into an evil way,
He shall fall into his own pit;
But the innocent shall inherit that which is good.***

In the first case, Pro. 26:27 is fulfilled: the deceiver who leads astray falls himself into the destruction which he prepared for others, whether he misleads them into sin, and thus mediately prepares destruction for them, or that he does this immediately by enticing them into this or that danger; for **בְּדֶרֶךְ רָע** may be understood of the way of wicked conduct, as well as of the experience of evil, of being betrayed, robbed, or even murdered. That those who are misled are called **יִשְׂרָיִם**, explains itself in the latter case: that they are such as he ought to show respect towards, and such as deserved better treatment, heightens the measure of his guilt. If we understand being morally led astray, yet may we not with Hitzig here find the “theory” which removes the punishment from the just and lays it on the wicked. The clause Pro. 11: 8 is not here applicable. The first pages of the Scripture teach that the deceiver does not by any means escape punishment; but certainly the deceiver of the upright does not gain his object, for his diabolical joy at the destruction of such an one is vain, because God again helps him with the right way, but casts the deceiver so much the deeper down. As the idea of **דֶּרֶךְ רָע** has a twofold direction, so the connections of the words may be genitival (*via mali*) as well as adjectival (*via mala*). **בְּשֹׁחָתוֹ** is not incorrectly written for **בְּשֹׁחֲתוֹ**, for **שֹׁחֲתִית** occurs (only here) with **שֹׁחֲתִית** as its warrant both from **שָׁחָה**, to bend, to sink; cf. **לְזוֹת** under Pro. 4:24. In line third, opposite to “he who misleads,” stand “the innocent” (pious), who, far from seeking to entice others into the evil way and bring them to ruin, are unreservedly and honestly devoted to God and to that which is good; these shall inherit good (cf. Pro. 3:35); even the consciousness of having made no man unhappy makes them happy; but even in their external relations there falls to them the possession of all good, which is the divinely ordained reward of the good.

**11 A rich man deems himself wise;
But a poor man that hath understanding searcheth him out,**

Pro. 28:11. or, as we have translated, Pro. 18:17, goes to the bottom of him, whereby is probably thought of the case that he seeks to use him as a means to an ignoble end. The rich man appears in his own eyes to be a wise man, i.e., in his self-delusion he thinks that he is so; but if he has anything to do with a poor man who has intelligence, then he is seen through by him. Wisdom is a gift not depending on any earthly possession.

We take vv. 12-20 together. A proverb regarding riches closes this group, as also the foregoing is closed, and its commencement is related in form and in its contents to v. 2:

**12 When righteous men triumph, the glory is great;
And when the godless rise, the people are searched for.**

Pro. 28:12. The first line of this distich is parallel with Pro. 29: 2; cf. 11:10a, 11a: when the righteous rejoice, viz., as conquerors (cf. e.g., Psa. 60: 8), who have the upper hand, then תַּפְאֲרָתָם, bright prosperity, is increased; or as Fleischer, by comparison of the Arab. *yawm alazynt* (day of ornament = festival day), explains: so is there much festival adornment, i.e., one puts on festival clothes, *signum pro re signata*: thus all appears festal and joyous, for prosperity and happiness then show themselves forth. רַבָּהּ is adj. and pred. of the substantival clause; Hitzig regards it as the attribute: “the is there great glory;” this supposition is possible (vid., Pro. 7:26, and under Psa. 89:51), but here it is purely arbitrary. 28a is parallel with 12b: “if the godless arise, attain to power and prominence, these men are spied out, i.e., as we say, after Zep. 1:12, they are searched for as with lamps. חִפְּשׁוּ אֲדָם is to be understood after Obadiah, 1: 6, cf. 2: 4: men are searched out, i.e., are plundered (in which sense Heidenheim regards חִפְּשׁ as here a transposition from חֲשׂוּ), or, with reference to the secret police of despotism: they are subjected to espionage. But a better gloss is יִסְתַּר אֲדָם 28a: the people let themselves be sought for, they keep themselves concealed in the inside of their houses, they venture not out into the streets and public places (Fleischer), for mistrust and suspicion oppress them all; one regards his person and property nowhere safer than within the four walls of his house; the lively, noisy, variegated life which elsewhere rules without, is as if it were dead.

**13 He that denieth his sin shall not prosper;
But he that acknowledgeth and forsaketh it shall obtain mercy.**

Pro. 28:13. Thus is this proverb translated by Luther, and thus it lives in the mouth of the Christian people. He who falsely disowns, or with self-deception excuses, if he does not altogether justify his sins, which are discernible as פְּשָׁעִים, has no success; he remains, after Psalm 32, in his conscience and life burdened with a secret ban; but he who acknowledges (the LXX has ἐξηγούμενος instead of ἑξομολογούμενος, as it ought to be) and forsakes (for the *remissio* does not follow the *confessio*, if there is not the accompaniment of *nova obedientia*) will find mercy (רַחֵם, as Hos. 14: 4). In close connection therewith stands the thought that man has to work out his salvation “with fear and trembling” (Php. 2:12).

***14 Well is it with the man who feareth always;
But he that is stiff-necked shall fall into mischief.***

Pro. 28:14. The *Piel* פָּחַד occurs elsewhere only at Isa. 51:13, where it is used of the fear and dread of men; here it denotes the anxious concern with which one has to guard against the danger of evil coming upon his soul. Aben Ezra makes God the object; but rather we are to regard sin as the object, for while the truly pious is one that “fears God,” he is at the same time one that “feareth evil.” The antithesis extends beyond the nearest lying contrast of fleshly security; this is at the same time more or less one who hardens or steels his heart (מִקְשָׁה לִבּוֹ), viz., against the word of God, against the sons of God in his heart, and against the affectionate concern of others about his soul, and as such rushes on to his own destruction (יְפוֹל בְּרָעָה), as at Pro. 17:20).

Pro. 28:15. This general ethical proverb is now followed by one concerning the king:

***15 A roaring lion and a ravening bear
Is a foolish ruler over a poor people,***

i.e., a people without riches and possessions, without lasting sources of help, — a people brought low by the events of war and by calamities. To such a people a tyrant is a twofold terror, like a ravenous monster. The LXX translate מוֹשֵׁל רָשָׁע by δὲ τυραννεῖ πτωχὸς ὢν, as if רָשָׁע had been transferred to this place from v. 3. But their translation of רָשָׁע, Pro. 29: 7, wavers between ἀσεβής and πτωχός, and of the bear they make a wolf זֵאֵב, dialectical דִּיב. שׂוֹקֵק designates a bear as lingering about, running hither and thither, impelled by extreme hunger (*Venet.* ἐπιόσσει), from שׂוֹקֵק = שָׁקַק, to drive, which is said of nimble running, as well as of urging impulses (cf. under Gen. 3:16), viz., hunger.

Pro. 28:16. Another proverb of the king:

*O prince devoid of understanding and rich in oppression!
He that hateth unrighteous gain continueth long.*

The old interpreters from the LXX interpret **וְרַב מֵעֲשָׂקוֹת** as pred. (as also Fleischer: *princeps qui intelligentiae habet parum idem oppressionis exercet multum*); but why did not the author use the word **הוֹא** or **וְהוֹא** instead of this ambiguous inconvenient **וְ**? Hitzig regards the first term as a nominative absolute, which does not assume a suffix in the second line. But examples such as 27a, 27: 7b, are altogether of a different sort; there occurs a reference that is in reality latent, and only finds not expression; the clause following the nominative is related to it as its natural predicate, but here 15b is an independent clause standing outside of any syntactical relation to 15a. Heidenheim has acknowledged that here there lies before us a proverb not in the form of a mere declaration, but of a warning address, and thus also it is understood by Ewald, Bertheau, Elster, and Zöckler. The accentuation seems to proceed on the same supposition. It is the only passage in the Book of Proverbs where **נְגִיד**, of the supreme ruler of the people, and where the plur. **תְּבוּנוֹת**, occur; it is not therefore at all strange if the proverb also has something strange in its formation. Often enough, proverbs are in the form of an address to a son, and generally to their reader; why not also one at least to the king? It is a proverb as when I say: Oh thou reckless, merry fellow! he who laughs much will sometimes weep long. Thus here the address is directed to the prince who is devoid of all wisdom and intelligence, which are necessary for a prince; but on this account the more earnest in exhortation to say to him that only one who hates defrauding the people attains an old age; thus that a prince who plunders the people wantonly shortens his life as a man, and his position as a ruler (cf. **שְׁנִיָּהֶם**, Pro. 24:22). The *Kerî* **שְׁנֵא** has the tone thrown back on the *penult.*, as the *Chethîb* **שְׁנֵאִי** would also have it, cf. **לְמַצְאִי**, Pro. 8: 9. The relation of a plur. subj. to a sing. pred. is as at Pro. 27:16. Regarding **בְּצַע**, vid., under Pro. 1:19. A confirmation of this proverb directing itself to princes is found in Jer. 22:13-19, the woe pronounced upon Jehoiakim. And a glance at the woe pronounced in Hab. 2:12, shows how easily v. 17 presents itself in connection.

*17 A man burdened with the guilt of blood upon his soul
Fleeth to the pit; let no one detain him.*

Pro. 28:17. Luther translates: “A man that doeth violence to the blood of any one,” as if he had read the word **עָשָׂק**. Löwenstein persuades himself that **עָשָׂק** may mean “having oppressed,” and for this refers to **לְבוּשׁ**, having clothed, in

the Mishna נָשׂוּי רָכֹוּב, Lat. *coenatus, juratus*; but none of all these cases are of the same nature, for always the conduct designated is interpreted as a suffering of that which is done, e.g., the drawing on, as a being clothed; the riding, as a being ridden, etc. Of עֲשֵׂק, in the sense of the oppression of another, there is no such *part. pass.* as throws the action as a condition back upon the subject. This is valid also against Aben Ezra, who supposes that עֲשֵׂק means oppressing after the forms אָגוּר, שָׁדוּד, שָׁכוּן, for of שָׁכוּן, settled = dwelling, that which has just been said is true; that אָגוּר is equivalent to אָגַר, cf. regarding it under Pro. 30: 1, and that שָׁדוּד, Psal. 137: 8, is equivalent to שָׁדַד, is not true. Kimchi adds, under the name of his father (Joseph Kimchi), also שָׁחַוּט, Jer. 9: 7 = שׁוֹחַט; but that “slaughtered” can be equivalent to slaughtering is impossible. Some MSS have the word עֲשֵׂק, which is not inadmissible, but not in the sense of “accused” (Löwenstein), but: persecuted, exposed to war; for עֲשֵׂק signifies to treat hostilely, and post-bibl. generally to aspire after or pursue anything, e.g., עָסוּק בְּדַבְרֵי תֹרָה, R. עֵשׂ (whence *Piel contractare*, cf. Isa. 23: 2, according to which עֲשֵׂק appears to be an intensifying of this עֵשׂ). However, there is no ground for regarding עֲשֵׂק^{f230} as not original, nor in the sense of “hard pressed;” for it is not used of avenging persecution, but: inwardly pressed, for Isa. 38:14 עֲשֵׂקָהּ also signifies the anguish of a guilty conscience. Whoever is inwardly bowed down by the blood of a man whom he has murdered, betakes himself to a ceaseless flight to escape the avenger of blood, the punishment of his guilt, and his own inward torment; he flees and finds no rest, till at last the grave (בּוֹר according to the Eastern, i.e., the Babylonian, mode of writing בַּר) receives him, and death accomplishes the only possible propitiation of the murderer. The exhortation, “let no one detain him,” does not mean that one should not lay hold on the fugitive; but, since תִּמְדָּה בִּי does not mean merely to hold fast, but to hold right, that one should not afford him any support, any refuge, any covering or security against the vengeance which pursues him; that one should not rescue him from the arm of justice, and thereby invade and disturb the public administration of justice, which rests on moral foundations; on the other side, the Book of Proverbs, Pro. 24:11 f., has uttered its exhortation to save a human life whenever it is possible to do so. The proverb lying before us cannot thus mean anything else than that no one should give to the murderer, as such, any assistance; that no one should save him clandestinely, and thereby make himself a partaker of his sin. Grace cannot come into the place of justice till justice has been fully recognised. Human sympathy, human forbearance, under the false title of grace, do not stand in contrast to this justice. We must, however, render אִל־תִּמְכֹּרֶנּוּ not directly as an admonition against that

which is immoral; it may also be a declaration of that which is impossible: only let no one support him, let no one seek to deliver him from the unrest which drives him from place to place. This is, however, in vain; he is unceasingly driven about to fulfil his lot. But the translation: *nemine eum sustinente* (Fleischer), is inadmissible; a mere declaration of a fact without any subjective colouring is never **ל** *seq. fut.*

**18 He who walketh blamelessly is helped,
And he who is perverse in a double way suddenly perisheth.**

Pro. 28:18. The LXX translate **תמים** by **δικαίως** (as the accusative of manner), Aquila and Theodotion by **τέλειος**; but it may also be translated **τέλειον** or **τελειότητα**, as the object accus. of Pro. 2: 7. Instead of **דְּרָכָיִם עֲקָשׁ**, v. 6, there is here **נְעַקְשׁ דְּרָכָיִם**, obliquely directed in a double way, or reflex bending himself. At v. 6 we have interpreted the *dual* **דְּרָכָיִם** rightly, thus **בְּאַחַת** cannot refer back to one of these two ways; besides, **דְּרָךְ** as fem. is an anomaly, if not a solecism. **בְּאַחַת** signifies, like the Aram. **בְּחֶדָּא**, either all at once (for which the Mish. **בְּאַחַת**, Aram. **בְּחֶדָּא**), or once (= **אַחַת בְּכַפְּאָם**), and it signifies in the passage before us, not: once, *aliquando*, ass Nolde, with Flacius, explains, but: all at once, i.e., as Geier explains: *penitus, sic ut pluribus casibus porro non sit opus*. Schultens compares:

“Procubuit moriens et humum semel ore momordit.”^{f231}

Rightly Fleischer: *repente totus concidet*.

**19 He who cultivateth his land is satisfied with bread,
And he that graspeth after vanities is satisfied with poverty.**

Pro. 28:19. A variation of Pro. 12:11. The pred. here corresponds to its contrast. On **רִישׁ** (here and at Pro. 31: 7), instead of the more frequent **רֵאשׁ**, cf. Pro. 10: 4.

Pro. 28:20. To this proverb of the cultivation of the land as the sure source of support, the next following stands related, its contents being cognate:

**20 A strong, upright man is enriched with blessings;
But he that hastens to become rich remains not unpunished.**

אִישׁ אֲמוּנִים, Pro. 20: 6, as well as **אֲמוּנֹת**, **א**, denotes a man *bonae fidei*; but the former expression refers the description to a constancy and certainty in the relations of favour and of friendship, here to rectitude or integrity in walk and conduct; the plur. refers to the all-sidedness and the ceaselessness of the activity. **בְּרָכוֹת** is related, as at Pro. 10: 6: the idea comprehends blessings on

the side of God and of man, thus *benedictio rei* and *benedictio voti*. On the contrary, he who, without being careful as to the means, is in haste to become rich, remains not only unblessed, but also is not guiltless, and thus not without punishment; also this **לֹא יִנְקָה** (e.g., Pro. 6:29), frequently met in the Mishle, is, like **בְּרִכּוֹת**, the union of two ideas, for generally the bibl. mode of conception and language comprehends in one, sin, guilt, and punishment.

With a proverb, in the first half of which is repeated the beginning of the second appendix, Pro. 24:23, a new group commences:

**21 Respect of persons is not good;
And for a morsel of bread a man may become a transgressor.**

Pro. 28:21. Line first refers to the administration of justice, and line second — the special generalized — to social life generally. The “Morsel of bread,” as example of a bribe by means of which the favour of the judge is purchased, is too low a conception. Hitzig well: “even a trifle, a morsel of bread (1Sa. 2:36), may, as it awakens favour and dislike within us, thus in general call forth in the will an inclination tending to draw one aside from the line of strict rectitude.” Geier compares A Gellius’ *Noct. Att.* i. 15, where Cato says of the Tribune Coelius: *Frusto panis conduci potest vel ut taceat vel ut loquatur.*

**22 The man of an evil eye hasteneth after riches,
And knoweth not that want shall come upon him.**

Pro. 28:22. Hitzig renders **אִישׁ וְגוֹר** [the man of an evil eye] as apos. of the subject; but in that case the phrase would have been **אִישׁ רָע עֵין נְבָהֵל לְהוֹן** (cf. e.g., Pro. 29: 1). **רָע עֵין** (Pro. 23: 6) is the jealous, envious, grudging, and at the same time covetous man. It is certainly possible that an envious man consumes himself in ill-humour without quietness, as Hitzig objects; but as a rule there is connected with envy a passionate endeavour to raise oneself to an equal height of prosperity with the one who is the object of envy; and this zeal, proceeding from an impure motive, makes men blind to the fact that thereby they do not advance, but rather degrade themselves, for no blessing can rest on it; discontentedness loses, with that which God has assigned to us, deservedly also that which it has. The *pret.* **נְבָהֵל**, the expression of a fact; the *part.* **נְבָהֵל**, the expression of an habitual characteristic action; the word signifies *praeceps* (*qui praeceps fertur*), with the root-idea of one who is unbridled, who is not master of himself (vid., under Psa. 2: 5, and above at Pro. 20:21). The phrase wavers between **נְבָהֵל** (Kimchi, under **בְּהֵל**; and Norzi, after Codd. and old editions) and **נְבָהֵל** (thus, e.g., Cod. *Jaman*); only at Psa. 30: 8 **נְבָהֵל** stands unquestioned. **חָסֵר** [want] is recognised by Symmachus, Syr., and Jerome. To

this, as the authentic reading, cf. its ingenious rendering of *Bereschith Rabba*, c. 58, to Gen. 23:14. The LXX reads, from 22*b*, that a חֲסִיד, ἑλεήμων, will finally seize the same riches, according to which Hitzig reads חֲסִיד, disgrace, shame (cf. Pro. 25:10).

**23 He that reproveth a man who is going backwards,
Findeth more thanks than the flatterer.**

Pro. 28:23. It is impossible that *aj* can be the suffix of אֲחֲרָי; the Talmud, *Tamid* 28*a*, refers it to God; but that it signifies: after my (Solomon's) example or precedence (Aben Ezra, Ahron b. Josef, *Venet.*, J. H. Michaelis), is untenable — such a name given by the teacher here to himself is altogether aimless. Others translate, with Jerome: *Qui corripit hominem gratiam postea inveniet apud eum magis, quam ille qui per linguae blandimenta decipit*, for they partly purpose to read אֲחֲרַיִבֵן, partly to give to אֲחֵי the meaning of *postea*. אֲחֲרָי, Ewald says, is a notable example of an adverb. Hitzig seeks to correct this adv. as at Neh. 3:30 f., but where, with Keil, אֲחֲרָי is to be read; at Jos. 2: 7, where אֲחֲרָי is to be erased; and at Deu. 2:30, where the traditional text is accountable. This אֲחֲרָי may be formed like אֲחֵי and אֲחֵי; but if it had existed, it would not be a ἀπαξ λεγ. The accentuation also, in the passage before us, does not recognise it; but it takes אֲחֲרָי and אֲדָם together, and how otherwise than that it appears, as Ibn-Jachja in his *Grammar*, and Immanuel^{f232} have recognised it, to be a noun terminating in *aj*. It is a formation, like לְפָנַי, 1Ki. 6:10 (cf. Olshausen's *Lehrb.* p. 428 f.), of the same termination as אֲחֵי, אֲחֵי, and in the later Aram.-Heb. אֲחֵי, and the like. The variant אֲחֲרָי, noticed by Heidenheim, confirms it; and the distinction between different classes of men (vid., p. 28) which prevails in the Book of Proverbs favours it. A אֲדָם אֲחֲרָי is defined, after the manner of Jeremiah (Jer. 7:24): a man who is directed backwards, and not לְפָנַי, forwards. Not the renegade — for מוֹכִיחַ, *opp.* מַחֲלִיק לְשׁוֹן, does not lead to so strong a conception — but the retrograder is thus called in German: *Rüchläufige* [one who runs backwards] or *Rückwendige* [one who turns backwards], who turns away from the good, the right, and the true, and always departs the farther away from them (Immanuel: going backwards in his nature or his moral relations). This centrifugal direction, leading to estrangement from the fear of Jahve, or, what is the same thing, from the religion of revelation, would lead to entire ruin if unreserved and fearless denunciation did not interpose and seek to restrain it; and he who speaks^{f233} so truly, openly, and earnestly home to the conscience of one who is on the downward course, gains for himself thereby, on the part of him whom he has directed aright, and on the part of all who are well disposed, better

thanks (and also, on the part of God, a better reward, Jam. 5:19 f.) than he who, speaking to him, smooths his tongue to say to him who is rich, or in a high position, only that which is agreeable. *Laudat adulator, sed non est verus amator*. The second half of the verse consists, as often (Psa. 73: 8; Job. 33: 1; cf. *Thorath Emeth*, p. 51), of only two words, with *Mercha Silluk*.

**24 He who robbeth his father and mother, and saith: It is no wrong,
Is a companion of the destroyer.**

Pro. 28:24. The second line is related to *Pro. 18: 9b*. Instead of *dominus perditionis* there found, there is here **אִישׁ מְשַׁחֵת**, *vir perdens (perditor)*; the word thus denotes a man who destroys, not from revenge, but from lust, and for the sake of the life of men, and that which is valuable for men; thus the spoiler, the incendiary, etc. Instead of **אֶחָד** there, here we have **חָבֵר** in the same sense. He who robs his parents, i.e., takes to himself what belongs to them, and regards his doing so as no particular sin, ^{f234} because he will at last come to inherit it all (cf. *Pro. 20:21* with *Pro. 19:26*), to to be likened to a man who allows himself in all offences against the life and property of his neighbour; for what the deed of such a son wants in external violence, it makes up in its wickedness, because it is a rude violation of the tenderest and holiest demands of duty.

**25 The covetous stirreth up strife;
But he that trusteth in Jahve is richly comforted.**

Pro. 28:25. Line first is a variation of *Pro. 15:18 a*; **רָחֵב־נֶפֶשׁ** is not to be interchanged with **רָחֵב־לֵב**, *Pro. 21: 4*. He is of a wide heart who haughtily puffs himself up, of a wide soul (cf. with Schultens **הִרְחִיב נֶפֶשׁוֹ**, of the opening up of the throat, or of revenge, *Isa. 5:14*; *Hab. 2: 5*) who is insatiably covetous; for **לֵב** is the spiritual, and **נֶפֶשׁ** the natural, heart of man, according to which the widening of the heart is the overstraining of self-consciousness, and the widening of the soul the overstraining of passion. Rightly the LXX, according to its original text: **ἄπληστος ἀνὴρ κινεῖ** (thus with Hitzig for **κρινεῖ**) **νεΐκη**. Line second is a variation of *Pro. 16:20*; *29:25*. Over against the insatiable is he who trusts in God (**וַבַּחַח**, with *Gaja* to the vocal, concluding the word, for it follows a word accented on the first syllable, and beginning with a guttural; cf. **אֶחָד**, *Pro. 29: 2*; **אֶפֶן**, *Pro. 29:18*), that He will bestow upon him what is necessary and good for him. One thus contented is easily satisfied (compare with the word *Pro. 11:25*; *13: 4*, and with the matter, *Pro. 10: 3*; *13:24*), is externally as well as internally appeased; while that other, never contented, has no peace, and creates dispeace around him.

Pro. 28:26. The following proverb assumes the **בְּמַחְסוֹר** of the foregoing: ^{f235}

***26 He that trusteth in his own heart is a fool;
But he that walketh in wisdom shall escape.***

From the promise in the second line, Hitzig concludes that a courageous heart is meant, but when by itself **לֵב** never bears this meaning. He who trusteth in his own heart is not merely one who is guided solely “by his own inconsiderate, defiant impulse to act” (Zöckler). The proverb is directed against a false subjectivity. The heart is that fabricator of thoughts, of which, as of man by nature, nothing good can be said, Gen. 6: 5; 8:21. But wisdom is a gift from above, and consists in the knowledge of that which is objectively true, that which is normatively godlike. **הַלֵּךְ בְּחָכְמָה** is he who so walks that he has in wisdom a secure authority, and has not then for the first time, when he requires to walk, need to consider, to reckon, to experiment. Thus walking in the way of wisdom, he escapes dangers to which one is exposed who walks in foolish confidence in his own heart and its changeful feelings, thoughts, imaginations, delusions. One who thoughtlessly boasts, who vainly dreams of victory before the time, is such a person; but confidence in one’s own heart takes also a hundred other forms. Essentially similar to this proverb are the words of Jer. 9:22 f., for the wisdom meant in 26b is there defined at v. 23.

***27 He that giveth to the poor suffereth no want;
But he that covereth his eyes meeteth many curses.***

Pro. 28:27. In the first line the pronoun **לוֹ**, referring back to the subject noun, is to be supplied, as at Pro. 27: 7 **לָהּ**. He who gives to the poor has no want (**מַחְסוֹר**), for God’s blessing reimburses him richly for what he bestows. He, on the other hand, who veils (**מַעְלִים**, cf. the *Hithpa.*, Isa. 58: 7) his eyes so as not to see the misery which calls forth compassion, or as if he did not see the misery which has a claim on his compassion; he is (becomes) rich in curses, i.e., is laden with the curses of those whose wants he cared not for; curses which, because they are deserved, change by virtue of a divine requital (vid., Sir. 4: 5 f.; Tob. 4: 7) into all kinds of misfortunes (*opp.* **רַב־בְּרָכוֹת**, 20a). **מֵאָרָה** is constructed after the form **מִקְרָה**, **מִגְרָה** from **אָרַר**.

Pro. 28:28. The following proverb resembles the beginnings Pro. 28: 2, 12. The proverbs Pro. 28:28; 29: 1, 2, 3, form a beautiful square grasp, in which the first and third, and the second and fourth, correspond to one another.

***28 When the godless rise up, men hide themselves;
And when they perish, the righteous increase.***

Line first is a variation of 12*b*. Since they who hide themselves are merely called men, people, the meaning of יִרְבוּ is probably not this, that the righteous then from all sides come out into the foreground (Hitzig), but that they prosper, multiply, and increase as do plants, when the worms, caterpillars, and the like are destroyed (Fleischer); Löwenstein glosses יִרְבוּ by יַגְדְּלוּ, they become great = powerful, but that would be Elihu's style, Job. 33:12, which is not in common use; the names of masters and of those in authority, רַב, רַבִּי, רִבְּן, רִבְּנוֹת, are all derived from רָבַב, not from רָבָה. The increase is to be understood of the prosperous growth (to become great = to increase, as perhaps also Gen. 21:10) of the congregation of the righteous, which gains in the overthrow of the godless an accession to its numbers; cf. Pro. 29: 2, and especially 16.

CHAPTER 29

Pro. 29: 1. A general ethical proverb here follows:

*A man often corrected who hardeneth his neck,
Shall suddenly go to ruin without remedy.*

Line second = Pro. 6:15*b*. The connection אִישׁ תִּנְכַּחֲוֹת must make the nearest impression on a reader of the Book of Proverbs that they mean a censurer (reprehender), but which is set aside by what follows, for the genit. after אִישׁ is, Pro. 16:29; 26:21; 29:10; 13:20, the designation of that which proceeds from the subject treated. And since תִּנְכַּחֲוֹת, Psa. 37:15, Job. 23: 4, denotes counter evidence, and generally rejoinders, thus in the first line a reasoner is designated who lets nothing be said to him, and nothing be shown to him, but contradicts all and every one. Thus e.g., Fleischer: *vir qui correptus contradicit et cervicem obdurat*. But this interpolated *correptus* gives involuntary testimony of this, that the nearest lying impression of the אִישׁ תוֹ suffers a change by עֲרַף (לב) הַקֶּשֶׁה : if we read עֲרַף with תוֹ, the latter then designates the *correptio*, over against which is placed obstinate boldness (Syr., Targ., Jerome, Luther), and תוֹ shows itself thus to be *gen. objecti*, and we have to compare the gen. connection of אִישׁ, as at Pro. 18:23; 21:17, or rather at 1Ki. 20:42 and Jer. 15:10. But it is unnecessary, with Hitzig, to limit תוֹ to divine infliction of punishment, and after Hos. 5: 9, Isa. 37: 3, to read תוֹכַחֲוֹת [punishment], which occurs, Psa. 149: 7, in the sense of punishment inflicted by man.^{f236}

Besides, we must think first not of actual punishment, but of chastening, reproving words; and the man to whom are spoken the reproving words is one

whose conduct merits more and more severe censure, and continually receives correction from those who are concerned for his welfare. Hitzig regards the first line as a conditional clause: “Is a man of punishment stiff-necked?”.... This is syntactically impossible. Only **מקשה ערף** could have such force: a man of punishment, if he.... But why then did not the author rather write the words **והוא מקשה ערף** ? Why then could not **מקשה ערף** be a co-ordinated further description of the man? Cf. e.g., Exo. 17:21. The door of penitence, to which earnest, well-meant admonition calls a man, does not always remain open. He who with stiff-necked persistence in sin and in self-delusion sets himself in opposition to all endeavours to save his soul, shall one day suddenly, and without the prospect and possibility of restoration (cf. Jer. 19:11), become a wreck. *Audi doctrinam si vis vitare ruinam.*

Pro. 29: 2. The general ethical proverb is here followed by one that is political:

***2 When the righteous increase, the people rejoice;
And when a godless man ruleth, the people mourn.***

Regarding **בְּרִבּוֹת צַדִּיק** (Aquila rightly, *ἐν τῷ πληθύνει δικαίους*), vid., at Pro. 28:28. If the righteous form the majority, or are in such numbers that they are the party that give the tone, that form the predominant power among the people (Fleischer, *cum incrementa capiunt iusti*), then the condition of the people is a happy one, and their voice joyful (Pro. 11:10); if, on the contrary, a godless man or (after Pro. 28: 1) godless men rule, the people are made to sigh (**וַיֵּאָנָח עַם**, with the *Gaja*, according to rule). “There is reason,” as Hitzig remarks, “why **עַם** should be placed first with, and then without, the article.” In the first case it denotes the people as those among whom there is such an increase of the righteous; in the second case, the article is wanting, because it is not generally used in poetry; and, besides, its absence makes the second line consist of nine syllables, like the first.

Pro. 29: 3. This political proverb is now followed by one of general ethics:

***3 A man who loveth wisdom delighteth his father;
And he who keepeth company with harlots spendeth his substance.***

Line first is a variation of Pro. 10: 1. **אִישׁ-אֹהֵב** has, according to rule, the *Metheg*, cf. 9a. **אִישׁ** is man, without distinction of age, from childhood (Gen. 4: 1) up to ripe old age (Isa. 66:13); love and dutiful relation towards father and mother never cease. Line second reminds of Pro. 28: 7 (cf. Pro. 13:20).

A series of six proverb follows, beginning with a proverb of the king:

**4 A king by righteousness bringeth the land to a good condition;
But a man of taxes bringeth it down.**

Pro. 29: 4. The *Hiph.* **הֶעֱמִיד** signifies to make it so that a person or matter comes to stand erect and stand fast (e.g., 1Ki. 15: 4); **הָרַס**, to tear down, is the contrary of building up and extending (Psa. 28: 5), cf. **נִהְרַס**, *opp.* **רוּם**, of the state, Pro. 11:11. By **אִישׁ הָרָר** is meant the king, or a man of this kind; but it is questionable whether as a man of gifts, i.e., one who lets gifts be made to him (Grotius, Fleischer, Ewald, Bertheau, Zöckler), or as a man of taxes, i.e., who imposes them (Midrash, Aben Ezra, Ralbag, Rosenmüller, Hitzig). Both interpretations are possible, for **הָרָר** means tax (lifting, raising = dedicating), free-will offerings, as well as gifts that are obligatory and required by the laws of nature. Since the word, in the only other place where it occurs, Eze. 45:13-16, is used of the relation of the people to the prince, and denotes a legally-imposed tax, so it appears also here, in passing over from the religious sphere to the secular, to be meant of taxes, and that according to its fundamental conception of gifts, i.e., such taxes as are given on account of anything, such as the produce of the soil, manufactures, heritages. Thus also is to be understood Aquila's and Theodotion's *ἀνὴρ ἀφαιρεμάτων*, and the rendering also of the *Venet.* *ἐράνων*. A man on the throne, covetous of such gifts, brings the land to ruin by exacting contributions; on the contrary, a king helps the land to a good position, and an enduring prosperity, by the exercise of right, and that in appointing a well-proportioned and fit measure of taxation.

**5 A man who flattereth his neighbour
Spreadeth a net for his steps.**

Pro. 29: 5. Fleischer, as Bertheau: *vir qui alterum blanditiis circumvenit*; but in the **אָל** there does not lie in itself a hostile tendency, an intention to do injury; it interchanges with **אָל**, Psa. 36: 3, and what is expressed in line second happens also, without any intention on the part of the flatterer: the web of the flatterer before the eyes of a neighbour becomes, if he is caught thereby, a net for him in which he is entangled to his own destruction (Hitzig). **הַחֲלִיק** signifies also, without any external object, Pro. 28:23; 2:16, as internally transitive: to utter that which is smooth, i.e., flattering. **פִּעְמִיו** is, as Psa. 57: 7 = **רַגְלָיו**, for which it is the usual Phoenician word.

**6 In the transgression of the wicked man lies a snare;
But the righteous rejoiceth [jubelt] and is glad.**

Pro. 29: 6. Thus the first line is to be translated according to the sequence of the accents, *Mahpach, Munach, Munach, Athnach*, for the second *Munach* is

the transformation of *Dechi*; אִישׁ רָע thus, like אֲנִשִּׁי־רָע, Pro. 28: 5, go together, although the connection is not, like this, genitival, but adjectival. But there is also this sequence of the accents, *Munach, Dechi, Munach, Athnach*, which separates רָע and אִישׁ. According to this, Ewald translates: “in the transgression of one lies an evil snare;” but in that case the word ought to have been מוֹקֵשׁ רָע, as at Pro. 12:13; for although the numeral רַבִּים sometimes precedes its substantive, yet no other adjective ever does; passages such as Isa. 28:21 and 10:30 do not show the possibility of this position of the words. In this sequence of accents the explanation must be: in the wickedness of a man is the evil of a snare, i.e., evil is the snare laid therein (Böttcher); but a reason why the author did not write מוֹקֵשׁ רָע would also not be seen there, and thus we must abide by the accentuation אִישׁ רָע. The righteous also may fall, yet he is again raised by means of repentance and pardon; but in the wickedness of a bad man lies a snare into which having once fallen, he cannot again release himself from it, Pro. 24:16. In the second line, the form יָרוּן, for יָרָן, is defended by the same metaplastic forms as יָשׁוּד, Psa. 91: 6; יָרוּץ, Isa. 42: 4; and also that the order of the words is not יְשִׁמַּח וְיָרִין (LXX ἐν χαρᾷ καὶ ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ; Luther: *frewet sich und hat wonne* [rejoices and has pleasure]), is supported by the same sequence of ideas, Zec. 2:14, cf. Jer. 31: 7: the *Jubeln* is the momentary outburst of gladness; the *Freude* [gladness], however, is a continuous feeling of happiness. To the question as to what the righteous rejoiceth over [*jubelt*] and is glad [*greuet*] because of, the answer is not: because of his happy release from danger (Zöckler), but: because of the prosperity which his virtue procures for him (Fleischer). But the contrast between the first and second lines is not clear and strong. One misses the expression of the object or ground of the joy. Cocceius introduces into the second line a *si lapsus fuerit*. Schultens translates, *justus vel succumbens triumphabit*, after the Arab. *rânf. o.*, which, however, does not mean *succumbere*, but *subigere* (vid., under Psa. 78:65). Hitzig compares Arab. *raymf. i., discedere, relinquere*, and translates: “but the righteous passeth through and rejoiceth.” Böttcher is inclined to read יָרָאָה וְשִׂמַּח, he sees it (what?) and rejoiceth. All these devices, however, stand in the background compared with Pinsker’s proposal (*Babylon.-Heb. Punktationssystem*, p. 156):

***“On the footsteps of the wicked man lie snares,
But the righteous runneth and is glad,”***

i.e., he runneth joyfully (like the sun, Psa. 19: 6) on the divinely-appointed way (Psa. 119:132), on which he knows himself threatened by no danger. The change of בַּפְּשַׁע into בִּפְשָׁע has Pro. 12:13 against it; but יָרוּץ may be

regarded, after Pro. 4:12, cf. 18:10, as the original from which יִרְוֹן is corrupted.

***7 The righteous knoweth the cause of the poor,
But the godless understandeth no knowledge.***

Pro. 29: 7. The righteous knoweth and recogniseth the righteous claims of people of low estate, i.e., what is due to them as men, and in particular cases; but the godless has no knowledge from which such recognition may go forth (cf. as to the expression, Pro. 19:25). The proverb begins like Pro. 12:10, which commends the just man's compassion to his cattle; this commends his sympathy with those who are often treated as cattle, and worse even than cattle. The LXX translates 7*b* twice: the second time reading רשׁ instead of רשׁע, it makes nonsense of it.

***8 Men of derision set the city in an uproar,
But wise men allay anger.***

Pro. 29: 8. Isaiah 28 shows what we are to understand by אָנְשֵׁי לְצוֹן : men to whom nothing is holy, and who despise all authority. The *Hiphil* יִפְיְחוּ does not signify *irretiant*, from פָּחַח (Venet. *παγιδιοῦσι*, after Kimchi, Aben Ezra, and others), but *sufflant*, from פּוּחַ (Rashi: יִלְהִיבוּ): they stir up or excite the city, i.e., its inhabitants, so that they begin to burn as with flames, i.e., by the dissolution of the bonds of mutual respect and of piety, by the letting loose of passion, they disturb the peace and excite the classes of the community and individuals against each other; but the wise bring it about that the breathings of anger that has broken forth, or is in the act of breaking forth, are allayed. The anger is not that of God, as it is rendered by Jerome and Luther, and as יִפְיְחוּ freely translated might mean. The Aram. err in regard to יִפְיְחוּ in passages such as Pro. 6:19.

***9 If a wise man has to contend with a fool,
He [the fool] rageth and laugheth, and hath no rest.***

Pro. 29: 9. Among the old translators, Jerome and Luther take the “wise man” as subject even of the second line, and that in all its three members: *vir sapiens si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur sive reideat, non inveniet requiem*. Thus Schultens, C. B. Michaelis, Umbreit, Ewald, Elster, and also Fleischer: “The doubled *Vav* is correlative, as at Exo. 21:16, Lev. 5: 3, and expresses the perfect sameness in respect of the effect, here of the want of effect. If the wise man, when he disputes with a fool, becomes angry, or jests, he will have no rest, i.e., he will never bring it to pass that the fool shall cease to reply; he yields the right to him, and thus makes it possible for him to end

the strife.” But the angry passion, and the bursts of laughter alternating therewith, are not appropriate to the wise man affirming his right; and since, after Ecc. 9:17, the words of the wise are heard **בְּנַחֵת**, **וְאִין נָחַת** [and there is no rest] will cause us to think of the fool as the logical subject. So far correctly, but in other respects inappropriately, the LXX ἀνήρ σοφὸς κρινεῖ ἔθνη (after the expression **עַם**, i.e., **עַם**, instead of **אֵת**), ἀνήρ δὲ φάυλος (which **אִישׁ אֵייל** does not mean) ὀργιζόμενος καταγελᾶται καὶ οὐ καταπτήσσει (as if the words were **וְלֹא יַחַת**).^{f236a} The syntactical relation would be simpler if **נִשְׁפָּט** in 9a were vocalized as a hypothetical perfect. But we read for it the past **נִשְׁפָּט**. Ewald designates 9a as a conditional clause, and Hitzig remarks that the Lat. *viro sapiente disceptante cum stulto* corresponds therewith. It marks, like 1Sa. 2:13, Job. 1:16, the situation from which there is a departure then with *perf. consec.*: if a wise man in the right is in contact with a fool, he starts up, and laughs, and keeps not quiet (supply **לוֹ** as at Pro. 28:27), or (without **לוֹ**): there is no keeping quiet, there is no rest. The figure is in accordance with experience. If a wise man has any controversy with a fool, which is to be decided by reasonable and moral arguments, then he becomes boisterous and laughs, and shows himself incapable of quietly listening to his opponent, and of appreciating his arguments.

We now group together vv. 10-14. Of these, vv. 10 and 11 are alike in respect of the tense used; vv. 12-14 have in common the pronoun pointing back to the first member.

***10 Men of blood hate the guiltless
And the upright; they attempt the life of such***

Pro. 29:10. The nearest lying translation of the second line would certainly be: the upright seek his soul (that of the guiltless). In accordance with the contrasted **יִשְׁנֹאוּ**, the Aram. understand the seeking of earnest benevolent seeking, but disregarding the **לִנְפֹשׁוֹ** in **נִפְשׁוּ**;^{f237}

Symmachus (**ἐπιζητήσουσι**), Jerome (*quaerunt*), and Luther thus also understand the sentence; and Rashi remarks that the phrase is here **לְשׁוֹן חֶבְדָּה**, for he rests; but mistrusting himself, refers to 1Sa. 21:23. Ahron b. Josef glosses: to enter into friendship with him. Thus, on account of the contrast, most moderns, interpreting the phrase *sensu bono*, also Fleischer: *probi autem vitam ejus conservare student*. The thought is, as Pro. 12: 6 shows, correct; but the *usus loq.* protests against this rendering, which can rest only on Psa. 142: 5, where, however, the poet does not say **אִין דִּוְרֵשׁ נִפְשִׁי**, but, as here also the

usus loq. requires, לְנַפְשִׁי. There are only three possible explanations which Aben Ezra enumerates:

(1) they seek his, the bloody man's, soul, i.e., they attempt his life, to take vengeance against him, according to the meaning of the expressions as generally elsewhere, used, e.g., at Psa. 63:10;

(2) they revenge his, the guiltless man's, life (LXX ἐκζητήσουσιν), which has fallen a victim, after the meaning in which elsewhere only בִּקֵּשׁ דָּם and נִפְשׁ דָּרֵשׁ, Gen. 9: 5, occur. This second meaning also is thus not in accordance with the usage of the words, and against both meanings it is to be said that it is not in the spirit of the Book of Proverbs to think of the יְשָׁרִים [the upright, righteous] as executors of the sentences of the penal judicature. There thus remains ^{f238} the interpretation

(3): the upright — they (the bloody men) seek the soul of such an one. The transition from the plur. to the sing. is individualizing, and thus the arrangement of the words is like Gen. 47:21: “And the people (as regards them), he removed them to the cities,” Gesen. § 145. 2. This last explanation recommends itself by the consideration that תָּם and יְשָׁרִים are cognate as to the ideas they represents, — let one call to mind the common expression יְשָׁר תָּם [perfect and upright, e.g., Job. 1: 1; 2: 3], — that the same persons are meant thereby, and it is rendered necessary by this, that the thought, “bloody men hate the guiltless,” is incomplete; for the same thing may also be said of the godless in general. One expects to hear that just against the guiltless, i.e., men walking in their innocence, the bloody-mindedness of such men is specially directed, and 10*b* says the same thing; this second clause first brings the contrast to the point aimed at. Lutz is right in seeking to confute Hitzig, but he does so on striking grounds.

***11 All his wrath the fool poureth out;
But the wise man husheth it up in the background.***

Pro. 29:11. That רוּחוֹ is not meant here of his spirit (Luther) in the sense of *quaecunq̄ue in mente habet* (thus e.g., Fleischer) the contrast shows, for יִשְׁבְּחֶנָּה does not signify *cohibet*, for which יִחְשְׁבֶנָּה (LXX ταμיעύεται) would be the proper word: רוּחַ thus is not here used of passionate emotion, such as at Pro. 16:31; Isa. 25: 4; 33:11. שִׁבַּח is not here equivalent to Arab. *sabbah*, αἰνεῖν (Imman., *Venet.*, and Heidenheim), which does not supply an admissible sense, but is equivalent to Arab. *sabbakh*, to quiet (Ahron b. Josef: קַטְפִּיאון = καταπαύειν), the former going back to the root-idea of extending (*amplificare*), the latter to that of going to a distance, putting away: *sabbakh*, *procul recessit*,

distiit, hence שִׁבַּח, Psa. 89:10, and here properly to drive off into the background, synon. הָשִׁיב (Fleischer). But בָּאָחוֹר (only here with ב) is ambiguous. One might with Rashi explain: but the wise man finally, or afterwards (Symmachus, ἐπ' ἔσχατων; Venet. κατόπιν = κατόπισθε), appeaseth the anger which the fool lets loose; i.e., if the latter gives vent to his anger, the former appeases, subdues, mitigates it (cf. בָּאָחֳרָה, לְאָחוֹר, Isa. 42:23). But it lies still nearer to refer the antithesis to the anger of the wise man himself; he does not give to it unbridled course, but husheth it in the background, viz., in his heart. Thus Syr. and Targ. reading בְּרַעֲיָנָא, the former, besides יְחַשְׁבֵּנָה (*reputat eam*), so also Aben Ezra: in the heart as the background of the organ of speech. Others explain: in the background, afterward, *retrosum*, e.g., Nolde, but to which *compescit* would be more appropriate than *sedat*. Hitzig's objection, that in other cases the expression would be בְּקִרְבּוֹ, is answered by this, that with בָּאָחוֹר the idea of pressing back (of אָחוֹר) is connected. The order of the words also is in favour of the meaning *in recessu (cordis)*. *Irae dilatio mentis pacatio* (according to an old proverb).

**12 A ruler who listens to deceitful words,
All his servants are godless.**

Pro. 29:12. They are so because they deceive him, and they become so; for instead of saying the truth which the ruler does not wish to hear, they seek to gain his favour by deceitful flatteries, misrepresentations, exaggerations, falsehoods. *Audita rex quae praecipit lex.* He does not do this, as the saying is, *sicut rex ita grex* (Sir. 10: 2), in the sense of this proverb of Solomon.

**13 The poor man and the usurer meet together —
Jahve lighteneth the eyes of both.**

Pro. 29:13. A variation of Pro. 22: 2, according to which the proverb is to be understood in both of its parts. That אִישׁ תְּכָכִים is the contrast of רֵשׁ, is rightly supposed in *Temura 16b*; but Rashi, who brings out here a man of moderate learning, and Saadia, a man of a moderate condition (thus also the Targ. גְּבַרְא מְצַעֲרָא, after Buxtorf, *homo mediocris fortunae*), err by connecting the word with תָּוֹךְ. The LXX δανειστοῦ καὶ χρεωφειλέτου, ἀλλήλοις συνελθόντων), which would be more correct inverted, for תְּכָכִים אִישׁ is a man who makes oppressive taxes, high previous payments of interest; the verbal stem תָּכַךְ, Arab. *tak*, is a secondary to R. *walk*, which has the meanings of pressing together, and pressing firm (whence also the middle is named; cf. Arab. *samym âlaklab*, the solid = the middle point of the heart). תָּוֹךְ, with the plur. תְּכָכִים, scarcely in itself denotes interest, τόκος; the designation

אִישׁ תַּכְכִּים includes in it a sensible reproach (Syr. *afflictor*), and a *rentier* cannot be so called (Hitzig). Luther: *Reiche* [rich men], with the marginal note: “who can practise usury as they then generally all do?” Therefore Löwenstein understands the second line after 1Sa. 2: 7: God enlighteneth their eyes by raising the lowly and humbling the proud. But this line, after 22: 2b, only means that the poor as well as the rich owe the light of life (Psa. 13: 4) to God, the creator and ruler of all things, — a fact which has also its moral side: both are conditioned by Him, stand under His control, and have to give to Him an account; or otherwise rendered: God maketh His sun to rise on the low and the high, the evil and the good (cf. Mat. 5:45) — an all-embracing love full of typical moral motive. ^{f239}

***14 A king who judgeth the poor with truth,
His throne shall stand for ever.***

Pro. 29:14. בְּאֵמֶת, as at Isa. 16: 5 (synon. בְּאֵמוּנָה, בְּמִישׁוֹר, בְּמִישׁוֹרִים), is equivalent to fidelity to duty, or a complete, full accomplishment of his duty as a ruler with reference to the dispensing of justice; in other words: after the norm of actual fact, and of the law, and of his duty proceeding from both together. מֶלֶךְ has in Codd., e.g., *Jaman.*, and in the Venetian 1517, 21, rightly *Rebia*. In that which follows, שׁוֹפֵט בְּאֵמֶת are more closely related than דְּלִים בְּאֵמֶת, for of two conjunctives standing together the first always connects more than the second. מֶלֶךְ שׁוֹפֵט בְּאֵמֶת דְּלִים is the truest representation of the logical grammatical relation. To 14b compare the proverb of the king, Pro. 16:12; 25: 5.

Pro. 29:15. A proverb with שָׁבֵט, v. 15, is placed next to one with שׁוֹפֵט, but it begins a group of proverbs regarding discipline in the house and among the people:

***15 The rod and reproof give wisdom;
But an undisciplined son is a shame to his mother.***

With שָׁבֵט [a rod], which Pro. 22:15 also commends as salutary, תּוֹכַחַת refers to discipline by means of words, which must accompany bodily discipline, and without them is also necessary; the construction of the first line follows in number and gender the scheme Pro. 27: 9, Zec. 7: 7; Ewald, § 339c. In the second line the mother is named, whose tender love often degenerates into a fond indulgence; such a darling, such a mother’s son, becomes a disgrace to his mother. Our “*ausgelassen*,” by which Hitzig translates מְשֻׁלַּח, is used of joyfulness unbridled and without self-restraint, and is in the passage before us too feeble a word; שְׁלַח is used of animals pasturing at liberty, wandering in

freedom (Job. 39: 5; Isa. 16: 2); נֶאֱדָר מְשֻׁלָּה is accordingly a child who is kept in by no restraint and no punishment, one left to himself, and thus undisciplined (Luther, Gesenius, Fleischer, and others).

***16 When the godless increase, wickedness increaseth;
But the righteous shall see their fall.***

Pro. 29:16. The LXX translation is not bad: πολλῶν ὄντων ἀσεβῶν πολλὰί γίνονται ἁμαρτίαι (vid., regarding רַבָּה, v. 2, Pro. 28:28); but in the main it is only a *Binsenwahrheit*, as they say in Swabia, i.e., a trivial saying. The proverb means, that if among a people the party of the godless increases in number, and at the same time in power, wickedness, i.e., a falling away into sins of thought and conduct, and therewith wickedness, prevails. When irreligion and the destruction of morals thus increase, the righteous are troubled; but the conduct of the godless carries the judgment in itself, and the righteous shall with joy perceive, in the righteous retribution of God, that the godless man will be cast down from his power and influence. This proverb is like a motto to Psalm ch. 12.

***17 Correct thy son, and he will give thee delight,
And afford pleasure to thy soul.***

Pro. 29:17. The LXX well translates וַיְנַיֵּחַד by καὶ ἀναπαύσει σε; ^{f240} הַנִּיחַ denotes rest properly, a breathing again, ἀνάψυξις; and then, with an obliteration of the idea of restraint so far, generally (like the Arab. *arah*, compared by Fleischer) to afford pleasure or delight. The post.-bibl. language uses for this the words נַחַת רוּחַ, and says of the pious that he makes נַחַת רוּחַ to his Creator, *Berachoth* 17a; and of God, that He grants the same to them that fear Him, *Berach.* 29b; in the morning prayer of the heavenly spirits, that they hallow their Creator בְּנַחַת רוּחַ (with inward delight). Write with Codd. (also *Jaman.*) and older editions וַיְנַיֵּחַד, not וַיְנַיֵּחַפּ; for, except in verbs ל"ה, the suffix of this *Hiphil* form is not dageshed, e.g., אֲמִיתָךְ, 1Ki. 2:26; cf. also 1Ki. 22:16 and Psa. 50: 8. מְעַדְנִים the LXX understands, after 2Sa. 1:24 (עַם-עַדְנִים, μετὰ κόσμου), also here, of ornament; but the word signifies dainty dishes — here, high spiritual enjoyment. As in vv. 15 and 16 a transition was made from the house to the people, so there now follows the proverb of the discipline of children, a proverb of the education of the people:

***18 Without a revelation a people becomes ungovernable;
But he that keepeth the law, happy is he.***

Pro. 29:18. Regarding the importance of this proverb for estimating the relation of the *Chokma* to prophecy, vid., p. 29. חֻזֵן is, according to the sense,

equivalent to נְבוּאָה, the prophetic revelation in itself, and as the contents of that which is proclaimed. Without spiritual preaching, proceeding from spiritual experience, a people is unrestrained (יִפְרָע, vid., regarding the punctuation at Pro. 28:25, and regarding the fundamental meaning, at Pro. 1:25); it becomes פָּרָא, disorderly, Exo. 32:25; *wild und wüst*, as Luther translates. But in the second line, according to the unity of the antithesis, the words are spoken of the people, not of individuals. It is therefore not to be explained, with Hitzig: but whoever, in such a time, nevertheless holds to the law, it is well with him! Without doubt this proverb was coined at a time when the preaching of the prophets was in vogue; and therefore this, “but whoever, notwithstanding,” is untenable; such a thought at that time could not at all arise; and besides this, תּוֹרָה is in the Book of Proverbs a moveable conception, which is covered at least by the law in contradistinction to prophecy. *Tōra* denotes divine teaching, the word of God; whether that of the Sinaitic or that of the prophetic law (2Ch. 15: 3, cf. e.g., Isa. 1:10). While, on the one hand, a people is in a dissolute condition when the voice of the preacher, speaking from divine revelation, and enlightening their actions and sufferings by God’s word, is silent amongst them (Psa. 74: 9, cf. Amo. 8:12); on the other hand, that same people are to be praised as happy when they show due reverence and fidelity to the word of God, both as written and as preached. That the word of God is preached among a people belongs to their condition of life; and they are only truly happy when they earnestly and willingly subordinate themselves to the word of God which they possess and have the opportunity of hearing. אֲשֶׁר־הוּ (defective for אֲשֶׁר־הוּ) is the older, and here the poetic kindred form to אֲשֶׁר־יו, Pro. 14:21; 16:20. From the discipline of the people this series of proverbs again returns to the discipline of home:

***19 With words a servant will not let himself be bettered;
For he understandeth them, but conformeth not thereto.***

Pro. 29:19. The *Niph.* נוֹסֵר becomes a so-called tolerative, for it connects with the idea of happening that of reaching its object: to become truly bettered (taught in wisdom, corrected), and thus to let himself be bettered. With mere words this is not reached; the unreasonable servant needs, in order to be set right, a more radical means of deliverance. This assertion demands confirmation; therefore is the view of von Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* ii. 2. 404) improbable, that 19*b* has in view a better-disposed servant: supposing that he is intelligent, in which case he is admonished without cause, then the words are also lost: he will let them pass over him in silence without any reply. This attempted explanation is occasioned by this, that מַעֲנָה can signify nothing else than a response in words. If this were correct, then without doubt its

fundamental meaning would correspond with כִּי; for one explains, with Löwenstein, “for he perceives it, and may not answer,” i.e., this, that a reply cut off frustrates the moral impression. Or also: for he understands it, but is silent, — *in prae fractum se silentium configit* (Schultens); and thus it is with the ancients (Rashi). But why should not וְאִין מַעֲנָה itself be the expression of this want of any consequences? מַעֲנָה cannot certainly mean humiliation ^{f241} (*Meiri*, after Exo. 10: 3, הַכְנֵעָה), but why as an answer in words and not also a response by act (Stuart: a practical answer)? Thus the LXX ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ νοήσῃ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑπακούσεται, according to which Luther: for although he at once understands it, he does not yet take it to himself. That מַעֲנָה may mean obedience, the Aram. so understood, also at Pro. 16: 4. It denoted a reply in the most comprehensive meaning of the word, vid., at Pro. 16: 1. The thought, besides, is the same as if one were to explain: for he understands it, and is silent, i.e., lets thee speak; or: he understands it, but that which he perceives finds no practical echo.

**20 Seest thou a man hasty in his words?
The fool hath more hope than he.**

Pro. 29:20. Cf. Pro. 26:12. Such an one has blocked up against himself the path to wisdom, which to the fool, i.e., to the ingenuous, stands open; the former is perfect, of the latter something may yet be made. In this passage the contrast is yet more precise, for the fool is thought of as the dull, which is the proper meaning of כִּסִּיל, vid., under Pro. 17:24. There is more hope for the fool than for him, although he may be no fool in himself, who overthrows himself by his words. “The προπετιῆς ἐν λόγῳ αὐτοῦ (Sir. 9:18) has, in the existing case, already overleaped the thought; the כִּסִּיל has it still before him, and comes at length, perhaps with his slow conception, to it” (Hitzig); for the ass, according to the fable, comes at last farther than the greyhound. Hence, in words as well as in acts, the proverb holds good, “*Eile mit Weile*” [= *festina lente*]. Every word, as well as act, can only be matured by being thought out, and thought over. From this proverb, which finds its practical application to the affairs of a house, and particularly also to the relation to domestics, the group returns to the subject of instruction, which is its ground-tone.

**21 If one pampers his servant from youth up,
He will finally reach the place of a child.**

Pro. 29:21. The LXX had no answer to the question as to the meaning of מְנֹן. On the other hand, for פִּנְק, the meaning to fondle; *delicatus enutrire*, is perfectly warranted by the Aram. and Arab. The Talmud, *Succa 52b*, resorts to the alphabet אִמ"בּוּח in order to reach a meaning for מְנֹן. How the Targ.

comes to translate the word by מְנַסֵּחַ (outrooted) is not clear; the rendering of Jerome: *postea sentiet eum contumacem*, is perhaps mediated by the ἔσταυ γογγυσμός of Symmachus, who combines נוּן with לוּן, *Niph. γογγύζειν*. The ὀθυνηθήσεται of the LXX, with the Syr., von Hofmann has sought to justify (*Schriftbew.* ii. 2. 404), for he derives מְנוּן = מְנוּהוּן from נָהָה. We must then punctuate מְנוּן; but perhaps the LXX derived the word from מְנוּן = מְנוּנוּן, whether they pronounced it מְנוּן (cf. מְסַרְתָּ = מְאַסְרְתָּ) or מְנוּן. To follow them is not wise, for the formation of the word is precarious; one does not see with the speaker of this proverb, to whom the language presented a fulness of synonyms for the idea of complaint, meant by using this peculiar word. Linguistically these meanings are impossible: of Jerome, *dominus* = מְמַנְהָה (Ahron b. Josef, *Meiri*, and others); or: the oppressed = מְנוּנָה, from נָהָה (Johanson); or: one who is sick = מְנוּנָה (Euchel). and Ewald's "*undankbar*" [unthankful], derived from the Arabic, is a mere fancy, since (Arab.) *manuwan* does not mean one who is unthankful, but, on the contrary, one who upbraids good deeds shown. ^{f242}

The ancients are in the right track, who explain מְנוּן after the verb נוּן, Psa. 72:17 = נִיּוּן = בְּנוּן; the *Venet.*, herein following Kimchi, also adopts the nominal form, for it translates (but without perceptible meaning) γόνωσις. Luther's translation is fortunate:

***“If a servant is tenderly treated from youth up,
He will accordingly become a Junker [squire].”***

The ideas represented in modern Jewish translations: that of a son (e.g., Solomon: he will at last be the son) and that of a master (Zunz), are here united. But how the idea of a son (from the verb נוּן), at the same time that of a master, may arise, is not to be perceived in the same way as with *Junker* and the Spanish *infante* and *hidalgo*; rather with מְנוּן, as the ironical naming of the son (little son), the idea of a weakling (de Wette) may be connected. The state of the matter appears as follows: — the Verb נוּן has the meanings of luxuriant growth, numerous propagation; the fish has from this the Aram. name of נוּן, like the Heb. דָּג, from דָּגָה, which also means luxuriant, exuberant increase (vid., at Psa. 72:17). From this is derived נִיּוּן, which designates the offspring as a component part of a kindred, as well as מְנוּן, which, according as the מ is interpreted infin. or local, means either this, that it sprouts up luxuriantly, the abundant growth, or also the place of luxuriant sprouting, wanton growing, abundant and quick multiplication: thus the place of hatching, spawning. The subject in דָּגָה might be the fondled one; but it lies nearer, however, to take

him who fondles as the subject, as in 21a. **אֶחָרִיתוֹ** is either adv. accus. for **בְּאַחֲרִיתוֹ**, or, as we preferred at Pro. 23:32, it is the subj. introducing, after the manner of a substantival clause, the following sentence as its virtual predicate: “one has fondled his servant from his youth up, and his (that of the one who fondles) end is: he will become a place of increase.” The master of the house is thought of along with his house; and the servant as one who, having become a man, presents his master with **יְלִידֵי בֵּית**, who are spoilt scapegraces, as he himself has become by the pampering of his master. There was used in the language of the people, **נֵיַן** for **בֵּיַן**, in the sense on which we name a degenerate son a “*Schönes Früchtchen*” [pretty little fruit]; and **מְנוּן** is a place (house) where many **נֵיַיִם** are; and a man (master of a house) who has many of them is one whose family has increased over his head. One reaches the same meaning if **מְנוּן** is rendered more immediately as the place or state of growing, increasing, luxuriating. The sense is in any case: he will not be able, in the end, any more to defend himself against the crowd which grows up to him from this his darling, but will be merely a passive part of it.

The following group begins with a proverb which rhymes by **מְנוּן**, with **מְדוּן** of the foregoing, and extends on to the end of this Hezekiah collection:

**22 A man of anger stirreth up strife;
And a passionate man aboundeth in transgression.**

Pro. 29:22. Line first is a variation of Pro. 15:18a and Pro. 28:25a. **אִישׁ** and **בְּאֵל** as here, but in the reverse order at Pro. 22:24. ^{f243}

אִף here means anger, not the nose, viz., the expanded nostrils (Schultens). In **רַב־פְּשַׁע** the **פְּשַׁע** is, after Pro. 14:29; 28:16; 20:27, the governed genitive; Hitzig construes it in the sense of **רַב פְּשַׁע**, Psa. 19: 2, with **יְגֵרָה**, but one does not say **יְגֵרָה פְּשַׁע**; and that which is true of **רַב־יָמִים**, that, after the manner of a numeral, it can precede its substantive (vid., under Psa. 7:26; 89:51), cannot be said of **רַב**. Much (great) in wickedness denotes one who heaps up many wicked actions, and burdens himself with greater guilt (cf. **פְּשַׁע**, v. 16). The wrathful man stirreth up (vid., under Pro. 15:18) strife, for he breaks through the mutual relations of men, which rest on mutual esteem and love, and by means of his passionate conduct he makes enemies of those against whom he thinks that he has reason for being angry; that on account of which he is angry can be settled without producing such hostility, but passion impels him on, and misrepresents the matter; it embitters hearts, and tears them asunder. The LXX has, instead of **רַב**, **ἕξασυξεν**, of dreaming, **כָּרָה** (Pro. 16:27).

Pro. 29:23. passes from anger to haughtiness:

*A man's pride will bring him low;
But the lowly attaineth to honour.*

Thus we translate תִּתְמַךְ כְּבוֹד (Lat. *honorem obtinet*) in accord with Pro. 11:16, and שְׁפַל־רוּחַ with Pro. 16:19, where, however, שְׁפַל is not adj. as here, but inf. The haughty man obscures the honour which he has by this, that he boasts immeasurably of it, and aspires yet more after it; the lowly man, on the other hand, obtains honour without his seeking it, honour before God and before men, which would be of no worth were it not connected with the honour before God. The LXX: τοὺς δὲ ταπεινόφρονας ἐρείδει δόξη κύριος. This κύριος is indeed not contrary to the sense, but it is opposed to the style. Why the 24th verse should now follow is, as regards the contents and the expression, hard to say; but one observes that vv. 22-27 follow each other, beginning with the successive letters of the alphabet א (ב), ג, ד, ה, ו, ז, ח (ט).

*24 He that taketh part with a thief hateth himself;
He heareth the oath and confesseth not.*

Pro. 29:24. Hitzig renders the first member as the pred. of the second: “he who does not bring to light such sins as require an atonement (Lev. 5: 1 ff.), but shares the secret of them with the sinner, is not better than one who is a partner with a thief, who hateth himself.” The construction of the verse, he remarks, is not understood by any interpreter. It is not, however, so cross, — for, understood as Hitzig thinks it ought to be, the author should have expressed the subject by שָׁמַע אֱלֹהִים וְלֹא יַגִּיד, — but is simple as the order of the words and the verbal form require it. The oath is, after Lev. 5: 1, that of the judge who adjures the partner of the thief by God to tell the truth; but he conceals it, and burdens his soul with a crime worthy of death, for from a concealer he becomes in addition a perjured man.

*25 Fear of man bringeth a snare with it;
But he that trusteth in Jahve is advanced.*

Pro. 29:25. It sounds strange, Hitzig remarks, that here in the Book of an Oriental author one should be warned against the fear of man. It is enough, in reply to this, to point to Isa. 51:12 f. One of the two translations in the LXX (cf. Jerome and Luther) has found this “strange” thought not so strange as not to render it, and that in the gnomic aorist: φοβηθέντες καὶ ἀισχυθέντες ἀνθρώπους ὑπεσκελίσθησαν. And why should not חָרַדְתָּ אָדָם be able to mean the fear of man (cowardice)? Perhaps not so that אָדָם is the *gen. objecti*, but so that חָרַדְתָּ אָדָם means to frighten men, as in 1Sa. 14:15. אֱלֹהִים

חרדה, a trembling of God; cf. Ps. 64: 2; פחד איב, the fear occasioned by the enemy, although this connection, after Deu. 2:25, can also mean fear of the enemy (*gen. objecti*). To יתן, occasioned = brings as a consequence with it, cf. Pro. 10:10; 13:15; the *synallage generis* is as at Pro. 12:25 *a*: it is at least strange with fem. infinit. and infinitival nouns, Pro. 16:16; 25:14; Ps. 73:28; but חרדה (trembling) is such a *nom. actionis*, Ewald, § 238*a*. Regarding שָׁב (for which the LXX¹ σωθήσεται, and LXX² ἐδραστηθήσεται = ישׁבח), vid., at Pro. 18:10. He who is put into a terror by a danger with which men threaten him, so as to do from the fear of man what is wrong, and to conceal the truth, falls thereby into a snare laid by himself — it does not help him that by this means he has delivered himself from the danger, for he brands himself as a coward, and sins against God, and falls into an agony of conscience (reproach and anguish of heart) which is yet worse to bear than the evil wherewith he was threatened. It is only confidence in God that truly saves. The fear of man plunges him into yet greater suffering than that from which he would escape; confidence in God, on the other hand, lifts a man internally, and at last externally, above all his troubles.

Pro. 29:26. A similar *gen. connection* to that between חרדת אדם exists between משפט-איש:

***Many seek the countenance of the ruler;
Yet from Jahve cometh the judgment of men.***

Line first is a variation of 19: 6*a*, cf. 1Ki. 10:24. It lies near to interpret איש as *gen. obj.*: the judgment regarding any one, i.e., the estimating of the man, the decision regarding him; and it is also possible, for משפט, Ps. 17: 2, may be understood of the judgment which I have, as well as of the judgment pronounced regarding me (cf. Lam. 3:59). But the usage appears to think of the *genit.* after משפט always as subjective, e.g., Pro. 16:33, of the decision which the lot brings, Job. 36: 6, the right to which the poor have a claim; so that thus in the passage before us משפט-איש means the right of a man, as that which is proper or fitting to him, the judgment of a man, as that to which as appropriate he has a claim (LXX τὸ δίκαιον ἀνδρός). Whether the *genit.* be rendered in the one way or the other, the meaning remains the same: it is not the ruler who finally decides the fate and determines the worth of a man, as they appear to think who with eye-service court his favour and fawn upon him.

***27 An abomination to a righteous man is a villanous man;
And an abomination to the godless is he who walketh uprightly.***

Pro. 29:27. In all the other proverbs which begin with **הוֹעֵבֶת**, e.g., *Pro. 11:20*, **יְהוָה** follows as genit., here **צַדִּיקִים**, whose judgment is like that of God. **אִישׁ עוֹל** is an abhorrence to them, not as a man, but just as of such a character; **עוֹל** is the direct contrast to **יֵשֶׁר**. The righteous sees in the villanous man, who boldly does that which is opposed to morality and to honour, an adversary of his God; on the other hand, the godless sees in the man that walketh uprightly (**יֵשֶׁר-דָּרָד**), as at *Psa. 37:14*) his adversary, and the condemnation of himself.

With this doubled **ת** the Book of Proverbs, prepared by the men of Hezekiah, comes to an end. It closes, in accordance with its intention announced at the beginning, with a proverb concerning the king, and a proverb of the great moral contrasts which are found in all circles of society up to the very throne itself.

First Appendix to the Second Solomonic Collection of Proverbs 30

Pro. 30: 1. The title of this first appendix, according to the text lying before us, is:

“The words of Agur the son of Jakeh, the utterance.”

This title of the following collection of proverbs is limited by *Olewejored*; and **הַמְשָׁא**, separated from the author’s name by *Rebia*, is interpreted as a second inscription, standing on one line with **דְּבַר**, as particularizing that first. The old synagogue tradition which, on the ground of the general title *Pro. 1: 1*, regarded the whole Book of Proverbs as the work of Solomon, interpreted the words, “Agur the son of Jakeh,” as an allegorical designation of Solomon, who appropriated the words of the *Tôra* to the king, *Deu. 17:17*, and again rejected them, for he said: God is with me, and I shall not do it (viz., take many wives, without thereby suffering injury), *Schemôth rabba*, c. 6. The translation of Jerome: *Verba congregantis filii Vomentis*, is the echo of this Jewish interpretation. One would suppose that if “Agur” were Solomon’s name, “Jakeh” must be that of David; but another interpretation in *Midrash Mishle* renders **בן** (“son”) as the designation of the bearer of a quality, and sees in “Agur” one who girded (**אגר = חגר**) his loins for wisdom; and in “son of Jakeh” one free from sin (**נְקִי מִכָּל חַטָּא וְעוֹן**). In the Middle Ages this mode of interpretation, which is historically and linguistically absurd, first began to prevail; for then the view was expressed by several (Aben Ezra, and *Meiri* the Spaniard) that Agur ben Jakeh was a wise man of the time of Solomon. That of Solomon’s time, they thence conclude (blind to *Pro. 25: 1*) that Solomon

collected together these proverbs of the otherwise unknown wise man. In truth, the age of the man must remain undecided; and at all events, the time of Hezekiah is the fixed period from which, where possible, it is to be sought. The name “Agur” means the gathered (Pro. 6: 8; 10: 5), or, after the predominant meaning of the Arab. *âjar*, the bribed, *mercede conductum*; also the collector (cf. יְקוּשׁ, fowler); or the word might mean, perhaps, industrious in collecting (cf. *alwaḡ*, attached to, and other examples in Mühlau, p. 36). Regarding בִּן = *binj* (usual in בִּן־נֵיִן), and its relation to the Arab. *ibn*, vid., *Genesis*, p. 555. The name *Jakeh* is more transparent. The noun יְקָהָה, Pro. 30:17, Gen. 49:10, means the obedient, from the verb יָקָה; but, formed from this verbal stem, the form of the word would be יְקָהָה (not יְקָהָה). The form יְקָהָה is the participial adj. from יָקָה, like יָפָה from יָפָה; and the Arab. *wakay*, corresponding to this יְקָהָה, 8 *ittakay*, to be on one’s guard, particularly before God; the usual word for piety regarded as εὐλάβεια. Mühlau (p. 37) rightly sees in the proper names *Eltekeh* [Jos. 19:44] and *Eltekon* [Jos. 15:59] the secondary verbal stem יְקָהָה, which, like e.g., יְקָהָה (תָּאָה), תָּאָב, תָּאָד, תָּאָה, has originated from the reflexive, which in these proper names, supposing that אֵל is subj., means to take under protection; not: to give heed = *cavere*. All these meanings are closely connected. In all these three forms — יְקָהָה, יְקָהָה, יְקָהָה — the verb is a synonym of שָׁמַר; so that יְקָהָה denotes ^{f244} the pious, either as taking care, εὐλαβής, or as keeping, i.e., observing, viz., that which is commanded by God.

In consequence of the accentuation, מִשְׁנֵה is the second designation of this string of proverbs, and is parallel with דְּבַר־י'. But that is absolutely impossible. מִשְׁנֵה (from נָשָׂה, to raise, viz., the voice, to begin to express) denotes the utterance, and according to the usage of the words before us, the divine utterance, the message of God revealed to the prophet and announced by him, for the most part, if not always (vid., at Isa. 13: 1), the message of God as the avenger. Accordingly Jewish interpreters (e.g., *Meiri* and Arama) remark that מִשְׁנֵה designates what follows, as דְּבַר־נְבוּאָה־י', i.e., an utterance of the prophetic spirit. But, on the other hand, what follows begins with the confession of human weakness and short-sightedness; and, moreover, we read proverbs not of a divine but altogether of a human and even of a decaying spiritual stamp, besides distinguished from the Solomonic proverbs by this, that the *I* of the poet, which remains in the background, here comes to the front. This מִשְׁנֵה of prophetic utterances does not at all harmonize with the following string of proverbs. It does not so harmonize on this account, because one theme does not run through these proverbs which the sing. מִשְׁנֵה requires.

It comes to this, that **מִשָּׁנָה** never occurs by itself in the sense of a divine, a solemn utterance, without having some more clearly defining addition, though it should be only a demonstrative **הַזֶּה** (Isa. 14:28). But what author, whether poet or prophet, would give to his work the title of **מִשָּׁנָה**, which in itself means everything, and thus nothing! And now: the utterance — what can the article at all mean here? This question has remained unanswered by every interpreter. Ewald also sees himself constrained to clothe the naked word; he does it by reading together **הַמִּשָּׁנָה נִשְׂאָה**, and translating the “sublime saying which he spoke.” But apart from the consideration that Jer. 23:31 proves nothing for the use of this use of **נִשְׂאָה**, the form **נִשְׂאָה (הַגִּבֹּר)** is supported by 2Sa. 23: 1 (cf. v. 5 with 2Sa. 22:31); and besides, the omission of the **שָׁרָה**, and in addition of the relative pronoun (**וְהַמִּשָּׁנָה**), would be an inaccuracy not at all to be expected on the brow of this gnomology (vid., Hitzig). If we leave the altogether unsuspected **נִשְׂאָה** undisturbed, **הַמִּשָּׁנָה** will be a nearer definition of the name of the author. The Midrash has a right suspicion, for it takes together *Hamassa* and *Agur ben Jakeh*, and explains: of Agur the son of Jakeh, who took upon himself the yoke of the most blessed. The *Graecus Venetus* comes nearer what is correct, for it translates: **λόγοι Αγουρου υιέως Ιακέως του Μασάου.**

We connect Pro. 31: 1, where **לְמוּאֵל מֶלֶךְ**, “Lemuel (the) king,” is a linguistic impossibility, and thus, according to the accentuation lying before us, **מִשָּׁנָה מֶלֶךְ** also are to be connected together; thus it appears that **מִשָּׁנָה** must be the name of a country and a people. It was Hitzig who first made this Columbus-egg to stand. But this is the case only so far as he recognised in **מֶלֶךְ מִשָּׁנָה לְמוּאֵל** a Lemuel, the king of Massa, and recognised this Massa also in Pro. 30: 1 (vid., his dissertation: *Das Königreich Massa* [the kingdom of Massa], in Zeller’s *Theolog. Jahrb.* 1844, and his *Comm.*), viz., the Israelitish *Massa* named in Gen. 25:14 (= 1Ch. 1:30) along with *Dumah* and *Tema*. But he proceeds in a hair-splitting way, and with ingenious hypothesis, without any valid foundation. That this *Dumah* is the *Dumat el-jendel* (cf. under Isa. 21:11) lying in the north of Nejed, near the southern frontiers of Syria, the name and the founding of which is referred by the Arabians to *Dûm* the son of Ishmael, must be regarded as possible, and consequently *Massa* is certainly to be sought in Northern Arabia. But if, on the ground of 1Ch. 4:42 f., he finds there a Simeonitic kingdom, and finds its origin in this, that the tribe of Simeon originally belonging to the ten tribes, and thus coming from the north settled in the south of Judah, and from thence in the days of Hezekiah, fleeing before the Assyrians, were driven farther and farther in a south-east direction towards Northern Arabia; on the contrary, it has been shown by Graf (*The Tribe of Simeon*, a contribution to the history of Israel, 1866) that Simeon never settled

in the north of the Holy Land, and according to existing evidences extended their settlement from Negeb partly into the Idumean highlands, but not into the highlands of North Arabia. Hitzig thinks that there are found traces of the *Massa* of Agur and Lemuel in the Jewish town ^{f245} of טַלְמַאס, of Benjamin of Tudela, lying three days' journey from Chebar, and in the proper name (Arab.) *Malsā* (smooth), which is given to a rock between Tema and Wady el-Kora (vid., Kosegarten's *Chestom*. p. 143); but how notched his ingenuity here is need scarcely be shown. By means of more cautious combinations Mühlau has placed the residence of Agur and Lemuel in the Hauran mountain range, near which there is a *Dumah*, likewise a *Têmâ*; and in the name of the town *Mismîje*, lying in the *Lejâ*, is probably found the *Mishma* which is named along with *Massa*, Gen. 25:14; and from this that is related in 1Ch. 5: 9 f., 18-22, of warlike expeditions on the part of the tribes lying on the east of the Jordan against the Hagarenes and their allies *Jetur*, *Nephish*, and *Nodab*, ^{f246} it is with certainty concluded that in the Hauran, and in the wilderness which stretches behind the Euphrates towards it, Israelitish tribes have had their abode, whose territory had been early seized by the trans-Jordanic tribes, and was held "until the captivity," 1Ch. 5:22, i.e., till the Assyrian deportation. This designation of time is almost as unfavourable to Mühlau's theory of a *Massa* in the Hauran, inhabited by Israelitish tribes from the other side, as the expression "to Mount Seir" (1Ch. 4:42) is to Hitzig's North Arabian *Massa* inhabited by Simeonites. We must leave it undecided whether *Dumah* and *Têmâ*, which the Toledoth of Ismael name in the neighbourhood of *Massa*, are the east Hauran districts now existing; or as Blau (*Deu. Morgl. Zeit.* xxv. 539), with Hitzig, supposes, North Arabian districts (cf. *Genesis*. p. 377, 4th ed.). ^{f247}

"Be it as it may, the contents and the language of this difficult piece almost necessarily point to a region bordering on the Syro-Arabian waste. Ziegler's view (*Neue Uebers. der Denksprüche Salomo's*, 1791, p. 29), that Lemuel was probably an emir of an Arabian tribe in the east of Jordan, and that a wise Hebrew translated those proverbs of the emir into Hebrew, is certainly untenable, but does not depart so far from the end as may appear at the first glance" (Mühlau). ^{f248}

If the text-punctuation lying before us rests on the false supposition that *Massa*, Pro. 30: 1; 31: 1, is a generic name, and not a proper name, then certainly the question arises whether מַשָּׂא should not be used instead of מַשָּׂא, much more מַשָּׂא, which is suggested as possible in the article "Sprüche," in Herzog's *Encycl.* xiv. 694. Were מַשָּׂא, Gen. 10:30, the region Μεσσηνη, on the northern border of the Persian Gulf, in which Apamea lay, then it might be said in favour of this, that as the histories of Muhammed and of Benjamin of Tudela prove the existence of an old Jewish occupation of North Arabia, but

without anything being heard of a מְשָׁה, the Talmud bears testimony ^{f249} to a Jewish occupation of Mesene, and particularly of Apamea; and by the mother of Lemuel, the king of *Mesha*, one may think ^{f250} of Helena, celebrated in Jewish writings, queen of Adiabene, the mother of Monabaz and Izates. But the identity of the *Mesha* of the catalogue of nations with Μεσηνη is uncertain, and the Jewish population of that place dates at least from the time of the Sassanides to the period of the Babylonian exile. We therefore hold by the Ishmaelite *Massa*, whether North Arabian or Hauranian; butt we by no means subscribe Mühlau's *non possumus non negare, Agurum et Lemuëlem proseytos e paganis, non Israelitas fuisse*. The religion of the tribes descended from Abraham, so far as it had not degenerated, was not to be regarded as idolatrous. It was the religion which exists to the present day among the great Ishmaelite tribes of the Syrian desert as the true tradition of their fathers under the name of *Dîn Ibrâhîm* (Abraham's religion); which, as from Wetzstein, we have noted in the *Commentary on Job* (p. 387 and elsewhere), continues along with Mosaism among the nomadic tribes of the wilderness; which shortly before the appearance of Christianity in the country beyond the Jordan, produced doctrines coming into contact with the teachings of the gospel; which at that very time, according to historic evidences (e.g., *Méjâsinî's* chronicles of the *Ka'be*), was dominant even in the towns of *Higâz*; and in the second century after Christ, was for the first time during the repeated migration of the South Arabians again oppressed by Greek idolatry, and was confined to the wilderness; which gave the mightiest impulse to the rise of Islam, and furnished its best component part; and which towards the end of the last century, in the country of Neged, pressed to a reform of Islam, and had as a result the Wahabite doctrine. If we except Pro. 30: 5 f., the proverbs of Agur and Lemuel contain nothing which may not be conceived from a non-Israelitish standpoint on which the author of the Book of Job placed himself. Even Pro. 30: 5 f. is not there (cf. Job. 6:10; 23:12) without parallels. When one compares Deu. 4: 2; 13: 1, and 2Sa. 22:31 = Psa. 18:31 (from which v. 5 of the proverbs of Agur is derived, with the change of יהוה into אֱלֹהִים), Agur certainly appears as one intimately acquainted with the revealed religion of Israel, and with their literature. But must we take the two Massites therefore, with Hitzig, Mühlau, and Zöckler, as born Israelites? Since the Bible history knows no Israelitish king outside of the Holy Land, we regard it as more probable that King Lemuel and his countryman Agur were Ishmaelites who had raised themselves above the religion of Abraham, and recognised the religion of Israel as its completion.

If we now return to the words of Pro. 30: 1 *a*, Hitzig makes Agur Lemuel's brother, for he vocalizes אַגוּר בֶּן־יִקְהָה מְשָׁה, i.e., Agur the son of her whom Massa obeys. Ripa and Björck of Sweden, and Stuart of America, adopt this

view. But supposing that **מַסָּא** is connected with the accusative of him who is obeyed, **בֶּן**, as the representative of such an attributive clause, as of its virtual genitive, is elsewhere without example; and besides, it is unadvisable to explain away the proper name **מַסָּא**, which speaks for itself. There are two other possibilities of comprehending **הַמַּשָּׂא**, without the change, or with the change of a single letter. Wetzstein, on Pro. 31: 1, has said regarding Mühlau's translation "King of Massa:" "I would more cautiously translate, 'King of the Massans,' since this interpretation is unobjectionable; while, on the contrary, this is not *terra Massa*, nor *urbs Massa*. It is true that the inhabitants of Massa were not pure nomads, after 30 and 31, but probably, like the other tribes of Israel, they were half nomads, who possessed no great land as exclusive property, and whose chief place did not perhaps bear their name. The latter may then have been as rare in ancient times as it is in the present day. Neither the *Sammar*, the *Harb*, the *Muntefik*, nor other half nomads whom I know in the southern parts of the Syrian desert, have any place which bears their name. So also, it appears, the people of Uz (**עוּז**), which we were constrained to think of as a dominant, firmly-settled race, since it had so great a husbandman as Job, possessed no **קְרִיַת עוּז**. Only in certain cases, where a tribe resided for many centuries in and around a place, does the name of this tribe appear to have remained attached to it. Thus from **גּוֹרֵי דוּמָה**, 'the low-country of the Dumahns,' or **קְרִיַת דוּמָה**, 'the city of Dumahns,' as also from **קְרִיַת תִּמָּא**, 'the city of the Temans,' gradually there arose (probably not till the decline and fall of this tribe) a city of *Dumah*, a haven of *Midian*, and the like, so that the primary meaning of the name came to be lost." It is clear that, from the existence of an Ishmaelite tribe **מַשָּׂא**, there does not necessarily follow a similar name given to a region. The conj. **מַמַּשָּׂא**, for **הַמַּשָּׂא** (vid., Herzog's *Encycl.* xiv. 702), has this against it, that although it is good Heb., it directly leads to this conclusion (e.g., 2Sa. 23:20, 29, cf. 1Ki. 17: 1). Less objectionable is Bunsen's and Böttcher's **הַמַּשָּׂא**. But perhaps **הַמַּשָּׂא** may also have the same signification; far rather at least this than that which Malbim, after **הַשָּׂר הַמַּשָּׂא**, 1Ch. 15:27, introduced with the LXX **ἄρχων τῶν ὠδῶν**: "We ought then to compare 2Sa. 23:24, **דוּדוּ בֵּית לָחַם**, a connection in which, after the analogy of such Arabic connections as *kaysu 'aylana*, *Ḳais* of the tribe of *Ailân* (*Ibn Coteiba*, 13 and 83), or *Ma'nu Ṭayyin*, *Ma'n* of the tribe of *Tay*, i.e., *Ma'n* belonging to this tribe, as distinguished from other men and families of this name (*Schol. Hamasae* 144. 3), **בֵּית לָחַם** is thought of as genit"^{f251}

(Mühlau). That **בֵּית הַלְחָמִי** (instead of **בֵּית לָחַם**) is easily changed, with Thenius and Wellhausen, after 1Ch. 11:26, into **מְבֵית לָחַם**, and in itself it is

not altogether homogeneous, because without the article. Yet it may be supposed that instead of **מִשָּׂא**, on account of the appellation of the proper name (the lifting up, *elatio*), the word **הַמִּשָּׂא** might be also employed. And since **בְּיָקָה**, along with **אֲנֹר**, forms, as it were, one *compositum*, and does not at all destroy ^{f252} the regulating force of **אֲנֹר**, the expression is certainly, after the Arabic *usus loq.*, to be thus explained: The words of Agur the son of Jakeh, of the tribe (the country) of Massa.

The second line of this verse, as it is punctuated, is to be rendered:

The saying of the man to *Ithiel*, to *Ithiel* and Uchal, not *Ukkal*; for, since Athias and van der Hooght, the incorrect form **וְאָכַל** has become current. J. H. Michaelis has the right form of the word **וְאָכַל**. Thus, with **כּ** *raphatum*, it is to be read after the Masora, for it adds to this word the remark **לִית וְחִסֵּר**, and counts it among the forty-eight words sometimes written defectively without **ו** (vid., this list in the *Masora finalis*, 27b, Col. 4); and since it only remarks the absence of the letter lengthening the word where no *dagesh* follows the vocal, it thus supposes that the **כּ** has no *dagesh*, as it is also found in Codd. (also *Jaman.*) written with the *Raphe*. **לְאִיתִיָּאל** is doubly accented; the *Tarcha* represents the *Metheg*, after the rule *Thorath Emeth*, p. 11. The **ל** after **נָאִם** is, in the sense of the punctuation, the same dat. as in **לְאֲדֹנָי**, Psa. 110: 1, and has an apparent right in him who asks **כִּי תִדַּע** in the 4th verse. *Ithiel* and Uchal must be, after an old opinion, sons, or disciples, or contemporaries, of Agur. Thus, e.g., Gesenius, in his *Lex.* under **אִיתִיָּאל**, where as yet his reference to Neh. 11: 7 is wanting. **אִיתִיָּאל** is rendered by Jefet and other Karaites, “there is a God” = **אִיתִיָּאל**; but it is perhaps equivalent to **אִתִּיָּאל**, “God is with me;” as for **אִתִּי**, the form **אִיתִי** is also found. **אָכַל** (**אָכַל**) nowhere occurs as a proper name; but in the region of proper names, everything, or almost everything, is possible. ^{f253}

Ewald sees in 1b -14 a dialogue: in vv. 2-4 the **הַגִּבֹּר**, i.e., as the word appears to him, the rich, haughty mocker, who has worn out his life, speaks; and in 5-14 the “*Mitmirgott*” [= God with me], or, more fully, “*Mitmirgott-sobinichstark*” [= God with me, so am I strong], i.e., the pious, humble man answers. “The whole,” he remarks, “is nothing but poetical; and it is poetical also that this discourse of mockery is called an elevated strain.” But

(1) **גִּבֹּר** is a harmless word; and in **נָאִם הַגִּבֹּר**, Num. 24: 3, 15, 2Sa. 23: 1, it is a solemn, earnest one;

(2) a proper name, consisting of two clauses connected by *Vav*, no matter whether it be an actual or a symbolical name, is not capable of being authenticated; Ewald, § 274*b*, recognises in גְּדַלְתִּי וְגוֹ' 1Ch. 25: 4, the naming, not of one son of Heman, but of two; and

(3) it would be a very forced, inferior poetry if the poet placed one half of the name in one line, and then, as if constrained to take a new breath, gave the other half of it in a second line. But, on the other hand, that אִיתִיאל and אַבְל are the names of two different persons, to whom the address of the man is directed, is attested by the, in this case aimless, *anadiplosis*, the here unpoetical parallelism with reservation. The repetition, as Fleischer remarks, of the name *Ithiel*, which may rank with Uchal, as the son of disciple of Agur, has probably its reason only as this, that one placed a second more extended phrase simply along with the shorter. The case is different; but Fleischer's supposition, that the poet himself cannot have thus written, is correct. We must not strike out either of the two לְאִיתִיאל; but the supposed proper names must be changed as to their vocalization into a declaratory clause.

A principal argument lies in v. 2, beginning with כִּי: this כִּי supposes a clause which it established; for, with right, Mühlau maintains that כִּי, in the affirmative sense, which, by means of *aposiopesis*, proceeds from the confirmative, may open the conclusion and enter as confirmatory into the middle of the discourse (e.g., Isa. 32:13), but cannot stand abruptly at the commencement of a discourse (cf. under Isa. 15: 1 and 7: 9). But if we now ask how it is to be vocalized, there comes at the same time into the sphere of investigation the striking phrase נַאֲם הַגִּבֹּר. This phrase all the Greek interpreters attest by their rendering, τάδε λέγει ὁ ἀνὴρ (*Venet.* φησὶν ἀνὴρ); besides, this is to be brought forward from the wilderness of the old attempts at a translation, that the feeling of the translators strives against the recognition in אַבְל of a second personal name: the Peshito omits it; the Targ. translates it, after the Midrash, by וְאֹבְל (I may do it); as Theodotion, καὶ δυνήσομαι, which is probably also meant by the καὶ συνήσομαι (from συνείναι, to be acquainted with) of the *Venet.*; the LXX with καὶ παύομαι; and Aquila, καὶ τέλεσον (both from the verb כָּלָה). As an objection to נַאֲם הַגִּבֹּר is this, that it is so bald without being followed, as at Num. 24: 3, 15, 2Sa. 23: 1, with the attributive description of the man. Luther was determined thereby to translate: discourse of the man Leithiel.... And why could not לְאִיתִיאל be a proper-name connection like שְׂאֵלְתִּיאל (שְׂאֵלְתִּיאל)? Interpreted in the sense of "I am troubled concerning God," it might be a symbolical name of the φιλόσοφος, as of one who strives after the knowledge of divine things with all his strength. But

(1) לָאֵה, with the accus. obj., is not established, and one is rather inclined to think of a name such as כְּלִיתֵיִאל, after Psa. 84: 3;

(2) moreover, לֵאִיתֵיִאל cannot be at one time a personal name, and at another time a declarative sentence — one must both times transform it into לָאִיתֵיִאל; but אֵל has to be taken as a vocative, not as accus., as is done by J. D.

Michaelis, Hitzig, Bunsen, Zöckler, and others, thus: I have wearied myself, O God!... The nakedness of הַגִּבֹּר is accordingly not covered by the first *Leithiel*. Mühlau, in his work, seeks to introduce הַמְשֵׂא changed into מִמְשֵׂא: “The man from Massa,” and prefers to interpret הַגִּבֹּר generically: ^{f254} “proverb (confession) of the man (i.e., the man must confess): I have wearied myself, O God!...” Nothing else in reality remains. The article may also be retrospective: the man just now named, whose “words” are announced, viz., Agur. But why was not the expression נַאֵם אַגוּר then used? Because it is not poetical to say: “the (previously named) man.” On the other hand, what follows applies so that one may understand, under הַגִּבֹּר, any man you choose. There are certainly among men more than too many who inquire not after God (Psa. 14: 2 f.). But there are also not wanting those who feel sorrowfully the distance between them and God. Agur introduces such a man as speaking, for he generalizes his own experience. Psa. 36: 2 (vid., under this passage) shows that a proper name does not necessarily follow נַאֵם.

With נַאֵם הַגִּבֹּר Agur then introduces what the man has to confess — viz. a man earnestly devoted to God; for with נַאֵם the ideas of that which comes from the heart and the solemnly earnest are connected. If Agur so far generalizes his own experience, the passionate *anadiplosis* does not disturb this. After long contemplation of the man, he must finally confess: I have troubled myself, O God! I have troubled myself, O God!... That the trouble was directed toward God is perhaps denoted by the alliteration of לֵאִיתֵיִ with אֵל. But what now, further? וְאָכַל is read as וְאָכַל, וְאָכַל, וְאָכַל, וְאָכַל, וְאָכַל, and it has also been read as וְאָכַל. The reading וְאָכַל no one advocates; this that follows says the direct contrary, *et potui (pollui)*. Geiger (*Urschrift*, p. 61) supports the reading וְאָכַל, for he renders it interrogatively: “I wearied myself in vain about God, I wearied myself in vain about God; why should I be able to do it?” But since one may twist any affirmative clause in this way, and from a *yes* make a *no*, one should only, in cases of extreme necessity, consent to such a question in the absence of an interrogative word. Böttcher’s לֵאִיתֵיִ אֵל, I have wearied myself out in vain, is not Hebrew. But at any rate the expression might be אֵל-אָכַל, if only the *Vav* did not stand between the words! If one

might transpose the letters, then we might gain **וְלֹא אָכַל**, according to which the LXX translates: **οὐ δύνησομαι**. At all events, this despairing as to the consequence of further trouble, “I shall be able to do nothing (shall bring it to nothing),” would be better than **וְאָכַל** (and I shall withdraw — become faint), for which, besides, **וְאָכְלָה** should be used (cf. Pro. 22: 8 with Job. 33:21). One expects, after **לְאִיתִי**, the expression of that which is the consequence of earnest and long-continued endeavour. Accordingly Hitzig reads **וְאָכַל**, and I have become dull — suitable to the sense, but unsatisfactory on this account, because **בָּלַל**, in the sense of the Arab. *kall*, *hebescere*, is foreign to the Heb. *usus loq*. Thus **וְאָכַל** will be a *fut. consec.* of **כָּלַה**. J. D. Michaelis, and finally Böttcher, read it as *fut. consec. Piel* **וְאָכַל** or **וְאָכַל** (vid., regarding this form in pause under Pro. 25: 9), “and I have made an end;” but it is not appropriate to the inquirer here complaining, when dissatisfaction with his results had determined him to abandon his research, and let himself be no more troubled. We therefore prefer to read with Dahler, and, finally, with Mühlau and Zöckler, **וְאָכַל**, and I have withdrawn. The form understood by Hitzig as a pausal form is, in the unchangeableness of its vocals, as accordant with rule as those of **וְיָחַד**, Pro. 27:17, which lengthen the — of their first syllables in pause. And if Hitzig objects that too much is said, for one of such meditation does not depart, we answer, that if the inquiry of the man who speaks here has completed itself by the longing of his spirit and his soul (Psa. 84: 3; 143: 7), he might also say of himself, in person, **כְּלִיתִי** or **וְאָכַל**. An inquiry proceeding not merely from intellectual, but, before all, from practical necessity, is meant — the doubled **לְאִיתִי** means that he applied thereto the whole strength of his inner and his outer man; and **וְאָכַל**, that he nevertheless did not reach his end, but wearied himself in vain. By this explanation which we give to 1*a*, no change of its accents is required; but 1*b* has to be written:

נֶאֱמַר הַגִּבּוֹר לְאִיתִי אֵל
: לְאִיתִי אֵל וְאָכַל: ^{f255}

Pro. 30: 2, 3. The **כִּי** now following confirms the fruitlessness of the long zealous search:

***2 For I am without reason for a man,
And a man’s understanding I have not.***

***3 And I have not learned wisdom,
That I may possess the knowledge of the All-Holy.***

He who cannot come to any fixed state of consecration, inasmuch as he is always driven more and more back from the goal he aims at, thereby brings guilt upon himself as a sinner so great, that every other man stands above him, and he is deep under them all. So here Agur finds the reason why in divine things he has failed to attain unto satisfying intelligence, not in the ignorance and inability common to all men — he appears to himself as not a man at all, but as an irrational beast, and he misses in himself the understanding which a man properly might have and ought to have. The מן of מאיש is not the partitive, like Isa. 44:11, not the usual comparative: than any one (Böttcher), which ought to be expressed by מכל-איש, but it is the negative, as Isa. 52:14; Fleischer: *rudior ego sum quam ut homo appeller*, or: *brutus ego, hominis non similis*. Regarding באר, vid., under Pro. 12: 1. ^{f256}

V. 3 now says that he went into no school of wisdom, and for that reason in his wrestling after knowledge could attain to nothing, because the necessary conditions to this were wanting to him. But then the question arises: Why this complaint? He must first go to school in order to obtain, according to the word “To him who hath is given,” that for which he strove. Thus למדתי refers to learning in the midst of wrestling; but למד, spiritually understood, signifies the acquiring of a *kennens* [knowledge] or *könnens* [knowledge = ability]: he has not brought it out from the deep point of his condition of knowledge to make wisdom his own, so that he cannot adjudge to himself knowledge of the all-holy God (for this knowledge is the kernel and the star of true wisdom). If we read לא אדע, this would be synchronistic, *nesciebam*, with למדתי standing on the same line. On the contrary, the positive אדע subordinates itself to ולא-למדתי, as the Arab. *fāa lama*, in the sense of (*ita*) *ut scirem scientiam Sanctissimi*, thus of a conclusion, like Lam. 1:19, a clause expressive of the intention, Ewald, § 347a. קדשים is, as at Pro. 9:10, the name of God in a superlative sense, like the Arab. *el-kuddūs*.

4 Who hath ascended to the heavens and descended?

Who hath grasped the wind in his fists?

Who hath bound up the waters in a garment?

Who hath set right all the ends of the earth?

What is his name, and what his son's name, if thou knowest?

Pro. 30: 4. The first question here, מי וגוי, is limited by *Pazer*; עלה-שמים has *Metheg* in the third syllable before the tone. The second question is at least shut off by *Pazer*, but, contrary to the rule, that *Pazer* does not repeat itself in a verse; Cod. Erfurt. 2, and several older editions, have for בחפניו more correctly בחפניו with *Rebia*. So much for the interpunction. חפנים are

properly not the two fists, for the fist — that is, the hand gathered into a ball, *pugnus* — is called אֶגְרִיף; while, on the contrary, חֶפֶן (in all the three dialects) denotes the palm of the hand, *vola* (vid., Lev. 16:12); yet here the hands are represented after they have seized the thing as shut, and thus certainly as fists. The dual points to the dualism of the streams of air produced by the disturbance of the equilibrium; he who rules this movement has, as it were, the north or east wind in one first, and the south or west wind in the other, to let it forth according to his pleasure from this prison (Isa. 24:22). The third question is explained by Job. 26: 8; the שְׁמֵלָה (from שָׁמַל, *comprehendere*) is a figure of the clouds which contain the upper waters, as Job. 38:37, the bottles of heaven. “All the ends of the earth” are as at five other places, e.g., Psa. 22:28, the most distant, most remote parts of the earth; the setting up of all these most remote boundaries (*margines*) of the earth is equivalent to the making fast and forming the limits to which the earth extends (Psa. 74:17), the determining of the compass of the earth and the form of its figures. כִּי תִדְעַ is in symphony with Job. 38: 5, cf. 18. The question is here formed as it is there, when Jahve brings home to the consciousness of Job human weakness and ignorance. But there are here two possible significations of the fourfold question. Either it aims at the answer: No man, but a Being highly exalted above all creatures, so that the question מַה־שְּׁמוֹ [what his name?] refers to the name of this Being. Or the question is primarily meant of men: What man has the ability? — if there is one, then name him! In both cases מִי עֹלָה is not meant, after Pro. 24:28, in the modal sense, *quis ascenderit*, but as the following וְיָרַד requires, in the nearest indicative sense, *quis ascendit*. But the choice between these two possible interpretations is very difficult. The first question is historical: Who has gone to heaven and (as a consequence, then) come down from it again? It lies nearest thus to interpret it according to the *consecutio temporum*. By this interpretation, and this representation of the going up before the descending again, the interrogator does not appear to think of God, but in contrast to himself, to whom the divine is transcendent, of some other man of whom the contrary is true. Is there at all, he asks, a man who can comprehend and penetrate by his power and his knowledge the heavens and the earth, the air and the water, i.e., the nature and the inner condition of the visible and invisible world, the quantity and extent of the elements, and the like? Name to me this man, if thou knowest one, by his name, and designate him to me exactly by his family — I would turn to him to learn from him what I have hitherto striven in vain to find. But there is not such an one. Thus: as I fell myself limited in my knowledge, so there is not at all any man who can claim limitless *können* and *kennen* [ability and knowledge]. Thus casually Aben Ezra explains, and also Rashi, Arama, and others, but without holding fast to this in its purity; for in the interpretation of

the question, “Who hath ascended?” the reference to Moses is mixed up with it, after the Midrash and Sohar (Parasha, **ויקהל**, to Exo. 35: 1), to pass by other obscurities and difficulties introduced. Among the moderns, this explanation, according to which all aims at the answer, “there is no man to whom this appertains,” has no exponent worth naming. And, indeed, as favourable as is the *quis ascendit in coelos ac rursus descendit*, so unfavourable is the *quis constituit omnes terminos terrae*, for this question appears not as implying that it asks after the man who has accomplished this; but the thought, according to all appearance, underlies it, that such an one must be a being without an equal, after whose name inquiry is made. One will then have to judge **עלה** and **יירד** after Gen. 28:12; the ascending and descending are compared to our German “*auf und neider*” [up and down], for which we do not use the phrase “*nieder und auf*,” and is the expression of free, expanded, unrestrained presence in both regions; perhaps, since **יירד** is historical, as Psa. 18:10, the speaker has the traditional origin of the creation in mind, according to which the earth arose into being earlier than the starry heavens above.

Thus the four questions refer (as e.g., also Isa. 40:12) to Him who has done and who does all that, to Him who is not Himself to be comprehended as His works are, and as He shows Himself in the greatness and wonderfulness of these, must be exalted above them all, and mysterious. If the inhabitant of the earth looks up to the blue heavens streaming in the golden sunlight, or sown with the stars of night; if he considers the interchange of the seasons, and feels the sudden rising of the wind; if he sees the upper waters clothed in fleecy clouds, and yet held fast within them floating over him; if he lets his eye sweep the horizon all around him to the ends of the earth, built up upon nothing in the open world-space (Job. 26: 7): the conclusion comes to him that he has before him in the whole the work of an everywhere present Being, of an all-wise omnipotent Worker — it is the Being whom he has just named as **אל**, the absolute Power, and as the **קדשִׁים**, exalted above all created beings, with their troubles and limitations; but this knowledge gained *viâ causalitatis*, *viâ eminentiae*, and *viâ negationis*, does not satisfy yet his spirit, and does not bring him so near to this Being as is to him a personal necessity, so that if he can in some measure answer the fourfold **מי**, yet there always presses upon him the question **מה-שמו**, what is his name, i.e., the name which dissolves the secret of this Being above all beings, and unfolds the mystery of the wonder above all wonders. That this Being must be a person the fourfold **מי** presupposes; but the question, “What is his name?” expresses the longing to know the name of this supernatural personality, not any kind of name which is

given to him by men, but the name which covers him, which is the appropriate personal immediate expression of his being.

The further question, “And what the name of his son?” denotes, according to Hitzig, that the inquirer strives after an adequate knowledge, such as one may have of a human being. But he would not have ventured this question if he did not suppose that God was not a *monas* [unity] who was without manifoldness in Himself. The LXX translates: ἡ τί ὄνομα τοῖς τέκνοις αὐτοῦ (בְּנֵי), perhaps not without the influence of the old synagogue reference testified to in the Midrash and Sohar of בְּנוּ to Israel, God’s first-born; but this interpretation is opposed to the spirit of this חִידָה (intricate speech, enigma). Also in general the interrogator cannot seek to know what man stands in this relation of a son to the Creator of all things, for that would be an ethical question which does not accord with this metaphysical one. Geier has combined this וְמֵה־שֵׁם־בְּנוּ with 8; and that the interrogator, if he meant the חֲכָמָה, ought to have used the phrase וְמֵה־שֵׁם־בְּתוֹ, says nothing against this, for also in אֲמוֹן, Pro. 8:30, whether it means foster-child or *artifex*, workmaster, the feminine determination disappears. Not Ewald alone finds here the idea of the Logos, as the first-born Son of God, revealing itself, on which at a later time the Palestinian doctrine of מִיִּמְרָא דִּיהוּדָה imprinted itself in Alexandria; ^{f257} but also J. D. Michaelis felt himself constrained to recognise here the N.T. doctrine of the Son of God announcing itself from afar. And why might not this be possible? The Rig-Veda contains two similar questions, x. 81, 4: “Which was the primeval forest, or what the tree from which one framed the heavens and the earth? Surely, ye wise men, ye ought in your souls to make inquiry whereon he stood when he raised the wind!” And i. 164, 4: “Who has seen the first-born? Where was the life, the blood, the soul of the world? Who came thither to ask this from any one who knew it?” ^{f258}

Jewish interpreters also interpret בְּנוּ of the *causa media* of the creation of the world. Arama, in his work עֲקֵדַת צַחֲקִים, *sect.* xvi., suggests that by בְּנוּ we are to understand the primordial element, as the Sankhya-philosophy understands by the first-born there in the Rig, the *Prakṛiti*, i.e., the primeval material. R. Levi b. Gerson (Ralbag) comes nearer to the truth when he explains בְּנוּ as meaning the cause caused by the supreme cause, in other words: the *principium principiatum* of the creation of the world. We say: the inquirer meant the demiurgic might which went forth from God, and which waited on the Son of God as a servant in the creation of the world; the same might which in Pro. 8 is called Wisdom, and is described as God’s beloved Son. But with the name after which inquiry is made, the relation is as with the “more excellent name than the angels,” Heb. 1: 4. ^{f259}

It is manifestly not the name **בן**, since the inquiry is made after the name of the **בן**; but the same is the case also with the name **חכמה**, or, since this does not harmonize, according to its grammatical gender, with the form of the question, the name **דבר** (**מִיָּמַר**); but it is the name which belongs to the first and only-begotten Son of God, not merely according to creative analogies, but according to His true being. The inquirer would know God, the creator of the world, and His Son, the mediator in the creation of the world, according to their natures. If thou knowest, says he, turning himself to man, his equal, what the essential names of both are, tell them to me! But who can name them! The nature of the Godhead is hidden, as from the inquirer, so from every one else. On this side of eternity it is beyond the reach of human knowledge.

The solemn confession introduced by **נא** is now closed. Ewald sees herein the discourse of a sceptical mocker at religion; and Elster, the discourse of a meditating doubter; in v. 5, and on, the answer ought then to follow, which is given to one thus speaking: his withdrawal from the standpoint of faith in the revelation of God, and the challenge to subordinate his own speculative thinking to the authority of the word of God. But this interpretation of the statement depends on the symbolical rendering of the supposed personal names **איתאל** and **אכל**, and, besides, the dialogue is indicated by nothing; the beginning of the answer ought to have been marked, like the beginning of that to which it is a reply. The confession, 1b -4, is not that of a man who does not find himself in the right condition, but such as one who is thirsting after God must renounce: the thought of a man does not penetrate to the essence of God (Job. 11: 7-9); even the ways of God remain inscrutable to man (Sir. 18: 3; Rom. 11:33); the Godhead remains, for our thought, in immeasurable height and depth; and though a relative knowledge of God is possible, yet the dogmatic thesis, *Deum quidem cognoscimus, sed non comprehendimus*, i.e., *non perfecte cognoscimus quia est infinitus*,^{r260} even over against the positive revelation, remains unchanged. Thus nothing is wanting to make 1-4 a complete whole; and what follows does not belong to that section as an organic part of it.

***5 Every word of Eloah is pure;
A shield is He for those who hide themselves in Him.***

***6 Add thou not to His words,
Lest He convict thee and thou becomest a liar.***

Pro. 30: 5, 6. Although the tetrastich is an independent proverb, yet it is connected to the foregoing *n^eûm* [utterance, v. 1]. The more limited a man is in his knowledge of God, — viz. in that which presents itself to him *lumine naturae*, — so much the more thankful must he be that God has revealed

Himself in history, and so much the more firmly has he to hold fast by the pure word of the divine revelation. In the dependent relation of v. 5 to Psa. 18:31 (2Sa. 22:31), and of v. 6 to Deu. 4: 2, there is no doubt the self-testimony of God given to Israel, and recorded in the book of the *Tôra*, is here meant.

בְּלֹא-אִמְרָתָא is to be judged after *πᾶσα γραφή*, 2Ti. 3:16, not: every declaration of God, wherever promulgated, but: every declaration within the revelation lying before us. The primary passage [Psa. 18:31] has not כָּל here, but, instead of it, לְכָל הַחַסִּים, and instead of אִמְרַת אֱלֹהִים it has אִמַּי יְהוָה; his change of the name of Jahve is also not favourable to the opinion that v. 5 f. is a part of the *N^eûm*, viz., that it is the answer thereto. The proverb in this contains traces of the Book of Job, with which in many respects that *N^eûm* harmonizes; in the Book of Job, אֱלֹהִים (with שְׂדֵי) is the prevailing name of God; whereas in the Book of Proverbs it occurs only in the passage before us. Mühlau, p. 41, notes it as an Arabism. צָרַף (Arab. *şaraf*, to turn, to change) is the usual word for the changing process of smelting; צָרוּף signifies solid, pure, i.e., purified by separating: God's word is, without exception, like pure, massive gold. Regarding חָסָה, to hide oneself, vid., under Psa. 2:12;: God is a shield for those who make Him, as revealed in His word, their refuge. The part. חָסֶה occurs, according to the Masora, three times written defectively, — Pro. 14:32; 2Sa. 22:31; Neh. 1: 7; in the passage before us it is to be written לְחֹסִים; the proverbs of Agur and Lemuel have frequently the *plena scriptio* of the *part. act. Kal*, as well as of the *fut. Kal*, common to the Book of Job (vid., Mühlau, p. 65).

In 6a, after Aben Ezra's *Moznajim 2b* (11b of Heidenheim's edition), and *Zachoth 53a* (cf. Lipmann's ed.), and other witnesses (vid., Norzi), *t sp* (the ך with *dagesh*) is to be written, — the Cod. *Jaman.* and others *defect.* without ך, — not *tôsf*; for, since הַתּוֹסֵף (Exo. 10:28) is yet further abbreviated in this way, it necessarily loses ^{f261} the aspiration of the *tenuis*, as in יְלֻדָּה (= יְלֻדַת). The words of God are the announcements of His holy will, measured by His wisdom; they are then to be accepted as they are, and to be recognised and obeyed. He who adds anything to them, either by an overstraining of them or by repressing them, will not escape the righteous judgment of God: God will convict him of falsifying His word (הוֹכִיחַ, Psa. 50:21; only here with כּ of the obj.), and expose him as a liar — viz. by the dispensations which unmask the falsifier as such, and make manifest the falsehood of his doctrines as dangerous to souls and destructive to society. An example of this is found in the kingdom of Israel, in the destruction of which the curse of the human institution of its state religion, set up by Jeroboam, had no little share. Also the Jewish traditional law, although in itself necessary for the carrying over of the

law into the *praxis* of private and public life, falls under the Deuteron. prohibition, — which the poet here repeats, — so far as it claimed for itself the same divine authority as that of the written law, and so far as it hindered obedience to the law — by the straining-at-a-gnat policy — and was hostile to piety. Or, to adduce an example of an addition more dogmatic than legal, what a fearful impulse was given to fleshly security by that overstraining of the promises in Genesis 17, which were connected with circumcision by the tradition, “the circumcised come not into hell,” or by the overstraining of the prerogative attributed by Paul, Rom. 9: 4 f., to his people according to the Scriptures, in the principle, “All Israelites have a part in the future world!” Regarding the accentuation of the *perf. consec.* after פִּן, vid., at Psa. 28: 1. The penultima accent is always *in pausa* (cf. vv. 9 and 10).

Pro. 30: 7-9. In what now follows, the key-note struck in v. 1 is continued. There follows a prayer to be kept in the truth, and to be preserved in the middle state, between poverty and riches. It is a Mashal-ode, vid., p. 9. By the first prayer, “vanity and lies keep far from me,” it is connected with the warning of v. 6.

*7 Two things I entreat from Thee,
Refuse them not to me before I die.*

*8 Vanity and lies keep far away from me
Poverty and riches give me not:
Cause me to eat the bread which is allotted to me,*

*9 Lest in satiety I deny,
And say: Who is Jahve?
And lest, in becoming poor, I steal,
And profane the name of my God.*

We begin with the settlement and explanation of the traditional punctuation. A monosyllable like שֹׁן receives, if *Legarmeh*, always *Mehuppach Legarmeh*, while, on the contrary, the poly-syllable אֲשַׁבַּע has *Asla Legarmeh*. אֲשַׁבַּע, with double *Makkeph* and with *Gaja* in the third syllable before the tone (after the *Metheg-Setzung*, § 28), is Ben-Asher’s; whereas Ben-Naphtali prefers the punctuation אֲשַׁבַּע (vid., Baer’s *Genesis*, p. 79, note 3). Also פִּן אֲשַׁבַּע has (cf. פִּן יִשְׁתָּה, Pro. 31: 5) *Makkeph*, and on the antepenultima *Gaja* (vid., *Thorath Emeth*, p. 32). The *perf. consec.* וְכַחֲשֵׁתִי has on the *ult.* the disjunctive *Zinnor (Sarka)*, which always stands over the final letter; but that the *ult.* is also to be accented, is shown by the counter-tone *Metheg*, which is to be given to the first syllable. Also וְאֲמַרְתִּי has in correct Codd., e.g., Cod. 1294, the correct ultima toning of a *perf. consec.*; Kimchi in

the *Michlol 6b*, as well as Aben Ezra in both of his *Grammars*, quotes only וְגִנְבְּתִי וְתִפְּשֶׁתִי as toned on the *penult*. That וְגִנְבְּתִי cannot be otherwise toned on account of the pausal accent, has been already remarked under *6b*; the word, besides, belongs to the פתתין בא"סר, i.e., to those which preserve their *Pathach* unlengthened by one of the greater disjunctives; the *Athnach* has certainly in the three so-called metrical books only the disjunctive form of the *Zakeph* of the prose books. So much as to the form of the text.

As to its artistic form, this prayer presents itself to us as the first of the numerical proverbs, under the "Words" of Agur, who delighted in this form of proverb. The numerical proverb is a brief discourse, having a didactic end complete in itself, which by means of numerals gives prominence to that which it seeks to bring forward. There are two kinds of these. The more simple form places in the first place only one numeral, which is the sum of that which is to be brought forth separately: the numerical proverb of one cipher; to this class belong, keeping out of view the above prayer, which if it did not commence a series of numerical proverbs does not deserve this technical name on account of the low ciphers: vv. 24-28, with the cipher 4; Sir. 25: 1 and 2, with the cipher 3. Similar to the above prayer are Job. 13:20 f., Isa. 51:19; but these are not numerical proverbs, for they are not proverbs. The more artistic kind of numerical proverb has two ciphers: the two-ciphered numerical proverb we call the sharpened (pointed) proverb. Of such two-ciphered numerical proverbs the "words" of Agur contain four, and the whole Book of Proverbs, reckoning Pro. 6:16-19, five — this ascending numerical character belongs to the popular saying, 2Ki. 9:32, Job. 33:29, Isa. 16: 6, and is found bearing the stamp of the artistic distich outside of the Book of Proverbs, Psa. 62:12, Job. 33:14; 40: 5; Job. 5:19, and particularly Amo. 1: 3-2: 6. According to this scheme, the introduction of Agur's prayer should be:

אֶחַת שְׁאֵלְתִי מֵאֵתֶךָ
וּשְׁתִּים אֶל־תִּמְנַע מִמֶּנִּי בְּטָרִם אָמוֹת

and it could take this form, for the prayer expresses two requests, but dwells exclusively on the second. A twofold request he presents to God, these two things he wishes to be assured of on this side of death; for of these he stands in need, so as to be able when he dies to look back on the life he has spent, without the reproaches of an accusing conscience. The first thing he asks is that God would keep far from him vanity and lying words. שְׁוֹא (= שְׁוֹאָה, from שָׂוָה = שָׂוָה, to be waste, after the form מְוֹת) is either that which is confused, worthless, untrue, which comes to us from without (e.g., Job. 31: 5), or dissoluteness, hollowness, untruthfulness of disposition (e.g., Psa. 26: 4); it is not to be decided whether the suppliant is influenced by the conception thus

from within or from without, since דְּבַר־כֶּזֶב [a word of falsehood] may be said by himself as well as to him, a falsehood can intrude itself upon him. It is almost more probable that by שׂוֹא he thought of the misleading power of God-estranged, idolatrous thought and action; and by דְּבַר־כֶּזֶב, of lying words, with which he might be brought into sympathy, and by which he might ruin himself and others. The second petition is that God would give him neither poverty (רָשָׁא, vid., Pro. 10: 4) nor riches, but grant him for his sustenance only the bread of the portion destined for him. The *Hiph.* הִטְרִיף (from טָרַף, to grind, viz., the bread with the teeth) means to give^{f262} anything, as טָרַף, with which, Pro. 31:15, נָתַן חֶק is parallel: to present a fixed piece, a definite portion of sustenance. חֶק, Gen. 47:22, the portion assigned as nourishment; cf. Job. 23:14 חֶקִי, the decree determined regarding me. Accordingly, לֶחֶם חֶקִי does not mean the bread appropriately measured out for me (like ἄριστος ἐπιούσιος, that which is required for οὐσία, subsistence), but the bread appropriate for me, determined for me according to the divine plan. Fleischer compares (Arab.) *ratab* and *marsaum*, which both in a similar way designate a fixed sustentation portion. And why does he wish to be neither poor nor rich? Because in both extremes lie moral dangers: in riches, the temptation to deny God (which בָּחַשׁ בְּה' signifies, in the later Heb. בָּפַר בַּעֲקָר, to deny the fundamental truth; cf. (Arab.) *kafar*, unbelieving), whom one flowing in superabundance forgets, and of whom one in his self-indulgence desires to know nothing (Job. 21:14-16; 22:16 f.); in poverty, the temptation is to steal and to blaspheme the name of God, viz., by murmuring and disputing, or even by words of blasphemy; for one who is in despair directs the outbreaks of his anger against God (Isa. 8:21), and curses Him as the cause of His misfortune (Rev. 16:11, 21). The question of godless haughtiness, מִי יְהוָה, the LXX improperly change into מִי יִרְאֶה τίς με ὀψᾶ. Regarding נֹרַשׁ, to grow poor, or rather, since only the *fut. Niph.* occurs in this sense, regarding יִנְרַשׁ, vid., at Pro. 20:13.

Pro. 30:10. That the author here, by blaspheming (grasping at) the name of God, especially thinks on that which the *Tōra* calls “cursing (קָלַל) God,” and particularly “blaspheming the name of the Lord,” Lev. 24:15, 16, is to be concluded from the two following proverbs, which begin with the catchword קָלַל:

***10 Calumniate not a servant with his master,
Lest he curse thee, and thou must atone for it.***

Incorrectly Ewald: entice not a servant to slander against his master; and Hitzig: “Make not a servant tattle regarding his master.” It is true that the *Poel*

לוֹשֵׁן (to pierce with the tongue, *linguâ petere*) occurs twice in the sense of to calumniate; but that לְשׁוֹן הַלְשִׁין means nothing else, is attested by the post-bibl. Hebrew; the proverb regarding schismatics (בְּרִבְתַּת הַמִּינִים) in the Jewish *Schemone-Esre* (prayer of the eighteen benedictions) began with וּלְמַלְשִׁינִים, “and to the calumniators” (*delatoribus*). Also in the Arab. *âlsana* signifies *pertulit verba alicujus ad alterum*, to make a babbler, *rapporteur* (Fleischer). That the word also here is not to be otherwise interpreted, is to be concluded from אָל with the causative rendering. Rightly Symmachus, μὴ διαβάλης; Theodotion, μὴ καταλαλήσης; and according to the sense also, Jerome, *ne accuses*; the *Venet.* μὴ καταμηνύσης (give not him); on the contrary, Luther, *verrate nicht* [betray not], renders לְשׁוֹן הַלְשִׁין with the LXX, Syr. in the sense of the Aram. אֲשַׁלֵּם and the Arab. *âslam* (*tradere, prodere*). One should not secretly accuse (Psa. 101: 5) a servant with his master, and in that lies the character of slander (לְשׁוֹן הָרָע) when one puts suspicion upon him, or exaggerates the actual facts, and generally makes the person suspected — one thereby makes a man, whose lot in itself is not a happy one, at length and perhaps for ever unhappy, and thereby he brings a curse on himself. But it is not matter of indifference to be the object of the curse of a man whom one has unrighteously and unjustly overwhelmed in misery: such a curse is not without its influence, for it does not fruitlessly invoke the righteous retribution of God, and thus one has sorrowfully to atone for the wanton sins of the tongue (*veaschâmta*, for *ve-aschamtá* as it is would be without pause).

Pro. 30:11-14. There now follows a *Priamel*, ^{f263} the first line of which is, by יִקְלַל', connected with the יִקְלַל' of the preceding distich:

*11 A generation that curseth their father,
And doth not bless their mother;*

*12 A generation pure in their own eyes,
And yet not washed from their filthiness;*

*13 A generation — how haughty their eyes,
And their eyelids lift themselves up;*

*14 A generation whose teeth are swords and their jaw teeth knives
To devour the poor from the earth and the needy from the midst of men.*

Ewald translates: O generation! but that would have required the word, 13a, הָרָוּר (Jer. 2:31), and one would have expected to have found something mentioned which the generation addressed were to take heed to; but it is not so. But if “O generation!” should be equivalent to “O regarding the generation!” then הוֹי ought to have introduced the sentence. And if we

translate, with Luther: There is a generation, etc., then שׁוֹ is supplied, which might drop out, but could not be omitted. The LXX inserts after ἔκγονον the word κακόν, and then renders what follows as pred. — a simple expedient, but worthless. The Venet. does not need this expedient, for it renders γενεὰ τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ βλασφημήσει; but then the order of the words in 11a would have been דור יקלל אביו ; and in 12a, after the manner of a subst. clause, הוּא דור טהור בעיניו, one sees distinctly, from 13 and 14, that what follows דור is to be understood, not as a pred., but as an attributive clause. As little can we interpret v. 14, with Löwenstein, as pred. of the three subj., “it is a generation whose teeth are swords;” that would at least have required the words דור הוא ; but v. 14 is not at all a judgment valid for all the three subjects. The Targ. and Jerome translate correctly, as we above; ^{f264} but by this rendering there are four subjects in the preamble, and the whole appears, since the common pred. is wanting, as a mutilated Priamel. Perhaps the author meant to say: it is such a generation that encompasses us; or: such is an abomination to Jahve; for דור is a *Gesamtheit* = totality, generation of men who are bound together by contemporary existence, or homogeneity, or by both, but always a totality; so that these verses, 11-14, might describe *quatuor detestabilia genera hominum* (C. B. Michaelis), and yet one *generatio*, which divide among themselves these four vices, of blackest ingratitude, loathsome self-righteousness, arrogant presumption, and unmerciful covetousness. Similar is the description given in the Mishna *Sota* ix. 14, of the character of the age in which the Messiah appeared. “The appearance of this age,” thus it concludes, “is like the appearance of a dog; a son is not ashamed before his father; to whom will we then look for help? To our Father in heaven!” ^{f265}

The undutifulness of a child is here placed first. To curse one’s parents is, after Exo. 21:17, cf. Pro. 20:10, a crime worthy of death; “not to bless,” is here, *per litoten*, of the same force as קלל [to curse]. The second characteristic, v. 12, is wicked blindness as to one’s judgment of himself. The LXX coarsely, but not bad: τὴν δ’ ἔξοδον αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀπένιψεν. Of such darkness one says: *sordes suas putat olere cinnama*. עִינָי is not the abbreviated part. (Stuart), as e.g., Exo. 3: 2, but the finite, as e.g., Hos. 1: 6.

In 13a the attributive clause forms itself, so as to express the astonishing height of arrogance, into an exclamation: a generation, how lofty are their eyes (cf. e.g., Pro. 6:17, עֵינַיִם רְמוֹת)! to which, as usual, it is simply added: and his eyelids (*palpebrae*) lift themselves up; in Lat., the lifting up of the eyebrow as an expression of haughtiness is described by *elatum* (*superbum*) *supercilium*.

The fourth characteristic is insatiable covetousness, which does not spare even the poor, and preys upon them, the helpless and the defenceless: they devour them as one eats bread, Psa. 14: 4. The teeth, as the instruments of eating, are compared to swords and knives, as at Psa. 57: 4 to spears and arrows. With שָׁנִיּוּ there is interchanged, as at Job. 29:17, Jon. 1: 6, מִתְּלַעְתָּיו (not מִתְּ, as Norzi writes, contrary to *Metheg-Setzung*, § 37, according to which *Gaja*, with the servant going before, is inadmissible), transposed from מִלְּתַעְתָּיו, Psa. 58: 7, from לְתַע, to strike, pierce, bite. The designation of place, מִן־אֲרֶץ, “from the earth” (which also, *in pausa*, is not modified into מִן־אֶרֶץ), and מִן־אָדָם, “from the midst of men,” do not belong to the obj.: those who belong to the earth, to mankind (vid., Psa. 10:18), for thus interpreted they would be useless; but to the word of action: from the earth, out from the midst of men away, so that they disappear from thence (Amo. 8: 4). By means of fine but cobweb combinations, Hitzig finds Amalek in this fourfold proverb. But it is a portrait of the times, like Psa. 14, and certainly without any national stamp.

Pro. 30:15, 16. With the characteristic of insatiableness it closes, and there follows an *apophthegma de quatuor insatiabilibus quae ideo comparantur cum sanguisuga* (C. B. Michaelis). We translate the text here as it lies before us:

***15 The 'Alûka hath two daughters: Give! Give!
Three of these are never satisfied;
Four say not: Enough!***

***16 The under-world and the closing of the womb;
The earth is not satisfied with water;
And the fire saith not: Enough!***

We begin with Masoretic externalities. The first ב in הַב is *Beth minusculum*; probably it had accidentally this diminutive form in the original MSS, to which the Midrash (cf. *Sepher Taghin ed. Bargès*, 1866, p. 47) has added absurd conceits. This first |הַב has *Pasek* after it, which in this case is servant to the *Olewejored* going before, according to the rule *Thorath Emeth*, p. 24, here, as at Psa. 85: 9, *Mehuppach*. The second הַב, which of itself alone is the representative of *Olewejored*, has in Hutter, as in the Cod. Erfurt 2, and Cod. 2 of the Leipzig Public Library, the pausal punctuation הַב (cf. קָח, 1Sa. 21:10), but which is not sufficiently attested. Instead of לֹא־אָמְרוּ, 15b, לֹא אָמְרוּ, and instead of לֹא־אָמְרָה, 16b, לֹא אָמְרָה are to be written; the *Zinnorith* removes the *Makkeph*, according to *Thorath Emeth*, p. 9, *Accentuationssystem*, iv. § 2. Instead of מַיִם, 16a, only Jablonski, as Mühlau remarks, has מַיִם; but incorrectly, since *Athnach*, after *Olewejored*, has no pausal force (vid., *Thorath Emeth*, p. 37). All that is without any weight as to the import of the words. But

the punctuation affords some little service for the setting aside of a view of Rabbenu Tam (vid., *Tosaphoth* to *Aboda zara* 17a, and *Erubin* 19a), which has been lately advocated by Löwenstein. That view is, that *Alûka* is the name of a wise man, not Solomon's, because the Pesikta does not reckon this among the names of Solomon, nor yet a name of hell, because it is not, in the Gemara, numbered among the names of Gehinnom. Thus לעלוקה would be a superscription, like לרוד and לשלמה, Psa. 26: 1; 72: 1, provided with *Asla Legarmeh*. But this is not possible, for the *Asla Legarmeh*, at Psa. 26: 1 and Psa. 72: 1, is the transformation of *Olewejored*, inadmissible on the first word of the verse (*Accentuationssystem*, xix. § 1); but no *Olewejored* can follow such an *Asla Legarmeh*, which has the force of an *Olewejored*, as after this לעלוקה, which the accentuation then does not regard as the author's name given as a superscription. עלוקה is not the name of a person, and generally not a proper name, but a generic name of certain traditional signification. "One must drink no water" — says the Gemara *Aboda zara* 12b — "out of a river or pond, nor (immediately) with his mouth, nor by means of his hand; he who, nevertheless, does it, his blood comes on his own head, because of the danger. What danger? עלוקה סכנת עלוקה," i.e., the danger of swallowing a leech. The Aram. also designates a leech by עלוקא (cf. e.g., Targ. Psa. 12: 9: hence the godless walk about like the leech, which sucks the blood of men), and the Arab. by *alāk* (*n. unit. alākat*), as the word is also rendered here by the Aram. and Arab. translators. Accordingly, all the Greeks render it by βδέλλα; Jerome, by *sanguisuga* (Rashi, *sangsue*); also Luther's *Eigel* is no the *Igel erinaceus* [hedgehog], but the *Egel*, i.e., as we now designate it, the *Blutegel* [leech], or (less correctly) *Blutigel*. עלוקה is the fem. of the adj. עלוק, attached to, which meaning, together with the whole verbal stem, the Arab. has preserved (vid., Mühlau's *Mittheilung des Art. alūka aus dem Kamus*, p. 42).^{f266}

But if, now, the *Alûka* is the leech,^{f267} which are then its two daughters, to which is here given the name הב הב, and which at the same time have this cry of desire in their mouths? Grotius and others understand, by the two daughters of the leech, the two branches of its tongue; more correctly: the double-membered overlip of its sucker. C. B. Michaelis thinks that the greedy cry, "Give! Give!" is personified: *voces istae concipiuntur ut hirudinis filiae, quas ex se gignat et velut mater sobolem impense diligit*. But since this does not satisfy, symbolical interpretations of *Aluka* have been resorted to. The Talmud, *Aboda zara* 17a, regards it as a name of hell. In this sense it is sued in the language of the Pijut (synagogue poetry).^{f268}

If *Alûka* is hell, then fancy has the widest room for finding an answer to the question, What are the two daughters? The Talmud supposes that רשות (the

worldly domination) and **מינות** (heresy) are meant. The Church-fathers also, understanding by *Alûka* the power of the devil, expatiated in such interpretations. Of the same character are Calmet's interpretation, that *sanguisuga* is a figure of the *mala cupiditas*, and its twin-daughters are *avaritia* and *ambitio*. The truth lying in all these is this, that here there must be some kind of symbol. But if the poet meant, by the two daughters of the *Alûka*, two beings or things which he does not name, then he kept the best of his symbol to himself. And could he use *Alûka*, this common name for the leech, without further intimation, in any kind of symbolical sense? The most of modern interpreters do nothing to promote the understanding of the word, for they suppose that *Alûka*, from its nearest signification, denotes a demoniacal spirit of the character of a vampire, like the *Dakinî* of the Indians, which nourish themselves on human flesh; the *ghouls* of the Arabs and Persians, which inhabit graveyards, and kill and eat men, particularly wanderers in the desert; in regard to which it is to be remarked, that (Arab.) *awlaḡ* is indeed a name for a demon, and that *al'aluwaḡ*, according to the *Kamus*, is used in the sense of *alghwal*. Thus Dathe, Döderlein, Ziegler, Umbreit; thus also Hitzig, Ewald, and others. Mühlau, while he concurs in this understanding of the word, and now throwing open the question, Which, then, are the two daughters of the demoness *Alûka*? finds no answer to it in the proverb itself, and therefore accepts of the view of Ewald, since 15b -16, taken by themselves, form a fully completed whole, that the line **לעלוקה וגו'** is the beginning of a numerical proverb, the end of which is wanting. We acknowledge, because of the obscurity — not possibly aimed at by the author himself — in which the two daughters remain, the fragmentary characters of the proverb of the *Alûka*; Stuart also does this, for he regards it as brought out of a connection in which it was intelligible, — but we believe that the line **שלוש וגו'** is an original formal part of this proverb. For the proverb forming, according to Mühlau's judgment, a whole rounded off:

שלוש הנה לא תשבענה

ארבע לא אמרו הון:

שאל ועצר רחם

ארץ לא שבעה מים

ואש לא אמרה הון:

contains a mark which makes the original combination of these five lines improbable. Always where the third is exceeded by the fourth, the step from the third to the fourth is taken by the connecting *Vav*: v. 18, **וְאַרְבַּע**; 21,

ארבע לא וגו' ; 29, וְאַרְבַּעָה. We therefore conclude that ארבע לא וגו' is the original commencement of independent proverb. This proverb is:

Four things say not: Enough!

*The under-world and the closing of the womb [i.e., unfruitful womb] —
The earth is not satisfied with water,
And the fire says not: Enough!*

a tetrastich more acceptable and appropriate than the Arab. proverb (Freytag, *Pro.* iii. p. 61, No. 347): “three things are not satisfied by three: the womb, and wood by fire, and the earth by rain;” and, on the other hand, it is remarkable to find it thus clothed in the Indian language, ^{f269} as given in the *Hitopadesa* (p. 67 of Lassen’s ed.), and in *Pantschatantra*, i. 153 (ed. of Kosegarten):

*nâgnis tṛpjati kâshṭhânân nâpagânân mahôdadhih
nântakah sarvabhûtânân na pun sân vâmalocanâh .*

*Fire is not sated with wood, nor the ocean with the streams,
Nor death with all the living, nor the beautiful-eyed with men.*

As in the proverb of Agur the 4 falls into 2 + 2, so also in this Indian *sloka*. In both, fire and the realm of death (*ântaka* is death as the personified “end-maker”) correspond; and as there the womb and the earth, so here *feminarium cupiditas* and the ocean. The parallelizing of ארץ and רחם is after passages such as Psa. 139:15, Job. 1:21 (cf. also Pro. 5:16; Num. 24: 7; Isa. 48: 1); that of שאול and אש is to be judged of ^{f270} after passages such as Deu. 32:22, Isa. 56:24. That לא אמרו הוון repeats itself in לא אמרה הוון is now, as we render the proverb independently, much more satisfactory than if it began with וְגו' : it rounds itself off, for the end returns into the beginning.

Regarding הוון, vid., 1:13. From הוון, to be light, it signifies living lightly; ease, superabundance, in that which renders life light or easy. “Used accusatively, and as an exclamation, it is equivalent to plenty! enough! It is used in the same sense in the North African Arab. *brrakat* (spreading out, fulness). Wetzstein remarks that in Damascus *lahôn* i.e., hitherto, is used in the sense of *hajah*, enough; and that, accordingly, we may attempt to explain הוון of our [Heb.] language in the sense of (Arab.) *hawn haddah*, i.e., here the end of it!” (Mühlau).

But what do we now make of the two remaining lines of the proverb of the *‘Alûka*? The proverb also in this division of two lines is a fragment. Ewald completes it, for to the one line, of which, according to his view, the fragment consists, he adds two:

***The bloodsucker has two daughters, “Hither! hither!”
Three saying, “Hither, hither, hither the blood,
The blood of the wicked child.”***

A proverb of this kind may stand in the O.T. alone: it sounds as if quoted from Grimm’s *Mährchen*, and is a side-piece to Zappert’s *altdeutsch. Schlummerlieder*. Cannot the mutilation of the proverb be rectified in a less violent way without any self-made addition? If this is the case, that in vv. 15 and 16, which now form one proverb, there are two melted together, only the first of which lies before us in a confused form, then this phenomenon is explained by supposing that the proverb of the *‘Alûka* originally stood in this form:

***The ‘Alûka has two daughters: Give! give! —
The under-world and the closing of the womb;
There are three that are never satisfied.***

Thus completed, this tristich presents itself as the original side-piece of the lost tetrastich, beginning with ארבע. One might suppose that if שאול and רחם עצר have to be regarded as the daughters of the *‘Alûka*, which Hitzig and also Zöckler have recognised, then there exists no reason for dividing the one proverb into two. Yet the taking of them as separate is necessary, for this reason, because in the fourth, into which it expands, the *‘Alûka* is altogether left out of account. But in the above tristich it is taken into account, as was to be expected, as the mother with her children. This, that sheol (שאול is for the most part fem.), and the womb (רחם = רחַם, which is fem., Jer. 20:17) to which conception is denied, are called, on account of their greediness, the daughters of the *‘Alûka*, is to be understood in the same way as when a mountain height is called, Isa. 5: 1, a horn of the son of oil. In the Arab., which is inexhaustibly rich in such figurative names, a man is called “a son of the clay (*limi*);” a thief, “a son of the night;” a nettle, “the daughter of fire.” The under-world and a closed womb have the *‘Alûka* nature; they are insatiable, like the leech. It is unnecessary to interpret, as Zöckler at last does, *‘Alûka* as the name of a female demon, and the לילית, “daughters,” as her companions. It may be adduced in favour of this view that לעלוקה is without the article, after the manner of a proper name. But is it really without the article? Such a doubtful case we had before us at Pro. 27:23. As yet only Böttcher, § 394, has entered on this difficulty of punctuation. We compare Gen. 29:27, בעבדה; 1Ki. 12:32, לעגלים; 1Ch. 13: 7, בעגלה; and consequently also Psa. 146: 7, לעשוקים; thus the assimilating force of the *Chateph* appears here to have changed the syntactically required ל and ב into ל and ב. But also supposing

that לעלוקה in לעלוקה is treated as a proper name, this is explained from the circumstance that the leech is not meant here in the natural history sense of the word, but as embodied greediness, and is made a person, one individual being. Also the symbol of the two daughters is opposed to the mythological character of the *Alûka*. The imper. לה, from לה, occurs only here and at Dan. 7:17 (= לת), and in the bibl. Heb. only with the intentional ה—, and in inflection forms. The insatiableness of sheol (Pro. 27:20 a) is described by Isaiah, 5:14; and Rachel, Gen. 30: 1, with her “Give me children,” is an example of the greediness of the “closed-up womb” (Gen. 20:18). The womb of a childless wife is meant, which, because she would have children, the *nuptiae* never satisfy; or also of one who, because she does not fear to become pregnant, invites to her many men, and always burns anew with lust. “In Arab. *aluwaḵ* means not only one fast bound to her husband, but, according to Wetzstein, in the whole of Syria and Palestine, the prostitute, as well as the κίταιδοι, are called ‘*ulak* (plur. ‘*alwak*), because they obtrude themselves and hold fast to their victim” (Mühlau). In the third line, the three: the leech, hell, and the shut womb, are summarized: *tira sunt quae non satiantur*. Thus it is to be translated with Fleischer, not with Mühlau and others, *tira haec non satiantur*. “These three” is expressed in Hebrew by שלש-אלה, Exo. 21:11, or אלה שלשת (האלה), 2Sa. 21:22; הנה (which, besides, does not signify *haec*, but *illa*) is here, taken correctly, the pred., and represents in general the verb of being (Isa. 51:19), vid., at 6:16. Zöckler finds the point of the proverb in the greediness of the unfruitful womb, and is of opinion that the poet purposely somewhat concealed this point, and gave to his proverb thereby the enhanced attraction of the ingenious. But the tetrastich ארבע וגו shows that hell, which is compared to fire, and the unfruitful womb, to which the parched and thirsty earth is compared, were placed by the poet on one and the same line; it is otherwise with vv. 18-20, but where that point is nothing less than concealed.

Pro. 30:17. The proverb of the *Alûka* is the first of the proverbs founded on the figure of an animal among the “words” of Agur. It is now followed by another of a similar character:

***17 An eye that mocketh at his father,
And despiseth obedience to his mother:
The ravens of the brook shall pluck it out,
And the young eagles shall eat it.***

If “an eye,” and not “eyes,” are spoken of here, this is accounted for by the consideration that the duality of the organ falls back against the unity of the mental activity and mental expression which it serves (cf. *Psychol.* p. 234). As

haughtiness reveals itself (v. 13) in the action of the eyes, so is the eye also the mirror of humble subordination, and also of malicious scorn which refuses reverence and subjection to father and mother. As in German the verbs [*verspotten, spotten, höhnen, hohnsprechen*] signifying to mock at or scorn may be used with the accus., genit., or dat., so also לָאֵג [to deride] and בּוּז [to despise] may be connected at pleasure with either an accusative object or a dative object. Ben-Chajim, Athias, van der Hooght, and others write תִּלְאָג; Jablonski, Michaelis, Löwenstein, תִּלְאָג, Mühlau, with Norzi, accurately, תִּלְאָג, with *Munach*, like תִּבְחָר, Psa. 65: 5; the writing of Ben-Asher^{f271} is תִּלְאָג, with *Gaja, Chateph, and Munach*. The punctuation of לִיקָהָת is more fluctuating. The word לִקָּהָת (e.g., Cod. *Jaman.*) may remain out of view, for the *Dag. dirimens* in ק stands here as firmly as at Gen. 49:10, cf. Psa. 45:10. But it is a question whether one has to write לִיקָהָת with *Yod quiesc.* (regarding this form of writing, preferred by Ben-Naphtali, the *Psalmen-Comm.* under Psa. 45:10, in both Edd.; Luzzatto's *Gramm.* § 193; Baer's *Genesis*, p. 84, note 2; and Heidenheim's *Pentateuch*, with the text-crit. *Comm.* of Jekuthiël ha-Nakdans, under Gen. 47:17; 49:10), as it is found in Kimchi, *Michlol 45a*, and under יָקָה, and as also Norzi requires, or לִיקָהָת (as e.g., Cod. Erfurt 1), which appears to be the form adopted by Ben-Asher, for it is attested^{f272} as such by Jekuthiël under Gen. 49:10, and also expressly as such by an old Maros-Cod. of the Erfurt Library. Löwenstein translates, "the weakness of the mother." Thus after Rashi, who refers the word to קָהָה, to draw together, and explains it, Gen. 49:10, "collection;" but in the passage before us, understands it of the wrinkles on the countenance of the aged mother. Nachmani (Ramban) goes still further, giving to the word, at Gen. 49:10, everywhere the meaning of weakness and frailty. Aben Ezra also, and Gersuni (Ralbag), do not go beyond the meaning of a drawing together; and the LXX, with the Aram., who all translate the word by *senectus*, have also קָהָה in the sense of to become dull, infirm (certainly not the Aethiopic *leh'eḵa*, to become old, weak through old age). But Kimchi, whom the *Venet.* and Luther^{f273} follow, is informed by *Abulwalid*, skilled in the Arab., of a better: יָקָהָה (or יָקָהָה, cf. נִצְרָה, Psa. 141: 3) is the Arab. *wakhat*, obedience (vid., above יָקָה under 1a). If now it is said of such a haughty, insolent eye, that the ravens of the brook (cf. 1Ki. 17: 4) will pluck it out, and the בְּנֵי-נֶשֶׁר eat it, they, the eagle's children, the unchildlike human eye: it is only the description of the fate that is before such an one, to die a violent death, and to become a prey to the fowls of heaven (cf. e.g., Jer. 16: 3 f., and Passow's *Lex.* under κόραξ); and if this threatening is not always thus literally fulfilled, yet one has not on that account to render the future optatively, with Hitzig; this is a false conclusion, from a too literal interpretation, for the threatening is only to be

understood after its spirit, viz., that a fearful and a dishonourable end will come to such an one. Instead of **יְקָרוּהָ**, as Mühlau reads from the Leipzig Cod., **יְקָרוּהָ**, with *Mercha* (Athias and Nissel have it with *Tarcha*), is to be read, for a word between *Olewejored* and *Athnach* must always contain a conjunctive accent (*Thorath Emeth*, p. 51; *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. § 9). **עַרְבֵי־נַחַל** is also irregular, and instead of it **עַרְבֵי־נַחַל** is to be written, for the reason given above under v. 16 (**מִים**).

Pro. 30:18-20. The following proverb, again a numerical proverb, begins with the eagle, mentioned in the last line of the foregoing:

*18 Three things lie beyond me,
And four I understand not:*

*19 The way of the eagle in the heavens,
The way of a serpent over a rock,
The way of a ship on the high sea,
And the way of a man with a maid.*

*20 Thus is the way of the adulterous woman:
She eateth and wipeth her mouth, and saith:
I have done no iniquity.*

נִפְלְאוּ מִמֶּנִּי, as relative clause, like 15*b* (where Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion rightly: *τρία δὲ ἔστιν ἃ οὐ πλῆσθησεται*), is joined to **שְׁלֹשָׁה הֶמָּה**. On the other hand, **אַרְבַּע** (*τέσσαρα*, for with the *Kerî*, conforming to 18*a*, **אַרְבַּעַה**, *τέσσαρας*) has to be interpreted as object. accus. The introduction of four things that are not known is in expressions like Job. 42: 3; cf. Psa. 139: 6. The turning-point lies in the fourth; to that point the other three expressions gravitate, which have not an object in themselves, but are only as *folie* to the fourth. The articles wanting after **הַנְּשָׂר**: they would be only the marks of the gender, and are therefore unnecessary; cf. under Pro. 29: 2. And while **בְּשָׁמַיִם**, in the heavens, and **בְּלִבְיָם**, in the sea, are the expressions used, **עָלֵי צוּר** is used for on the rock, because here “on” is not at the same time “in,” “within,” as the eagle cleaves the air and the ship the waves. For this same reason the expression, “the way of a man **בְּאַלְמָה**,” is not to be understood of love unsought, suddenly taking possession of and captivating a man toward this or that maid, so that the principal thought of the proverb may be compared to the saying, “marriages are made in heaven;” but, as in *Kidduschin 2b*, with reference to this passage, is said *coitus via appellatur*. The **ב** refers to *copula carnalis*. But in what respect did his understanding not reach to this? “Wonderful,” thus Hitzig explains as the best interpreter of this opinion

elsewhere (cf. *Psychol.* p. 115) propounded, “appeared to him the flying, and that how a large and thus heavy bird could raise itself so high in the air (Job. 39:27); then how, over the smooth rock, which offers no hold, the serpent pushes itself along; finally, how the ship in the trackless waves, which present nothing to the eye as a guide, nevertheless finds its way. These three things have at the same time this in common, that they leave no trace of their pathway behind them. But of the fourth way that cannot be said; for the trace is left on the *substrat*, which the man **דָּרַךְ**, and it becomes manifest, possibly as pregnancy, keeping out of view that the **עלמה** may yet be **בתולה**. That which is wonderful is consequently only the coition itself, its mystical act and its incomprehensible consequences.” But does not this interpretation carry in itself its own refutation? To the three wonderful ways which leave no traces behind them, there cannot be compared a fourth, the consequences of which are not only not trackless, but, on the contrary, become manifest as proceeding from the act in an incomprehensible way. The point of comparison is either the wonderfulness of the event or the tracklessness of its consequences.

But now “the way of a man **בתולה**” is altogether inappropriate to designate the wonderful event of the origin of a human being. How altogether differently the *Chokma* expresses itself on this matter is seen from Job. 10: 8-12; Ecc. 11: 5 (cf. *Psychol.* p. 210). That “way of a man with a maid” denotes only the act of coition, which physiologically differs in nothing from that of the lower animals, and which in itself, in the externality of its accomplishment, the poet cannot possibly call something transcendent. And why did he use the word **בעלמה**, and not rather **בַּנְּבָה** [with a female] or **בַּאִשָּׁה** [*id.*]? For this reason, because he meant the act of coition, not as a physiological event, but as a historical occurrence, as it takes place particularly in youth as the goal of love, not always reached in the divinely-appointed way. The point of comparison hence is not the secret of conception, but the tracelessness of the carnal intercourse. Now it is also clear why the way of the serpent **עַל־צוּר** was in his eye: among grass, and still more in sand, the trace of the serpent’s path would perhaps be visible, but not on a hard stone, over which it has glided. And it is clear why it is said of the ship **בַּלְּבַיִם** [in the heart of the sea]: while the ship is still in sight from the land, one knows the track it follows; but who can in the heart of the sea, i.e., on the high sea, say that here or there a ship has ploughed the water, since the water-furrows have long ago disappeared? Looking to the heavens, one cannot say that an eagle has passed there; to the rock, that a serpent has wound its way over it; to the high sea, that a ship has been steered through it; to the maid, that a man has had carnal intercourse with her. That the fact might appear on nearer investigation, although this will not always guide to a certain conclusion, is not kept in view; only the outward appearance is spoken of, the intentional concealment (Rashi)

being in this case added thereto. Sins against the sixth [= seventh] commandment remain concealed from human knowledge, and are distinguished from others by this, that they shun human cognition (as the proverb says: **אין אפיטרופוס לערוות**, there is for sins of the flesh no **ἐπιτροπος**) — unchastity can mask itself, the marks of chastity are deceitful, here only the All-seeing Eye (**אין ראה כל**, *Aboth* ii. 1) perceives that which is done. Yet it is not maintained that “the way of a man with a maid” refers exclusively to external intercourse; but altogether on this side the proverb gains ethical significance. Regarding **אלמה** (from **עלם**, *pubes esse et caeundi cupidus*, not from **עלם**, to conceal, and not, as Schultens derives it, from **עלם**, *signare*, to seal) as distinguished from **בתולה**, vid., under Isa. 7:14. The mark of maidenhood belongs to **עלמה** not in the same way as to **בתולה** (cf. Gen. 24:43 with 16), but only the marks of puberty and youth; the wife **אשה** (viz., **אשת איש**) cannot as such be called **עלמה**. Ralbag’s gloss **בעולה** **עלמה שהיא** is incorrect, and in Arama’s explanation (*Akeda*, Abschn. 9): the time is not to be determined when the sexual love of the husband to his wife flames out, ought to have been **ודרך איש באשתו**. One has therefore to suppose that v. 20 explains what is meant by “the way of a man with a maid” by a strong example (for “the adulterous woman” can mean only an old adulteress), there not inclusive, for the tracklessness of sins of the flesh in their consequences.

This 20th verse does not appear to have been an original part of the numerical proverb, but is an appendix thereto (Hitzig). If we assume that **בן** points forwards: thus as follows is it with the... (Fleischer), then we should hold this verse as an independent cognate proverb; but where is there a proverb (except Pro. 11:19) that begins with **בן? בן**, which may mean *eodem modo* (for one does not say **בן גם**) as well as *eo modo*, here points backwards in the former sense. Instead of **ומחטה פיה** (not **פיה**; for the attraction of that which follows, brought about by the retrogression of the tone of the first word, requires dageshing, *Thorath Emeth*, p. 30) the LXX has merely **ἀπονιψαμένη**, i.e., as Immanuel explains: **מקנחה עצמה**, *abstergens semet ipsam*, with Grotius, who to *tergens os suum* adds the remark: **σεμνολογία** (*honesta elocutio*). But eating is just a figure, like the “secret bread,” Pro. 9:17, and the wiping of the mouth belongs to this figure. This appendix, with its **בן**, confirms it, that the intention of the four ways refers to the tracklessness of the consequences.

Pro. 30:21-23. It is now not at all necessary to rack one’s brains over the grounds or the reasons of the arrangement of the following proverb (vid.,

Hitzig). There are, up to this point, two numerical proverbs which begin with שְׁתַּיִם, v. 7, and שְׁתֵּי, v. 15; after the cipher 2 there then, v. 18, followed the cipher 3, which is now here continued:

*21 Under three things doth the earth tremble,
And under four can it not stand:*

*22 Under a servant when he becomes king,
And a profligate when he has bread enough;*

*23 Under an unloved woman when she is married,
And a maid-servant when she becomes heiress to her mistress.*

We cannot say here that the 4 falls into 3 + 1; but the four consists of four ones standing beside one another. אָרְצָה is here without pausal change, although the *Athnach* here, as at v. 24, where the modification of sound occurs, divides the verse into two; מְאָרְצָה, 14b (cf. Psa. 35: 2), remains, on the other hand, correctly unchanged. The “earth” stands here, as frequently, instead of the inhabitants of the earth. It trembles when one of the four persons named above comes and gains free space for acting; it feels itself oppressed as by an insufferable burden (an expression similar to Amo. 7:10); — the arrangement of society is shattered; an oppressive closeness of the air, as it were, settles over all minds. The first case is already designated, Pro. 19:10, as improper: under a slave, when he comes to reign (*quum rex fit*); for suppose that such an one has reached the place of government, not by the murder of the king and by the robbery of the crown, but, as is possible in an elective monarchy, by means of the dominant party of the people, he will, as a rule, seek to indemnify himself in his present highness for his former lowliness, and in the measure of his rule show himself unable to rise above his servile habits, and to pass out of the limited circle of his earlier state. The second case is this: a נָבֵל, one whose mind is perverted and whose conduct is profligate, — in short, a low man (vid., Pro. 17:17), — יִשְׁבַּע-לֶחֶם (cf. *Metheg-Setzung*, § 28), i.e., has enough to eat (cf. to the expression Pro. 28:19, Jer. 44:17); for this undeserved living without care and without want makes him only so much the more arrogant, and troublesome, and dangerous. The שְׁנוּאָה, in the second case, is not thought of as a spouse, and that, as in supposed polygamy, Gen. 29:31, Deu. 21:15-17, as fallen into disfavour, but who again comes to favour and honour (Dathe, Rosenmüller); for she can be שְׁנוּאָה without her own fault, and as such she is yet no נְרוּשָׁה; and it is not to be perceived why the re-assumption of such an one should shatter social order. Rightly Hitzig, and, after his example, Zöckler: an unmarried lady, an old spinster, is meant, whom no one desired because she had nothing attractive, and was only repulsive (cf. Grimm, under Sir. 7:26b). If

such an one, as **כִּי תִבְעַל** says, at length, however, finds her husband and enters into the married relation, then she carries her head so much the higher; for she gives vent to ill-humour, strengthened by long restraint, against her subordinates; then she richly requites her earlier and happily married companions for their depreciation of her, among whom she had to suffer, as able to find no one who would love her. In the last case it is asked whether **בִּי־תִרְשׁ** is meant of inheriting as an heiress (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, the Targ., Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther), or supplanting (Euchel, Gesenius, Hitzig), i.e., an entering into the inheritance of the dead, or an entering into the place of a living mistress. Since **יָרַשׁ**, with the accus. of the person, Gen. 15: 3, 4, signifies to be the heir of one, and only with the accus. of peoples and lands signifies, “to take into possession (to seize) by supplanting,” the former is to be preferred; the LXX (Syr.), **ὅταν ἐκβάλλῃ**, appear to have read **בִּי־תִנְרַשׁ**. This **נִרְשׁ** would certainly be, after Gen. 21:10, a piece of the world turned upside down; but also the entering, as heiress, into the inheritance, makes the maid-servant the reverse of that which she was before, and brings with it the danger that the heiress, notwithstanding her want of culture and dignity, demean herself also as heiress of the rank. Although the old Israelitish law knew only intestate succession to an inheritance, yet there also the case might arise, that where there were no natural or legal heirs, the bequest of a wife or rank passed over to her servants and nurses.

Pro. 30:24-28. Another proverb with the cipher 4, its first line terminating in **אַרְבָּע**:

*24 Four are the little things of the earth,
And yet they are quick of wit — wise:*

*25 The ants — a people not strong,
And yet they prepare in summer their food;*

*26 Conies — a people not mighty,
And yet set their dwelling on the rocks;*

*27 No king have the locusts,
And yet they go forth in rank and file, all of them together;*

*28 The lizard thou canst catch with the hands,
And yet it is in the king's palaces.*

By the disjunctive accent, **אַרְבָּעָה**, in spite of the following word toned on the beginning, retains its *ultima* -toning, 18a; but here, by the conjunctive accent, the tone retrogrades to the *penult.*, which does not elsewhere occur with this word. The connection **קַמְנֵי־אַרְבָּעִים** is not superlat. (for it is impossible that the

author could reckon the שפנים, conies, among the smallest of beasts), but, as in the expression נְכַבְּדֵי-אֶרֶץ, the honoured of the earth, Isa. 23: 8. In 24b, the LXX, Syr., Jerome, and Luther see in מ the comparative: σοφώτερα τῶν σοφῶν (מַחְכְּמִים), but in this connection of words it could only be partitive (wise, reckoning among the wise); the *part. Pual* מַחְכְּמִים (Theodotion, the *Venet.* σεσοφισμένα) was in use after Psa. 88: 6, and signified, like מְבֻשָּׁל בְּשֵׁל, Exo. 12: 9, boiled well; thus חַכְמִים מַחְכְּמִים, taught wit, wise, cunning, prudent (cf. Psa. 64: 7, a planned plan = a cunningly wrought out plan; Isa. 28:16, and Vitringa thereto: grounded = firm, grounding), Ewald, § 313c. The reckoning moves in the contrasts of littleness to power, and of greatness to prudence. The unfolding of the ארבעה [four] begins with the הַנְּמָלִים [the ants] and שפנים [conies], subject conceptions with apposit. joined; 26a, at least in the indetermination of the subject, cannot be a declaration. Regarding the *fut. consec.* as the expression, not of a causal, but of a contrasted connection, vid., Ewald, § 342, 1a. The ants are called אַנְּסִי, and they deserve this name, for they truly form communities with well-ordered economy; but, besides, the ancients took delight in speaking of the various classes of animals as peoples and states. ^{f274}

That which is said, 25b, as also Pro. 6: 8, is not to be understood of stores laid up for the winter. For the ants are torpid for the most part in winter; but certainly the summer is their time for labour, when the labourers gather together food, and feed in a truly motherly way the helpless. שָׂפָן, translated arbitrarily in the *Venet.* by ἐχίνοι, in the LXX by χοιρογρύλλιοι, by the Syr. and Targ. here and at Psa. 104 by אֲנָסִי, and by Jerome by *lepusculus* (cf. λαγίδιον), both of which names, here to be understood after a prevailing Jewish opinion, denote the *Caninichen* ^{f275} (Luther), Latin *cuniculus* (κόνικλος), is not the *kaninchen* [rabbit], nor the marmot, χοιρογρύλλιος (C. B. Michaelis, Ziegler, and others); this is called in Arab. *yarbuw'*; but שָׂפָן is the *wabr*, which in South Arab. is called *thufun*, or rather *thafan*, viz., the *klippdachs* (*hyrax syriacus*), like the marmot, which lives in societies and dwells in the clefts of the mountains, e.g., at the Kedron, the Dead Sea, and at Sinai (vid., Knobel on Leb. 11: 5; cf. Brehm's *Thierleben*, ii. p. 721 ff., the *Illustrierte Zeitung*, 1868, Nr. 1290). The *klippdachs* are a weak little people, and yet with their weakness they unite the wisdom that they establish themselves among the rocks. The ants show their wisdom in the organization of labour, here in the arranging of inaccessible dwellings.

Pro. 30:27. Thirdly, the locusts belong to the class of the wise little folk: these have no king, but notwithstanding that, there is not wanting to them

guidance; by the power and foresight of one sovereign will they march out as a body, **חֲצִי**, dividing, viz., themselves, not the booty (Schultens); thus: dividing themselves into companies, *ordine dispositae*, from **חֲצִי**, to divide, to fall into two (cogn. **חֲצָה**, e.g., Gen. 32: 7) or more parts; Mühlau, p. 59-64, has thoroughly investigated this whole wide range of roots. What this **חֲצִי** denotes is described in Joe. 2: 7: “Like mighty men they hunt; like men of war they climb the walls; they march forward every one on his appointed way, and change not their paths.” Jerome narrates from his own observation: *tanto ordine ex dispositione jubentis* (LXX at this passage before us: ἄφ’ ἐνὸς κελεύσματος εὐτάκτως) *volitant, ut instar tesserularum, quae in pavimentis artificis figuntur manu, suum locum teneant et ne puncto quidem et ut ita dicam ungue transverso declinent ad alterum*. Aben Ezra and others find in **חֲצִי** the idea of gathering together in a body, and in troops, according to which also the Syr., Targ., Jerome, and Luther translate; Kimchi and *Meîri* gloss **חֲצִי** by **חֲתָךְ** and **כֹּרֵת**, and understand it of the cutting off, i.e., the eating up, of plants and trees, which the *Venet.* renders by ἐκτέμνουσα.

Pro. 30:28. In this verse the expression wavers in a way that is with difficulty determinable between **שְׂמַמִּית** and **שְׂמַמִּית**. The Edd. of Opitz Jablonski and Van der Hooght have **שְׂמִ**, but the most, from the Venetian 1521 to Nissel, have **שְׂמִ** (vid., Mühlau, p. 69). The Codd. also differ as to the reading of the word; thus the Codd. Erfurt 2 and 3 have **שְׂמִ**, but Cod. 1294 has **שְׂמִ**. Isaak Tschelebi and Moses Algazi, in their writings regarding words with **ש** and **ש** (Constant. 1723 and 1799), prefer **שְׂמִ**, and so also do Mordecai Nathan in his *Concordance* (1563-4), David de Pomis (1587), and Norzi. An important evidence is the writing **סַמְמִית**, *Schabbath 77b*, but it is as little decisive as **סְרִיּוֹן** [coat of mail], used by Jeremiah [44: 4], is decisive against the older expression **שְׂרִיּוֹן**. But what kind of a beast is meant here is a question. The swallow is at once to be set aside, as the *Venet.* translates (*χελιδόν*) after Kimchi, who explains after *Abulwalid*, but not without including himself, that the Heb. word for (Arab.) *khuttaf* (which is still the name given to the swallow from its quickness of motion), according to Haja’s testimony, is much rather **סַנְנִיית**, a name for the swallow; which also the Arab. (Freitag, ii. p. 368) and the modern Syriac confirm; besides, in old Heb. it has the name of **סַשׁ** or **סַשׁ** (from Arab. *shash*, to fly confusedly hither and thither). In like manner the ape (Aben Ezra, *Meîri*, Immanuel) is to be set aside, for this is called **קַפִּי** (Indian *kapi*, *kap*, *kamp*, to move inconstantly and quickly up and down), ^{f276} and appears here admissible only on the ground that from **בִּידִים תִּתְפֹּשׂ** they read that the beast had a resemblance to man. There

remains now only the lizard (LXX, Jerome) and the spider (Luther) to be considered. The Talmud, *Schabbath 77b*, reckons five instances in which fear of the weaker pursues the stronger: one of these instances is סנונית על הנשר, another אימת סממית על העקרב. The swallow, thus Rashi explains, creeps under the wings of the eagle and hinders it from spreading them out in its flight; and the spider (*araigne*) creeps into the ear of the scorpion; or also: a bruised spider applied heals the scorpion's sting. A second time the word occurs, *Sanhedrin 103b*, where it is said of King Amon that he burnt the *Tôra*, and that over the altar came a שממית (here with ש), which Rashi explains of the spider (a spider's web). But Aruch testifies that in these two places of the Talmud the explanation is divided between *ragnatelo* (spider) and (Ital.) *lucërta* (lizard). For the latter, he refers to Lev. 11:30, where למאה (also explained by Rashi by *lézard*) in the Jerus. Targ. is rendered ^{f277} by שממיתא (the writing here also varies between ש and ש or ס). Accordingly, and after the LXX and Jerome, it may be regarded as a confirmed tradition that שממית means not the spider, for which the name אַפְבִּישׁ is coined, but the lizard, and particularly the stellion (spotted lizard). Thus the later language used it as a word still living (plur. סַמְמִיּוֹת, *Sifre*, under Deu. 33:19). The Arab. also confirms this name as applicable to the lizard. ^{f278}

“To this day in Syria and in the Desert it is called *samawiyyat*, probably not from poison, but from *samawah* = שַׁמְמָה, the wilderness, because the beast is found only in the stony heaps of the *Kharab*” (Mühlau after Wetzstein). If this derivation is correct, then שממית is to be regarded as an original Heb. expression; but the lizard's name, *samm*, which, without doubt, designates the animal as poisonous (cf. סם, *samam*, *samm*, vapour, poisonous breath, poison), favours Schultens' view: שממית = (Arab.) *samamyiat*, *afflatu interficiens*, or generally *venenosa*.

In the expression בִּידָיִם תִּתְפֹּשׂ, Schultens, Gesenius, Ewald, Hitzig, Geier, and others, understand בִּידָיִם of the two fore-feet of the lizard: “the lizard feels (or: seizes) with its two hands;” but granting that יָדַיִם is used of the fifteen feet of the *stellio*, or of the climbing feet of any other animal (LXX *καλαβώτης* = *ἀσκαλαβώτης*), yet it is opposed by this explanation, that in line first of this fourth distich an expression regarding the smallness of the weakness of the beast is to be expected, as at 25*a*, 26*a*, and 27*a*. And since, besides, תִּפְשׂ with בִּידָיִם or בכף always means “to catch” or “seize” (Eze. 21:16; 29: 7; Jer. 38:23), so the sense according to that explanation is: the lizard thou canst catch with the hand, and yet it is in kings' palaces, i.e., it is a little beast, which one can grasp with his hand, and yet it knows how to gain an entrance into

palaces, by which in its nimbleness and cunning this is to be thought of, that it can scale the walls even to the summit (Aristoph. *Nubes* 170). To read שַׁתְּפֵשׁ with Mühlau, after Böttcher, recommends itself by this, that in שַׁתְּפֵשׁ one misses the suff. pointing back (שַׁתְּפֵשׁ־הָ); also why the intensive of תִּפְשׂ is used, is not rightly comprehended. Besides, the address makes the expression more animated; cf. Isa. 7:25, תִּבְוֹא. In the LXX as it lies before us, the two explanations spoken of are mingled together: καὶ καταβώτης (= ἀσκαλαβώτης) χερσὶν ἐρειδόμενος καὶ εὐάλωτος ὦν... This εὐάλωτος ὦν (Symmachus, χερσὶν ἔλλαμβανόμενος) hits the sense of 28a. In מֶלֶךְ הַיְיָכָלִי מֶלֶךְ, is not the genit. of possession, as at Psa. 45: 9, but of description (Hitzig), as at Amo. 7:13.

Pro. 30:29-31. Another numerical proverb with the cipher 4 = 3 + 1:

**29 Three things are of stately walk,
And four of stately going:**

**30 The lion, the hero among beasts,
And that turneth back before nothing;**

**31 The swift-loined, also the goat;
And a king with whom is the calling out of the host.**

Regarding הַיְיָכָלִי with inf. following (the segolated *n. actionis* צָאד is of equal force with an inf.), vid., under Pro. 15: 2. ^{f279}

The relation of the members of the sentence in 30a is like that in 25a and 26a: subj. and apposit., which there, as here, is continued in a verbal clause which appears to us as relative. It deserves to be here remarked that לֵישׁ, as the name for a lion, occurs only here and at Job. 4:11, and in the description of the Sinai wilderness, Isa. 30: 6; in Arab. it is *layth*, Aram. לֵית, and belongs to the Arameo-Arab. dialect of this language; the LXX and Syr. translate it “the young lion;” the *Venet.* excellently, by the epic λις. כִּבְהֶמָה has the article only to denote the genus, viz., of the beasts, and particularly the four-footed beasts. What is said in 30b (cf. with the expression, Job. 39:22) is described in Isa. 30: 4. The two other beasts which distinguish themselves by their stately going are in 31a only briefly named. But we are not in the condition of the readers of this Book of Proverbs, who needed only to hear the designation מְרִירָה at once to know what beast was meant. Certainly מְרִירָה, as the name for a beast, is not altogether unknown in the post-bibl. Heb. “In the days of Rabbi Chija (the great teacher who came from Babylon to the Academy of Sepphoris), as is narrated in *Bereschith rabba*, sect. 65, a *zarzir* flew to the land of Israel, and it was brought to him with the question whether it were eatable. Go, said he, place it on the roof! Then came an Egyptian raven and

lighted down beside it. See, said Chija, it is unclean, for it belongs to the genus of the ravens, which is unclean (Lev. 11:15). From this circumstance there arose the proverb: The raven goes to the *zarzir* because it belongs to his own tribe.” ^{f280}

Also the *Jer. Rosch ha-schane*, Halacha 3: “It is the manner of the world that one seeks to assist his *zarzir*, and another his *zarzir*, to obtain the victory;” and *Midrash Echa* v. 1, according to which it is the custom of the world, that one who has a large and a little *zarzir* in his house, is wont to treat the little one sparingly, so that in the case of the large one being killed, he might not need to buy another. According to this, the *zarzir* is a pugnacious animal, which also the proverb *Bereschith rabba*, c. 75, confirms: two *zarzir* do not sleep on one board; and one makes use of his for contests like cock-fights. According to this, the זרזיר is a bird, and that of the species of the raven; after Rashi, the *étourneau*, the starling, which is confirmed by the Arab. *zurzur* (vulgar Arab. *zarzur*), the common name of starlings (cf. Syr. *zarzizo*, under *zrz* of Castelli).

But for the passage before us, we cannot regard this as important, for why is the starling fully named זרזיר מְתַנִּים ? To this question Kimchi has already remarked that he knows no answer for it. Only, perhaps, the grave magpie (*corvus pica*), strutting with upraised tail, might be called *succinctus lumbos*, if מְתַנִּים can at all be used here of a bird. At the earliest, this might possibly be used of a cock, which the later Heb. named directly גָּבֵר, because of its manly demeanour; most old translators so understand it. The LXX translates, omitting the loins, by ἀλέκτωρ ἑμπεριπατῶν θηλείαις εὐψυχος, according to which the Syr. and Targ.: like the cock which struts about proudly among the hens; ^{f281}

Aquila and Theodotion: ἀλέκτωρ (ἀλεκτρυῶν) νότου; The Quinta: ἀλέκτωρ ὀσφύος; Jerome: *gallus succinctus lumbos*. *Şarşar* (nor *şirşir*, as Hitzig vocalizes) is in Arab. a name for a cock, from *şarşara*, to crow, an *onomatopoeia*. But the Heb. זרזיר, as the name of a bird, signifies, as the Talmud proves on the ground of that history, not a cock, but a bird of the raven order, whether a starling, a crow, or a magpie. And if this name of a *corvinus* is formed from the *onomatopoeia* זרזר, the weaker form of that (Arab.) *şarşar*, then מְתַנִּים, which, for זרזיר, requires the verbal root זרז, to girdle, is not wholly appropriate; and how strangely would the three animals be mingled together, if between לֵישׁ and תֵּישׁ, the two four-footed animals, a bird were placed! If, as is to be expected, the “*Lendumgiürtete*” [the one girded about the loins = זרזיר מְתַנִּים] be a four-footed animal, then it lies near, with C. B. Michaelis and Ziegler, after Ludolf’s ^{f282} example, to think of the zebra, the South African wild ass. But this animal lay beyond the sphere of the author’s observation, and perhaps also of his knowledge, and at the same time of that of

the Israelitish readers of this Book of Proverbs; and the dark-brown cross stripes on a white ground, by which the zebra is distinguished, extend not merely to its limbs, but over the whole body, and particularly over the front of the body. It would be more tenable to think of the leopard, with its black round spots, or the tiger, with dark stripes; but the name **זְרוֹר מִתְנִים** scarcely refers to the colour of the hair, since one has to understand it after the Aram. **תְּרִצִיָּה זָרוּ** = **שָׁנִים מִתְנִיו**, 1Ki. 18:46, or **אָזַר חֶלְצָיו**, Job. 38: 3, and thus of an activity, i.e., strength and swiftness, depending on the condition of the loins. Those who, with Kimchi, think that the **נֶמֶר** [leopard] is thus named, ground their view, not on this, that it has rings or stripes round its legs, but on this, that it **דַּק מִתְנִים וְחוּק בְּמִתְנָיו**. But this beast has certainly its definite name; but a fundamental supposition entering into every attempt at an explanation is this, that **זְרוֹר מִתְנִים**, as well as **לֵישׁ** and **תִּישׁ**, is the proper name of a beast, not a descriptive attribute. Therefore the opinion of Rosse, which Bochart has skilfully established in the *Hierozoicon*, does not recommend itself, for he only suggests, for choice, to understand the name, “the girded about the loins,” in the proper sense of straps and clasps around and on the loins (thus e.g., Gesenius, Fleischer, Hitzig), or of strength, in the sense of the Arab. *habuwk*, the firmly-bound = compact, or *šamm aššlab*, the girded loin (thus e.g., Muntinghe). Schultens connects together both references: *Utrumque jungas licet*. That the by-name fits the horse, particularly the war-horse, is undeniable; one would have to refer it, with Mühlau, to the slender structure, the thin flanks, which are reckoned among the requisites of a beautiful horse. ^{f283}

But if *succinctus lumbos* were a by-name of a horse, why did not the author at once say **סוּם זְרוֹר מִתְנִים**? We shall give the preference to the opinion, according to which the expression, “girt about the loins” = “with strong loins,” or “with slender limbs,” is not the by-name, but the proper name of the animal. This may be said of the hunting-hound, *lévrier* (according to which the *Venet.*, incorrectly translating **מִתְנִים**: **λαγωσκύων ψοιδῶν**^{f284}), which Kimchi ranks in the first place. Luther, by his translation, *Ein Wind* = *Windhund* [greyhound], of good limbs, has given the right direction to this opinion. Melancton, Lavater, Mercier, Geier, and others, follow him; and, among the moderns, so also do Ewald and Böttcher (also Bertheau and Stuart), which latter supposes that before **זְרוֹר מִתְנִים** there originally stood **כַּבֵּל**, which afterwards disappeared. But why should the greyhound not at once be called **זְרוֹר מִתְנִים**? We call the smaller variety of this dog the *Windspiel* [greyhound]; and by this name we think on a hound, without saying *Windspielhund*. The name **זְרוֹר מִתְנִים** (Symmachus excellently: **περιεσφιγμένος**, not **περιεσφραγισμένος, τὴν ὀσφύν**, i.e., strongly bound in the limbs) is fitted at once to suggest to us this almost restless, slender animal, with its high, thin,

nimble limbs. The verbal stem **זָרַר** (Arab.) *zarr*, signifies to press together, to knit together; the reduplicative form **זָרְזַר**, to bind firmly together, whence **זָרְזִיר**, firmly bound together, referred to the limbs as designating a natural property (Ewald, § 158a): of straight and easily-moveable legs. ^{f285}

The hunting-hound (*salâki* or *salûki*, i.e., coming from Seleucia) is celebrated by the Arab. poets as much as the hunting-horse. ^{f286}

The name **בָּלָב**, though not superfluous, the author ought certainly to have avoided, because it does not sound well in the Heb. collocation of words.

There now follows **תִּישׁ**, a goat, and that not the ram (Jerome, Luther), which is called **אֵיל**, but the he-goat, which bears this name, as Schultens has already recognised, from its pushing, as it is also called **אַתּוּד**, as *paratus ad pugnam*; the two names appear to be only provincially different; **שְׁעִיר**, on the contrary, is the old he-goat, as shaggy; and **צִפִּיר** also perhaps denotes it, as Schultens supposes, with twisted, i.e., curled hair (*tortipilus*). In Arab. *tays* denotes the he-goat as well as the roebuck and the gazelle, and that at full growth. The LXX (the Syr. and Targ., which is to be emended after the Syr.) is certainly right, for it understands the leading goat: **καὶ τράγος ἡγούμενος αἰπολίου**. The text, however, has not **וְתִישׁ**, but **אִו תִּישׁ**, ἢ **τράγος** (Aquila, Theodotion, Quinta, and the *Venet.*). Böttcher is astonished that Hitzig did not take hold of this **אִו**, and conjectures **תּאִו-תִּישׁ**, which should mean a “gazelle-goat” (Mühlau: *dorcas mas*). But it is too bold to introduce here **תּאִו** (**תּוֹא**), which is only twice named in the O.T., and **תּאִו-תִּישׁ** for **תּאִו זָכָר** is not the Heb. style; and besides, the setting aside of **אִו** has a harsh *asyndeton* for its consequence, which bears evidence to the appearance that **תּאִו** and **תִּישׁ** are two different animals. And is the **אִו** then so objectionable? More wonderful still must Son. 2: 9 appear to us. If the author enumerated the four of stately going on his fingers, he would certainly have said **וְתִישׁ**. By **אִו** he communicates to the hearer, setting before him another figure, how there in the Song Sulamith’s fancy passed from one object to another.

To the lion, the king of the animal world, the king **אַלְקִים עִמּוֹ** corresponds. This **אַלְקִים** Hitzig regards as mutilated from **אֱלֹהִים** (which was both written and pronounced as **אַלְקִים** by the Jews, so as to conceal the true sound of the name of God), — which is untenable, for this reason, that this religious conclusion [“A king with whom God is”] accords badly with the secular character of this proverb. Geiger (*Urschrift*, p. 62 ff.) translates: “and King Alkimos corresponding to it (the lustful and daring goat)” — he makes the

harmless proverb into a *ludibrium* from the time of the Maccabeo-Syrian war. The LXX, which the Syr. and Targ. follow, translates *καὶ βασιλεὺς δημηγορῶν ἐν ἔθνει*; it appears to have changed *אלקום עמו* into *קם אל עמו* (standing with his people and haranguing them), like the Quinta: *καὶ βασ. ἀναστάς (ὅς ἀνέστη) ἐν τῷ λαῷ αὐτοῦ*. Ziegler and Böttcher also, reading *אָל* and *אָמו* without any transposition, get *ומלך אל-קום אָמו*, which the former translates: “a king with the presence of his people;” the latter, “a king with the setting up of his people,” — not accordant with the thought, for the king should be brought forward as *מיטיב לכת*. For the same reason, Kimchi’s explanation is not suitable: a king with whom is no resistance, i.e., against whom no one can rank himself (thus e.g., also Immanuel); or more specially, but not better: who has no successor of his race (according to which the *Venet. ἀδιάδεκτος ζῶν ἑαυτῷ*). Rather this explanation commends itself: a king with whom (i.e., in war with whom) is no resistance. Thus Jerome and Luther: against whom no one dare place himself; thus Rashi, Aben Ezra, Ralbag (*עמו עומה* (שׂאין תקומה), Ahron b. Josef (*קום = ἀντίστασις*), Arama, and others; thus also Schultens, Fleischer (*adversus quem nemo consistere audent*), Ewald, Bertheau, Elster, Stuart, and others. But this connection of *אל* with the infin. is not Heb.; and if the *Chokma*, xii. 28, has coined the expression *אל-מֹות* for the idea of resistlessness by so bold a *quasi compositum*. But this boldness is also there mitigated, for *יהי* is supplied after *אל*, which is not here practicable with *קום*, which is not a subst. like *מֹות*. Pocock in the *Spec. historiae Arabum*, and Castellus in the *Lex. Heptaglotton* (not Castellio, as the word is printed by Zöckler), have recognised in *אלקום* the Arab. *âlkawm*; Schultens gives the LXX the honour of this recognition, for he regards their translation as a paraphrase of *ὁ δῆμος μετ’ αὐτοῦ*. Bertheau thinks that it ought to be in Arab. *kawmuhu*, but *אלקום עמו = âlkawhu ma’ahu* is perfectly correct, *âlkawhu* is the summons or the *Heerbann = arriere-ban*; ^{f287} in North Africa they speak in their language in the same sense of the *Gums*. This explanation of *אלקום*, from the Arab. *Dachselt (rex cum satellitio suo)*, Diedrichs in his *Arab.-Syr. Spicilegium* (1777), Umbreit, Gesenius, and Vaihinger, have recognised, and Mühlau has anew confirmed it at length. Hitzig, on the contrary, remarks that if Agur wrote on Arab. territory, we could be contented with the Arab. appellative, but not with the article, which in words like *אלמנים* and *אלגביש* is no longer of force as an art., but is an integ. component part of the word. We think that it is with *אלקום* exactly as with other words descriptive of lordship, and the many similar that have passed over into the Spanish language; the word is taken over along with the article, without requiring the Heb. listener to take the art. as such, although he certainly felt it better than we do, when we

say “*das Alkoran*” [the Alcoran], “*das Alcohol*,” and the like. Blau also, in his *Gesch. der Arab. Substantiv-Determ.*,^{f288} regards it as certain that Agur borrowed this אלקום from the idiom of the Arabians, among whom he lived, and heard it constantly spoken. By this explanation we first reach a correspondence between what is announced in lines first and second and line sixth. A king as such is certainly not “comely in going;” he can sit upon his throne, and especially as δμῆγορος will he sit (Act. 12:21) and not stand. But the majesty of his going shows itself when he marches at the head of those who have risen up at his summons to war. Then he is for the army what the תיש [he-goat] is for the flock. The א, preferred to ו, draws close together the ריש and the king (cf. e.g., Isa. 14: 9).

Pro. 30:32, 33. Another proverb, the last of Agur’s “Words” which exhorts to thoughtful, discreet demeanour, here follows the proverb of self-conscious, grave deportment:

*32 If thou art foolish in that thou exaltest thyself,
Or in devising, — put thy hand to thy mouth!*

*33 For the pressure on milk bringeth forth butter,
And pressure on the nose bringeth forth blood,
And pressure on sensibility bringeth forth altercation.*

Löwenstein translates v. 32:

*Art thou despicable, it is by boasting;
Art thou prudent, then hold thy hand on thy mouth.*

But if זמם denotes reflection and deliberation, then נבל, as its opposite, denotes unreflecting, foolish conduct. Then בַּהֲתַנְשֵׂא [by boasting] is not to be regarded as a consequent (thus it happens by lifting thyself up; or: it is connected with boasting); by this construction also, אִם-נִבְלָתָה must be accented with *Dechi*, not with *Tarcha*. Otherwise Eichel:

*Hast thou become offensive through pride,
Or seems it so to thee, — lay thy hand to thy mouth.*

The thought is appropriate,^{f289} but נִבְלָתָה for נִבְלָתָה is more than improbable; נבל, thus absolutely taken in an ethical connection, is certainly related to נבל, as כָּסַל, Jer. 10: 8, to כָּסִיל. The prevailing mode of explanation is adopted by Fleischer: *si stulta arrogantia elatus fueris et si quid durius (in alios) mente conceperis, manum ori impone*; i.e., if thou arrogantly, and with offensive words, wilt strive with others, then keep thyself back, and say not what thou hast in thy mind. But while מְזַמָּה and מְזַמּוֹת denote intrigues, 14:17, as well

as plans and considerations, **זָמַן** has never by itself alone the sense of *meditari mala*; at Psa. 37:12, also with **ל** of the object at which the evil devices aim. Then for **אָסַן ... אָסַן** (Arab. *ân...wân*) there is the supposition of a correlative relation, as e.g., 1Ki. 20:18, Ecc. 11: 3, by which at the same time **זָמַן** is obviously thought of as a contrast to **נִבְלָתָהּ**. This contrast excludes ^{f290} for **זָמַן** not only the sense of *mala moliri* (thus e.g., also Mühlau), but also the sense of the Arab. *zamm, superbire* (Schultens). Hitzig has the right determination of the relation of the members of the sentence and the ideas: if thou art irrational in ebullition of temper and in thought — thy hand to thy mouth! But **הִתְנַשֵּׂא** has neither here nor elsewhere the meaning of **הִתְנַשֵּׂא** (to be out of oneself with anger); it signifies everywhere to elevate or exalt oneself, i.e., rightly or wrongly to make much of oneself. There are cases where a man, who raises himself above others, appears as a fool, and indeed acts foolishly; but there are also other cases, when the despised has a reason and an object for vindicating his superiority, his repute, his just claim: when, as we say, he places himself in his right position, and assumes importance; the poet here recommends, to the one as well as to the other, silence. The rule that silence is gold has its exceptions, but here also it is held valid as a rule. Luther and others interpret the *perfecta* as looking back: “hast thou become a fool and ascended too high and intended evil, then lay thy hand on thy mouth.” But the reason in v. 33 does not accord with this rendering, for when that has been done, the occasion for hatred is already given; but the proverb designs to warn against the stirring up of hatred by the reclaiming of personal pretensions. The *perfecta*, therefore, are to be interpreted as at Deu. 32:29, Job. 9:15, as the expression of the abstract present; or better, as at Job. 9:16, as the expression of the fut. *exactum*: if thou wouldest have acted foolishly, since thou walkest proudly, or if thou hadst (before) thought of it (Aquila, Theodotion: **καὶ ἐὰν ἐννοηθῆς**) — the hand on thy mouth, i.e., let it alone, be silent rather (expression as 11:24; Jud. 18:19; Job. 40: 4). The *Venet.* best: **εἶπερ ἐμώρυνας ἐν τῷ ἐπαίρεσθαι καὶ εἶπερ ἐλογίσω, χεῖρ τῷ στόματι**. When we have now interpreted **הִתְנַשֵּׂא**, not of the rising up of anger, we do not also, with Hitzig, interpret the dual of the two snorting noses — viz. of the double anger, that of him who provokes to anger, and that of him who is made angry, — but **אֶפְיָס** denotes the two nostrils of one and the same person, and, figuratively, snorting or anger. Pressure against the nose is designated **מִיץ-אָף**, **ἐκμύζησις** (**εκπίεσις**) **μυκτῆρος** (write **אֶפְיָס** and **מִיץ-אָף**, with *Metheg*, with the long tone, after *Metheg-Setzung*, § 11, 9, 12), and **אֶפְיָס**, **ἐκμύζησις** **θυμοῦ** (Theodotion), with reference to the proper meaning of **אֶפְיָס**, pressure to anger, i.e., to the stirring up and strengthening of anger. The nose of him who raises himself up comes into view, in so far as,

with such self-estimation, sneering, snuffing scorn (μυκτηριζειν) easily connects itself; but this view of מתנשא is not here spoken of.

Second Appendix to the Second Solomonic Collection of Proverbs — Pro. 31: 1-9

Superscription:

*1 Words of Lemuel the king,
The utterance wherewith his mother warned him.*

Pro. 31: 1. Such would be the superscription if the interpunction of the text as it lies before us were correct. But it is not possibly right. For, notwithstanding the assurance of Ewald, § 277b, למואל מלך, nevertheless, as it would be here used, remains an impossibility. Certainly under circumstances an indeterminate apposition can follow a proper name. That on coins we read מתתיה כהן גדול or נרון קיסר is nothing strange; in this case we also use the words “Nero, emperor,” and that we altogether omit the article shows that the case is singular: the apposition wavers between the force of a generic and of a proper name. A similar case is the naming of the proper name with the general specification of the class to which this or that one bearing the name belongs in lists of persons, as e.g., 1Ki. 4: 2-6, or in such expressions as, e.g., “Damascus, a town,” or “Tel Hum, a castle,” and the like; here we have the indefinite article, because the apposition is a simple declaration of the class.

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But would the expression, “The poem of Oscar, a king,” be proper as the title of a book? Proportionally more so than “Oscar, king;” but also that form of indeterminate apposition is contrary to the *usus loq.*, especially with a king with whom the apposition is not a generic name, but a name of honour.

We assume that “Lemuel” is a symbolical name, like “Jareb” in “King Jareb,” Hos. 5:13; 10: 6; so we would expect the phrase to be מלך למואל (ה) rather than למואל מלך. The phrase “Lemuel, king,” here in the title of this section of the book, sounds like a double name, after the manner of עבר מלך in the book of Jeremiah. In the Greek version also the phrase Λεμουέλου βασιλέως (*Venet.*) is not used as syntactically correct without having joined to the βασιλέως a dependent genitive such as τῶν Ἀράβων, while none of the old translators, except Jerome, take the words מלך למואל together in the sense of *Lamuelis regis*. Thus מלך משא are to be taken together, with Hitzig, Bertheau, Zöckler, Mühlau, and Dächsel, against Ewald and Kamphausen; משא, whether it be a name of a tribe or a country, or of both at the same time, is the region ruled over by Lemuel, and since this proper name throws back the

determination which it has in itself on מֶלֶךְ, the phrase is to be translated: “Words of Lemuel the king of Massa” (vid., under 30: 1). If Aquila renders this proper name by Λεμμοῦν, Symmachus by Ἰαμουήλ, Theodotion by Πεβουήλ, the same arbitrariness prevails with reference to the initial and terminal sound of the word, as in the case of the words Αμβακούμ, Βεελζεβούλ, Βελίαρ. The name לְמוּאֵל sounds like the name of Simeon’s first-born, יְמוּאֵל, Gen. 46:10, written in Num. 26:12 and 1Ch. 4:24 as נְמוּאֵל; יוּאֵל also appears, 1Ch. 4:35, as a Simeonite name, which Hitzig adduces in favour of his view that מְשָׂא was a North Arab. Simeonite colony. The interchange of the names יְמוּאֵל and נְמוּאֵל is intelligible if it is supposed that יְמוּאֵל (from יָמָה = יָמָה) designates the sworn (sworn to) of God, and נְמוּאֵל (from נָמַשׁ = נָמַשׁ) Mishnic = נָמַשׁ^{f292} the expressed (addressed) of God; here the reference of יְמוּ and נְמוּ to verbal stems is at least possible, but a verb לָמַה is found only in the Arab., and with significations *inus*. But there are two other derivations of the name:

(1) The verb (Arab.) *waâla* signifies to hasten (with the infin. of the *onomatop.* verbs *waniyal*, like *rahyal*, walking, because motion, especially that which is tumultuous, proceeds with a noise), whence *mawnil*, the place to which one flees, retreat. Hence לְמוּאֵל or לְמוּאֵל, which is in this case to be assumed as the ground-form, might be formed from אֵל מוּאֵל, God is a refuge, with the rejection of the א. This is the opinion of Fleischer, which Mühlau adopts and has established, p. 38-41; for he shows that the initial א is not only often rejected where it is without the support of a full vocal, e.g., אֲנַחְנִי = נַחְנִי, *lalah* = *ilalah* (*Deus*), but that this aphaeresis not seldom also occurs where the initial has a full vocal, e.g., אֲלַעְזָר = לַעְזָר, *lahmaru* = *âllahmaru* (*ruber*), *lahsâ* = *âl-lahsâ* (the name of a town); cf. also Blau in *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitschr.* xxv. 580. But this view is thus acceptable and tenable; a derivation which spares us by a like certainty the supposition of such an abbreviation established only by the late Palestinian לַעְזָר, Ἀλάραρος, might well desire the preference.

(2) Fleischer himself suggests another derivation: “The signification of the name is *Deo consecratus*, לְמוּ, poetic for לָ, as also in v. 4 it is to be vocalized לְמוּאֵל after the masora.” The form לְמוּאֵל is certainly not less favourable to that first derivation than to this second; the *û* is in both cases an obscuration of the original. But that “Lemuel” may be explained in this second way is shown by “Lael,” Num. 3:24 (Olshausen, § 277d).^{f293}

It is a beautiful sign for King Lemuel, and a verification of his name, that it is he himself by whom we receive the admonition with which his mother in her

care counselled him when he attained to independent government. אֲשֶׁר connects itself with דְּבַר־י, after we have connected מִשָּׂא with מֶלֶךְ; it is accus. of the manner to יִסְרְתָהוּ = יִסְרְתָהוּ; cf. הִטָּתוּ, 7:21, with נִמְלָתָהוּ, 31:12: wherewith (with which words) she earnestly and impressively admonished him. The Syr. translates: words of Muel, as if ל were that of the author. “Others as inconsistently: words to Lemuel — they are words which is himself ought to carry in his mouth as received from his mother” (Fleischer).

The name “Massa,” is it here means *effatum*, would be proportionally more appropriate for these “Words” of Lemuel than for the “Words” of Agur, for the maternal counsels form an inwardly connected compact whole. They begin with a question which maternal love puts to itself with regard to the beloved son whom she would advise:

***2 What, my son? and what the son of my womb?
And what, O son of my vows?!***

Pro. 31: 2. The thrice repeated מָה is completed by תַּעֲשֶׂה (cf. Köhler under Mal. 2:15), and that so that the question is put for the purpose of exciting attention: Consider well, my son, what thou wilt do as ruler, and listen attentively to my counsel (Fleischer). But the passionate repetition of מָה would be only affectation if thus interpreted; the underlying thought must be of a subjective nature: what shall I say, אֲדַבֵּר (vid., under Isa. 38:15), what advise thee to do? The question, which is at the same time a call, is like a deep sigh from the heart of the mother concerned for the welfare of her son, who would say to him what is beneficial, and say it in words which strike and remain fixed. He is indeed her dear son, the son whom she carries in her heart, the son for whom with vows of thanksgiving she prayed to God; and as he was given her by God, so to His care she commits him. The name “Lemuel” is, as we interpret it, like the anagram of the fulfilment of the vows of his mother. בְּרִי bears the Aramaic shade in the Arameo-Arab. colouring of these proverbs from Massa; בְּרִיָּה is common in the Aram., and particularly in the Talmudic, but it can scarcely be adduced in support of וְיָמָה בְּרִי. מָה, 24, with ה or ו not following; vid., the Masora to Exo. 32: 1, and its correction by Norzi at Deu. 29:23. We do not write וְיָמָה בְּרִי; מָה, with *Makkeph* and with *Metheg*, exclude one another.

Pro. 31: 3. The first admonition is a warning against effeminating sensuality:

***Give not thy strength to women,
Nor thy ways to them that destroy kings.***

The punctuation **לְמַחֹת** sees in this form a syncopated *inf. Hiph.* = **לְהַמְחֹת** (vid., at Pro. 24:17), according to which we are to translate: *viasque tuas ad perdendos reges (ne dirige)*, by which, as Fleischer formulates the twofold possibility, it may either be said: direct not thy effort to this result, to destroy neighbouring kings, — viz. by wars of invasion (properly, to wipe them away from the table of existence, as the Arabs say), — or: do not that by which kings are overthrown; i.e., with special reference to Lemuel, act not so that thou thyself must thereby be brought to ruin. But the warning against vengeful, rapacious, and covetous propensity to war (thus Jerome, so that *Venet.* after Kimchi: *ὑπομάττειν βασιλέας*, C. B. Michaelis, and earlier, Gesenius) does not stand well as parallel with the warning against giving his bodily and mental strength to women, i.e., expending it on them. But another explanation: direct not thy ways to the destruction of kings, i.e., toward that which destroys kings (Elster); or, as Luther translates: go not in the way wherein kings destroy themselves, — puts into the words a sense which the author cannot have had in view; for the individualizing expression would then be generalized in the most ambiguous way. Thus **לְמַחֹת מַלְכֵינָּ** will be a name for women, parallel to **לְנָשִׁים**. So far the translation of the Targum: **לְבִנְתַּי מַלְכֵינָּ**, *filiabus (לְאַמְהַת?) regum*, lies under a right supposition. But the designation is not thus general. Schultens explains *catapultis regum* after Eze. 26: 9; but, inasmuch as he takes this as a figure of those who lay siege to the hearts of men, he translates: *expugnatricibus regum*, for he regards **מַחֹת** as the plur. of **מְחָה**, a particip. noun, which he translates by *deletor*. The connecting form of the fem. plur. of this **מְחָה** might certainly be **מְחָתוֹת** (cf. **מִנֵּי**, from **מָנָה**), but **לְמַחֹת מַלְכֵינָּ** ought to be changed into **לְמֵי וְגוֹ**; for one will not appeal to anomalies, such as **לְמֵי**, Pro. 16: 4; **בְּגֵי**, Isa. 24: 2; **לְמֵי**, Lam. 1:19; or **הֵתֵי וְגוֹ**, 1Ki. 14:24, to save the *Pathach* of **לְמַחֹת**, which, as we saw, proceeds from an altogether different understanding of the word. But if **לְמֵי** is to be changed into **לְמֵי**, then one must go further, since for **מְחָה** not an active but a conditional meaning is to be assumed, and we must write **לְמַחֹת**, in favour of which Fleischer as well as Gesenius decides: *et ne committe consilia factaque tua iis quae reges perdunt, regum pestibus*. Ewald also favours the change **לְמַחֹת**, for he renders **מְחָה** as a denom. of **מַח**, marrow: those who enfeeble kings, in which Kamphausen follows him. Mühlau goes further; he gives the privative signification, to enfeeble, to the *Piel* **מְחָה** = *makhakha* (cf. Herzog's *Real-Wörterb.* xiv. 712), which is much more probable, and proposes **לְמַמְחֹת**: *iis quae vires enervant regum*. But we can appropriately, with Nöldeke, adhere to **לְמַחֹת**, *deletoricibus (perditricibus)*, for by this change the parallelism is satisfied; and that **מְחָה** may be used, with immediate reference to men, of

entire and total destruction, is sufficiently established by such passages as Gen. 6: 7, Jud. 21:17, if any proof is at all needed for it. Regarding the LXX and those misled by it, who, by מלכין and מלכים, 4a, think on the Aram. מלכין, βουλαί, vid., Mühlau, p. 53. ^{f294}

But the Syr. has an idea worthy of the discourse, who translates *epulis regum* without our needing, with Mühlau, to charge him with dreaming of לָחֵם in למחות. Perhaps that is true; but perhaps by למחות he thought of לְמַחֵה (from מָה, the particip. adj. of מָחָה): do not direct thy ways to rich food (morsels), such as kings love and can have. By this reading, 3b would mediate the transition to v. 4; and that the mother refers to the immorality, the unseemliness, and the dangers of a large harem, only in one brief word (3a), cannot seem strange, much rather it may be regarded as a sign of delicacy. But so much the more badly does וּדְרָכָיִךְ accord with לְמַחֵה. Certainly one goes to a banquet, for one finds leisure for it; but of one who himself is a king, it is not said that he should not direct his ways to a king's dainties. But if לְמַחֵה refers to the whole conduct of the king, the warning is, that he should not regulate his conduct in dependence on the love and the government of women. But whoever will place himself amid the revelry of lust, is wont to intoxicate himself with ardent spirits; and he who is thus intoxicated, is in danger of giving reins to the beast within him. Hence there now follows a warning against drunkenness, not unmediated by the reading לְמַחֵה:

**4 It is not for kings, O Lemuel,
Not for kings to drink wine,
Not for rulers to ask for intoxicating drink;**

**5 Lest he drink, and forget what is prescribed,
And pervert the right of all the children of want.**

Pro. 31: 4, 5. The usual translation of 4a is: *non decet reges...* (as e.g., also Mühlau); but in this לֹא is not rightly rendered, which indeed is at times only an *ob*, spoken with close interest, but yet first of all, especially in such paraenetic connection as here, it is a dissuasive μή. But now למלכים שתות לֹא or לֹא למלכים לשתות, after 2Ch. 26:18, Mic. 3: 1, signifies: it is not the part of kings, it does not become them to drink, which may also be turned into a dissuasive form: let it not be the part of kings to drink, let them not have any business therewith, as if it belonged to their calling; according to which Fleischer renders: *Absit a regibus, Lemuel, absit a regibus potare vinum.* The clearer expression למואל, instead of למואל, is, after Böttcher, occasioned by this, that the name is here in the vocative; perhaps rather by this, that the meaning of the name: consecrated to God, belonging to God, must be placed in

contrast to the descending to low, sensual lust. Both times we write למלכים ל with the orthophonic *Dagesh* ^{f295} in the ל following ל, and without the recompensative *Dagesh*, the want of which is in a certain measure covered by the *Metheg* (vid., Norzi). Regarding the *inf. constr.* שתו (cf. קנה, 16:16), vid., Gesen. § 75, Anm. 2; and regarding the sequence of accents here necessary, אל למלכים שתו־יין (not *Mercha, Dechi, Athnach*, for *Dechi* would be here contrary to rule), vid., *Thorath Emeth*, p. 22 § 6, p. 43 § 7.

In 4b nothing is to be gained from the *Chethib* או. There is not a substantive או, desire, the *constr.* of which would here have to be read, not או (Umbreit, Gesenius), but או, after the form קו (Maurer); and why did the author not write תאנת שבר? But the particle או does not here also fall in with the connection; for if או connect itself with יין (Hitzig, Ewald, and others), then it would drag disagreeably, and we would have here a spiritless classification of things unadvisable for kings. Böttcher therefore sees in this או the remains of the obliterated סבו; a corrector must then have transformed the ו which remained into או. But before one ventures on such conjectures, the *Keri* או [where?] must be tried. Is it the abbreviated אין (Herzog's *Real-Wörterbuch*, xiv. 712)? Certainly not, because וְרוֹזְנִים אֵין שָׁבֵר would mean: and the princes, or rulers (vid., regarding רוֹזְנִים at Pro. 8:15), have no mead, which is inconsistent. But אין does not abbreviate itself into או, but into או. Not או, but או, is in Heb., as well as in Ethiop., the word with which negative adjectives such as או נקי, not innocent, Job. 22:30, and in later Heb. also, negative sentences, such as או אפשר : it is not possible, are formed. ^{f296}

Therefore Mühlau vocalizes או, and thinks that the author used this word for או, so as not to repeat this word for the third time. But how is that possible? או שבר signifies either: not mead, or: there is not mead; and both afford, for the passage before us, no meaning. Is, then, the *Keri* או truly so unsuitable? Indeed, to explain: how came intoxicating drink to rulers! is inadmissible, since או always means only *ubi* (e.g., Gen. 4: 9); not, like the Ethiop. *aitê*, also *quomodo*. But the question *ubi temetum*, as a question of desire, fits the connection, whether the sentence means: *non decet principibus dicere* (Ahron b. Josef supplies שיאמרו) *ubi temetum*, or: *absit a principibus quaerere ubi temetum* (Fleischer), which, from our view of 4a, we prefer. There is in reality nothing to be supplied; but as 4a says that the drinking of wine ought not to

characterize kings, so 4b, that “Where is mead?” (i.e., this eager inquiry after mead) ought not to characterize rulers. ^{f297}

Why not? v. 5 says. That the prince, being a slave to drink, may not forget the **מִהֲקָקָא**, i.e., that which has been made and has become **חֶק**, thus that which is lawfully right, and may not alter the righteous cause of the miserable, who cry against their oppressors, i.e., may not handle falsely the facts of the case, and give judgment contrary to them.

שְׁנֵה דִין (Aquila, Theodotion, Quinta, **ἄλλοιοῦν κρῖσιν**) is elsewhere equivalent to **הָמָה מִשְׁפָּט (עוֹת)**. **בְּנֵי-עֲנִי** are those who are, as it were, born to oppression and suffering. This mode of expression is a Semitism (Fleischer), but it here heightens the impression of the Arab. colouring. In **כל (Venet. ὄντινοῦν)** it is indicated that, not merely with reference to individual poor men, but in general to the whole class of the poorer people, suffering humanity, sympathy and a regard for truth on the part of a prince given to sensuality are easily thrown aside. Wine is better suited for those who are in a condition to be timeously helped over which, is a refreshment to them.

***6 Give strong drink to him that is perishing,
And wine to those whose soul is in bitter woe;***

***7 Let him drink and forget his poverty,
And let him think of his misery no more.***

Pro. 31: 6, 7. The preparation of a potion for malefactors who were condemned to death was, on the ground of these words of the proverb, cared for by noble women in Jerusalem (**נָשִׁים יָקְרוֹת שְׁבִירוֹשָׁלַיִם**), *Sanhedrin* 43a; Jesus rejected it, because He wished, without becoming insensible to His sorrow, to pass away from the earthly life freely and in full consciousness, *Mar.* 15:23. The transition from the plur. to the sing. of the subject is in v. 7 less violent than in v. 5, since in v. 6 singular and plur. already interchange. We write **תְּנוּ-שֶׁכֶר** with the counter-tone *Metheg* and *Mercha*. **אֹבֵד** designates, as at *Job.* 29:13; 31:19, one who goes to meet destruction: it combines the present signification *interiens*, the fut. signif. *interiturus*, and the perf. *perditus* (hopelessly lost). **מֵרֵי נֶפֶשׁ** (those whose minds are filled with sorrow) is also supported from the Book of *Job*, 3:20, cf. 21:25, the language and thought and mode of writing of which notably rests on the Proverbs of Agur and Lemuel (vid., Mühlau, pp. 64-66). The *Venet.* **τοῖς πικροῖς** (not **ψυχροῖς**) **τῆν ψυχὴν**. **רֵישׁ** (poverty) is not, however, found there, but only in the Book of Proverbs, in which this word-stem is more at home than elsewhere. Wine rejoices the heart of man, *Psa.* 104:15, and at the same time raises it for the time above oppression and want, and out of anxious sorrow,

wherefore it is soonest granted to them, and in sympathizing love ought to be presented to them by whom this its beneficent influence is to be wished for. The ruined man forgets his poverty, the deeply perplexed his burden of sorrow; the king, on the contrary, is in danger from this cause of forgetting what the law required at his hands, viz., in relation to those who need help, to whom especially his duty as a ruler refers.

**8 Open thy mouth for the dumb,
For the right of all the children of leaving;**

**9 Open thy mouth, judge righteously,
And do right to the poor and needy.**

Pro. 31: 8, 9. He is called dumb who suffers the infirmity of dumbness, as עֵוֶר and פֶּסֶחַ, Job. 29:15, is he who suffers the infirmity of blindness or lameness, not here figuratively; at the same time, he who, on account of his youth, or on account of his ignorance, or from fear, cannot speak before the tribunal for himself (Fleischer). With לְ the *dat. commodi* (LXX after Lagarde, μογιλάω; Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, ἀλάω; the *Venet.* after Gebhardt, βωβω) אֵל, of the object aimed at, interchanges, as e.g., 1Ki. 19: 3, 2Ki. 7: 7, אֵל-נַפְשָׁם, for the preservation of their life, or for the sake of their life, for it is seldom that it introduces the object so purely as here. And that an infin. such as חָלוּף should stand as a subst. occurs proportionally seldomer in Heb. (Isa. 4: 4; Psal. 22: 7; cf. with הָ of the artic., Num. 4:12; Psal. 66: 9) than it does in Arab. בני חלוף in the same way as בני-עני, 5b, belongs to the Arab. complexion of this proverb, but without its being necessary to refer to the Arab. in order to fix the meaning of these two words. Hitzig explains after *khalf*, to come after, which further means “to have the disadvantage,” in which Zöckler follows him; but this verb in Arab. does not mean ὑστερεῖν, ὑστερεῖσθαι), we must explain “sons of him that remains behind,” i.e., such as come not forward, but remain behind (‘*an*) others. Mühlau goes further, and explains, with Schultens and Vaihinger: those destitute of defence, after (Arab.) *khalfahu* he is ranked next to him, and has become his representative — a use of the word foreign to the Heb. Still less is the rendering of Gesenius justified, “children of inheritance” = children left behind, after *khallafa*, to leave behind; and Luther, “for the cause of all who are left behind,” by the phrase (Arab.) *khalfany* ‘*an* ‘*awnih*, he has placed me behind his help, denied it to me, for the *Kal* of the verb cannot mean to abandon, to leave. And that בני חלוף means the opposers of the truth, or of the poor, or the litigious person, the quarrelsome, is perfectly inadmissible, since the *Kal* חלוף cannot be equivalent to (Arab.) *khilaf*, the inf. of the 3rd conj., and besides, the gen.

after **יָד** always denotes those in whose favour, not those against whom it is passed; the latter is also valid against Ralbag's "sons of change," i.e., who say things different from what they think; and Ahron b. Josef's "sons of changing," viz., the truth into lies. We must abide by the meaning of the Heb. **חָלַף**, "to follow after, to change places, pass away." Accordingly, Fleischer understands by **חָלוּף**, the going away, the dying, viz., of parents, and translates: *eorum qui parentibus orbati sunt*. In another way Rashi reaches the same sense: orphans deprived of their helper. But the connection **בְּנֵי חָלַף** requires that we make those who are intended themselves the subject of **חָלוּף**. Rightly Ewald, Bertheau, Kamphausen, compare Isa. 2:18 (and Psa. 90: 5 f., this with questionable right), and understand by the sons of disappearance those whose inherited lot, whose proper fate, is to disappear, to die, to perish (Symmachus: *πάντων υἱῶν ἀποικομένων*; Jerome: *omnium filiorum qui pertranseunt*). It is not men in general as children of frailty that are meant (Kimchi, *Meiri*, Immanuel, Euchel, and others), after which the *Venet.* **τῶν υἱῶν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν** (i.e., those who must exchange this life for another), but such as are on the brink of the abyss. **צָדֵק** in **שִׁפְט־צָדֵק** is not equivalent to **בְּצָדֵק**, but is the accus. of the object, as at Zec. 8:16, decide justice, i.e., so that justice is the result of thy judicial act; cf. Knobel on Deu. 1:16. **יְדִי** is imper., do right to the miserable and the poor; cf. Psa. 54: 3 with Jer. 22:16; 5:28. That is a king of a right sort, who directs his high function as a judge, so as to be an advocate [*procurator*] for the helpless of his people.

Third Appendix to the Second Collection of Solomonic Proverbs — 31:10 ff.

Pro. 31:10 ff. The admonitions of a faithful mother are followed by words in praise of a virtuous wife; the poet praises them through all the *praedicamenta*, i.e., all the twenty-two letters of the Hebrew alphabet. The artificialness of the order, says Hitzig, proves that the section belongs to a proportionally late age. But if, as he himself allows, even a Davidic psalm, viz., Psa. 9-10, is constructed acrostically, then from this, that there the acrostic design is not so purely carried out as it is here in this ode, no substantial proof can be drawn for the more recent origin of the latter. Yet we do not deny that it belongs to an earlier time than the earliest of the era of Hezekiah. If Hitzig carries it back to the times subsequent to Alexander on account of the *scriptio plena*, without distinctive accents, vv. 17, 25, it is, on the other hand, to be remarked that it has the *scriptio plena* in common with the "utterance from Massa," which he places forward in the times of Hezekiah, without being influenced to such clear vision by writings such as **יְמִלֹךְ**, Pro. 30:22, **אוֹבֵד**, Pro. 31: 6, **רוֹזְנִים**, Pro. 31: 4. Besides, the *plene* written **עוֹז**, v. 25, is incorrect, and **בְּעוֹז**, v. 17,

which has its parallel in עֹדֶה, Psa. 84: 6, is in its form altogether dependent on the *Munach*, which was added some thousand years after.

In the LXX this section forms the concluding section of the Book of Proverbs. But it varies from the Heb. text in that the ט (στόμα) goes before the ע (ισχύς).; The very same sequence of letters is found in the Heb. text of Psa. 34 and Lamentations 2, 3 and 4.

Stier has interpreted allegorically the matron here commended. He understands thereby the Holy Ghost in His regenerating and sanctifying influence, as the *Midrash* does the *Tôra*; Ambrosius, Augustine, and others, the Church; Immanuel, the soul in covenant with God, thirsting after the truth. As if it were not an invaluable part of Biblical moral instruction which is here presented to us! Such a woman's mirror is nowhere else found. The housewife is depicted here as she ought to be; the poet shows how she governs and increases the wealth of the house, and thereby also advances the position of her husband in the common estimation, and he refers all these, her virtues and her prudence, to the fear of God as their root (Von Hofmann's *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 2. 404 f.). One of the most beautiful expositions of this section is that of Luis de Leon, *La perfecta casada* (Salamanca, 1582), which has been revived in a very attractive way by Wilkens.^{f298}

Pro. 31:10. A wife, such as she ought to be, is a rare treasure, a good excelling all earthly possession:

10 § A virtuous woman, who findeth her!

She stands far above pearls in worth.

In the connection אִשֶּׁת חַיִל and the like, the idea of bodily vigour is spiritualized to that of capacity, ability, and is generalized; in *virtus* the corresponding transition from manliness, and in the originally Romanic "*Bravheit*," valour to ability, is completed; we have translated as at Pro. 12: 4, but also Luther, "a virtuous woman," is suitable, since *Tugend* (virtue) has with *Tüchtigkeit* [ability] the same root-word, and according to our linguistic [German] usage designates the property of moral goodness and propriety, while for those of former times, when they spoke of the *tugend* (*Tugend*) of a woman, the word combined with it the idea of fine manners (cf. הָן, Pro. 11:16) and culture (cf. שִׁבְלֵי מוֹב, Pro. 13:15). The question מִי יִמְצָא, *quis inveniatur*, which, Ecc. 7:24, proceeds from the supposition of the impossibility of finding, conveys here only the idea of the difficulty of finding. In ancient Jerusalem, when one was married, they were wont to ask: אִם מוֹצֵא מִצָּא, i.e., has he found? thus as is said at Pro. 18:22, or at Ecc. 7:26. A virtuous woman [*braves Weib*] is not found by every one, she is found by

comparatively few. In 10b there is given to the thought which underlies the question a synonymous expression. Ewald, Elster, and Zöckler incorrectly render the ו by “although” or “and yet.” Fleischer rightly: the second clause, if not in form yet in sense, runs parallel to the first. מִכָּר designates the price for which such a woman is sold, and thus is purchasable, not without reference to this, that in the Orient a wife is obtained by means of מִהָר. מִכָּר, synon.

מִחִיר, for which a wife of the right kind is gained, is רָחֹק, placed further, i.e., is more difficult to be obtained, than pearls (vid., regarding “pearls” at Pro. 3:15), i.e., than the price for such precious things. The poet thereby means to say that such a wife is a more precious possession than all earthly things which are precious, and that he who finds such an one has to speak of his rare fortune. The reason for this is now given:

**11 ב The heart of her husband doth trust her,
And he shall not fail of grain.**

Pro. 31:11. If we interpret שָׁלַל, after Ecc. 9: 8, as subject, then we miss לו; it will thus be object., and the husband subj. to לֹא יִחָסֵר : *nec lucro carebit*, as e.g., Fleischer translates it, with the remark that שָׁלַל denotes properly the spoil which one takes from an enemy, but then also, like the Arab. *danymat*, can mean profit and gain of all kinds (cf. Rödiger in Gesenius' *Thes.*). Thus also in our “*kriegen*” = to come into possession, the reference to war disappears. Hitzig understands by שָׁלַל, the continual prosperity of the man on account of his fortunate possession of such a wife; but in that case the poet should have said שְׂמֵחַת שָׁלַל; for שָׁלַל is gain, not the feeling that is therewith connected. There is here meant the gain, profit, which the housewife is the means of bringing in (cf. *Psa. 78:13*). The heart of her husband (בְּעֵלָהּ) can be at rest, it can rest on her whom it loves — he goes after his calling, perhaps a calling which, though weighty and honourable, brings in little or nothing; but the wife keeps the family possessions scrupulously together, and increases them by her laborious and prudent management, so that there is not wanting to him gain, which he properly did not acquire, but which the confidence he is justified in reposing in his wife alone brings to him. She is to him a perpetual spring of nothing but good.

**12 ג She doeth good to him, and not evil,
All the days of her life;**

or, as Luther translates:

**“Sie thut jm liebs und kein leids.”
[She does him good, and no harm.]**

Pro. 31:12. She is far from ever doing him evil, she does him only good all her life long; her love is not dependent on freaks, it rests on deep moral grounds, and hence derives its power and purity, which remain ever the same. **נַמְלְתָהּ** signifies to accomplish, to perform. To the not assimilated form **וְנַמְלְתָהּ**, cf. **וְנִסְרְתָּו**, 1b. The poet now describes how she disposes of things:

*13 † She careth for wool and flax,
And worketh these with her hands' pleasure.*

Pro. 31:13. The verb **דָּרַשׁ** proceeds, as the Arab. shows, ^{f299} from the primary meaning *terere*; but to translate with reference thereto: *tractat lanam et linum* (LXX, Schultens, Dathe, Rosemüller, Fleischer), is inadmissible. The Heb. **דָּרַשׁ** does not mean the external working at or manufacturing of a thing; but it means, even when it refers to this, the intention of the mind purposely directed thereto. Thus wool and flax come into view as the material of work which she cares to bring in; and **וְתַאֲשׁ** signifies the work itself, following the creation of the need of work. Hitzig translates the second line: she works at the business of her hands. Certainly **בְּ** after **עָשָׂה** may denote the sphere of activity, Exo. 31: 4; 1Ki. 5:30, etc.; but if **חֲפִיץ** had here the weakened signification business, *πράγμα*, — which it gains in the same way as we say business, affair, of any object of care, — the scarcely established meaning presents itself, that she shows herself active in that which she has made the business of her hands. How much more beautiful, on the contrary, is the thought: she is active with her hands' pleasure! **חֲפִיץ** is, as Schultens rightly explains, *inclinatio flexa et propensa in aliquid*, and *pulchre manibus diligentissimis attribuitur lubentia cum oblectatione et per oblectationem sese animans*. **עָשָׂה**, without obj. accus., signifies often: to accomplish, e.g., Psa. 22:32; here it stands, in a sense, complete in itself, and without object. accus., as when it means “*handeln*” [*agere*], 13:16, and particularly to act in the service of God = to offer sacrifice, Exo. 10:25; it means here, and at Rut. 2:19, Hab. 2: 4, to be active, as at Isa. 19:15, to be effective; **וְתַאֲשׁ** is equivalent to **וְתַעַשׂ בְּמִלְאָכָה** or **וְתַעַשׂ מְלָאכְתָּהּ** (cf. under 10: 4). And pleasure and love for the work, **חֲפִיץ**, can be attributed to the hands with the same right as at Psa. 78:72, discretion. The disposition which animates a man, especially his inner relation to the work devolving upon him, communicates itself to his hands, which, according as he has joy or aversion in regard to his work, will be nimble or clumsy. The Syr. translates: “and her hands are active after the pleasure of her heart;” but **בַּחֲפִיץ** is not equivalent to **בְּחֲפִיץ**; also **בַּחֲפִיץ**, in the sense of *con amore* (Böttcher), is not used. The following proverb praises the extent of her housewifely transactions:

**14 ¶ She is like the ships of the merchant —
Bringeth her food from afar.**

Pro. 31:14. She is (LXX ἐγένετο) like merchant ships (בְּאֲנִיּוֹת), indeterminate, and thus to be read *kōōñjōth*, i.e., she has the art of such ships as sail away and bring wares from a distance, are equipped, sent out, and managed by an enterprising spirit; so the prudent, calculating look of the brave wife, directed towards the care and the advancement of her house, goes out beyond the nearest circle; she descries also distant opportunities of advantageous purchase and profitable exchange, and brings in from a distance what is necessary for the supply of her house, or, mediately, what yields this supply (מִמְרָחֵק, Cod. *Jaman*. מִמְרָחֵק, cf. under Isa. 10: 6), for she finds that source of gain she has espied. With this diligence in her duties she is not a long sleeper, who is not awakened till the sun is up; but

**15 ¶ She riseth up while it is yet night,
And giveth food to her house,
And the fixed portion to her maidens.**

Pro. 31:15. The *fut. consec.* express, if not a logical sequence of connection, yet a close inner binding together of the separate features of the character here described. Early, ere the morning dawns, such a housewife rises up, because she places care for her house above her own comfort; or rather, because this care is to her a satisfaction and a joy. Since now the poet means without doubt to say that she is up before the other inmates of the house, especially before the children, though not before the maids: we have not, in וַיִּתְּנָן, to think that the inmates of the house, all in the morning night-watch, stand round about her, and that each receives from her a portion for the approaching day; but that she herself, early, whilst yet the most are asleep, gives out or prepares the necessary portions of food for the day (cf. וַיִּתְּנָן, Isa. 53: 9). Regarding מִרְרָף, food, from מָרַף (to tear in pieces, viz., with the teeth), and regarding חֶק, a portion decreed, vid., at Pro. 30: 8. It is true that חֶק also means the appointed labour (*pe nsum*), and thus the day's work (דְּבַר יוֹם); but the parallelism brings it nearer to explain after Pro. 30: 8, as is done by Gesenius and Hitzig after Exo. 5:14. This industry, — a pattern for the whole house, — this punctuality in the management of household matters, secures to her success in the extension of her household wealth:

**16 ¶ She seeketh a field and getteth possession of it;
Of the fruit of her hands she planteth a vineyard.**

Pro. 31:16. The field which she considereth, towards which her wish and her effort are directed, is perhaps not one beyond those which she already possesses, but one which has hitherto been wanting to her family; for the poet has, after v. 23, an inhabitant of a town in his eye, — a woman whose husband is not a landlord, but has a business in the city. The perf. **וַתִּמְכַּר** precedes and gives circumstantiality to the chief *factum* expressed by **וַתִּקְחָהּ**. Regarding **וַתִּמְכַּר**, vid., *Pro. 21:27*. “**לָקַח** is the general expression for purchasing, as **וַתִּתֵּן**, 24*b*, for selling. Thus the Aram. and Arab. **אָחַד**, while, (Arab.) *akhadh w‘ta*, Turk. *alisch werisch* (from *elmeḳ*, to take, and *wirmek*, to give — viz. *şâtılın*, in the way of selling; Lat. *venum*), post-bibl. **מִשָּׂא וּמַתָּן** or **מִקָּח וּמִמְכָר**, denotes giving and taking = business in general” (Fleischer). In 16*b* the *Chethîb* is, with Ewald and Bertheau, to be read **וַתִּמְכַּר**, and, with Hitzig, to be made dependent on **וַתִּקְחָהּ**, as parallel obj.: “of her hands’ fruit (she gaineth) a planting of vines.” But a planting of vines would be expressed by **מִטַּע כֶּרֶם** (*Mic. 1: 6*); and the *Kerî* **וַתִּמְכַּר** is more acceptable. The perf., as a fundamental verbal form, is here the expression of the abstract present: she plants a vineyard, for she purchases vines from the profit of her industry (*Isa. 7:23*, cf. *5: 2*). The poet has this augmented household wealth in his eye, for he continues:

**17 ה She girdeth her loins with strength,
And moveth vigorously her arms.**

Pro. 31:17. Strength is as the girdle which she wraps around her body (*Psa. 93: 1*). We write **וַתִּגְדָּה בְּעֹז**; both words have *Munach*, and the **ו** of **וַתִּגְדָּה** is aspirated. Thus girded with strength, out of this fulness of strength she makes firm or steels her arms (cf. *Psa. 89:22*). The produce of the field and vineyard extend far beyond the necessity of her house; thus a great portion is brought to sale, and the gain thence arising stimulates the industry and the diligence of the unwearied woman.

**18 ט She perceiveth that her gain is good;
And her light goeth not out at night.**

Pro. 31:18. The perf. and fut. are related to each other as antecedent and consequent, so that 18*a* can also be rendered as an hypothetical antecedent. She comes to find (taste) how profitable her industry is by the experience resulting from the sale of its product: the corn, the grapes, and the wine are found to be good, and thus her gain (cf. *Pro. 3:14*) is better, this opened new source of nourishment productive.

This spurs on her active industry to redoubled effort, and at times, when she is not fully occupied by the oversight of her fields and vineyard, she has another employment over which her light goes not out till far in the night. **בַּלַּיְלָה** is, as at Lam. 2:19, a needless *Kerî* for the poetic **בַּלַּיִל** (Isa. 16: 3). What other business it is to which she gives attention till in the night, is mentioned in the next verse.

**19 " She putteth her hand to the rock [Spinnrocken];
And her fingers lay hold on the spindle.**

Pro. 31:19. She applies herself to the work of spinning, and performs it with skill. The phrase **בַּשְּׂלָח יָדָהּ** (**שְׂלַח**, Job. 28: 9) signifies to take up an object of work, and **וַתִּמְדֵּךְ**, with obj. accus. (cf. Amo. 1: 5), the handling of the instrument of work necessary thereto. **בַּכַּפַּיִם** denotes the hands when the subject is skilful, successful work; we accordingly say **וַיִּגְיֵא כַפַּיִם**, not **וַיִּגְיֵעַ יָדַיִם**; cf. vv. 13 and 16, Psa. 78:72. What **פְּלָדָהּ** means is shown by the Arab. *falakat*, which, as distinguished from *mighzal*, i.e., *fuseau* (Lat. *fusus*), is explained by *bout arrondi et conique au bas du fuseau*, thus: the whorl, i.e., the ring or knob fastened on the spindle below, which gives it its necessary weight and regulates its movement, Lat. *verticellus*, post-bibl. **פִּיקָה** (which Bartenora glosses by the Ital. *fusajuolo*) or **צַנְנָרָה**, e.g., *Kelim* ix. 6, **שְׂבַלַע אֶת הַצְּנֹרָה**, a spindle which holds the whorl hidden (vid., Aruch under **כַּש**, iii.). But the word then also signifies *per synecdochen partis pro toto*, the spindle, i.e., the cylindrical wood on which the thread winds itself when spinning (cf. 2Sa. 3:29, where it means the staff on which the infirm leans); Homer gives to Helen and the goddesses golden spindles (**χρυσηλάκατοι**). Accordingly it is not probable that **כִּישוּר** also denotes the whorl, as Kimchi explains the word: “**כִּישוּר** is that which one calls by the name *verteil*, viz., that which one fixes on the spindle (**פְּלָדָהּ**) above to regulate the spinning (**מַטְוֵה**),” according to which the *Venet.* renders **כִּישוּר** by **σφόνδυλος**, whorl, and **פְּלָדָהּ** by **ἄτρακτος**, spindle. The old interpreters have not recognised that **כִּישוּר** denotes a thing belonging to the spinning apparatus; the LXX, Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Syr., and Jerome see therein an ethical idea (from **כָּשָׁר**, to be capable, able); but Luther, not misled thereby, translates with unusual excellence:

***She stretches her hand to the rock,
And her fingers grasp the spindle.***

He has in this no predecessors, except only the Targumists, whose כּוֹנֶשֶׁתָא (vid., Levy) appears also to denote the spinning-rock. The Syriac and Talmudic כּוֹשׁ, which is compared by Gesenius-Dietrich, is another word, and denotes, not the rock, but the spindle. Immanuel also, who explains פּלך as the מעזל, i.e., the spindle, understands (as perhaps also Parchon) by כּיִשׁוּר the rock. And why should not the rock (*wocken* = distaff), i.e., the stock to which the tuft of flax, hemp, or wool is fixed for the purpose of being spun, Lat. *colus*, not be named כּיִשׁוּר, from כּשׂר, to be upright as a stick, upright in height, or perhaps more correctly as מְכַשִּׁיר, i.e., as that which prepares or makes fit the flax for spinning? Also in צִינּוֹק, Jer. 29:26, there are united the meanings of the close and the confining dungeon, and שְׁלֵחָה = שִׁלּוֹחַ signifies ^{f300} the place which yields rest. The spinning-wheel is a German invention of the 16th century, but the rock standing on the ground, or held also in the hands, the spindle and the whorl, are more ancient. ^{f301}

With the spindle תּוֹמֵךְ stands in fit relation, for it is twirled between the fingers, as Catullus says of Fate:

Libratum tereti versabat pollice fusum. ^{f302}

That which impels the housewife to this labour is not selfishness, not a narrow-hearted limitation of her care to the circle of what is her own, but love, which reaches out far beyond this circle:

20 ׀ *She holdeth out her hand to the unfortunate,
And stretcheth forth her hands to the needy.*

Pro. 31:20. With כּפִיָּה, 19*b*, is connected the idea of artistic skilfulness; with כּפִיָּה, here that of offering for counsel (vid., at Isa. 2: 6); with sympathy and readiness to help, she presents herself to those who are oppressed by the misfortunes of life as if for an alliance, as if saying: place confidence in me, I shall do whatever I can — there thou hast my hand! Hitzig erroneously thinks of the open hand with a gift lying in it: this ought to be named, for כּף in itself is nothing else than the half-opened hand. Also in 20*b* we are not to think of alms. Here Hitzig rightly: she stretches out to him both of her hands, that he might grasp them, both of them, or whichever he may. She does not throw to him merely a gift from a distance, but above all she gives to him to experience her warm sympathy (cf. Eze. 16:49). Here, as at 19*a*, שְׁלֵחָה is punctuated (with *Dagesh*) as *Piel*. The punctuation supposes that the author both times not unintentionally made use of the intensive form. This one verse (20) is complete in itself as a description of character; and the author has done well in choosing such strong expressions, for, without this sympathy with misery and poverty,

she, so good and trustworthy and industrious, might indeed be pleasing to her husband, but not to God. One could almost wish that greater expansion had been given to this one feature in the picture. But the poet goes on to describe her fruitful activity in the nearest sphere of her calling:

**21 ל She is not afraid of the snow for her house;
For her whole house is clothed in scarlet.**

Pro. 31:21. A fall of snow in the rainy season of winter is not rare in Palestine, the Hauran, and neighbouring countries, and is sometimes accompanied with freezing cold. ^{f303}

She sees approaching the cold time of the year without any fear for her house, even though the season bring intense cold; for her whole house, i.e., the whole of the members of her family, are לְבַשׁ שָׁנִים. The connection is accusative (*Venet.* ἐνδεδυμένος ἐρυθρά), as at 2Sa. 15:32; Eze. 9: 2, 3. שָׁנִי, from שָׁנָה, to shine, glance clear, or high red, and is with or without תּוֹלַעַת the name of the colour of the *Kermes* worm, crimson or scarlet, perhaps to be distinguished from אַרְגָּמָן, the red-purple shell colour, and תְּכֵלֶת, the blue. שָׁנִים are clothing or material coloured with such שָׁנִי (bright red) (vid., at Isa. 1:18). The explanation of the word by *dibapha* is inadmissible, because the doubled colouring, wherever it is mentioned, always refers to the purple, particularly that of Tyre (*dibapha Tyria*), not to the scarlet. ^{f304}

But why does the poet name scarlet-coloured clothing? On account of the contrast to the white snow, says Hitzig, he clothes the family in crimson. But this contrast would be a meaningless freak. Rather it is to be supposed that there is ascribed to the red material a power of retaining the heat, as there is to the white that of keeping off the heat; but evidence for this are wanting. Therefore Rosenmüller, Vaihinger, and Böttcher approve of the translation *duplicibus* (Jerome, Luther) [= with double clothing], because they read, with the LXX, שָׁנִים. ^{f305}

But, with right, the Syr., Targ. abide by זְהוּרִיתָא, scarlet. The scarlet clothing is of wool, which as such preserves warmth, and, as high-coloured, appears at the same time dignified (2Sa. 1:24). From the protecting, and at the same time ornamental clothing of the family, the poet proceeds to speak of the bed-places, and of the attire of the housewife:

**22 ה She prepareth for herself pillows;
Linen and purple is her raiment.**

Pro. 31:22. Regarding מְרַבְּדִים (with ב *raphatum*), vid., at Pro. 7:16. Thus, pillows or mattresses (Aquila, Theodotion, περιστρώματα; Jerome, *stragulatam vestem*; Luther, *Decke* = coverlets) to make the bed soft and to adorn it (Kimchi: לְיָפוֹת עַל הַמַּטּוֹת, according to which Venet. κόσμια); Symmachus designates it as ἀμφιτάπους, i.e., τάπητες (*tapetae, tapetia*, carpets), which are hairy (shaggy) on both sides. ^{f306}

Only the LXX makes out of it δισσὰς γλαίνας, lined overcoats, for it brings over שְׁנַיִם. By עֲשֶׂתָהּ-לָהּ it is not meant that she prepares such pillows for her own bed, but that she herself (i.e., for the wants of her house) prepares them. But she also clothes herself in costly attire. שֵׁשׁ (an Egyptian word, not, as Heb., derived from שׁוּשׁ, cogn. יֵשֵׁשׁ, to be white) is the old name for linen, according to which the Aram. translates it by בּוּיָן, the Greek by βύσσοσ, vid., *Genesis*, pp. 470, 557, to which the remark is to be added, that the linen [Byssus], according to a prevailing probability, was not a fine cotton cloth, but linen cloth. Luther translates, *here and elsewhere, by weisse Seide* [white silk] (σηρικόν, i.e., from the land of the Σῆρες, Rev. 18:12); but the silk, is first mentioned by Ezekiel under the name of מִשֵׁי; and the ancients call the country where silk-stuff (*bombycina*) was woven, uniformly Assyria. אֲרָגְמָן (Aram. אֲרָגְמָן, derived by Benfey, with great improbability, from the rare Sanscrit word *rāgavant*, red-coloured; much rather from רָגַם = רָקַם, as stuff of variegated colour) is red purple; the most valuable purple garments were brought from Tyre and Sidon.

Now, first, the description turns back to the husband, of the woman who is commended, mentioned in the introduction:

**23 נ Well known in the gates is her husband,
Where he sitteth among the elders of the land.**

Pro. 31:23. Such a wife is, according to Pro. 12: 4, עֲמֶרֶת בַּעֲלָהּ, — she advances the estimation and the respect in which her husband is held. He has, in the gates where the affairs of the city are deliberated upon, a well-known, reputable name; for there he sits, along with the elders of the land, who are chosen into the council of the city as the chief place of the land, and has a weighty voice among them. The phrase wavers between נוֹדֵעַ (LXX περίβλεπτος γίνεταί; Venet. ἔλνωσται) and נוֹדֵעַ. The old Venetian edd. have in this place (like the Cod. *Jaman.*), and at Psa. 9:17, נוֹדֵעַ; on the contrary, Psa. 76: 2, Ecc. 6:10, נוֹדֵעַ, and that is correct; for the Masora, at this place and at Psa. 76: 2 (in the *Biblia rabb*), is disfigured. The description, following

the order of the letters, now directs attention to the profitable labour of the housewife:

**24 □ She prepareth body-linen and selleth it,
And girdles doth she give to the Phoenicians.**

Pro. 31:24. It is a question whether **סָדִין** signifies **σινδών**, cloth from *Sindhu*, the land of India (vid., at Isa. 3:23); the Arab. *sadn* (*sadl*), to cause to hang down, to descend (for the purpose of covering or veiling), offers an appropriate verbal root. In the Talmud, **סָדִין** is the sleeping linen, the curtain, the embroidered cloth, but particularly a light smock-frock, as summer costume, which was worn on the bare body (cf. Mar. 14:51 f.). Kimchi explains the word by night-shirt; the *Edictum Diocletiani*, xviii. 16, names **σινδόνες κοιταρῖαι**, as the *Papyrus Louvre*, **ῥθόνια ἐγκοιμήτρια**; and the connection in the Edict shows that linen attire (**ἐκ λίνου**) is meant, although — as with **שֵׁשׁ**, so also with **סָדִין** — with the ancients and the moderns, sometimes linen and sometimes cotton is spoken of without any distinction. Aethicus speaks of costly girdles, *Cosmogr.* 84, as fabricated at Jerusalem: *baltea regalia...ex Hierosolyma allata*; Jerusalem and Scythopolis were in later times the chief places in Palestine for the art of weaving. In Galilee also, where excellent flax grew, the art of weaving was carried on; and the **ῥθόνια**, which, according to Clemens Alex. *Paedag.* ii. 10, p. 239, were exported **ἐκ τῆς Ἑβραίων**, are at least in their material certainly synon. with **σινδόνες**. Regarding **נָתַן**, syn. **מָכַר**, opp. **לָקַח**, syn. **נָשָׂא** = **קָנָה**, vid., at 16a. There is no reason to interpret **בְּנִעְנִי** here, with the obliteration of the ethnographical meaning, in the general sense of **סָחַר**, trader, merchant; for purple, 22b, is a Phoenician manufacture, and thus, as an article of exchange, can be transferred to the possession of the industrious wife. The description is now more inward:

**25 √ Strength and honour is her clothing;
Thus she laugheth at the future day.**

Pro. 31:25. She is clothed with **עֹז**, strength, i.e., power over the changes of temporal circumstances, which easily shatter and bring to ruin a household resting on less solid foundations; clothed with **הָדָר**, glory, i.e., elevation above that which is low, little, common, a state in which they remain who propose to themselves no high aim after which they strive with all their might: in other words, her raiment is just pride, true dignity, with which she looks confidently into the future, and is armed against all sorrow and care. The connection of ideas, **עֹז וְהָדָר** (defectively written, on the contrary, at Psa. 84: 6, Masora, and only there written *plene*, and with *Munach*), instead of

the frequent **הוֹד וְהַדָּר**, occurs only here. The expression *25b* is like Job. 39: 7, wherefore Hitzig rightly compares Job. 24:14 to *25a*. **יּוֹם אֲחֵרֹן**, distinguished from **אֲחֵרִית**, and incorrectly interpreted (Rashi) of the day of death, is, as at Isa. 30: 8, the future, here that which one at a later period may enter upon.

Pro. 31:26. The next verse presents one of the most beautiful features in the portrait:

26 פ *She openeth her mouth with wisdom,
And amiable instruction is on her tongue.*

The **ב** of **בְּחִכְמָה** is, as also at Psa. 49: 5; 78: 2, that of means: when she speaks, then it is wisdom pressing itself from her heart outward, by means of which she breaks the silence of her mouth. With **אֵל**, in the expression *26b*, elsewhere **תַּחַת** interchanges: under the tongue, Psa. 10: 7, one has that which is ready to be spoken out, and on the tongue, Psa. 15: 3, that which is in the act of being spoken out. **תּוֹרַת־חֶסֶד** is a genitive connection after the manner of *tôrath* **אֱמֶת**, Mal. 2: 6. The gen. is not, as at Lev. 6: 2, in *tôrath* **הַעֲלֵה**, the gen. of the object (thus e.g., Fleischer's *institutio ad humanitatem*), but the gen. of property, but not so that **חֶסֶד** denotes grace (Symmachus, **νόμος ἐπίχαρις**; Theodotion, **νόμος χάριτος**), because for this meaning there is no example except Isa. 40: 6; and since **חֶסֶד** in the O.T. is the very same as in the N.T., love, which is the fulfilling of the law, Hos 6: 6, cf. 1Ki. 20:31, ^{f307} it is supposed that the poet, since he writes **תּוֹרַת־חֶסֶד**, and not **תּוֹרַת־חֵן**, means to designate by **חֶסֶד** this property without which her love for her husband, her industry, her high sentiment, would be no virtues, viz., unselfish, sympathizing, gentle love. Instruction which bears on itself the stamp of such amiability, and is also gracious, i.e., awakening love, because going forth from love (according to which Luther, translating *holdselige Lere* = pleasing instructions, thus understands it) — such instruction she carries, as house-mother (Pro. 1: 8), in her mouth. Accordingly the LXX translate (vid., Lagarde regarding the mistakes of this text before us) **θεσμοὶ ἐλεημοσύνης**, and Jerome *lex clementiae*. **חֶסֶד** is related to **אֲהַבָה** as grace to love; it denotes love showing itself in kindness and gracefulness, particularly condescending love, proceeding from a compassionate sympathy with the sufferings and wants of men. Such graceful instruction she communicates now to this and now to that member of her household, for nothing that goes on in her house escapes her observation.

**27 ז She looketh well to the ways of her house,
And eateth not the bread of idleness.**

Pro. 31:27. Although there exists an inner relation between 27a and v. 26, yet 27a is scarcely to be thought of (Hitzig) as appos. to the suffix in **לְשׂוֹנָה**. Participles with or without determination occur in descriptions frequently as predicates of the subject standing in the discourse of the same force as abstr. present declarations, e.g., Isa. 40:22 f., Psa. 104:13 f. **צוֹפֵיָה** is connected with the accus. of the object of the intended warning, like Pro. 15: 3, and is compared according to the form with **הַמְיָה**, 7:11. **הַלִּיכָה** signifies elsewhere things necessary for a journey, Job. 6:19, and in the *plur. magnificus* it denotes show (*pompa*), Hab. 3: 6: but originally the walk, conduct, Nah. 2: 6; and here in the plur. walks = comings and goings, but not these separately, but in general, the *modi procedendi* (LXX **διατριβαί**). The *Chethîb* has **הִילְכוֹת**, probably an error in writing, but possibly also the plur. of **הַלְכָה**, thus found in the post-bibl. Heb. (after the form **צַדְקוֹת**), custom, viz., appointed traditional law, but also like the Aram. **הַלְכָא** (*emph. הַלְכְתָא*), usage, manner, common practice. Hitzig estimates this *Chethîb*, understood Talmudically, as removing the section into a late period; but this Talmudical signification is not at all appropriate (Hitzig translates, with an incorrect rendering of **צוֹקִיָה**, “for she sees after the ordering of the house”), and besides the Aram. **הַלְכָא**, e.g., Targ. Pro. 16: 9, in the first line, signifies only the walk or the manner and way of going, and this gives with the *Kerî* essentially the same signification. Luther well: *Sie schawet wie es in jrem Hause zugeht* [= she looks how it goes in her house]. Her eyes are turned everywhere; she is at one time here, at another there, to look after all with her own eyes; she does not suffer the day’s work, according to the instructions given, to be left undone, while she folds her own hands on her bosom; but she works, keeping an oversight on all sides, and does not eat the bread of idleness (**אֲצִלּוֹת** = **אֲצִלָּה**, Pro. 19:15), but bread well deserved, for **εἴ τις οὐ θέλει ἐργάζεσθαι, μηδὲ ἐσθιέτω**, 2Th. 3:10.

Now begins the finale of this song in praise of the virtuous woman:

**28 ק Her sons rise up and bless her,
Her husband (riseth up) and praiseth her.**

Pro. 31:28. The *Piel* **אָשַׁר** in such a connection is denom. of **אֲשֵׁר** (**אֲשִׁרִי**). Her children rise up (**קוּם**, like e.g., Jer. 26:17, but here, perhaps, with the associated idea of reverential honour) and bless her, that she has on her part brought the house and them to such prosperity, such a position of respect, and

to a state where love (חסד) reigns, and her husband rises up and sings her praise.

29 ג “*Many are the daughters who have done bravely,
But thou hast surpassed them all together.*”

Pro. 31:29. We have already often remarked, last time under Pro. 29: 6, that רַב, not indeed in its sing., but in its plur. רַבִּים and רַבּוֹת, can precede, after the manner of a numeral, as attribute; but this syntactical licence, Pro. 28:12, by no means appears, and needs to be assumed as little here as at Pro. 8:26, although there is no reason that can be adduced against it. עָשָׂה חֵיל signifies here not the gaining of riches (the LXX, Syr., Targ., Jerome, Luther, Gesenius, Böttcher, and others), which here, where the encomium comes to its height, would give to it a mercenary mammon-worship note — it indeed has this signification only when connected with ל of the person: *Sibi opes acquirere*, Deu. 6:17; Eze. 28: 4 — but: bravery, energy, and, as the reference to חֵיל אִשָּׁה demands, moral activity, capacity for activity, in accordance with one’s calling, ποιεῖν ἀρετήν, by which the *Venet.* translates it. בְּנוֹת is, as in the primary passages, Gen. 30:13, Son. 6: 9, a more delicate, finer name of women than נְשִׁים: many daughters there have always been who have unfolded ability, but thou my spouse hast raised thyself above them all, i.e., thou art excellent and incomparable. Instead of עָלִיתָ, there is to be written, after Chajug, Aben Ezra (*Zachoth 7a*), and Jekuthiel under Gen. 16:11, עָלִיתָ; the Spanish *Nakdanim* thus distinguish the forms מְצָאתָ, thou hast found, and מְצָאתָ, she has found. בְּלָנָה, for בְּלָן, Gen. 42:36. What now follows is not a continuation of the husband’s words of praise (Ewald, Elster, Löwenstein), but an *epiphonema auctoris* (Schultens); the poet confirms the praise of the husband by referring it to the general ground of its reason:

30 ש *Grace is deceit; and beauty, vanity —
A wife that feareth Jahve, she shall be praised.*

Pro. 31:30. Grace is deceit, because he who estimates the works of a wife merely by the loveliness of her external appearance, is deceived by it; and beauty is vanity, *vanitas*, because it is nothing that remains, nothing that is real, but is subject to the law of all material things — transitoriness. The true value of a wife is measured only by that which is enduring, according to the moral background of its external appearance; according to the piety which makes itself manifest when the beauty of bodily form has faded away, in a beauty which is attractive. ^{f308}

יְרָאָה (with *Makkeph* following), ^{f309} is here the connective form of יְרָאָה (fem. of יָרָא). The *Hithpa.* תִּתְהַלֵּל is here manifestly (Pro. 27: 2) not reflexive, but representative of the passive (cf. Pro. 12: 8, and the frequently occurring מְהַלֵּל, *laudatus = laudandus*), nowhere occurring except in the passage before us. In itself the fut. may also mean: she will be praised = is worthy of praise, but the jussive rendering (Luther: Let her be praised) is recommended by the verse which follows:

31 תַּ *Give to her of the fruit of her hands;*
And let her works praise her in the gates!

Pro. 31:31. The fruit of her hands is the good which, by her conduct, she has brought to maturity, — the blessing which she has secured for others, but, according to the promise (Isa. 3:10), has also secured for her own enjoyment. The first line proceeds on the idea that, on account of this blessing, she herself shall rejoice. תִּנְנוּ-לָהּ (with *Gaja*, after *Metheg-Setzung*, § 37) is not equivalent to give to her honour because of...; for in that case, instead of the ambiguous מִן, another preposition — such e.g., as לָ — would have been used; and so תִּנְנוּ, of itself, cannot be equivalent to תִּנְנוּ (sing the praise of), as Ziegler would read, after Jud. 11:40. It must stand with כְּבוֹד, or instead of מִפְּרֵי an accus. obj. is to be thought of, as at Psa. 68:35, Deu. 32: 3, which the necessity of the case brings with it, — the giving, as a return in the echo of the song of praise. Immanuel is right in explaining תִּנְנוּ-לָהּ by תִּגְמְלוּ לָהּ חֶסֶד or חֶסֶד וְכְבוֹד עִתָּה, cf. Psa. 28: 4. The מִן, as is not otherwise to be expected, after תִּנְנוּ is partitive: give to her something of the fruit of her hands, i.e., recompense it to her, render it thankfully, by which not exclusively a requital in the form of honourable recognition, but yet this specially, is to be thought of. Her best praise is her works themselves. In the gates, i.e., in the place where the representatives of the people come together, and where the people are assembled, her works praise her; and the poet desires that this may be right worthily done, full of certainty that she merits it, and that they honour themselves who seek to praise the works of such a woman, which carry in themselves their own commendation.

Note

THE PROVERBS PECULIAR TO THE ALEXANDRINE TRANSLATION

Note: In the LXX there are not a few proverbs which are not found in the Heb. text, of, as we may express it, are peculiar to the Egyptian Text Recension, as distinguished from the Palestinian. The number is not so great

as they appear to be on a superficial examination; for many of these apparently independent proverbs are duplicate translations. In many places there follows the Greek translation of the Heb. proverbs another translation, e.g., at Pro. 1:14, 27; 2: 2; 3:15; 4:10; 6:25*b*, 10: 5; 11:16; 14:22; 15: 6; 16:26; 23:31; 29: 7*b*, 25, 31:29*a*. These duplicate translations are found sometimes at different places, e.g., Pro. 17:20*b* is duplicate to Pro. 17:16*d* ; Pro. 19:15 is duplicate to Pro. 18: 8; 22: 9*cd* = Pro. 19: 6*b*, 1:19*b* ; 29:17 is duplicate to Pro. 28:17*cd*; or, according to the enumeration of the verses as it lies before us, not within the compass of one verse to which they belong: 22: 8, 9 is a duplicate translation of v. 8*b* and 9*a* of the Heb. text; Pro. 24:23; 30: 1, a duplicate translation of Pro. 30: 1; and Pro. 31:26, 27*b*, of Pro. 31:26 of the Heb. text. ^{f310}

Everywhere, here, along with the translated proverb of our Heb. text, there is not an independent one. Also one has to be on his guard against seeing independent proverbs where the translator only, at his own will, modified one of the Hebrews proverbs lying before us, as e.g., at Pro. 10:10; 13:23; 19: 7, as he here and there lets his Alexandrine exegesis influence him, Pro. 2:16 f., 5: 5; 9: 6, and adds explanatory clauses, Pro. 2:19; 3:18; 5: 3; 9:12; seldom fortunate in this, oftener, as at Pro. 1:18, 22, 28; 9:12; 28:10, showing by these interpolations his want of knowledge. There are also, in the translation, here and there passages introduced from some other part of Scripture, e.g.: Pro. 1: 7*ab* = Psa. 111:10, LXX; 3:22*cd* = 3: 8; 3:28*c* = 27: 1*b*, 13: 5*c*, from Psa. 112: 5, cf. 37:21; 16: 1 (ὄσω μέγας κ.τ.λ.) = Sir. 3:18; 26:11*cd* = Sir. 4:21. A free reminiscence, such as Pro. 16:17, may speak a certain independence, but not those borrowed passages.

Keeping out of view all this only apparent independence, we place together the independent proverbs contained in the LXX, and, along with them, we present a translation of them into Heb. Such a translation has already been partly attempted by Ewald, Hitzig, and Lagarde; perhaps we have been here and there more fortunate in our rendering. It is certainly doubtful whether the translator found all these proverbs existing in Heb. Many of them appear to be originally Greek. But the rendering of them into Hebrew is by no means useless. It is of essential importance in forming a judgment regarding the original language. ^{f311}

There are a few grains of wheat, and, on the other hand, much chaff, in these proverbs that are peculiar to the LXX. They are not, in the most remote way, fit to supply the place of the many proverbs of our Heb. text which are wanting in the LXX. One must also here be cautious in examining them. Thus, e.g., Pro. 17:19 stands as a proverb of only one line; the second forms a part of v. 16. As true defects, we have noticed the following proverbs and parts of proverbs: Pro. 1:16; 7:25*b*, 8:32*b*, 33, 9: 3*b*, 4, 10*b*, 18: 8, 23, 24; 19: 1, 2, 15;

21: 5; 22: 6; 23:23; 25:20*a*. All these proverbs and parts of proverbs of the Heb. text are wanting in the LXX.

It is difficult to solve the mystery of this Alexandrine translation, and to keep separate from each other the Text Recension which the translator had before him, the transformations and corrections which the text of the translation, as it came from the first translator and the later revisers of it, has suffered in the course of time. They appear in Egypt to have been as arbitrary as incompetent in handling the sacred Scriptures. The separating from each other of the proverbs of Agur and Lemuel, Proverbs 30-31: 9, has its side-piece in the separation of Jeremiah's proaemiums of the prophecies concerning the people, Jeremiah 25.

Footnotes

- ^{ft1a} In hoc genere autem nihil invenitur, quod ullo modo coparandum sit cum aphorismis illis, quos edidit rex Salomon; de quo testatur Scriptura *cor illi fuisse instar arenae maris*: sicut enim arenae maris universas orbis oras circumdant, ita et sapientia ejus omnia humana, non minus quam divina, complexa est. In aphorismis vero illis, praeter alia majis theologica, reperies liquido haud pauca praecepta et monita civilia praestantissima, ex profundis quidem sapientiae penetralibus scaturientia, atque in amplissimum varietatis campum excurrentia.
- ^{ft1} Cf. *Outlines of Hebrew Accentuation, Prose and Poetical*, by Rev. A. B. Davidson, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, Free Church College, Edinburgh, 1861, based on Baer's *Torath Emeth*, Rödelheim 1872.
- ^{ft2} Vol. ii., ed. of 1860, pp. 477-511.
- ^{ft3} *Pesikta*, ed. Buber (1868), 34b, 35a. Instead of 800, the Masora reckons 915 verses in the Book of Proverbs.
- ^{ft4} *Schir-ha-Schirim Rabba*, c. i.f. 4a.
- ^{ft5} Vid., *B. Bathra*, 15a. From the fact that Isaiah outlived Hezekiah it is there concluded that the Hezekiah-collegium also continued after Hezekiah's death. Cf. Fürst on the *Canon of the O.T.* 1868, p. 78f.
- ^{ft6} Isaac Euchel (†1804), in his *Commentary on the Proverbs*, regards 14: 4a and 17:19b as such popular proverbs.
- ^{ft7} Such integral distichs are also Pro. 15: 3; 16: 7, 10; 17:13, 15; 18: 9, 13; 19:26, 27; 20: 7, 8, 10, 11, 20, 21; 21: 4, 13, 16, 21, 23, 24, 30; 22: 4, 11; 24: 8, 26; 26:16; 27:14; 28: 8, 9, 17, 24; 29: 1, 5, 12, 14. In Pro. 14:27; 15:24; 17:23; 19:27, the second line consists of one sentence with ו and the infin.; in Pro. 16:12, 26; 21:25; 22: 9; 27: 1; 29:19, of one sentence with ו; with ו, Pro. 18: 2; 23:17. The two lines, as 11:31; 15:11; 17: 7; 19: 7ab, 10, 20:27, form a conclusion *a minori ad majus*, or the reverse. The former or the latter clauses stand in grammatical relation in Pro. 23: 1, 2, 15f., 27:22; 29:21 (cf. 22:29; 24:10; 26:12; 29:20, with hypoth. perf., and Pro. 26:26 with hypoth. fut.); in the logical relation of reason and consequence, Pro. 17:14; 20: 2, 4; in comparative relation, Pro. 12: 9, etc. These examples show that the two lines, not merely in the more recent, but also in the old Solomonic Mashal, do not always consist of two parallel members.
- ^{ft8} This so-called Vav adaequationis, which appears here for the first time in the Proverbs as the connection between the figure and the thing itself without a

verbal predicate (cf. on the other hand, Job. 5: 7; 12:11; 14:11f.), is, like the Vav, ׀, of comparison, only a species of that Vav of association which is called in Arab. Waw alajam ‘a, or Waw alam ‘ayat, or Waw al ‘asatsahab (vid., at Isa. 42: 5); and since usage attributes to it the verbal power of secum habere, it is construed with the accus. Vid., examples in Freytag’s Arabum Proverbia, among the recent proverbs beginning with the Arabic letter k

- ^{ft9} [From *praeambulum*, designating a peculiar kind of epigram found in the German poetry of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
- ^{ft10} [Isaac Ha-Levi was born at Satanow (whence his name), in Russian Poland, 1732, died at Berlin 1802. Besides other works, he was the author of several collections of gnomes and apothegms in imitation of the Proverbs. Vid., Delitzsch *Zur Gesch. der Jüd. Poesie*, p. 115.
- ^{ft11} Zöckler takes 24:23ff. as a second appendix to the first principal collection. This is justifiable, but the second superscription rather suggests two collectors.
- ^{ft12} Quite the same phenomenon, Fleischer remarks, presents itself in the different collections of proverbs ascribed to the Caliph Ali, where frequently one and the same thought in one collection is repeated in manifold forms in a second, here in a shorter, there in a longer form. As a general principle this is to be borne in mind, that the East transmits unchanged, with scrupulous exactness, only religious writings regarded as holy and divine, and therefore these Proverbs have been transmitted unchanged only since they became a distinct part of the canon; before that time it happened to them, as to all in the East that is exposed to the arbitrariness of the changing spirit and the intercourse of life, that one and the same original text has been modified by one speaker and writer after another. Thus of the famous poetical works of the East, such e.g., as Firdusi’s *Schah-Nahem* [*Book of the Kings*] and Sadi’s *Garden of Roses*, not one MS copy agrees with another.
- ^{ft13} *Reden u. Aufsätze*, ii. 316.
- ^{ft14} A similar thing is found among German proverbs, e.g.: *Wer nicht mitsass, auch nicht mitass* (Whoso sat not, ate not).
- ^{ft15} This name [meaning “wisdom, including all virtue”, there are many things to show, was common in Palestine. The Jerusalem Talmud, in a passage quoted by Krochmal, *Kerem Chemed*, v. 79, divides the canon into תורה, נבואה, and חכמה. Rashi, in *Baba bathra*, 14b, calls Mishle (Proverbs) and Koheleth (Ecclesiastes) ספרי חכמה. The Book of Koheleth is called (*b. Megilla*, 7a), according to its contents, חמתו של שלמה. The Song

bears in the Syriac version (the Peshito) the inscription *chekmetho dechekmotho*.

^{ft16} “In hoc genere,” says Lord Bacon, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, viii. 2, “nihil invenitur, quod ullo modo comparandum sit cum aphorismis illis, quos edidit rex Salomon, de quo testatur Scriptura, cor illi fuisse instar arenae maris. Sicut enim arenae maris universas orbis oras circumdant, ita et sapientia ejus omnia humana non minus quam divina complexa est. In aphorismis vero illis praeter alia magis theologica reperies liquido haud pauca praecepta et monita civilia praestantissima, ex profundis quidem sapientiae penetralibus scaturientia atque in amplissimum varietatis campum excurrentia.” Accordingly, in the same work Bacon calls the Proverbs of Solomon “insignes parabolas s. aphorismos de divina atque morali philosophia.”

^{ft17} Cf. also J. Gottlob Jäger’s *Observationes in Proverbiorum Salomonis Versionem Alexandrinam*, 1788; de Lagarde’s *Anmerkungen zur griech. Uebersetzung der Proverbien*, 1863; M. Heidenheim’s *Zur Textkritik der Proverbien*, in his *Quarterly Journal for German and English Theological Criticism and Investigation*, No. VIII (1865), and IX, XI (1866). The text of the LXX (cf. Angelo Mari’s *Classici Auctores*, t. ix.) used by Procopius in his *Ἑρμηνεία εἰς τὰς παροιμίας* is peculiar, and here and there comes near to the Hebrew original. The *scholion* of Evagrius in the *Σχόλια εἰς τὰς παροιμίας* of Origen, edited by Tischendorf in his *Notitia*, 1860, from a MS of Patmos, shows how soon even the Hexaplar text became ambiguous.

^{ft18} Cf. Dathe, *De ratione consensus Versionis Syriacae el Chaldaicae Proverbiorum Salomonis* (1764), edited by Rosenmüller in his *Opuscula*. Maybaum, in the Treatise on the Language of the Targum to the Proverbs and its relation to the Syriac, in Merx’s *Archiv*, ii. 66-93, labours in vain to give the priority to that of the Targum: the Targum is written from the Peshito, and here and there approaches the Hebrew text; the language is, with few differences, the Syriac of the original.

^{ft19} The Ethiopic translation, also, is in particular points, as well as on the whole, dependent on the LXX, for it divides the Book of Proverbs into proverbs (*παροιμίας*), 1-24, and instructions (*παιδείαι*) of Solomon, 25-31. Vid., Dillmann in Ewald’s *Jahrb.* v. 147, 150.

^{ft20} Norzi has erroneously accented *משלי* with the accent *Munach*. The *מ* is besides the Masoretic *majuscule*, like the *ב*, *ש*, and *ס* at the commencement of the Law, the Canticles, and Chronicles.

^{ft21} If it had belonged to *דוד*, then the sentence would have been accented thus: *משלי שלמה בן-דוד מלך ישראל*.

- ft22 לְדָאֵת is rightly pointed by Löwenstein with *Dechi* after Cod. 1294; *vide* the rule by which the verse is divided, *Torath Emeth*, p. 51, § 12.
- ft23 [Guna = a rule in Sanskrit grammar regulating the modification of vowels.
- ft24 According to Malbim, מִשְׁפָּט is the fixed objective right, צְדָקָה the righteousness which does not at once decide according to the letter of the law, but always according to the matter and the person.
- ft25 Like עֲפָאִים, Psa. 104:12, וְכִצְבָאִים, 1Ch. 12: 8, cf. *Michlol*, 196a. In vv. 22, 32, the mute א is wanting.
- ft26 In Sirach 1:14, 16, the Syr. has both times רִישׁ חֲמַתָּא ; but in the second instance, where the Greek translation has *πλησμονη σοφίας*, שִׁבְעַת חֲכָמָה (after Psa. 16:11) may have existed in the original text.
- ft27 Malbim's explanation is singular: the sceptics, from אֱוִלִי, perhaps! This also is Heidenheim's view.
- ft28 In לוֹיִת חֵן the חֵן has the conjunctive accent *shalshleth*, on account of which the *Pesiq* accent (|) is omitted. This small *shalshleth* occurs only eight times. See *Torath Emeth*, p. 36.
- ft29 The writing varies greatly. Here and at Pro. 6:21 we have לְגִנְרֵתֶיךָ; at 3: 3, אֶל־גִּנְרֵתֶיךָ, 3:22, לְגִנְרֵתֶיךָ. Thus according to the Masora and correct texts.
- ft30 The accent *Pazer* over the בְּנֵי has the force of *Athnach*.
- ft31 [Rashi, i.e., Rabbi Salomo Isaaki, of Troyes, died A.D. 1105. Ralbag, i.e., Rabbi Levi ben Gershon, usually referred to by Christian writers as Master Leo de Bannolis, or Gersonides, a native of Banolas near Gerona, died about 1342.
- ft32 Only in this sense is the existing accentuation of this verse (cf. the Targ.) to be justified.
- ft33 Here, in v. 14, גּוֹרֵלֶכָּה is to be written with *Munach* (not *Metheg*) in the second syllable; *vid.*, *Torath Emeth*, p. 20. Accentuationssystem, vii. § 2.
- ft34 The Arab. grammarians regard this as half determination, and call it *takhsys*; that אִתְּם has with them the force of a virtually coordinated attributive; while, according to the Arab. gram., it is also possible that בְּדֶרֶךְ, “in one way,” is equivalent to on the common way, for in the indetermination sometimes there lies the conception not merely of *âhad*, but of *weahad*.
- ft35 The MS Masora remarks לִיּוֹת וְחֹסֶר, and hence מְזוּרָה is written defectively in the *Erfurt*, 1, 2, 3, *Frankf.* 1294, in the edition of Norzi and elsewhere.

- ft36 In the Indo-Germanic languages the *s* of the plur. also probably proceeds from the prep. *sa* (*sam*) = סׁׂׂׂׂ. See Schleicher, *Compend. der vergl. Gram.* § 247.
- ft37 In the *Hagiographa* everywhere written *plene*, with exception of Job. 17:10.
- ft38 The *Metheg* belongs to the ׀, under which it should be placed (and not to the ׀), as the commencing sound of the second syllable before the tone-syllable; cf. v. 25.
- ft39 Jul. Ley, in his work on the *Metrical Forms of Hebrew Poetry*, 1866, has taken too little notice of these frequently occurring alliteration staves; Lagarde communicated to me (8th Sept. 1846) his view of the stave-rhyme in the Book of Proverbs, with the remark, “Only the Hebr. technical poetry is preserved to us in the O.T. records; but in such traces as are found of the stave-rhyme, there are seen the echoes of the poetry of the people, or notes passing over from it.”
- ft40 In the *Codd.* ׀׀׀׀׀׀ is written; in this case the *Metheg* indicates the tone syllable: vid., *Torath Emeth*, p. 7 note, p. 21 note; and *Accentssystem*, ii. § 1, note. In ׀׀׀׀׀׀ the *Rebia* is to be placed over the ׀. In the *Silluk* -word ׀׀׀׀׀׀ it appears undoubtedly that the form is to be spoken as *Milel*, i.e., with tone on the penult.
- ft41 A plur. denoting unity in the circumstances, and a similarity in the relations of time and space.
- ft42 Regarding this formula, see Strack’s *Prolegomena*, pp. 66-70.
- ft43 I was formerly in error in regarding the word as a *Hophal* formation, and in assigning to it the primary signification of being in a state of realized existence, of reality, in contradistinction to appearance only. The objection of J. D. Michaelis, *Supplem.* p. 1167, *Non placent in linguis ejusmodi etyma metaphysica*, etc., does not apply here, since the word is a new one coined by the *Chokma*, but all the shades of meaning are naturally derived from the fundamental signification “furtherance” (cf. Seneca, *Deus stator stabilitorque est*). “תושיה׀, from Arab. *âsy* and *wasy*, to further by word and deed, to assist by counsel and act, to render help, whence the meanings *auxilium*, *salus*, and *prudens consilium*, *sapientia*, easily follow; cf. Ali’s Arab. proverb, *w-‘s-sâk mn tgâfl* — ‘He furthers thee, who does not trouble himself about thee.’”
- ft44 The Arab. ‘*aysa* (almost only in the negative *la-ysa* = לא יש׀), of the same signification as יש׀, with which the Aram. א׀ית (א׀ית׀) is associated, presupposes an ‘*âsa* (= ‘*âssa*), to be founded, to found, and is rightly

regarded by the Arabs as an old segolate noun in which the verbal force was comprehended.

^{ft45} The Arab. *wsy* and *swy* are confounded in common usage (Wetstein, *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitschr.* xxii. 19), but the roots **וש** and **שו** are different; **וש** and **אש**, on the contrary, are modifications of one root.

^{ft46} For the right succession of the accents here, see *Torath Emeth*, p. 49, § 5; *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. § 3.

^{ft47} In Talmudic Heb. **אַרְמִית** (Aramean) has this meaning for the Biblical **נְבֻרְיָה**.

^{ft48} One is here reminded of the expression in the *Aenid*, vi. 127-129:

*Revocare gradum superasque evadere ad auras,
Hoc opes, hoc labor est.*

See also an impure but dreadful Talmudic story about a dissolute Rabbi, *b. Aboda zara*, 17a.

^{ft49} In correct texts **וּלְאִישׁוֹנוֹ** has the *Makkeph*. Vid., *Torath Emeth*, p. 41; *Accentuationssystem*, xx. § 2.

^{ft50} Similar is the relation in Arab. of *labbasa* to *libâs* (**לְבוּשׁ**); it means to make a thing unknown by covering it; whence *telbîs*, deceite, *mulebbis*, a falsifier.

^{ft51} Fleischer is here reminded of the giraffe in the *Jardin des Plantes*, the head of which was adorned by its Arabic keeper with strings and jewels, the object of which was to turn aside the ‘*ain* (the bad, mischievous look) from the precious beast.

^{ft52} *In the st. constr.* Pro. 2:19, and with the grave suff. Pro. 2:15, *ō* instead of *ō* is in order; but Ben-Asher’s **אַרְחֻקִי**, Job. 13:27, cf. 33:11, is an inconsistency.

^{ft53} See my work, *Physiologie u. Musik in ihrer Bedeutung für Grammatik besonders die hebräische*, pp. 11-13.

^{ft54} Here Procop. rightly distinguishes between **παιδεία** and **τιμωρία**.

^{ft55} Vid., *Torath Emeth*, p. 19; *Accentuationssystem*, vi. § 6; the differences between Ben-Asher and Ben-Naphtali in the Appendixes to *Biblia Rabbinica*; Dachselt’s *Biblia Accentuata*, and Pinner’s *Prospectus*, p. 91 (Odessa, 1845).

^{ft56} The root is not **תב**, to grope, but **נת**; whence Arab. *natt*, to bubble up, *natâ*, to raise oneself, to swell up, etc.

^{ft57} According to Malbim, תִּקְוָה is the expectation of good, and בְּסֵל, confidence in the presence of evil.

^{ft58} Hitzig rejects Pro. 3:22-26 as a later interpolation. And why? Because 3, which he regards as a complete discourse, consists of twice ten verses beginning with בְּנִי. In addition to this symmetry other reasons easily reveal themselves to his penetration. But the discourses contained in Proverbs 1-9 do not all begin with בְּנִי (vid., Pro. 1:20); and when it stands in the beginning of the discourse, it is not always the first word (vid., Pro. 1: 8); and when it occurs as the first word or in the first line, it does not always commence a new discourse (vid., 1:15 in the middle of the first, Pro. 3:11 in the middle of the fourth); and, moreover, the Hebr. poetry and oratory does not reckon according to verses terminated by *Soph Pasuk*, which are always accented distichs, but they in reality frequently consist of three or more lines. The rejected verses are in nothing unlike those that remain, and which are undisputed; they show the same structure of stichs, consisting for the most part of three, but sometimes also only of two words (cf. Pro. 3:22 *b* with Pro. 1: 9 *b*, 10*b*), the same breadth in the course of the thoughts, and the same accord with Job and Deuteronomy.

^{ft59} Accentuate אֶל־תִּמְנַע טוֹב, not אֶל־תִּמְנַע־טוֹב. The doubling of the *Makkeph* is purposeless, and, on the contrary, the separating of טוֹב from מִבְּעִלְיוֹ by the *Dechi* (the separating accent subordinate to *Athnach*) is proper. It is thus in the best MSS.

^{ft60} Thus also (Arab.) *raj'* is used in Thaalebi's *Confidential Companion*, p. 24, line 3, of Flügel's ed. Admission was prevented to one Haschmid, then angry he sought it once more; he was again rejected, then he sought it not again (Arab. *flm yraj'*), but says, etc. Flügel has misunderstood the passage. Fleischer explains *raj'*, with reference to Pro. 3:28, by *revenir à la charge*.

^{ft61} Accentuate וְהוֹאִי־יֹשֵׁב לְבַטָּח . It is thus in correct texts. The *Rebia Mugrash* is transformed, according to the *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. § 2.

^{ft62} Jona Gerundi renders it otherwise: "But shame raises the fools high;" i.e., only the infamous, he who has no sense of honour, makes much advancement out of fools.

^{ft63} In some editions לְבָנִי is noted as *Kerî* to לִפְנֵי, but erroneously and contrary to the express evidence of the Masora, which affirms that there are two passages in which we ought to read not לִפְנֵי, but לְבָנִי, viz., Psa. 80: 3 and Pro. 4: 3.

- ^{ft64} The writing of יְתַמְּדֶה with the grave *Metheg* (*Gaja*) and *Kametz-Chatuph* (*ō*) is that of Ben Asher; on the other hand, יְתַמְּדֶה with *Cholem* (*ō*) and the permanent *Metheg* is that of Ben Naphtali; vid., *Michlol* 21a (under the verbal form 25), § 30.
- ^{ft65} According to correct readings in codd. and older editions, וְתִשְׁמְרֶנּוּ has also indeed *Rebia Mugrash*, and אֶתְּבַרְכֶּנּוּ, *Mercha* (with *Zinnorith*); vid., *Torath Emeth*, p. 47, § 6; *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. § 1, 2; and regarding the *Zinnorith*, see *Liber Psalmorum Hebraicus* by S. Baer, p. xii.
- ^{ft66} Löwenstein has rightly וְתִרְוַמְמֶנּוּ, vid., my preface to Baer's *Genesis*, p. vii.
- ^{ft67} We read תְּכַבְּדֶהָ, not כְּבֹדֶהָ (Hahn) or תְּכַבְּדֶהָ (Löwenstein); the tone lies on the *penult.*, and the tone-syllable has the point *Tsere*, as in וְיִנְדֶּהָ, Deu. 32: 7; vid., *Michlol* 66b.
- ^{ft68} [R. Nathan ben Jechiel, A.D. 1106, who is usually styled by the Jewish writers בְּאֵל עֲרוּךְ, *Auctor Aruch*, author of a Talmudical Lexicon.
- ^{ft69} Punctuate הִיא ; the *Zinnorith* represents the place of the *Makkeph*, vid., *Torath Emeth*, p. 9.
- ^{ft70} In good MSS and printed copies the כ has the *Pathach*, as Kimchi states the rule in *Michlol* 45a: כֹּל בְּאֲבָנִים פֶּתַח, כֹּל בְּאֲפֵלָה פֶּתַח .
- ^{ft71} Hitzig inverts the order of vv. 18 and 19, and connects the כִּי of 16a immediately with v. 19 (for the way of the wicked...). He moreover regards vv. 16, 17 as an interpolation, and explains v. 16 as a gloss transforming the text of v. 19. "That the wicked commit wickedness," says Hitzig, "is indeed certain (1Sa. 24:14), and the waning of v. 15 ought not to derive its motive from their energy in sinning." But the warning against the way of the wicked is founded not on their energy in sinning, but on their bondage to sin: their sleep, their food and drink — their life both when they sleep and when they wake — is conditioned by sin and is penetrated by sin. This foundation of the warning furnishes what is needed, and is in nothing open to objection. And that in vv. 16 and 19 יִבְשׁוּלוּ, לֹא יָדְעוּ and לֹא יִרְעוּ and יִבְשׁוּלוּ, נִגְזְלָה and בְּאֲפֵלָה seem to be alike, does not prove that v. 16 originated as a parallel text from v. 19 — in the one verse as in the other the thoughts are original.
- ^{ft72} Böttcher, under 2Sa. 23: 4, explains נִגְזָה of the brightness striking against, conquering (cf. נִגְרָה, נִגְזָה) the clouds; but *ferire* or *percutere* lies nearer (cf. נִגְזָה, Eze. 17:10, נִבְּחָה, Psa. 121: 6, and the Arab. *darb*, used of strong sensible impressions), as Silius, iv. 329, says of the light: *percussit lumine campos*.

ft73 The correct form here is כִּי־מִמֶּנּוּ, with the *Makkeph* to כִּי.

ft74 The Arabic word *teflis*, said to be of the same signification (a balance), and which is given in the most recent editions of Gesenius' Lexicon, has been already shown under Job. 37:16 to be a word devoid of all evidence.

ft75 The LXX translate ἀπὸ σῶν ἀγγέλων, i.e., מִבְּרִיָּה (vid., Lagarde).

ft76 The latter idea (vid., under Psa. 1: 3) lies nearer, after Job. 38:25: the brook as dividing channels for itself, or as divided into such; *falj* (*Falaj*) signifies, according to the representation Isa. 58: 8, also like *fajr*, the morning-light (as breaking forth from a cleft).

ft77 Many editions have here בְּכֹל־; but this *Dagesh*, which is contrary to rule, is to be effaced.

ft78 A translation by R. Joseph Joel of Fulda, 1787, whose autograph MS Baer possesses, renders the passage not badly thus: — "My son, if thou hast become surety for thy friend, and hast given the hand to another, then thou art bound by thy word, held by thy promise. Yet do what I say to thee, my son: Be at pains as soon as thou canst to get free, otherwise thou art in the power of thy friend; shun no trouble, be urgent with thy friend."

ft79 For the right succession of the accents here (three serviles before the *Pazer*), vid., *Torath Emeth*, p. 30; *Accentuationssystem*, xii. § 4. According to Gen-Naphtali, *Mercha* is to be given to the זֹאת.

ft80 The *Zinnorith* before the *Mahpach* in these words represents at the same time the *Makkeph* and rejects the *Zinnorith*; vid., *Torath Emeth*, p. 16, and my *Psalmencomm.* Bd. ii. (1860), p. 460, note 2.

ft81 [El-Feyroozábádee's *Kâmus*, a native Arabic Lexicon; vid., Lane's *Arab. Lex.* Bk. i. pt. 1, p. xvii.

ft82 There is here no distinction between the *Kethîb* and the *Kerî*. The Masora remarks, "This is the only passage in the Book of Proverbs where the word is written with *Yod* (י);" it thus recognises only the undisputed רָעִיד.

ft83 Cod. 1294 accentuates לֶךְ אֶל־נַמְלָה; and that, according to Ben-Asher's rule, is correct.

ft84 V. 7 is commonly halved by *Rebia*; but for the correct accentuation, vid., *Torath Emeth*, p. 48, § 3.

ft85 Vid., Goldberg's *Chofes Matmonim*, Berlin 1845; and Landsberger's Berlin Graduation Thesis, *Fabulae aliquot Aramaeae*, 1846, p. 28.

ft86 The root-idea of the Arab. *mall* is unquietness of motion; the Arab. noun *mallt* signifies the glow with its flickering light and burning: glowing ashes, inner agitation, external haste; Arab. *malil* (مَلِيل) is the feverish

patient, but also one quickly hastening away, and generally an impatient or hasty person (vid., Wetstein in Baudissin in his *Job. Tischendorfianus*, vii. 6). The grinding is made by means of a quick movement hither and thither; and so also is speaking, for the instrument of speech, particularly the tongue, is set in motion. Only the meaning *praecidere, circumcidere*, does not connect itself with that root-idea: מל in this signification appears to be a nuance of מר, *stringere*.

^{ft87} The writing םך follows the Masoretic rule, vid., Kimchi, *Michlol* 205b, and Heidenheim under Deu. 19:10, where in printed editions of the text (also in Norzi's) the irregular form םךנק is found. Besides, the *Metheg* is to be given to םך, so that one may not read it *dom*, as e.g., םךמאות, Gen. 7:11, that one may not read it םךשש.

^{ft88} Isaak Albo thus distinguishes these synonyms in his dogmatic, bearing the title םךספר עקרים, Pro. 2:27.

^{ft89} The conjecture thrown out by Wetstein, that (Arab.) *shykh* is equivalent to משיח (מסיח), speaker, is untenable, since the verb *shakh*, to be old, a so-called *munsarif*, i.e., conjugated throughout, is used in all forms, and thus is certainly the root of the *shykh*.

^{ft90} [The παρατακτικὸς χρόνος denotes the imperfect tense, because it is still extended to the future.

^{ft91} Behaji ought rather to have referred to Zep. 3:19, Eze. 7:27, 22:14; but there עשה את means *agere cum aliquo*, as we say: *mit jemandem abrechnen* (to settle accounts with any one).

^{ft92} תפילין, *prayer-fillets, phylacteries*.

^{ft93} [= *the door-posts*, afterwards used by the Jews to denote the passages of Scripture written on the door-posts.

^{ft94} Regarding the Targ. of Pro. 7: 6, 7, vid., Perles, *Etymologische Studien*, 1871, p. 9.

^{ft95} Virgil's *Aenid*, iv. 1.

^{ft96} Eurip. *Herac*.

^{ft97} Vid., Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 29f., and *Psalmen-Commentar* under Psa. 52: 5.

^{ft98} [*Kirmse* = anniversary of the dedication of a church, village *fête*.

^{ft99} Hence perhaps the Greek ὀθόνη, which Fick in his *Vergl. Wörterbuch* connects with the Arab. verb-root *vadh*, to bind, wind, clothe, but not without making thereto interrogation marks.

- ft100 Myrrh has its name מֵר from the bitterness of its taste, and קָנִים appears to be a secondary formation from קָנָה, whence קָנָה, reed; cf. the names of the cinnamon, *cannella*, Fr. *cannelle*. *Cinnamum* (κίνναμον) is only a shorter form for *cinnamomum*. Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xii. 19 (42), uses both forms indiscriminately.
- ft101 Vid., the *Hebr. Zeitschrift*, החלוץ, 1856, p. 112.
- ft102 If the Masoretes had read שפטי צדק, then would they have added the remark לית (“it does not further occur”), and inserted the expression in their Register of Expressions, which occurs but once, *Masora finalis*, p. 62.
- ft103 [One of the most ancient and celebrated Codd. of the Heb. Scriptures, called Hillel from the name of the man who wrote it. Vid., Streck’s *Prolegomena*, p. 112. It was written about A.D. 600.
- ft104 Biesenthal combines the etymologically obscure הנחיל with נחל: to make to flow into, so that נחל denotes inheritance in contradistinction to acquisition; while נחלה, in contradistinction to ירשה, denotes the inheritance rather of many than of the individual.
- ft105 One might regard it as modified from בחקקו; but that שורי, Psa. 102:12, is modified from שררי, or הורי, Gen. 49:26, from הררי, is by no means certain.
- ft106 Vid., Spiegel’s *Grammatik der pärsisprache*, p. 162, cf. 182.
- ft107 The LXX has considerable additions introduced after v. 18, as also after v. 12, of which we shall elsewhere speak.
- ft108 Hitzig’s comparison of *rawââ*, *finem respicere*, as transposed from *waray* is incorrect; the former verb, which signifies to consider, thus appears to be original.
- ft109 Elias Levita, in his note to the root פה in Kimchi’s *Wörterbuch*, reads תצילם, and so also do 6 codd. in Kennicot. But פה is masculine.
- ft110 Vid., kindred proverbs by Carl Schulze, *Die bibl. Sprichwörter der deutschen Sprache* (1860), p. 50, and M. C. Wahl’s *Das Sprichwort in der heb.-aram. Literatur, u.s.w.* (1871), p. 31.
- ft111 Whether ῥάπτειν, explained neither by Curtius nor by Flick, stands in a relation to it, we leave out of view.
- ft112 Vid., Duke’s *Rabbin. Blumenlese* (1844), p. 231.
- ft113 [A fragment of an anonymous translation, so called from the place it holds in Origen’s *Hexapla*.

- ft114 That the Targum of the Proverbs is a Jewish elaboration of the Peshito text, vid., Nöldeke in Merx' *Archiv*, Bd. ii. pp. 246-49.
- ft115 [= *R. Moses b. Maimum = Rambam*, so called by the Jews from the initial letters of his name = Maimonides, d. 1204.
- ft116 [“*Er breitet es heiter und glänzend aus,
Das zusammengewickelte Leben.*”
- ft117 Vid., regarding the strong demand which the Hebr. style makes on hearer and reader, my *Gesch. der jüdischen Poesie* (1863), p. 189.
- ft118 We have said, p. 156, that a *Niph.* in which the peculiar causative meaning of the *Hiph.* would be rendered passively is without example; we must here with היה add, that the *Niph.* of intransitive verbs denotes the entrance into the condition expressed by the *Kal*, and may certainly be regarded, according to our way of thinking, as passive of the *Hiphil* (Ges. § 51, 2). But the old language shows no היה to which היה (Arab. *âinhaway*, in Mutenebbi) stood as passive; in the Arab. also the seventh form, rightly regarded, is always formed from the first, vid., Fleischer's *Beiträge*, u.s.w., in the *Sitzungs-Bericht. d. Sächs. Gesellschaft d. Wiss.* 1863, p. 172f.
- ft119 Vid., regarding these forms with *ō* instead of the simple *Sheva*, Kimchi, *Michlol 20ab*. He also remarks that these three forms with *û* are all *Milra*; this is the case also in a remarkable manner with ישפט, vid., *Michlol 21b*; *Livjath Chen* ii. 9; and particularly Heidenheim, in his edition of the Pentateuch entitled *Meôr Enajim*, under Exo. 18:26.
- ft120 “Nein, der Mensch ist zur Freude nicht gemacht,
Darum weint sein Aug' wenn er herzlich lacht.”
- ft121 Regarding the supplying (*ibdâl*) of a foregoing genitive or accus. pronoun of the third person by a definite or indefinite following, in the same case as the substantive, *Samachscharî* speaks in the *Mufassal*, p. 94ff., where, as examples, are found: *raeituhu Zeidan*, I have seen him, the Zeid; *marartu bihi Zeidin*, I have gone over with him, the Zeid; *saraftu wugûhahâ awwalihâ*, in the flight I smote the heads of the same, their front rank. Vid., regarding this anticipation of the definite idea by an indefinite, with explanations of it, Fleischer's *Maḳḳarî*, *Additions et Corrections*, p. xl. col. 2, and Dieterici's *Mutanabbi*, p. 341, l. 13.
- ft122 These examples moreover do not exceed that which is possible in the Arab., vid., regarding this omission of the *mudâf*, where this is supplied from the preceding before a genitive, *Samachscharî's Mufassal*, p. 34, l. 8-13. Perhaps לחמך, Oba. 1: 7, of thy bread = the (men) of thy bread, is an example of the same thing.

- ft123 As here an ל too few is written, so at Isa. 32: 1 (ולשרים) and Psa. 74:14 (לציים) one too many.
- ft124 According to rule the Hebr. ש becomes in Arab. *ṣ*, as in Aram. ܫ; but *kthar* might be from *ktar*, an old verb rarely found, which *derivata* with the idea of encircling (wall) and of rounding (bunch) point to.
- ft125 Vid., *Wissenschaft, Kunst, Judenthum* (1838), p. 240.
- ft126 Ovid, *Trist.* i. 8.
- ft127 Ewald's derivation of אריל from און = און, null, vain, is not much better than Heidenheim's from אולי: one who says "perhaps" = a sceptic, vid., p. 59, note.
- ft128 Vid., my *Bibl.-prophet. Theol.* (1845), p. 268, cf. *Bibl. Psychologie* (1861), p. 410, and *Psalmen* (1867), p. 52f., and elsewhere.
- ft129 Vid., Duke's *Rabbinische Blumenlese*, p. 176, where the rendering is somewhat different.
- ft130 In Rabbin. this concluding form is called קל וחמר (light and heavy over against one another), and דין (judgment, viz., from premisses, thus conclusion), κατ' ἐξ. Instead of the biblical אף כי, the latter form of the language has אל-אחת במה ובמה (all speaks for it that it is so), (so much the more), אינו דין, or also קל וחמר (*as minori ad majus = quanto magis*); vid., the Hebr. *Römerbrief*, p. 14.
- ft131 [The *fifth* commandment of the Westminster Shorter Catechism is named as the *fourth* in Luther's catechism.
- ft132 An expression of similar meaning is אחריו דרגא תביר = after *Darga* (to rise up) comes *tebîr* (breaking = destruction); cf. Zunz, in Geiger's *Zeitschrift*, vi. 315ff.
- ft133 Milton's *Paradise Regained*, ii. 466-8.
- ft134 "Zerbrich den Kopf dir nicht so sehr; Zerbreich den Willen — das ist mehr." — Matth. Claudius
- ft135 The Cod. brought by Sapiir from Jemen (vid., p. 214), of which there is an account in the preface to the edition of *Isaiah* by Baer and me.
- ft136 In the *Torath Emeth*, p. 18, the word is irregularly represented as *Milel* — a closed syllable with *Cholem* can suffer no retrogression of the tone.
- ft137 Vid., Simon Nascher's *Der Gaon Haja u. seine giest. Thätig.* p. 15.
- ft138 [Vid., p. 109, note.

ft139 If we write **וְלֹב־** with *Makkeph*, then we have to accentuate **לְקִנּוֹת חֲכָמָה** with *Tarcha Munach*, because the *Silluk* word in this writing has not two syllables before the tone. This sequence of accents is found in the Codd. Ven. 1521, 1615, Basel 1619, while most editions have **חֲכָמָה וְלֹב־אֵין לְקִנּוֹת**, which is false. But according to MSS we have **וְלֹב** without *Makkeph*, and that is right according to the *Makkeph* rules of the metrical *Accentuationssystem*; vid., *Torath Emeth*, p. 40.

ft140 The Arab. grammarians say that the article in this case stands, *l'astfrâgh khsânas âljnas*, as an exhaustive expression of all essential properties of the genus, i.e., to express the full ideal realization of the idea in that which is named.

ft141 Nöldeke's assertion (Art. *Orion* in Schenkel's *Bibel-Lexicon*) that the Arab. *kasal* corresponds to the Hebr. **בָּשַׁל** proceeds from the twofold supposition, that the meaning to be lazy underlies the meaning to totter (vid., also Dietrich in Gesenius' *Heb. Wörterbuch*), and that the Hebr. **ס** must correspond with the Arab. *š*. The former supposition is untenable, the latter is far removed (cf. e.g., **בָּסַא** and *kursî*, **סִפֵּר** and *sifr*, **מִסְכֵּן** and *miskîn*). The verb **בָּשַׁל**, Aram. **תִּקַּל**, is unknown in the Arab.

ft142 "He has made my eye glowing" (*askhn*, cf. **שָׁחִין**) is in Arab. equivalent to "he has deeply troubled me." The eye of the benevolent is *bârid*, and in the Semitic manner of expression, with deep psychological significance, it is said that the tears of sorrow are hot, but those of joy cold.

ft143 Cf. C. Schultze's *Die bibl. Sprichwörter* (1860), p. 60f.

ft144 In the Arab. language, influenced by philosophy, *rwh*, the *anima vitalis*, and *nfs*, the *anima rationalis*, are inverted; vid., Baudissin's *Translationis antiquae Arab. libri Jobi quae supersunt* (1870), p. 34.

ft145 Among the whole Heb. synonym. for sinning, there exists no reflexive *Niph.*; and also the Arab. *fšk* has no ethical signification. **נִסְכַּל** only, in the sense of fool, is found.

ft146 Cf. Gendlau's *Sprichwörter u. Redensarten deutsch-jüdischer Vorzeit* (1860), p. 235.

ft147 One sees from this interchange how softly the **ו** was uttered; cf. Wellhausen's *Text der B. Samuel* (1871) (Preface). Kimchi remarks that we say **אֶקְטַל** for **אֶקְטַל**, because we would otherwise confound it with **יֶקְטַל**.

ft148 The old interpreters and also the best Jewish interpreters mar the understanding and interpretation of the text, on the one side, by distinguishing between a nearest and a deeper meaning of Scripture (**נִגְלָה**)

דרך and דרך נסתר); on the other by this, that they suppose an inward connection of all the proverbs, and expend useless ingenuity in searching after the connection. The former is the method especially adopted by Immanuel and *Meiri*, the latter has most of all been used by Arama.

ft149 In vol. p. 193, we have acknowledged מרעהו, from מרע, friend, only for Pro. 19: 7, but at Pro. 19: 4 we have also found *amicus ejus* more probable than *ab amico suo* (= מן רעהו).

ft150 Lagarde erroneously calls Theodotion's ῥήσεις οὐκ αὐτῷ a translation of the *Kerî*; οὐκ is, however, ל, and instead of αὐτῷ the expression αὐτῶν, which is the translation of המה, is also found.

ft151 The LXX translates: παρὰ δὲ κυρίου ἁρμόζεται γυνὴ ἀνδρί. Here as often (vid., my *Jesurun*) The Arab. *usus loquendi* makes itself felt in the idiom of the LXX, for *shâkl* means ἁρμόζειν.

ft152 While צפחת, *ṣahfat*, in the sense of dish, is etymologically clear, for צלחת, neither *ṣalah* (to be good for), nor *salakh* (to be deaf, mangy), offers an appropriate verbal meaning. The Arab. *zuluh* (large dishes) stands under *zalah* (to taste, of the tasting of good), but is scarcely a derivative from it. Only צלה, which in the meaning of good for, proceeding from the idea of penetrating through, has retained the root-meaning of cleft, furnishes for צלחת and צלוחית a root-word in some measure useful.

ft153 The 915 verses of the *Mishle*, according to the Masora, fall into eight *sedarim*, beginning as follows: Pro. 1: 1; 5:18; 9:12; 14: 4; 18:10; 22:22; 25:13; 28:16.

ft154 Vid., the *Prefatio* to the Masoretico-Critical Edition of Isaiah by Baer and myself; Leipzig, 1872.

ft155 There are spaces within the lines after Pro. 1: 7, 9, 33; 2:22; 3:18, 35; 5:17, 23; 6: 4, 11, 15, 19 (here a פ), 35, Pro. 8:21, 31, 35; 9:18; 17:25; 18: 9; 22:19, 27; 23:14; 24:22, 33; 26:21; 28:10, 16; 29:17, 27; 30: 6, 9, 14, 17, 20, 24, 28, 33; Pro. 31: 9.

ft156 Vid., Gebhardt's *Prolegomena* to his new edition of the *Versio Veneta*.

ft157 Vid., Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 426.

ft158 A similar comparison from *Bereschith Rabba*, vid., Duke's *Rabbin. Blumenlese*, p. 126.

ft159 [i.e., The *fifth* according to the arrangement of the Westminster Confession.

ft160 Vid., Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 419.

ft161 Vid., Dozy's *Lettre à M. Fleischer* (1871), p. 198.

- ft162 Vid., Friedr. Philippi's *Status constructus*, p. 17, Anm. 3; and cf. therewith such constructions as (Arab.) *mân 'u faḍlah âlmanhtâjî*, i.e., a refuser of the needy, his beneficence = one who denies to the needy his beneficence.
- ft163 The *n. act* formed from *wazara* is *wazr*, *wizr*, *wizat*. These three forms would correspond to the Heb. *vězēr*, *vězēr*, and *zērēth* (*z'rah*, cf. *rēdēth*, *r'dah*, Gen. 46: 3).
- ft164 The Arab. National Grammarians, it is true, view the matter otherwise. When *ḵatlu zydn*, the putting to death of Zeid, is used in the sense of Zeid's becoming dead, according to their view the *fā' l* (the *gen. subjecti*) is omitted; the full expression would be *ḵatlu 'amrn zaydnâ*. Since now 'amrn is omitted, *zaydn* has in the *gen.* form taken the place of the *fā' l*, but this *gen.* is the representative of the *acc. objecti*. Without thus going round about, we say: it is the *gen. objecti*.
- ft165 The Arabs call this indetermination *âlnkrt lalt'zym wallthwyl*. Vid., under Psa. 2:12.
- ft165a In the old High German the word for war is *urlag* (*urlac*), fate, because the issue is the divine determination, and *nôt* (as in "*der Nibelunge Not*"), as binding, confining, restraint; this *nôt* is the correlate to תְּשׁוּעָה, victory; מִלְחָמָה corresponds most to the French *guerre*, which is not of Romanic, but of German origin: the *Werre*, i.e., the *Gewirre* [complication, confusion, for נִלְחַם signifies to press against one another, to be engaged in close conflict; cf. the Homeric κλονος of the turmoil of battle.).
- ft165b e.g. *Aboth* iv. 17: there are three crowns: the crown of the Tôra, the crown of the priesthood, and the crown of royalty; but כְּתָר שֵׁם טוֹב, the crown of a good name, excels them all.
- ft166 The text to Immanuel's *Comment.* (Naples 1487) has in both instances עֲמוּקָה.
- ft167 The Syr. *n. fem.* *awchda* (אֲוַחְדָּא, Psa. 49: 5, Targ.) is equivalent to Heb. חִידָּה, from (Syr.) *achd*, אַחַד = אַחַז, Neh. 7: 3, to shut up, properly, to lay hold on and retain; the Arab. *akhdhat* means magic, incantation; as seizing and making fast.
- ft168 Thus *Rosch ha-schana* 26b: Levi came once to N.N. There a man came to meet him, and cried out קָבַעַן פְּלִינָא . Levi knew not what he would say, and went into the Madrash-house to ask. One answered him: He is a robber (גּוֹלֵף) said that one to thee; for it is said in the Scriptures (Mal. 3: 8), "Will a man rob God?" etc. (vid., *Wissenschaft Kunst Judenthum*, p. 243). In the Midrash, שׁוֹחֵר טוֹב, to Psa. 57, R. Levi says that אַתָּה קִיבַעַ לִי is used in the sense of אַתָּה גּוֹזֵל לִי . And in the Midrash *Tanchuma*, P. תְּרוּמָה, R.

Levi answers the question, “What is the meaning of קבע, Mal. 3: 8?” — It is an Arabic expression. An Arabian, when he wishes to say to another מה אתה גוולני, says instead of it, מה אתה קובעני. Perhaps קבע is cogn. to קבץ; the R. קב coincides in several groups of languages (also the Turkish *k̄b*) with the Lat. *capere*.

^{ft169} After Ben-Asher, the pointing is אַם־אִין־לֶךְ; while, on the contrary, Ben-Naphtali prefers אַם־אִין־לֶךְ; vid., my *Genesis* (1869), pp. 74 (under 1: 3) and 81. So, without any bearing on the sense, Ben-Asher points לָמָה with *Tarcha*, Ben-Naphtali with *Mercha*.

^{ft170} As an analogical example, סְגִי נְהוֹר, seeing clearly = blind.

^{ft171} In an appendix to *Ochla We-Ochla*, in the University Library at Halle, he reads שְׁעַר, but with פְּלִיגָא [doubtful added].

^{ft172} We may write בֶּן הוּא : the *Mehuppach* (*Jethib*) sign of the *Olewejored* standing between the two words represents also the place of the *Makkeph*; vid., *Thorath Emeth*, p. 20.

^{ft173} Immanuel makes so much of having recognised the verb in this פָּתַד (and has he persuaded thee), that in the concluding part of his *Divan* (entitled *Machberoth Immanuel*), which is an imitation of Dante's *Divina Commedia*, he praises himself on this account in the paradise of King Solomon, who is enraptured by this explanation, and swears that he never meant that word otherwise.

^{ft174} The second part of the saying is, “But a fool knows not how a wise man feels, for he has never been a wise man.” I heard this many years ago, from the mouth of the American missionary Schaufler, in Constantinople.

^{ft175} The form כִּי־אִם does not contradict the connection of the two particles. This use of the *Makkeph* is general, except in these three instances: Gen. 15: 4; Num. 35:33; Neh. 2: 2.

^{ft176} Rashi reads בְּדֶרֶךְ לִבְךָ (walk), in the way of thy heart (which has become wise), and so Heidenheim found it in an old MS; but בְּדֶרֶךְ is equivalent to בְּדֶרֶךְ בִּינָה, Pro. 9: 6.

^{ft177} The right punctuation of 26a is תִּנְהַבְנִי לְבָבְךָ, as it is found in the editions: Ven. 1615; Basel 1619; and in those of Norzi and Michaelis.

^{ft178} The Targ. translates 28b (here free from the influence of the Peshito) in the Syro-Palestinian idiom by וְצָאֵד אֲבִנְיָא שְׁבָרִי, i.e., she seizes thoughtless sons.

- ft179 We punctuate | לְמִי אֹיִ, for that is Ben Asher's punctuation, while that of his opponent Ben Naphtali is | לְמִי־אֹיִ. Vid., *Thorath Emeth*, p. 33.
- ft180 The English version is, "when it moveth itself aright," which one has perceived in the phenomenon of the tears of the wine, or of the movement in the glass. Vid., *Ausland*, 1869, p. 72.
- ft181 However, we will not conceal it, that the post-bibl. Heb. does not know הַפְּרִישׁ in the sense of to prick, sting (the *Midrash* explains the passage by יַפְרִישׁ בֵּין מִיתָה לַחַיִּים, i.e., it cuts off life); and the Nestorian Knanishu of Superghan, whom I asked regarding *aphrish*, knew only of the meanings "to separate" and "to point out," but not "to sting."
- ft182 Vid., Nöldeke's *Neusyrische Gram.* p. 219, *Anm.*, and p. 416.
- ft183 This explanation is more correct than Levy's: he lifts himself up (boasts) with wisdom.
- ft184 Vid., my *hebräischen Römerbrief*, p. 14f.
- ft185 Write דִּעָה with *Illuj* after the preceding *Legarmeh*, like 12b, הוֹאֵ (Thorath *Emeth*, p. 28).
- ft186 Vid., Strack's *Prolegomena critica in V.T.* (1872), p. 19.
- ft187 This proverb, according to *Aboth* iv. 24, was the motto of that Samuel with the surname הַקָּטָן, who formulated בְּרַכַּת הַמִּינִים (the interpolation in the Schemone-Esre prayer directed against the schismatics): he thus distinguished between private enemies and the enemies of the truth.
- ft188 We use the forms *âwa*, *âthûmm*, for we suppose the interrogative to the copula; we also say *fahad*, vid., *Mufaṣṣal*, p. 941.
- ft189 This is particularly the name of what lies round about on the ground in the Bedouin tents, and which one takes up from thence (from *ḵmesh*, cogn. קִמָּץ, *ramasser*, cf. the journal הַמְגִיד, 1871, p. 287b); in modern Arab., linen and matter of all kinds; vid., *Bocthor*, under *linge* and *étouffe*.
- ft190 Perhaps ὄλυρα, vid., Lagarde's *Gesamm. Abhandl.* p. 59.
- ft191 Cf. von Lasaulx, *Philosophie der Geschichte*, p. 128f.: "God and Nature love to conceal the beginning of things."
- ft192 It is something different when the weaver's beam, *minwâl* in Arab., is metaph. for kind and manner: they are 'aly *minwâl wâhad*, is equivalent to they are of a like calibre, Arab. *kalib*, which is derived from καλόπους, καλοπόδιον), a shoemaker's last.
- ft193 On this proceeds also the beautiful interpretation by Maimuni in the preface to *More Nebuchim: Maskiyyôth sont des ciselures réticulaires*, etc., according to Munk's translation from the Arab. text, vid., Kohut's *Pers.*

Pentateuch-Uebers. (1871), p. 356. Accordingly Jewish interpreters (e.g., Elia Wilna) understand under אֲפִנְיוֹ the four kinds of writing: פֶּשֶׁט, רִמּוֹז, דְּרוֹשׁ, and סוּד, which are comprehended under the memorial word פֶּרְדָּס.

ft194 A favourite expression of Goethe's, vid., Büchmann's *Geflügelte Worte*, 1688.

ft195 Vid., Gieger's *Zeitschrift*, 1872, pp. 45-48, where it is endeavoured to be shown that נִזָּם, as an earring, is rejected from the later biblical literature, because it had become "an object used in the worship of idols," and that the word was used only of a ring for the nose as a permissible ornament, while עֲנִיל was used for the earring. But that does not apply to the Solomonic era; for that, in the passage under review, נִזָּם signifies a ring for the nose, is only a supposition of Geiger's, because it accords with his construction of history.

ft196 *Hitzig compares Arab. kumêt*; but this means bayard, as Lagarde remarks, the Greek κόμμαθος; and if by כֶּתֶם gold foxes (gold money) are to be thought of, yet they have nothing whatever to do with bayards (red-brown horses); cf. Beohmer, *de colorum nominibus equinorum*, in his *Roman. Stud.* Heft 2, 1872, p. 285.

ft197 Another Greek translates πύλωσις χροσση. This πύλωσις is a philological mystery, the solution of which has been attempted by Bochart, Letronne, and Field.

ft198 The writing wavers between אֵל לְבָרֶע (cf. אֵל אֲסֻדָּל and אֵל־לֵב רֶע .

ft199 The Hebrew meaning *investigare*, and the equivalent Arabic *ḥkr*, *contemnere* (*contemptui esse*), are derivations from the primary meaning (R. חָק): to go down from above firmly on anything, and thus to press in (to cut in), or also to press downward.

ft200 Cf. Sir. 3:20f. with Ben-Sira's Heb. text in my *Gesch. der jüd. Poesie*, p. 204 (vv. 30-32); nowhere does this adj. כִּבְד appears here in this warning against meditating over the transcendental.

ft201 Vid., Drbal's *Empirische Psychologie*, § 137.

ft202 It is true that the Gemara to *Negaim*, Pro. 14: 1, explains the Mishnic דְּרוֹר צִפְרִים, "house-birds," for it derives דְּרוֹר from דוּר, to dwell.

ft203 Thus after Ben Asher; while, on the contrary, Ben Naphtali writes כִּסִּיל עֵינָה with *Munach*, vid., *Thorath Emeth*, p. 41.

- ft204 Vid., my dissertation on three little-observed passages in the Gospel of John, and their practical lessons, in the *Evang. luth. Kirchenzeitung*, 1869, Nos. 37, 38.
- ft205 The *Venet.* translates שְׁתֵּה by ἄνους, so שְׁמֵה (the post-bibl. designation of a fool) — one of the many indications that this translator is a Jew, and as such is not confined in his knowledge of language only to the bibl. Hebrew.
- ft206 The plur. חֲוֹהִים, 1Sa. 13: 6, signifies not thorn bushes, but rock-splitting; in Damascus, *chôcha* means a little gate in the wing of a large door; vid., Wetstein's *Nordarabien*, p. 23.
- ft207 Vid., Schulze's *Die bibl. Sprichwörter der deutschen Sprache*, p. 71f.
- ft208 Vid., Wahl's *Das Sprichwort der heb.-aram. Literatur*, p. 147; Duke's *Rabbin. Blumenlese*, p. 9.
- ft209 The Targum has 12*b* after Codd. פִּקַּח סִכְלָא טַב מִנְיָה (= Syr. *pekach, expedit, convenit, melius est*), it is far better circumstanced regarding the fool than regarding him. Vid., Geiger's *Zeitschr.* vi. (1868), p. 154.
- ft210 The Arab. verb signifies radically: to turn, like the Persian verbs *kashatn* and *kardydan*, and like our "werden" [to grow, turn, accords with *vertere* (Fleischer)].
- ft211 The Aram. עַטַּל is the Hebr. עֲצַל, as עֲטַא = עֲצָה; but in Arab. corresponds not to 'atal, but to 'azal.
- ft212 Vid., regarding *gleisen* (to give a deceitful appearance) and *gleissen* (to throw a dazzling appearance), Schmitthenner-Weigand's *Deutsches Wörterbuch*.
- ft213 Schultens explains the *labia flagrantia* by *volubiliter prompta et diserta*. But one sees from the Arab. *dhaluḡa*, to be loose, lightly and easily moved (vid., in Fleischer's *Beiträgen zur arab. Sprachkunde* the explanation of the designation of the liquid expressed with the point of the tongue by *dhalkiytt*, at Pro. 1:26, 27; cf. de Sacy's *Grammar*), and *dalk*, to draw out (of the sword from its scabbard), to rinse (of water), that the meaning of the Heb. דָּלַק, to burn, from R. דָּל, refers to the idea of the flickering, tongue-like movement of the flame.
- ft214 Vid., de Goeje's *Fragmenta Hist. Arab.* ii. (1871), p. 94. The verb נָכַר, primarily to fix one's attention, sharply to contemplate anything, whence is derived the meanings of knowing and of not knowing, disowning. The account of the origin of these contrasted meanings, in Gesenius-Dietrich's *Lexicon*, is essentially correct; but the Arab. *nakar* there referred to means, not sharpness of mind, from *nakar* = הִכִּיר, but from the negative

signification prevailing in the Arab. alone, a property by which one makes himself worthy of being disowned: craftiness, cunning, and then also *in bonam partem*: sagacity.

ft215 The fundamental idea of firmness in **האמין** is always in the subject, not the object. The Arabic interpreters remark that *âman* with *b* expresses recognition, and with *l* submission (vid., Lane's *Lexicon* under *âman*); but in Hebr. **האמין** with **ב** *fiducia fidei*, with **ל** *assensus fidei*; the relation is thus not altogether the same.

ft216 Sand is called by the name **חול** (**חיל**), to change, whirl, particularly to form sand-wreaths, whence (Arab.) *al-Habil*, the region of moving sand; vid., Wetzstein's *Nord-arabien*, p. 56.

ft217 Thus also Schultens in the *Animadversiones*, which later he fancied was derived from **עתר**, *nidor*, from the meaning *nidorosa*, and thence *virulenta*.

ft218 Vid., regarding this word, Schlottmann in *Deutsch.-Morgenl. Zeitschrift*, xxiv. 665, 668.

ft219 Gustave Baur's article "Vaterlandsliebe," in Schmid's *Pädagogischer Encyklopädie*.

ft220 The translators transfer to this place a note from vol. ii. p. 191f. of the author's larger *Comm. ü. den Psalter*, to which Delitzsch refers the reader: — "The modern High German adj. *elend*, middle High German *ellende*, old High German *alilandi*, *elilendi*, or *elilenti*, is composed of *ali* and *land*. The adj. *ali* occurs only in old High German in composition. In the Gothic it is found as an independent adj., in the sense of *alius* and **ἄλλος** (vid., Ulfilas, Gal. 5:10). The primary meaning of *elilenti* is consequently: of another country, foreign. In glosses and translations it is rendered by the Lat. words *peregrinus*, *exul*, *advena*, also *captivus*. In these meanings it occurs very frequently. In the old High German translation of Ammonius, *Diatessaron*, *sive Harmoniae in quatuor Evangelica*, the word proselytism, occurring in Mat. 23:15, is rendered by *elilantan*. To the adj. the old High German subst. corresponds. This has the meaning *exilium*, *transmigratio*, *captivitas*. The connection in *elilenti* or *elilentes*, used adverbially, is rendered by the Lat. *peregre*. In the middle High German, however, the proper signification of both words greatly predominates. But as, in the old High German, the idea of *miser* is often at the same time comprehended in the proper signification: he who is miserable through banishment, imprisonment, or through sojourning in a strange land; thus, in several places of the middle High German, this derived idea begins to separate itself from the fundamental conception, so that *ellende* comes in general to be called *miser*. In the new High German this derived conception is almost

alone maintained. Yet here also, in certain connections, there are found traces of the original idea, e.g., *in's Elend schicken*, for to banish. Very early also the word came to be used, in a spiritual sense, to denote our present abode, in contrast to paradise or the heavenly kingdom.... Thus, e.g., in one of Luther's hymns, when we pray to the Holy Ghost:

*“Das er vns behüte, an vnserm ende,
Wenn wir heim farn aus diesem elende.”*

That He guard us to our end When we go home from this world. — Rud. von Raumer

^{ft221} The second *Munach* is at Pro. 22: 3, as well as here, according to the rule 18: 4 of the *Accentuationssystem*, the transformation of the *Dechi*, and preserves its value of interpunction; the *Legarmeh* of | ערום is, however, a disjunctive of less force than *Dechi*, so that thus the sequence of the accents denotes that רעה ראה ערום is a clause related to ונסתר as a hypothetical antecedent: if the prudent sees the calamity, then he hides himself from it. This syntactic relation is tenable at Pro. 22: 3, but not here at Pro. 27:12. Here, at least, ערום would be better with *Rebia*, to which the following *Dechi* would subordinate itself. The prudent seeth the evil, concealeth himself; or also, prudent is he who sees the evil, hides himself. For of two disjunctives before *Athnach*, the first, according as it is greater or less than the second, retains either *Legarmeh* (e.g., Psa. 1: 5; 86:12; 88:14; 109:14) or *Rebia* (Pro. 12: 2, Psa. 25: 2; 69: 9; 146: 5).

^{ft222} In Gesen. *Lex.* this אבדה stands to the present day under אבדה.

^{ft223} Vid., Frankel, *Zu dem Targum der Propheten* (1872), p. 25.

^{ft224} The LXX translates ἐν μέσῳ συνηδρῶν, and has thereby misled the Syr., and mediately the Targum.

^{ft225} *The Targum of 28: 1a* is, in *Bereschith rabba*, c. 84, וְלֹא יְדִיפִין לָהּ, עַרְק רְשִׁינָא; that lying before us is formed after the Peshito.

^{ft226} Thus to be written with *Gaja* here and at Pro. 29: 6, after the rule of *Metheg-Setzung*, § 42.

^{ft227} The three connected words וּבֹאֲדָם מִבֵּין יָדַע have, in Löwenstein, the accents *Mercha, Mercha, Mugrash*; but the Venetian, 1515, 20, Athias, v. d. Hooght, and Hahn, have rightly *Tarcha, Mercha, Mugrash*, — to place two *Merchas* in Ben-Naphtali's manner.

^{ft228} The Phoen. writes רש (i.e., רש, rus); vid., Schröder's *Phönizische Gram.* p. 133; cf. Gesen. *Thes.* under ראש.

- ft229 If, as Hitzig, after J. H. Michaelis, remarks, the word were Ben-Asher's **יִקְבְּצֵנוּ**, then it would be thus rightly punctuated by Clodius and the moderns. Kimchi, in the *Wörterbuch* under **קָבַץ**, adduces this word as Ben-Asher's. But the Masora knows nothing of it. It marks **יִקְבְּצֵנוּ**, Jer. 31:10, with **לִית** as *unicum*, and thus supposes for the passages before us **יִקְבְּצֵנוּ**, which certainly is found in MSS, and is also marked on the margin with **לִית** as *unicum*.
- ft230 Böttcher supposes much rather **עָשַׂק = מַעֲשָׂק**; also, Pro. 25:11, **רָדַר = מַדְרָר**; but that does not follow from the *defectiva scriptio*, nor from anything else.
- ft231 *Aeneid*, xi. 418.
- ft232 *Abulwalid (Rikma)*, p. 69) also rightly explains **אֶחְרִי**, as a characterizing epithet, by **אֶחְרִי** (turned backwards).
- ft233 Löwenstein writes **מוֹכִיחַ**, after *Metheg-Setzung*, § 43, not incorrectly; for the following word, although toned on the first syllable, begins with guttural having the same sound.
- ft234 Accentuate **וְאָמַר אֵין פִּשְׁעֵי** without *Makkeph*, as in Codd. 1294 and old editions.
- ft235 We take the opportunity of remarking that the tendency to form together certain proverbs after one catchword is found also in German books of proverbs; vid., Paul, *Ueber die urspr. Anord. von Friedanks Bescheidenheit* (1870), p. 12.
- ft236 Vid., Zunz, "Regarding the Idea and the Use of *Tokhecha*," in Steinschneider's *Heb. Bibliographia*, entitled **הַמְזֻכָּר**, 1871, p. 70f.
- ft236a According to this the Targum **וְלֹא מִתְתַבֵּר** (he remains obstinate), according to which the **וְלֹא מִתְתַפִּיר** (he does not lose his wits) of the Peshito is perhaps to be corrected. The distribution of the subjects is obscure.
- ft237 The Targum translates **תָּם**, guiltlessness, and the *Venet.* (**μῖσσοῦς**) **γνώσῃν**, turning to Pro. 1:22.
- ft238 For **ἐπιθῆξαι δὲ συνάξουσιν** (will bring away?) **תְּהַיָּשִׁיב אֶת־אֲדָמָתְךָ**, understood after Jer. 45: 5, lies linguistically yet further off.
- ft239 **מֵאִיר** has, by Löwenstein, *Mehuppach Legarmeh*, but incorrectly, since after *Legarmeh* two conjunctives cannot occur. Also Norzi with *Mehuppach Mercha* is irregular, since Ben-Asher recognises only two examples of this double accentuation to which this **מֵאִיר** does not belong;

vid., *Thorath Emeth*, p. 12. That the *penultima* toning מַאִיר in several editions is false scarcely needs to be remarked. Jablonski rightly points with *Mehuppach* on the *ult.*, and *Zinnorith* on the preceding open syllable.

ft240 Their translation of vv. 17 and 18 here is found, in a marred and mutilated form, after Pro. 28:17. At that place the words are *καὶ ἀγαπήσει σε*.

ft241 The Syr. and Targ. also think on עֵנָה, for they translate: “for he knows that he receives no strokes.”

ft242 In *Jahrb.* xi. p. 10f. Ewald compares, in an expressive way, the Ethiopic *mannána* (*Piel*) to scorn; *menûn*, a reprobate; and *mannânî*, one who is despised; according to which מִנּוֹן could certainly designate “a man despising scornfully his own benefactors, or an unthankful man.” But this verbal stem is peculiarly Ethiop., and is certainly not once found in Arab. For *minnat* (which Ewald compares) denotes benefaction, and the duty laid on one thereby, the dependence thereby produced. The verb (Arab.) *minn* (= مَنَّ) signifies to divide; and particularly, partly to confer benefaction, partly to attribute benefaction, reckon to, enumerate, and thereby to bring out the sense of obligation. Thus nothing is to be derived from this verbal stem for מִנּוֹן.

ft243 For אִישׁ-אֶרֶץ (Löwenstein after Norzi) is to be written, with Baer (*Thorath Emeth*, p. 19), אֶרֶץ אִישׁ. Thus also in *Cod. jaman*.

ft244 According to the *Lex. Gezerî* (from the Mesopotamian town of ‘Geziret *ibn ‘Amr*), the word *wakihon* is, in the Mesopotamian language, “the overseer of the house in which is the cross of the Christians;” and accordingly, in Muhammed’s letter to the Christians of Negran, after they became subject to him, “a monk shall not be removed from his monastery, nor a presbyter from his presbyterate, (*wakâhtah*) *wala watah wakahyttah*” (this will be the correct phrase), “nor an overseer from his office.” The verbal stem *wak-ah* (וָקַח) is, as it appears, Northern Semitic; the South Arabian lexicographer Neshwan ignores it (Wetzstein in Mühlau).

ft245 Cf. Blau’s *Arab. im sechsten Jahrh.* in the *Deutsch. Morgl. Zeits.* xxxiii. 590, and also p. 573 of the same, regarding a family of proselytes among the Jews in Taima.

ft246 Mühlau combines *Nodab* with *Nudêbe* to the south-east of Bosra; Blau (*Deu. Morg. Zeit.* xxv. 566), with the *Ναβδαῖοι* of Eupolemos named along with the *Ναβαταῖοι*. The *Kamûs* has Nadab as the name of a tribe.

ft247 Dozy (*Israeliten in Mecca*, p. 89f.) connects *Massa* with *Mansâh*, a pretended old name of Mecca.

- ft248 These German quotations with the name of Mühlau are taken from the additions to his book, which he placed at my disposal.
- ft249 Vid., Neubauer's *Le Géographie du Talmud*, pp. 325, 329, 382.
- ft250 Derenbourg's *Essai sur l'Hist. et la Géog. de la Palestine*, i. p. 224.
- ft251 In **הָעַם וְגוֹי יְרוּשָׁה**, Jer. 8: 5, **יְרוּשָׁה** is though of as genit., although it may be also nom., after the scheme of apposition instead of annexion. That it is genit., cf. Philippi's *St. Const.* pp. 192-195.
- ft252 We say, in Arab., without any anomaly, e.g., *Aljū-bnu-Muḥammadin Tajjī'n*, i.e., the Ali son of Muhammed, of the tribe (from the tribe) of Tay; cf. Jos. 3:11; Isa. 28: 1; 63:11; and Deu. 3:13.
- ft253 Vid., Wetzstein's *Inschriften aus den Trachonen und dem Haurangebirge* (1864), p. 336f.
- ft254 Thus, viz., that **הַגִּבּוֹר** denotes, not the man as he ought to be, but the man as he usually is (the article, as the Arabic grammarians say, "not for the exhaustion of the characteristic marks of the genus," but for the expression of "the quality *mâhîje* of the genus").
- ft255 The *Munach* is the transformation of *Mugrash*, and this sequence of accents — *Tarcha, Munach, Silluk*, — remains the same, whether we regard **אֵל** as the accusative or as the vocative.
- ft256 According to the Arab. **בַּעִיר** is not a beast as grazing, but as dropping *stercus* (*ba'r*, camel's or sheep's droppings); to the R. **בָּר**, Mühlau rightly gives the meanings of separating, whence are derived the meanings of grazing as well as of removing (cleansing) (cf. Pers. *thak karadn*, to make clean = to make clean house, *tabula rasa*).
- ft257 Vid., *Apologetik* (1869), p. 432ff.
- ft258 Cited by Lyra in *Beweis des Glaubens Jahrg.* 1869, p. 230. The second of these passages is thus translated by Wilson (*Rig-Veda-Sanhitá*, London, 1854, vol. ii. p. 127): "Who has seen the primeval (being) at the time of his being born? What is that endowed with substance which the unsubstantial sustains? From earth are the breath and blood, but where is the soul? Who may repair to the sage to ask this?"
- ft259 The *Comm.* there remarks: It is the heavenly whole name of the highly exalted One, the **שֵׁם הַמְּפֹרֶשֶׁת**, *nomen explicitum*, which here on this side has entered into no human heart, and can be uttered by no human tongue, the **ὄνομα ὃ οὐδείς οἶδεν εἶ μὴ ὁ αὐτός**, Rev. 19:12.
- ft260 Vid., Luthardt's *Kimpendium der Dogmatik*, § 27.

- ft261 That both *Shevas* in *tôsp* are quiesc., vid., Kimchi, *Michlol* 155 *a b*, who is finally decided as to this. That the word should be read *tôsp^eal* is the opinion of *Chagûg* in ס' הנוח (regarding the quiesc. letters), p. 6 of the Ed. by Dukes-Ewald.
- ft262 The *Venet.* translates, according to Villoison, *θήρψον με*; but the MS has, according to Gebhardt, *θρέψον*.
- ft263 [Cf. p. 11. The name (from *praeambulum*) given to a peculiar form of popular gnostic poetry which prevailed in Germany from the 12th (e.g., the Meistersinger or Minstrel Sparvogel) to the 16th century, but was especially cultivated during the 14th and 15th centuries. Its peculiarity consisted in this, that after a series of antecedents or subjects, a briefly-expressed consequent or predicate was introduced as the epigrammatic point applicable to all these antecedents together. Vid., Erschenburg's *Denkmälern altdeutscher Dichtkunst*, Bremen 1799.
- ft264 The Syr. begins 11a as if *הרי* were to be supplied.
- ft265 Cf. also Ali b. Abi *Tâleb*'s dark description, beginning with *hadha alzman* (this age), *Zur allg. Char. der arab. Poesie* (1870), p. 54f.
- ft266 Nöldeke has remarked, with reference to Mühlau's *Monographie*, that *aluḡa*, in the sense of tenacious (*tenax*), is also found in Syr. (*Geopon.* xiii. 9, xli. 26), and that generally the stem *עלק*, to cleave, to adhere, is more common in Aram. than one would suppose. But this, however common in Arab., is by no means so in Syr.; and one may affirm that, among other Arabisms found in the Proverbs of Agur, the word *Alûka* has decidedly an Arab. sound.
- ft267 In Sanscrit the leech is called *galaukas* (masc.) or *galaukâ* (fem.), i.e., the inhabitant of the water (from *gala*, water, and *ôkas*, dwelling). Ewald regards this as a transformation of the Semitic name.
- ft268 So says e.g., Salomo ha-Babli, in a *Zulath* of the first *Chanukka-Sabbats* (beginning *אין צור חלק*): *יִקְדוּ כְּהַבְהִיבֵי עֵלֶק*, they burn like the flames of hell.
- ft269 That not only natural productions, but also ideas and literary productions (words, proverbs, knowledge), were conveyed from the Indians to the Semites, and from the Semites to the Indians, on the great highways by sea and land, is a fact abundantly verified. There is not in this, however, any means of determining the situation of Massa.
- ft270 The parallelizing of *רחם* and *שאול*, *Berachoth* 15b, is not directly aimed at by the poet.

- ft271 The *Gaja* has its reason in the *Zinnor* that follows, and the *Munach* in the syllable beginning with a moveable *Sheva*; תִּלְאֵג with *Scheva quiesc.* must, according to rule, receive *Mercha*, vid., *Thorath Emeth*, p. 26.
- ft272 Kimchi is here no authority, for he contradicts himself regarding such word-forms. Thus, regarding וַיִּלְלֵת, Jer. 25:36, in *Michlol* 87b, and under יִלֵּל. The form also wavers between בִּיתְרוֹן and בִּיתְרוֹן, Ecc. 2:13. The Cod. *Jaman.* has here the *Jod* always *quiesc.*
- ft273 Jerome translates, *et qui despicit partum matris suae*. To *partus* there separates itself to him here the signification *expectatio*, Gen. 49:10, resting on a false combination with קוּדָה. To think of *pareo*, *parui*, *paritum* (Mühlau), was not yet granted to him.
- ft274 Vid., *Walter von der Vogelweide*, edited by Lachmann, p. 8f.
- ft275 The *kaninchen* as well as the *klippdachs* [cliff-badgers may be meant, Lev. 11: 5 (Deu. 14: 7); neither of these belong to the *bisulca*, nor yet, it is true, to the ruminants, though to the ancients (as was the case also with hares) they seemed to do. The *klippdach* is still, in Egypt and Syria, regarded as unclean.
- ft276 Vid., A Weber's *Indische Studien*, i. pp. 217, 343.
- ft277 The Samaritan has, Lev. 11:30, שִׁמְמִית for אֲנָקָה, and the Syr. translates the latter word by אֲמַקְתָּא, which is used in the passage before us (cf. Geiger's *Urschrift*, p. 68f.) for שִׁמְמִית; *omaḳto* (Targ. *aḳmetha*) appears there to mean, not a spider, but a lizard.
- ft278 Perhaps also the modern Greek, σαμιάμινθος, σαμιάμιδος, σαμιαμίδιον), which Grotius compares.
- ft279 In 29a, after Norzi, מִיִּטְבִּי, and in 29b, מִיִּטְבִּי, is to be written, and this is required by the little Masora to 1Sa. 25:31, the great, to Eze. 33:33, and also the Erfurt little Masora to the passage before us.
- ft280 This "like draws to like" in the form: "not in vain goes the raven to the *zarzir*, it belongs just to its own tribe," came to be often employed, *Chullin* 65a, *Baba Kamma* 92b. Plantavitius has it, Tendlau more at large, *Sprichwörter*, u.s.w., Nr. 577.
- ft281 Regarding the Targum Text, vid., Levy under אֲבָכָא and זִרְבֵּל. The expression דְּמִזְדִּירָו (who is girded, and shows himself as such) is not unsuitable.
- ft282 Ludolf, gave, in his *Hist. Aethiop.* i. 10, and *Commentarius*, p. 150, only a description of the *Zecora*, without combining therewith זִרְזִיר; but vid., Joh. Dietr. Winckler's *Theol. u. Philol. Abhand.* i. (1755) p. 33ff.: "A

nearer explanation of what is to be understood by זרזיר מתנים, Pro. 30:31, along with a statement from a hitherto unpublished correspondence between the learned philologists Hiob Ludolf and Matthai Leydecker, a Reformed preacher in Batavia.” With Ludolf, Joh. Simonis also, in the *Arcanum Formarum* (1735), p. 687f., decides in favour of the zebra.

ft283 Vid., Ahlwardt, *Chalef elahmar's Qasside* (1859), and the interpretation of the description of the horse contained therein, p. 210ff.

ft284 Thus reads Schleusner, *Opusc. Crit.* p. 318, and refers it to the horse: *nam solebant equos figuris quibusdam notare et quasi sigillare.*

ft285 The Aram. זרז is shortened from זרזר, as פרה from פרהר; the particip. adj. זרז signifies nimble, swift, eager, e.g., *Pesachim 4a*: “the zealous obey the commandment — as soon as possible hasten to fulfil it.”

ft286 Vid., Ahlwardt, *Chalef elahmar's Qasside*, p. 205f.

ft287 Wetzstein's *Ausgewählte Inschriften*, p. 355: “The word *ḵawm* signifies people, not in the sense of *populus*, but in the sense of the Heb. קים (Job. 24: 7) = *muḵawim abraju*, he who breaks with or against any one.” Incorrect in Gesenius-Dietrich's *Heb. Wörterbuch*.

ft288 In the “*Alt-arab. Sprachstudien*,” *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitschr.* xxv. 539f.

ft289 Yet the Talmud, *Nidda 27a*, derives another moral rule from this proverb, for it interprets זמם in the sense of זמם = זמם, to tie up, to bridle, to shut up, but אם נבלת in the sense of “if thou hast made thyself despicable,” as Löwenstein has done.

ft290 The Arab. signification, to become proud, is a *nüance* of the primary signification, to hold erect — viz. the head, — as when the rider draws up the head of a camel by means of the halter (Arab. *zamam*).

ft291 Thus it is also with the examples of indeterminate *gentilicia*, which Riehm makes valid for למואל מלך (for he translates למואל symbolically, which, however, syntactically makes no difference): “As analogous to ‘Lemuel, a king,’ one may adduce ‘Jeroboam, son of Nebat, an Ephrathite,’ 1Ki. 11:26, instead of the usual form ‘the Ephrathite;’ “ and בן-ימיני, Psa. 7: 1, for בן הימיני; on the contrary, כהן, 1Ki. 4: 5, does not belong to the subject, but is the pred.

ft292 In the *Midrash Koheleth* to Pro. 1: 1, the name Lemuel (as a name of Solomon) is explained: he who has spoken to God in his heart.

ft293 *Simonis has also compared Aethiopic proper names, such as Zakrestos, Zaiasus. Zamikaël, Zamariam.*

- ft294 Also Hitzig's *Blinzlerinnen* [women who ogle or leer = seductive courtesans and Böttcher's *Streichlerinnen* [caressers, viz., of kings are there rejected, as they deserve to be.
- ft295 Vid., *Luth. Zeitschrift*, 1863, p. 413. It is the rule, according to which, with Ben-Asher, it is to be written **בְּרִנּוֹן**.
- ft296 The author of the Comm. **עַמְרַת זְקֵנִים** to the **אַרְחַ חַיִּים**, c. 6, Geiger and others would read **אַ**, because **אַ** is abbreviated from **אַיִן**. But why not from **אֵי**, 1Sa. 21: 9? The traditional expression is **אַ**; and Elias Levita in the *Tishbi*, as also Baer in the *Siddur Abodath Jisrael*, are right in defending it against that innovation.
- ft297 The translation of Jerome, *quia nullum secretum est ubi regnat ebrietas* (as if the words were **לִית רְזָא אֵי שְׁכָר**), corresponds to the proverb: **סוּד נִכְסֵי יַיִן יֵצֵא**, when the wine goes in the secret comes out; or, which is the same thing: if one adds **יַיִן** (= 70), **סוּד** (= 70) comes out.
- ft298 C. A. Wilkens' *Fray Luis de Leon*. A biography from the History of the Spanish Inquisition and Church of the 16th cent. (1866), pp. 322-327.
- ft299 The inquirer is there called (Arab.) *daras*, as *libros terens*.
- ft300 Otherwise, but improbably, Schultens: *colus a כֶּשֶׁר = katr kathr, necti in orbem, circumnecti in globum*. In **פִּלְדָּה**, whence **פִּלְדָּה**, he rightly finds the primary meaning of *circumvolutio sive gyratio*.
- ft301 A view of the ancient art of spinning is afforded by the figures of the 12th Dynasty (according to Lepsius, 2380-2167 B.C.) in the burial chamber of *Beni Hassan* (270 kilometres above Bulak, on the right bank of the Nile). M. J. Henry, in his work *L'Egypte Pharaonique* (Paris 1846), Bd. 2, p. 431, mentions that there are figures there which represent "*toutes les opérations de la fabrication des tissus depuis le filage jusqu'au tissage.*" Then he continues: *Lex fuseaux dont se servent les fileuses sont exactement semblables aux nôtres, et on voit même ces fileuses imprimer le mouvement de rotation à ces fuseaux, en en froissant le bout inférieur entre leur main et leur cuisse.*
- ft302 In the "marriage of Peleus and Thetis," Catullus describes the work of the Fates: "Their hands are ceaselessly active at their never-ending work; while the left holds the rock, surrounded with a soft fleece, the right assiduously draws the thread and forms it with raised fingers; then it swiftly turns the spindle, with the thumb stretched down, and swings it away in whirling circles." Then follows the refrain of the song of the Fates:

Currite ducentes subtegmina, currite, fusi.
(After Hertzberg's Translation.)

- ft303 Vid., regarding a fall of snow in Jerusalem, the journal *Saat auf Hoffnung Jahrg.* 3, Heft 3; and in the Hauran Comm. to Job. 38:22.
- ft304 Vid., Blümner's *Die gewerbliche Thätigkeit der Vlder des klassischen Alterthums* (1869), p. 21f.
- ft305 The LXX reads together שנים מרבדים, δισσας γλαίνας, and brings into vv. 21 (her husband remains without care for the members of the family if it does not snow χιονίζη, as it is to be read for χρονίζη) and 22 the husband, who appears to the translator too much kept in the background.
- ft306 Vid., Lumbroso, *Recherches sur l'Economie politique de l'Egypte sous les Lagides* (Turin, 1870), p. 111; *des tapis de laine de premeère qualité, pourpres, laineux des deux côtés* (ἀμφίταπιο).
- ft307 Immanuel remarks that *Tôrath* חסד probably refers to the *Tôra*, and חסד שכולה, i.e., which is wholly love, which goes forth in love, to the *Gesetz* = statute.
- ft308 Vid., the application of v. 30 in *Taanith* 26b: “Young man,” say the maidens, “lift up thine eyes and behold that which thou choosest for thyself! Direct thine eyes not to beauty (נו), direct thine eyes to the family (משפחה); pleasantness is a deception, etc.”
- ft309 The writing יראת is that of Ben Asher, יראת that of Ben Naphtali; Norzi, from a misunderstanding, claims יראת (with *Gaja*) as Ben Asher's manner of writing.
- ft310 One must suppose that here translations of other Greeks, which were placed alongside of the LXX in Origen's *Hexapla*, were taken up into the LXX. But this is not confirmed: these duplicates were component parts of the LXX, which Origen and the Syriac translators found already existing.
- ft311 These the translator has not printed, because, however interesting it may be to the student of the Hebrew language as such, to compare Delitzsch's renderings into Hebrew with the Greek original, as placed before him, they may be here omitted, inasmuch as all that is of importance on the subject, in an exegetical point of view, has been already embodied in the Commentary.